HISTORY OF THE OFFICE
OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE
BUDGET
OF THE
UNITED STATES
1955

OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

STRATEGY, MONEY, AND THE NEW LOOK
1953-1956
History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Foreword

This publication, Volume III of the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is concerned with the first three and a half years of the Eisenhower administration—1953-1956. The hallmark of these years was the constant struggle of the administration to hold down the cost of national defense and balance that cost against an array of post-Korea cold war challenges. For President Eisenhower the budget balancing priority was almost an obsession. His firm belief that a sound and fundamental economy was the bedrock on which all national policy had to be based manifested itself powerfully in all considerations of the national budget, and especially in the national defense budget, the dominant element. This volume, therefore, seeks to demonstrate and develop the interlocking relationship between the economy, strategy, and money in the making of a national security policy that came to be known as the New Look.

The New Look had its antecedent in the immediate pre-Korean War policies of the Truman administration, which had begun to emphasize the role of airpower and nuclear weapons in an effort to diminish reliance on the manpower-intensive ground forces and hold down the cost of national defense. The Korean War frustrated the overt implementation of this policy because of its demands for large ground forces, but important advances occurred in the buildup of strategic nuclear airpower during the war that would facilitate that transformation. Thus, for its New Look strategic air component, the Eisenhower administration inherited and embraced, within the constraints of the budget, needed essential elements—a fast-growing Strategic Air Command being equipped with jet bombers, rapidly expanding stockpiles of nuclear weapons, beginnings of ballistic missile development, and revolutionary advances in electronics. All of these could make it possible for the New Look to fulfill its widely perceived promise of a "bigger bang for a buck."
The author has organized and shaped his account of these years with the budget at the center, around which revolved issues of strategy, technology, interservice competition, and the state of the national economy. This approach affords an illuminating and near-exhaustive examination of the total budget process—from the earliest planning and consideration to the final executive branch determination and through the sometimes comprehensive congressional reviews before becoming law. *Strategy, Money, and the New Look* offers a revealing picture not only of the key dynamic in national security decisionmaking during the Eisenhower era, but of the central and dominant role that is generally played by the budget in forming government policies.

The period saw a transition then in the shaping of the U.S. military establishment. The Eisenhower administration succeeded in gradually reducing the size and cost of the armed forces, but not as much as it had hoped to. The technological revolution in weaponry on which the New Look intended to rely in place of the large manpower requirements for ground forces, greatly increased the costs of military materiel, further frustrating efforts by Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson to hold down the defense budget. The many uncertainties, contingencies, domestic pressures, and international instability and threats that always had to be taken into account prevented the administration from pursuing a steady course of action toward its goal. Nevertheless, on balance it is fair to conclude that Eisenhower and Wilson did their best to adhere to their basic policies and made clear and measurable progress in the desired direction.

The book's intensive focus on strategy and the budget meant that other topics, relating chiefly to intelligence and logistics, received only brief mention or were omitted. The huge scale and diversity of potential source materials required a high level of selection and discrimination by the author. From this effort has come a scholarly, highly readable, and insightful account of an important period in American military and national security history.

Richard M. Leighton held the Ph.D. degree from Cornell University and served as a historian with the Army Service Forces during World War II. With the U.S. Army Historical Division after the war he was co-author of *Global Logistics and Strategy*, a two-volume history that is the definitive work on the subject for World War II. Subsequently, as a historian and professor at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces for a number of years he also edited the quarterly journal *Perspectives in Defense Management*. In the years he spent in the OSD Historical Office creating this authoritative work, Dick Leighton was a much loved and greatly
esteemed colleague. Tragically, Dr. Leighton died as the volume went to press.

Interested government agencies reviewed Volume III and declassified and cleared its contents for public release. Although the text has been declassified, some of the official sources cited in the volume may remain classified. This volume was prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

ALFRED GOLDBERG
Historian, OSD
Preface

In January 1953 the Republicans, after 20 years in the wilderness, were jubilant over their takeover of the White House. They were confident that Dwight D. Eisenhower, their war-hero president, would wrap up the war in Korea, bring the troops home, reduce military spending, cut taxes, stabilize the economy, and get on with other peacetime business. A symbol of this vision of peacetime prosperity was one of the president’s first appointees, the new secretary of defense, Charles Erwin Wilson, president of America’s largest corporation, General Motors, which had borne a large share of munitions production during World War II and the Korean War. Eisenhower considered him the logical choice to run the huge Department of Defense, the acid test of “manager of bigness.” Wilson was a deep admirer and loyal supporter of the president, but no belittler of his own worth, nor backward in stating his own views, even when they ran counter to the president’s.

The distinctive defense policy of the first Eisenhower administration following the Korean War came to be called the “New Look.” The term described the reduction and realignment of the military services to peacetime proportions and airpower-oriented forces, with a radical shift of emphasis from ground forces and tactical airpower to strategic airpower. The shift was the more striking by contrast with the Korean conflict’s large land armies and close-support tactical air forces. The “New Look” also continued the previous administration’s response to the challenge of the dawning age of nuclear weapons. By the end of Eisenhower’s first administration, the nation’s nuclear arsenal included a wide range of atomic and thermonuclear bombs and the first generation of intercontinental (ICBM) and intermediate-range (IRBM) missiles.

Eisenhower’s prime architects in developing the “New Look” were Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The views of the other chiefs tended
to be colored by their service interests; General Matthew Ridgway was frankly hostile, as might be expected in light of the Army's reduced status under the "New Look," while Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining, for similar parochial reasons, usually favored it. For his part Wilson did not lack detractors. His gaffes both exasperated the president and delighted his opponents, but the crosscurrents of dissent among the chiefs of staff over the "New Look" infuriated the president even more at a time when he was trying to induce a broad consensus on national defense policies. Wilson was relatively unmoved by these differences and continued to support the president, whose confidence in his defense secretary was correspondingly enhanced.

Books need editors. This one had several and was especially fortunate in its general editor, Alfred Goldberg, a gifted editor who combines compassion with a striving for perfection. His organization is responsible for writing the history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, bringing together for the purpose a small corps of professional historians. Working together under his leadership, this group has achieved a rare atmosphere of collegial association—an academic-style "History Department" unusual in the government. Our many years of personal and professional association have left me with a deep appreciation of his character, his mind, and his dedication to his work and to friends and colleagues.

Ronald Hoffman, professor of history at the College of William and Mary, was associated with this project from its inception and performed much of the research involved. In addition he helped shape the conceptual scheme of the volume to an important degree. His many specific contributions to portions of the volume are duly noted with great appreciation.

To Ronald Landa I owe an enormous debt of gratitude for his inestimable support in many areas of administration and research and for an important substantive contribution to the writing of the book. I thank him as well for persuading me (a reluctant candidate) to become computer literate while pursuing research for the book.

Stuart Rochester I thank for his able assistance as Dr. Goldberg's deputy in many areas of administration and his astute editorial touches in preparing the final version of the manuscript. I am greatly indebted to others who made contributions to the preparation of this book. Robert J. Watson, author of Volume IV in this series, exchanged helpful suggestions and ideas with me. Lawrence Kaplan and Edward Drea, authors of succeeding volumes, provided similar assistance.
Alice Cole, Roger Trask, Dalton West, and especially John Glennon and Max Rosenberg performed indispensable editorial services that helped shape the book and provide strong assurance of its accuracy. To them I owe a special vote of thanks. Ruth Sharma, Josephine Dillard, and Carolyn Thorne deserve appreciation for the demanding technical and administrative skills they brought to the preparation of several drafts of the manuscript.

The Directives and Records Division of OSD, especially Jesse McNeal, made it possible to secure access to Department of Defense records for the period, which are held by the National Archives and Records Administration, where highly competent archivists greatly eased the task of finding records. I profited greatly from research visits to the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library at Abilene, Kansas, and subsequent assistance from obliging archivists at the Library.

Many authors thank their wives in prefaces or dedications for enduring patiently the time spent in writing their books. I acknowledge not merely my wife's endurance of the long years, but her constant encouragement and support. I owe her heartfelt thanks for having entered into the spirit of the work and rendering valuable assistance in research and writing. She was indispensable to completion of the book.

RICHARD M. LEIGHTON
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Prologue

Atomic Weapons and the End of the Korean War

When Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency on 20 January 1953—more than two and a half years after the Korean War began—armistice talks to end hostilities in Korea had been under way since July 1951. Although fighting had continued throughout the period and the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces more than doubled in size, the United Nations ground forces, strongly supported by airpower, held their own.\(^1\) The early chaos and disorganization of the American military effort had given way to a coherent application of power.\(^2\) The South Korean army of eight divisions in 1950 initially performed poorly but had significantly improved by 1953. The Truman administration proceeded cautiously in strengthening the hand of President Syngman Rhee, who continually pushed for a large combat force, out of fear his unpredictable behavior and obsession to reunite the country might deepen already critical political and military problems. Nor could the weak Korean economy realistically support an expanded military. Despite these concerns, the cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Korea and the domestic pressure to reduce their number finally persuaded President Truman to authorize in October 1952 an increase of the Republic of Korea (ROK) army to 12 divisions. The administration also initiated preliminary planning to expand the army to 20 divisions by mid-1954, a force theoretically able to assume responsibility for holding the front line.\(^3\)

While the situation facing the United Nations Command in Korea by the time of the 1952 presidential election had improved greatly, its commander, General Mark Clark, did not feel he possessed sufficient strength to achieve a military victory. Clark believed that to coerce the enemy into accepting an armistice would require bombing targets in
China, establishing a naval blockade of China, and perhaps launching a major ground offensive. He also raised the possibility in late 1952 of using atomic weapons in Manchuria and North Korea, an action that had indeed been under consideration since Truman convened the first war-crisis meeting on 25 June 1950 at the immediate start of the North Korean attack.4

When Eisenhower, as promised in his election campaign, visited Korea in December 1952, he made clear his opposition to a major ground campaign. His four-day visit did not lessen his aversion to expanding a war that he regarded as an expensive diversion in a peripheral theater. He modified Truman’s position against employing small tactical atomic bombs by agreeing to reopen the question of their potential use. Enthusiastic about the prospect of turning over more of the fighting to the South Koreans, the president indicated his willingness in principle to endorse an expansion of the ROK army to 20 divisions.5

As armistice talks got under way again in late April 1953, a number of issues divided the United States and South Korea, particularly the latter’s insistence on a mutual security agreement that would provide meaningful assurances in the event of a future invasion. Later, at the end of May, Eisenhower expressed his willingness under certain conditions to conclude such an arrangement.6 The forcible repatriation of unwilling prisoners attracted the greatest public attention. Although Eisenhower continued to adhere publicly to the stated U.S. position that no prisoners would be forced to return to North Korea or China, he made it clear to his top staff that he did not want this or any other matter to either prolong or scuttle the negotiations. When the talks appeared to be slowing in May, he authorized an expanded bombing campaign, a move the North Koreans and Chinese countered by significantly stepping up ground action.

The heightened military activity formed the context for the administration’s intensive review of the atomic option. Prior to the escalation in fighting, National Security Council discussions regarding the employment of atomic weapons had proceeded in a discursive fashion. Now the subject took on real urgency, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff presenting six different scenarios for ending the war, most envisioning the possible use of atomic weapons.7 After the NSC reached a seeming consensus on 20 May to employ atomic weapons both strategically and tactically—that is within and outside the Korean peninsula—the administration communicated its resolve to the Chinese and North Koreans through Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India (by Secretary of State Dulles in person to Nehru on 21 May), President Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China, and lower-level officials engaged in the armistice discussions.8 Both Eisenhower and Dulles believed the message had the desired effect.9 Although
extremely heavy fighting continued well into June and the subject of the prisoner return remained a thorny issue—especially after President Rhee ordered the release of all non-Communist North Korean prisoners in mid-June—the adversaries finally signed an armistice on 27 July 1953. The agreement provided for a divide generally along the 38th parallel, the same line that had separated the two Koreas at the outbreak of fighting in 1950.

If the outline of events that brought about the armistice in Korea is familiar, the Eisenhower administration's deliberations on the potential use of atomic weapons merit further consideration. The subject is particularly relevant in light of "Operation Solarium," the re-examination of the containment doctrine ordered at this time by the president. Eisenhower's purpose entailed more than a periodic review of an existing strategy. Rather he asked the NSC to consider adopting a more aggressive posture that would incorporate the use of atomic weapons as one of its most prominent features. The coincidence of the Solarium examination and the administration's discussions about the use of atomic weaponry in Korea is thus important in making an assessment of Eisenhower's willingness to order an atomic attack in 1953.10

Although the president indicated that he was prepared to employ atomic weapons both within and outside Korea to bring the war to an end, the depth of his commitment has been open to question. One close analysis of Eisenhower's efforts to stop the Korean conflict has argued that the NSC's 20 May decision, which included hitting targets in China with atomic bombs, contained too many contingencies to constitute a definitive decision. It notes particularly the president's statement that implementing the plan would require a year of preparation. Neither the position taken by the president on the 20th nor his follow-up action authorizing the transfer of atomic weapons to the military for deployment is, in this analysis, persuasive evidence of Eisenhower's determination.11

There is another reading of the evidence that suggests otherwise. Four actions taken immediately after 20 May document the president's aggressive stance and his determination to strike hard, and with atomic weaponry if necessary, to break the stalemate and prevent the Communist offensive from subverting the armistice talks. First—as Dulles stated in a 1956 Life article—the administration conveyed to the Chinese its intention to use atomic weapons if the talks did not produce positive results. Second, the administration told General Clark to present the U.S. stand on the POW issue as the administration's final offer. Third, Clark also received directions to inform the top Communist commanders, General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Dehuai, that the talks had arrived at the final stage. And fourth, on 3 June, Charles Bohlen, the U.S. ambassador in
Moscow, conveyed the same message to Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov. Another important consideration involved the sharp increase in the level of fighting. A great Communist offensive commenced on 25 May and mounted in intensity, reaching a climax in the second week of June.

These actions set the scene for the White House 30 May meeting, attended by eight people, including the president, Secretary Dulles, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, General J. Lawton Collins, chief of staff of the Army, General Clyde D. Eddleman, Army deputy assistant chief of staff for military operations, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. The minutes of the discussion reveal that the president, while forgoing strategic atomic bombing in Manchuria and China—a campaign that would not in any event be mounted quickly—was willing to employ tactical atomic weapons if necessary.

At the outset of the meeting the President inquired of General Collins whether the present conditions of the Communist attack in Korea were such as to make it feasible and desirable to employ atomic weapons against the enemy. He inquired specifically whether the new atomic artillery tested at Frenchmen’s Flat could be effectively employed if it were available in Korea at this time. After some discussions of the point the President concluded that if the armistice negotiations break down it will be imperative immediately to discuss with our allies the necessity of using every available military resource, including atomic weapons, to bring a conclusion to hostilities. The President emphasized that the weapons would be used tactically and that he saw no reason why our allies should disagree on the employment against enemy troops.

If halting the Korean War required the use of atomic weapons Eisenhower seems, at least in early June, to have been disposed to act. The subsiding of the Communist offensive later in June ended the threat to derail the armistice talks and presumably rendered moot the possible use of atomic weapons.

The extent to which the atomic threat influenced the Communists to cease their offensive and resume armistice talks is, of course, conjectural. For certain, however, the administration had succeeded in ending hostilities and setting the stage for a thorough reappraisal of national security policy intended to give new shape to strategy and the size and composition of the U.S. military establishment.
CHAPTER I

New Bosses in the E Ring

Washington, D.C., 20 January 1953, 11:30 a.m. A bright, unseasonably mild day, hotels jammed, beauty parlors dispensing “Mamie bangs” at $2 each, street vendors’ stands displaying GOP elephants and other Republican regalia, festive crowds in the streets, especially along Pennsylvania Avenue awaiting the inaugural parade. In a traditional rite of passage symbolizing the transfer of power, outgoing President Harry S. Truman and President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower drive together, mostly in unfriendly silence, the few blocks from the White House to the Capitol for the swearing-in ceremony—the last scene of a transition that one Eisenhower biographer called “the most hostile of the twentieth century.” The Marine Corps band plays “Hail to the Chief” a last time for President Truman, before he and Mrs. Truman depart for home in Independence, Missouri. Eisenhower’s inaugural address, thoughtful but (wrote one critic) “too much a product of staff work to be eloquent,” is memorable chiefly for the simple and moving opening prayer, hastily composed that same morning by the president-elect himself.¹

Mr. Wilson Comes to Washington

As one of the “eight millionaires”² of the incoming administration’s cabinet, General Motors president and Secretary of Defense-designate Charles E. Wilson brought credentials of leadership at least as distinguished as those of any of his colleagues. The new president, whom Wilson had met during World War II, early on placed him at the top of his short list of prospective appointees to the Defense post, based on his reputation as “one of the ablest of our executives in big corporations.” Years before, Wilson had
already made a name for himself at Westinghouse as a brilliant electrical
engineer, later moving to General Motors where, in 1941, he succeeded
William S. Knudsen as president. During World War II GM, by then the
world's largest private corporation, produced daily more than $10 mil­
lion in military equipment, $10 billion overall—almost one-fourth of the
production of tanks, armored cars, and airplane engines, almost half of
the machine guns and carbines, two-thirds of the heavy trucks, and three­
fourths of the Navy's diesel-engine horsepower, not to mention several
thousand aircraft for the Navy. His nomination to be secretary of defense
was announced on 20 November.³

In Washington Wilson found himself at age 62 among "his kind" of
people, leaders in the private sector, whose presence in the administration
evidenced Eisenhower's admiration for them and sharing of their con­
servative bent, as well as recognition of the business community's support
during the election campaign. The new cabinet included two distinguished
 corporate lawyers, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Attorney
General Herbert Brownell, and Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey,
former chairman of M. A. Hanna and Company of Cleveland. As budget
director, Eisenhower selected Joseph M. Dodge, former president of the
Detroit Bank. By Eisenhower's deliberate choice, the cabinet contained not
a single experienced government administrator. "Anyone," he told his diary,
"who can, without great personal sacrifice, come to Washington to accept
an important governmental post, is not fit to hold that post."⁴

Wilson's selection also reflected the president's desire for a skilled
industrial manager to run the Defense Department's huge procurement,
storage, transportation, distribution, and other logistical functions. Equally
important, as would soon become apparent, he did not want his defense
secretary to involve himself in foreign policy or strategy as Wilson's prede­
cessor Robert A. Lovett had done or, indeed, given the president's own
military experience and competence, even in many areas of military policy
that would normally fall within the secretary's purview. Early on, Eisen­
hower made the point bluntly: "Charlie, you run defense. We both can't do
it, and I won't do it. I was elected to worry about a lot of other things than
the day-to-day operations of a department." "Running" Defense meant, in
large part, implementing national security policy, not making it. In this
sense Eisenhower was his own defense minister—but as his principal
adviser on defense Wilson would of course influence policymaking in
many ways.⁵ In addition, he became an effective spokesman and lightning
rod for the administration in elucidating and defending its frequently
controversial positions on national security issues.

In manning his new empire Wilson, taking his cue from the presi­
dent's cabinet appointments, recruited from the business world. Robert T.
Stevens, his nominee to head the Army, was a wealthy textile manufacturer; after two years he would be replaced by Wilber M. Brucker, formerly governor of Michigan. For Navy secretary, he chose Robert B. Anderson, a Texas banker and oilman and heavy contributor to Eisenhower's election campaign. His Air Force secretary, Harold E. Talbott, was formerly chairman of North American Aviation and of the Republican National Finance Committee, and a Chrysler Corporation executive. In 1955 he was to leave office under a cloud for using Air Force stationery in promoting a private company in which he was a partner. Roger M. Kyes, a vice president at General Motors, was Wilson's first deputy at Defense. After his departure in May 1954 he was followed by Robert Anderson, in turn replaced in the Navy secretaryship by Charles S. Thomas, head of a West Coast chain of men's clothing stores. 

Wilson regarded the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as a sort of holding company, and the three military departments as subsidiaries. Within OSD the most important entity was the office of the comptroller, headed since its creation in 1949 by Wilfred J. McNeil, who had attained the rank of rear admiral during his wartime service with the Navy. Over the years McNeil had made himself well-nigh indispensable to four successive defense secretaries not only as technical adviser on fiscal, especially budgetary matters—the Defense budget was prepared, in its final stages, in his office—but as an adviser on policy in general. Perhaps equally important, as a Defense witness in budget hearings he had won the confidence and admiration of successive congressional appropriations committees. Eisenhower, who had crossed swords with him during the 1949 budget hearings, had no reason to share this confidence, and at first perceived him as only an unneeded holdover. But Republican legislative leaders thought otherwise, as did Wilson, and the president was persuaded to withdraw his veto of McNeil's retention. It was to prove one of Wilson's most fortunate choices.

Also fortunate, in an only slightly less critical sector, was Wilson's decision to retain Frank C. Nash, assistant to the secretary for international security affairs, as his principal adviser on Defense overseas operations, particularly foreign aid. Later in 1953 Nash's title would be changed, along with some of his responsibilities, to assistant secretary for international security affairs, one of the six new assistant secretaries (whom Wilson sometimes called his "vice presidents") created in the legislation implementing the Rockefeller Committee recommendations. Donald A. Quarles, a vice president of Bell Laboratories and of Western Electric, was Wilson's assistant secretary for research and development, which replaced the

* See Chapter II.
Research and Development Board in the Rockefeller Committee reorganization. Closely related was the Office of Applications Engineering, a special creation of Secretary Wilson, headed by Assistant Secretary Frank D. Newbury, at 74 the oldest of the "vice presidents," a retired engineer and vice president from Westinghouse. The Munitions Board was absorbed by the Office of Supply and Logistics under Charles S. Thomas and later Thomas P. Pike, formerly an oil well drilling contractor in California. The assistant secretary of properties and installations was Franklin G. Floete, a South Dakota building contractor. Two of the new assistant secretar­­ships—Legislation and Public Affairs, and Health and Medical—were headed, respectively, by a Nebraska publisher, Fred Seaton, and Dr. Melvin A. Casberg, a prominent physician and medical administrator, and later consultant to DoD. A unique and ingeniously contrived product of the British and American tradition of subordinating military to civilian authority, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were heirs of the unchartered body that had served, under the president, as the core of the national high command during World War II. Since then they had acquired statutory respectability and a new and influential, if less dominant, role in the unified military establishment as military advisers to the president and secretary of defense and as planners and coordinators of national military strategy. The Joint Chiefs inherited by the new administration in 1953 comprised the three military service chiefs and a non-voting chairman. Like the other chiefs, the chairman was ap­pointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate for a two-year term with eligibility for reappointment. However, he was denied command authority over the other chiefs, each of whom was also empowered to make independent recommendations to the president or the secretary of defense. The Joint Chiefs retained a measure of their wartime "high command" role (e.g., war planning and strategic direction of military forces) with modifications suitable to a peacetime environment. Each of the chiefs, apart from his membership in the corporate JCS, was subordinate to the civilian secretary of his department. Like the secretary of defense vis-à-vis the president, his relationship to his civilian secretary was that of a military adviser. Unlike the crowd of new VIP appointments filling the Pentagon's E Ring in January 1953, the Joint Chiefs were temporary holdovers, since their terms of office ran to midyear and later. Except for Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William M. Fechteler and Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel Shepherd, they were old friends of the president. He was,

* The Marine Corps commandant was not a full-time member of the JCS; he participated only in matters relating to the Marine Corps. During this period reference was generally to a JCS of four members.
however, under heavy pressure from the Taft wing of the Republican Party to replace all of the chiefs as too closely identified with Defense programs now targeted for budget cuts. They aimed particularly at Chairman Omar N. Bradley, a West Point classmate who had commanded the Twelfth Army Group under Eisenhower in Europe during World War II, because of his public support of Truman's Europe-oriented policies and alleged neglect of air and sea power. By the end of August, all the "old" chiefs except Shepherd, whose four-year statutory term extended to the end of 1955, had retired.11

The most important replacement was Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the commander in chief, Pacific, slated to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs when Bradley retired on 14 August. In 1949 Radford had been a leader in the "revolt of the admirals" against unification. On the other hand, he was an ardent champion of airpower, with a World War II record of uncompromising toughness against the Japanese. More recently he had favored the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists on Formosa against the Chinese Communists. These credentials endeared him to the Republican right and made him an ideal spokesman for the more Asia-oriented foreign and military policy they demanded. Wilson had met him in December on the trip to Korea, where he accompanied the president-elect, and at the latter's request "sized him up" for the JCS chairman job. Radford apparently convinced him that his views on unification had changed radically since 1949 and were now in accord with the administration's. Wilson and Eisenhower were impressed, as well, by Radford's view (which was to become a core tenet of the "New Look") that U.S. forces were dangerously overextended, especially in the Far East, and should in large part be redeployed back to the Western Hemisphere to constitute a strategic reserve. Clearly, Radford made a deep and, as it turned out, lasting impression on Wilson, who came to rely on his judgment in military matters second only to the president's.12


What's Good for General Motors

When the new cabinet was sworn in on the afternoon of 21 January, Wilson was conspicuously absent. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in hearings on the 15th and 16th, had questioned his credentials for holding a cabinet position. Specifically, the committee cited his and his wife's large holdings of General Motors stock and prospective cash and
stock bonuses over the next four years, valued at more than $3 million, as a potential obstacle to the effective and proper execution of his responsibilities as secretary of defense. These holdings seemed to some of the senators, Republicans as well as Democrats, potentially in conflict with a nearly 90-year-old statute that prohibited government officials from transacting business with a corporation in which they had financial interests. In practice, many businessmen having such interests had entered government service without divesting themselves of their holdings, usually resigning from their firms and assigning to non-interest third parties any dealings with them. Wilson's predecessor at GM, William Knudsen, had adopted this course during his World War II government service. On the other hand, Stuart Symington, Truman's Air Force secretary, and Louis Johnson, his secretary of defense, had both sold their corporate stocks when entering government service.

Wilson, who had expected his nomination to sail through the Senate without trouble, was taken aback. He readily agreed to resign from GM and assured the senators that he would not personally handle any negotiations with that firm, but he refused to sell his stock because of the heavy capital gains tax involved. Republicans on the committee reluctantly accepted this decision, but the leading Democrats (one of whom was Symington, whose own divestiture had cost him $67,000 in taxes) opposed his nomination. It was during this argument that Wilson made the remark that, as widely misreported, passed into history as the hallmark of his confirmation hearings and a much celebrated gaffe. Asked whether he believed he could make a decision in the interest of the United States even if it were "extremely" adverse to GM's interest, he replied with an emphatic affirmative, adding, "for years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist. Our company is too big. It goes with the welfare of the country."

Wilson's biographer, Bruce Geelhoed, cited several statements made by him at congressional hearings during World War II that limited the connection to the first part of the quote above, i.e., without the "and vice versa," suggesting that this was and remained Wilson's true intent. In both the earlier and the current situations, however, Wilson did not explicitly place his country's interests above General Motors' interests, but simply refused to admit the possibility of a conflict, as in his testimony before a House committee in May 1943: "Our business is so tied up with the lives of the people, ... and having the standard of living that we have established in this country, that we cannot conceive how our company can be prosperous when the country isn't prosperous."
In January 1953, unfortunately, his view regarding a possible conflict of interest was precisely what the committee wanted to know, and his ambiguous response to the question understandably ruffled their feelings. For the public and many reporters, of course, the distinction was too fine to be worth explaining. What came through was the simple political verdict that, as the Washington Evening Star put it, “even if he gave up his financial connections, he could scarcely quit thinking as his fellow industrialists think,” i.e., GM would always come first. The “breast-beaters,” Eisenhower recorded, “had a field day.”

Leverett Saltonstall and other senators urged Wilson to sell his stock to avoid further embarrassment to the administration, and on the night of the inauguration the president himself told him he could not take the Defense post unless he did so. Wilson asked for a few hours’ delay, but the next afternoon yielded and informed the president he would give up both his stock and the promised bonus. When the hearings resumed on 23 January, Wilson announced his decision.

A more critical phase of the hearings was yet to come. The Democratic members of the committee, especially Sen. Richard Russell, the ranking Democrat, were now concerned with the method of divestiture of the prospective bonus, cash and stocks. These were to be paid in installments over the next four years, with the stipulation that Wilson not do anything “inimical to the interests of General Motors”—such as, he explained, taking employment with a rival firm. But suppose, he was asked, he awarded a defense contract to such a firm? No, Wilson replied, his contract provided that no action by him while serving as secretary of defense would be construed as “prejudicial” to the interests of General Motors. Then should he not sell his stock bonus immediately, in order to preclude the possibility that he might in the interim seek to drive up its value by his actions as secretary? Wilson explained that he could not legally transfer any part of the bonus until he actually received it. Russell demanded that he pledge to sell his bonus stocks before taking office. This, too, was impossible, Wilson pointed out, because he could not legally alter his agreement with General Motors without the consent of the stockholders; the best he could do was to promise to give to charity the profit if the stock increased in value.

And so it went, through a long morning session. “I really feel,” Wilson wearily told Russell at one point, “you are giving me quite a pushing around,” and he remarked to another senator that the committee would do him a favor if it rejected his nomination. Finally, during a short recess, Wilson called a General Motors legal counsel, who was persuaded
to accept the course that Russell had demanded: convert the stock portion of the bonus into cash at current market value. Satisfied, the committee voted unanimously to approve Wilson's candidacy. On the Senate floor some Democrats opposed the nomination, but it was confirmed by a large margin.20

Wilson emerged from this experience seemingly unscarred, although he believed his grilling by the Armed Services Committee was politically driven and that the sacrifice of his holdings served no useful purpose. "The problem," he wrote a friend soon after, "was really a political and public relations one, rather than a factual or legal one." The remarkably parallel case of Treasury Secretary Humphrey, who had earlier represented his company, M. A. Hanna, in urging Congress to support construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, but nevertheless was allowed after perfunctory discussion to retain his stock, strongly suggests a double standard by the two committees involved, Armed Services and Finance.

Eisenhower, who in 1952 had placed his own holdings in an irrevocable trust for the duration of his incumbency, worried that Wilson's treatment would make it more difficult to induce able people to enter government service. He felt (as Wilson did) that nominees for high office should be men of such demonstrated integrity as to be above suspicion of improper behavior and that the president alone should be held responsible for taking appropriate action in cases where this assumption proved unwarranted. "The likely eventual result" of the existing confirmation system, he confided to his diary, "is that sooner or later [presidents] will be unable to get anybody to take jobs in Washington except business failures, political hacks, and New Deal lawyers. All of these would jump at the chance to get a job that a successful business man has to sacrifice very materially in order to take. But it is the carrying of the practice to the extreme that will eventually damage us badly."21

"Engine Charlie" Wilson: A Portrait22

"I know how interested you must be," wrote Wilson, a few days after his stormy Senate confirmation, to his old General Motors mentor, Alfred P. Sloan, "in what is going on with relation to my appointment as Secretary of Defense. I appreciate your great interest and I thought I would like to write you the first letter I am writing from my new office in the Pentagon." It was an affectionate letter, with a hint of nostalgia beneath the boyish first-day-on-the-job enthusiasm. Not surprisingly, in the light of his recent Senate ordeal, he enclosed a copy of his first directive, which concerned the conduct of procurement officials.23
Charlie Wilson was not a careful dresser. As befitted his station and corporate image, his suits were of good quality (preferably dark blue) and conservative design. But the image was often tarnished by the white ash sprinkled over the front of the jacket from the cigarette that habitually dangled over his lower lip. Sometimes a button was missing. A portly man in his early sixties, five feet ten, 185 pounds, Wilson was loud, gregarious, opinionated, stubborn, sometimes insensitive. Some Washingtonians could not imagine how such a man had managed to become the head of the biggest corporation in the world.24

Many historians and observers of the Eisenhower era, while differing widely on specifics, share this unfavorable impression. Conceding the miracle of his success at General Motors, his detractors generally hold that he did not measure up to the job of secretary of defense. "The president's greatest cabinet disappointment," concluded Elmo Richardson, one of Eisenhower's early biographers. "A bundle of banalities and suspicions, Wilson habitually wavered between moments of self-doubt and bouts of truculence."25 More recently, Douglas Kinnard contended that Wilson had little influence in the development of strategic policy, that his effectiveness diminished during his tenure as secretary, and that the president ultimately held him in low regard, while the other two powerful cabinet officials, Dulles and Humphrey, grew in stature.26 James Schlesinger, a later defense secretary, similarly observed, "the early years of the Eisenhower administration until Secretary Gates were not the high point for the Secretary of Defense."27 And Adam Yarmolinsky, a special assistant to Secretary Robert S. McNamara, later noted that, unlike his boss, in his opinion the first secretary "to exercise the full authority of the office," Louis Johnson and Wilson "reigned with a good deal of bluster, but they did not rule."28

Stephen Ambrose, one of Eisenhower's most approving biographers, also was no admirer of Wilson, whom he described as, "the most outspoken, self-confident, bluntest, and ill-informed member of the cabinet." In time, according to Ambrose, Eisenhower lost confidence in him owing to his perceived failure to control the Pentagon—"certainly he had never turned out missiles the way he had turned out automobiles"—but, like many others, he was allowed to remain because he was loyal.29

Other scholars have been less harsh. Charles C. Alexander, an Eisenhower biographer writing in the mid-seventies, described sympathetically Wilson's efforts for four and a half years against the pressures of the cold war to "hold down the most demanding and profligate sector of the federal budget, military spending."30 Charles S. Maier, in his introduction to George B. Kistiakowsky's memoirs, complimented Wilson for his managerial style of encouraging "a rip-roaring rivalry among the Armed Forces.
for new roles and weapons" that actually served to stimulate the production of effective missiles. In his full-length study of Wilson’s tenure at Defense, Geelhoed emphatically disagreed with an army of critics to conclude that, despite his “narrowly provincial” outlook and foot-in-mouth penchant for uttering embarrassing public statements, Wilson was a major asset of the Eisenhower administration. As manager of the Defense Department, the job for which he was hired, Wilson “proved to be a durable, pragmatic, and competent executive.”

A rather different perspective came from Emmet John Hughes, the president’s speechwriter. Hughes gave the secretary high grades as the quintessential representative of big business. “Wilson personified, occasionally almost to the point of caricature, a classic type of corporation executive: basically apolitical and certainly unphilosophic, aggressive in action and direct in speech—the undoubting and uncomplicated pragmatist who inhabits a world of sleek shining certitudes. Like most of his colleagues he felt utterly free of any selfish political ambitions, and he was given to saying, ‘I’m just in this damn town to get a job done.’” Conceding that he was also an “uncompromising simplifier of issues,” Hughes nevertheless recognized in Wilson “strength, of one kind or another.” Whether in cabinet meetings or testifying before Congress, he always maintained “almost imperturbable self-assurance”; he loved to talk, hated to listen. And for those who had to listen, more than a little could be too much. Wilton B. Persons, one of Eisenhower’s conference coordinators, who had more exposure to Wilson’s loquacity than most, after one especially long cabinet session scribbled a note to Hughes of Wilson’s interminable “dogmatic irrelevancies.” “From now on,” it read, “I’m buying nothing but Plymouths.” Sherman Adams, the president’s chief of staff, lacked Hughes’s easy tolerance, perceiving Wilson as an unalloyed and incorrigible bore, whose long-winded bromides were an unfair ordeal for those forced to listen to them. Worse, in Adams’s view, his shallowness and vanity were uncompensated by competence in his job. He “leaned” on the president for direction on small details, and was weak and indecisive in managing his department. Secretary of State Dulles once characterized Wilson as a “glorified office manager,” and Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin referred to Wilson as “the most uninformed man, and the most determined to stay so, that has ever been Secretary.”

On the other hand, the press loved Wilson, and although opinions of his competence and influence varied, they appreciated him as a reliable fount of good copy. His quick tongue and alert mind made his news conferences lively theater. He loved to tell stories, had no real pretensions, and
could laugh at himself. He collected critical political cartoons of himself and kept them on display in an anteroom next to his office. Describing the display years later, his military assistant recalled: “My secretary’s husband was a White House photographer, and they both knew the press and the cartoonists here in town, so she would get the original and would have it framed before the day was over. That was the greatest collection that Mr. Wilson took with him when he left office. He and his family loved it.”

Naturally, several of the cartoons pictured him with his foot in his mouth, including, of course, the unfortunate “what’s good for General Motors” comment. More serious was the press conference early in 1954, soon after Dulles’s speech unveiling the “massive retaliation” policy, in which Wilson criticized officials who “rattled” the atomic bomb. In another instance of bad timing later that year, while Dulles was trying to arrest the decline of European support for NATO and for the establishment of a European army, Wilson announced that the advent of advanced weaponry might permit some reduction of American troop strength in Europe.

Most indiscreet and least defensible of all, perhaps, was his action on 10 March 1954, the very day when Sen. Joseph P. McCarthy’s attack on Army Secretary Stevens reached its climax, in sending his limousine to Capitol Hill to bring the Wisconsin senator to the Pentagon for lunch, all without informing the president or anyone else in the White House. Wilson’s motives in this episode are obscure, but it is hard to imagine him making such a move unless he believed the president would approve. It may be that he thought a conciliatory gesture might be helpful at this particular juncture. McCarthy had just called to complain about Wilson’s remark at a press conference earlier that morning, at which he had declared that McCarthy’s charges about the Army “coddling Communists” were “damn tommyrot.” The president, informed only after the luncheon, was furious, recognizing that Wilson had naïvely allowed himself to be lured into a trap. “We need acute politicians in those [high-level] positions,” he bitterly told James Hagerty, his press secretary. “They are the only ones who know enough to stay out of traps.” Wilson had consistently defended Secretary Stevens, however, and when McCarthy pressured him to appear at the Army hearings, he refused, telling the senator in the presence of reporters, “I didn’t come down here to be a television actor.” Wilson authorized the Army, and arranged with his Michigan friend Sen. Charles Potter, to release information on the efforts of McCarthy and his aide, Roy Cohn, to ensure preferential treatment for David Schine, another McCarthy aide, who had been inducted into the Army. He agreed to the hiring of Joseph Welch, the Boston lawyer whose sharp wit and masterful strategy (which Wilson and his aides also helped to plan) served to
publicly discredit McCarthy in the eyes of millions of TV viewers who watched the hearings.  

Wilson was the president's loyal servant, but his occasional indiscretions, in word or in deed, as biographer William Ewald observed, "at times could drive Ike wild." "Damn it," the latter once exploded, "how in hell did a man as shallow as Charlie Wilson ever get to be head of General Motors?" Hughes described Eisenhower's typical reaction when informed of one of his gaffes: "the audible grinding of teeth, the strained tightening of the mouth, and the slow, pained rolling of the bright blue eyes heavenward." Wilson, the president once complained, "is prone to lecture rather than to answer," a trait that congressmen found especially annoying. "While I think that he considers himself a master of public relations, he seems to have no comprehension at all of what embarrassment [his indiscreet remarks] can cause the secretary of state and me in our efforts to keep the tangled international situation from becoming completely impossible."  

But the president also valued Wilson's "headknocking and organizational talents," his courage, and most important, the expertise in research, engineering, and production that the president himself lacked and appreciated. These skills complemented, in a sort of tradeoff, Eisenhower's preemption of the area of military policy, normally the province of a secretary of defense, in which the president himself was without peer and made the important decisions. OSD Comptroller Wilfred McNeil defined Wilson's greatest strength as production and procurement, exemplified most spectacularly in the immense output of military equipment by General Motors in World War II. Early in 1955, Alfred Sloan asked Wilson for his views on the "how and why" of GM's success, for a history he was writing. Wilson complied, and also sent a copy of his reply to the president, suggesting that he might be interested in its applications to current defense policies and operations. More broadly, Wilson also sometimes advised the president on general economic problems, usually drawing on GM's experience in the automobile industry.  

Eisenhower's dominance in the field of military policy is exemplified by his decision on 21 December 1955 to authorize equal priority for the parallel and concurrent development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), possibly his single most critical defense decision. It is significant, however, that the president reached it only after Wilson had reassured him, against his deep misgivings, that in this instance simultaneous development of the missiles by three services was feasible. Eisenhower was still skeptical about ballistic missiles, at least at their then stage of development, and he was not confident that more money could be wisely spent. He feared that the country did not contain the engineering talent necessary to sustain a parallel and
current development of such scope and complexity. And, not least, he doubted that the military services could put aside their historic rivalry and cooperate on the venture. The decision was one of very few, in the area of strategic weapons, in which Wilson actually "sold" the president on a major innovation. Subsequent events proved both sound and historic the decision to proceed with the missiles; arguably, the consequences of holding back at that particular juncture could have been serious.

Without pretensions to expertise in the military and political fields, Wilson generally shared the New Look view of the world: the overriding reality of the two major Communist powers united in a grand design to communize the globe, masterminded and directed from the Kremlin. He perceived his own primary role as spearheading the effort to reduce military spending below the high levels of the Korean War and maximizing the effect of every necessary American dollar spent in the war against communism, lest its relentless demands push the country into bankruptcy. In the spring and summer of 1954 the French debacle in Indochina raised the specter of a Communist tide sweeping over all Southeast Asia, plunging the free world into disarray, undermining American leadership, and fostering neutralism. For many, including Wilson, it called for a "soul-searching review" of the basic tenets of the New Look, as he put it in a speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on 26 April 1954. At a meeting of the National Security Council on 24 June, discouraged by the diminishing influence of the United States over its allies, he stated that "the time for the 'agonizing reappraisal' of U.S. basic security policy was at hand" since the whole effort to build up military strength to combat communism seemed to have produced diminishing dividends.

The proposal was not pursued, but two weeks later he, or someone at his instance, drafted a long letter to the president explaining what he had in mind. The United States had become too dependent on military solutions; what was needed was a "fresh new look" at policies toward the underdeveloped world, "free of any suspicions of European colonialism" and stressing actions—e.g., education and exchange programs—rather than words. The letter also outlined a broad new economic development approach, relying heavily on free enterprise and protection of developing countries against foreign exploitation. This, Wilson hoped, might "reverse the slow paralysis of the Free World," revivify the Western coalition, and "assert our true leadership within it." Wilson probably did not compose the letter—it was not his style—and apparently nothing came of it. But fragments of its ideas surfaced from time to time in his remarks at NSC meetings, and on several occasions he reverted to the theme of the diminishing utility of military power.
The president did not, however, regard this line of thought as one of Wilson's long suits, even if he suspected its existence. In essence, he trusted Wilson to run the Defense Department, in large part because he was confident that Wilson knew how to run a large organization. From the beginning, as Wilson told Admiral Radford, he intended to run the department much as he had run GM. He followed principles that he had learned at the feet of the legendary Sloan, who believed that policymaking should be centralized and its execution decentralized; the size and diversification of GM, Wilson told the president, posed essentially the same organizational problems as the Defense Department. Wilson liked people. He got along well with most of his associates, subordinates and superiors alike, and even with many who did not have a high opinion of his abilities. His instinct was to seek consensus. He tolerated disagreement well and preferred to deal with people individually rather than in formal meetings. His relations with the Joint Chiefs (except Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway) were cordial and he tried hard, as he told his friend, entertainer Arthur Godfrey, to promulgate a "team" attitude of mutual understanding and common purpose throughout the department.  

Wilson's close associates almost uniformly regarded him as gentlemanly and fair. His military assistant, Marine Corps Col. Carey Randall, vividly remembered his first meeting with Wilson. Having previously served under Wilson's predecessor, Robert Lovett, Randall feared a conflict of loyalties. "I told him that I admired President Truman and believed in General Marshall and Mr. Lovett, and that if there was going to be any criticism of their administration, I couldn't conscientiously change my position . . . . He told me that he had always admired President Truman and was proud of the Medal of Merit that he had from World War II, and that he would never criticize one of those gentlemen at any time. So I got hooked . . . and eventually became his primary assistant." Randall never regretted his decision. Wilson, he said, "was the kindest, nicest individual. Everybody that knew him loved him. He was the idol of General Motors. They wanted to send their own pilots and planes back here to fly him; they weren't sure that the Air Force and Navy were good enough. He worked interminably. I usually came to work at 8:00 or shortly before. He would come in about 9:00, and if we got home at all, it was fine."  

At General Motors, Wilson had conducted retreats for the top executives at Lake Placid, New York, to foster a spirit of cooperation. The first summer he arranged something similar at the Pentagon. The 100 or so top civilian and military administrators were invited to gather at the Marine Corps base at Quantico, Virginia, where they held business sessions in the morning and devoted afternoons to golf, skeet shooting, and other non-work activities. The first meeting was a big hit, and the Quantico
“Secretaries' Conference” became an annual event. Incidentally, Wilson also saw to it that a special party was scheduled for the enlisted personnel who had to work at the conference.\(^7\)

As a skilled manager, the secretary could combine spontaneity with technique. Journalists who applauded his policies and programs were encouraged to credit the entire organization and not Wilson personally. In his directives to high-level colleagues he preferred to solicit suggestions as to how a mandated objective could be achieved, rather than order them to take specific actions. A shrewd bridge player, Wilson was also a cagey manager, often taking some time and a circuitous route to get to the point. Sometimes he seemed to cultivate the “ordinary guy” image. He and his wife, for example, often refused the government transportation that was always at their disposal and lined up with everyone else at the airline counter at National Airport to buy tickets for their visits to Michigan.\(^8\)

But along with the folksy, bumbling, gregarious, jovial persona, Wilson could also be serious and tough, very tough. This image emerged when he was engaged in “his kind” of business—production and procurement. In investigating manufacturing delays, for example, he could be unrelenting, scheduling conferences, appointing committees, seeking additional expertise, and employing other tools for getting to the bottom of a problem. Usually patient, he was also demanding and often worked with his staff until late at night. When he visited a plant, little escaped his eye. Returning in October 1955 from a naval ordnance plant in Macon, Georgia, he scolded the secretary of the Navy for shortcomings in the plant’s production methods, unleashing an unbroken stream of technical criticisms: this was Wilson in his element. When directives involving the production of engines or other types of manufactured equipment became bogged down in the military departments, Wilson wanted to know the technical or administrative reason for the holdup. At home with engineering subjects, he sometimes insisted on personally reviewing manufacturing schedules for the important components of the country’s defense structure. Wilson knew his business.\(^9\)

He also understood bureaucracy and how to command assent. Several months after taking office, he wrote the three military secretaries regarding the long history of challenges to the authority of the secretary of defense by their departments. The central issue was whether the phrase in the National Security Act that required that the three military departments be “separately administered” was a limitation on the authority of the secretary of defense, especially with respect to functions assigned directly to the military departments by statute. The Rockefeller Committee had concluded “that such challenges have no basis in either the language of the laws in question, or in the legislative history.” Wilson asked if each of the service
secretaries accepted this interpretation and would abide by it. Thus con­fronted, all responded affirmatively and even, in the words of one of them, "enthusiastically." 

Of Charles E. Wilson it can be fairly said that, on balance, he more than held his own as secretary of defense. During his tenure defense costs were reasonably contained, management reforms were enacted, and the department was "run," as the president had directed, with considerable efficiency. Moreover, he presided over a period of modernization that subsequently gave the United States a substantial lead over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons technology. Wilson knew that he was a good manager and a trained engineer, and he drew on those strengths in administering his department. Recognizing his limitations as a defense strategist or military expert, he readily accepted as reality, without yielding the prerogative of voicing his dissenting views, that the broad design of administration defense policy would be shaped by the president. Wilson had enormous respect for Eisenhower, both as a person and as an experienced military thinker and commander. At the same time he knew his own worth, and rarely betrayed any self-doubt. If he sometimes avoided making decisions and appealed to the president for guidance on relatively minor problems, it was because he was unfamiliar with many of the activities for which he was responsible. But in those major sectors of defense that he understood—engineering, procurement, production, budgeting—he was invariably unflappable, often tenacious, and willing to take on all critics including the president. When on 2 October 1957 he entered his final press conference, the assembled reporters greeted him with a standing ovation. For a job well done, he had earned their respect.
"No more painful than backing into a buzz saw," was Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett's wry characterization, shortly before leaving office, of efforts to reorganize the Army's seven technical services. He and many others in the Truman administration believed, nevertheless, that these services and the rest of the worn baggage inherited by the new unified defense establishment five years earlier were ready for change. So did presidential candidate Eisenhower, who charged in a major campaign speech in September 1952 that unification of the armed forces was still not working—"too much form and too little substance"—and that current defense operations wasted "time, money, and talent with equal generosity." The next administration, he said, should create "at the earliest possible date next year . . . a commission of the most capable civilians in our land to study the operations of our Department of Defense." Soon after his inauguration, the new president followed up this pledge by directing his new defense secretary to submit by 1 May a plan for improving the operations of his department, without doubt one of the most important assignments for anyone in the administration during the next four years.

Wilson Takes Charge

Wilson lost no time in naming, on 19 February, a blue-ribbon committee to study the Defense Department and recommend improvements in its organization. Headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, the panel included the president's brother, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, Dr. Arthur S.
Flemming, outgoing defense secretary Lovett, Dr. Vannevar Bush, David Sarnoff, and JCS chairman General Omar N. Bradley. The committee counsel was H. Struve Hensel. The committee was to be assisted by a five-man staff headed by Don K. Price, and, appointed later, three distinguished retired military officers as consultants: George C. Marshall, Chester W. Nimitz, and Carl A. Spaatz. Welcoming the committee on 2 March, Wilson told them that their mission was to devise an organization that would "get the cooperation of the whole without destroying the initiative of the pieces."4

Although reorganizing Defense was a campaign pledge to wrap up what the new administration regarded as unfinished business inherited from its predecessor, it was not in the main a partisan issue. Substantially the same mix of views on the problem could be found in both administrations. The service secretaries in both administrations, especially the Navy secretaries, were jealous of their prerogatives and resisted domination by the defense secretary. Conversely, Wilson's predecessor, Lovett, had held that his office should be strengthened.5 Truman's Joint Chiefs, who carried over into the new administration to serve out their terms, brought their views with them. The objects of contention were neither absolute authority, nor total autonomy, but degrees of each—and certainly negotiable.

At the same time the membership of the new committee—which Wilson presumably had cleared with the president—suggested that the chief purpose of the reorganization would be to increase the authority of the secretary of defense. That aim had two prominent and aggressive advocates on the committee, Lovett and Bush; another member, General Bradley, could be counted on to support it up to a point, as could the president's brother, Milton Eisenhower. The remaining members were either neutral or moderate proponents of a strong defense secretary. The key player in this lineup was Lovett. Highly respected by Republicans and Democrats alike, he was probably the most knowledgeable expert on defense organization. Even Marshall could not match Lovett's experience. Lovett had recently analyzed his experience at length in his letter to President Truman in November 1952 published in the New York Times on 8 January. Most emphatically he advised that the status and power of the defense secretary, still ambiguous in his opinion, should be clarified to ensure his authority over the military departments and the Joint Chiefs and his primacy as the president's adviser on defense matters. Only in time of war would the Joint Chiefs command and operate, and then under the direction of the secretary, who in turn would report to the president as commander in chief.6
Lovett’s letter was a primary source for the committee’s study as well as for Wilson’s own homework. On 26 February, responding to a request from Chairman Rockefeller for guidance, Wilson wrote a seven-page analysis of the organization problem, astonishingly detailed for someone only a month into his new job. As might be expected, he began by putting defense organization in the context of organization theory, the standard dichotomies of staff-and-line, centralization-and-decentralization, headquarters-and-field, that he had learned at the feet of Alfred P. Sloan at General Motors. “The most effective way to organize the Defense Department,” he wrote, “is in the form of a decentralized organization for administration (Army, Navy, Air) and a centralized organization (the Defense Department itself) for coordinated policy and control.” He would not, in short, scrap the old edifice and replace it with, say, a monolithic new structure framed along functional lines as some had proposed. But within the old framework, he wanted a simpler, cleaner structure. 7

Wilson then laid out the bounds within which the committee would be expected to work, cautioning that his memo was not his “formal recommendation or final thinking.” Clearly, however, it was intended to be regarded as a quasi-mandate. The staff assumed that the committee’s mission was to “help the [secretary] organize the set-up the way he is accustomed to function, more or less along the lines of his memorandum.” It stipulated that the three existing assistant secretaryships (comptroller, manpower and personnel, and international security affairs) should be retained, and the statutory boards replaced by new assistant secretaries with a smaller competent staff and redefined duties, to which the secretary could add at will. 8

Wilson had little to say about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a bundle of issues in itself. Since its glory days as the high command at the president’s right hand in World War II and Korea, the JCS had declined, in the view of one critic, into “a debating society rather than a vigorous strategic planning body, and ... a staff organization overloaded with [such] minor details as ... how many coffee roasting plants should be operated by the Army.” Wilson proposed creating a deputy chairman as a fifth member, of equal military rank to the other four and second ranking under the chairman. 9 Presumably the deputy would relieve the chairman of some of his growing workload but Wilson did not specify how. He had no suggestions regarding the overall role of the JCS, but did pick up Lovett’s idea of adding a “combined staff” of recently retired, still vigorous and healthy former chiefs to advise the secretary on the effectiveness and balance of defense

* In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act established the position of vice chairman of the JCS.
CHART 1
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1 APRIL 1953

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(Comptroller)

RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(Human Resources)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(International Security Affairs)

GENERAL COUNSEL
(Legal and Legislative Affairs)

CHAIRMAN OF THE MUNITIONS BOARD

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE TO AEC

DEFENSE SUPPLY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP

MUNITIONS BOARD

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT STAFF

MILITARY TRAFFIC SERVICE

DIRECTOR OF GUIDED MISSILES

DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
(Public Information)

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
(Health and Medical)

DIRECTOR OF INSTALLATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(Manpower and Personnel)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
programs, and make "physical audits of what is going on." Finally, Wilson asked for the committee's views on the question of the chiefs' voting rights, and on Lovett's so-called "gray areas" of disputed jurisdiction. He stressed his concern that the various defense entities below the OSD level (the services, National Guard, Reserve components, etc.) be given full opportunity to voice their opinions.9

The Committee Follows Instructions

Facing the president's desire for quick action and the members' own demanding schedules the committee did not linger over its assignment. After its initial meeting on 2 March it met 10 more times, mostly on weekends, at the Pentagon.10 On 11 April it submitted its final report to Wilson, who promptly forwarded it with his full approval to the president.11

The report focused on the secretary's relationships with his principal officials. In his letter of transmittal, however, the chairman stressed the committee's belief that the secretary should also provide, through the three military departmental secretaries, for a "thorough analysis and possible revision of the organization and procedures" of those departments. Reinforcing this recommendation in his own message transmitting the approved report to Congress, the president stated that the service secretaries had been directed to initiate studies "with a view toward making those Secretaries truly responsible administrators, ... and attaining economies wherever possible."12

Beginning on a grim note—"the continuing challenge of providing adequate national defense without wrecking the national economy"—the report moved on to the salient point that in 1947 Congress had established a central organization to exercise direction, authority, and control over the nation's defenses, and a decentralized organization for administration through the three military departments. Experience had indicated that, while its fundamental principles were still sound, the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense required improvement (1) to establish clear lines of authority and responsibility within the department, (2) to enable the secretary to clarify service roles and missions, (3) to make effective use of modern science and industry in planning, and (4) to achieve maximum economies without injury to military strength and its productive support. To attain these objectives, the secretary must have (1) clear and effective authority over the entire organization and control over its chief personnel; (2) a system to provide "complete, accurate, and understandable" information for decisionmaking; and (3) an independent audit of programs and performance, through inspection where necessary.
The report's recommendations had five broad organizational aims: (1) to make clear the authority of the secretary; (2) to clarify command channels within the department, especially to raise the status of the secretaries of the military departments; (3) to enhance the status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the top military planning and advisory body by clarifying the role of the chairman, improving the subordinate staff structure, and clearly establishing executive responsibility for unified commands; (4) to abolish certain statutory boards in the secretary's office and provide him sufficient assistant secretaries to perform essential staff functions; (5) to enable the secretary to ensure the promotional prospects of officers assigned to his office.

Lovett's 18 November letter had noted "contradictions and straddles" in the 1947 and 1949 national security acts regarding the powers of the secretary and suggested that they should be clarified. On 26 February the committee received a long memorandum from Roger Kent, Lovett's general counsel still in office, concerning the "gray areas" in the department. Kent instanced cases in which the service secretaries had directly challenged the secretary's authority, citing their prerogative under the 1947 act to "separately administer" their respective military departments. Certain statutes enacted since 1947 had in fact vested authority directly in the military departments, giving rise to the view that they were to be administered independently of the secretary of defense, even though in the same act he was given "authority, direction and control" over his whole department, including the three military departments. Similarly, individual chiefs of staff and the military heads of certain technical services and bureaus had claimed that in some areas they too were legally required to act independently of their civilian superiors. In Kent's view—which Lovett supported, and other executive agencies and previous organization plans had adopted—the proper solution was to transfer all functions of all agencies and employees of the department to the secretary, with exceptions as necessary.

None of the experts who advised or submitted statements to the committee challenged the view that the secretary should have "complete and effective authority" over the entire department. Ironically, it was one of the committee's own senior military consultants who voiced the most extreme opposition to strong secretarial powers. Admiral Nimitz, a blunt spokesman for the Navy's resistance to unification, urged that the authority of OSD be sharply reduced and that the secretary's role be redefined to include that of chairman of the Joint Chiefs, with the principal function of extracting monies from Congress and seeing to their proper expenditure. The secretary's office, Nimitz asserted, should be
divested of any authority over manpower and personnel, international security affairs, legal and legislative affairs, the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group—and the admiral was confident that the secretary could find still other functions that his office could do without. 15

Nimitz was a solitary champion of these views on the committee, however. His colleague, General Spaatz, favored enhancing the authority of both the secretary and the JCS chairman. Meanwhile a new legal opinion drafted by the General Counsel’s office determined that corrective measures to “clarify” the secretary’s authority would not be needed, concluding that existing legislation already supported the “supreme” authority of the secretary “to run the affairs of the Department of Defense and all its organizations and agencies.” It declared that “the power of the Secretary of Defense extends to all matters arising in the Department of whatsoever kind or nature; that the statute provides that the power and authority of the Secretary are superior to the authorities possessed by any other official, officer or member of the Department; that the Secretary’s power in the Department is the superior power irrespective of when or how any other individual’s power was derived.” 16

Convinced by the new ruling, the committee recommended that the superior power of the secretary should be “confirmed by decisive administrative action, and if necessary by statutory amendment,” presumably to protect it against future challenge. On the other hand, the three military departments should “continue to be separately organized and administered by their respective Secretaries subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.” The secretary, finally, exercised his authority “subject to the overriding authority of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief,” who was, moreover, free to deal directly with subordinates of the secretary of defense, including the military chiefs of the services. In time of war the president as commander in chief could be expected to assume much more active command over strategic operations, “but this is not in any way inconsistent with the National Security Act provision ‘that the Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.’” 17

The Unified Commands

Having thus established the primacy of the secretary within his department, the report next asserted the similar status of the three military
departmental secretaries within their respective departments: "The Secretary of each military department carries full responsibility for the administration of his department. No witness disagreed with the principle that the military chief of each service should be completely subject to the direction of civilian authority." Owing to the elusive character of the distinction between civilian and military affairs, parallel civilian and military channels linking the defense secretary with each service secretary and each military service chief would be administratively impracticable. The president and the secretary of defense would normally communicate with a military service chief or other military officers through the appropriate civilian secretary. In emergencies the communication might go directly to the recipient, but even then "such a channel of communication does in no sense take the military chief of a service out from under his responsibility to the Secretary of his military department, or relieve him of the obligation to keep his service Secretary fully informed." Effective implementation of this principle, the report added, might require adjustments in the internal organization and procedures of each military department. 18

This elucidation of the service secretaries' status derived mainly from an ongoing controversy over the role of the military service chiefs as executive agents of unified commands. The Key West Agreement of 1948 had provided that when a unified command was created, the Joint Chiefs should designate one of their members as executive agent for the command. Under this provision, for example, they had later designated Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins executive agent to administer the unified command in Korea. Subsequently Collins had asserted that when wearing this hat he reported to the secretary of defense through the Joint Chiefs, rather than through his superior, Army Secretary Frank Pace. The latter had promptly taken the issue to Secretary Lovett. Assistant Secretary Coolidge, whom Lovett assigned to deal with the problem, proceeded to write a legal opinion that when the chiefs established a unified command, the executive agent (specifically the Army chief of staff) was not independent of supervision by the secretary of the Army. The JCS, he argued, should be required to "treat the Secretary of a military department whose Chief of Staff has been appointed their agent as if the department itself had been appointed." Lovett reportedly had decided to adopt this course, but Truman left office before the issue could be brought before him. 19

Soon after the new administration took over, the issue was revived when the chiefs submitted a new unified command plan for Europe, following the traditional practice of designating a particular military service

* See Rearden, *Formative Years*, 393-97.
chief as executive agent for each overseas command. General Counsel Kent recommended that Wilson confront the issue squarely. If the unified command plan were approved in its present form, he pointed out, "it could be argued that Secretary Wilson had ratified the Key West paper"; that paper should be amended to provide for appointment of a military department as executive agent. Following the line of reasoning elucidated by Lovett, Kent, and others, the Rockefeller Committee accordingly declared that the executive agent provided by the Key West agreement was "undesirable." The committee recommended that the Key West agreement be revised accordingly, and that all orders transmitted by a unified command specify that they were issued by direction of the secretary of defense.20

During the hearing, General Bradley voiced the concern of the Joint Chiefs that the military might be unable, under this procedure, to exercise operational control over their forces, particularly in an emergency. In their last working session, the committee clarified the language of the report to ensure, "that, for the strategic direction and operational control of forces and for the conduct of combat operations, the military chief of that department should be empowered to receive and transmit orders and to act for that department in its executive agency capacity.21

The Joint Chiefs and Their Chairman

One of the basic aims of the reorganization was to improve the machinery of strategic planning, centered in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its supporting staff and committees. Eisenhower shared the belief of many critics in a basic weakness of the JCS system—a tendency of the chiefs and especially their committees and the Joint Staff—to be excessively influenced by loyalty to their respective services and by traditional service biases. This tendency, the Rockefeller Committee asserted, must be resisted. JCS plans must "provide for the defense of the Nation as a whole." The chiefs "must rise above the particular views of their respective services and provide the Secretary of Defense with advice which is based on the broadest conception of the national interest."22

A major anomaly in the existing defense structure was the dual role of the Joint Chiefs as planners and advisers and as administrators and commanders, the former prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947, the latter by subsequent delegation. One of the committee's first recommendations was that the Key West agreement be revised to eliminate command functions delegated to the JCS by the secretary of defense—notably in the establishment and administration of unified commands, as
mentioned earlier—"in order to enable them to work more effectively as a unified planning agency." In its planning role the corporate JCS also benefited from the practical experience of its individual members as chiefs of their respective services in implementing JCS plans. But the committee looked primarily to the JCS chairman, with enhanced powers, to organize the subordinate structure of the JCS and the Joint Staff with a view (1) to freeing the chiefs to concentrate on their primary function of strategic planning, and (2) as the president later put it, to divorce "the thinking and the outlook of the members of the Joint Staff from those of their parent services and to center their entire effort on national planning for the over-all common defense of the nation and the West." To this end the committee recommended that selection of the director of the Joint Staff be subject to the approval of the secretary, and assignments of officers to the JCS committees and to the Joint Staff be subject to approval of the chairman. To give the secretary a basis for full understanding of the background of each issue in making decisions, it was important also to bring into the planning process at all levels the independent views of other parts of the secretary's office and the expertise of scientific and technical specialists.23

The report recommended a variety of additional responsibilities for the JCS chairman, more or less inferable from the provision of the National Security Act. He should prepare JCS meeting agendas and help the chiefs "to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable." For example, to send matters referred to the JCS, if he saw fit, back to the secretary for proposed reassignment to a military department; to appoint consultants to the JCS from outside the department; to set up ad hoc committees to advise the JCS; and to determine which matters should be referred to the chiefs or delegated to other JCS bodies—in effect, with the help of the director of the Joint Staff, to serve as a general manager of the JCS system.24

The committee expressed particular concern for strengthening the role of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), senior advisers to the JCS on overall strategy. Officers assigned to this group needed to have an exceptional grasp of strategic matters, not only in their traditional international context but especially with respect to the effects of new weapons. They should also be chosen for their demonstrated emancipation from traditional service biases and appreciation of the need for integration of service plans. The committee urged that the JSSC be reinforced with prestigious civilian scientists, both physical and social, as well as with outstanding retired officers, and that it be given an important role in the integration of new weapons into the armed forces.25
Of all the proposed organizational reforms, elimination of the Munitions Board commanded widest support. Given statutory sanction in 1947,* it consisted, like other Defense boards, of representatives from the military departments sharing equal power with the civilian chairman. From its inception it had been a hotbed of interservice rivalry, which intensified during the Korean War when it was overwhelmed by an unanticipated large-scale mobilization. Another statutory agency, the Research and Development Board, on the other hand, had had the good fortune to receive a new charter from Secretary Lovett in May 1952, under which its chairman functioned, in effect, as an assistant secretary. The Rockefeller Committee recommended that both boards be transferred to the secretary of defense and their functions divided between three assistant secretaries: supply and logistics, research and development, and applications engineering.26

The disposition of these two statutory boards was part of a sweeping reorganization of defense functions contemplated by the committee. The statutory board (or agency) form of organization, the committee argued, was too rigid and unwieldy and should be replaced by assistant secretary positions to which the secretary could flexibly assign functions as required. The three existing assistant secretary positions—comptroller, international security affairs, and manpower and personnel—should be retained with their present responsibilities, and five more created to absorb the functions of the two eliminated boards, the Defense Supply Management Agency, the Office of Director of Installations, and the Office of Legislative Affairs. In addition the general counsel should be raised to assistant secretary rank.27

This reshuffle of existing functions was viewed, the president confidently asserted at the end of April, as “the key to the attainment of increased effectiveness at low cost in the Department of Defense.” As a “simple token testimony” he pledged an OSD staff reduction of about 500 people.28

In its final recommendations, the committee deplored the professional stigma that, despite official denials, seemed to be fastened on military officers assigned to OSD. It urged the secretary of defense to insist on full cooperation by the military departments “in assigning highly qualified officers” to all OSD agencies and in assuring them that such service would offer important opportunities for career advancement. It was imperative, moreover, that officers serving there “do not lose standing in their respective services through a lack of appreciation of the importance of this assignment or of the accomplishments of the individual officer while

* It was the successor to the Army-Navy Munitions Board, created in 1922.
on such duty. At the present time, many officers feel that assignment in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense isolates them from their service
and deprives them of an equal opportunity for promotion with other
officers of the same age and rank." In general the committee held that
civilian OSD officials should have exclusive authority to write formal
efficiency reports for military personnel serving under them, and military
departmental secretaries should direct their selection boards to give the
same weight to OSD service as to military service elsewhere.29

The Congressional Hurdle

Wilson forwarded the committee's report to the president on 13 April.
On that same day Rockefeller and staff director Don Price conferred with
Wilton B. Persons and Bryce Harlow of the White House staff on the
tactics of submitting the plan to Congress. The group decided to submit
it as an executive reorganization measure, the president's preference. It
would not require statutory passage and allowed the legislators 60 days to
"take it or leave it." On the 23d, in a meeting between the president and
congressional leaders, the omens were judged to be favorable. Informal
contacts with both houses continued. By the beginning of the next week
an agreed draft of the president's message had cleared the Justice Depart­
ment, as private briefings continued. On 30 April the president officially
transmitted his message, and copies were made available to the press.30

The president's message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 6, as it
was now labeled, briefly reviewed the circumstances that had led him to
conclude, after six years of experience under the National Security Act,
that the defense establishment was "in need of immediate improvement."
The Communist powers had chosen, he said "to conduct themselves in
such a way that these are years neither of total war nor total peace." Never­
theless, he was convinced that the Defense structure was fundamentally
sound, and would not be adversely affected by the changes now proposed.
He stressed three major objectives: (1) The military establishment must
rest firmly on basic constitutional principles and traditions, chiefly on a
"clear and unchallenged civilian responsibility," essential not only to preserve
democratic institutions but also to protect the integrity of the military
profession. Military leaders "must not be thrust into the political arena
to become the prey of partisan politics." (2) Because adequate defense
demanded more of the nation's resources than anticipated, "maximum effec­
tiveness at minimum cost is essential." (3) Finally, it was imperative to
develop "the best possible military plans," incorporating the "most competent
and considered thinking . . . military, scientific, industrial, and economic."31
After encountering no hurdles in the Senate, the plan ran into hostile fire in the House, primarily over the new powers accorded the JCS chairman. This issue set the tone of the debate. Behind the criticism lurked the suspicion that the plan reflected a power play by the Army members and their supporters on the committee with the backing of Commander in Chief Eisenhower—aimed at "Prussianizing" the high command by centralizing power in a large, Army-dominated general staff. In the immediate postwar years the Army had led the march toward unification and the concept of an integrated general staff with a single chief of staff. A prominent retired National Guard general and leading critic of the Army charged that it "has engaged in an unrelenting struggle for power." Throughout May unfriendly articles appeared from time to time. On the 30th, Rep. Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, Republican Whip and member of the Armed Services Committee, released to the press a letter he had written the president along with the latter's response. Speaking to Arends's question, "Does the proposal in any way represent a step toward our having an overall armed forces General Staff comparable to the Prussian General Staff?" the president answered at length: "The plan does not give the chairman of the Joint Chiefs command powers over the other three members of that body, it does not give him a vote in their proceedings, it does not ..." and so on down a long list of other attributes describing the popular image of the "Prussian" General Staff. Meanwhile, the chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, Clare Hoffman, a bitter foe of the National Security Act and enlarged powers for the JCS chairman, had introduced on 27 May a resolution providing that all aspects of the plan should take effect except those relating to that issue. Several weeks later he ordered a hearing on the resolution. Testifying before the House committee, Rockefeller, Kyes, and Dodge argued that the purpose of the chairman's enlarged powers was, in Kyes's words, "to afford the responsible official the managerial latitude normally given to any management head and to remove management detail from the heavily burdened members of the JCS." On 22 June the House Government Operations Committee, belying earlier signals of a favorable disposition toward the reorganization plan, approved Hoffman's resolution to delete the clauses that increased the power of the JCS chairman. Two days later, it rejected the entire plan. But on 29 June, after intensive administration lobbying, the full House decisively reversed the committee's vote, 235 to 108. On 30 June the reorganization plan became effective.
Organization of the Department of Defense subsequently became a major object of inquiry by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (known as the Second Hoover Commission).* Recommendations in June 1955 by its Committee on Business Organization in the Defense Department resulted in the merger of the assistant secretaryships for research and development and for applications engineering, and establishment of the Defense Science Board. Another recommendation, to organize the administration of research and development uniformly in the service departments under an assistant secretary in each, although approved by the administration, failed in Congress in 1956, along with a proposal to raise the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs to under secretary level.36

A more difficult problem addressed by the commission concerned the changed position of the Joint Chiefs in OSD resulting from their exclusion from the chain of command. The 1953 reorganization had intended to make the JCS a staff agency with a purely planning and advisory role, while increasing OSD participation in formulating defense policy. But as the system evolved, the secretary's office, with its augmented corps of assistant secretaries, became a business-oriented bureaucracy devoted largely to applying fiscal and managerial controls to the services' procurement, supply, and other logistic operations. Apparently, this trend accorded with Wilson's wishes and suited his view of OSD's proper role in the DoD firmament. But it also deprived the JCS of the leaven of civilian experience and outlook that the Rockefeller Committee had hoped to infuse into the formulation of defense policies and strategic plans. Also, the service chiefs tended to be even more focused than before on the daily business and special interests of their respective services, contrary to the intent of the 1953 reorganization that they delegate their administrative duties and cultivate broader perspectives. Late in 1955 one of them estimated that he spent only 18 apparently unrewarding hours a week on Joint Staff work, which he regarded as more than ample. As a corporate entity the JCS came to be centered in the office of the chairman and the Joint Staff and the committee empire that the former controlled.37

One of the staff working papers of the Hoover Commission roundly criticized these developments, asserting that the chiefs were still immersed in details, devoted too little time to broad planning, and were too partisan. The recommended remedy was to give the secretary "a high level group to advise directly in the field of strategy, missions [and] force levels." This

* The predecessor Hoover Commission had carried out a similar study in 1948.
proposal harked back to a similar one by Lovett and McNeil, rejected by the Rockefeller Committee with the argument that such a staff would overlap or conflict with the role of the JCS. As an alternative the committee had recommended strengthening the Joint Strategic Survey Committee by adding to it distinguished scientists and outstanding retired officers. Little was done to adopt these proposals, and the JSSC continued to function in the JCS system much as before. The Rockefeller Committee had also regarded the expansion of the secretary's office by the addition of several new assistant secretaries as a kind of alternative to the proposed new committee, and in the end opted for that solution because of the perceived need for individuals of elevated rank and salary to provide the desired talent and prestige. 38

**Unintended Consequences**

Missing from the blessings that Eisenhower told Congress and the nation he expected to flow from the Defense reorganization was a solution to the apparent inability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to function as a corporate body. Lovett and other critics tended to see this as the principal challenge facing the secretary and one of the most compelling reasons for strengthening his authority and that of the JCS chairman. 39 Eisenhower had grown up with parochial service attitudes in the Army, and as a young officer presumably shared them. But from early in World War II he had held high leadership positions in national and multinational organizations in which single-service points of view were often irrelevant or counterproductive. Long before he reached the White House he had shed these attitudes, and apparently saw no reason why mature and intelligent individuals in high positions should not be expected to do likewise. In mid-1953, with the Korean quagmire behind him, he moved quickly to replace the Truman chiefs of staff, whose terms expired shortly, with a new set selected before his inauguration, a distinguished group of officers whom he repeatedly praised thereafter as possibly the most able ever appointed to these posts. 40

For one of them, Admiral Arthur Radford, recruited from commander in chief, Pacific, to replace Bradley as JCS chairman, he had especially high hopes. An odd choice, Radford had opposed unification and been a leader of the "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949. But the admiral persuaded both Eisenhower and Wilson that he had changed his spots and was ready to support Eisenhower's national strategy, involving sharp reductions in conventional forces and defense spending and more emphasis on atomic
weapons and airpower. Apparently he asked for no commitments on treatment of the Navy. But in May, before Radford assumed his new post, Eisenhower demanded from him a sort of "prenuptial" agreement in the form of a public statement that his confirmation as JCS chairman would require a "divorce from exclusive identification with the Navy," that henceforth he would be loyal to the Defense Department as a whole and would serve as "champion of all the services, governed by the single criterion of what is best for the United States." How much of Radford's conversion was genuine and how much opportunism is not clear, but for practical purposes it was complete. From then on he was the "president's man," his chief military adviser and spokesman, his most reliable supporter against the often fractious service chiefs, and a persuasive vindication of his belief that a chief of staff or commander such as Radford could be weaned from partisan loyalty to his own service.11

But except for Radford the new Joint Chiefs did not shed their service loyalties and biases. Indeed, the president's constant criticism of these attitudes may have served to intensify them. For his part, Eisenhower apparently was surprised and disappointed, and soon incensed by the persistence of attitudes which he could only regard as self-serving lack of vision. His reaction revealed not only the depth of his own "emancipation," but his unwillingness or inability to recognize any validity in these opposing viewpoints. Why, indeed, should he have expected otherwise? Each of the new chiefs now found himself in a position to which he must have aspired for many years. To be chief of staff of his own service was the traditional ultimate goal of every ambitious officer. To be told at this juncture—the beginning of a new administration and the end of a debilitating and frustrating war—that he must not strive to expand his service, or take on new missions, or compete with his sister services, flew in the face of the whole military culture.

Eisenhower's hope that the services could work together without friction like a well-oiled machine under a single coordinated plan in which each service played a fixed assigned role was shown to be unrealistic from the beginning. The service chiefs were persistently competitive, each demanding more resources than the administration was willing to give and lacking in sensitivity to the possible repercussions on the needs of other services or the national economy. "Every recommendation made by the military authorities," Eisenhower complained, "seems to be for an increase in strength or in money or both." Recalling that the Army, his own service, had held on to its horses for 50 years after cavalry had become obsolete, he remarked that he had yet to hear of any service being willing to give up something. Each service chief should, he insisted,
subordinate his identity to that of a team member of national military advisers to the president. He should even initiate reductions in his program, including transfers of a function to another service that could perform it more efficiently and cheaply.42

The services were also incorrigibly image-conscious. Each publicly flaunted its sophisticated new weaponry, advanced doctrine, and asserted role in the ultimate defeat of the Communists, while engaged in an endless competition for headlines and broadcast time. Most of this was normal, if flamboyant, public relations activity, aimed at improving service morale. Some was more covert and politically motivated, ostensibly conducted behind the back of the service chief or secretary. In the spring of 1956 the "competitive publicity," as an exasperated Eisenhower called it, reached such a pitch that he took all three service chiefs "to the woodshed" in his office, castigating them for leaking information, some of it classified, to the press.43

Service competition also found a public outlet through the testimony offered at congressional hearings on the Defense budget. Service spokesmen, while praising their own service's weaponry and performance, on occasion disparaged those of their service rivals. Eisenhower angrily lectured the chiefs on this practice. A service chief of staff, he declared, "should not present just the picture of his own service alone. Each service supplements the other in over-all military strength. Those testifying should not make it look as though each does the job alone."44

Eisenhower's most serious grievance against the chiefs pertained to their refusal, or inability, to accept wholeheartedly all the prescriptions of his new national cold war strategy, the so-called New Look, worked out and supposedly agreed to by all of them in the fall of 1953 and winter of 1954. Occasionally he protested that he did not expect them to "abandon their basic convictions" and that he laid no claim to ultimate wisdom in these matters. Practically speaking, this meant little. A dissenter was entitled to a hearing (with Admiral Radford in watchful attendance and Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster busily scribbling for the record). Once heard, if he failed to change the president's mind, he was expected to refrain from airing his dissent publicly or from stirring up arguments in official circles.45

The framing of the New Look strategy and its subsequent development over the next three years are traced in detail in later chapters, but its effect on Eisenhower's deteriorating relations with the chiefs can be summarized here. The core elements of the New Look centered on heavy reliance on nuclear airpower; modernized but drastically reduced ground forces, concentrated as far as practical in and near the continental United States; and integrated air-ground-sea continental defense forces. Indigenous allied
forces, aided by U.S. support forces and materiel as needed, would provide for their own defense against Communist aggression. The whole system was designed to be affordable under peacetime cold war budgets and adequate for the nation's defense over the long haul. The Air Force had assured preeminence as the chief arsenal of the nation's nuclear and conventional airpower, with nuclear-armed long-range ballistic missiles only a few years down the road. By mid-1956, war plans assumed, a war with the Soviet Union would be fought with nuclear weapons and initiated by air strikes against one or both homelands. The Navy had a secondary, more specialized role with its nuclear and conventional sea power, including carrier-borne aviation and supported by the Marine Corps' amphibious forces with their own tactical aviation. Since naval carriers could also project nuclear air strikes against an enemy's coastal regions, the Air Force and the Navy together held a de facto monopoly of offensive airpower, soon to be enhanced by the nuclear submarine armed with mid-range nuclear ballistic missiles. These two services were thus principal beneficiaries of Defense budgets. The Air Force's budget actually continued to grow despite peacetime economies, and the Navy's suffered only moderate reductions.

The Army, traditional home of the nation's land power and the dominant service during the Korean War, found itself relegated to underdog status through massive force and budget reductions. Subsequently, although it shared with the Navy the building of the first intermediate-range ballistic missiles, it was denied an operational mission for them. Its first chief of staff after the war, Matthew B. Ridgway, a Korean War hero and NATO supreme commander, fiercely resisted the New Look manpower cuts as best he could short of insubordination. For his pains Eisenhower brushed off his protests as "parochial." Retiring in mid-1955 after only a two-year term, Ridgway continued the fight with speeches and magazine articles. His successor, Maxwell D. Taylor, a World War II hero and Far East commander, was a more formidable adversary, both politically and intellectually. He became chief of staff at a time when the pace of the growing Soviet threat had suddenly quickened, with major advances, both technical and quantitative, in airpower and nuclear capabilities. By 1956 these advances had brought alarmingly nearer than previously anticipated the attainment of parity between the two powers in their capacity to destroy each other by surprise attack. For the first time an all-out general war, precipitated by reciprocal fear of being attacked first, seemed a real possibility.

Taylor did not settle for mere protests of personnel cuts. His answer to what he viewed as the administration's overweening emphasis on a
cold war strategy of “massive retaliation” proposed the first coherent alternative strategy the president had yet had to confront. Later known as “flexible response,” it stressed deterrence and measured response at all levels of aggression, with balanced forces, conventional as well as nuclear, appropriate to the task. Massive retaliation remained on the menu but, as Taylor pointed out, the National Security Council itself had already declared an all-out Soviet air attack on the United States as the least likely of all contingencies in a situation of nuclear parity. The most likely Communist strategy was seen as a “nibbling” expansion through local and proxy aggression and fomented insurrection and subversion, mainly in underdeveloped and vulnerable Third World countries as already demonstrated in Southeast Asia, Greece, Guatemala, the Philippines, and elsewhere. The priorities of effort for dealing with these challenges, Taylor believed, should be ordered accordingly.48

These views put him on a collision course with the president. Confronting him (by invitation) in his office in May 1956, Taylor challenged as unrealistic the assumption in the current 1960 war plan that a war with the USSR would necessarily start with an all-out nuclear attack by one or both sides. Far more likely, he argued, it would come “through a succession of actions and counteractions.” Since not only big wars, but small ones, as well, must be deterred, diverse types of forces were needed. “We should first calculate what is needed for deterrence and provide that; we should then provide the requirements for flexible forces usable in small wars, and finally put what remaining effort we have into the requirements for fighting an all-out war.”49

Eisenhower rejected Taylor’s reasoning. Tactical nuclear weapons, he went on, had “come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern armed forces” and should therefore be freely used in small wars wherever appropriate. However, the United States should generally not “tie down our forces around the Soviet periphery in small wars,” but rather build up indigenous forces in the regions threatened. It was folly to contemplate moving large numbers of divisions overseas in the early months of an all-out war. “Massive retaliation . . . is likely to be the key to survival . . . . Planning should . . . [assume] the use of tactical atomic weapons against military targets in any small war in which the United States might be involved.” Taylor’s position, the president implied, was motivated by understandable nostalgia for “the same great role [for the Army] in the first year of war in relation to the other services as formerly.” Regrettably the “Chiefs of Staff still thought much too much in terms of his own service.” The Army should recognize that its new role, to maintain order at home in the initial stages of war, was “truly vital.” He was confident that the nation’s
security required primary reliance on nuclear weapons. He did not claim to be "all wise in such matters," but "he was very sure that as long as he ... [was] President he would meet an attack in the way indicated."50

From the president's vantage point the new JCS "system" would seem to offer rock-solid support for his defense policies. Radford "rubbed in" Taylor's defeat, pointing out that the president's decision supported the majority view of the Joint Chiefs.51 In fact, a majority of the chiefs, knowing that the president had already made up his mind, dutifully went along. This was another of the JCS decisions against the Army that on major issues over the past three years had become almost the norm. Wilson's almost ritual concurrence simply added another nail. The real decision was the president's. All the others were only decisions to advise.

Public relations disasters confirmed the president's growing discontent with the way the 1953 reorganization was working out. Although only the Army's chief of staff had openly and fundamentally opposed the New Look strategy, only the Air Force chief, its principal beneficiary, had supported it with any enthusiasm, but without abating his open efforts to gain larger appropriations. None of the chiefs had shown any concern, except as directed by higher authority on particular issues, for the impact of his service's rising demands in treasure or resources on the health of the national economy which, next to the Communist menace, the president regarded as the single greatest threat to the nation's security. "In working for permanent security," he lectured the Joint Chiefs in March 1956, "we must give due consideration to the right 'take' from the economy—one which will permit the economy to remain viable and strong."52

Even Wilson and Radford, the president's two Defense stalwarts, were not totally undemanding. Wilson's loyalty to the president was beyond question, but as head of the hungriest of the agencies feeding on the economy, he felt obliged periodically to defend its needs and interests, including even service protests against budget and manpower cuts. Prospective increases in DoD spending over the next few years, he protested to the NSC on one occasion, "were not the result of extravagance, but were based on the realities which we faced. ... The problem ultimately gets back to the basic matter of U.S. commitments and U.S. troop deployments." Discussing the rapid growth of Soviet airpower, he "opposed the view that we should simply sit where we are. We should speed up, should increase both our production of B-52s and our production of new fighter aircraft. Otherwise we could not honestly go before the people of the United States and honestly tell them we were staying ahead of the Russians."53 At a meeting of the NSC on 17 May Wilson confessed that "try as they would, he and Admiral Radford simply could not carry out
their commitments on the basis of the budgets on which the Defense Department now operates." Radford agreed. 54

A few days earlier Eisenhower reached a decision that "some reorientation of the whole organization ought to be made sometime next year." The kind of "reorientation" he had in mind revealed the extent to which he had lost confidence in the service chiefs as key elements of the machinery for developing defense policy, and, conversely, his continued reliance on Wilson and Radford to ride herd on the system. The authority of these two, already strengthened in the 1953 reorganization, he wanted further enlarged, while the services would be reduced to "a more operational, less policy role," making the chiefs, in effect, "assistants to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—i.e. giving him the power to select and reassign them. The Chiefs would then have the duty of implementing policy within their own service—not of developing over-all policy." 55

The president had in mind other changes aimed at curbing the chiefs' propensity to make trouble when "off the reservation": requiring prospective appointees to take an oath to accept decisions once made, and officials who served in the Pentagon not to disclose any "security information" after retirement, as well as other rules for statements on government policies by retired officers. Eisenhower also began to reconsider instituting a senior defense advisory staff, a new, more senior military committee ("senior officers divorced from service") modeled on one he had set up when chief of staff. 56

Eisenhower found less fault with the civilian than with the military side of the 1953 reorganization. Perhaps because he was less involved than Wilson in the selection of the service secretaries and in subsequent dealings with them, he seemed to expect less of them than of the service chiefs. Most of the latter were former associates or old friends, whose opposition he seemed to regard almost as a betrayal. His complaints of the service chiefs' performance, both individually and as a corporate group, were not matched by similar strictures concerning the secretaries. The latter, indeed, offered less resistance than the chiefs to the president's policies. 57

Nothing was done in 1956 to implement Eisenhower's few remarks on Defense reorganization. 6 During the presidential election campaign the

* In 1956 Congress finished the task begun in 1948 of codifying the laws governing the military establishment (Titles 10 and 32). Inadvertently, the new legislation incorporated old provisions that gave command authority to the chief of naval operations and the Air Force chief of staff, thus conflicting with the president's authority to put units of those services in unified commands. As it happened, this issue was never raised. For some reason the Army chief of staff received no command authority, remaining legally an adviser to the secretary of the Army. See Cole et al, Department of Defense, 163-64; Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956, 11; PL 1028, 84 Cong (10 Aug 56).
topic was relegated to a back burner, and Wilson did not seem eager to have his responsibilities enlarged, as the president desired. The following June he stated emphatically that he regarded the existing organization of the Defense Department as "sound" and "responsive to the President, the Congress and the American people." He urged the purveyors of radical changes "to advocate them only after the most careful thought and when experience has proved that they are necessary."^{58}

Over the horizon and unexpected was the next Soviet "surprise," Sputnik. It would bring a new sense of urgency and lend impetus to a new, more far-reaching reorganization of the Defense Department in 1958.
Charles E. Wilson was no stranger to his future boss in 1952; he and Eisenhower had been acquainted for several years, and, even before the 1952 election, he had let the general know of his willingness to serve in an Eisenhower administration. In 1952 Wilson stood at the pinnacle of a brilliant career. Reputedly the nation's highest-paid business executive, Wilson in 1953 headed the world's largest private corporation in a highly competitive technology-based industry in which managerial competence was a driving force and a prerequisite to survival.

All this was known to Herbert Brownell and Lucius Clay, Eisenhower's chief talent searchers, who recommended Wilson for the post of secretary of defense—in time to join the president-elect's entourage on the pre-inauguration trip to the Pacific in December 1952. For Eisenhower, what counted most about Wilson was his demonstrated competence in managing bigness, the salient characteristic of the Defense Department. For other departments the president chose executives primarily for their expertise or experience in their departments' fields of endeavor. Unlike his predecessors, Wilson had no experience or acquired knowledge in foreign or military affairs, credentials that would not have been required by a president of Eisenhower's military and international stature. What the president did need and want was a seasoned executive who could effectively implement his defense policies and run the vast Pentagon empire, the world's biggest purchaser and user of armaments technology. Wilson seemed to be custom-built for the job, an executive who would not be daunted by bigness. At first he seemed to be daunted by something else, perhaps the unfamiliarity of the managerial problems he initially encountered. DoD was an administrative headache, plagued with inherited organizational and management troubles, some of them historic, awaiting
long overdue solutions. Whatever the reason, Wilson apparently sought early on to have weekly conferences with the president. But Eisenhower quickly put a stop to that, telling Wilson, "Charlie, you run defense." Wilson got the message, and his self-confidence quickly returned. Thereafter he ran DoD more or less as he had run General Motors, minus the profit imperative—dealing with the familiar problems of production, procurement, and personnel management—and in this vast arena he soon became, wrote a biographer, "a spokesman and management specialist for the administration."  

"Gray Eminence"

In managing the Defense Department Wilson benefited greatly from the services of his comptroller, Wilfred J. McNeil, the most valuable of the officials retained from the departing administration. A high school dropout from a small town in Iowa, McNeil had come a long way since leaving home, successively a Navy enlistee in World War I, a bank cashier and small town bank president, an automobile distributor, an executive at the Des Moines Register. As circulation manager at the Washington Post beginning in 1934, he seemed to be headed for a promising career in the newspaper business. But during World War II he took a new turn. As a Navy reservist he rose to the rank of rear admiral, and Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal made him his fiscal director and a key player in his budgetary reforms. McNeil was thus "present at the creation" in 1947 when Forrestal became the first secretary of the new National Military Establishment and brought him from the Navy Department to serve as his special financial assistant. Later, his was a guiding hand behind Forrestal's successful efforts to promote the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act. Title IV of the amendments established the position of comptroller of the Defense Department, with responsibility for advising and assisting the secretary in performing departmental budgetary and fiscal functions, and also outlined uniform budgetary and financial procedures to be administered by the OSD comptroller and the newly created Army, Navy, and Air Force comptrollers.

McNeil became the first comptroller under Title IV. From this new vantage point he devised, and persuaded Congress to adopt, a more rational structure for the DoD budget. Until this time, the services had received their appropriations in more than a hundred separate compartments with which service budgeteers were forbidden to tamper; appropriations were annual, expiring on 30 June, the end-date of each fiscal year. In McNeil's
system funds were grouped in a few broad functional, non-organizational categories, such as procurement, maintenance and operations, and research and development, which, for the first time, enabled Congress and the secretary of defense to compare the funding of like activities across organizational lines. He also persuaded the key congressional committees to remove from the services and consolidate in OSD the apportionment procedures, which regulated both the amounts of money to be spent, and the rates at which funds could be obligated. Henceforth the comptroller's office in OSD received and endorsed the services' apportionment requests and forwarded them to the Bureau of the Budget. This provided McNeil with enormous influence in the operation of the department.

Long before the Eisenhower administration took over, McNeil had built for himself a solid base of respect and trust, bridging party lines, in the congressional committees and staffs that dealt with DoD finance. Over the years he had followed a few simple, common sense rules for dealing with members of Congress: never confront them with unpleasant surprises; whenever possible, settle "hot" issues before going public; expect congressional wrath when programs and policies unpopular with legislative constituencies—such as base closings—generate unfavorable publicity; always ensure that information provided to Congress is prompt, accurate, and comprehensive; give Congress credit for all favorable developments, up to and including acts of God. As Forrestal's fiscal director, he had persuaded the secretary not to follow the common practice of padding the budget request: "I think we ought to go [only] for what we ought to have," he said, "and try to prove it." Later, this decision paid off when Congress awarded the Navy almost all of the amount requested, and on another occasion approved the full amount of a customary emergency fund even though only a small fraction of it had been used the year before.

McNeil quickly gained the trust and respect of his boss, Secretary Wilson. Possessed of an uncommonly lucid and analytical mind, the comptroller was more than a fiscal policy expert. In many difficult policy areas—weaponry, strategy, procurement, foreign affairs—his Navy and OSD experience, backed by military service in both wars, had given him a broad and versatile competence, and, even more important, a sophisticated, firsthand familiarity with congressional politics. This background enabled him to expound with confidence and knowledge on a wide range of issues that Wilson, loquacious and self-confident but unclear in expression and not notably well informed outside the range of his own experience, could not address persuasively. Placed at Wilson's service in many forums, especially Congress, where McNeil's credentials were already established, these skills provided the secretary a formidable administrative tool. Much
of McNeil's expertise derived from the assistance rendered him by an exceptionally expert staff that he had chosen with an eye to high quality.

In overall defense policy McNeil exercised influence so transcendent that his recommendations were virtually assured of approval and implementation. Early on, he convinced Wilson that the budget was a potent mechanism for controlling the direction and monitoring of policy. This conviction dovetailed neatly with the president's view that defense policies must not exceed the limits of what the country could afford, both immediately and for the long haul—perhaps the most fundamental tenet of the Eisenhower New Look. Early in 1953, when the large FY 1954 defense budget proposed by the Truman administration was under critical examination in the National Security Council, Budget Director Joseph Dodge raised the question "whether we can afford to keep absorbing our resources at this rate and maintain our free and democratic way of life." Eisenhower promptly suggested, to forestall the tendency of defense costs to creep upward with the piecemeal approval of proposals and plans, that every program supported by the defense budget should contain a financial appendix, or its equivalent, showing its estimated cost and predicted impact on policies.5

This procedure, while not invariably adhered to, served henceforth as a useful curb on overambitious programming, whether in the initial formulation of defense budgets or during their subsequent journey to final executive and legislative approval. Similarly, it tended to deter proposals of unaffordable objectives in other policy documents, notably the annual Basic National Security Policy issued by the NSC. Certain ambitious or visionary "declaratory" policies—affirmations of far-reaching aims left largely unimplemented—could become embarrassing, such as the proclaimed intention, inherited from the 1952 presidential campaign, to roll back communism in eastern Europe. Eisenhower did not explicitly repudiate it until late in 1953.

A seriously planned "roll back" strategy was so foreign to Eisenhower's thinking, as reflected in the emerging New Look, that it never really approached realization. But the cold war attitude it reflected, a determination to respond aggressively to Communist encroachment anywhere, had deep roots in the armed services and indeed in the national psyche. Whenever it surfaced in the National Security Council or other high-level forums, it usually yielded quickly to counsels of prudence or economy, or both. But Wilson and McNeil were wary of initially modest proposals that, if pursued without an eye to possible costs and other long-term implications, might develop a life of their own and spin out of control. One such instance was the clamor in the spring of 1954 to rescue a large
French Union garrison trapped by insurgent Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu, in northwestern Indochina. There were fears that Communist China, supporting the Viet Minh, would engulf Indochina and sweep over the rest of Southeast Asia. Wilson and McNeil firmly backed the president in resisting pressure to intervene, which enjoyed some support in the JCS and even within OSD. Dien Bien Phu fell, but the sky, contrary to some predictions, remained in place.6 Later, following the 1956 anti-Communist risings in Hungary and Poland, McNeil opposed moves to exploit this apparent opportunity to undermine Soviet dominance of eastern Europe, warning that the Soviets would go to war rather than back down under such a provocation.7

Apart from such crises, there was continuing tension, in many forums from the NSC on down, between the military services' asserted requirements for implementing their commitments and responsibilities and the administration's efforts to hold down spending—in effect, a conflict over the size and shape of the DoD budget, McNeil's primary area of responsibility and expertise. Wilson had a twofold responsibility to the president in this endeavor, advisory and executive: to recommend, and to implement, policies and actions for pursuing the economy goal. The latter was the corporate executive's normal function; the former was more demanding of initiative and ingenuity, and it was especially here that McNeil showed his worth. "Where the Comptroller . . . participates in the making of decisions," he once confided to a congressional committee, "is in attempting to . . . force upon the attention, of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the secretaries of the military departments, the costs and other implications of what is happening in various operations of the Department of Defense. If you do not feel the proper attention has been given, you point out the problem [and] . . . force a considered solution.8

In this role, by virtue of Wilson's reliance on him, McNeil served as an executive vice president for fiscal affairs, exercising effective control over spending levels for most major defense programs. He had many counterparts, of course, all along the chain of command from post commanders to the president, most of whom routinely depended on the advice and specialized knowledge of trusted aides in making decisions in areas outside their own field of expertise. But McNeil's role, if not unique, was certainly special by virtue of the key importance of the preparation and administration of the defense budget. McNeil was sometimes referred to, in fact (although he later professed not to remember), as Wilson's "gray eminence."*
The Budget Process

McNeil might as aptly have been called "Mr. Budget," had not that title belonged more properly to the head of the Bureau of the Budget. In the Defense Department, however, the budget was indisputably McNeil's turf, his familiarity with it the source of his power. "Several budgets are with us all the time," he explained to an audience of newspaper editors in April 1954. The FY 1950 and FY 1951 budgets still fueled current operations, programs funded with FY 1952 and FY 1953 money were under way, and still others now being initiated were authorized in the FY 1954 budget, as would be some in the FY 1955 budget soon to be passed by Congress. Finally, plans were now being prepared for implementation under the FY 1956 budget.\(^9\)

Normally budget preparation began soon after the beginning of the calendar year with a top-level review, by the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the basic national strategic posture, objectives, and policies, with the Joint Chiefs' attendant recommendations of force goals and military strength needed to execute them. About May the NSC reviewed and modified the JCS recommendations, approved some, and by the end of June transmitted the necessary directives through OSD to the services. Soon thereafter, at an informal conference of top DoD officials at the Marine base at Quantico, Virginia, the services would be given approximate budget targets and an opportunity to vent their initial reactions. During the summer the military department comptrollers developed their respective cost estimates and submitted them in September.

Then came the climactic event of the whole process, a joint BoB-OSD analysis of the by now thoroughly picked-over budget. Although referred to as a "markup" this phase actually involved a markdown. The services received a report of the revisions and where they found the cuts unacceptable they contested the comptroller's decision by filing an appeal or a "reclama" (a federalese term suggesting noisy contention). At first these appeals spun off a sideshow of negotiations between McNeil's staff and representatives of the military departments. Those that could not be resolved at this level were taken to the secretary for what became known during Wilson's tenure as the "big tent shows." Each service was given a day to present its case against the analysis compiled by McNeil. The respective adversaries sat across from one another along a lengthy table while Wilson, very much in juridical fashion, sat at the head. Generally all of the rulings were prearranged between Wilson and McNeil. The secretary would grant some of the service's requests but in the main he supported his comptroller. Early in December, the product of these negotiations was submitted to the president and NSC for a final working
over, and in January was forwarded to Congress as part of the proposed federal budget.10

Defense financing was measured by three closely related dollar figures: new obligational authority (NOA) or appropriations, planned obligations, and expenditures. NOA represented the funds Congress authorized the Treasury to deposit to the various accounts—major procurement, operations and maintenance, public works, military personnel, research and development, etc.—that made up the budget of each military service department and of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The total amount of NOA for each account, comparable to a line of credit issued by a bank, was entered on the books of the Treasury as the maximum amount that could be drawn upon for spending within that appropriation account. No cash was actually involved in this transaction; the Treasury did not have to borrow funds or have cash on hand beyond the amount needed to meet current day-to-day expenditures.11

Planned obligations measured the level of new financial activity anticipated for the fiscal year, for example the civilian and military personnel to be employed and the volume of contracts to be placed for goods and services. Obligations for a particular fiscal year often exceeded the new appropriations for that year, since certain still unobligated funds carried over from previous years' appropriations were also available for obligation. How this happened can be illustrated by the obligation sequence for a Forrestal-class aircraft carrier. Complying with DoD policy, as instituted by McNeil before the first contract was let, Congress always appropriated all the funds needed to build a ship, or carry out a project of similar magnitude. A Forrestal carrier cost about $200 million, most of which (about $152.5 million) was obligated in the first year by the basic contract, plus another $12.5 million for long lead-time items like boilers and turbines. During the next four years about $35 million would be obligated for equipment, consumable stores, and various adjustments.12

Expenditures, the third budget category, were the total amount of checks drawn on the Treasury from obligated funds to pay personnel and for purchased goods and services, regardless of the years in which they were ordered. Since the flow of expenditures in a particular year could not be accurately predicted, it had to be estimated.13

Which of these three categories best reflected the direction and emphasis of defense policy was a subject of continuing debate among defense policy makers. One view held that new appropriations were the factor most directly related to current policy and planning. Obligations and expenditures represented the sequential actions by which past decisions were implemented. To meet a current demand, i.e., to pay a
In terms of new obligational authority, DoD appropriations tended to be relatively stable over the Wilson years, holding steady between $34 billion and $36 billion during the FY 1954-57 period. Nevertheless, the distribution of appropriated funds among services and within appropriation categories could vary significantly. In FY 1956-57, Air Force appropriations soared while Army appropriations plunged, partly owing to major policy changes. Each year's new appropriations, moreover, represented only part, although the most important part, of available assets. A major source of additional funds for DoD planners was the backlog of still unobligated prior-year appropriations, particularly for several years after the Korean War, when the Army, for example, financed its procurement needs wholly from these funds. Another source was the earnings of the military departments from reimbursement for goods and services provided in military assistance programs. Other factors affecting the total of NOA were the occasional transfers of funds by Congress from one appropriation account to another, and rescissions that cancelled the appropriation authority granted by a previous bill. Hence an administration’s decisions in a given year to spend appropriated funds were reflected by obligations, rather than appropriations, whether or not the actual expenditures were made in that year or later. For that reason, McNeil came to believe that obligations reflected current policy more accurately than either appropriations or expenditures.

McNeil also believed that the procedures of the financial management system should be sufficiently flexible to enable its participants to seize opportunities for economy and efficiency and reap the rewards thereof. To this end he succeeded in having the principal procurement, construction, and research and development funds converted from annual to “no year” appropriations, i.e., continuing appropriations which did not expire with the fiscal year on 30 June. With annual money, as McNeil put it, “once they [a government agency] make a contract, that’s it. Even if they don’t need the damn stuff afterwards, they still get [it] delivered . . . . [But with no-year money] you could go up to June 30 [or later] and not buy the stuff . . . . You can cancel it and buy what you do need.”

Another illustration of McNeil’s pursuit of flexibility and economy was his aforementioned advocacy of full initial funding for multiyear projects such as aircraft carriers. He also believed that project managers should have built-in procedural incentives to economize, for example, by being allowed to shift to other projects the funds saved by completing a project under budgeted cost. He also assisted contractors burdened by cost overruns to secure government-guaranteed loans. As an obvious
incentive to encourage companies to proceed expeditiously, however, he made them responsible for the interest payments on the new financing.

Within the military establishment, McNeil believed, mutual dissatisfaction between suppliers and users was normal and healthy. Building on that concept McNeil created first during his tenure in the Navy, and later throughout all of the DoD, various stock funds. The principal objective was to confront the user of an item with the cost. For example, a particular component of a military department might be assigned to provide paint and common hardware supplies or assume responsibility for performing printing services for its particular branch of the service or in some cases the entire DoD. To initiate such an operation an agency or agencies would be established and capitalized. Other components within the military departments would receive operating and maintenance budgets from which they could purchase paint or contract for printing services in accordance with their needs and priorities. The choice of the rate and amount of the spending would thus be up to the user who might be a base commander. As these transactions occurred the common supply agency, with the resources it had acquired through its sales, would employ its financial earnings to replenish its stock in anticipation of future demand. In the most optimistic of circumstances the various stock and industrial fund operations would only have to be capitalized once. By FY 1957 the assets of the various stock funds were $8.2 billion and those of the industrial funds $1.8 billion.17

The Elusive Unobligated Balances

Perhaps the most baffling and persistent aspect of fiscal management that Wilson and McNeil had to deal with was that of controlling the accumulation of unobligated balances—the unspent and not yet obligated funds earmarked for specific purchases that remained at the end of each fiscal year. These ballooning sums—$15.7 billion at the end of FY 1954—frustrated them and, even more, the House and Senate Defense appropriations subcommittees, whose members suspected that the money was being used for purposes other than those specified in the original appropriation. Major deviations, such as reprogramming or transferring of funds from one major account to another—say, from procurement and production to maintenance and operations—required prior authorization by the appropriate congressional committee. But shifts of funds within a single budget category were permitted—say, a decision to purchase more bombers and fewer transports, or tanks instead of trucks. As an
architect of the arrangement McNeil defended this latitude, arguing that it enabled the services to correct second best choices that, at the time, seemed clearly justified.\textsuperscript{18}

The disagreement over the use of unobligated funds headed for a showdown in 1955. As hearings on the FY 1956 Defense budget began in February, the House Appropriations Subcommittee confronted McNeil with the embarrassing record of erroneous forecasts of unobligated carryovers from FY 1954. Starting at $6.9 billion in January 1954 the estimates had risen a year later to $15.7 billion including the separate public works budget.\textsuperscript{19} Meanwhile, for the current year, FY 1955, the administration was already predicting an unobligated balance of $11.7 billion.\textsuperscript{20} The figures left the administration vulnerable to charges of sloppy procurement planning, as well as wasteful hoarding of unneeded funds that ought to be returned to the Treasury. "Why," demanded the exasperated subcommittee chairman, Democratic Rep. George H. Mahon, "can you not do a better job of estimating your requirements at this time when the President says that we are in the midst of a peacetime economy?\textsuperscript{21} The pileup of unobligated FY 1954 carryovers may in good part be explained by the need to make huge adjustments in procurement after the end of the Korean War in July 1953. The cancellations, cutbacks, and stretchouts of programs inevitably caused the larger than usual pileup.

Some of the legislators had fond memories of the pre-1952 appropriation system, under which, for the big military procurement and construction programs, Congress provided a combination of cash appropriations for the short lead-time items that would be paid for during the fiscal year, and unfinanced contract authority for the longer lead-time items that could be paid for later. The system made for low unexpended balances but, as McNeil pointed out, it resembled buying on the installment plan—"little money down and low monthly payments during the first year"—without much awareness of total costs, duration of payment schedules, or the often concealed costs of the credit thus extended. Now, in 1955 some of the unfinanced contract authority provided back in FY 1951 remained unliquidated. In FY 1952, McNeil recalled that this committee "wisely and courageously" instituted full initial funding of approved multiyear procurement and construction programs, even though it would require larger initial appropriations. This enabled Congress to review these programs in their entirety before financing them, including specific numbers and prices of aircraft, ships, missiles, tanks, etc. DoD thus had assurance that each delivered aircraft or tank would have all its component parts, while Congress would not have to deal with a series of half-finished projects partially financed by a
previous Congress, and now needing additional financing to protect the original investment. Defense programming improved, he argued; the taxpayer got more for his money.  

The system did, however, generate at the end of each fiscal year large unexpended and unobligated balances committed, in varying degrees, to specific designated purposes in following years. While advance financing in full was fundamental to the system, early obligation of all the funds would defeat its purposes. Sound management demanded careful timing of obligations to bring maximum returns through lower prices, shorter production times, better designed equipment, and economies of scale. Short lead-time components of major equipment should be contracted for later than long lead-time components, lest they be overtaken by design changes or improved versions. A ship's armament, for example, should be ordered long after contracts were placed for the hull and machinery.

It was essential, therefore, that sufficient funds in any appropriation be held for future years beyond the budget year to assure payment of the additional costs needed for completion of the projects launched in that year—thus maintaining uninterrupted production from one fiscal year to the next. How much was enough? For a program comparable in size and scale to the current one (FY 1956), McNeil believed a carryover of $4.5 billion to $5 billion (about $2 billion less than the current forecast) would be about right. It was not one of his more prescient judgments. The transition from war to peace following the July 1953 armistice was attended by prolonged turbulence in all sectors of DoD administration, not least in contract administration.

A major landmark of the general postwar shakedown was the passage in August 1954 of Section 1311 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1955, one of the most important financial reforms undertaken during Wilson's tenure. This law established for the first time a firm definition of what constituted a recordable obligation. It gave OSD authority to require the military departments to report precisely their year-end unobligated balances estimated under the new criteria. Formerly they had registered funds in appropriation accounts as obligated under a variety of arrangements, many ambiguous, some patently deceptive. The Air Force, the service whose practices were the most creative, frequently considered money as obligated once a letter of intent was received from a supplier to provide a particular item or service, a practice almost unavoidably inaccurate since the actual working out of final arrangements might entail years of negotiation. A large volume of recorded obligations could, of course, be a useful lever for justifying larger appropriations. The Air Force, McNeil once remarked, had two accounting systems, one for internal management,
the other for congressional appropriations. The impact of the Section 1311 legislation on Air Force accounting of unobligated carryovers was dramatic, resulting in a massive “deobligation” of recorded obligations which in a few months swelled an estimated FY 1956 unobligated carryover from $3.84 billion to $7.67 billion.²⁴

Implementing the Section 1311 procedures was not a weekend task. For months following the passage of the legislation, OSD and service staffs labored over the preparation of revised contract procedures in compliance with the exacting specifications of the statute. More months passed awaiting approval by the General Accounting Office. Meanwhile the detailed forecasting of year-end unobligated balances dragged on, involving, for each service budget account, projecting and aggregating both obligations and deobligations. This involved simultaneously reducing (by obligating) and augmenting (by invalidating previously validated obligations) the total of available unobligated funds.

The process had been chancy enough in 1954, when the early forecasts had understated the carryover by 125 percent. In 1955 the more exacting criteria imposed by Section 1311 on the validating of obligations threatened to make early forecasts even less accurate, especially since detailed instructions for applying the new criteria had not yet been promulgated.²⁵

Through February, March, and April 1955 the forecasts held remarkably stable, but in May a new forecast rose to $14.2 billion, 21 percent above the original. The House Appropriations Committee, already skeptical, saw this development as confirmation of its suspicion that large unobligated balances were a device to weaken congressional control of the purse strings. The committee angrily demanded more accurate forecasts, reminding McNeil of his recent assurance that a $4-to-5 billion carryover would be adequate for all legitimate purposes and warning that carryovers must diminish. In June the Senate Appropriations Committee was even less forgiving, expressing “strong disapproval” of both carryovers and unobligated balances. All pipeline items, it asserted, should be reviewed annually by the committee, and it planned to work closely with DoD and Treasury in the future “to the end that unobligated balances be reduced to a minimum and a pay-as-you-go policy be established and carried out.” In other words, the practice of carryovers should be “terminated without delay”—presumably to be replaced by the pre-1952 contract authorization system.²⁶

The Section 1311 legislation of August 1954 was closely followed in September by another, equally momentous measure concerning the financing of military assistance. Hitherto the program had been administered for the president by the Foreign Operations Administration,
the funds being allocated and transferred through the secretary of defense to the military departments, which thus controlled the fiscal operations and bookkeeping procedures. The services were supposed to maintain separate accounts for their own needs and for military assistance, resulting in a bookkeeper's nightmare because of transfers and assemblies from different components. A flagrant but well established abuse of the system involved the procedure of double costing, by which the services charged the military assistance program the full price for old and depreciated equipment, sometimes adding transfer expenses.27

By the mid-1950s the military assistance program had become, in effect, a slush fund used by the military services to stretch their procurement budgets—a normal practice, in their view. During the Korean War, at a time when both the Air Force and the military assistance program had placed large orders for the F-84 aircraft, trouble with its engine was seriously slowing production. Under a wartime first-things-first philosophy, for a time most of the new aircraft destined for military assistance were diverted to the Air Force while their costs were charged to the MDAP account. The Air Force planned to rehabilitate these fighters after the war and return them to the MDAP, but other considerations intruded and the issue remained long unresolved.28

With the end of hostilities in Korea, OSD had moved to correct the basic problem—the decentralization of military assistance administration to the military departments. "It is the view of this department," Secretary Wilson wrote Budget Director Joseph Dodge on 15 October 1953, "that all funds appropriated for military aid should be appropriated directly to the secretary of defense and not to the military departments." The resulting legislation, Section 110 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955, made the secretary of defense the agent of the president to administer military assistance funds, and OSD became the authorizing agency for all military assistance expenditures. In OSD the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs set up item schedules and procedures for reimbursing the military departments for supplies and services provided to the aid program. In sum, Section 110 placed the reimbursement to the military departments for military assistance, as McNeil put it, "on a COD basis."29

This procedure allowed OSD to justify, from both its own perspective and that of the services, the amount of unobligated funds to be retained by the services to meet both short-term and long-term demands, i.e., adequate supplies on hand backed up by an operating production base, and assurance of adequate funding for long-term negotiations. OSD and the Army, for example, agreed that about half of the $1.6 billion in
unobligated funds available in 1955 would be needed in the Army's procurement account to meet both its own and military assistance needs. The financial leverage afforded by sizable unobligated balances was vital to the smooth running of a military assistance program administered on a reimbursable basis.30

When Wilson and McNeil appeared before the House Appropriations Subcommittee in February 1956 to defend the FY 1957 budget, they faced the real possibility that the two houses would join to carry out the threat of the Senate committee, the preceding June, to "terminate without delay" the practice of unobligated carryovers. Without waiting to be reminded, McNeil made this the lead topic of his presentation. He acknowledged a disappointing 36 percent increase in the previous year's forecast of unobligated balances at the end of FY 1956, upcoming at the end of June, and, for the end of FY 1957, a forecast balance almost as large. McNeil blamed this poor showing, in part, on the 1954 legislation redefining obligations and integrating military assistance financing with Defense financing. The new legislation tended to increase the size of unobligated carryovers, because in essence, it stretched out the obligation/spending process by generating a variety of anticipated and unforeseeable needs that could not be met by the immediate obligation of available funds, or, much less, by the cumbersome and lengthy process of new appropriations. The new procedures were a natural outgrowth of the system of advance financing of multiyear procurement programs, which was still anathema to some congressmen. Grumbled Rep. Jamie L. Whitten, (D-Miss.), "You have more money than you will spend this year?"31

At this point in the hearings, McNeil used a familiar term—"commitments"—to which he proposed to give a new application. Briefly, it referred to transactions for which negotiations were well advanced—procurement directives issued, bids requested, the government virtually "committed"—but not yet to the stage where they could be legally classified as obligations under Section 1311. McNeil proposed to report these funds as unobligated but "committed" ("earmarked," as Kansas Rep. Errett P. Scrivner reminded him such funds used to be called) so that the transactions could be completed early in the next fiscal year, contracts placed, and the funds duly recorded as obligated. McNeil estimated that "committed" funds would comprise about $3.8 billion of the forecast $8.1 billion unobligated carryover at the end of the fiscal year. Uncommitted funds, $4.3 billion plus the $1.9 billion of future reimbursements, had been set aside for long lead-time projects and other important anticipated purposes such as probable engineering changes and procurement of spare parts. The balance between committed and uncommitted funds,
McNeil thought about right. Apparently none of the committee members noticed that, by separating out nearly half of the unobligated funds, the most predictable half, McNeil had reduced the forecasting problem by almost that much, leaving a much smaller margin of error.

For his overall budget presentation, the comptroller had prepared and displayed with obvious pride a large flow chart depicting in a single multi-column table the department’s fiscal plan for FY 1957 general appropriation accounts, by appropriation and by service. “It is the first time,” marveled Representative Scrivner, “I have ever seen your entire money picture put on one page.” He revealed that the forecast unobligated balance of $8.9 billion for the end of FY 1956 would be augmented by an estimated $2.9 billion of anticipated reimbursements from military assistance reservations outstanding as of 30 June 1956, creating a total of $11.8 billion.

McNeil forecast that if recorded obligations actually matched current expectations, the unobligated balance for the end of FY 1956 would be $11.8 billion including military construction money and military assistance reimbursements. For the end of FY 1957 he estimated a $10 billion carryover, including $1.9 billion in military assistance reimbursements. When McNeil appeared before the subcommittee the following year, in March 1957, the members were evidently confident that the unobligated balances problem had been resolved. His last year’s forecasts had been nearly on target. He also directed his hearers’ attention to the downward trend in annual unobligated balances: from $15.7 billion at the end of FY 1954, to $12.8 billion at the end of FY 1956, to the now current forecast of $10.5 billion for FY 1957.

**Hoover Commission Reforms**

Budget and management reform initiatives by Wilson, McNeil, and Congress took place against the backdrop of broader reform of the executive branch. The promotion of efficiency and economy in government ranked high on the agenda of the new president and his party. Wilson had moved promptly in the spring of 1953 to implement this agenda in his own department using the Rockefeller Committee report and Reorganization Plan No. 6 as the vehicle of change. On 10 July, Congress, at the president’s urging, agreed to a review of the entire executive branch. The president then appointed a 12-member Commission on Organization of the Government of the Executive Branch (4 members

* For the Rockefeller Committee reforms and Reorganization Plan No. 6, see Chapter II.
selected by the president, 8 by Congress) to develop recommendations for reducing expenditures, eliminating duplication and non-essential services (especially those that competed with private enterprise), redefining the functions of officials and agencies, and consolidating functions and activities of a similar nature. As his first appointee, Eisenhower chose former President Herbert Hoover, whom the commission (five Democrats and seven Republicans) then elected as its chairman.

Despite its broad mandate, the commission gave particular attention to the Defense Department, devoting 9 of its 19 reports wholly or substantially to that agency. The most important of these, the Report on Business Organization of the Department of Defense, was written by a subcommittee on business organization headed by Charles R. Hook, board chairman of the Armco Steel Corporation. Of the 349 recommendations made by the commission, in April 1956 OSD reported that it had accepted all but 49.36

While the commission's recommendations ranged over the whole span of Defense activities, suggesting a potential of up to two billion dollars in savings annually, most of them were aimed at the department's methods and organization for conducting business. The recommendations had four primary objectives: (1) to improve coordination within OSD and between OSD and the services, (2) to improve the management of services and supply functions common to the military departments, (3) to make personnel policies more effective, and (4) to upgrade the quality of financial management.

With respect to the first, the commission criticized the handling of the budget process, in which civilian control was exercised largely through the review of service requirements by the assistant secretary/comptroller. Instead, the commission proposed the creation of a new high-level office to supervise the review and analysis of defense plans and requirements, participating with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this process from the beginning. The commission further suggested redesignating four of the existing assistant secretaries of defense, as well as the corresponding assistant secretaries in the three military departments, as "management assistant secretaries" with broad authority to formulate policy for logistics, research and development, personnel, and financial management.

These sweeping recommendations met a chilly reception in DoD, and for the most part were not accepted. As Secretary Wilson pointed out, they went far beyond and ran counter to the recently enacted Reorganization Plan No. 6. Moreover, many of the problems of cooperation cited by the commission had already been addressed by Wilson through enhancing the role of the deputy secretary of defense, clarifying office charters to
establish lines of authority, and instituting better analysis and review procedures at the military department and assistant secretary levels. The second objective required improving logistic management among the services. Pointing to the Navy’s widely publicized possession of a 60-year supply of canned hamburger and other oversupply horror stories—"tremendous trifles," Secretary Wilson wryly called them—the commission proposed to bring the administration of common supply and services under efficient, businesslike management. This modern miracle would be brought about by creating a new agency, possibly coequal with the military departments, to administer these activities for all the armed forces. Wilson thought the idea had merit but believed the same purpose would be better served by another method, the single manager system, already in place and functioning, whereby one of the military services provided a single category of supply or service for all of them. The Army, for example, was already the single manager for procurement of food and clothing, and was expected soon to take over similar responsibility for petroleum, medical supplies, and photographic materials.

The commission’s proposal also called for the reduction, in some cases termination, of transportation services and other commercial-type activities operated by the military services, and turning them over to private enterprise. For transportation, the commission proposed the creation of a central traffic director to manage the shipment of goods and personnel for all three services. Of the myriad other activities—post exchanges, commissaries, bakeries, laundries, dry-cleaning plants, tree and garden nurseries, automotive repair shops, shipyards, cobbler shops, coffee roasting plants, and others—300 of the nearly 2,000 such facilities already were scheduled to be eliminated by late 1956. Closure of the Navy’s shipbuilding and repair facilities was never seriously considered, however, and post exchanges and commissaries, those pillars of service morale, were of course retained. To the annoyance of the president, privatization was delayed and complicated by a congressional stipulation incorporated in the FY 1956 budget mandating that no commercial or industrial facilities could be terminated without assurances to the appropriation committees that no additional costs would be involved.

The commission stressed the desirability of placing more civilians in logistics and supply administration, and also in other major military planning positions, in order to further the third objective. Fully approving, Wilson launched the process of redefining the roles of military and civilian personnel, assigning Carter L. Burgess, the assistant secretary for manpower and reserve affairs, the task of restructuring job requirements and career path lines. An interservice committee appointed by Burgess
established a new definitional framework for civilian positions and proposed procedures for enhancing the attractiveness of senior-level government service.\textsuperscript{40}

With regard to the fourth objective, upgrading financial management, most of the improvements advocated in this category were proposed by a task force established by Wilson soon after the Hoover Commission's creation in July 1953—the Advisory Committee on Fiscal Organization and Procedures. Chaired by Charles P. Cooper, a former vice president and director of AT&T, it consisted mainly of major corporation executives, with a few bankers, academics, and DoD officials—including McNeil. Its immodest aim was to develop a "more effective, simplified, standardized, and modernized system [conducive to] sound financial management and expense control."\textsuperscript{41} McNeil's involvement in the Cooper Committee's activities in 1954 and 1955 became one of the more intriguing episodes of his long Pentagon career.

The committee began with a survey of accounting systems in the field, dividing itself into seven working groups, each assigned to study specific types of military installations and activities. Including technical staff, the committee ultimately employed 150 people and filed 20 reports. McNeil hoped for three significant changes, which he explained in detail to the chairman. First, he wanted a clear determination of OSD's role in auditing the budgets of the three military departments. Second, he urged correction of situations at places like the Atlanta General Depot, where a single activity received its funding from 130 different allotments or sub-allotments; funding channels and responsibilities should be simplified to enable Congress and the administration to measure with reasonable accuracy the cost of a particular function. Finally, McNeil recommended the creation of a single management channel for the flow of financial information between OSD and the services. Currently, he pointed out, all financial reporting from the military departments went through the service secretary's office before coming to OSD. Until responsibility for financial management in the armed forces was assigned to organizational units that reported directly to the secretary of defense or a designated assistant secretary, many findings, particularly derogatory ones, would be buried and elude remedial action.\textsuperscript{42}

McNeil was destined to be disappointed. The first draft of the committee's report, written by Paul Green, a member of the committee, appeared in mid-August 1954. It confirmed McNeil's fears. He was most outraged by the report's criticism of accounting practices associated with one of his favorite programs, industrial and stock funds, whose real benefits, in his opinion, lay "outside the narrow field of accounting."
Even the accounting section of the report, which McNeil had initially rated fair, he now considered "impracticable and incomplete," because the procedures it recommended would apply only to resources consumed, a minor element of defense expenditures, not to equipment or materiel procured. But the report's most basic fault was its failure to relate the budget and accounting methods to appropriation funding. As a result, the proposed system would not provide timely information on funds used to accomplish a given task.43

Facing McNeil's threat that he would not sign the report in its existing form, Cooper and Green bowed to his criticisms and consented to revise it. Or such, at least, was McNeil's understanding. Late in September the agreement broke down and Wilson appointed McNeil to chair a group representing OSD and the military departments to review the report and make recommendations for its implementation.44 McNeil, his wrath mounting, was unwilling to wait. On 23 September, after an unproductive and obviously frustrating telephone wrangle with Cooper, he fired off a long, argumentative letter, denouncing the study panel's work procedures as ineffective and uncoordinated, its failure to encourage communication and discussion among the members, the superficiality of its investigation, and its undue haste to reach conclusions. He recited his substantive criticisms of the draft report, and reiterated his refusal to put his name to it. Later the same day, after further reflection, McNeil sent Cooper another letter announcing that he would rewrite the entire report himself and submit it directly to the secretary of defense.45

The story had a final chapter. On 26 October McNeil reported to Wilson that Cooper had admitted that he had rushed the report through, even though incomplete, in order to satisfy the accounting group of the Hoover Commission, thus avoiding a detailed investigation of the Pentagon. Most of McNeil's criticisms were well taken, he said, and he acquiesced in the decision to submit separate proposals.46

Weeks later a now mollified McNeil reported the outcome to Deputy Secretary Robert Anderson: he had completed his rewrite of the report, drawing heavily on other studies as well as working papers prepared by the committee's sub-working groups (apparently not previously examined). The revised paper was, he thought, a good job, incorporating methods of finance and accounting adapted to the realities of life in the Defense Department. It had been submitted to all members of the Cooper Committee, the Bureau of the Budget, the three military services, key members of Congress, former Defense Secretary Robert Lovett, the Hoover Commission, and the defense committee of the American Institute of Accountants.47
Lovett praised McNeil's report enthusiastically, complimenting the author for having simplified accounting to the level of understanding of the "knuckleheads around." Wilson apparently was less pleased, not necessarily with McNeil's report, but with the fact that the financial reform effort had bogged down for months in the production of not one but two rival reports, reflecting contrasting points of view and possibly incompatible recommendations. In any event, Wilson turned the Cooper and McNeil reports over to the Hoover Commission, asking for recommendations on what to do with them. Ultimately the commission made several valuable technical adjustments, but improvements in financial management during the Wilson era were incremental rather than comprehensive.

The Hoover Commission recommended that the department's budget and those of all other federal agencies be placed on an accrued expenditure basis. Wilson fully endorsed the recommendation, as well as the related ones that followed, and directed their application in the military departments. A major consequence of these reforms, reflecting one of McNeil's chief preoccupations, was the development of accrual accounting methods for financial accounting of property and construction, and the extension of stock and industrial funds to include the bulk of wholesale and retail supply items and maintenance facilities.

The Hoover Commission also examined the area of research and development. Its principal recommendation, to combine OSD's R&D activities with application engineering, was also approved, and eventually in 1957 the two offices were merged. Wilson also supported the proposed establishment of R&D assistant secretaries in the military departments, but Congress blocked this move. The commission also urged more generous funding of scientific pursuits, including basic research, resulting in the establishment of the Defense Science Board to coordinate and promote weapon-related scientific research.

Congress and the public looked on the Hoover Commission favorably as a presumed deterrent to excessive defense spending, a reputation the commission understandably did not seek to discourage. In 1957 the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Commission confidently "estimated" that savings "reasonably attributed to the Commission's work" had amounted to $235 million, 10 percent of the government's total savings in accounting operations reported by the Comptroller of the United States. This claim aroused both amusement and annoyance in OSD. Requested in 1957 to comment by the House Appropriations Committee, Secretary Wilson conceded many qualitative improvements resulting from commission recommendations, but also noted "unsupportable claims of great monetary savings" by the commission's "over-zealous supporters."
was no meaningful way, he argued, to isolate the effects of the recommendations from the department's continuing efforts to eliminate waste and achieve greater economy and efficiency.\textsuperscript{31} Since Hoover task force reports, he went on, were not issued until May and June 1955, obviously none of the savings in FY 1955 could be attributed to the commission's recommendations. Moreover, in all of the areas singled out by the citizens' committee—a new cataloging program, stock standardization, closing of military supply depots, improved transportation rates, and more—the measures responsible for them had been instituted well before the middle of 1955. And the largest single saving—a reduction of $585 million in unnecessary inventory—was not a product of the commission's findings at all, but of the stock fund system created long ago by Title IV of the National Security Act. Indeed, Wilson complained, "despite their demonstrated worth as highly effective management tools," the commission showed scant awareness, in its report on business organization in his department, of the significant role of working capital funds.\textsuperscript{52}

From the beginning in 1947 the Department of Defense had been the biggest management problem in the U.S. government, because it was the biggest department in money and people. Moreover, it had the unique mission of safeguarding national security, which gave it special status, and it had a complex organization that made centralized control difficult. Wilson inherited a Department of Defense that was more than twice as large as it had been three years before and was spending three times as much money. Eisenhower's determination to cut back the size and cost of the military establishment created powerful pressures for more efficient and economical management and aggravated internal tensions, particularly between the military services. The management and financial reforms initiated or responded to by Wilson and McNeil, in the main represented positive steps toward more effective use of limited resources. Their efforts were part of a never-ending process of adjustment and change in the operation of the Defense Department, always subject to intense congressional and public examination and criticism.
CHAPTER IV

Shrinking the Truman Budget

"This Budget," President Truman stated at the beginning of his annual budget message to Congress on 9 January 1953, "has been prepared under unique circumstances. It is the first Budget since the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution to be presented to the Congress by a President who will leave office a few days after its transmission." And, he may have said to himself, "and thus not face the ordeal of defending it." For Eisenhower, the inherited FY 1954 budget was the first serious internal challenge his administration had to face, substantive as well as symbolic. In no sense a lame duck effort, since its preparation had begun long before the campaign, the budget represented the Truman administration's best shot, a fiscal charter it would presumably have been prepared to live by had the Democrats won the election. No one thought that the new Republican administration, still breathing hard from the campaign and still intoning the charges and promises that had helped to win it, would take a benign view of this legacy. On the other hand, the Truman submission could not be rejected out of hand. Government and its expenses went inexorably on, and the new Congress would have to approve a budget before the next fiscal year (beginning 1 July) was much advanced. Most of the inherited budget would have to be accepted, if only because there was not enough time to prepare a brand new one.

Reconnoitering

Truman had requested new appropriations totaling $72.9 billion, of which the Defense Department's share was $41.3 billion, almost 57 percent. This $41.3 billion figure was to become the principal target of the new
administration since, even with the “halo effect” of national security, the sheer size of the DoD budget offered the most visible target and the best prospect for substantial savings. The urge to cut reflected more than mere partisan animosity or the automatic impulses of an administration dedicated to fiscal conservatism. At Truman’s invitation, Joseph M. Dodge, Eisenhower’s budget director-designate, had attended the final stages of the new budget’s formulation during November and early December, learning a great deal about the hard choices that had to be made. As he reported to Eisenhower during these pre-inaugural weeks, the emerging document, despite large reductions in the requests submitted by various departments, was coursing at full speed down the path of deficit financing begun with the onset of the Korean War in 1950. Projected expenditures were still expected to incur a deficit of some $9.9 billion for FY 1954 piled on top of deficits for previous years. And this was only the beginning. Under the system of congressional appropriations instituted in 1951, the government was authorized to incur contractual obligations in one year that would be settled in some future year. As a consequence, a mountain of mostly war-related unspent obligations had accumulated, dwarfing the gap between annual income and outgo. Eisenhower later recorded: “What we did not previously know was that our predecessors had piled on top of this mountainous debt additional C.O.D. purchases—largely in defense contracts—with no income whatsoever in sight to pay for them upon their arrival over the next few years. These purchases totaled more than $80 billion—more than all the expenditures of the federal government put together from 1789 through World War I.” That the president and his advisers could have been unaware that unspent obligations existed seems improbable. No doubt it was the huge amount that startled and upset him.

Furthermore, Dodge warned of a 10 percent reduction in federal income that would occur if Congress permitted certain wartime taxes to lapse automatically. The excess profits tax was due to expire on 30 June; the 11 percent increase in personal income taxes adopted in 1951 would expire on 1 January 1954; and still other taxes would expire in 1954. Republicans in Congress were eager to speed up the timetable for tax cuts. When the new Congress convened in January, Daniel A. Reed (R-N.Y.), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced a bill to advance the income-tax reduction by six months to 1 July 1953. These changes could cost the government an estimated $3.9 billion in lost revenue in FY 1954 and about $8.3 billion in FY 1955.

At a pre-inaugural meeting with Eisenhower and his cabinet designees on 12 January, Dodge projected the Truman programs against estimated revenue and predicted a resulting cumulative deficit of $56 billion by
mid-1957. It would be very difficult, moreover, to reduce current levels of spending substantially over the next few years. Assuming a continuation of the cold war, the huge national security sector looked to Dodge essentially irreducible, unless the nation's strategic goals and military programs were fundamentally reoriented. Similarly, nothing much could be done soon to reduce the permanent statutory programs—debt service, veterans' benefits, price supports, grants-in-aid to states, social security—which accounted for another 18 percent of federal expenditures. The miscellaneous 12 percent remaining—the basic running expenses of the country—while more vulnerable, represented too small a part of the total to yield quantitatively significant savings. Even by heroic efforts it was not certain, Dodge feared, that the budget could be balanced by mid-1956; mid-1955 was absolutely out of the question.7

Except for Eisenhower and Humphrey, whom Dodge had kept informed as the budget picture unfolded, the group assembled at the Commodore was stunned by the bad news. “Until that moment,” Attorney General Herbert Brownell later recalled, “the rest of us had no idea how bad the financial state of the government was.”8 Eisenhower remained philosophical: the budget would be balanced eventually, if not as soon as had been hoped. Meanwhile another cherished Republican goal, cutting taxes, would also have to be postponed, lest the impending deficit grow even larger. In his State of the Union message on 2 February, the president warned: “Reduction of taxes will be justified only as we show we can succeed in bringing the budget under control . . . . Until we can determine the extent to which expenditures can be reduced, it would not be wise to reduce our revenues.”9

Focus on Defense

The attack on the Truman budget began formally on 3 February with letters from Dodge, now presiding over the Bureau of the Budget, to each federal department and agency head, setting forth the administration's approach to the budget review. Reflecting the budget director's pessimism regarding the prospects for achieving an early budgetary balance, the letter stated that the review could only “take the initial steps toward that goal” by defining “how far we can go in that direction in the fiscal year 1954,” and thus “set the stage for the fiscal year 1955,” the first year for which the administration could construct a budget wholly its own.10 For Dodge and the president, cutting the Truman budget down to size was only the beginning of a process, which might take years, of leading the
country back into the paths of fiscal responsibility, of forcing a govern­
ment which had produced only four budget surpluses in the past 20 years
to live within its means.11 Dodge’s own estimate at this time, assuming the
expiration of wartime tax legislation and the resulting loss of revenue,
was that the budget could not be balanced until 1958.12
Dodge’s letter wasted little time on the inherited fiscal problem or
its causes: a national debt already over $265 billion, pushing the statutory
limit of $275 billion; a prospective deficit of $15.8 billion for the two
years 1953 and 1954; and accumulated unexpended appropriations far
exceeding the new obligatory authority requested for FY 1954. To gain
control Dodge wanted to halt and turn back the rising tide of both cur­
crent expenditures and new obligatory authority, and “critically examine
existing programs.” A series of stern “it is the policy to” paragraphs spelled
out some of the specifics: reduction of government personnel; restrictions
on construction; no increases over the January rate of obligations without
complete justification and specific approval; and an immediate intra­
departmental review looking to a “downward adjustment of program
levels.” Each agency was “to translate these guides into proposals for
specific revisions” of the 1954 budget and to submit them by 2 March to
the Bureau of the Budget, along with proposals for legislative changes.13
Despite Dodge’s pessimism and the president’s apparent resignation to
an unbalanced budget for the present, pressures mounted during February
to strive for budgetary balance as early as FY 1955.14 Dodge’s 3 February
letter had been widely publicized as the opening gun in the administra­
tion’s budget offensive. Media commentators and administration spokes­
men were recalling the president’s campaign promises to cut federal
spending, particularly the alleged commitment to Sen. Robert A. Taft at
the celebrated Morningside Heights meeting on 12 September 1952 to
reduce expenditures to $70 billion in 1954 and $60 billion in 1955.15
Treasury Secretary Humphrey was the most vocal advocate of an immedi­
ate drive to balance the budget. “From now on out,” he told the National
Security Council on 11 February, “this government must pay its own way.”
He recommended that henceforth all major policy proposals should
be accompanied by cost estimates and their probable effects on other
programs—an idea that appealed to the president and was actually
formalized several weeks later.16 Humphrey also fretted over the uncer­
tainty surrounding future tax receipts and criticized the NSC’s tendency
to approve policies piecemeal without consideration of total costs.17 Given
predictable postwar congressional pressures for reinstatement programs
deferred during the emergency, and the increasing burden of debt service,
Dodge could not foresee more than about $1.5 billion of possible reduc­
tions in non-security programs.18
On 11 February, the new NSC began a detailed review of the adequacy of national security programs, initiated months earlier but completed too late to be dealt with by the outgoing administration. Naturally the cost implications of NSC 141 had not been taken into account in the proposed FY 1954 budget. Not surprisingly, its reception was chilly, the president regarding its tardy addition to the already staggering inherited burden of spending as another example of Truman fiscal irresponsibility. NSC 141's proposed remedies for the inadequacies of the civil defense and continental defense programs were variously estimated by Dodge's and Wilson's staffs as likely to add $4 billion or $5 billion a year to defense costs from 1955 through 1958; the Joint Chiefs doubted whether they could be funded "under the limitations imposed by current fiscal directives" except at the expense of other programs. NSC 141 was returned to the staff for further study. The administration needed, said the president, to devise a "reasonable and respectable" defense posture that would provide adequate security "without bankrupting the nation."20

At the 18 February meeting Budget Director Dodge detailed the implications of all the Truman programs: a grim procession of deficits starting with $6 billion in the current year, rising to $15 billion in FY 1955, and declining to $12 billion in FY 1956 and $6.5 billion in 1957, before finally balancing out in FY 1958. Particularly discouraging about Dodge's recital was that unlike his earlier estimated cumulative deficit of $56 billion this one assumed certain reductions in the Truman programs. Foreign aid appropriations (including military assistance) were left intact for FY 1954 but would decline thereafter. The approved force goals of the military services were also accepted. But the projected defense budgets envisaged a 30 percent slowdown in the modernization programs for Air Force and Navy aviation, as well as curtailment of overseas base development and industrial mobilization expansion.

Commenting on the anticipated cumulative deficit of almost $50 billion through FY 1957, Dodge pointed out that tax receipts were now approaching the World War II peak as a percentage of national income. Eisenhower reiterated his determination to put a "price tag" on every new policy proposal. In apparent frustration, he wondered whether the non-security parts of the budget could not take a larger share of the cuts. The economy theme carried over into the ensuing discussion of basic national security strategy, triggered by Secretary Dulles's query, "What . . . should we consider our first line of defense?" Making the hard decisions would require a grand strategy. The president undertook to answer: The aim, he said, somewhat elliptically, "was to build redoubts throughout the free world," to be manned by indigenous forces, in order to get our own people home. This would require infusing America's allies with the courage to
defend themselves, based on assurance that the United States would not let them down. Europe stood in the front line as the most important bastion. What, Dulles then inquired, did all this imply in terms of programs? Should we rely mainly on atomic weapons or conventional forces? General Bradley interjected that both capabilities would be needed, drawing sharp rejoinders from three of his hearers: Dulles and Humphrey (where would the money come from?) and Wilson (we must take calculated risks). "All seemed to agree," the official recorder reported, "that a review of policy was needed."

During the week that followed, Wilson apparently took a more careful look at the impact that a serious attempt to balance the budget would have on his department. Government revenue, assuming the tax reductions mandated by existing legislation and proposals already before Congress, could be expected to decline from about $69 billion in 1954 to about $63.5 billion in 1956; thereafter, with the normal growth in gross national product, it would probably rise. Non-security programs were virtually certain to expand. If budget deficits continued, debt service costs would also rise. Major national security programs other than Defense were likely to decline and eventually level off under peacetime conditions. But the big foreign aid program, comprising almost two-thirds of the total of these non-DoD security programs, was slated to increase through 1954 and 1955 before dropping off rapidly in the later 1950s. Even if the Truman foreign aid estimates could be slashed substantially in those two years, staff calculations indicated that only about $45 billion would be left over in FY 1954 for Defense and military assistance. This amounted to $6 billion less than the Truman budget estimates. In FY 1955, expenditures for these two categories were projected to drop to $38 billion. Depending on how much would go for military assistance, DoD's own expenditures in FY 1954 probably could not exceed $39 billion.

The implications were discouraging. With military pay and allowances and maintenance and operations costs taking about $24 billion a year, less than $15 billion annually would remain for the "hard goods" procurement and construction programs of the military services. Even immediate action to slow down current departmental expenditures, running at an annual rate of about $46 billion, would have little appreciable effect before late summer or fall. It would be necessary to reprogram outstanding contractual arrangements, to replan existing military commitments, and to place in reserve a substantial part of the $15 billion not yet obligated for major procurement and construction programs. Basic production schedules would have to be lengthened and replanned, since unliquidated obligations for aircraft, ships, tanks, guns, and other major materiel stood at $66 billion at the end of January. There would be, in fact, no need for new
obligational authority during FY 1954 for major procurement; that com-
ponent of the Truman budget would simply be wiped out. Force and
modernization goals approved early in the Korean War—a modernized
naval and Marine Corps air arm, a 143-wing Air Force, the Navy's ship-
building and modernization program—would be unachievable within the
funds available for procurement. Military manpower, mainly Army, would go
down by only 50,000 to 60,000 in FY 1954. But in 1955, with the cessation
of hostilities in Korea and the curtailment of equipment and base pro-
grams, the three services would have to scale down their manning levels
an estimated 17 percent, from the existing 3.6 million to about 3 million.
Many bases and posts would have to be closed down, and research and
development funds cut by about $500 million per year. In short, rearma-
ment would come to a halt and military strength would decline.25

Opening Skirmishes in Congress

Wilson seemed in a somber mood when he appeared on 24 February
before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Commit-
tee for a preliminary hearing on the proposed budget. It could hardly be
expected that the new secretary, after only four weeks on the job, would
say anything very specific or revealing about the budget, and the commit-
tee members, with one or two exceptions, did not press him. He did make
revealing comments about his management philosophy, mainly during
a long sparring match with the most inquiring of the three Democrats
present, George H. Mahon of Texas. Mahon's questioning reflected his
party's dilemma on defense spending in the new administration: trying
to be responsive to the public clamor for both economy and security while
reluctant to be unduly critical of the Truman budget proposals. It developed
that he was interested in savings that might be gained through increased
efficiency in procurement. Wilson responded that he did not consider
that to be "our primary job." Getting procurement costs down depended
ultimately on reducing production costs. He saw his most important
responsibility as running the huge defense establishment more efficiently
by improving its management and organization.26

Wilson refused to be drawn into a discussion on managerial technique.
Good management came close to being an end in itself; he looked for no
dramatic short-run savings, and tangible rewards only in the long haul. "If
you did away with all of the people in the Pentagon, that would not help
you much on the budget; perhaps $150 million if you just blew the whole
place up and then you would probably have to spend $2 billion out in
the field because you would not have any supervision at all."27
What little Wilson had to say about the new budget, particularly against the background of current gossip about impending slashes in defense spending, was startling enough. It embodied, he thought, "what our military [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] think is necessary." It was not, he declared, a politically motivated document. Wilson refused to pinpoint major areas of potential savings, and he had no plans to change major objectives, not even the Air Force's 143-wing program. His central problem was to steer a course between the outflow of cash to meet current defense needs and the needs of approved goals and commitments in future years. Currently, the rate of expenditure exceeded the budget rate by at least $5 billion, the difference between the $41.2 billion of new obligatory authority requested and the estimated $46 billion-plus (McNeil's office estimated more nearly $48 billion) expenditure for FY 1954. This was a reversal of the normal wartime experience in which appropriations ran far ahead of expenditures. Now the pressure to reduce spending ran counter to the war-generated momentum of still expanding programs and accelerating rates of output. His remarks clearly indicated that, for the moment at least, he was at a loss where to start to cut the Truman budget.

Wilson pointed out in his opening statement that the proposed budget "contemplated achieving certain standards of readiness in the Army, Navy, and Air Force by certain dates." Significant reductions, apart from savings through improved operational efficiency and better organization, would have to come from "a reappraisal of the dates on which the necessary degrees of preparedness . . . are to be brought about" — i.e., a stretch-out. The hint was not picked up, either in the hearings or in the press. Newspaper stories and radio commentators told the country that the administration saw no possibility at present of reducing the Truman budget without endangering national security, prompting Senator Taft and other senators from both parties to publicly retort that if the administration could not cut the budget, Congress assuredly could.

That same day Wilson told the NSC that very little could be squeezed out of the Truman budget unless the administration was prepared either to re-examine approved national security objectives or to stretch out the buildup. Thus challenged, Secretary Humphrey restated his view that to balance the budget the Truman proposal would have to be reduced by $5 billion to $6 billion, and surgery on this scale could only be performed on the Defense and mutual security programs. When the council met the following day the president's special assistant, Robert Cutler, said that by comparison with Defense, all the other government programs were mere "chicken feed." The president agreed but made no decision, saying he wanted further information.
Initial Attacks on Spending

Baffled though he was by the difficulty of making deep cuts in planned outlays for FY 1954 and beyond, Wilson lost no time in getting on with the more urgent and essentially simpler task of slowing the rate of current spending. Dodge’s letter of 3 February had laid down firm guidelines for reductions; Wilson immediately circulated the letter within DoD and followed up with a series of implementing directives. His first freeze order on 4 February directed an immediate halt to new construction contracts pending a careful review. Service secretaries were required to certify the essentiality and report action to OSD. Looking further ahead, he ordered the military departments on 7 February to reassess for each program “the urgency of proceeding at the planned rates” while expending available funds “in such a manner as to reduce the need for additional appropriations in FY 1954.” To bring the obligation of funds under OSD control McNeil also directed the service secretaries to place in administrative reserve all remaining unobligated FY 1953 funds “in order that these funds will in fact be subject to administrative action at the time we discuss the FY 1953 and FY 1954 budgets.”

Wilson also moved quickly to freeze civilian employment at the 31 January level of 1,271,000 with specific injunctions against using military personnel to fill civilian vacancies. There followed a month later a general DoD directive to reduce civilian employment worldwide by three percent over the next three months. In mid-May Wilson reported that total civilian employment had already fallen to 1,243,000, well below the 31 May target, and further reductions were in prospect.

The effect of these actions on current spending was not easy to determine. Civilian personnel cuts, while useful as ammunition in congressional hearings, could not affect Defense expenditures for weeks or months because of the red tape involved. In any case, the numbers amounted to only a tiny fraction of the almost five million people, military and civilian, who worked for DoD. Undoubtedly, the flurry of economy directives sifting down through the bureaucracy in February and March served to dispel lingering assumptions that the attack on spending would not begin before the morning of 1 July. A more immediate effect was a loss of momentum in the pace of military construction. McNeil told the House Appropriations Subcommittee late in February that the Navy construction program would inevitably be delayed by several months. The emphasis on construction was important, since it accounted for a large and growing segment of the Defense budget.

Wilson and McNeil anticipated that the most important effect of the economy measures of February and March would be a “psychological
"slowdown" in the defense business community that could make a
difference in expenditures of a billion dollars in a given year. On the
strength of this expectation, McNeil predicted that Defense expenditures
in FY 1954, even without any major cuts in the Truman programs, might
fall $1-to-2 billion short of the $48 billion he had estimated in December.
But psychological forces alone could hardly produce the much deeper
spending cuts being demanded. Something like $20 billion of DoD's annual
expenditures went for the existing size, composition, and major equip­
ment of the armed forces, the consuming corpus of the establishment.
Economies in equipment operation could come only from such risky
expedients as reducing monthly flying hours or ship steaming time.
Big savings could come only in procurement of major equipment and
in construction. 36

By the beginning of March Defense spending was beginning to
slacken. 37 On 20 March Wilson stated publicly that as a result of his freeze
orders it had fallen to a monthly level of $3.6 billion, where he hoped to
hold it during FY 1954. That would mean total expenditures of $43.2
billion. To do so it might be necessary to resort to such expedients as
slowing troop training, lowering draft calls, or even reducing temporarily
the size of divisions in training, since so much of future expenditures
would go for major equipment already contracted for. 38

_Dodge's Budget Exercise_

Wilson's projected expenditure of $43.2 billion for FY 1954 was
well above the level that the budget balancers had in mind. In going
public with it at this time, he could face accusations of attempting to
foreclose decisions yet to be made at higher levels. In the NSC meetings of
24 and 25 February an impasse had been reached between Wilson's view
of how much could, and Humphrey's insistence on how much must, be
sheared from the Defense budget. On 4 March Dodge presented a new
proposal, presumably reflecting discussions during the preceding week
with the president and the treasury and defense secretaries. To explore the
security implications of actually achieving balance in FY 1955 Dodge
proposed a novel exercise. Each of the major national security agencies
(Defense, Mutual Security, Atomic Energy, etc.) would be assigned an
arbitrary "illustrative" expenditure ceiling for each of the two fiscal years
and instructed, within this framework, to work out the best possible dis­
tribution of funds and organization of assets. In the short time before
presentation of the finally revised budget to Congress, it would not be
possible to consider alternative divisions of the deficiency, but the views
of the major claimants could at least be weighed in the making of final decisions. Dodge's proposal secured acceptance after a short discussion. The ceilings were $6.8 billion below the totals currently projected for all the national security programs in 1954 and $14 billion below those in 1955. The deepest percentage cut fell on the Mutual Security Administration, which would be reduced 26 percent below the Truman estimates for 1954 and 50 percent below 1955 estimates, leaving DoD to absorb a relatively light 10 percent cut in 1954 and a 21 percent cut in 1955. Dodge evidently intended to postpone the most painful surgery of budget balancing until the second year. By comparison, the "approach" in 1954 could appear almost cosmetic.39

But only by comparison. To Defense budget staffs, still working within the framework and preconceptions of the Truman proposals, the 1954 expenditure ceiling of $41.2 billion seemed low indeed, certainly by comparison with the $48 billion figure generally considered realistic within OSD. It posed in stark terms the question whether the perceived requirements of national security could be reconciled with the necessity of living within the nation's means.40

DoD had less than three weeks to inform the NSC of the program revisions necessary to accommodate the expenditure ceiling and their expected impact on approved national security policies. Wilson's office provided for each military department suggested personnel strengths and internal fund distributions that were labeled "illustrative only." In the limited time allowed for the analysis, however, it seemed doubtful that the departmental staffs could explore alternatives very deeply. The manpower ceilings actually contemplated lopping off almost a half-million people by the end of FY 1955 from the proposed 30 June 1953 strengths planned by the previous administration and 383,000 from the current (30 March 1953) level. Each military department was directed to submit to OSD by 16 March a detailed cost estimate of the forces that could be maintained by the expenditures indicated, assuming continuation of hostilities in Korea throughout the two-year period. The Joint Chiefs would then have four days (until 20 March) to review these statements and make their own recommendations.41

Understandably the prospective victims reacted with cries of anguish and predictions of doom. Denied sufficient time for bureaucratic maneuver and obviously fearing that the so-called budget "exercise" might be for real, each military department chose its own tactics and responded in its own way. Navy Secretary Anderson proposed no significant alterations in the funds and personnel OSD had suggested, preferring to retain forces in being and put the whole burden of fund cutbacks on maintenance,
expansion, modernization, and the mobilization base. His Army and Air Force counterparts found the suggested ceilings altogether unworkable. Secretary Stevens proposed reducing the Army establishment by the end of FY 1955 to 1,175,000 men and 12 divisions and stipulated a different fund structure within the overall ceiling. Secretary Talbott, accepting the prescribed funding, abandoned the Air Force's 143-wing goal for either of two leaner alternatives (93 wings and 79 wings), heavily weighted on the side of strategic bombing and continental air defense. Each service secretary detailed his own catalogue of anticipated dire consequences. The Joint Chiefs agreed. Asked to evaluate service responses, they simply accepted as plausible the prophecies of catastrophe, adding their own voices and prestige to the doomsday chorus. Any adjustments in force structures, they said, must await a thorough re-examination and redefinition of national objectives and development of implementing military strategies. Similarly negative in their appraisal of the capability of the reduced forces to carry out existing policies and commitments, they predicted that any drastic cutback in U.S. rearmament would prompt other free world nations to follow suit, leading to a general loss of momentum "if not actual reversal of the trend." They doubted whether the reduced forces could sustain operations in Korea at the present level after FY 1954, and foresaw a chain reaction among United Nations forces there to the proposed withdrawal of Army divisions, which might encourage the Communists "to seek a military decision through a major offensive." The United States, they predicted, would be unable to fulfill its NATO commitments beginning in 1954 or to regain this capability in 1956, even if hostilities ended in Korea; by 1955 the capability to stop the Communists in any new local war would also evaporate. We might then find ourselves, short of a general war, isolated and critically vulnerable. The bleak recital ended with a blunt warning that the Dodge spending limitations would "pose a grave threat to the survival of our allies and the security of this nation." 

While the JCS were preparing their "evaluation" of the departmental responses to the proposed expenditure ceilings, McNeil's staff was making mincemeat of most of their substantive findings. All three papers were riddled with inconsistencies and errors. The Army, for example, had radically changed its force proposal after dollar costs had been calculated and had not estimated costs for the support of either the 20-division ROK Army or the augmented Japanese National Security Force. All three papers grossly overstated projected procurement expenditures, failing to allow for production slippages of items such as aircraft and guided missiles. The Air Force had continued to project construction of four or five major new
installations each year without regard to the proposed cutback to a 79-wing force. Much of this criticism was probably unfair, even though valid, considering the limited time allowed the harried service staffs to prepare their responses. The expectation that the staffs would explore various alternative force structures, or even coordinate their responses to come up with a balanced total force, seems in retrospect unreasonable. But some of the critics challenged not merely the numbers and methodology but the positions and arguments of the service responses. For example the Navy proposed a high level of research funding and retention of existing forces at the expense of modernization and mobilization reserves. The Air Force’s decision to take its stand on a 79-wing structure encountered the sharpest criticism. “In arriving at this position,” complained the OSD staff analysis, “the Air Force did not ... price out any program except the 79-wing program. The result ... is that we have nothing provided upon which judgment can be made. To date, the Air Force has refused to face up to the costs of a 143-wing program ....” 44

Wilson and Kyes apparently had hoped for some exposition of the internal divergences, both of attitudes and of interests, which they knew existed in the vast Pentagon bureaucracy. The three new service secretaries might have been expected to be less parochial than the military chiefs, inherited from the previous administration, even though they necessarily depended on them for professional advice. The Joint Chiefs theoretically should have been able to bring a measure of institutional detachment to bear in their evaluation of the departmental responses, and had been rather pointedly invited to do so. McNeil had no such expectation. A veteran of many years of Pentagon politics, he was not surprised by the monolithic reaction of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs. His attitude was reflected in a scrawled note to Kyes, shortly before the budget exercise was initiated: Army Secretary Stevens, he wrote, “will get the same run around all Secretaries have in the Army .... Sure as h— they will overdo or underdo. They can’t be trusted—Stevens, a babe in the woods.” 45

McNeil rarely committed such sentiments to writing, and his distillation of the staff’s analysis for Wilson was carefully understated. “In general,” he wrote, “the Department of Defense should be able to obtain greater forces than those listed with the dollars stated as being available in this study, or should spend less for the forces proposed.” Even so, despite all the emotionalism, exaggeration, and methodological shortcomings of the responses, McNeil considered their basic position was sound. “It appears perfectly clear ... that with the expenditure limitations provided in this study, it would be impossible for the U.S. Military
Forces to carry out present commitments in FY 1955, and it also appears clear that within the currently forecast revenue it will not be possible to balance the budget and achieve the present force goals in FY 1954, 1955, or 1956.46

Wilson's report to the NSC on 24 March reflected these conclusions: if required, the Defense Department "could find the means to maintain somewhat larger forces than those indicated" and otherwise to "improve on the situation." Nevertheless, the general comments of the Joint Chiefs could be taken as a "rough approximation" of the consequences that might be expected if the proposed expenditure limitations were imposed. Wilson added a warning, almost certainly suggested by McNeil, that drastic limitations on Defense spending at the existing stage of the rearmament program would reduce the rate of procurement to a point where it would not support a buildup. Moreover, there would occur sudden and severe changes in plans, schedules, commitments, and capabilities that would result in waste and dislocation.47

Key Decisions

Thus, when the NSC met on 25 March for the budget showdown, Wilson's conclusions were already on record, including his estimate, released to the press, of $43.2 billion for expenditures during FY 1954. At the NSC meeting the prospective victims of Dodge's proposed spending cuts lined up in solid opposition: Wilson, flanked by Frank Nash of ISA, the service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs. Invited to make brief statements, one speaker after another made his case against the proposed cuts. The president and Secretary Humphrey manifested growing frustration. Following the DoD presentations Eisenhower remarked acidly that perhaps a further study was needed to indicate "whether national bankruptcy or national destruction would get us first." He wondered whether the effects of spending reductions would be less severe if more of the burden were shifted from FY 1954 to FY 1955 and later years.48 This meeting reached no firm conclusions. It seemed clear, however, that the prevailing sentiment opposed such deep expenditure cuts, and that the warnings of the Joint Chiefs, voiced by General Bradley, had made an impression.49

A special day-long session of the council on the 31st took the form of a series of briefings by the NSC members for a group of seven special consultants appointed by the president three weeks earlier. Later dubbed the "Seven Wise Men," these prominent individuals, most of them industrialists, included such notables as lawyer Dillon Anderson, James B. Black,
chairman of the board of Pacific Gas and Electric, and Eugene Holman, president and chairman of the board of Standard Oil of New Jersey. The president had stressed that the consultants should express their opinions as individuals rather than as a committee and would be expected to assist in the appraisal of all aspects of national security policies and programs; he wanted a "fresh view," not a consensus.  

Discussion of the 1954 budget took place in the context of a wide-ranging review of the national security scene, including Moscow's current "peace offensive," the armistice stalemate in Korea and the feasibility of breaking it by an all-out offensive (including use of atomic weapons), the crisis in Iran, civil defense, and nuclear power issues. In a sober assessment, Secretary Dulles repeatedly warned against muscle-cutting economies, especially in foreign aid, that might endanger the nation's security. Such cuts could risk the loss of vital outposts around the periphery of the Soviet bloc, or the collapse and leftist takeover of shaky governments in European countries. The greatest danger of a general war, Dulles feared, could arise from a Soviet miscalculation of American intentions, resulting from deep and sudden cuts in the Defense budget. He reminded his hearers that Europeans had come to believe that the advent of a Republican administration would mean a return to isolationism; and a sudden cut in American defense spending might cause a panic abroad unless accompanied by dramatic compensating moves, such as tariff reductions and similar confidence-building measures. Dulles felt it imperative, particularly at this critical juncture, for the United States to maintain pressure on the Soviets, "psychological and otherwise." The death of Stalin had, for the first time in many years, created a real possibility of either bringing about the collapse of the regime or transforming the Communist world from an aggressive Moscow-dominated bloc into a purely defensive coalition. How much the effort would cost in dollars he could not say, and it would undoubtedly fluctuate but it must not be abandoned. He thought $6 billion a year for foreign aid was "probably reasonable."

Dulles's earnest plea for restraint in cutting national security spending constituted the centerpiece of the long NSC meeting and may well have influenced its outcome. He was by no means preaching to the choir. Humphrey stuck to his hard line, repeating his warning of a $3 billion revenue deficit in June. The seven consultants also sounded the economy theme. Dillon Anderson, their principal spokesman, criticized the "profligate" use of military manpower and the attempt to "purchase" loyalty and friendship abroad through foreign aid, drawing a retort from the president that without foreign aid many European countries would surely have gone Communist, and it would be folly to abandon them now. Eisenhower also
reacted sharply to a suggestion that the five U.S. divisions in Europe provided a merely psychological rather than a physical deterrent to the Soviets. The consultants supported “drastic” cuts in the mutual security program as a whole, though they were willing to except portions of it based on prior commitments or with clear defense implications.

Wilson steered the discussion toward the specifics of the Defense budget. Despite progress in rearmament over the past three years, he said, to achieve by 1956 the force and readiness goals set forth during the war would require DoD expenditures of $45 billion annually over the next three years, and $40 billion per year thereafter. He favored an alternate approach, based on the assumption of a “floating D-day,” without specific readiness dates. Defense spending could then be reduced immediately to about $41 billion in the coming fiscal year, plus another $2 billion to finance the war in Korea. With further reductions in subsequent years, expenditures could be brought down to perhaps $33 billion by 1958. Even with such reductions, Wilson believed it possible to maintain present military strength substantially intact over the next two years, a crucial consideration because of the effect on opinion abroad. From 1956 on, “we would be less well off.” As for appropriations in FY 1954, Wilson thought that to cut more than about $5 billion from the Truman budget would invite the charge that the United States “was abandoning a serious defense effort for itself and its allies.”

No one challenged either Wilson’s figures or his reasoning. The president said simply that he was “satisfied.” Whether Wilson had succeeded in changing anyone’s mind may, however, be doubted. The kind of budget he proposed was perhaps marginally less objectionable to the security-minded than to the budget balancers in his audience. Presidential assistant Robert Cutler’s attempted summation of the “consensus” at the end of the meeting was a masterpiece of empty generalities: existing national security policies (no mention of goals, strategies, or target dates) were “appropriate and reasonable,” the administration would “approach” the balancing of the budget “as rapidly as possible,” and in so doing would adjust programs to policies rather than the reverse. Nevertheless, Wilson was instructed to go back to the drawing board and recommend expenditure objectives for FY 1954 that would not endanger national security.51

The Interpretation of NSC 149

So the debate went on, but clearly the end was in sight. The revised budget should have been in the hands of the budget staffs earlier for the final markup, and the services would still have mountains of work to do
after they received the guidance OSD had not yet provided. The whole revised budget needed to go to Congress at the beginning of May. The president would have to decide—and soon.

The Defense bureaucracy had not been waiting idly for firm guidance. Detailed work based on tentative assumptions had been under way ever since Dodge's 3 February letter. On 26 and 27 March an OSD staff analysis of the FY 1953 and FY 1954 budgets proposing new fund apportionments for major programs was distributed to the military departments, precipitating a new round of interdepartmental negotiations that continued past mid-April. Meanwhile, Wilson had made his proposals to the NSC on 31 March, and on 3 April the NSC staff produced a new projection (NSC 149) of total national security costs over the next three years. Expanded and revised to provide definitive outlines of the FY 1954 military programs as the basis for the budget to be submitted to Congress, the paper was adopted by the council on 22 April and signed by the president on the 29th as NSC 149/2.52

The revised FY 1954 Defense budget that emerged at the end of April adhered to the outline Wilson had sketched for the NSC a month earlier. Through all of its versions, NSC 149/2 projected the cost estimates he had proposed on 31 March. Expenditures would decline from $43.2 billion in FY 1954 to $40 billion in FY 1955, and to $35 billion in FY 1956. Overall, the requested appropriations for FY 1954 were "up to $5 billion" less than the $41.3 billion in the Truman budget. This included $2 billion to continue Korean hostilities at the current level and build up the ROK army to 20 divisions. But Wilson's blunt prediction that rearmament would come to a halt had disappeared. The opening paragraphs, following a ritual denunciation of deficit spending, flatly stated that the proposed expenditures for FY 1954 and FY 1955, while moving only gradually toward budgetary balance, would "provide greater force strength than we have today—in the United States, in NATO, and in the Far East." The promised military program, unfettered by any "specified" D-day readiness date, would provide a "steady improvement in defense capabilities, with a substantial base for full mobilization in the event of all-out war."

The reassuring tone of NSC 149/2 was no doubt responsive to the pressures upon Wilson to promise more security at no increase in cost or at lesser cost. Translating dollars into security was a great deal less than an exact science; honest men could easily differ over how much security a budget of a given size could deliver. On the other hand, the shift in the official DoD position involved more than nuances. Wilson had told the NSC on 31 March that spending at the levels he proposed would serve only to maintain U.S. forces in being for two more years and thereafter
they would decline. Three days later NSC 149 asserted that the same spending would support continued growth in military strength. Wilson's 31 March remarks had an impromptu quality and were couched mainly in generalities; NSC 149 was a thoroughly staffed, carefully phrased document packed with specifics and nice distinctions. Its specifics, however, seem more consistent with Wilson's 31 March generalities than with its own. The most conspicuous provision, a military personnel reduction of 250,000 to start immediately and be completed by the end of 1954, was 100,000 more than the FY 1954 cut in Dodge's late unlamented "illustrative" budget. It was mitigated somewhat by deferral of 56,000 of the total cut in Army and Marine Corps strength for the duration of Korean hostilities and by the requirement that the entire cut be taken in non-combat units. Even so, overall military strength would decline immediately rather than three years later.

Behind its generally soothing language, NSC 149/2 in fact signaled a re-examination of all existing expansion programs. The force and readiness goals laid down earlier in the war could not be achieved by FY 1956 or FY 1957 without undermining the nation's economic health. The entire military program would have to be stretched out. More fundamentally, the military program would be reviewed and modified from time to time as a result of "periodic recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in view of changing tactical, strategic, and economic considerations throughout the world." It would be farfetched to detect in these diffuse phrases a rumble of the impending restructuring of American strategy and forces. In April 1953 the New Look had not yet taken form, even as a concept, and NSC 149/2 contained no hint of its central theme—increased reliance on nuclear weapons. It did, however, foreshadow a general leveling-off of American rearmament under the same economy pressures that were eventually to shape the New Look. It was ironic that the service that was to become the New Look's prime beneficiary, the Air Force, was the one that reacted most sharply to the paper's implied threat to the continued growth of airpower.53

The Air Force Reacts

On 13 April Wilson directed the three military departments to accomplish no later than 30 June 1954 the non-combat personnel reductions specified in NSC 149: 125,000 for the Army, 75,000 for Navy and Marines, 50,000 for the Air Force.54 This ostensibly routine action precipitated a confrontation with the Air Force. Replying on the 17th to
Wilson's directive, Air Force Under Secretary James H. Douglas outlined how the Air Force intended to make the reductions. Two Air Force wartime missions were vital to the nation's survival: the strategic air offensive to be launched against the Soviet Union immediately at the beginning of hostilities, and the air defense of U.S. population and industrial centers. A third major mission, tactical support of U.S. ground forces, had a lower priority. Within the new level-off strength of 915,000 to be reached by the end of FY 1954, the Air Force could not continue to expand toward its approved goal of 143 wings. Of necessity, therefore, its force structure would have to be modified in order to carry out its highest-priority missions. Within the specified strength of 915,000, Douglas asserted, the "least undesirable" force composition that the Air Force could attain and support was 106 wings, which would include the entire complement of strategic (57) and air defense (29) wings planned for the 143-wing force. Because of the reduced number of tactical wings remaining (20) and personnel requirements elsewhere, the Air Force would be able to provide only 10 of the 28 wings of its commitment to NATO forces over the coming three years.55

The Air Force had employed the same tactic in its counterattack on the proposed expenditure cuts in March, in effect threatening to radically alter its planned force structure to preserve intact a capability to fulfill favored missions at the expense of less favored but still vital ones. The tactic could be highly effective, for it might force a difficult choice on decisionmakers at higher levels: reassign the orphaned missions to another service, with the unpleasant consequences ensuing from another public "roles and missions" controversy, or provide the Air Force the wherewithal to carry out all its original missions. The second alternative, although unpalatable since it involved capitulation and restoration of the status quo ante, was clearly the more rational choice. The Air Force's leaders, less convinced than Wilson and his superiors of the overriding need for economy, must have gambled heavily that OSD would adopt it.56

As in many institutional disputes, other options lay between the two theoretical extremes. OSD recognized that in building toward its distant but still officially approved goal of 143 wings the Air Force faced problems in many respects more severe than those of the other services. For the Air Force, the strength reductions mandated by NSC 149/2 would be especially difficult because of the need for a large training pipeline during a period of increasing wing strength. OSD Comptroller staff calculated that the Air Force would have to reduce its total personnel from about 990,000 at the end of FY 1953 to 915,000 a year later.* The Air Force

* This was a reduction of 75,000 compared with the 50,000 reduction Wilson had directed shortly before.
claimed that its allowed net intake of only 62,000 would not suffice to provide a training pipeline for the much larger intake expected in the following year. For this reason, the OSD staff felt that the target date for meeting the 915,000 objective should be extended a year to the end of FY 1955. 57

The Air Force had won its point. OSD's recommendation, based on the analysis by McNeil's staff and duly incorporated in NSC 149/2, approved on 29 April 1953, gave the Air Force an additional year to reach its reduced strength of 915,000. This would provide an average strength of 970,000 during FY 1954, ensuring a capability to support at least the 106-wing structure proposed. OSD took the position, however, that this force should be regarded as an interim objective, and that the Air Force should continue to work during FY 1954 toward the increase in the number of combat wings that NSC 149/2 would stipulate. 58

Like most compromises this one contained the seeds of future disagreement. The Air Force wanted to work toward its 143-wing goal and to attain it as rapidly as possible, but it was reluctant to commit itself to an interim objective for FY 1954 larger than 106 wings. OSD, reasonably confident that a force of 114 wings could be attained by the end of FY 1954, wanted the Air Force to make the effort "both as an incentive to get all we can out of the resources and with the knowledge that any subsequent adjustment would not be of a magnitude as to be disruptive in character." 59 OSD analysts seriously doubted, however, that a 143-wing force could be achieved by the end of FY 1956 within the expenditure framework of NSC 149/2, and Air Force leaders were well aware that repeatedly stretched-out programs seldom survived unscathed. If a balanced force capable of performing all the Air Force's missions was a receding possibility, the preferred fallback goal, given the predilections of the Air Force leadership, was a force heavily unbalanced in favor of the strategic and air defense missions. Proposed alternatives in late April looking beyond the end of FY 1954 all involved increasing emphasis on the strategic and air defense missions. 60

With the personnel ceilings authorized in April, the Air Force could continue to expand, albeit at a moderate pace, toward the 143-wing force. McNeil's staff warned in mid-April that the Air Force's heavy funding of procurement of long lead-time items for that force had already built up a large commitment which would be difficult and expensive, in terms of contract cancellations, to reduce. But the more immediate Air Force concern, as reflected in the 106-wing proposal, was to build hedges against future imposed cutbacks in the expansion of SAC and Air Defense Command by hastening the equipping of those wings, if necessary at the expense of the expansion of the total force and particularly the tactical component. NSC 149/2 left this broader issue unresolved. 61
The Pressure of Unexpended Funds

NSC 149/2 contained a thoughtful reminder that "the FY 1954 budget must be distinguished from cash expenditures in FY 1954." Like earlier appropriations, not all of those for FY 1954 would actually be obligated, much less spent, in the year they were voted. Expenditures during FY 1954 would come both from unexpended prior year appropriations and from funds to be appropriated in FY 1954.\footnote{Expenditures during FY 1954 were not prescribed but estimated at approximately $43.2 billion and at successively lower levels in subsequent years. The revised DoD budget, when presented, would be accompanied by a letter from Dodge to the secretary of defense stipulating that DoD expenditures during FY 1954 should "be held to a level of about $43.2 billion." The latter injunction represented an internal administration requirement, not a commitment to the Congress; changing Defense needs during the ensuing 12 months conceivably could cause it to be revoked or relaxed.} Expenditures during FY 1954 were not prescribed but estimated at approximately $43.2 billion and at successively lower levels in subsequent years. The revised DoD budget, when presented, would be accompanied by a letter from Dodge to the secretary of defense stipulating that DoD expenditures during FY 1954 should "be held to a level of about $43.2 billion." The latter injunction represented an internal administration requirement, not a commitment to the Congress; changing Defense needs during the ensuing 12 months conceivably could cause it to be revoked or relaxed.\footnote{Expenditures during FY 1954 were not prescribed but estimated at approximately $43.2 billion and at successively lower levels in subsequent years. The revised DoD budget, when presented, would be accompanied by a letter from Dodge to the secretary of defense stipulating that DoD expenditures during FY 1954 should "be held to a level of about $43.2 billion." The latter injunction represented an internal administration requirement, not a commitment to the Congress; changing Defense needs during the ensuing 12 months conceivably could cause it to be revoked or relaxed.}

Congress had, of course, the power to impose ceilings on expenditures, and there was growing concern in OSD that with the declining intensity of hostilities in Korea this power might be invoked. Expenditure ceilings had the practical effect of holding actual spending well below the levels projected. Imposition of a legislative ceiling, McNeil advised Wilson, should be resisted if possible.\footnote{Expenditures during FY 1954 were not prescribed but estimated at approximately $43.2 billion and at successively lower levels in subsequent years. The revised DoD budget, when presented, would be accompanied by a letter from Dodge to the secretary of defense stipulating that DoD expenditures during FY 1954 should "be held to a level of about $43.2 billion." The latter injunction represented an internal administration requirement, not a commitment to the Congress; changing Defense needs during the ensuing 12 months conceivably could cause it to be revoked or relaxed.}

The OSD staffs had worked on estimating Defense expenditures for FY 1954 throughout the winter and spring. The most solid basis available for this crystal ball exercise, the weekly record of current cash outflow, had dipped from a level of about $900 million in January to about $800 million by mid-March—primarily a reflection, McNeil accurately believed, of the tendency for production and construction schedules to slip and contract completions to be delayed as a consequence of a prevailing expectation in the business community that the new administration intended to reduce Defense spending. Wilson had already promised the president on 31 March, and written into NSC 149, that he would save an estimated $1 billion during the coming year by improved fiscal and administrative management. He expected other savings from the manpower reductions directed in March and April and from postponed procurement of many items that now required less lead time than before since production capacity was established and output flowing. Against these possibilities had to be reckoned the requirement to plan on a continuation of Korean hostilities, albeit at a low level, through all of FY 1954. Finally, the administration's business-oriented outlook counseled against any deep or abrupt cutback in DoD expenditures that would involve wholesale cancellation and renegotiation of contracts and disruptive changes in
production schedules. The budget exercise of March had been a sobering experience, convincing most of those involved in it that a $41 billion expenditure limit would be dangerously low. The target of $43.2 billion finally decided on, generally regarded as a rock-bottom figure and viable only through careful management, was almost identical with actual spending during FY 1953.

The misgivings in OSD stemmed largely from the looming pressure of unexpended funds. The decision to reduce the FY 1954 Truman budget's $41.3 billion appropriation request by no more than $5 billion, as explained by Wilson at the 31 March meeting of the NSC, apparently rested on the "political" argument that any deeper cut would have disastrous repercussions abroad. There is no available evidence that the figure was based on a quantitative calculation of any kind. OSD staff calculations, indeed, pointed to a much smaller appropriation request for 1954 than Wilson's minimum $36 billion.65

The process of dividing the projected $36 billion appropriation among the services had been under way since late March. Since Wilson was scheduled to make his final budget presentation to the NSC on 22 April, OSD ended the debate on the 18th with McNeil's recommendations on service responses to the personnel cut directed five days earlier. After the stormy squabbles of March, this final phase was remarkably tranquil—a lull before the pyrotechnics impending in Congress. The services' final requests for new obligational authority, when added to $1 billion-odd for OSD and interdepartmental activities, came to $37.8 billion, already $3.4 billion less than the original Truman request. The Air Force asked for a mere $12 billion, $4.7 billion less than the amount it had fought for so hard in the Truman budget. Its accompanying proposal for a 106-wing force, noted above, was less a response to the prospect of reduced appropriations than to a perceived threat that under manpower and spending restrictions expansion toward a 143-wing structure might be halted. The Navy, asking for $1.3 billion less than in the Truman budget, repeated the warnings of reduced staying power and calculated risks that it had made in March. Only the Army's request was larger than in the Truman budget—a consequence of the inclusion of estimated Korean War costs through FY 1954 (and six months beyond for ammunition and certain other items). The FY 1954 Truman budget, like its three predecessors, had left war financing to be covered in supplementary appropriations. From all these requests, OSD squeezed out a further $1.7 billion, mainly at the expense of the Army, for a reduced total of $36.1 billion—within a few million of the revised total submitted to Congress on 7 May.66
The chief concern in OSD was the very real question whether the line could be held on spending. Service estimates of expenditures in FY 1954 added up to some $47.7 billion. OSD estimates, though $2 billion to $2.5 billion less, still ran well above the $43.2 billion target. The reductions made by McNeil’s staff in the services’ requested appropriations had been carefully calculated to provide funds only for those programs that “would have the least effect on expenditures in FY 1954 and [permit] reduced expenditures in subsequent fiscal years.” Staff analyses warned that to stay under the FY 1954 spending target, immediate adjustments and cancellations of contracts on a large scale would be necessary, particularly for the Air Force with its immense backlog of obligations falling due in the coming year. Beyond these measures and the civilian personnel cuts directed in March lay the potentially vast but practically elusive cost reductions theoretically attainable through a concerted management attack on encrusted inefficiencies and waste throughout the establishment, a theme that administration spokesmen had already raised to the level of a crusade.67

End-April Outlook

“The results of the 1954 special budget review,” wrote Dodge soon after the revised budget had gone to the Congress, “fall substantially short of the administration’s budgetary objectives.” They had, indeed, borne out his pessimistic forecasts to the president-elect five months earlier. For a variety of reasons—lack of time, inherited commitments, legislative impediments—“the reductions which it was possible to propose to Congress represented only the first estimate of what can be accomplished and cannot be accepted as satisfactory goals for actual results in the 1954 fiscal year.”68 Dodge’s unhappiness derived from the projections of total national security costs as they appeared at the end of April. While the Truman programs had been cut back substantially, the expenditure cuts produced by the three-months budget review fell short by several billion of those Dodge had proposed at the beginning of March. The total savings against the Truman projections for the two years were much less than the $6.8 billion and $14 billion Dodge had hoped for. As a consequence, while his original predictions of budget deficits for FY 1954 and FY 1955 had shrunk measurably, the administration still faced deficits for those two years of $5.5 billion and $7.9 billion, assuming expiration of wartime taxes as scheduled. Still ahead, it had to see the FY 1954 budget legislation through to passage by Congress.
CHAPTER V

Defense Goes to Capitol Hill:
The FY 1954 Budget

By the time the revised FY 1954 Defense budget went to Congress on 7 May 1953 the public debate on the new administration's defense spending program was in full cry. Except for a short press conference on 30 April, the president had refrained from advance public statements, but his reticence evidently did not inhibit many of his subordinates, and a briefing for congressional leaders on the 30th generated a fanfare of publicity. As the congressional hearings rolled on during May and June, many legislators carried the debate into the public arena, and the president himself made two more important contributions—a radio talk on the costs of national security on 19 May and an address in Minneapolis on 10 June.1

The Debate Begins: The Myth of the Five Billion Dollar Cut

At the congressional briefing on 30 April, conservative Republican legislators led by Sen. Robert A. Taft reacted explosively to the news that the federal budget would not be balanced in FY 1954 and probably not in FY 1955. Taft accurately predicted that the party would lose heavily in the elections of 1954 and berated the military for their profligate spending. "I have no confidence whatsoever," he declared, "in their judgment or their ability to break away from recommendations they have made in the past. There should be a complete resurvey of all military demands and a reduction all along the line." He bluntly reminded the president of his now broken promise to hold FY 1954 spending below $70 billion and
threatened to call for tax reductions in 1954, an issue on which he had up to now supported the president. The threat came at an awkward time, for Eisenhower was about to ask Congress to extend a number of wartime taxes due for early reduction or demise with a view to paring about $1 billion from the impending FY 1954 deficit. The tax battle was joined on 20 May, with the formal submission of this proposed legislation; it continued through May and June while the Defense budget hearings were in progress. In his radio address on 19 May the president dwelt bitterly on the legacy of unresolved fiscal problems his predecessor had left behind: projected expenditures of $78.6 billion, an underestimated deficit of $9.9 billion that it now appeared would exceed $11 billion, a two-year expenditure curve peaking precisely at the time when revenues were scheduled to drop, an extravagant $41.4 billion FY 1954 Defense budget which made no provision for continuing the war in Korea or for building up the ROK army, and an enormous "overhang" of $81 billion in C.O.D. obligations "for which cash must be found in the tax revenues of the next several years." The request for new appropriations had been reduced by $8.5 billion, and projected spending in FY 1954 would be at least $4.5 billion less than previously planned. Even so, he warned, American citizens would have to forgo scheduled and proposed tax cuts. The following January, he would submit to Congress a comprehensive tax reform program.

Most of the opposition to the revised Defense budget came, however, from Democrats and liberal Republicans worried over its possible impact on national security. The president aimed his 19 May radio address mainly at these critics, stressing the now familiar themes: the "great equation" of economic and military strength and the policy of the "long haul" in defense without deadlines, D-days, or a year of maximum peril. A sudden, massive attack or an all-out war was not the most likely danger, said the president, for the Communists knew that the United States could meet and defeat any major military challenge. Soviet leaders hoped instead, through the constant threat of military aggression,

to force upon America and the free world an unbearable security burden leading to economic disaster. They have plainly said that free people cannot preserve their way of life and at the same time provide enormous military establishments....

In our present world...a crippled industry or a demoralized working force could be the equivalent of a lost battle. Prolonged inflation could be as destructive of a truly free economy as could a chemical attack against an army in the field. If, in today's continuing danger, we were to strain our capacity until rigid
In the Defense budget hearings airpower quickly became the central issue. Because almost all ($5.09 billion) of the $5.2 billion cut in the Truman Defense budget seemed to be accounted for by reductions in Air Force programs, the revised budget was trumpeted by the press and in Congress as an attack on airpower in general. Although the administration commanded a majority in the two appropriations committees, Wilson and his team faced a serious problem in making both critics and supporters aware of the true dimensions of the budget behind the misleading arithmetic. There was no disputing that the Air Force was the principal victim of the budget cutters, since its original request had been slashed by about 30 percent. But the Navy’s original request had also been cut, a fact obscured by the net increase in the Army’s request resulting from the inclusion of Korean War costs and the buildup of the South Korean army. Even with the reduced request the Air Force emerged as the only service whose force structure was slated to expand in FY 1954.

In an important sense, however, the $5 billion cut in the Air Force budget was a myth. Congress could hardly be blamed for perceiving it as central, since the revised budget invited—indeed demanded—comparison with the Truman original. Administration spokesmen abetted this view by citing the cut with pride as visible proof that campaign pledges to reduce military spending were taken seriously. The fact remained, however, that the Truman budget estimates of new money for the Air Force in FY 1954 had become passe even before they reached Congress. As early as January the Air Force itself was no longer defending them because lagging aircraft production was pushing some projected deliveries into FY 1954 and later years, thus reducing the need for piling new appropriations in FY 1954 on the huge backlog of obligated but still unspent funds from prior years. OSD and the Air Staff disagreed on the amount of new money needed in FY 1954, and the OSD decision late in March to decouple the FY 1954 budget from the 143-wing force goal introduced a major new issue on which the parties could agree to disagree as far as the FY 1954 budget was concerned. The $11.7 billion request submitted in the revised Air Force budget derived, in fact, more from negotiation than OSD dictation. The more rabid congressional partisans of the Air Force would discover, to their chagrin, that, with the sole exception of General Vandenberg himself, the Air Force high command not only endorsed it but had helped to formulate it.
In short, by May the $5 billion cut in the Air Force budget was more apparent than real. This circumstance lent an unreal quality to much of the congressional inquiry. Understanding came hard to legislators primed to attack or defend the revised budget in terms of the dollar gaps between it and the Truman budget, and not at all to those who evidently did not want to understand. In the hearing rooms, hour after hour and day after day, respectful OSD and Air Force spokesmen recited the basic facts, from their respective points of view, to interrogating senators and representatives, some of whom may have been mainly interested in getting their own tendentious questions into the record or provoking harried or unwary officials into making exploitable statements. A conscientious few did their homework and mastered the pertinent facts, and the practical issue quickly narrowed down to relatively modest additions to, or subtractions from, the revised budget. But a hard core of intractable airpower enthusiasts continued to the end to intone the simplistic rhetoric of the $5 billion cut and the 143-wing Air Force. Their voices, relayed and interpreted to the public in the press, seemed to dominate the debate.5

The OSD Team Makes Its Case

Making his second appearance before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Secretary Wilson was its first witness when the hearings on the revised budget began on 11 May in a relaxed and friendly atmosphere. The secretary briefly reviewed the salient features of the revision, the manpower and other economy measures instituted during the spring, and the abortive exploration of the feasibility of achieving a balanced budget in 1954 and 1955, culminating in the April NSC decisions on forces, manpower, and expenditures that pointed to acceptance of the probability of unbalanced budgets until 1958. He alluded to the president’s 30 April press conference, with its emphasis on economic strength, the strategy of the long haul, and rejection of goal-determining critical dates.6

Wilson spelled out recent decisions affecting the Air Force: gradual reduction in aggregate strength to 915,000 by the end of FY 1955, continued modernization and increase in combat strength, despite declining personnel strength, to 114 well-equipped wings by the end of FY 1954, and accelerated equipping of reserve units with modern aircraft, all looking toward an interim goal of 120 wings. The secretary assured his hearers that the 143-wing goal had not been abandoned but would be re-examined by the Joint Chiefs that summer as part of the development of the FY 1955 budget. Meanwhile, the aim was to push the growth of air combat
power, bringing the parallel processes of training, provision of modern equipment, and base development into better balance.

Why had most of the total Defense cut come out of the Air Force budget? Because, said Wilson, the Air Force had the most extended commitments. With a $29 billion carryover, it would still have more than $40 billion theoretically available to spend in FY 1954—$10 billion more than the Army, $14 billion more than the Navy, and far more than it could actually spend in that single year. Wilson delivered a lecture on carried-over funds, explaining that they were a necessary part of any modern military buildup program, especially in the early stages, when production and procurement lagged far behind appropriations. This was particularly true of aircraft procurement because of the long lead times involved. As production difficulties were overcome and design changes were reduced, as the whole program emphasis shifted from design of new types into engineering and finally into production, the need for advance financing diminished—again, especially in aircraft procurement. The Air Force was now reaching this stage; the Army had reached it about a year earlier, when its requested appropriations had been similarly cut back.

With shorter lead times the obligation of new money for procurement could safely be postponed until some of the backlog of obligated funds had been liquidated by payments for deliveries under old contracts. Committee members who had done their homework knew that this trend had been in evidence for a year or more. During FY 1953 the Air Force had a total of $25.7 billion in unexpended funds for aircraft and related procurement, of which only $6 billion was actually spent. Truman's budgeteers, facing the next fiscal year with $19.7 billion in unexpended money, including $2 billion not yet obligated, had asked for only $6.6 billion in new obligational authority, $4.5 billion less than the year before. Their successors reduced this request to $3.5 billion. Added to the $2 billion carryover, this made a total of only $5.5 billion available for advance financing of new contracts in the still massive total of $23.2 billion ($19.7 billion plus $3.5 billion) of unexpended funds. Since the Air Force expected, however, to spend only about $6.3 billion of this sum during FY 1954, the prospect was that $16.9 billion of unexpended funds would be carried over into FY 1955—only $2.8 billion less than the previous year's carryover.

Wilson explained that extended advance financing tended to throw procurement out of balance through the accumulation of inventories of easy-to-produce items awaiting delivery of related long lead-time items. Also, if advance financing failed to take into account the shrinkage of lead times, it encouraged the services to foreclose options by committing money unnecessarily far into the future to weaponry that might obsolesce
or to quantities that might not be needed. "We do not have to order another year of the B-52's now, because we have not produced any of them yet except experimental models. The money is in there for tooling up the plant and the initial production. We could decide a year from now how many more B-52's we wanted."

Wilson failed to include in his opening remarks one of the most persuasive arguments at his disposal: the revised Air Force budget, despite deep cuts in requested appropriations and spending, would have very little impact on the output of new combat aircraft over the coming two and a half years, which, in the main, were already funded by prior appropriations. But it was hard to convince the uninitiated or forgetful, without hard numbers backed up by documents, that the same number of new aircraft could, in the long run, be bought for less money. Air Force partisans suspected some sort of cover-up, and Wilson proved to be a surprisingly inept witness, coming to the hearings without the data that could prove his contention.  

Democratic Representative Mahon, Wilson's adversary in the earlier February hearings, charged that the 143-wing program was again being stretched out just as under Truman. Whose idea was it to cut $5 billion from the Air Force request? Wilson reminded him that the 143-wing program, since its extension by the previous administration, had not been scheduled for completion in FY 1954 anyway. He asserted that the new 114-wing target (not goal) for that year, unlike previous ones, was realistic and represented an important increase in strength, but he admitted that "a few planes" had been rescheduled from late in FY 1954 to FY 1955 in order "to level out production." The final figures were not arbitrary but the end product of a detailed analysis of each service's programs.  

Mahon remained unconvinced, but Wilson and Kyes stood their ground. While conceding that reduced appropriations now would not affect the production of aircraft in the coming year, Mahon contended that the $2.4 billion cut in spending together with the $5 billion appropriations cut added up to a "$7 billion-plus reduction" in the Air Force program. Reduced appropriations, he insisted, must mean fewer new aircraft eventually, a slowing down of the buildup of airpower that Congress had ordained and lavishly funded over the past two years. It was a question of maintaining momentum. Not so, retorted Wilson: The $2.4 billion represented savings that would be achieved through improved management, not by restricting payments for new aircraft. It should be deducted from, not added to, the $5 billion reduction in appropriations, making a net program cut of only $2.6 billion. "That," said Wilson, "is a fairer statement than saying it is a $7 billion cut."
Mahon at least succeeded in pinning down the reluctant Wilson on the question of projected aircraft production under the new budget. In scaling down an original request of $6 billion-plus for aircraft procurement, Mahon demanded, "How many planes did you cut out?" Wilson and Kyes resorted to evasive tactics. The dialogue quickly climaxed as Mahon persisted; Kyes insisted that the bald comparison between total numbers of planes originally planned and now planned would be only part of the answer and really meaningless. The new budget projected a few more new combat aircraft than the Truman budget through December 1955. On the other hand, about 1,200 support-type aircraft—trainers, transports, helicopters, and liaison aircraft—had been dropped from the program, in many cases with the full agreement of the Air Force.12

To the Republican members, it became evident that the major points of Wilson's defense—economy, improved management, program balance, continued but orderly growth of airpower—were more persuasive than Mahon's repetitive but undocumented charges that the revised budget concealed a slowdown in growth. Of the three Democrats, only Mahon remained hostile.13

After grilling Wilson and Kyes for the better part of two days, the subcommittee called on McNeil, as the recognized expert on the Defense budget, to give supplementary testimony. He was a model witness—imperturbable, courteous, attentive, articulate, ready and accurate in his responses, qualities which Wilson and Kyes did not display to the same degree. Both, especially Wilson, commanded genuine respect owing to their standing in the business world, and neither lacked self-assurance. But they occasionally became irascible when irritated by what they deemed an unreasonable question, and they experienced some difficulty in communicating with their interlocutors. McNeil, by contrast, was regarded with a deference that reflected not merely recognition of his demonstrated expertise, but, even more, confidence in his integrity, a remarkable achievement after five years as a key Defense official and innumerable appearances before congressional committees. Illustrative of his persuasiveness in congressional hearings were his successive appearances in February, when he was called on to expound the outgoing administration's DoD budget (which he himself had helped to frame), and in the full hearings of May, when he defended the revised budget. On the former occasion, circumstances required him to play the role of a neutral expert who had followed guidelines laid down by his superiors, not easy before an audience prone to assume that much sworn testimony was an attempt to conceal the truth. In May he appeared as both expert and advocate, defending while explaining.14
In his opening review McNeil sliced the budget horizontally, so to speak, by principal categories (military personnel, maintenance and operations, etc.), thereby complementing the vertical breakdown by service given earlier. This perspective was hardly reassuring to airpower enthusiasts: The revised budget for aircraft procurement represented a 68-percent drop within a single budget year—a dramatic indication of how steeply the trend of such procurement was plunging downward. More broadly speaking, the reductions from the Truman budget fell largely in the major procurement and production account (27 percent as compared with the reduction of only 13 percent in the overall budget), and, within this category, ships and harbor craft (mainly a Navy account) had also been cut back steeply, by almost 25 percent. The shape of the whole budget had thus been altered: military personnel, despite manpower reductions, was now the largest single account, rising from 28 to 31 percent of the whole; major procurement and production, formerly the largest account, had dropped to second place (from 35 to 29 percent), with aircraft procurement absorbing less than half of that. 15

Both the Truman budget and the expected new FY 1954 program, said McNeil, used as a base former Secretary Marshall’s “high plateau” concept of limited mobilization. As Marshall had described it, “This is not full mobilization. This is a raising up of the whole establishment to gain momentum from which we can open the throttle and go very quickly in any required direction.” The pace of mobilization could be accelerated or slowed down to deal with the threat as it developed, but once the plateau had been reached, the partially mobilized establishment “would be one that might be maintained indefinitely, if necessary, without becoming a damaging economic burden.”16

More elusive, for committee members, were the meaning and practical effect of administration rhetoric on rejection of the so-called “critical year” factor in force and mobilization planning and its replacement by steady continuous improvement over a period of years. McNeil tried to clarify the difference. Under an assumed specific D-day, he explained, procurement managers tended to push the building of mobilization reserves rapidly toward full prescribed levels without regard for balance, with the result that readily available items were procured early and in large quantities, while stocks of hard-to-get items grew more slowly or not at all. In effect, normal priorities were reversed. Production scheduling also tended to be less efficient than it would have been if projected over a longer period; the effort to meet planning goals by specific dates caused peaks and valleys of production. With specific planning dates eliminated, a reasonable rate of production could be maintained for a longer time and reserve stocks
accumulated over a period of three or four years; thus less money would be needed now than would be if the aim were to compress most of the buying in the next two years. Near-term mobilization reserve targets also had the disadvantage of premature closing down of production lines with consequent erosion of production potential. 17

D-day readiness dates, tied to an assumed critical year of “maximum peril,” were successively moved back—from mid-1952 to mid-1953 to mid-1954—either as the threat failed to materialize or as it became apparent that readiness schedules would not be met. Production programs were stretched out correspondingly, but since each extension was relatively short, the psychology of rapid and unbalanced buildup persisted. Perceptions, McNeil noted, differed significantly at upper and lower levels of the hierarchy. General Omar Bradley, for example, regarded the new planning dates merely as targets likely to be changed again and not requiring new computations and schedules, while officers further down the line had to take them literally and act accordingly. 18

During his testimony on 14 May McNeil communicated a sense of budgeting as a continuous process; successive budgets, however conspicuous on the political landscape, were something less than the fiscal monuments that legislators and most administration spokesmen pictured them. The Truman FY 1954 budget, for example, developed over the spring and summer of 1952, was based on data out of date by fall, making the final estimates excessive when submitted to BoB in November. The FY 1953 budget had gone through a similar evolution, with the result that Congress cut it by $4.5 billion and later mandated the absorption of an additional outlay of $1.2 billion for a military pay increase, without, as far as could be determined, causing undue strain. When Rep. Errett P. Scrivner drew the obvious conclusion, “we could have cut $6 billion more and not hurt it,” McNeil agreed and conceded that in six months, if all went well, some reductions might become possible. For now, further cuts would be risky; as it stood, the budget had “room to turn around.” 19

The two afternoons of hearings (19-20 May) that opened the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee’s consideration of the revised DoD budget, with Secretary Wilson as the principal witness, contributed little of substance to the congressional debate. Only 4 of the 15 members attended both days, and the level of the discussion (senators appeared to be addressing not each other or the witnesses but their elsewhere constituents and the record) was so low as to preclude any serious exploration of the issues. 20 The committee may have preferred to husband its time and energy for the impending sessions with the service secretaries and especially the star witness, Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg.
Wilson’s ablest adversary in this forum was the senior senator from Maine, Margaret Chase Smith, a dedicated champion of airpower. On this occasion, however, she engaged in demagoguery, attacking the revised budget with a barrage of 32 blatantly loaded questions—e.g., “Do you plan to cut out the Strategic Air Command buildup so that the Soviets will be encouraged in their acts of aggression without fear of retaliation?”—directed to Wilson for response and simultaneously released to the media. This scatter-gun format partially masked a purposeful focus on the same two charges that Mahon had aired so persistently during the House subcommittee hearings—that American airpower was being reduced, through funding cuts and program stretchouts at a time when the enemy threat was increasing, and that “someone” in the Defense Department, placing economy above security and overriding the protests of the military, had arbitrarily decided that the Air Force budget should be cut by $5 billion.21

Wilson and Kyes stonewalled, reciting with occasional flashes of irritation the now familiar litany: the Soviet threat was continuous and growing, no one underrated it. The Air Force already had more money than it could possibly spend in the next two years. The 120-wing force was an interim not a final goal; the new Joint Chiefs would review basic strategy and force goals in the summer, and their views would be reflected in the FY 1955 budget; there had been no prior decision to cut the Air Force budget by a given amount, and Wilson and Kyes had both been “surprised” by the “statistical result” of the staff analysis assigning most of the cuts to Air Force programs. The Joint Chiefs had been fully consulted but had not approved the final verdict since budget approval was not a JCS responsibility. Wilson urged the committee to solicit JCS views directly.22

The Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations began hearing testimony from the service secretaries and military chiefs on Monday, 1 June. Two days of discussion sufficed for the Army and Navy, but Wednesday the 3d, when Air Force officials were scheduled to appear, was expected to be a “fireworks” session. Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott had been quoted as saying he was “disappointed” with the budget cuts, and retiring Chief of Staff General Vandenberg, returning from a two-week trip to South America, not only professed ignorance of the details of the revised budget but asserted that two weeks earlier he had not known that virtually the entire cut had been taken from his budget. Sen. Homer Ferguson, chairman of the subcommittee, immediately scheduled a return visit by Wilson and Kyes to reply to the expected Air Force counterattack.23
Talbott led off as the first Air Force witness on the morning of 3 June. A veteran aviation industry executive with experience reaching back to World War I, Talbott had grown up with American aviation and worked with the Wright brothers in their famous bicycle shop. A staunch Republican and bridge-playing friend of the president from pre-nomination days, when offered a place in the new administration he had specified the Air Force post as the only one that interested him. It was clear from his first few minutes in the witness chair that he had considered his position carefully, made up his mind, and done his homework. 24

Talbott was an effective witness, his replies cool, correct, and straight to the mark. But his testimony, ably supplemented by aides, failed to produce the expected fireworks. In a brief opening statement, he carefully defined his position. The proposed Air Force budget had his unequivocal support, generally because, as the president had asserted, it embodied an optimum balance between the needs of military security and economic health for the nation, more specifically because he was confident it in no way jeopardized the timely achievement of the 143-wing force, which he regarded as still the ultimate goal of Air Force expansion. The scheduled re-examination of strategy and force requirements later in the year was a matter of the greatest urgency in view of the revolutionary changes, especially in the development of atomic weapons, that had occurred since the last formulation in 1951. Whether the 143-wing goal was reaffirmed or not would be known in less than six months, so that the orderly buildup of airpower could continue with a minimum of delay or loss of momentum.

The revised budget, Talbott emphasized, thus represented an interim program calculated to provide a solid base from which the Air Force could continue to grow. By the end of FY 1954 the Air Force could promise 110 wings, fully equipped and manned; it would also try hard to produce by then the 4 additional wings that OSD believed to be attainable. Beyond 1954 the outlook was less clear, but for the present the Air Force had undertaken to program toward an interim goal of 120 wings by December 1955, but with a capability to build rapidly to a still higher level. 25

Not money or materiel, but personnel posed the primary limitation on the Air Force's planned growth during FY 1954. While building and equipping new wings, it would be shrinking in personnel. Precisely how many combat wings could be adequately manned in the total reduced force was noisily disputed in the Air Force, with echoes occasionally heard in congressional hearing rooms. The official Air Force view, stubbornly intoned despite OSD pressure, held that no more than 110 could be guaranteed, although 114 would be attempted. Looking beyond, 120 well-equipped wings might be attained by mid- or end-FY 1956, but not in a numerically dwindling total force. For the present the issue was
academic; it would be settled, or overtaken, later in the year in the context of the big decisions on national strategy and force goals.\textsuperscript{26}

Senators seemed to find all this extraordinarily hard to understand.\textsuperscript{27} They seemed more comfortable with the arithmetic of dollars than of people and things. Questioning in both Senate and House subcommittees enabled the Air Force witnesses to give their side of the picture of “enormous” unspent funds carried over from prior-year appropriations. Only $3.3 billion of these funds, they pointed out, was still unobligated, and almost all of this, along with the $11.7 billion of new money requested, was already earmarked and would be committed during the coming fiscal year.\textsuperscript{28}

In the Senate subcommittee the ritual question was posed: “Were the present Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted about this budget?,” leading to the inevitable charade of “amazed” senators, headed by the formidable Margaret Chase Smith, refusing to believe that the Joint Chiefs, by law, gave only advice not decisions on the budget. This kind of posturing was notably absent in the House subcommittee’s exploration of the same question.\textsuperscript{29}

More revealing, in the House hearing, was the testimony of the principal witnesses, Talbott, Under Secretary James H. Douglas, and Vice Chief of Staff General Twining, on the Air Staff’s role in the $5 billion cut. Their portrayal was quite different from the one in the media that highlighted an autocratic OSD imposing arbitrary budget cuts on a protesting but helpless Air Force. The January budget, according to Douglas, had been prepared under heavy pressure to build a fully modern 143-wing force by the end of FY 1955, but by early March the atmosphere had changed. In the Air Force as well as in OSD, the aim now was to “get the essential defense with the fewest possible dollars,” even to the point of postponing the 143-wing program. The first big slice had been taken out by the Air Staff itself well before the OSD decisions of mid-April. An Air Force proposal of $15.2 billion gave way after more negotiation to the final OSD proposal on 18 April of an $11.7 billion appropriation request.\textsuperscript{30}

The reduction of the Air Force budget, Douglas explained, was a product of interstaff negotiation rather than OSD fiat. But, Mahon challenged him, was not this willingness of the Air Staff to perform self-surgery a result of “pressure from . . . [OSD] to cut the military budget?” Disarmingly, Douglas agreed. It was “the only way I personally would expect that such reviews and reconsiderations could, as a practical matter, be accomplished.” Clearly, by March the climate of opinion in the Air Force was generally receptive to “intelligent” budgetary savings and the original submissions were no longer considered defensible. The whole budgetary
process was far too complicated and involved far too many individuals and organizations to be explained by a simple response to the question "who decided?"

The Air Force officials did not, however, merely parrot the official OSD line, and to some degree they even undermined it. Their repeated characterizations of the 120-wing program as only "interim," a way station on the high road to the 143-wing force, seemed to imply that it lacked merits of its own. "I would be very unhappy about that," said Douglas, "... if it were not for our confidence that there will be a proper redetermination with an opportunity to go ahead if the go ahead is indicated." What most worried Talbot and Douglas was the likelihood, as they saw it, that the new program might irretrievably retard the Air Force buildup before the Joint Chiefs could review strategy and propose new objectives and the administration and the Congress act upon them.

Talbott's misgivings derived from the more immediate and concrete problems that could be foreseen in carrying out the new program. Deliveries of combat aircraft would presumably continue under the old schedules, unaffected by reduced appropriations; theoretically, if reorders were executed by July 1954 and new funding provided in FY 1955, this part of the 143-wing program could ultimately be completed. But more than 2,000 trainer and other non-combat aircraft would have to be eliminated, pilot and other technical training cut back, and base construction postponed. All this meant loss of time and momentum, which would be difficult to regain if it were decided later to expand beyond the 120-wing force. "We are moving backward," Mahon exclaimed impatiently. "Every time you reprogram and reschedule, ... you have wasted time, lost motion, and a delay in the buildup." Talbott blew both hot and cold, but on the whole took a gloomy view. "There is no use fooling ourselves. This reduction holds us back to a certain degree. We take a certain calculated risk while we take a new look."

By mid-afternoon of 3 June, it became clear from the testimony given to the two congressional subcommittees by Talbott and his principal aides (General Vandenberg had not yet testified) that despite some reservations (and an understandable willingness to accept more funds if offered), the Air Force officially stood solidly behind the revised budget. The chagrin of the hard-line critics was evident. In the Senate subcommittee the orthodoxy of Talbott's position was so evident to Senator Smith that she asked him whether "there is any truth to the reports that retaliatory action is going to be ordered" against Air Force officers who opposed the budget. Talbott replied, "I say with a smile I almost resent that question."
The Senate subcommittee accordingly awaited the testimony of General Vandenberg, the last scheduled Air Force witness, with high expectations. For the general public, which had learned little about the testimony thus far given, the retiring chief of staff was the Air Force spokesman, the prototype of the war aviator hero. In the days to come, his utterances were to dominate press reports and analyses of the budget debate. Most senators and congressmen knew better, but even in that select forum the carefully phrased and tempered views of the Air Force's civilian leaders would be generally overlooked or forgotten in the uproar over Vandenberg's all-out attack on the revised budget.

A man of strong convictions but no maverick, Vandenberg had commanded the Ninth Air Force with distinction in the war in Europe. Since General Spaatz's retirement at the end of April 1948, he had presided as chief of staff over the growth of the Air Force and had become the leading professional advocate of strategic airpower as the nation's primary weapon against the threat of Communist expansion. The 143-wing program was largely his creation. A cool and articulate spokesman, still boyishly handsome despite his 54 years, he was an attractive and commanding figure. 35

Vandenberg began by inserting into the record an unclassified version of the presentation he had made in executive session on 6 March to the House subcommittee introducing the Truman Air Force budget. It was a shrewd maneuver. The statement had not heretofore been made public, and the press promptly picked it up. Its central theme was that rapid completion of the 143-wing force remained the minimum requirement of national security—minimum because its adoption by the Joint Chiefs in 1951 reflected an extremely conservative estimate of the strength needed, following careful consideration of the Air Force's own recommendation of a 155-wing force. Since its original formulation, Vandenberg stressed, the requirement had become even more urgent because successive stretch-outs during the Truman administration had extended its earliest possible completion date well beyond the mid-1954 peril point originally projected, and the growth of Soviet power meanwhile had proceeded even more rapidly than expected. On 19 March, he reminded the senators, the Joint Chiefs had warned that any reduction in the 143-wing goal would increase the threat to the security of the United States "beyond the dictates of national prudence," and they had repeated the warning on 8 May at the time the revised budget was submitted. 36

This uncompromising insistence on nothing less than the 143-wing force was the basic difference between Vandenberg's position and that of the civilian Air Force leaders who, without renouncing that goal, were
willing to work toward the interim 120-wing force while awaiting the new Joint Chiefs' redetermination of national strategy and force goals. To Vandenberg, the revised budget merely substituted a 120-wing goal for the approved 143-wing goal without advancing the target date. To label the new goal as "interim" was, he implied, an attempt to conceal what amounted to another stretchout. Unlike the other two services, which had substantially achieved their long-range expansion goals, the Air Force, largely because of the long lead time required for developing and producing modern aircraft, had progressed only about two-thirds of the way toward its goals. Now, with most of the problems of research, development, and "debugging" behind it and the end of the road finally in view, new obstacles—administrative, fiscal, and political—were being imposed. "No sound military reason has been offered to explain why the Air Force buildup to the agreed force level is again to be delayed . . . . We face an enemy who has more modern jet fighters than we have and enough long-range bombers to attack this country in a sudden all-out atomic effort. Rather than reduce our efforts to attain air superiority over the Communists, we should now increase those efforts."

It was an effective opening statement, full of quotable passages for the press and cast in a question-answer format that stood up well under the battering of senatorial interruptions. Vandenberg added little of substance, indeed, to what the civilian officials had already said, although he patiently replowed the same ground during almost two and a half days of grilling by the subcommittee. The senators did not really want more information, having already listened to far more than they could digest. Their prime purpose, on both sides of the argument, was to draw or provoke the general into statements that would fuel the already inflamed public debate.

One significant addition to the Air Force case did emerge from Vandenberg's testimony: a coherent argument to the effect that, apart from the $5 billion budget cut, various "restrictions" imposed on the Air Force over the past several months had already set back the possible fulfillment of the 143-wing program by at least six months. The restrictions referred to had, it turned out, all been mentioned in earlier testimony—deferment of contracts and freezing of advertising for bids resulting in slippage of the base construction program, civilian and military personnel cuts, the de facto ceiling on expenditures, substitution of lesser forces than 143 wings as the effective program objective. Since Talbott and Douglas had already confessed to fears that the program might have been set back, Vandenberg's calm but unequivocal assertion that this bad happened carried a certain force. The argument focused attention
on the practical consequences of reprogramming for a 120-wing force. If and when the 143-wing program was reinstated, however, the delay in base construction, for example, might indeed put back its achievement. Similarly, because of the lead times required for training, "if it should be decided next year that the Air Force will, after all, have 143 wings, it will then be impossible to recruit and train the personnel for such a force earlier than 1957." Such piecemeal economies, Vandenberg argued, ignored the organic character of a modern air force. He emphasized that a shortage of any one of the three principal elements of an air force—people, planes, and bases—would render the force ineffective. To reach established goals on a schedule required a consistent and orderly program. 38

The decision to continue procuring combat aircraft for a 143-wing force, while reprogramming everything else for a 120-wing force, had been widely touted as a saving that would not impair the growth of real airpower. Actually, Vandenberg charged, it would disrupt and set back the whole program. Even though some of the new aircraft would go to modernize units of the Air National Guard and Air Reserve, the reductions in personnel and in base construction would leave "most of these airplanes without units, people, or bases, and the only alternative is to store them" until new wings were activated, manned, and prepared to receive them. Modernizing the Guard and Reserve, although a worthy enough aim, would not add an iota to the Air Force's ready D-day strength, on which the nation's survival depended. In a "one-shot Air Force," Vandenberg reminded his hearers, a reservist pilot winding up his business affairs in an office 100 miles from the base was of little use to the bomber crew preparing to take off within 15 minutes. 39

The airpower hard-liners on the Senate subcommittee had high hopes of making a case from Vandenberg's testimony that the Joint Chiefs' collective views, and his in particular, had been ignored, and their advice had not been sought. One of the general's opening remarks seemed to provide a springboard: "The Air Force did not, and I did not" approve the reduction from 143 wings to 120 wings as the goal of Air Force expansion—nor, of course, did the JCS. During the ensuing two and a half days a group of determined senators (Knowland, McClellan, Hill, and Smith) spent many hours trying to ascertain what lay behind these assertions.

Vandenberg reviewed the history of his unavailing resistance to the Truman stretchouts and delays in the Air Force buildup, including the cuts made in the original FY 1954 budget before its submission in January, and of the rejection by all the services and the Joint Chiefs of the proposed expenditure limits in the Dodge budget exercise in March. He explained again his passive stance at the 28 April NSC meeting, when
the total Defense budget had been discussed: "There was no information [on the Air Force budget] available to me or the Chiefs to comment on, and therefore there was nothing for me to say"; silence meant neither acquiescence nor dissent. After learning of the final OSD budget decisions on 6 May, Vandenberg registered his protest with Secretary Talbott on the following day. But why, Senator Knowland wanted to know, did he not appeal (through channels) to the president, as he was entitled to do? Because, Vandenberg replied, "As Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I do not feel that my protest is going to be nearly as strong as a protest from the Joint Chiefs of Staff"; he cited the JCS warnings of 19 March and 8 May, in which he had participated, against any reduction in the 143-wing program.40

As the questioning proceeded, the precise nature and timing of Vandenberg's asserted protest on 7 May became less and less clear. However it might have been "registered," it soon became evident that the protest had not been made in writing; "there was no need . . . ," Douglas argued, "[since] General Vandenberg has never varied from his conviction that 143 wings is required for the defense of the United States." Pressed for details as to how Air Force officials had reacted to the 6 May OSD budget allocations, both Vandenberg and Douglas were increasingly vague on dates and events and no clear answer emerged.41

So much for the "protest" allegedly "registered" with Secretary Talbott on 7 May. The battle within the Defense Department for the 143-wing Air Force had been lost when OSD shunted aside the Air Force's 7 April budget proposals; indeed, the president's approval of NSC 149/2 on 29 April had doomed it. Accepting that provisional decision (subject to later modification by the new Joint Chiefs), the Air Force's civilian leaders sought to negotiate the best terms they could with OSD. The issue of force goals narrowed down to a difference between 110 and 114 wings as the objective for FY 1954. On these terms, Secretary Talbott and his civilian associates went into the congressional hearings committed to support the revised budget and the interim 120-wing force, knowing that the air-power faction in Congress would take up the larger cause of the 143-wing force and conceivably might even win, preempting the later decisions of the new Joint Chiefs. In the Air Force high command, Vandenberg was thus left in lonely isolation, however large and dedicated his following among the rank and file. For him on the eve of retirement, the fading outlook for the 143-wing force, the lodestar of his whole recent career, must have been a devastating personal trauma, particularly since he was terminally ill and would die within a year.
Still, to the airpower hard-liners Vandenberg’s testimony had wrapped up their case that (a) the Joint Chiefs, the nation’s constituted experts on military strategy, firmly on record as irrevocably opposed to any delay in the 143-wing program, had not been “consulted” in the revision of the Defense budget; (b) the Defense budget total approved by the NSC on 28 April offered Vandenberg no basis for protest on behalf of the Air Force since on that day he had no way of determining how much of it would be allocated to his service; and (c) the president’s approval of that figure on 29 April and OSD’s notification of its final budget allocations to the services on 6 May effectively denied the Air Force chief of staff an opportunity to protest or propose alternatives. Buried in this stream of argument, but also fully supported by the general’s testimony, were the facts that the decisions of 29 April and 6 May were made by officials legally empowered to make them, that the Joint Chiefs had no budgetary responsibilities, and that the final decisions on the Defense budget, including the allocations to the services, had been preceded by prolonged and detailed “consultation” (i.e., negotiations) among the staffs concerned.

The congressional critics did not, of course, challenge civilian control in principle, but they argued that in this instance the military should have been more intimately involved in decisionmaking. They charged that economy-minded civilian officials had overridden or ignored expert military judgment concerning a clearly visible threat to national security. Senator Knowland even demanded whether, when top Air Force officials learned of their new budget allocation, it was “kept a top secret from the military end of the Air Force?” He seemed unconvinced by Douglas’s reply that “it could not be, Senator.”

At the end of his testimony Vandenberg received a gracious expression of thanks from Chairman Homer Ferguson, who had been his most relentless inquisitor. For the general, however, the high point of the Senate subcommittee hearings must have been reached much earlier when Senator McClellan told him: “I am convinced about the 143 wings. I do not need any further argument about that, when you say everyone agrees that is the minimum that is essential.” Repeating an earlier request to Secretary Talbott, McClellan asked Vandenberg to provide an estimate of how much more money, over and above the $11.7 billion in the revised budget, could be expended “judiciously” to this end.

The following Monday, 8 June, Wilson made a return visit to the Senate to rebut Vandenberg’s attack and plunged directly into the issues. The Joint Chiefs had not been asked to approve the revised budget, he said, because their function was purely advisory. Their successors would review all the military programs and make their recommendations in time
for the preparation of the FY 1955 budget. It was time for a new look, since all the current chiefs except Admiral Fechteler had now served in that capacity through four years and as many defense budgets. Wilson assured the senators that the United States was not going to have a "second best Air Force." As the air battles over North Korea had shown, "We have the best airmen and fighter aircraft in the world." Moreover, American long-range bombers were far in advance of Soviet bombers, and improved models were coming into production.

Wilson referred scornfully to the "narrow, restricted vision" of the critics who championed the 143-wing program. The administration was not, at this point, advocating this or any other particular goal, but the Air Force would, in fact, have approximately 143 combat wings by June 1955, if Air National Guard and Reserve wings were included. Moreover, there were nearly 10,000 modern aircraft in the naval and Marine air arms—branches in which the Soviets had no comparable strength. Through American aid, allied nations would contribute effectively to the strength of the free world; within the next few years "there will be substantial production of modern aircraft in Britain and Canada along with coordinated production and assembly of modern combat aircraft in France, Italy, and other European countries. This, too, must be added to the air equation."44

As the hard-liners continued to press Vandenberg's charge, Wilson insisted that the 143-wing goal for the regular Air Force had been neither reaffirmed nor abandoned. That goal could be achieved—but not by June 1955, as the Air Force claimed. That possibility had already been eliminated by lagging aircraft production before the new administration came to power. Meanwhile, a realistic interim goal of 120 wings by December 1955, fully manned and modern, had been established. "We are going to come closer on making good on Vandenberg's dream than anybody, including his own organization, ever did."45

Again Wilson stressed the Air Force's record of spectacularly inaccurate forecasting of requirements and performance. Since the war began, production had never matched schedules. The schedule now in effect, approved only the preceding October, had already slipped an average of 12 percent for all types of aircraft, and 22 percent for combat aircraft, and was now in process of being superseded. "This certainly shows very poor estimating, a disastrous slippage in the program, or poor coordination and management," and, whatever the cause, it could not be blamed on the new administration. The new Defense team, Wilson told the senators, would make a determined effort, by concentrating on engineering and production difficulties, to "actually make this new production schedule." A conclave of aircraft manufacturers meeting in Washington
the preceding week had been told "this schedule must be met and we expected them to do it." If they did, it would be "the first time that a monthly aircraft schedule in total has been made since the outbreak of the Korean War."

Wilson commented at some length from the OSD perspective on the personnel limitations placed on the Air Force. The original cut of 50,000 below the 1 March strength had been postponed a year to June 1955 in recognition of the Air Force's problem of expiring enlistments in FY 1955 necessitating a large number of replacements for training in 1954. During FY 1954 the Air Force was to be allowed an average of 970,000 man-years in reaching an end-strength of 960,000. The Air Force now proposed to take this cut mostly in its elite young pilots in training, reducing the annual average from 12,000 to about 7,200. "An old military trick," Wilson acidly remarked, "when the civilians push them a little to try to make them save some money to take something out that they know the civilians can't stand with." There were other types of personnel that could be reduced with less harm. And, Wilson added, "a little less passive resistance would be a good help." He cited Assistant Secretary John Hannah's assurance that, "with reasonable effort and desire," even the 143-wing force, if decided upon, with all needed backup support and training, could be achieved within planned manpower ceilings.

To Vandenberg's charges of a six-month delay caused by OSD "restrictions" on base construction projects, Wilson also had tart answers. McNeil had admitted that this did cause some delay. Wilson promptly interposed, "You do not get a 6 months delay in 4 months by taking a little time to do the thing right. . . . The boys will not have everything they would like to have, but they never will." He could not resist taking a dig at General Curtis E. LeMay, whose planned new administration building at SAC headquarters in Omaha, whose planned new administration building at SAC headquarters in Omaha was one of the projects deferred: "I have had some offices in the past that were not nearly as good as he has now to work out of."

If given more money, could the Air Force accelerate its program? Of course it could, said Wilson. Mobilizing the aircraft industry to higher levels of output was always a theoretical option. But was the need urgent enough to warrant the economic disruption and huge additional costs that would be entailed? At the current level of effort, more money would not produce more aircraft of the types needed. "You can always make a list of things that you want to buy," added McNeil, referring to the "wish list" Senator McClellan had invited Vandenberg to submit, but it would not mean much "until you go back and look at what you can do with what you already have."
At several points, indeed, Wilson seemed to be inviting the senators to cut even more from the budget. He blandly admitted that there was "probably a billion or a billion-and-a-half dollars more in our budget now than we really need" that had been left in the budget "for a little extra turn-around time or some unforeseen thing." McNeil similarly confessed that a more thorough review of the Truman budget would probably have resulted in further reductions, and that many of the appropriation requests would probably turn out to have been in excess of need. The revised budget, Wilson asserted on another occasion, was "a good, straight, honest estimate" which he hoped would not be cut further. But then he wondered aloud whether he should not, like some of his predecessors, have left in "a little something" for Congress to take out. Chairman Ferguson's reaction to Wilson's rather coy hints that some fatty deposits might still remain was one of benevolent indifference, and no one on the subcommittee seemed inclined to pursue the matter. 50

For the hard-liners, expecting a "wish list" of $3-to-4 billion from Vandenberg, the very notion of further cuts was of course anathema. Vandenberg sent his list to Senator Ferguson on 15 June. Wilson's rebuttal followed four days later. The additional appropriations requested by the Air Force added up to $1.435 billion, a figure dramatically less than the $3-to-4 billion banded about in the hearings; it would leave the revised budget, thus augmented, still more than $2 billion short of the Air Force's last 143-wing proposal of 7 April. The additional funds, Vandenberg warned, would not make good the six months already lost through the recent "restrictions," but would enable the Air Force to begin moving immediately "at an orderly rate" toward fulfillment of the 143-wing program, thus correcting the anomalies caused by reprogramming for a 120-wing force. Assuming that the recently imposed strength ceilings would be lifted and adequate funding provided after FY 1954, a force of 120 wings and a total strength of 1,035,000 could be attained by the end of that year, and the full 143-wing force with 1,155,000 personnel in FY 1958. 51 In his written reply, Wilson bluntly characterized Vandenberg's proposal as "simply a request for more money," representing only the general's personal opinion and "not substantiated by supporting information or a showing as to the utilization of funds otherwise available." The usual devastating and detailed analysis by McNeil's staff supported Wilson's dismissal of the proposal. Clearly there existed no need for the added financing. But Wilson went further. "The real question, therefore," he wrote, referring to aircraft procurement, "is whether further reductions in new authorization for fiscal 1954 should not be made to reduce to a reasonable basis the 2 1/2 years of financed lead-time which will be
carried into fiscal 1955." A more straightforward invitation for further cuts in the already shrunken Truman budget could hardly be imagined.52

Was Wilson's invitation genuine? Of the two appropriations subcommittees, the Senate group, with its hard core of airpower zealots, was more likely to support the general's proposals, even though the chances of changing minds might well appear to be slim. Vandenberg's letter to the subcommittee chairman offered a target of opportunity, which Wilson could be expected to shoot at, and the proposed budget increases proved easy to knock down. Their modest size, which surprised the senators, evidently reflected an appraisal that the Air Force case would not be advanced by asking for more. In retrospect, this appraisal seems to have been ill-advised. In the simplistic rhetoric of the budget debate, the opposition's chief target from the beginning had been the $5 billion cut in the Air Force's January budget request, despite undisputed testimony that the Air Force itself had long since retreated from that figure. For its principal spokesman now to admit that the administration's revised budget was less than $1.5 billion under the amount that would suffice to put the 143-wing program back on track, inevitably made many critics wonder what all the shouting was about. Vandenberg's testimony in the hearings had received a generally good press, with almost universal praise for the procedural correctness of his public and official objections to the reduced Air Force budget, and he made the most of his opportunities to air those objections publicly in numerous speeches during the remaining weeks before his retirement. But the substance of his "wish list," when made public, was usually reported along with Wilson's rebuttal, and, more often than not, critically.

On 12 June, in his last congressional appearance, Vandenberg endured a rough going-over by Representatives Scrivner and Hruska of the House Air Force subcommittee. Although the Air Staff was still working on his budget request, he was able by this time to indicate its approximate amount. The revelation drew caustic comments, Scrivner confessing skepticism that so small a sum, added to the $90 billion or so poured into building up airpower since the Korean invasion, could mean "the difference between success and disaster."53 Mahon contented himself with some remarks about the general's distinguished career and a few perfunctory questions. For the most part Vandenberg endured the ordeal stoically, betraying his feelings in only one cri de coeur, when Scrivner pressed him on the time required to build a combat-ready air wing: "I maintain that no one other than an airman . . . really has even the faintest conception of what is involved in air power or the problems incident to it . . . . It is a new arm, with a new concept, that changes almost daily . . . .
And what worries me is that we have spent . . . $90 billion of the taxpayers' money to build up this Air Force, and yet for the lack of $2 or $3 billion more we are going to have the second best air force." The general seemed to realize that he had had his day in court and had lost.

_Congress Splits the Difference_

When the Defense budget emerged from the House Appropriations Committee at the end of June, it was clear that General Vandenberg had, in fact, lost his last fight. Indeed, the committee had treated the Air Force more kindly than the other services, cutting its budget only $240 million compared to $689 million taken from the Army and $398 million from the Navy. Wilson's open invitation to trim the lavish advance financing of aircraft procurement had been rejected in order to avoid the costs of contract cancellation. But it explicitly denied the general's plea for an immediate revival of the 143-wing program. The committee's report asserted that the interim 120-wing program together with modernization of the Air National Guard and Reserve would produce an equivalent result. It showed comparative estimates indicating that a 143-wing force, once achieved, would cost $2.2 billion a year more to maintain than the smaller force.

More than 60 percent of the cut ($150 million) came in maintenance and operations, largely from curtailment of planned proficiency flying. The Military Air Transport Service (MATS) also incurred a substantial cut. The committee took a dim view of the emphasis by MATS on flight crew training, recommending that MATS be reorganized as an air transport service and the operation be put on an industrial fund basis like the Military Sea Transportation Service, with users paying for the cost of services. It also severely criticized the Air Force for having procured almost $11.5 billion of spare parts since the beginning of the war, with an additional $1.2 billion requested for FY 1954, even though consumption had run so low that an unused balance of over $11 billion in stock or on order was anticipated at the end of FY 1954. It trimmed the military personnel account another $30 million as a reminder to the Air Force "that a check on little items is frequently a fruitful field for economies."

The committee urged a number of manpower-saving measures that would permit improvement in the so-called fighting edge, including reductions in military personnel assigned to hospitals, in numbers of military bands, clerks, chauffeurs, orderlies, and aides, and in training support personnel, to levels nearer to Army and Navy standards. It also
The FY 1954 Budget

recommended more extensive employment of indigenous personnel overseas rather than of U.S. nationals, whose pay averaged three times as much. Air Force research and development was reduced $35 million, "a little tightening of the purse strings" aimed at inducing more self-discipline in the initiation of new projects and curbing the steady accumulation of unexpended R&D funds that had occurred over the past several years, but without reducing the present level of effort. 56

The Appropriations Committee bill reached the House floor on 30 June. 57 Thwarted in the committee sessions, the pro-Air Force opposition mounted a last-ditch effort, led by Mahon, to push through General Vandenberg's "substitute budget," as the proposed additions were now called. 58 Mahon himself led the floor fight with impressive vigor and skill. But the attack on the administration budget by now had the air of a lost cause. Mahon reported a rumored threat by Secretary Wilson to flout the will of Congress by impounding any extra monies that might be voted for the Air Force, and taunted fellow legislators who supported the budget for being docile servants of the administration. The additional funds requested were, he argued, minuscule by comparison with the enhanced security they would buy; moreover they would leave the Defense budget, from which the Appropriations Committee had already carved $1.3 billion, still comfortably below the total submitted to Congress. 59

Mahon failed in his attempt to portray the president as a harassed executive who had not studied the budget and had rubber-stamped its major components, particularly the infamous $5 billion cut. Waiting for this maneuver, Representative Scrivner, floor manager for the committee bill, introduced a letter from the president unequivocally affirming "that this budget represents my own views and bears my personal endorsement in all major particulars"—as he had already made clear on radio and television and in the press. The letter reviewed his involvement in various stages of the budget's evolution. Concluding, the president reiterated his full accord with the budget, adding that he would, of course, not object if the Congress should discover possible further reductions that would not endanger national security. 60

The president's letter left Mahon out on a limb. He could only argue, rather weakly, that according to the testimony the president had not originated the idea of victimizing the Air Force, even though he had approved it. That decision had been taken in the Pentagon after "the word was passed down" to cut the Defense budget by $5 billion. But Eisenhower's familiarity with its contents could not now be challenged. When Mahon's amendment came to a vote on 2 July, it was defeated, 230 to 161 on a primarily party-line division, only 5 Republican dissidents and 156
Democrats voting for it. The House then passed the committee-sponsored bill by a 386-0 vote.  

The floor debate in the Senate consumed only two days (22-23 July) and, as in the House, it focused almost exclusively on the Air Force budget. Like its House counterpart, the Senate Appropriations Committee had been more generous with the Air Force than with the other services, restoring almost $200 million of the House cuts as compared to $31 million and $96 million, respectively, in the Army and Navy budgets. On the other hand, the Senate committee, pointing to an unobligated balance of $600 million, cut in half the requested $500 million appropriation for reserve tools and facilities (an OSD account), which had emerged unscathed from both the House committee and floor debate. Truman's former secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, now Democratic senator from Missouri, who as a member of the Armed Services Committee had not participated in the budget hearings, led the floor fight against the revised budget. The floor manager for the bill was Senator Ferguson, the committee chairman.  

Symington was a more impassioned, articulate, and even better informed advocate for airpower than Mahon, and his numerous interventions dominated the two-day debate. As in the House, however, despite an almost even split between the two parties, the administration commanded a secure, mostly silent majority for the revised budget (which the committee's amended bill more closely resembled than did the House bill) while a few opposition speakers held the floor most of the time. As the result showed, it was a futile effort. There were complaints of administration pressure to hold wavering in line and intimidate adversaries. With relish Symington quoted McNeil as having threatened on the telephone that "we are going to get plenty dirty with you" if he (Symington) took a hard line against the budget. The budget controversy had, in fact, already cost McNeil some of the low visibility he enjoyed during most of the winter and spring, and he was increasingly portrayed by hostile commentators as the evil genius behind Wilson's attack on the Air Force.

Two amendments were offered: a $400 million addition to the Air Force appropriations request to procure 200 more B-47s (the latest-model medium bomber) and a modest funding increase to expand annual pilot training from 7,200 to 12,000. The remainder of General Vandenberg's "wish list" was swept under the rug. Senator Ferguson effectively demolished the former amendment with a reminder that the Air Force had not asked for the additional B-47s and could not produce them in FY 1954 anyway, since existing production capacity was saturated. Even so, 37
Democrats and Senator Wayne Morse, the lone Independent, voted for the amendment, against the 46 Republicans and 9 Democrats who defeated it. On the question of pilot training, Senator Ferguson again was ready: the Air Force had not yet been able to train even as many as 7,200 pilots a year; its FY 1953 output was about 6,000, and it expected, with the scheduled funds, to reach a level of 8,300 in FY 1954. The proposed amendment fared somewhat better than its predecessor but went down nevertheless, 48 to 41, in a similarly partisan division. Shortly thereafter the Senate passed the bill by a voice vote.

### Table 1

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Sources: *Cong Rec*, House, 83 Cong, 1 sess, 29 Jul 53, pt 7:10341; OSD(C) table, Congressional Action on Basic FY 1954 Budget Request, 1 May 56, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

Since each chamber supported its own committee bill, the two versions went to conference for resolution. The final compromise, approved by Congress on 29 July, reflected the spent passions of the debate in a remarkably even splitting of differences. The Air Force budget was cut by $120 million instead of the $240 million proposed by the House (or, with base construction included, $279 million instead of $640 million). The Army lost $676 million, and the Navy budget was reduced by $344 million. For the Defense Department as a whole, the final budget totaled $34.4 billion, about $1.4 billion less than the figure submitted to Congress on 7 May and more than $6 billion less than the Truman budget. In effect, Congress had taken back from the revised budget the $1.5 billion “turnaround” allowance that Wilson and McNeil had written into it. On 1 August President Eisenhower signed the budget bill into law.
Defense of the North American continent against air attack, a pillar of the New Look, bulked large in the FY 1955 Defense budget, but because many continental defense programs served other missions as well no one knew exactly how large. Beyond dispute was that the continent's defenses were perilously weak. Top officials of the outgoing Truman administration, while at least partly responsible for the situation, had made no bones of the fact. "Our present capability to defend the continental United States from atomic attack," warned NSC 141 in mid-January 1953 over the signatures of Truman's secretaries of state and defense and director for mutual security, "is considered to be extremely limited . . . Defensive measures in current programs will not provide an effective defense against mass atomic attack. The U.S.S.R. will possess, in the period 1954-1955, the capability to make an air attack upon the United States which would represent a blow of critical proportions." A month later the Joint Chiefs confirmed this judgment, adding that defenses against a low-level attack were "almost non-existent."1

The Legacy

At the end of 1952 continental U.S. air defenses were a legacy of a piecemeal and uncoordinated evolution reflecting the national preoccupation with the war in Korea, doctrinaire commitment to offense-over-defense strategy, and lingering perceptions of Soviet backwardness in offensive airpower and aviation technology. Under a 1951 plan the Air Force had primary responsibility for air defense, but there existed no joint
command or integrated plan. Coordination with Canadian agencies came through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense established by the two nations in 1940. The Air Force's Air Defense Command operated a chain of radar stations and primitively equipped control centers giving an estimated one hour's warning of attack—provided the attackers flew in daylight and at altitudes of 5,000 to 45,000 feet. A volunteer ground observer corps (about 70 percent short of its planned strength of 500,000 at this time) provided limited visual coverage at lower altitudes. Of 45 squadrons of interceptors, 39 of them based in the United States, only 20 had all-weather jet night fighters, the remainder jet or piston-engine day fighters, all armed with World War II-vintage cannon or machine guns.

Current plans provided for expansion of the radar network by FY 1955 from the existing 100 stations to 216, mostly in the United States. There were no plans to cover the wide approach route through north central Canada. Planned seaward extensions of the warning system would use modified radar-equipped Lockheed Constellations, beginning in September 1954, as "airborne-early-warning" (AEW) aircraft with a 250-mile offshore radius, and converted destroyer escorts as radar picket ships (DERs). By FY 1955 control centers were to be doubled in number and modernized, and interceptor squadrons increased from 45 to 69, all equipped with all-weather jets, most of them armed with air-to-air rockets. At the end of 1952, the Army had 57 battalions of antiaircraft artillery deployed around the country and 5 more in Alaska; it planned a total of 68 by the end of FY 1954. The Navy counted heavily on the recently developed LOFAR (low-frequency acquisition and ranging) sound wave system to detect submarines several hundred miles offshore; the first five of a chain of nine LOFAR stations along the Atlantic coast from Nova Scotia southward were to begin operating in FY 1955.2

An Air Defense Command (ADC) study completed in February 1953 explored the probable performance of this expanded and improved defense system against hypothetical attacks. The study concluded that had a force of 256 Soviet Tu-4 medium bombers (copied from the American B-29) attacked 42 assorted Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) installations, and large cities in mid-1952, only 15 percent of the attackers would have been shot down before reaching their targets in a high-altitude daylight attack, and almost none in a low-level night attack. Most or all of the targets would have been wiped out. In a hypothetical mid-1955 attack by a force more than twice as large, improved radar cover and more interceptors might raise the kill count to 37 percent in a high-altitude daylight attack and to 23 percent in a low-level night attack; this scenario involved 114 targets including, besides the 1952 list, important military installations and industrial facilities.
The study considered urgent a quickening of existing development programs during the next two years, a period during which Soviet offensive capabilities were expected to grow more rapidly than American defenses. Without going into specifics, the study listed the principal areas needing immediate attention (virtually cataloging the whole system in the process). It also advocated examining the feasibility of accelerating development of two distant early warning lines in Canada employing advanced radar technology. The ominous final recommendation called for increased vigilance against possible technological surprise from the Soviet guided missile effort, "which may exceed present expectations."³

Previously, in August 1952, the Summer Study Group, drawn mainly from the Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had recommended to DoD officials as a top priority construction of a distant early warning (DEW) line from Greenland to northwestern Canada. This would give from two to six hours warning of hostile aircraft, and would have to be supplemented by a second line for tracking and interception farther south, at about the 54th parallel. The scientists believed that advanced technology available and in prospect would make it possible to raise the disastrously low kill rates in current scenarios to 60 or 70 percent, enough to make air defense a practical option and not merely a forlorn hope. They also recommended development of an integrated, fully automatic air defense communication and control system and improved armament and avionics for interceptor aircraft. The Summer Study Group's recommended projects added up to an estimated several billion dollars, but the group believed that the two DEW lines could be built for $370 million.⁴

By the very weight of its authority, the Summer Study Group had the effect of coalescing the resistance from the many individuals and groups within the Air Force and in the national security bureaucracy at large who feared the impact of the proposed rapid innovations on other programs. To get the report before the NSC its supporters had to bypass the Air Force high command and route it through the National Security Resources Board, whose chairman presented it to the council late in September 1952, urging immediate construction of the proposed DEW system. The proposal won President Truman's support and eventually emerged as NSC 139, approved on 31 December. In this paper the president declared that, because of increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities, "we should plan to have an effective system of air, sea, and land defenses ready no later than December 31, 1955" along with well organized civil defense, industrial security, and post-attack rehabilitation programs. DoD, he said, should develop by that date a radar screen providing from three to six hours warning. In November Secretary Lovett directed the Air
Force to contract with Western Electric to construct the warning line, and in January 1953 he issued implementing directives to the JCS. Lovett also appointed in December an ad hoc study group of scientists and engineers, headed by Mervin J. Kelly, president of Bell Telephone Laboratories, to re-study the whole problem of continental defense, including improvements in the warning system. In a last-minute action, Truman on 19 January set up a Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC, chaired by Air University Commander Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, to study (and report to the NSC by 15 May) the USSR's "net capability to inflict direct injury on the United States."6

Meanwhile, U.S. strategic planners had been studying how continental defense might be affected when both superpowers possessed atomic and thermonuclear weapons. In August 1952 this broader context received lengthy analysis in NSC 135/1, one of the Truman administration's major strategic studies. Currently, the paper stated, the United States appeared to enjoy a comfortable lead in its atomic weapon stockpile, production of fissionable materials, and the prospective imminent development of a thermonuclear weapon. The controlling factor appeared to be "the relationship of one stockpile, plus its deliverability, to the number of key enemy targets, including retaliatory facilities, which must be destroyed in order to warrant an attack. . . . It follows that the Soviets may achieve what is, in their judgment, a level of atomic strength sufficient to warrant the risk of an all-out surprise attack, even though this level may be inferior—in absolute terms—to the then-existing atomic strength of the United States."7

In January 1953 a follow-on review of all national security programs (NSC 141), as noted earlier, roundly condemned the whole continental defense program as inadequate and urged the expenditure of very substantial increased resources over the next few years to improve it. The director of State's Policy Planning Staff, Paul H. Nitze, drew even more alarming conclusions from the reciprocal dynamics of U.S. vs. Soviet power. The combination of increasing Soviet offensive and defensive capabilities, he argued, was approaching a point where it was likely, in a confrontation, despite continuing but diminishing U.S. offensive superiority, to paralyze the will of the U.S. government "to threaten or initiate the use of atomic weapons." More specifically, "I do not think there is, even now, a general understanding . . . that vulnerability to Soviet attack may prevent SAC from ever leaving the ground; nor that our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses is not increasing any faster, if as fast, as Soviet defensive capabilities."8
The new administration thus encountered on its arrival a chorus of warnings pointing to continental defense as "the Achilles heel of our national security." The Joint Chiefs, to be sure, sounded a strong dissenting note. In September 1952 they had estimated the cost of improvements to existing continental defenses at $10 billion, on top of an estimated $7 billion already invested, and recommended against undertaking them without further study of their impact on the competing requirements of offensive forces. In December they opposed Truman's decision to proceed with the Summer Study Group's recommendation to begin immediately the construction of a distant early warning line. In the years to come, the chiefs would consistently uphold the asserted requirements of offensive superiority against the competing needs of defense. But in January 1953 the tide of alarmed comment seemed to converge on continental defense as the sector most vulnerable to early surprise attack.9

The Spring Study Groups

Given the new administration's commitment to sharply reduced defense spending, its reaction to any continental defense buildup was predictable. Eisenhower, reportedly annoyed that the various continental defense projects left on his doorstep "had not been screened or coordinated, let alone carefully priced," at an NSC meeting on 11 February curtly shut off discussion of NSC 141 with a remark that it was valuable mainly as a "legacy" of three prominent members of the former administration who had no personal interest in the adoption of its proposals. The following day Secretary Wilson received a report from Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott sharply criticizing NSC 141 for undue preoccupation with the vulnerability of the United States to attack and failure to recognize the value of American offensive atomic superiority as an offset thereto. Talbott conceded, however, the need for the country to improve its continental defenses lest fear of Soviet retaliation paralyze the will of the government to unleash atomic weapons. NSC 141, with its call for vast "additional" funding of continental defense, was quietly shelved, but the administration authorized research to continue on the DEW line project, and at the end of February negotiated an agreement with Canada for construction of test stations in northwestern Canada and Canadian participation in the further development of the system.10

During its first few months in office the administration marked time on continental defense, no doubt owing to preoccupation with the new DoD budget. There persisted also widespread doubts as to the feasibility
of effective defense against air attack and fear that an early commitment of major resources to an accelerated effort might be overtaken by advancing technology. Another concern was the longstanding feud between the Air Force and some of the Lincoln scientists; "big bomber" generals reportedly perceived a "Maginot Line" obsession in the Lincoln early warning studies. Underlying everything abided the resistance to the threat of a new contender for funds in a time of shrinking budgets, which (on this issue at least) linked in an improbable coalition the military and civilian bureaucracies supporting the big established programs, and administration budget cutters supported by business-oriented advisory groups. Indicative of the tendency to postpone decision on the issue, NSC 149/2, the basic paper on reformulation and costing of security programs issued at the end of April, relegated continental defense to a perfunctory three-line mention in a list of objectives due to receive increased emphasis.\textsuperscript{11}

The findings of the two study groups did little to alter the prevailing mood. Kelly's ad hoc study group in its report to Secretary Wilson on 11 May declared that perfect security against attack was unattainable: "There can be no safety in the atomic age short of the elimination of war." The committee deplored the notion of an air defense system that could approach 100 percent in effectiveness, considering it inconceivable. Pointing out the deterrent as well as the war-fighting value of forces, the committee noted with satisfaction the "impressive strides... since World War II in improving U.S. atomic weapons, together with the means for their delivery." Also needed, it hastened to add, was an air defense system "much better" than the one now in place and assured by existing programs. How much better? An unanswerable question, said the committee regretfully, after giving it earnest attention.\textsuperscript{12}

The Kelly group proposed, among other things, centralization of responsibility in a single agency, development of a comprehensive continental air defense plan, immediate measures to close gaps in the existing control and warning system and to extend it seaward, improvement of equipment and procedures for interception, and establishment of a stable and sustained research and development program. It recommended further research on a fully automatic control system and establishment of a vigorous civil defense program. The report endorsed the construction of an early warning line far enough north of the Canadian border to afford about two hours warning, and cooperation with Canada in developing its 54th parallel line then under consideration. Eventually it should be extended seaward at both ends and tied into the Navy's LOFAR network. A second line much farther north would also be required and should
be started as soon as the results of the Arctic test program assured its feasibility.\textsuperscript{13}

For all its generally calm and measured reporting, and the opening warning against exaggerated hopes for improvements, the report's description of the existing system seemed likely to give many readers sleepless nights. It noted the conclusion of a Stanford Research Institute study that 75 to 80 "perfectly placed" atomic bombs "might kill 13,000,000 people or destroy approximately one-third of the U.S. war industry, or a combination of the two." The Kelly group's response to this disturbing picture was a rational but not very comforting warning: "All the effort the country is willing (or in fact able) to put into its defenses will not in the long term buy the degree of protection that is desirable, perhaps even essential. The full requirement, then, is really for a new national way of life, not so comfortable as before, but one the country can abide, still remaining free."\textsuperscript{14}

Within this less than reassuring compass, the Kelly report sought to forestall panicky official or public responses to a threat that all experts agreed must be taken seriously. In substance, the report stressed the primary importance of effective deterrence over defense, which at best could only blunt a large-scale Soviet attack. Of particular concern to the committee was the pressure for a crash program like the World War II Manhattan Project to create overnight an impenetrable defense system; it advocated an orderly top-level DoD information program to improve public understanding of the problem. The pressure had intensified that spring with a spate of scare publicity resulting from the revelation by the journalist brothers Joseph and Stewart Alsop in March of the findings of the 1952 Summer Study Group.\textsuperscript{15} The Kelly report was also leaked to the Alsops, who published most of it, praised it, and challenged Secretary Wilson to make it public and act on it. Five days later Wilson released a sanitized version of the report for publication.\textsuperscript{16}

On 4 June the NSC considered the report of the Edwards study group (Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC) on Soviet net capabilities to damage the United States. The report was at least as nightmarish as the earlier ADC scenario and even more so than the Kelly Report. Most serious would be the psychological impact of an atomic attack: "morale and political problems of a magnitude which it is impossible to estimate, or even comprehend." The president refused to take alarm. He "had perhaps some little doubt," he confessed, "as to whether [the committee] had given sufficient weight, in downgrading Soviet capabilities, to their obvious inferiority and even incompetence in the navigation of planes at long ranges," as, he added, anyone who had ever ridden with a Soviet
pilot could testify. The report’s bottom line, moreover, was that the Soviets, over the two-year period examined (1953-55), would fail to develop a really significant capability to attack the continental United States. General Edwards offered his personal conclusion that “any attack on the United States by the Soviets during this period would be an act of desperation and not an exercise of military judgment.”

The president had already decided on further study by appointees of his own administration, perhaps with the hope that yet another study group might complete the process of “studying the problem to death.” Before the end of May the NSC Planning Board established a Continental Defense Committee, headed by Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull, USA (Ret.), an old friend of the president from World War II days and CIA representative on the Edwards Committee. The new committee was directed to make a comprehensive study of continental defense by 15 July. Later, while the Bull group was still at work, the president appointed his own panel of outside consultants to review its findings.

The Bull Report: Mounting Costs

The Continental Defense Committee’s (Bull) report, circulated to the council members (as NSC 159) on 22 July, contrasted sharply with the Kelly and Edwards reports in its uncompromising sense of urgency. The existing defense programs, it asserted, “are not now adequate either to prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military or covert attacks which the USSR is capable of launching, nor are they adequate to ensure the continuity of government, the continuity of production or the protection of the industrial mobilization base and millions of citizens in our great and exposed metropolitan centers.” This situation posed “an unacceptable risk” to national survival; “the nation must act now with speed and energy . . . to meet the potential threat.” What had aroused this sense of urgency is not readily apparent, but it may be significant that the Bull committee, unlike the others, included representatives of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) and the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), the agencies that had urged aggressive action to implement the findings of the Lincoln study.

One of the committee’s major tasks had been to evaluate the continental defense plans on which the services had been working for the past several months as a prelude to the development of the integrated plan called for in NSC 139. Since the Air Force claimed responsibility for the entire system, its plan was, in a sense, already integrated. It provided
for immediate construction of the southern Canada (54th parallel) radar warning chain, running from Labrador to British Columbia and linking with the Alaskan warning system, with seaward extensions to Hawaii and from Newfoundland to the Azores. The proposed DEW line from northern Alaska to southern Baffin Island was also to be built if proved feasible, and later connected with the Atlantic Ocean system via Greenland. Seaward extensions of the existing “contiguous” (i.e., coastal) control and warning system also appeared in the Air Force plan, using five shoal-water radar stations called “Texas Towers” to supplement AEW aircraft and radar picket ships.

Besides claiming operational control of the entire defense system, at sea as well as on land, the Air Force wanted to provide all the aircraft. The principal increase in force requirements involved 18 squadrons of interceptor aircraft, bringing to 75 the total for continental defense. The Air Force also proposed to supplement the Army’s antiaircraft forces by 20 fixed defense units armed with a Navy-developed surface-to-air missile (Talos). Naturally this plan clashed at numerous points with those of the other two services, its most fundamental jurisdictional differences with the Navy, which insisted on operational control of the oceanic sector; the Navy envisaged multiple offshore barriers combining the functions of detecting and tracking enemy aircraft and submarines, and wanted to provide the aircraft as well as the ships and radar equipment used at sea. The Army, for its part, was programming 150 antiaircraft battalions, as against the 110 in the Air Force plan. By the end of July some of these differences had been resolved: The Air Force yielded on the issue of operational control at sea, and the Navy accepted the scheme of seaward extensions of the southern Canada warning line so long as they provided for submarine detection. The remaining major dispute, over aircraft, was referred on 29 July to Secretary Wilson, who postponed decision pending further exploration of less costly alternatives. A few days later the outgoing Joint Chiefs left for their successors a comprehensive draft plan prepared by their continental defense planning group.

The Bull committee, regarding these differences as within the province of the JCS to resolve, concerned itself primarily with setting priorities among programs. Its chief recommendations assigned top priority, for immediate implementation, to: (1) construction of the southern Canada warning system, including its seaward extensions; (2) extension seaward of the existing contiguous radar control and warning system; and (3) preparation of emergency “continuity of government” plans. Second priority went to a larger bundle of undertakings covering most of the other elements of a complex defense system. The committee also urged a stronger effort to
improve public understanding of the threat of air attack. It set a readiness goal of December 1955 for most programs.

Bull's terse briefing to the NSC on 6 August, appropriately following an updating of recent intelligence on the new Soviet turboprop heavy bomber by Allen Dulles, upset the president, conjuring up the old specter of endlessly rising costs leading ultimately to a garrison state. The report was sobering not only because it placed a new seal of respectability on the anxieties aroused by the earlier study findings, but also because it presented more comprehensive and persuasive cost estimates than any yet produced.22

The costing of continental defense programs under the existing accounting system was little better than an exercise in the soothsayer's art. Neither the DoD budget nor the individual service budgets recognized a continental defense "program." Various programs and sub-programs could, of course, be identified as primarily serving the function of continental defense—e.g., procurement of certain types of radars or submarine detection equipment—but this was only the beginning of the problem. The trail of contributing and supporting costs behind a given function such as defense of the continental United States invariably disintegrated in the maze of multiple purposes served by individuals, units, organizations, installations, and items of equipment and supply—almost everything to which a valid price tag could be attached. Three of the largest air defense bases, pointed out the earlier ADC study, expended money and operated facilities in support of units "whose operations are alien to the air defense mission," while, conversely, some ADC squadrons, stationed at non-ADC bases, used non-ADC funds and facilities. The ambiguity of function occurred in extreme form in the Navy, which, with such exceptions as the LOFAR detection system and nets and booms for harbor defense, did not normally program forces for specific defense purposes of any kind.23

The military service accounting structures, wrote McNeil's deputy, Lyle Garlock, in a March 1953 reply to a request from the Kelly study group for cost data, were not designed to provide "even reasonably good approximations" of the kind of information wanted; "while certain chunks of these costs would seem to be fairly apparent, . . . a greater proportion would not be, particularly in the case of the Army and Navy." Apart from the problem of functional ambiguity, the difficulty lay also in the lack of an accepted definition or even concept of continental defense around which a program and cost accounting system could be built. He advised against "any arbitrary allocation of costs" for continental defense activities.24

The same line of thinking, of course, prompted both the outgoing and the new Joint Chiefs to see in the surge of public and official concern over
the vulnerability of continental U.S. air defenses a competitive threat to the strategic offensive and deterrent forces. A disturbing feature of the Bull committee's proposals was that they stretched the concept of continental defense to embrace areas of vulnerability not ordinarily considered in this context—civil and industrial (i.e., passive) defense, internal security, control of subversives, continuity of government under attack, and clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons.

The committee's study of costs made it clear that much more had already been spent and was being spent for continental defense, broadly construed, than had been generally reckoned. Internal security and other non-military programs such as those just noted had absorbed perhaps $450 million per year in 1952 and 1953, and numerous buried but nonetheless real costs in the military programs had also escaped notice. The whole bill, the committee estimated, had come to $1.7 billion in 1952 and $2.8 billion in 1953. The FY 1954 DoD budget was now in concrete, but the continental defense costs already built into it added up, by the committee's reckoning, to an appalling $4.3 billion. This had ominous implications in the context of the committee's proposals for the future. These aimed at a rapid buildup in order to attain a high level of readiness by the end of FY 1956, with expenditures projected at $5.2 billion in FY 1955 and $6.8 billion in FY 1956—making a three-year total larger than the cumulative spending, past and projected, under existing programs through FY 1957. After FY 1956, in the Bull committee's projection, continental defense spending would drop sharply to an annual maintenance level of about $3.8 billion. 25

The first official reaction to the Bull committee's report came from the outgoing chiefs, presented to the NSC along with Bull's briefing on 6 August. Their only specific recommendations proposed that measures to improve identification capabilities should receive top priority along with construction of the early warning system, and that protective measures for certain critical targets against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons should also receive special attention. They had more concern that the focus on the defensive capabilities per se might lead to diversion of resources from offensive retaliatory forces, and they hinted that the use of ad hoc study groups and outside consultants, bypassing the regular machinery, was getting out of hand. Defensive systems should not be examined in isolation from the total military program, and they reminded Wilson that the current integrated military programs had taken into account both the threat of enemy attack and the counterthreat to U.S. and allied offensive forces. 26

The NSC decided to ask the new Joint Chiefs to submit their thoughts by 1 September, on both the Continental Defense Committee's
report and the outgoing chiefs' comments on it. On the basis of this input, together with that of the president's civilian consultants appointed in July, the Planning Board would prepare a revised version of the report for the council's consideration not later than 17 September.27

**The Soviets Go Thermonuclear**

At this juncture, on 12 August, the Soviets detonated their first thermonuclear device. The event, heralded by Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov's announcement a few days earlier that the American "monopoly of the hydrogen bomb was broken," followed by less than two weeks an intelligence assessment that the Soviets were unlikely to achieve a nuclear fusion explosion for at least another year.28 The basic facts soon became public. Government analysts, Joseph Alsop reported on 24 August, were "tentatively convinced" that what the Soviets had exploded was an "interim weapon similar to the American bomb tested at Eniwetok in 1951," a preliminary test of the hydrogen fusion reaction and the large fission explosion needed to trigger it.29

Caught off guard, American officials reacted publicly with varying degrees of dismay, embarrassment, and reassurance. The Joint Atomic Energy Committee, after a CIA briefing, announced that the United States remained well ahead in both A-bomb and H-bomb development "and will continue to be." On the other hand, AEC Chairman Lewis L. Strauss warned that the American atomic stockpile was no longer "a complete deterrent to aggressive action," and Civil Defense Administrator Val Peterson declared that a "better and bigger" civil defense was now needed. Admiral Radford made no public comment until 26 August, when he stated in reply to a reporter's question that the Soviet achievement had been foreseen and would not change "over-all strategic plans," although "certain programs" would be reviewed. The president waited much longer for the dust to settle before giving a soothing but uninformative response to a question at his 30 September news conference.30

Actually, there was nothing casual about Eisenhower's private reaction to the Soviet achievement. It touched him in one of his most sensitive nerves—the virtually insoluble problem of maintaining a strong, expensive defense posture without moving inexorably down the path toward a regimented society. Early in September he expressed to Dulles the thought that the Soviet threat might grow so menacing that it would become necessary "to consider whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to *initiate* war at the most propitious moment that we could designate."31
At a meeting of the NSC on 24 September, with continental defense the major agenda item, Allen Dulles reviewed the recent Soviet thermonuclear tests against the background of atomic weapons development since 1949, pointing out that the Soviets were believed to have a capability now to deliver thermonuclear bombs by air. This assessment elicited from Eisenhower a discourse on the problem of decision now facing NSC and the nation. Suppose the Soviets rejected accommodation and continued on their present course? People talked of the moral guilt incurred by using atomic weapons first, but what about the moral guilt of failing to do now what was required to free future generations from this terrible threat? The question might soon have to be faced whether "to throw everything at once against the enemy"; "merely shuddering" at the threat would not suffice.32

The Debate Over NSC 159

The Soviet achievement put the opponents of an all-out program to strengthen continental defenses temporarily on the defensive. ODM promptly called for a crash continental defense program "at wartime tempo" and supplemental appropriations to support it.33 Wilson steadily resisted this pressure, while allowing the newly installed Joint Chiefs to take the lead in developing the case against it. This they did, at length, in their formal comments late in August on the Bull committee's recommendations as requested by the NSC.

The JCS echoed the warning of their predecessors against overreactions that might strengthen continental defenses only at the expense of offensive capabilities. "An aggressor nation," they asserted, "will be far more deterred by evidence that we have the offensive potential and the mobility capable of dealing it decisive blows than by the excellence of our defenses." Conceding that substantial improvements in continental air defenses could be made "at modest additional cost," they warned that efforts in this direction tended to produce diminishing returns at increasing cost. More fundamentally, defense of the continental United States against air attack constituted only one aspect of the whole military establishment which, if not quite a seamless web, was composed of tightly interrelated, mutually supporting parts, many of them contributing directly to the defenses of the continent. These defenses should be built up, but not at the expense of other essential elements. In a time of shrinking budgets, the chiefs had a deep wariness of priorities, whether for continental defense as a whole or for its separate parts. As for specific continental defense programs, aircraft identification belonged in the top priority
Continental Vitals

Continuous costs, while requirements for fighter-interceptor and antiaircraft forces, accounting for the bulk of the estimated costs in NSC 159, were noted as under consideration.

In the same vein, the chiefs struck down the other possibilities suggested in NSC 159. Improvements in continental defense, they insisted, would not permit any offsetting reductions in other security programs, since all were indispensable and underfunded. Allied forces, also meager and stretched thin, would require massive American help if attacked; no foreseeable increases in their strength could reduce U.S. commitments sufficiently to free additional resources for continental defense. The Pacific extension of the southern Canada warning line should be postponed until forces were available. Finally, while agreeing that the public should be “informed,” the chiefs thought that a stepped-up program of public education might generate a “fear complex,” forcing the government to concentrate on “solely defensive measures” to the detriment of other missions.

The NSC Planning Board split deeply on the continental defense issue. DoD representatives supported the JCS arguments for a “calm and orderly” approach “within the total context of national security policy,” while the ODM and FCDA members pushed for a rapid expansion and strengthening of continental defenses, whether by diversion of funds from “less essential” areas or by supplemental appropriations. Since the Soviet thermonuclear explosion of 12 August the advocates of caution had been put on the defensive by the general upsurge of public and official apprehension. According to the board’s chairman, Robert Cutler, the president now wanted an early resolution of the debate and at least some action by the NSC in time for his address to the nation early in October as the opening gun in Operation “Candor,” the long-simmering initiative for speaking frankly to the American people about the dangers of nuclear weapons.

On 16 September the Planning Board circulated its revised continental defense paper (NSC 159/3). Evidently the “pro” faction had prevailed. The paper made few concessions to OSD-JCS misgivings and peppered its proposals with urgent phrases—“as early as possible” and with “all possible speed.” It did accept the JCS principle that “defense of the vitals of America” was an integral part of the whole offensive-defensive security complex. But the board still insisted that continental defense had been seriously neglected and must be built up, especially in light of the latest Soviet achievement. Contrary to JCS views, the Planning Board still thought that some U.S. commitments might be reduced in the light of what was known about Soviet weaponry, and the savings diverted to a strengthened continental defense. If not, the only alternative would be to increase the budget. The Joint Chiefs had time for a final brief reply before the
Planning Board sent NSC 159/3 to the NSC. They reasserted their "seamless web" theory of national security and the primacy of offensive capabilities in that context. They urged, however, that the paper not be approved until it could be re-examined in the light of the new overall strategic concept on which they were then working. 37

*The September Decisions*

The revised continental defense proposal came before the NSC on 24 September, with the president in the chair and more than twice the usual number of participants. Cutler gave a long briefing of NSC 159/3, following which the president's consultants expressed their views. The consultants came down hard for economy, endorsing the proposal but not at the expense of budget reduction. Radford then explained the misgivings he and his colleagues felt about a premature crash effort to build up continental defenses and bluntly characterized the original Bull committee report as based on a worst-case estimate of Soviet capabilities. For the coming year, Radford continued, the programs recommended by the JCS would accomplish essentially what the Planning Board proposed. 38

The president reacted with irritation and gloom. The council, he complained, was still trying to dodge the "essential dilemma" posed by the Soviet threat. The measures required to meet the threat seemed to involve "ever-greater controls on our economy and on the freedom of our people." The need was not merely to save money to repel aggression; "we were engaged in the defense of a way of life." Radford confessed that he and his colleagues were dissatisfied with both the antiaircraft defense and interceptor programs for the same reason that bothered the president—the dangers of becoming committed to obsolescing weaponry in an era of revolutionary technological change. Eisenhower seemed to take comfort in Radford's criticism that the Bull report exaggerated Soviet offensive capabilities and minimized the enormous difficulties facing an air attack on the North American continent. 39

Secretary Humphrey steered the discussion toward a decision. No sound conclusion could be reached, he said, until the council viewed national security in its entirety. This observation, which seemed to put the treasury secretary in lockstep with the Joint Chiefs and Wilson on continental defense, illustrated how the issue had complicated established alignments on defense spending. Although an admirer of the new Joint Chiefs, particularly Admiral Radford, Humphrey seemed genuinely worried over the state of continental defenses, and he was even willing to contemplate new taxes to finance their strengthening if enough money could not
be squeezed out of other security programs. But he was determined to squeeze those programs because he was convinced they were bloated.40

Thus the council faced a curious dilemma. The president still wanted immediate action of some kind to reassure an alarmed public, but he was obviously less than enthusiastic about the Planning Board proposal and seemed unwilling to pay its probable costs. Yet no one had a better approach to offer. The JCS, even while admitting in an earlier paper that current plans were barely adequate "to avoid initial disaster," wanted to postpone action until a comprehensive national security strategy had been developed and approved and its funding determined. Humphrey, a powerful voice on the council, seemed to share this view.

Anticipating this indecision, Cutler had prepared and circulated in advance a recommendation that NSC 159/3 be approved and implemented "in a rapid and orderly fashion," but with two significant provisos: (1) Before 15 November the Defense Department should come up with a "more precise definition" and "phasing" of the controversial seaward extension program of the early warning system and for the two most costly force programs—fighter-interceptors and antiaircraft forces; (2) before 1 December, the council itself would determine how to finance continental defense in FY 1954 and later. This was, of course, the nub of the matter, giving Wilson and the JCS the postponement they wanted. During the next 10 weeks, with reasonable luck, the chiefs could develop an affordable strategy and force structure and get it approved, while interrelated high-level decisions were reached on tax programs and federal budget estimates as a whole for FY 1955 and FY 1956. Cutler's proposal was promptly approved and the president signed the amended paper (NSC 159/4) the following day.41

It was, of course, really a decision to postpone decision, reflecting Eisenhower's own ambivalence. His approval was purely symbolic; no one could foresee the shape or size of the continental defense commitment until decisions were taken on DoD and federal budget ceilings. Probably for that reason, the financial annex of NSC 159/3, containing the cost estimates, had been omitted from the revised paper. What had been approved was thus little more than a statement of principle accompanied by a "wish list" in descriptive rather than quantified terms.

This result came as a letdown for those who had hoped for a crash effort. Spending might be increased a little during the coming year, reported James Reston in the New York Times the day following the meeting, but "all dramatic plans such as the multi-billion dollar Project Lincoln will be postponed or rejected." The Alsops, who had gloomily predicted early in September that the president would settle for half-measures, took no joy now in the confirmation of their fears.42
Stretching Continental Defense

Following the September decisions, continental defense retreated for several weeks from center stage. It no longer inspired the same sense of urgency that it had in the aftermath of the Soviet thermonuclear demonstration in August, except in a small segment of officialdom and the public, especially the scientific community outside government, still acutely mindful of its potential for disaster. In Congress the chairmen of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continued to beat the drums for more spending. In October the Senate Armed Services Committee appointed as a consultant on continental defense Robert C. Sprague, head of an electronics firm in the home state (Massachusetts) of the committee chairman, Leverett Saltonstall. ODM and FCDA were still leading champions of continental defense expansion. But the prevailing view in OSD and the JCS was that of an unnamed official quoted by the *Wall Street Journal* late in November: “If we could buy an airtight continental defense system for $20 billion, we might do it. But it just isn’t for sale at that or any other price.”

DoD resistance to a crash program became more pointed after mid-October when the NSC sent Wilson back to the drawing board to reduce his FY 1955 budget estimates. Any increase in money for continental defense would have to come from other programs, making the larger issue of offense vs. defense in New Look strategy suddenly more immediate and prominent than heretofore. In this context OSD responded to the president’s directive, in connection with the approval of NSC 159/4 on 25 September, to define more precisely the content and phasing of the southern Canada early warning system and fighter-interceptor and anti-aircraft forces, identifying in the process Defense’s share of the effort and costs. Estimated full costs of continental defense in the FY 1955 Defense budget would be shown in the formal presentation to the council on 15 December. The council’s decisions at that time would settle the manner of financing continental defense under the president’s 25 September directive, a question already settled in principle. Continental defense military programs would be financed under the dollar ceilings of the DoD budget.

The effort to contain continental defense costs faced formidable obstacles in NSC 159/4 itself. The Soviet thermonuclear detonation of 12 August, NSC 159/4 explained, indicated that the Soviets might have developed a method of substantially increasing the yield from their available supplies of fissionable uranium. This would enable them to increase the number of bombs of 30-100 KT yield in their stockpile, or to make their weapons individually more destructive, or to create very
high-yield weapons (500-1,000 KT) by accepting a reduction in the total number. Further, the demonstration suggested that the USSR might have reached an advanced stage in the development of true thermonuclear weapons yielding more than a million tons of TNT energy equivalent. In addition to raising the high premium on deterrence of general war, the event also raised the premium on improved intelligence, an effective early warning system, maximum attrition of attacking forces before reaching targets, readiness of offensive striking forces, and non-military defense measures. 45

While faithfully reciting the Joint Chiefs' "seamless web" doctrine, the paper also retained the "red alert" flavor of the original Bull report (NSC 159). Existing continental defenses were "not now adequate either to prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military or covert attacks which the USSR is capable of launching, nor are they adequate to ensure the continuity of government, the continuity of production, or the protection of the industrial mobilization base and millions of citizens in our great and exposed metropolitan centers." Nevertheless "a reasonably effective defense system can and must be attained." It should concentrate initially on short-term programs to deal with the kind of attacks foreseeable through about 1957. Even these measures would provide "no acceptable degree of over-all defense readiness" until about 1956. Thereafter, until about 1960, if the recommended measures were vigorously carried out, the Soviets would not be able to destroy the war-making capacity of the United States. But sometime after that date, "due to the possible development of long range air-to-ground or ground-to-ground guided missiles, there can be no assurance that the proposed programs will give the high degree of protection required. Unless our defensive system is . . . kept thoroughly modern, including a defense against such possibilities as an intercontinental ballistic missile, we face the possibility of having our continental defense program largely nullified." All this, NSC 159/4 reminded its readers, had been written before the Soviet thermonuclear test, which had substantially enhanced the urgency of the measures already advocated for meeting the threat of a massive surprise attack. 46 In short, the measures the Defense and JCS staffs were directed to implement did not encourage risk-taking in the interests of economy. After the budget decisions of October a new approach was needed, since continental defense was now in competition with other programs.

Characteristically, with two approaches possible, to squeeze or to stretch, the decision was to do both. By November Wilson and Radford were both saying publicly that continental defense expansion did not lend itself to rapid acceleration in the first year or two. No more than $500
million over and above current funding, Wilson announced, could be absorbed during FY 1955, and BoB staffers put the figure as low as $300 million. On the eve of a scheduled 23 November progress report to the NSC, the estimated total program costs for FY 1956 were even more dramatically reduced, largely by stretching out key programs three years or more. All this restructuring, accompanied by a reduction in total costs, added up cumulatively to more than $6 billion through 1958. These new cost projections reflected the more precise definitions of the three major programs called for at the end of September. The Air Force reduced the program goal of its fighter-interceptor program from 75 to 69 squadrons (23 wings) by the end of FY 1958; 19 wings were to be in place by the end of FY 1955. The Navy proposed to spread the conversion of its radar picket vessels for the early warning barriers over the next four years, but at the same time raised its FY 1955 requirement for early warning and antisubmarine aircraft from 27 to 35 and to 150 overall. The Army's anti-aircraft goal of 150 battalions was extended through FY 1958, with up to 50 battalions to come from the National Guard; actually, substantial readiness was expected by the end of FY 1956, with 100 battalions to be available and others awaiting their full complement of Nike missiles.47

In approving the redefined programs, the Joint Chiefs warned that continental defense should not “take preclusive priority over essential offensive programs.” Radford repeated the warning when he reported to the NSC on 23 November, adding the hope that the NSC would not impose an ironclad directive to implement continental defense without regard to its impact elsewhere. Cutler laid the basic issue on the table. Radford's report, he said, seemed to indicate that continental defense was no longer, as visualized in September, a “crash” effort aimed at full readiness by 1956, but, on the strength of recent intelligence estimates was to be stretched out over a longer period. Was this what the council wanted? Radford promptly denied any such intention. The seaward extensions were going ahead as fast as the Navy could modify destroyer escorts, and the pace of progress as a whole would be governed by technical feasibility and availability of funds. Deputy Secretary Kyes defended Radford's optimistic appraisal of the Soviet threat; he charged the Air Force with “sales promotion intelligence” to justify expansion. This drew a tart reminder from Allen Dulles that no one service was responsible for final intelligence estimates, and that the current ones were “not particularly alarming” in assessing the likelihood of a Soviet sneak attack.48

The president did not press the issue Cutler had raised but probed for possible further savings. How useful were antiaircraft weapons against modern high-flying bombers, and would they not probably soon be out
of date? Perhaps, Radford agreed, but as yet there was nothing else. And what about the risks of shooting down bombers carrying nuclear bombs over American cities, as in the case of German buzz-bombs over England? The president seemed especially skeptical about the seaward extensions of the warning systems, which struck him as providing little extra security at very high cost. Dissatisfied and fretful, he said at the end of the meeting that he wanted the JCS to make a special study (for him alone, not the council) on the best method of patrolling the seaward warning barriers—a "reasonable" level of patrolling he stressed, "not an effort to fill every little gap."49

The inconclusive 23 November meeting resolved none of the issues and left all parties frustrated, not least the president, whose evident unwillingness to resolve the issues was, of course, the root of the difficulty. The council noted the assignment to the JCS of a special study and rescheduled for 15 December DoD's final report on the three principal continental defense programs along with the FY 1955 DoD budget. Kyes and McNeil seized the opportunity to hasten the transformation of continental defense from the high-urgency effort launched in September to a no-special-preference status in the family of New Look programs.50

As the president's man, Cutler had an overriding concern to protect his boss's interests as he perceived them. Eisenhower was as eager as OSD and the Joint Chiefs, if not more so, to contain the costs of continental defense. He had always regarded NSC 159/4 as an unwelcome, if necessary, concession to public anxiety over the threat of a Soviet sneak attack. But the president had a higher burden of accountability than his advisers, and, in Cutler's view, the urgent pronouncements of NSC 159/4, still the basic and approved policy paper on continental defense, could not lightly be ignored. The stretchout of the major continental defense programs plainly evident in the services' recent redefinition of them was certainly not what the president and the council had approved at the end of September. The provisions of NSC 159/4 were explicit: one of the three major programs, the seaward extensions of the southern Canada warning system, along with the land-based portion of the system, the warning barriers farther south, and several other smaller programs, were to be completed "with all possible speed." The other two big elements, fighter-interceptors and antiaircraft forces, were to be "developed to a high state of readiness over the next two years." NSC 159/4 further stated that even if FY 1955 budgetary constraints dictated a re-examination of security programs, work on the seaward extension should not be held up.51

Cutler made the further point that NSC 159/4 judged it unlikely that the Kremlin would deliberately initiate general war before mid-1955,
although it might "result from miscalculations growing out of a series of actions and counteractions." The JCS estimated more optimistically that through 1957 the Soviet Union would merely use its increasing capabilities to exert pressure against the West. What apparently disturbed Cutler was that the chiefs had prescribed this evaluation as "guidance for planning" although NSC 159/4 had already been adopted "as a guide in implementing . . . programs."52

McNeil's staff dissected Cutler's exposition with customary thoroughness, and the OSD-JCS objections were thrashed out in a formal conference with Cutler on 2 December. The DoD representatives made their chief target the cost and requirements comparisons that Cutler had used to support his contention that the revised programs violated the intent of NSC 159/4. The cited cost data, McNeil objected, were not official, but unilateral estimates by the military departments based on incomplete information. Given the indefinability of the whole concept of continental defense and the dynamism of the technology, McNeil considered it unwise at the moment "to attempt to define these programs with any greater precision."53

Cutler asked about the injunction in NSC 159/4 to complete the seaward extensions "with all possible speed," which the redefined programs clearly would not do. Kyes explained that the Defense agreement to this program was subject to the "overall caveat in NSC 159/4 to the effect that the military programs therein must be considered in their relationship to the total military programs." Kyes also went on to assure Cutler that "this did not mean that the Department of Defense intended in any way to delay the implementation of the programs . . . but that such programs should . . . combine speed of completion with the achievement of the most effective and economical results."54

At this point Cutler abruptly dropped the argument, admitting that "there had been some misconception in his mind as to the Department of Defense interpretation . . . but he accepted it as reasonable." It is difficult to believe that he accepted arguments that DoD's proposed implementation of NSC 159/4 accorded with the tone and language of that document. The only provision in the paper that in any way resembled the "caveat" mentioned by Kyes appeared in an introductory paragraph describing the "integrated complex of offensive and defensive elements" constituting the total strength of the United States, with each element "in proper balance with all the other elements."55 "Proper balance," always in the eye of the beholder, was invoked by the proponents of all-out continental defense with passionate conviction equal to that of the Joint Chiefs. Cutler probably perceived that nothing could be gained by further
argument. In the 2 December conference, as at the 23 November NSC meeting, he recognized the evident determination by the DoD high command to make haste slowly, developing the continental defense program in a deliberate, "orderly" fashion, contrary to the explicit and unqualified guidance in NSC 159/4 to make haste. Since the president showed no inclination to intervene, Cutler accomplished nothing by forcing the issue except to bring it out into the open—which may have been his real aim.

Continental defense received scant mention when the NSC discussed and approved the budget on 16 December. Officially, the council noted that estimated expenditures for this purpose during FY 1955 would come to approximately $500 million more than in FY 1954, thus fulfilling the intent of NSC 159/4 to increase emphasis on the program. This figure merely reflected the still impressionistic cost projections at the time, and was invalidated within a few weeks. 56 Ironically, by January 1954 the process of refining FY 1955 estimates downward had reached a point where it created a question of credibility for the president in his impending State of the Union message, in which he would have to tell the American people that increasing efforts were being made to meet the threat of Soviet surprise attack. His speechwriters met the challenge. In his address on 7 January 1954 he declared, "in the current fiscal year we are allocating to these purposes [continental defense] an increasing portion of our effort, and in the next fiscal year we shall spend nearly a billion dollars more for them than in 1953." The "nearly a billion" was a rounding-off of some $800 million, the projected increase over 1953 spending. 57

**Continental Defense Joins the System**

The FY 1955 Defense budget submitted to Congress in January 1954 contained $3.198 billion for continental defense proposed by the JCS in November and approved by the NSC in mid-December. It included increases as well as reductions, and estimates for certain items not even included in the November proposals. It appeared, however, that the proposed budget had been reduced by about $362 million; but this really reflected bookkeeping modifications and computational refinements. Overall, the services' requests for aircraft, antiaircraft missiles, picket ships, Texas Towers, radars, and identification and control systems were largely met. 58

Of more moment to OSD and the Joint Chiefs, a new policy statement (NSC 5408) would purge the "red alert" features perceived as a potential
threat to the offensive emphasis of the New Look. The top-priority early warning system and the fighter-interceptor and antiaircraft forces were to be completed “with all practicable speed” instead of “all possible speed”; the next group of programs (northern Canada early warning line, air control system, gap-filler radars, etc.) were, as before, to be developed “to a high state of readiness” over the next two years. Throughout NSC 5408 the language of urgency in NSC 159/4 was replaced by more reassuring phraseology. Describing the early warning system the paper added this caveat: “Considering that it is not feasible to establish an absolute defense against air attack, development of the seaward extensions should be weighed against the increasing Soviet capability so as to provide a reasonable early warning of air attack through the most probable sea approaches.” NSC 5408 also added that any major change in total funding for national security would necessitate a complete re-examination. Thus the Joint Chiefs gained the assurance they needed that continental defense would be accorded no “preclusive priority” in any future competition for funds.

By February the stretched-out program began to develop reasonably firm projections of procurement, construction, and organization costs, with readiness goals ranging from 1956 to 1962 and beyond. In the main, the duration (beyond FY 1955) of the buildup was that envisaged in November: five years for the seaward extensions of the southern Canada warning system, two years for the land portion of that system and the contiguous radar barriers to the south, two years for the manned fighter-interceptor forces, seven years for their guided-missile augmentation, one year for antiaircraft forces, seven years for the semiautomatic control system, three years for the low-altitude gap-filler radars, one year for the LOFAR submarine-detection system.

Of the two basic functions of the system, warning and interception, provision for the former was the less reassuring. Radar coverage, where it existed, remained shallow, and at low altitudes still virtually non-existent. There existed no early warning coverage of the most likely routes of attack, the ocean flanks and the vast arctic and sub-arctic reaches of Canada between Alaska and Greenland. Above the Pinetree radar fence just north of the U.S.-Canadian border and still under construction, the supplementary warning line across southern Canada was expected to be partially completed in 1956 and in full operation a year later. Seaward, there was no coverage at all, except by a half dozen radar picket ships on the Atlantic side, first installment of an eventual 36 to be in place by July 1958, to be augmented by 18 AEW aircraft by July 1955, with a total complement of 108 aircraft on station a year later.
The two principal interception elements of the system, fighter-interceptor aircraft and antiaircraft weapons, approached greater readiness in January 1954 than did the warning system. At the beginning of 1954 the interceptor force comprised 18 wings (54 squadrons) not yet fully equipped with all-weather aircraft—about 1,450 aircraft of all types. The total of 23 wings (69 squadrons) was expected to be in place by the end of FY 1957.62 In addition, 19 Air National Guard squadrons and various other Air Force and Navy units stood available for continental defense if needed, some of them equipped for all-weather operations. At full strength, from FY 1957 on, interceptor forces would level off at about 2,000 aircraft, relying for improved performance on continuous modernization. Farther down the road, the Boeing Bomarc ground-to-air guided missile, ramjet powered, with a 250-mile range, would augment the interceptor squadrons. Planned antiaircraft units would expand from their current 66 Army and 11 National Guard battalions to 100 and 50 battalions, respectively, plus another 43 more Army separate battalions as backup, by the end of FY 1956.63

Long-range projections provided a clue to the president's carping at the cost-benefit shortcomings of the early warning system, for which FY 1955 costs had been reduced to about 15 percent of continental defense money. But in 1955 and 1956 they were slated to rise sharply, and in the years beyond the projected level was only slightly less. The biggest dollar consumer in the system was the air control and warning system in the United States, particularly the projected conversion to semi-automatic computerized operations which, beginning in 1956, stretched on far into the 1960s at an annual cost (grossly underestimated, as time would show) of almost $300 million. For continental defense costs as a whole, however, the heaviest funding would go to the fighter-interceptor program—not in FY 1955 when antiaircraft forces were still the most pricey item, but in the years beyond—from 39 percent in FY 1955 to 50 percent in 1956 and to 65 percent in the early 1960s. This reflected the combination of high costs for continuing modernization and operation of tactical jet aircraft and the introduction and prolonged buildup of the Bomarc guided missile force, not expected to achieve readiness status until 1962.

In the aggregate, these long-range trends added up to a sharp rise in costs in the years immediately ahead. DoD spokesmen remained reluctant to give out cost estimates for this program; all forces, ran the official line, contributed to the defense of the continental United States. Pressed by the House Appropriations Subcommittee in February 1954, Wilson grudgingly admitted that continental defense, narrowly defined, might account for close to 10 percent of Defense spending in FY 1955.64 The
actual estimate was 8.7 percent, but future spending, if current pro-
jections had any validity, would dwarf that figure in a period of dwindling
DoD budgets. The trend was already visible: continental defense costs had
grown from 5.5 percent in FY 1953 to 7 percent in FY 1954. Moreover, the
projected upward curve reflected efforts to stretch out and reduce costs
on the basis of discounted risks.

The NSC put its seal of approval on the revised program in two final
meetings on 14 January and 17 February 1954. On both occasions the presi-
dent, in a captious mood, grumbled about rising costs and reminded the
council grimly of the fate of the Maginot Line. He was especially worried
about the seaward extensions, which he feared the Soviets might render
worthless by end-running them before they were finished. He also pre-
dicted that the whole antiaircraft system would soon obsolesce and “go
out the window.” The only bright spot he seemed to see was the interceptor
program, with its promise of accurately guided pilotless aircraft in the
near future. More than ever, a crash program remained anathema to him;
he warmly endorsed the replacement of the phrase “all possible speed”
by “as soon as practicable.”

In this atmosphere open dissent was not to be expected, but rumbles
of resistance could be detected. At the 17 February meeting Cutler intro-
duced a letter from Lee A. DuBridge, chairman of the ODM Science
Advisory Committee, contending that current technology warranted pro-
ceeding with the southern Canada warning line and its seaward extensions
without fear of rapid obsolescence. Accordingly the Planning Board, said
Cutler, proposed to write into NSC 5408 a caveat that the programming
was “not intended to preclude a more rapid phasing or earlier completion
of the early warning and other programs.” ODM Director Arthur Flemming
reinforced Cutler’s comments, urging the council to take a fresh look at
the problem in June, “and not to regard the present dates for completion
of the early warning program as frozen.” Kyes rejected the implication
of DoD foot-dragging and cited the necessity of keeping in phase with
the Canadians’ progress in completing the land portion of their warning
system. Humphrey registered emphatic preference for the “go slow”
approach over a revived crash program. Momentarily, the president seemed
uncertain. Installation of the warning line, he conceded, should certainly
not be held up “if all we contemplated was a gradual and steady improve-
ment in the effectiveness of the equipment installed.” In the end, the
council noted DuBridge’s letter, referred it to Defense for comment, and
approved the inserted phraseology proposed by the Planning Board. It
was a modest but probably satisfying victory for Cutler.
During the unceasing quest of the president and his advisers to achieve a large reduction in the gap between federal government income and outgo, DoD programs were a special target and experienced frequent changes and adjustments. The overriding determination to reduce expenditures and appropriations had a strong and obvious effect on all programs. As a major claimant of resources in the years ahead (some projections amounted to more than $33 billion through FY 1962), continental defense would continue to figure prominently in the budget deliberations within the administration and in Congress. Perhaps more than most other Defense programs, it would have to cope with the greater-than-usual uncertainties of the budget process.
Budget Director Joseph Dodge, already looking forward to the FY 1955 budget, had followed the congressional budget battle with mingled distaste and impatience. He viewed revision of the inherited Truman FY 1954 budget as only a preliminary step toward putting the new administration on a sound fiscal basis, and that step had been too short. The results of the intensive budget review, he wrote in May 1953, fell “substantially short” of the administration’s fiscal objectives; actual expenditures during FY 1954 would have to be reduced well below the levels contemplated even in the revised budget. He thus took a sour view of the progress of the congressional battle; if administration forces were holding firm against the big spenders, they were also fending off the critics who demanded further cuts. Dodge knew as well as Wilson and McNeil that the $1.5 billion finally taken out of the revised Defense budget was only water and air. DoD spending in FY 1954 would remain well above the spartan levels the NSC had refused to impose in March.1

Even though the overweight Truman FY 1954 budget had now given way to a leaner one, Dodge still felt oppressed by the fiscal burdens left him by his predecessors. The powerful momentum of the Truman budget would be very difficult to arrest or slow down. Some 18 percent, about $14.4 billion, consisted of mandatory expenditures beyond the reach of administrative action—interest on the public debt, pension and benefit programs, grants to states for public assistance, and the like. On the other
hand, requests for new appropriations for national security, comprising 71 percent of the whole budget, could be curbed more or less arbitrarily since most of the impact would not be felt until after the coming fiscal year, but spending was more difficult to control or to predict. Some expenditures could be reduced by cutting payrolls or consumption of fuel or ammunition in training, but contracts let in prior years generally needed to be paid when due. Procurement spending might be significantly affected by fluctuations in output in any major sector of defense industry. Expenditure cuts of $3.5 billion below the levels projected in the Truman budget had been decreed for the defense programs, and $4.5 billion for the whole budget, but whether they would actually come to pass would depend on such contingencies as the continuation of hostilities in Korea, redeployment of forces, and industrial strikes. 2

The huge appropriations of the Korean War years, far in excess of current revenues or even of the country's capacity to provide immediately sufficient goods and services to absorb them, had generated a rising curve of mostly deferred spending that would peak in fiscal years 1954 and 1955. Those were the years, unfortunately, in which the wartime taxes enacted by Congress were scheduled to expire, with an estimated reduction in revenue of about $2.1 billion in FY 1954 and $8 billion in FY 1955. The cumulative deficits for the four fiscal years 1952-55 might, Dodge estimated, come to $40 billion, and the FY 1955 deficit alone to $15-16 billion. 3

Dodge's harsh view of Truman policies lacked historical understanding. Many administrations, especially war administrations, had bequeathed large deficits and other fiscal problems to their successors. In previous wars, excessive appropriations had usually been the norm as had deferred spending. The Korean War aftermath differed from World War II in that there was not a great demobilization, and the country maintained its military forces and spending at a much higher level than after World War II.

From his critical analysis Dodge drew two main conclusions. The administration "could not permit the tax reductions now in the law to have their full effect"—fostering continuing large budget deficits, further weakening the dollar, and renewing inflationary pressures. He endorsed the president's tax proposals of May—extending the excess profits tax for six months and continuing the corporate income tax and excise taxes at current levels—to avert a forecast revenue loss of about a billion in FY 1954 and as much as $5 billion the year following. 4 Dodge's second conclusion, though less explicit, had more significant implications. He stressed that in recent years the cost of national security programs had risen
much faster than that of the federal government as a whole (hardly an astonishing observation for war years). His point was, of course, that balancing the budget would necessarily be largely at the expense of these programs, which, with the almost irreducible mandatory part of the budget, accounted for $70 billion of the $78.6 billion expenditures originally projected.5

Since BoB estimates of net FY 1955 revenue ranged from $60 billion to $66 billion, it was clear that total expenditures anywhere near the $74 billion level of the administration's revised FY 1954 budget would be unthinkable. For appropriations, BoB calculated that from $40 billion to $43 billion could be allocated in a balanced budget to the major national security programs, with Mutual Security taking upwards of $6 billion, Atomic Energy about $2.3 billion, and Defense about $33 billion.6

Understandably, OSD took a somewhat different approach, suggesting that even with Defense expenditures of about $40 billion (the level projected in NSC 149/2), only a small deficit would result. To bring total expenditures down to the $65.4 billion level of estimated receipts, however, would require cutting DoD spending back to $37.8 billion, and Mutual Security and Atomic Energy commensurately. In the absence of a balanced budget policy directive and with a shooting war still going on in Korea, OSD saw no compelling reason to adopt this as an assumption for budget planning. In early July OSD planners were projecting Defense expenditures for FY 1955 of approximately $41 billion, with active forces reduced to 3.2 million by 30 June 1955. Even with an early truce in Korea it was assumed no substantial redeployment of U.S. forces from that theater would begin before December 1954 and that continued building of ammunition reserves and the equipping and maintaining of Korean forces would require major outlays. Delivery of modern jet aircraft would bring big increases in operating costs, more would have to be spent on civilian components to offset the reductions in active forces, and research and development programs, even though purged of marginal-utility projects, would be actively pursued in order to maintain American leadership in advanced weaponry.7

The threat of major expenditure reductions aroused in OSD the old specter of immediate large-scale contract cancellations and suspension of the commitment of FY 1954 money, cutbacks in current production schedules, and reduction of force objectives—necessary measures to slow down the rate of cash outflow. The president had already directed the new Joint Chiefs of Staff (as yet not even on board) to re-examine the nation's security goals and commitments. Their findings were to provide a basis for the FY 1955 budget. Until the president had acted on their
recommendations, the proper basis for tentative budget planning remained the interim force and readiness objectives underlying the revised FY 1954 budget now before Congress.\(^8\)

On 10 July Dodge dropped the first shoe, a letter to department and agency heads alerting them to a 15 September deadline for FY 1955 budget submissions. He stressed its importance as the first budget prepared by the administration. Revision of the FY 1954 budget had been only a first step. Further substantial reductions would be required, spending and obligations must be held well below budget level, and agencies would receive expenditure ceilings called targets representing maximum amounts on which to base FY 1955 budgetary plans.\(^9\) Almost buried was the administration's underlying philosophy of government: “The 1955 budget will reflect the continued withdrawal of the Federal government from activities that can be more appropriately carried on in some other way.”\(^10\) It was a tough directive, but there was one notable omission—nowhere in it appeared the phrase “balanced budget.”

**Pressures for a Balanced Budget**

The National Security Council scheduled a special meeting for 14 July to hear a briefing on the FY 1955 budget by Dodge and Treasury Secretary Humphrey. The preceding week McNeil gave Wilson a copy of the 9 July staff analysis of the FY 1955 DoD budget and followed it up with an urgent memo spelling out the implications of what he expected Dodge and Humphrey to propose: a ceiling on expenditures “significantly lower than $40 billion—say, $36 or $37 billion.” He listed for Wilson the difficult measures that would then have to be taken, including warning NATO governments that the United States would be unable to fulfill all its force commitments, particularly Air Force units, for December 1953 or even December 1954. McNeil warned that even a tentative agreement to such an expenditure ceiling “would support the contention that major national security decisions are being taken solely from a financial point of view without regard to the military security of the nation.”\(^11\)

The Dodge-Humphrey budget offensive in the NSC meeting on 14 July proved even more crushing than McNeil had expected. Dodge forecast a deficit of $8.7 billion on the basis of projected FY 1955 revenues of only $60.4 billion, and he projected current expenditure estimates of about $69 billion ($41 billion for DoD). This evidently made a deep impression on the president, who remarked that “we were in a hell of a fix” when Humphrey called forcefully for a cut in taxes and a balanced budget. To redeem campaign promises, Humphrey stated, spending for
overall defense programs would have to be cut back "in the neighborhood of $12 billion" below the level estimated in the administration's revised FY 1954 budget. Since the president left the meeting at this point, he did not hear the remainder of Humphrey's discourse, which became a tirade as he warmed to his theme. Spending cuts of the magnitude needed, he declared, could only be achieved by a genuine root-and-branch reform of the military establishment. The military must "give the proper emphasis to new weapons, and to the possibilities of nuclear warfare." The country's new leaders seemed to be little more than "niggardly Harrimans"; if this was the best they could do, they might as well give up hope of remaining in office.

Wilson waited for two weeks before replying, defiantly, to Dodge's 10 July letter. He reminded Dodge that the president had directed the incoming Joint Chiefs to review all aspects of defense as a basis for the FY 1955 budget, that the interim force goals established by direction of the NSC were subject to whatever change might be indicated by the chiefs' findings, and that Congress had been so informed. At his direction, the review had already begun, but until the Joint Chiefs produced their recommendations, DoD could not develop its submissions. As for Dodge's admonitions to reduce spending, Wilson added that he could give no assurance that DoD would "be able to achieve greater economies than were taken into account in the expenditure estimates for FY 1954 submitted with the revised budget."

The Eight Billion Dollar Gap

The next day, 24 July, Wilson took the opportunity presented by a convocation of high DoD civilian and military officials at the Marine Corps base at Quantico, Virginia, to give his "team" an unscheduled status report on the FY 1954-55 budgets. McNeil's deputy, Lyle Garlock, reviewed in formidable detail the record of DoD appropriations and expenditures during the Korean War. He exhibited a chart showing the current BoB estimate of $60.4 billion FY 1955 net revenue, of which $40.3 billion would be available for national security appropriations. Allowing $7.3 billion for Mutual Security and Atomic Energy, this would leave only $33 billion for DoD—$8 billion less than the current OSD estimate of Defense needs based on programs in progress.

The president remained ambivalent. While unwilling as yet to whip the federal bureaucracy into line on a policy of budget balancing in FY 1955, he nevertheless supported Dodge in quashing Wilson's opposition to immediate expenditure cuts and reduced appropriation requests.
for that year. "It is absolutely essential," he wrote Wilson peremptorily on 6 August, "that you begin immediately to take every possible step progressively to reduce the expenditures of your department during the fiscal year 1954"; in addition, "you will be expected to make substantial reductions in your requests for new appropriations and in the level of your expenditures for the fiscal year 1955, beyond those already indicated for the fiscal year 1954." But the president also damped expectations that the Korean truce might produce early reductions in spending. He told the NSC on 23 July that he wanted to use any savings there for the immense task of postwar Korean economic rehabilitation.

Plainly worried about the brittle situation in Korea even though an armistice impend, Eisenhower expressed surprise and alarm at a report that the Chinese planned to launch a major offensive on 26 August. Against the advice of the military chiefs, he wanted to rush reinforcements to Korea and even asserted his intention of sending nuclear-capable air units to Okinawa to be available should the impending armistice be violated. On 27 July (Washington time), the day after the armistice was signed, he asked Congress to expand Korean aid.

July thus closed with dim prospects for a balanced budget in FY 1955 and with pressures building for more rather than less spending in FY 1954. Dodge nevertheless refused to back down. He called for a "serious attempt to balance the budget in [FY] 1955," laid down DoD expenditure "estimates" for FY 1954 and FY 1955 of $40-41 billion and $33-35 billion, respectively, and demanded that current estimates of Defense spending be reduced immediately. Invoking the president's 6 August letter to Wilson, Dodge announced his intention "to use the apportionment process in cooperation with [DoD] to initiate this action." Dodge evidently distrusted the Defense bureaucracy's response to economy pressures and feared that the administration appointees now heading DoD and other federal agencies were becoming prisoners of their own staffs. He was especially incensed by agency pressures on the White House and BoB to mount "rescue operations" in the legislative committees against threatened budget cuts.

After receiving the president's peremptory order of 6 August, Wilson waited almost a week before sending copies to the service secretaries. His covering memorandum, directing full compliance, added a pointed reminder of his own: "No change is contemplated in the basic military program pending receipt of recommendations from the new Joint Chiefs of Staff and actions thereon by the National Security Council." By 12 August both Wilson and the president knew something not yet made known to other high officials (including Dodge), namely that on 8 August
the new Joint Chiefs-to-be had submitted their first report and recommendations, a preliminary glimpse of the emerging New Look.

*The New Joint Chiefs*

The nation’s new military leaders had been designated some three months earlier. General Nathan F. Twining had preceded the others into office, succeeding General Vandenberg as Air Force chief of staff on 30 June. In mid-August General Bradley would be formally succeeded as chairman by Admiral Radford, General Collins as Army chief of staff by General Matthew B. Ridgway, and Admiral Fechteler as chief of naval operations by Admiral Robert B. Carney. The only holdover service chief would be Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel C. Shepherd. When asked at a press conference on 14 May whether he expected the new chiefs to change the national strategy, the president’s reply was disarmingly elliptical. “The great facts that affect a so-called strategic situation and plan,” he said, “do not change rapidly.”

In Congress, Senator Taft and other Republican leaders to whose advice Eisenhower was mainly responsive in this matter considered that the main purpose in bringing the new chiefs to Washington early was to give them time for a contemplative review of the nation’s strategic posture, primarily as a basis for developing the FY 1955 budget. Taft and his followers, disappointed by the size of the revised FY 1954 budget and the slow progress of tax reform, considered FY 1955 more urgent. Apparently more concerned with strategic policy, in late June Eisenhower decided, and a week later directed Wilson, to make the incoming chiefs available for the study for at least a month—beginning early in July and before undertaking their new duties, giving to the examination full-time, uninterrupted attention. The four officers did not receive their orders until mid-July, when the president in person gave the directive to Wilson. Since Ridgway, Radford, and Carney had arrived in Washington only in time for this meeting, the month or more originally planned for the study had already dwindled to somewhere between two and four weeks. As it turned out, precious days of their study time were taken up by impromptu inspection trips and by the DoD conference at Quantico at the end of July, all of which the president (his written instructions notwithstanding) ordered them to attend. Finally, in an effort to escape the ringing telephones and other distractions of the Pentagon, the four officers spent 6-7 August cruising the Chesapeake Bay on the Navy secretary’s yacht, *Sequoia.*
Regardless of time limitations, the kind of study the president had asked the new chiefs to undertake could not be expected to have much effect on the preparation of the FY 1955 budget. He desired only a summarized statement of views on five listed topics: (a) strategic concepts and implementing plans, (b) service roles and missions, (c) composition and readiness of existing forces, (d) development of new weapons and resulting advances in tactics, and (e) military assistance.* In short, not only was the scope of the study formidable, but by its nature it had to be purely conceptual, and therefore of little help in formulating the FY 1955 budget.27

On the other hand, the president left no room for doubt that he wanted what amounted to a directed, or at least a tightly constrained, verdict. The chiefs were to seek the views of the secretary of the treasury and the budget director on NSC 153/1 in order to take account of economic and fiscal considerations. Theoretically, the chiefs were free to recommend a strategy and military posture responsive to the enemy threat as they perceived it. As a practical matter, however, they were confined within a tight circle of generally consistent policy pronouncements shaped above all by the conviction of the president and his chief economic advisers that prolonged heavy spending for defense would lead to national bankruptcy and a regimented society. These constraints would undoubtedly have been felt even without the president’s strong reminder that he expected the chiefs’ recommendations to point toward a “really austere basis in military preparation and operations.” The extent of the study’s projection into the future was of crucial importance. Eisenhower made it clear that he had in mind an interim guidance paper for the NSC, neither a requirements blueprint for immediate application in the FY 1955 budget nor a strategic guide for the distant future. The examination “should provide a fresh view as to the best balance and effective use and deployment of our armed forces under existing circumstances.”28

In his hope that the chiefs would provide a strategic rationale for the FY 1955 budget, Wilson evidently had failed to read the president’s directive carefully. Had that been its purpose, the chiefs would have had no alternative—given the guidance provided them—but to devise a strategy that could be implemented in FY 1955 and by a $33 billion defense budget—truly a directed verdict. Fortunately for Wilson, the chiefs retained the option, even under this constrained directive, to provide the NSC a conceptual launching pad for a long-haul national

* The British chiefs of staff went through the same exercise in 1952 at Churchill’s behest. Their recommendations were strikingly similar to those of the JCS, particularly with reference to nuclear weapons. There is reason to believe that the U.S. chiefs and Eisenhower were aware of this and possibly influenced by it.
strategy supported by gradually, not steeply, declining budgets. This, indeed, is what they did.

**Solarium: Containment Reaffirmed**

The real charter for the New Look, however, would come from the long-range study by the NSC initiated at a meeting in the White House on 8 May, when the president met with Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, Special Assistant to the President Robert Cutler, CIA Director Alan Dulles, and C.D. Jackson, chairman of the Psychological Strategy Board. Operation "Solarium," as the undertaking came to be called, represented a fundamental re-examination of the containment policy and its alternatives. Inherited from the preceding administration, containment was relatively defensive, unaggressive, and geared to the long haul, stressing collective defense of vital free world areas, deterrence of general war, and sustained effort to help other free world nations resist Communist pressures. A more aggressive alternative envisaged that the United States would publicly draw a "thus-far-and-no-farther" line around the Soviet bloc, extending lines drawn in Europe and the Far East, and would warn the Soviets that any military crossing of the line might precipitate a general war. In dealing with local Communist takeovers, the United States would reserve freedom of action. The most aggressive option would be the "liberation" policy so confidently urged by some Republicans in the election campaign but little heard of since. Under this policy the United States would actively seek to exploit the internal vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union and its satellites through vigorous programs of economic, political, and psychological warfare, including subversion, sabotage, and support of unrest and rebellion. All three policies assigned first priority to protection of the continental United States and maintenance of the capacity to win a general war should deterrence fail.

The study in depth of each alternative was assigned early in June to a task force of military and civilian experts headed by a distinguished advocate of the policy in question. George F. Kennan was the obvious choice to head the containment study (Task Force "A"); Maj. Gen. James McCormack, Jr., USAF, and Vice Adm. Richard L. Conolly, USN, drew the "B" and "C" assignments, respectively. The task forces reported to the NSC on 16 July, two days after the climactic budget presentation by Dodge and Humphrey.

Kennan's optimistic presentation of the "A" study portrayed the containment policy favorable to the United States, and he recommended continuation of the policy with modest increases for continental defense
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and deterrent capacity. General McCormack, speaking for Task Force "B," urged an abrupt shift to the hard-line policy examined by his group: "The warning of general war as the primary sanction against further Soviet Bloc aggression, under clearly defined circumstances," his report declared, "is the best means available for insuring the security of the United States," and the only way to avoid an endless succession of "costly small wars, none of which seems to lead anywhere except to another one." Admiral Conolly characterized the policy examined by Task Force "C" as "a positive course of action designed to seize the strategic initiative and deliberately undertake the task of eliminating the Communist threat to the free world." The United States should complete its military buildup without delay, develop the appropriate organization for aggressive covert, economic, and diplomatic action, and then launch its short-of-war offensive to disrupt and eventually break up the Soviet bloc from within. 31

Only Task Force "C" attempted to estimate the cost of its preferred strategy: $60 billion per year for 1954 and 1955, declining thereafter to $45 billion in 1958—in the view of the task force, not prohibitive. Both the other groups considered their strategies as readily affordable. General McCormack seemed to imply that the essential simplicity of the "draw-the-line" strategy, with its heavy reliance on (and clear intention to employ) strategic airpower and nuclear weapons, should make it less costly than the current containment strategy. 32 Kennan's reinforced containment policy, which would require large, widely dispersed forces overseas, an augmented base and alliance structure, and increased aid to allies would certainly require more than current costs.

The president seemed depressed by the whole presentation: No matter who won a global war, he believed, there would be no freedom for the survivors, and even the necessary measures to protect the security of a free people by deterring war seemed to lead them ineluctably down the road toward a garrison state. In the end, the president asked for preparation of a summary of the three presentations and the council discussion for review by task force representatives, whose comments would then be incorporated and presented to the council on 23 July, looking toward final discussion and recommendations on the 30th. 33

When the NSC returned to the problem on the 30th, it promptly rejected a recommendation from the JCS (through the secretary of defense) that the Planning Board prepare a historical study of the reasoning behind past rejections of the various proposals that had now cropped up again in the reports of the three task forces. Instead, it directed the Planning Board, with the help of task force representatives, to draft a single new policy statement incorporating some features of all three reports—maintenance of U.S. military strength, continued close relations with
allies, continued assistance to other free world nations. There should also be a more precise specification of "off limits" areas where any Soviet encroachment would call for a strong military response, but no resort to the far-reaching offensive action proposed in the "liberation" policy. That policy thus faded into history. The NSC decision amounted to a reaffirmation of containment, with some redefinition, a task that would keep the committee assigned to it busy for the next two months. 34 The council took this standpat position despite a CIA analysis, presented by Alan Dulles at the same meeting, of discouraging long-range trends in the East-West conflict (highlighted by recent popular disturbances in East Berlin and Czechoslovakia). The analysis concluded that, on the whole, time seemed to be working against the West, as a consequence of growing Soviet economic strength and the emergence of new weapons that would eventually make the United States vulnerable to direct nuclear attack. 35

The NSC's daring three-month excursion into the wilderness of "liberation" and other tough responses to the Soviet threat thus ended where it had begun—with the inherited six-year-old containment policy. That policy had already been officially restated, at about the time the Solarium task forces got to work, in NSC 153/1, which the president approved on 10 June. Its provisions suggest why the president, despite his perception of a steadily increasing Soviet threat, was unwilling to abandon containment. While NSC 153/1 envisaged an indefinitely prolonged state of East-West tension without major hostilities, it recognized the importance of maintaining a strong retaliatory capability sufficient "to inflict massive damage on Soviet war-making capacity, at a level that the Soviets must regard as. . . unacceptable," and of providing "the basis for winning a general war if one should be forced on us." It also called for measures to prevent the expansion and consolidation of Soviet bloc power without "unduly" risking a general war, but accepted the risk of giving the Soviets pretexts for resorting to war. It even advocated unilateral action, if necessary, against "local communist aggression in key areas."

Nevertheless NSC 153/1 was neither as provocative as a "liberation" policy nor as inflexible as a "draw the line" policy would be. For response to aggression the United States retained options other than general war. Containment held out a reasonable possibility of a prolonged, comparatively stable standoff accompanied by a slow erosion of Communist rule and cohesion. The sticking point, of course, was cost. NSC 153/1 warned that the cost of sustaining a posture of readiness to counter Soviet aggression could in time seriously weaken the U.S. economy. Sound fiscal policy might therefore require acceptance of "increased risks" in dealing with the threat of aggression. 36 Somehow, ways must be found
to contrive a strategy that would permit placing the military establishment, in the president's words, "on a really austere basis." To this end, the new Joint Chiefs-designate had been asked to provide expert guidance.  

*The New Chiefs Weigh In*

By the time the chiefs submitted their report on 8 August the Korean watershed lay behind them, although troublesome rumors still abounded. For a report so long and eagerly awaited, this one was remarkably brief, only five pages. It started with the assertion that war plans and their implementation since June 1950 had served their purpose and in general were "sound and adequate." But the responses to open aggression in Korea and to threats and pressures in Europe and elsewhere had left the nation ill-prepared for future challenges. The armed forces had little strategic reserve. Virtually the entire pool of trained manpower had been drained off, particularly specialists. Even a limited emergency would require time-consuming training of new personnel and any significant augmentation of the armed forces could occur only after full-scale mobilization. Technology offered no prompt remedy for this overall decline in military strength, except perhaps for atomic weapons.

Meanwhile, the enemy's military strength was growing. The chiefs noted that the Soviets now had an increasing capability for atomic attack against the continental United States, an especially alarming development since continental defenses appeared to be critically weak and badly in need of bolstering. Also vital was the capability for strategic retaliation, both to deter and to fight and win wars. The chiefs summed up their indictment: "Our current military capabilities are inadequate to provide essential national security and at the same time to meet our global military commitments. We are over-extended."

Mindful of the directed budgetary focus of their inquiry, the chiefs said they had examined various courses of action that might reverse this deterioration without undermining the nation's economic health. Only one course seemed to offer reasonable promise of improving U.S. general security while meeting the economic requirement—reverse current priorities by stressing continental air defense and strategic retaliatory power at the expense of military commitments abroad. The word "reduction" did not appear. If adopted, the plan would require at least two years to accomplish, during which the need for deficit financing would probably continue.

The report did not explore aspects of the upheaval that would be involved in the nation's foreign policy and relations with allies and other
free world nations, but one of its recommendations hinted that as leader of the free world the United States should be more discriminatory in extending aid or protection, "and should require an appropriate contribution or concession in return." Adequate intelligence would be crucially important, particularly with respect to early warning of attack, and as a basis for correct appraisals of Soviet capabilities and intentions. The chiefs also foresaw difficulties in selling the new dispensation to Congress and the American people. 38

It remains to note one startling omission—whether the enormous accretion of nuclear firepower, since it did not require commensurate increases in manpower to bring it to bear against an enemy, might permit substantial force reductions. An alluring idea to budget cutters, presumably it was what Humphrey had in mind at the 14 July NSC meeting in calling for "proper emphasis" on new weapons and the "possibilities of nuclear warfare." 39 On 20 July General Twining had made the same point to his three colleagues-to-be when he reminded them of the strong economy focus of their directive. The president, he noted, wanted a force structure that could be "maintained and operated for an indefinite period without forcing such a financial burden on the country as to endanger a strong, sound U.S. economy." A fresh look at the capabilities of atomic weapons might offer a means of achieving this purpose. 40

The president had been far from reticent on the subject of nuclear weapons, although in his public utterances he had thus far been squeamish about referring to them by name, preferring such euphemisms as "new" or "modern" weapons. One of his favorite themes was that these weapons were bringing about revolutionary changes in warfare and military organization that military planners and national leaders must take into account. "Today," he told a Minneapolis audience on 10 June, "25 aircraft equipped with modern weapons can in a single attack visit upon an enemy as much explosive violence as was hurled at Germany by our entire air effort throughout four years of World War II." Behind closed doors in the NSC, where the employment of atomic weapons often came up for discussion during the winter and spring of 1953, usually in the context of the Korean War, the president expressed himself with sometimes startling candor. He favored but had not directed their introduction on a tactical scale against Communist forces in Korea, and had agreed with the Joint Chiefs that atomic weapons would have to be used strategically if it became necessary to broaden the war in order to bring it to an early conclusion. On at least two occasions, both in the Korean context, Eisenhower had previously made the point expressed by Twining later in his 20 July memo to the other chiefs. On 31 March he agreed with Secretary Dulles that "somehow or other the taboo [among
America’s allies which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed.” On 6 May he told the NSC, in a discussion of the feasibility of attacking Chinese airfields in North Korea, that he had become convinced that “we have got to consider the atomic bomb as simply another weapon in the arsenal.”

Twining could thus be reasonably confident that his proposal, if formally put forward by the JCS, would have the president’s support, but he did not explain how it would permit the force reductions needed to effect major cuts in the defense budget. Proposals to use atomic weapons against the Communists in Korea had, of course, an altogether different aim—to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy under circumstances in which he would be unable, at least immediately, to retaliate in kind or impose other penalties. The long-haul policy that Twining proposed implied that the United States would plan (perhaps publicly, for deterrent effect) on using atomic weapons in many situations where otherwise it would normally use conventional weapons, thus making possible reductions in conventionally armed forces. The near certainty that the enemy would respond in kind posed a risk that must be accepted, as Twining recognized.

Presumably the chiefs discussed Twining’s proposal. Yet the only indication in their 8 August report that they had done so was a non-committal recommendation at the end of the paper for the formulation and public announcement of a clear, positive policy on the use of atomic weapons. It seems reasonable to infer that they had been unable to agree on such a policy and accordingly left the task, without recommendation, to the NSC. Their solution to providing adequate security without undermining the economy thus amounted to a turn toward Fortress America—a massive pullback from overseas commitments and deployments and increased emphasis on defense of the homeland.

**Scheduling Problems**

Although under mounting pressure from Dodge, since early July Wilson had been delaying the preparation of FY 1955 DoD budget estimates. He finally served notice that the 15 September deadline could not be met, contending that he could not proceed until the Joint Chiefs provided, and the president approved, the revised strategy and force requirements that the budget was supposed to reflect. Whether or not Wilson believed this, the argument was at least an accepted expedient. Behind it lay the hope that the revised strategy, when it materialized, might provide a basis for resisting the demands of administration and
congressional budget balancers for crippling cuts. But the Joint Chiefs' strategic concept paper was far too general and pointed toward horizons too distant to provide real guidance. When it was expounded to the NSC on 27 August, Humphrey pronounced it "terrific" and "the most important thing to happen in the country since January 20." Radford warned that for the near term the redeployments and readjustments involved in the new strategy would cost more rather than less than the current military posture.43

In the last week of August discussions between Kyes, McNeil, and BoB representatives reached an impasse. OSD officials rejected a new schedule proposed by BoB that would have required Wilson to set interim force and readiness levels for FY 1955 without guidance from the Joint Chiefs, other than the Sequoia report. After reworking by OSD and BoB and review by NSC the Defense budget would be formally submitted to BoB by 1 December and go to the president on the 15th.44 This required the immediate determination of force, strength, and readiness goals, but they need only be interim—that is, not aimed beyond FY 1955—and tentative; adjustments could be made later.45

McNeil warned Wilson that to prepare a FY 1955 Defense budget on the basis of arbitrarily fixed interim goals before the NSC had considered the Joint Chiefs' recommendations would be interpreted by the press and Congress as a violation of public pledges by the president that the chiefs would be given an "uninhibited" opportunity to recommend, without specific fiscal limitations, the forces needed for the nation's security. The gross figures derived from interim force goals would be frozen into governmental thinking, influencing the shaping of tax policy and decisions on total federal budget expenditures, and would thus specify prematurely the total funds available for DoD. The Joint Chiefs would have to adjust their recommendations to these totals. McNeil wanted Wilson to propose an alternative schedule giving the Joint Chiefs until 15 October to come up with FY 1955 force goals. The end result would be the submission sometime in January of a detailed Defense budget based on the revised military plan and reflecting Treasury-BoB tax and expenditure recommendations. Congress would get the whole package "prior to 15 February."46

But McNeil's plan was foredoomed. Dodge lost no time in submitting his proposed schedule to the president, who promptly approved it, primarily because it ensured that the budget would be submitted to Congress, as the law required, in January. With Dodge warning against further foot-dragging, Wilson directed the Joint Chiefs on 16 September to submit promptly a short-term plan for force and readiness levels in FY 1955, as a basis for OSD's rough cost estimates for that year's budget.
A special meeting of the NSC was set for 13 October to review both. This would enable the service staffs to begin work almost immediately on detailed budget estimates, looking to submission of the completed budget to OSD by 9 November, to BoB about a month later, and to the president by 15 December.47

So Dodge won his main point, getting budget preparation on track and moving. Interim force, readiness, and strength goals would be fixed immediately and translated into dollars without waiting for the Joint Chiefs to complete their strategy proposals. Ironically, the schedule now directed by the White House was only about two weeks “faster” in its early stages than the one in McNeil’s abortive plan, but the debate and decision he had hoped for would now be limited to the NSC meeting on 13 October. From then on, OSD and the services would have to work within a rigid framework of approved ceilings with little room to negotiate adjustments with BoB before final submission of the DoD budget on 7 December.

The Joint Chiefs Stand Pat

The hurriedly prepared military services’ force-level recommendations reached the JCS during the last week of September. Evidently there had been no JCS mandate to reduce manpower requirements, for the aggregate strength proposed for the end of FY 1955—3,507,721—was approximately 150,000 more than the existing goal for the end of FY 1954 and only 47,000 under the actual strength of the armed forces at the end of FY 1953. The Army wanted the largest increase, 87,000 over the end-FY 1954 goal proposed in May 1953; the Air Force and the Navy proposed increases of 42,000 and nearly 23,000, respectively.48

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>FY 1954 (May 53)</th>
<th>FY 1955 (Oct 53)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,421,000</td>
<td>1,508,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>745,066</td>
<td>767,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>230,021</td>
<td>230,021</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>1,002,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,356,087</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,507,721</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>
None of the services proposed major structural changes. The Army intended to retain a constant 20-division force through 1955 and the Marine Corps to keep its existing 3 divisions. The Air Force planned to accelerate its expansion to 114 wings by the end of FY 1954 and 130 wings by the end of FY 1956, with an ultimate goal of 137 wings in 1957. The Navy would retain its current active force of more than 800 combat ships built around 14 heavy carriers. The JCS rubber-stamped these proposals except for the Air Force's new 137-wing goal, which would have to wait until the overall force review was completed. They merely forwarded the services' personnel strength proposals.49

In view of Radford's recent warning that the new JCS strategic concept would cost more rather than less in its early stages, these force estimates for FY 1955 perhaps should not have come as a surprise. But they posed for Wilson an awkward dilemma. At the NSC meeting on 1 October, before the JCS paper was submitted, Humphrey had given a foretaste of the storm clouds gathering over the FY 1955 Defense budget. He declared that "the whole world was going broke" in the arms race. The H-bomb, he charged, was being used as "an excuse for raising taxes," but the American public, after 20 years of "scare stories," would not be taken in by them any longer. The president mildly interjected that he too had heard of the H-bomb and "it scared him." Wilson listened in silence, for the most part, but he quietly warned that his department could not reduce its expenditures during the coming fiscal year to the level required to balance the budget. Other agencies would have to make the necessary cuts.50

Wilson's staff was both baffled and annoyed by the JCS recommendations and the obviously uncoordinated service proposals that accompanied them. The services offered no justification for the requested personnel increases. The Army's proposal, a staff member noted, seemed to be an earlier plan "dusted off and resubmitted," but the Air Force proposal came from out of the blue and did not tally with figures obtained from the Air Staff: "God knows where the numbers came from." The Air Force still projected a pilot training program (9,000 per year) far in excess of any level it had ever achieved. The Navy's requested increase seemed "to represent an afterthought." Overmanning of the fleet, carried over from wartime, still averaged about 30,000.51

Facing the 13 October deadline Wilson instructed McNeil to use the only prepared data available, the unreviewed and uncoordinated service proposals, labeling his recommendations as "preliminary." McNeil's money figures could not have been too surprising, but they were shocking enough—$43 billion in FY 1955 expenditures and $40.4 billion for FY
1956. The spending estimates were only slightly lower than the amounts currently projected by BoB as likely to be available for all three major security programs (Defense, Mutual Security, and Atomic Energy)—$43.3 billion in FY 1955 and $42.6 billion in FY 1956—even if Congress partially extended existing excise and corporate income taxes scheduled to lapse in FY 1954. In a balanced federal budget, this meant an expenditure ceiling for DoD in the neighborhood of $34 billion for each of the two years.\textsuperscript{52}

Wilson thus faced a certain showdown in the NSC on 13 October. The gap between his figures and the Dodge-Humphrey budgetary objectives was too wide to be bridged by minor concessions on both sides. The difference—one of principle—only the president could resolve.

\textit{Redeployment, Nuclear Weapons, and the Soviet Threat}

Deep cuts in the DoD budget were implicit in the New Look concept, although the Joint Chiefs had somewhat obscured the point in their strategic paper by ruling out the possibility of immediate economies. They had proposed, in essence, a radical reduction of the whole military establishment by thinning out forces overseas, replacing them in large part by indigenous allied manpower, concentrating U.S. forces nearer home in a central strategic reserve, and placing greater reliance on airpower, especially strategic retaliatory airpower. The surprising omission of an explicit affirmation of the role of atomic weapons was quickly corrected when Radford and his colleagues explained the paper to the NSC on 27 August. By this time the Soviet thermonuclear test on the 12th had created a new sense of urgency. Radford confirmed that the new concept relied heavily on the deterrent effect of combining airpower and atomic weapons (both strategic and tactical) and that this would affect reshaping of the armed forces. None of the other chiefs demurred on this point—Twining presumably supported it unreservedly—and most of the discussion centered on the proposed pullback from worldwide deployments and commitments.

On this question the chiefs clearly differed, although all agreed that American forces were dangerously overextended and that allied countries must make larger manpower contributions. Dulles feared that a too rapid pullback from overseas would be taken as a signal that American leaders considered the Soviet menace to be fading and would make immeasurably more difficult the task of persuading allied governments to build up their defenses. Any chance of inducing the Japanese to assume responsibility for their own defense might disappear. Withdrawing U.S.
forces and reducing U.S. commitments might undermine the administration’s major foreign policy goal of reinvigorating the NATO alliance. Dulles restated his argument that no single nation, not even the United States, could match in peacetime the power that the totalitarian Soviet government could squeeze from its people; the United States might “go bust” if it tried to do so. Only by pooling its resources could the free world muster sufficient strength to face the Soviet bloc. The “art of the thing,” to use Dulles’s phrase, in any fundamental revision of policy and strategy was to manage it in such a way as to maintain the cohesion of the free world and permit a pooling of resources. There existed widespread fear abroad that the United States might revert to the Fortress America posture. Implementation of the new strategy would require delicate handling.  

On this cautious note the 27 August meeting closed. The council in general favored the JCS concept so far as it went, and the State Department was charged with developing a plan for implementing it. The NSC discussion, when reported by Dulles to the president at his vacation retreat in Denver, elicited a long, thoughtful, mostly gloomy response, generally acquiescing in the new strategic concept but endorsing the council’s go-slow approach to redeployment and stressing the necessity for careful education of public opinion both at home and abroad. “Any withdrawal that seemed to imply a change in basic intent would cause real turmoil abroad,” the president emphasized. Equally clear, he expected it would be a long time before the new strategy could pay dividends in budget cuts. The role of nuclear weapons, which the recent Soviet thermonuclear tests had thrust suddenly into the limelight, loomed paramount, deepening Eisenhower’s pessimism regarding the prospects of avoiding the trap of increasing social and economic regimentation that he perceived as inherent in the high costs of maintaining for the indefinite future an adequate defense posture. This led him also to speculate that “in such circumstances we would be forced to conclude whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment that we could designate.”

Debate continued during September and early October over redeployment and the role of nuclear weapons—the two potential manpower-saving (and therefore money-saving) features of the Joint Chiefs’ new strategic concept. The initial forum, the Solarium Special Committee appointed by the NSC Planning Board on 30 July, submitted its first draft statement on 17 September to the Planning Board, which sent it up to the NSC as a split paper (NSC 162) on the 30th.

On the issue of “special” (i.e., nuclear) weapons there was apparently no difference of opinion in the board; NSC 162 stated simply that they should be used “whenever they are required by the national security”
and that the "understanding and approval" of this intent should be secured from other governments as far as possible. The board also approved redeployment in principle, but members differed over the risks involved; the more cautious wanted more study of the possible political consequences before carrying out any significant withdrawals. Others wanted the pullback to begin immediately, though on a modest scale, along with diplomatic efforts to convince allied governments that it was in their long-term interests to undertake a larger share of the burdens of their own defense. Similar differences appeared when the Joint Chiefs reviewed NSC 162. All agreed that U.S. forces were overextended and to some degree improperly positioned. Carney and Ridgway warned against any major withdrawal from Europe or the Far East. Radford opposed any withdrawals from the Far East as long as the risk of a resumption of hostilities remained high. In Europe, conceding the inconsistency of U.S. troop withdrawals at a time when the United States sought to persuade allied governments to increase their own troop commitments, the JCS chairman hoped nevertheless that the latter might acquiesce because of the increased role played by growing U.S. nuclear capabilities.

The split on the redeployment issue in NSC 162 in fact sparked little debate when the NSC discussed the papers on 7 October. Dulles, who had stressed caution on 27 August, now accepted an early but selective initiation of the pullback provided it was done quietly and without alarming our allies. The president seemed pleased, remarking that our allies should be "brought to realize that such a redeployment was really good military policy."

The JCS strategic concept paper had not addressed the fundamental question of the seriousness of the Soviet military and economic threats. On the Planning Board, the Treasury and BoB representatives had pushed hard for a strong statement that the prolonged drain of high military expenditures would weaken the U.S. economy and therefore the country's military strength. The majority of the board considered the economy strong enough to sustain a military posture adequate to deal with any foreseeable threat; the nation should be prepared to pay whatever price its security required. The Joint Chiefs emphatically endorsed this position, but in their report to Wilson on 6 October declined for the present to endorse NSC 162 as a whole pending further study.

Budgetary implications related mainly to the long haul, but it could not be doubted that they would influence the approach to the FY 1955 budget. At the 7 October NSC meeting, C. D. Jackson, the president's psychological warfare adviser, supported the JCS view that the needs of national security should always take priority over the demands of the
economy. Squeezed uncomfortably between the two hard lines, Wilson agreed with Humphrey and Dodge that current tax rates were oppressive for business and, in general, that heavy defense spending in the long run would weaken the nation's defense posture. But it would be a "terrible day," he thought, if the administration ever put "a balanced budget ahead of national defense." He was put off by apocalyptic views of unbalanced budgets as a threat to the American way of life; he favored a "reasonable" defense posture for the long haul.

The president, clearly sympathetic to the budget-driven Treasury-BoB assessment and repelled by the argument that long-term military needs must be met regardless of cost, declared that "in the long run this country must have a sound dollar." He agreed with Humphrey that the American people would not indefinitely tolerate high levels of defense spending, but he avoided committing himself on the budget-balancing issue, remarking that he had to take a "daily beating" from the balanced-budget zealots. NSC 162 went back to the Planning Board for resolution of differences.

When Wilson totted up his assets and liabilities on the eve of the 13 October NSC meeting, he must have found the results depressing. The JCS had recommended "no change" in force levels, while passing on, with no recommendation at all, the accompanying bundle of uncoordinated service proposals for major personnel increases, implying that these were his problem, not theirs. All this added up, by McNeil's reckoning, to $43 billion in expenditures for FY 1955. Wilson could accept or reject it, but he had no better alternative to offer and no time to develop one. Substantial savings could probably be squeezed from the support forces, and the service secretaries had been directed to attend to this. But until they provided their findings this was only a hope and a talking point.

The New Look strategy, still evolving, held out tantalizing promise of eventual major economies but at the moment provided no basis for concrete budget reductions. An immediate phased pullback of forces from Europe and/or the Far East would have given Wilson an ideal opening for major budget cuts based on an approved strategy and redeployment plan, with hard numbers. But on 13 October an approved strategy and program was still no more than a hypothetical prospect. There remained the new nuclear weapons policy likely to be approved in the final version of NSC 162. In theory this also held promise of major manpower reductions, but even if approved, how was the translation into men and dollars to be made? At an NSC meeting on 1 October Wilson had ruminated wistfully about pulling out all the U.S. divisions from Europe, leaving only token and base defense forces costing much less, while Radford contrasted
the burgeoning cost of modern nuclear weapons with the much lower expenditures for munitions in Europe during World War II: "At present we are trying to keep abreast of both atomic and conventional armaments. We must make every effort to change over to a greater emphasis on the new weapons system since the cost of trying to maintain both systems is plainly too high."

Wilson did not have a strong bargaining strategy for the 13 October NSC meeting since it rested on the assumption that force levels and budget estimates were negotiable. Ever since the Soviet thermonuclear tests in August the president had been in a somber mood, oppressed by the prospect of high defense spending without end and the tightening economic controls and rising taxes he was sure this would entail. In this frame of mind the president could even speculate about so radical a solution as preemptive war, but it must have seemed far more likely to Wilson that, if forced to get on with the FY 1955 budget, Eisenhower would reject the extreme budget-balancing cuts that Humphrey, Dodge, and the Republican Old Guard were demanding.

**Showdown**

At the 13 October NSC meeting Dodge's detailed presentation culminated in an estimated deficit of $8.7 billion that he characterized as optimistic in the light of anticipated revenues. Wilson reviewed the immediate background of the DoD budget estimates, climaxing in the JCS 2 October recommendation to approve again combat force levels already planned for FY 1955, with the addition of recently proposed augmentations for continental defense and the Air Force's proposed acceleration to 120 wings. He recited the chiefs' reasons: There had been no change in basic policy or strategy, in assessments of the Soviet threat, or in policy for use of nuclear weapons. McNeil then reviewed the budget estimates, aggregating $43 billion. He stressed that his figures were only a "rough order of magnitude."

The reaction was immediate and sharp. Dodge protested the failure to show savings from termination of hostilities in Korea and Humphrey complained that Defense "offered no cut at all." Wilson retorted firmly that the uncertain situation created by the Korean truce had not permitted the hoped-for reduction in spending. Changes in the DoD budget required that decisions be made on use of nuclear weapons and deployment of forces overseas. Wilson had asked the Joint Chiefs to make a new long-range military posture projection which would be affordable without raising
fears among the allies that the United States was either about to withdraw its protection or unleash global war. The president turned to Radford and delivered a little lecture. There was no such thing as a perfect defense, he said. The best that could be hoped for was, "in Washington's words, a respectable posture of defense." He wanted the chiefs to look again, and hard, at their combat force requirements. Could they not stretch out some of them over a longer period of time? Also, he was going to insist that the chiefs not confine their recommendations to major combat forces only; he wanted austerity across the board. Radford pointed out that what had been presented was only an interim budget that would be refined later; the still unreviewed estimates of support elements could be substantially reduced. The president said that he found most disturbing the proposed increase in the total force level to 3.5 million. "We ought rather to be trying to reduce present levels to 3 million," without cutting combat units, but reducing "everywhere else."

Dulles brought the discussion back to the subject of nuclear weapons, which dominated the remainder of the meeting. The connection between these weapons and force levels, at least in the short term, began to appear more theoretical than real. The idea that treating nuclear weapons as nearly akin to conventional ones would serve as a powerful lever to bring overextended American forces back home rested at bottom on the assumption that small forces with immense nuclear firepower could be substituted for much larger ones conventionally armed. The policy under consideration in NSC 162, however, had a proviso that nuclear weapons could not be used from bases in allied territory without the advance consent of the host government. Negotiations over this issue could be expected to take a long time. Dulles proposed to raise the question with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in London during the following week.

The principal obstacle to an early pullback of American forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs persisted—the extreme sensitivity of the issue abroad, especially in Europe, where it continued hostage to the fears of the French, overextended in Indochina, that Britain and the United States would abandon them to a resurgent Germany. In the Far East the threat of renewed hostilities, whether by the Chinese or by disgruntled Korean President Rhee, made early withdrawal of U.S. forces from there unlikely. Accordingly, although both the president and Dulles recognized that the vast U.S. overseas establishment would have to be greatly reduced in the long run, they saw no immediate prospect of significant withdrawals and were even reluctant to admit publicly that major redeployments were a long-term goal. On 7 October, for the revised version of NSC 162, they had virtually dictated, over the opposition of the Joint Chiefs, a statement of
redeployment policy so cautious and devious that only a careful reader could discern that such an undertaking was contemplated.\textsuperscript{64}

Radford, defending his contention that the proposed revised policy on nuclear weapons offered no basis for large force reductions in FY 1955, boldly asked the president whether the Joint Chiefs could count on using these weapons in Korea in the event of renewed hostilities. The case was shrewdly chosen: a theater from which large U.S. forces might be withdrawn, where nuclear weapons could be used without involving bases on allied soil, and where early eruption of fighting was a real possibility. Perhaps taken aback, Eisenhower hesitated, while Dulles made the point that inasmuch as "we are the UN command," the United States had the authority to use the weapons if militarily justified, but the allies ought to be informed. The president said he too believed in using nuclear weapons if hostilities were resumed in Korea but noted that previous agreements with allies might affect the decision. The answer to Radford's questions seemed to be that nuclear weapons could and should be used, but the allies should be consulted. Radford had made Korea a test case for the application of nuclear policy because a policy of only partial normalization of use of nuclear weapons was not enough to warrant large force reductions that could come only from large-scale redeployment.\textsuperscript{65} In the 7 October NSC meeting the president had stated that the JCS could count on using nuclear weapons in a general war but not in little ones.\textsuperscript{66} Now the most likely middle-size war, in Korea, seemed also to have been ruled out.

Unless the Joint Chiefs could count on using nuclear weapons "in a blanket way," as Radford put it, they could not proceed with the radical reconstitution of the armed forces contemplated in their long-haul strategy. Wilson told the council that it must decide how far it was prepared to go in changing the basic policy of deploying large forces around the world and in shifting emphasis from conventional to nuclear weapons. To bring the armed forces down from 3.5 million to 3 million, as the president demanded, and still maintain reasonable security, would be very difficult. The president thought otherwise. In his view, the assurance that an attack on the United States would surely provoke a nuclear response represented a significant breakthrough for force planning. "The only war that the United States was really scared of was a war initiated by the enemy against us. In this contingency we could always use atomic weapons from our own bases." As for redeployment, he did not seem unduly disturbed by the prospect of a long delay. We could "think and plan for such a redeployment, and meanwhile calculate everything else on the most austere basis possible." The bottom line was not redeployment, not normalization of nuclear weapons, but austerity. For those attuned to listen, the message came through clearly.
Humphrey continued to urge a less restrictive policy on use of nuclear weapons as a means of justifying further budget cuts. Dodge chimed in to point out that the $43 billion spending estimate for Defense amounted to a reduction of only $2.5 billion from President Truman’s original forecast. This was too much for Wilson, who reminded Dodge of the new requirements for continental defense and the new threat of the Soviet H-bomb, not to mention inflation. Dulles supported Wilson, declaring “with great emphasis” that to balance the budget in FY 1955 would require cuts in foreign aid—“the worst kind of false economy.”

The president intervened, as usual taking a middle position. If he could be convinced that Defense really needed all the money it was asking for, he would fight for it, but he did not want to “scare the people to death.” Redeployment on the scale the military seemed to project could not possibly be carried out in a single year, but the process of cutting down the inflated strength of the armed services could begin at once. When Humphrey, a few moments later, tried to raise the issue again, it was his turn to receive a presidential lecture. According to the record, “the President turned on Secretary Humphrey and said, ‘Let me ask you a question. Just how many troops do you think it possible for us to get out of Europe in 1955? The presence of our troops there is the greatest single morale factor in Europe. You cannot therefore make a radical change so quickly. Besides, the physical cost of bringing back these troops will be so high as to effect very little savings in the course of next year, even if considerable numbers were to be redeployed.’” The balanced-budget issue was thus laid to rest for FY 1955. The president directed the Joint Chiefs to recompute their force levels “on a genuine austerity basis,” but without cutting combat forces, and he told Wilson to submit new, presumably lower, FY 1955 expenditure estimates in line with the council discussion.57

The 21 October Decisions

The showdown in the NSC on 13 October did little to solve Wilson’s immediate problems. Sent back to the drawing board with orders to reduce his budget estimates, he had no specific guidance and no approved strategy. Forced to move ahead on the budget without delay, Wilson directed the services on the 16th to submit detailed estimates by 5 December.58

After the 13th, Wilson’s most urgent tasks were to prepare the DoD budget and to get on with the strength reductions the president had directed. The personnel-cutting task remained primarily a planning problem, since both the size and the method of the cuts remained undefined. Under
the tight deadlines now imposed, the budget task could not wait. To get on with it, the staffs needed, right away, a basis for calculating costs, and the only one available was the force and strength goal recommended by the JCS on 2 October. Cost estimates derived from them would far exceed the dollar limits Humphrey and Dodge talked about. Almost surely they would prove unacceptable to the president. But they could be diminished by simple mathematical procedures when the new, reduced strength and force goals had been determined. Budget preparation and personnel planning would therefore go on concurrently.

In issuing his 16 October directive, Wilson intended that the military services also review their combat and service supporting units. This seems to have been in response to the president's remark to Radford on 13 October that the Joint Chiefs should broaden their recommendations to cover supporting elements as well as "above the line" combat units. After discussing his schedule difficulties further with Dodge and the president, Wilson obtained a decision to concentrate on overall force requirements and programs. This would free the Joint Chiefs, at least in their corporate capacity, to pursue their primary task of developing the long-term military strategy and force posture Wilson had directed on 16 October. It also served to free Wilson of the burden of preparing an interim report for the NSC on 29 October; the meeting on that date would now be devoted wholly to NSC 162. Wilson could thus concentrate on his two principal tasks of budget preparation and strength reduction, aiming at "submission of overall [budget] estimates for first consideration by the council on 15 December or shortly thereafter." The schedule was still very tight and would "not permit as thorough an analysis of the submissions of the military departments [by OSD] as would be desired." Swept under the rug in the accelerated process was the systematic review of "below the line" supporting elements. Under Wilson's 16 October directive, these would now be screened for budgetary savings only to the extent that the staffs might incidentally unearth possible areas of reduction. 69

The JCS had a third task—the formulation of the long-haul strategy and posture of the New Look. In the ordered cosmos of military thought they visualized this as a logical outgrowth or appendage of NSC 162, a military strategy implementing the national strategy set forth in that basic charter. They had developed the conceptual framework for the New Look military strategy in their concept paper. Now, with NSC 162 nearing formal approval, they were ready to take this task seriously in hand. 70 In the immediate aftermath of 13 October, the chiefs appear to have felt that the FY 1955 DoD budget would probably emerge as an interim budget little if any smaller than its predecessor. Radford himself had left
the meeting on the 13th clearly still convinced, despite the president's lecture on economy, that large budgetary cuts could not be made until emphasis shifted markedly to nuclear weapons and major force withdrawals from overseas.

As for DoD's prospective FY 1955 spending total, Wilson almost certainly shared Radford's view of the probable outcome of the budget battle. Indeed, his judgment may well have shaped Radford's on this point. Even in November Wilson would be talking openly of a $40 billion Defense budget, at a time when the size of the manpower cuts the president would impose was much more predictable than it was in late October. But the president had set no dollar ceilings (or even "targets" or "goals"), and his one mention of a three-million-man target for strength reduction evidently had been made so offhandedly that neither Wilson nor anyone else seems to have taken it literally. It seemed reasonable to infer that the precise limits of the budget remained negotiable.

However, Wilson seems to have parted company with Radford on the third task—mapping the long-haul New Look strategy. He was as eager as Radford for the chiefs to get on with the task, but he was unwilling to allow them the six months or more Radford seemed to have in mind. He hoped that the New Look strategy would provide some basis and justification for manpower and dollar ceilings that otherwise, for lack of presidential guidance, might be dictated by fiscal fanatics. Wilson believed, moreover, that the president, who had often expressed impatience with doctrinaire budget balancers, might welcome an attempt to relate the FY 1955 budget to an updated strategy. What he had seemed to be asking in the 13 October meeting was how much was it reasonably safe to reduce defense spending in the coming fiscal year, recognizing that a perfect defense was unattainable and that a sound defense depended ultimately on a sound dollar. It was primarily a military question and only the nation's top military experts could answer it—not in dollar terms, but in the specifics of forces and programs. The FY 1955 budget had to be placed in the context of security, military and economic, for the long haul.

Wilson asked the chiefs to develop, by 15 December, an outline military strategy to implement the national strategy set forth in NSC 162, along with their recommendations for the size and composition of the armed forces in fiscal years 1955, 1956, and 1957, leveling off at an active-duty strength between 2.5 million and 3 million. Wilson intended that in arriving at a new end-strength figure for FY 1955 the JCS would have to re-examine their 2 October proposals "as they might be modified by NSC 162 and related documents." Some of the salient points of NSC 162 were repeated in Wilson's directive, including the importance of
adequate continental air defense and, most notably, the "military advantage" to be gained from the new policy governing use of nuclear weapons. Wilson hoped that the chiefs' recommendations would make possible modification in the FY 1955 DoD budget.71

On 20 October the president approved Wilson's effort and told him to go ahead meanwhile with the detailed budget estimates for FY 1955, "placing personnel, both civilian and military, on an austerity basis." Clearly Eisenhower did not expect the recasting of strategy to have much effect on the FY 1955 budget.72

Thus ended Wilson's dogged effort to marry the FY 1955 Defense budget to the emerging New Look strategy. It had been an uphill battle, probably foredoomed to defeat by the relentless urgency of a budget process that could not accommodate the slower tempo of long-range strategic planning. One might, however, have expected more cooperation from the Joint Chiefs and more sympathy from the president; they were more likely champions than the ex-president of General Motors of the doctrine that strategy should shape budgets. The decisions of 21 October did leave the door slightly ajar to a realization of that doctrine, but the president, at least, evidently did not take the possibility too seriously. Meanwhile, the JCS would continue to develop the shape of the new military structure. As a result of the 13 and 21 October decisions, the processes of budget preparation and strategy-and-force planning would move on parallel tracks, with virtually no interaction, for almost eight more weeks. In final form, the FY 1955 Defense manpower ceilings would be dictated wholly by economic considerations.
The high cost of military manpower inevitably brought it to the fore in considerations of New Look policy. Perhaps more than any other element it became the object of acute controversy, evoking deeply-felt reaction especially from the Army. The president's budget instructions to Wilson on 21 October 1953 enjoined him to place both military and civilian manpower "on an austerity basis." Eisenhower's intention to cut manpower strength had been clearly manifested long before this.

Wilson's response to the president's military manpower strength instructions of 21 October was prompt but curiously tentative. On the 23d Assistant Secretary Hannah issued personnel guidelines to the services suggesting new strength ceilings to be reached by the end of FY 1955:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,281,000</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>670,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>207,000</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>970,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,128,000</strong></td>
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It was a sharp retort to the services' late September "wish list" lately rebuffed by the NSC. The suggested ceilings were 11 percent lower in the aggregate. Overall, they envisaged a continuous decline in the strength of the armed forces (except the Air Force) over the next 20 months, in contrast to the "bottoming out" and subsequent upward curve that had characterized the service proposals. The new guidelines confirmed currently approved strength objectives of the Army and Marine Corps for FY 1954, retaining the Korea pipeline allowances (56,000) as a partial alleviation of those services' biennial personnel turnover problem.¹
Predictably, the Army and Navy immediately registered objections. On 27 October Army Secretary Stevens defiantly informed Wilson that he was going ahead with his already proposed FY 1955 budget estimates of an end-strength of 1,508,000, preceded by an increase during FY 1954 to a peak level of 1,540,000. The increase in FY 1954, he assured Wilson, would involve no increase in currently planned expenditures, but reduction of the Army's strength to 1,370,000 by the end of FY 1954 would require withdrawal of four divisions from the Far East by the end of FY 1955 and elimination of two division forces. The planned eight-division general reserve in the United States would have only one division, one regimental task force, and some antiaircraft units manned and ready for combat. Stevens concluded: "The Army cannot, under present or proposed strength limitations, maintain and support its current overseas strengths and deployments, and at the same time maintain and support in the U.S. those units required to meet our NATO commitments. . . . Strength reductions of the magnitude under consideration by your office cannot be made without relieving the Army of some of its basic missions and commitments."²

To these protests, as well as similar ones from the Navy, Wilson responded briefly and mildly on the 29th. He reminded the two secretaries of his earlier directive to review and reduce their supporting establishments and pointed out that Assistant Secretary Hannah's guidelines, while ruling out reductions in the number of combat units, "did not eliminate the possibility of changing the effective strength or state of readiness of some of the units." He urged the two secretaries to "make a real effort" to bring their personnel strengths down to the levels suggested for the end of FY 1955.³ He apparently reasoned that since the president had not stipulated specific manpower numbers nothing would be gained by fixing rigid manpower ceilings.

The new personnel guidelines preceded by a week the approval of NSC 162/2, the basic policy framework of the New Look, on 30 October, following a final full-dress debate by the NSC the previous day. Even though NSC 162/2 ended the policy debate over the central interconnected issues of use of nuclear weapons and the great pullback of forces from overseas, it did not provide guidance that would permit the new policies to be translated into significant manpower and dollar savings. The revised version stated simply that nuclear weapons, in the event of hostilities, would be considered "as available for use as other munitions." Apparently Admiral Radford thought this went about as far as a unilateral statement of U.S. policy could go—and the president, when it was discussed in the
council on the 29th, seemed to think it would enable the Joint Chiefs to plan on radically reduced requirements for conventional forces. But the chiefs did not agree. In the final version, NSC 162/2, the revised statement on nuclear weapons was allowed to stand, with a proviso that the advance consent of U.S. allies should be sought for U.S. use of these weapons from their territory. NSC 162/2 also held out little prospect for early redeployments.4

**Dodge Applies Pressure**

Budget Director Dodge launched the final phase of budget preparation on 4 November, presenting the president with his budget recommendations for the principal federal agencies. He reiterated that both spending and appropriations in 1955 must be reduced substantially below FY 1954 levels, and stressed one significant feature, until now not conspicuous in budget policy guidance: “It will be necessary to anticipate results from improved management in the agencies by making reasonable reductions for improved efficiency in operations.” What was probably the real purpose of the memo appeared in its final paragraph: “This approach leads inevitably to differences concerning the amounts between the Bureau of the Budget and the agency. Unless all concerned clearly understand that it has the full support of the President, agencies can be expected to appeal to the President directly and in many cases on what will appear as relatively unimportant decisions. Therefore I should like to have your approval or modification of the approach outlined so that I may be guided accordingly in subsequent recommendations.”5

Eisenhower responded with his usual celerity, approving on 5 November the idea of taking budgetary credit for anticipated operational savings and endorsing the criterion of “necessity rather than desirability” for budget estimates across the board. In the DoD budget, he indicated his desire for “some little increase” in appropriations for the Air Force and continental defense, “even though we may make considerable overall savings in that Department.” On the other hand, he neither approved nor disapproved Dodge’s specific recommendations on budget ceilings, and his conditional “may” in the matter of DoD savings presumably did not pass unnoticed. That Dodge had his full confidence, however, was unmistakably clear. He invited Dodge to talk to him periodically about the budget, noting “we can always squeeze in an opportunity.”6

A week later the president moved to galvanize his reluctant defense secretary into action. He summoned Dulles, Humphrey, and Wilson to the White House on 11 November to confer on “how to provide necessary
security and still reduce the Defense budget for '55.' Dulles opened the meeting with the startling proposal to begin withdrawing ground forces from Korea. The recommendation had come from the theater commander himself, General John E. Hull, a week or so earlier, and Dulles agreed with him. His reasoning flew directly in the face of the carefully phrased arguments against such action only recently spelled out in NSC 162/2: To withdraw ground forces would, Dulles said, "show confidence in our air and naval strength" while implementing the basic policy of avoiding ground force deployments in mainland Asia. Moreover, it would permit early substantial Army troop cuts.7

These views drew no objections. It was agreed that withdrawals from Korea could reduce, "very soon," the number of divisions there and that significant numbers of personnel from service and support elements could be pulled out of Europe, but withdrawal of full divisions would have to be approached more cautiously. As for general manpower reduction in the United States and overseas the president and his three advisers agreed that reliance on nuclear weapons "would justify completely some reduction in conventional forces"—mainly Army ground troops and also "certain parts of the Navy." They imposed no ceiling on total strength but decided that, "in the absence of some marked change in the international situation," a 1.5 million-man Army was an unaffordable luxury.8

The 11 November decisions, while dramatic, did not require Wilson to take immediate action, but he could not count much longer on the president's forbearance. Dodge's tolerance of delay, which would in turn affect the president's, was already wearing thin. The curve of Defense spending, far from declining as the president had directed, was again on the rise, with aircraft deliveries, ammunition production, and the accumulation of war reserves accounting for most of the increase. The $43.2 billion of DoD expenditures projected in the FY 1954 budget remained the official DoD estimate; BoB's predictions were lower but rising, from $41.7 billion late in October to $42.3 billion in mid-November. Most disturbing about all this was that spending momentum from one year carried over into the next; similarly, programs projected at a high level for one year tended to require an acceleration during the preceding year.9

* Hull's cable recommended the action as part of a general political settlement involving withdrawal of all, or most, of non-Korean forces on both sides. He thought that retention of U.S. forces in Korea might actually tend to encourage President Rhee to take the unilateral action against the North he was currently threatening, by implying assurance of U.S. support in such an eventuality. Hull also favored early withdrawal in order to avoid reinvolve-ment in a protracted ground war in mainland Asia. He recommended initiation of withdrawal immediately following decisions of a political conference with the Communists, the movement to extend over 11 months. FRUS 1952-54, XV, pt 2:1588-89.
According to BoB observers, unilateral service plans for FY 1955 spending (not yet reviewed by OSD) had, in the aggregate, not fallen appreciably below the estimates of late July. The staff priced the current force projections—the 20-division, 1.5 million-man Army, the 843 combat-ship Navy with 16 air groups, 3 Marine divisions and 3 Marine air wings, and the interim 120-wing Air Force—at about $40.5 billion. With military assistance included, the total could come to $48.5 billion. By BoB's estimates, a variety of measures might reduce the total DoD bill to $37 billion. But even these austerity measures would still fall short of reducing DoD expenditures to the level required to meet the administration's FY 1955 goal of $36.2 billion. A cut of this magnitude, the staff calculated, would further require shrinking the Army down to a little over 1 million men, the Navy to 650,000, and the Marine Corps to 175,000.

The intelligence Dodge was getting also raised serious doubts whether DoD would meet its budget deadlines. It was doubtful whether OSD could, or would, make the drastic cuts indicated, and the Joint Chiefs were reported to be far behind schedule in revising strategy and programs because of wrangling among the service representatives. The NSC might be faced on 16 December, as it had been on 13 October, with a Defense budget that it could not accept. Concerned about the service budgets, in a letter to Deputy Secretary Kyes on 27 November Dodge asked if it was clearly understood that the revised JCS programs were to be "definitive for application to the FY 1955 Budget by December 15?" It was imperative, he warned, "to avoid the need for major last-minute revisions and internal or public disputes about them."

Without waiting for a reply, Dodge characteristically went to the top, sending a long "personal and confidential" letter to the president on 30 November. He stressed the centrality of the national security budget and the short time remaining for key decisions. Dodge pointed out that because of the attendance of Secretaries Dulles, Wilson, and Humphrey and Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) Director Harold Stassen at the NATO ministerial meetings on 14-17 December, they would not be present at the scheduled NSC review of the budget, not to mention the meetings with legislative leaders on 17-19 December. He then urged the president to hold the NSC meeting before the 14th. He reported that the military services still had received no firm guidelines, i.e., dollar or manpower ceilings, without which there was little likelihood that the

* The president dismissed as inconsequential Dodge's concern over the absence of Wilson and other officials from town at the time of the NSC budget discussions. Responsible heads, he said, must make key decisions in advance and clear them with BoB and the White House. Memo Pres for DirBoB, 1 Dec 53, ltr Dodge to SecDef, 4 Dec 53: PP(AWF), DDEL.
services would take the necessary initiatives to meet the administration's economy objectives. "It may be necessary to use presidential authority to implement these objectives," because, as matters stood, there was no assurance of spending reductions sufficient to put the administration even within reach of at least a balanced budget.12

The Army Targeted

By this time the crisis over the Defense budget had become public knowledge, and the issues were being debated widely. The "story" broke on the evening of 19 November when the Columbia Broadcasting System reported an "officially inspired" leak from Treasury to the effect that the administration faced a $10 billion spending deficit in FY 1955, which it hoped to reduce by $6 billion, of which $4 billion would come from DoD. The next day the New York Times elaborated on the report under the headline: "Eisenhower Seeks Six Billion Slash in Fed Budget; High Official Says Defense Outlay Will Be Cut, But Not At Expense Of Security." Five days later Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen simultaneously revealed that the source of the leak had been Treasury Secretary Humphrey, who (according to Pearson) was "teed off" by the persistent foot-dragging of the military on budget reductions and revision of strategy and had "decided to force the Pentagon's hand." The Army-Navy-Air Force Journal fanned the flames with a forecast of an imminent 10 percent cut in the military manpower of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, involving, for the luckless Army, a slash of 200,000 men by mid-1955.13

On 26 November Assistant Secretary Hannah gave reporters an authoritative version of the rumored manpower cut. It turned out to be his 23 October guidelines, now opened to public inspection—an overall reduction of about 400,000 for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, a small increase for the Air Force, and an end-strength total for the armed forces of 3,128,000 in FY 1955. For the Army, it involved a cut of about 244,000, for the Marines 43,000, for the Navy 115,000. Hannah stressed that the cut was not mandatory; the services had been urged to make an honest effort to achieve it but could offer alternatives if they thought it would impair their combat effectiveness.14

Army officials, of course, had no doubt that it would. In a careful analysis in the Baltimore Sun reflecting their views, Mark Watson emphasized that the Army could not make the suggested cut of 200,000 without gravely reducing its ability to perform its assigned tasks. The Army, he concluded, could whittle down its size as ordered by civilian authority, but only by having its assigned missions altered by that civilian
authority. In fact, Secretary Stevens and General Ridgway had decided to take this position in preparing their FY 1955 budget estimates, which were based on the Joint Chiefs' original force recommendations of 2 October, aiming at a 20-division Army and a FY 1955 end-strength of 1,508,000, with a peak strength of 1,540,000 at the end of FY 1954. In a "statement of risks" to accompany the budget estimates Stevens warned that "any substantial downward revision in this budget, particularly as regards the strength of the Army, will involve additional risks which it is not within the prerogatives of the Army to assume, and which can be evaluated only when the extent of the reduction is known."16

As the December budget deadlines loomed, the Army's leaders were thus on a collision course with the president's stated rejection of a 1.5 million-man Army. Did they know this? Possibly not. Although Wilson had received his marching orders on 11 November, he still had received no specific personnel or dollar ceilings. And the 11 November decisions were not necessarily passed on to Stevens. How far below 1.5 million men the Army would have to reduce still remained negotiable, as were also the cuts for the other services and the dollar limits to be placed on the DoD budget. All these factors interacted. Wilson evidently decided to let matters take their course, probably hoping that the services, with some nudging from Assistant Secretary Hannah and the OSD staff, would see the light and follow his manpower guidelines. At BoB, Dodge was less optimistic. His 30 November appeal for presidential intervention elicited on 1 December the usual prompt response the next day. By now, however, the president evidently felt that he had provided sufficient policy guidance and it was up to his subordinates to take the necessary implementing actions without further delay. He confined himself essentially to positions already taken. The 1955 budget would not be affected by any last-minute alteration in strategy: "It requires a long time to adjust training systems, organization, equipment contracts and other things to changed ideas in the realm of strategy." He had already advised Wilson that the only way to reduce DoD spending within a short time required lowering personnel ceilings sufficiently to "place everything except a few units on an austerity basis." The "few units" he had in mind included the forces remaining in Korea, elements of the Strategic Air Command, certain air defense squadrons, and units of the Navy and Marine Corps intended for response to emergencies. With these exceptions, Eisenhower thought, "practically all supporting units can safely be reduced by a definite percentage." Savings could also be made, he was sure, in foreign aid and military assistance.17

The next day, 2 December, replying to a reporter's question about the proposed "10 percent cut" in the Army, the president spoke in a similar
Cutting Manpower

vein, stressing the advent of a "cold war status" in Korea. There would be no strength reductions in front-line units until this became politically feasible, but on the other hand the full pipeline to replace casualties was no longer needed. 18

Wilson in the Middle

Thus prodded, on 4 December Wilson issued approved, not suggested, personnel strengths for FY 1955—without waiting for the service budget estimates due the next day and now overtaken by this action. 19

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<tr>
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<th>End strength</th>
<th>Man-year average</th>
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<td>1,305,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,167,000</td>
<td>3,225,500</td>
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The new end-strength figures were 39,000 higher than the late-October guidelines—24,000 of the increase going to the Army and 12,000 and 3,000, respectively, to the Navy and Marine Corps. The man-year averages for FY 1955 gave the services some room for maneuver in determining FY 1954 end-strengths that would alleviate the difficulties of reaching the reduced goals a year later. Even so, the new goals represented severe reductions from current strength. In submitting the Army budget estimates on 5 December based on the unreduced 1.5 million strength figure, Stevens implied that the Army accepted no responsibility for the consequences of the new cutbacks, and now awaited "early advice on the changes in missions that will necessarily ensue." 20 Inspired press reports a few days later left no uncertainty on this point. "Reliable sources," according to the Washington Post on 9 December, "said Wilson has settled this major issue [of responsibility], on which the size of the 1955 defense budget largely turns, by ruling that the projected reduction can be made without endangering security. In effect, he is taking responsibility for the slash." 21

The projected spending total of $39 billion for FY 1955 was almost $3 billion too high to meet Dodge's asserted budgetary objective. 22 Was Wilson still dragging his feet? The precise size of the DoD budget was still negotiable and would remain so until the president made his final

* This was the average strength over a full year.
decision. Although his wishes were plain enough, Eisenhower had studiously refrained from prescribing exact numbers. In the NSC meeting of 13 October he had said that the strength of the armed forces should be reduced to three million, but no one seems to have taken him literally, and he had not alluded to the figure again. Wilson's directed strength ceilings of 4 December were a response to presidential prodding, but they were also a move in his bargaining contest with Humphrey and Dodge over the ultimate size of the FY 1955 DoD budget.

In that contest Wilson's adversaries held most of the bargaining assets, especially the high ground of the president's favor. Eisenhower unmistakably leaned most of the way toward their point of view and was also clearly losing patience with Wilson's reluctance to cut short the debate with the Army leaders and impose a solution. Wilson was fighting a rearguard action against Humphrey and Dodge. In the post-Korean War climate it could be politically risky to oppose a balanced budget publicly, and Wilson did not contest it as a policy for the long haul, arguing only that to impose it now would dangerously weaken the nation's defense posture. Humphrey, thoroughly out of patience with the military for what he perceived as their stalling, rejected this argument while conceding that a genuine emergency might justify temporary continuation of deficit financing. Had Wilson been able to mobilize the Joint Chiefs to support him on this issue, his argument might have carried more weight, since it was, after all, largely a question of professional military judgment. But Radford had virtually withdrawn the chiefs as a body from the debate over the FY 1955 Defense budget, although as service chiefs they were, of course, active participants.

Alone, with little room to maneuver between budget cutters and the beleaguered but uncompromising Army and Navy leaders, Wilson now had his back to the wall. Stevens and Ridgway had asserted in October, and still held, that if the Army's forces must be reduced, so also must its missions. It was a typical affirmation of the military professional's view of his role vis-a-vis his civilian superior—the latter was to prescribe ends, the former to determine the military means required to achieve them. Whether Wilson accepted this view is uncertain—doctrinal postures were not his style—but he could hardly afford the luxury of simply rejecting responsibility, as Stevens had done, for the consequences of an action properly directed by a superior.*

* Stevens, after taking this position (i.e., that the directed personnel cuts would require mission changes by higher authority), in the end yielded, under protest, to presidential direction—and the president complimented him. Had Wilson taken a similar position in resisting the president's expressed wishes, he almost certainly would have had to resign or be fired.
On the other hand, Wilson took no visible umbrage at Stevens's defiance of the OSD personnel guidelines in late October. Nor did he challenge the Army staff's alarming estimates of the risks involved in strength reductions considerably less drastic than those he was proposing. Those estimates were overtaken on 11 November (though, again, not in the view of the Army leaders) when the president decreed that conventional force levels could be reduced simply on the basis of increased reliance on nuclear weapons. But by how much? How were the numbers to be arrived at? If manpower cuts could be determined solely by Humphrey-Dodge spending levels, then the question would boil down to simple arithmetic. No responsible official, including Humphrey and Dodge, admitted to such a view. Since everyone agreed that the Defense budget should embody some mixture of economic and military considerations, DoD planners were still expected to make estimates, using processes more objective and quantitative than intuition or divine revelation, of the forces the nation needed to ensure its security under the president's new guidelines.

To what extent would the great firepower of nuclear weapons actually reduce the need for manpower in FY 1955? Putting aside the rejection of that premise by Ridgway and others, and even assuming that the new weapons would be used wherever available, bases for such a calculation simply did not exist in December 1953. How many of what kinds of tactical atomic weapons would be needed to replace the firepower of a single ground division? No one could answer this question with confidence for lack of experience data. The tendency at this time was to think rather in terms of "substituting" nuclear-armed strategic airpower for ground forces, particularly in near-term projections in which tactical weapons were only a marginal factor. "If one H-weapon can wipe out an entire attacking division, or an entire army corps in the field," wrote Hanson Baldwin in a think piece on the New Look, "one wing of forty-five B-47 bombers to carry the H-bomb might possibly be substituted, some argue, for one of our own defensive divisions." The currently popular slogan, "a bigger bang for a buck," however, had already aroused, as Baldwin remarked, as much skepticism and antipathy as optimism. "One cannot simply substitute atomic bombs for ground divisions," wrote Walter Millis, "without at the same time profoundly affecting the strategies which can be employed and limiting the kind of objectives which can be maintained." Radford, next to the president the authority on these matters, in a highly publicized speech in mid-December, refused to elaborate on the manpower implications of his own statement that nuclear weapons had "virtually achieved conventional status within our
armed forces." He ventured only a cautious comment that increasing
reliance on these weapons would in time ease manpower needs. 23

Wilson Acts

As it turned out, Wilson found a rationale for part of the required
manpower cuts the president required not in the new nuclear weapons
policy but in the first of the major "disengagement" redeployments from
overseas heralded by the New Look. Secretary Dulles's unexpected pro-
posal on 11 November to initiate troop withdrawals from Korea had not
resulted in any immediate action, primarily because the Joint Chiefs were
torn between their desire to rectify the worldwide overextension of U.S.
forces and their fear that any significant withdrawal from Korea would
weaken U.S. control over President Rhee and be exploited by the Com-
umnists as a sign of lack of resolve. The issue was complicated, moreover,
by General Hull's proposal to return the Army's 24th Infantry Division to
Japan, leaving its equipment behind for the expanding ROK army. In
mid-November the JCS recommended to Wilson that the United States and
its allies press the Communists to agree to a phased withdrawal from
Korea by both sides. The JCS stipulated that no U.S. forces be withdrawn
without similar Communist moves at the same time, and that the United
States proclaim its determination to defend South Korea. Earlier the JCS
had approved fitting two more ROK divisions with equipment to be left
behind by departing U.S. units, as part of a contemplated expansion of
the ROK army from 16 to 20 divisions. 24

When the issue came before the NSC on 3 December, the prospects
for early initiation of the redeployment did not seem bright. Relations with
President Rhee were still tense following a visit in November by Vice
President Richard Nixon, who brought a blunt warning from Eisenhower
for Rhee to cease public threats of renewing hostilities against North
Korea. Talks with the Communists about a political conference were on
the point of breaking down; the NSC agenda on 3 December in fact
included a JCS plan for responding to any Communist renewal of hostilities
with major nuclear air attacks against both North Korea and China. Despite
these ominous overtones, Radford opened the redeployment discussion
with the observation that if the present stalemate continued the JCS
believed the withdrawal of U.S. forces should begin as soon as the ROK
army attained a level of 20 combat-ready divisions. If equipment could
be made available, he offered the optimistic appraisal that this might
be possible within two or three months. Dulles and Wilson promptly
applauded this prospect. The president, Dulles, and Radford all agreed that prompt redeployment of two divisions, far from weakening the U.S. position, would encourage allies and warn enemies by conveying a sense of confidence; it would also, they decided, signal that the United States had no aggressive intentions toward Communist China and might even give Rhee second thoughts about American support should he throw off the traces and attack the North. Wilson remarked that the two-division redeployment "would fit in very nicely" with the new program.

At this point Humphrey, who had joined the chorus of approbation, demanded to know why the redeployment could not begin at once. Radford reminded him of the threat of a new attack from the North; U.S. forces must remain poised for instant retaliation. But Wilson seconded Humphrey; he wanted "to be able to count on having the two divisions back" in the United States before 30 June 1954 so that the movement costs would not have to be covered in the FY 1955 budget. Before Radford could reply, the president said that he saw no need to wait for the council's action on the JCS recommendations for responding to a Communist attack. Radford, backed into a corner by the president's intervention, could only reply that the JCS had made their proposal for redeployment contingent on the existence of a "prolonged stalemate." The president retorted that if, as Radford said, 20 ROK divisions would be combat-ready in February or March, then the 2 U.S. divisions could be brought home between 1 March and 1 May and then demobilized. He wanted to give the news to Churchill when he joined him a few days later in Bermuda. At that time he would make it clear the United States expected the British to leave their own contingent in Korea. Wilson, delighted with the turn of the discussion, remarked that he saw no need to consult with the UN allies about the planned move.

So it was ordered. The council agreed that, beginning about 1 March, "assuming a continuation of present conditions," two U.S. divisions should withdraw from Korea, and, if the stalemate continued, the United States should seek allied agreement to the phased reduction of UN forces as proposed by the JCS. A week later the president and Dulles, back from the Bermuda conference, reported to the council that the prime minister had seemed to take the news in good part. After some discussion it was agreed, with Radford's full concurrence, that the president would make the public announcement of the redeployment probably in a week or two.

It was only a small step. Demobilizing the two divisions would reduce the Army's rolls by about 35,000 men—hardly more than a token cut. Even with the 56,000 Korean pipeline allowance (for Army and Marines combined) thrown in, the total reduction would not likely impress Dodge.
But time had run out. On 11 December Wilson issued a new set of approved FY 1955 personnel strengths, rescinding those directed a week earlier. Unlike the latter, they represented only man-year averages, thus leaving the military services a modicum of flexibility in determining beginning and end strengths—an additional task for the weary OSD and service staffs to grapple with during the few remaining days before the budget deadline.

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**Table 3**

Approved Personnel Strengths for FY 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1954 Actual Strength (Dec 53)</th>
<th>FY 1955 Overall Man-year Averages</th>
<th>FY 1955 Begin Strength (1 Jul 54)</th>
<th>FY 1955 End Strength (30 Jun 55)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td>1,481,200</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>1,407,500</td>
<td>1,164,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td>765,400</td>
<td>706,000</td>
<td>740,532</td>
<td>688,909</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps</strong></td>
<td>243,800</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>225,021</td>
<td>215,005</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td>912,500</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>955,000</td>
<td>970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,402,900</td>
<td>3,186,000</td>
<td>3,328,053</td>
<td>3,037,914</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**A Smaller and Leaner Army**

The December manpower cuts placed the major burden of FY 1955 Defense spending reductions unequivocally on the Army. The first salvo on 4 December had projected a reduction of almost 200,000 in the Army's then current strength by June 1955; the second a week later raised the total to 317,000, more than 20 percent of the Army's actual strength at the end of December 1953. By contrast, the Navy and Marine Corps escaped with reductions of only 10 and 12 percent, respectively, while the still expanding Air Force received a 6 percent increase. In the armed forces as a whole the cut came to less than 11 percent. In December 1953 the Army comprised almost 44 percent of the uniformed forces; over the next 18 months it was slated to dwindle to only 38 percent.

When Wilson directed the first personnel cuts on 4 December, he was fighting a delaying action against threatened crippling budgetary reductions. The overriding cuts of 11 December marked his belated submission to the president's insistence on a highly unequal distribution of the burdens of economy in FY 1955. Too, it represented a significant
compromise on the larger issue of the level of DoD spending in that year, an issue that mattered most to Humphrey and Dodge and perhaps to the president himself, since it would decisively influence the size of the federal budget deficit. Given the growing pressures for economy at this time, with increasing uncertainty whether Congress would support the tax extensions the president wanted, Wilson had a right to feel that the 11 percent manpower cut he had negotiated for FY 1955, which priced out the budget at about $37.6 billion, was a reasonably good deal.

This looked especially good in light of the "austerity basis" the president seemed at the beginning of the month to have in mind for most of the armed forces. DoD had an ongoing initiative for thinning out noncombat personnel, which by November had identified some 160,000 noncombat spaces as dispensable; 69,000 of them went in the reduction ordered by Wilson in October, and the remainder were used for combat positions. Assistant Secretary Hannah projected a total reduction by June 1955 of 151,000 support personnel below the June 1953 level; as in the earlier phase, presumably some of the men released were to be reassigned to combat units. This was a Defense-wide effort.

Rigorous measures would be necessary, especially in the Army, to achieve the required cuts. Ridgway, perceiving Wilson as the willing tool of the president, recounted in his memoirs a conversation in Wilson's office in which the latter urged him to reduce the strength of divisions and other combat units. "Pull them down to 85 per cent. Why don't you inactivate certain units? Just keep them on a cadre basis." Ridgway indignantly refused, remembering the skeletonized regiments that had been overwhelmed by invading North Korean forces in the summer of 1950. "I would not reduce the strength of combat units who stood face to face with potential enemies overseas, thus exposing them to possible disaster, unless I had clear, specific, and direct orders from him to do so." Wilson responded, according to Ridgway, that the idea of reducing unit strength "came directly from the President," whose wishes and military expertise the Army chief of staff would be ill-advised to ignore. But Ridgway indicated that the "clear, specific and direct orders" he demanded never came.

Forced to accept strength reductions which "would leave us dangerously overextended geographically, with a personnel base incapable of supporting the overseas deployment we had considered essential to our safety," Ridgway at least had his way, against Wilson, on the method

*The allusion to specific decisions on force reductions in mid-December seems to place this episode at some time during the two weeks following Eisenhower's 1 December memo to Dodge, describing the nature of the reductions he had in mind.
of applying the cuts. From Wilson’s and the president’s point of view a principal though seldom acknowledged objection to reducing the number of major combat units was that it could raise in question, far more demonstrably than merely an overall reduction in manpower, the Army’s ability to fulfill its commitments, perhaps even its mission. Even if allowed 200,000 more troops than planned in FY 1955, Stevens and Ridgway had asserted, on the strength of staff analyses, that the Army would have to pull back four of the eight divisions in the Far East, dangerously dilute the manning of the general reserve in the continental United States, renege on its NATO war commitments, and eliminate two divisions from its structure. In December with eventual redeployment of up to six divisions from the Far East in prospect, the threat to NATO commitments seemed less acute.

This issue occasioned intensive negotiations between OSD and the Army during December. According to an informed newspaper account, the Army had successively screened and thinned out its service units, its rear-area support elements, and even the combat engineer, heavy artillery, and other combat units required when divisions were combined into corps and armies. There remained the divisions themselves and the 18 separate regimental combat teams—should they be diluted internally or should the total number be reduced? Probably a combination of the two methods would be adopted, but it seemed certain that two or three divisions would have to go. Similar reductions in the Marine Corps were also under study.

The president had already conceded this kind of solution by stating in the NSC meeting on 3 December that the first two divisions to be withdrawn from Korea should come home and be demobilized, although the decision apparently had not been formalized. The final decision, reached sometime before 16 December, eliminated 3 Army divisions, reducing the total to 17, by the end of FY 1955; the 18 regimental combat teams would remain, and the Marine Corps would keep its existing 3 divisions and 3 air wings. Elimination of the 3 Army divisions would account for 52,500 of the 317,000 personnel the Army had to remove from its rolls before mid-1955. Another 51,000 spaces would go with the elimination of the pipeline allowance for wartime attrition in Korea. The Marine Corps would take a similar reduction of 5,000. Removing the remaining 213,000-odd spaces of the Army’s cut was now essentially a problem of internal management over the months ahead. Some part of the 213,000 would come out of the ongoing effort to reduce support personnel; OSD guidelines following the NSC decisions of 16 December stressed that combat units must not be reduced in strength until “all possible” reductions had been made elsewhere. From the shrinkage the Army would emerge
in mid-1955 a leaner and smaller force, with a division slice* of only 65,000 as compared with its 1953 slice of 74,000. The Navy and Marine Corps faced a similar, if somewhat less painful, process.33

For the Army it was a familiar ordeal. In all of the nation’s wars the Army had experienced the greatest growth in manpower, and after each war it had suffered the greatest reduction in strength. That there might be a different outcome after the Korean War, even in the face of a peacetime threat greater than the country had ever had to contend with before, was too much to expect. But the heavy cuts were made all the harder to bear because they were inflicted by one of the Army’s own—former Chief of Staff General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

* Division slices were determined by dividing the number of divisions into the total strength of the Army.
In many ways the most impressive intellectual and policymaking achievement of Eisenhower's first term was the so-called "New Look" in national policy and strategy for the cold war. Although national security in the face of the threat of communism was its central concern and military responses to the threat its primary focus, the New Look was far more than a military strategy; it embraced political, economic, psychological, and even social responses as well. Like any major collective policymaking effort, it did not spring full-grown onto the national scene, but grew and matured, after its initial formulation, under the pressure of public debate and changing circumstances. The conceptual and policy core of the new cold war strategy appeared in a single document, NSC 162/2, approved by the president on 30 October 1953 after several months of intense study and deliberation.1

The final product of the re-examination of containment policy originated with the Solarium study (May-July 1953).2 NSC 162 was originally drafted during August and early September by a special committee of the NSC Planning Board and then submitted to the NSC as a split paper on 30 September. On 7 October the paper occasioned a stormy discussion within the council, resulting in the resolution of many disputed points, some of them by the overriding decision of the president. After further revision by the board, the council debated and settled the remaining unresolved issues on the 29th.3

Necessarily a tissue of compromises on a wide range of issues, NSC 162/2 nevertheless reflected a consensus at the top of the administration on the state of the world and the nation. Despite its bleak analysis of the threat posed by world communism, it portrayed optimistically a strong and resourceful United States likely to remain for the foreseeable future.
the dominant power in a world gradually becoming less perilous and chaotic. In its policy prescriptions NSC 162/2 essentially reaffirmed the optimistic, middle-of-the-road approach of containment, rejecting both supine caution and now-or-never final solutions in favor of demonstrable strength, clear resolve, and steady but flexible resistance to aggression. An examination of how the major conceptual and policy questions were debated and resolved reveals the complexity of both the process and the circumstances it addressed.

**Soviet Threat, Free World Weakness**

Perhaps the most basic compromise embodied in NSC 162/2 concerned the nature of the Soviet threat, hotly debated by the council early in October and subsequently by the Planning Board. In both forums Treasury and BoB representatives had argued vehemently for defining the Soviet threat as both military and economic: spiraling U.S. defense costs would lead to unsound fiscal policies, inflation, depression, and ultimately political and social regimentation. While no one in the administration was inclined to dispute the reality of the dual threat, a majority of both the NSC and the Planning Board—most emphatically, the Joint Chiefs—had favored a clear subordination of the economic to the military threat, especially when the argument came to focus on whether to accept some risk to national security by balancing the federal budget at the expense of defense programs. Secretary Humphrey, pressing the argument for acceptance of risk at the council meeting on 7 October, had found most of his colleagues in opposition, including Secretary Dulles. The president clearly felt more strongly than most the urgency of reducing defense expenditures even though he was unwilling to make the deep cuts necessary to balance the FY 1955 budget.¹

The upshot was that the draft sent to the council on the 29th deftly finessed the issue by recognizing the gravity of both the military and the economic threat without imputing precedence to either.² The council accepted the change, which stated the "basic" national security objective at the outset—to meet the Soviet threat without seriously weakening the U.S. economy. This would require a strong military posture, a protected mobilization base, a strong and growing economy, maintenance of public morale and free institutions, and public support of measures to preserve security. The paper affirmed the importance of a "strong healthy and expanding U.S. economy." A saving proviso demanded by State and Defense—"The United States must . . . meet the necessary costs of the
policies essential for its security"—was offset by reassurances to the Treasury-BoB views on budget-balancing. In developing the theme that "a sound economy based on free private enterprise" was imperative, NSC 162/2 asserted that the security of the whole free world depended on steady expansion of the U.S. economy and avoidance of recession. Stated requirements for defense spending must be weighed in the light of dangers to the economy, including the threat to productivity in defense industries. The policy paper also warned that while the supply of qualified manpower annually coming of military age was sufficient to support existing military requirements, advancing technology constantly increased the need for technically skilled personnel. Any considerable increases in military manpower demands would therefore require additional measures to meet special needs.

Although the final compromises in NSC 162/2 generally reflected a somewhat less alarming view of the balance between Communist and free world capabilities, the image of the Soviet Union as a great and growing power with malign intent was disturbing enough: one sixth of its GNP devoted to military spending; huge conventional forces with modern armaments and dramatically increased nuclear capabilities; a docile, hard-working people and abundant economic resources; dependent, effectively controlled and exploited satellite states; a basic community of interests with the Chinese Communists, controlling limitless manpower reserves and strategic territory—in sum, a worldwide subversive apparatus. While a deliberate attack on the United States in the near future seemed unlikely, largely owing to U.S. retaliatory capabilities, the ability of the Soviets to carry out such an attack was increasing steadily; soon they would be able to deal a "crippling blow to our industrial base and our continued ability to prosecute a war," while having greatly improved the defenses of their own industrial centers.

At a future stage of nuclear plenty, NSC 162/2 speculated that a standoff might result, but Soviet leaders would always be susceptible to the temptation to attack preemptively in the hope of destroying the American capacity for effective retaliation. Long before then, the growing Soviet nuclear capability would tend to erode the deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear power against both local or peripheral aggressions, thus enhancing the risks of unwanted escalation of local conflicts through miscalculation. Some day Soviet leaders might experience a change of heart or mind as a result of declining revolutionary zeal and pressures from different quarters. They might then be willing to negotiate on major issues—but "without necessarily abandoning [their] basic hostility to the non-Soviet world."
It was a grim assessment, not wholly offset by the analysis of prospects for successful free world resistance to Communist aggression or penetration. This analysis, a rather confused mixture of positives and negatives, evidently reflected the efforts of the drafters to satisfy both the optimists and the pessimists. Since 1950, NSC 162/2 asserted, the “coalition” of allies and friends of the United States had, with American help, succeeded in increasing its relative strength and cohesion, probably deterring a second Korea-type aggression. In Western Europe, NATO had enough strength now to make a Soviet invasion costly. Nevertheless, a full-scale Soviet attack would certainly overrun Western Europe. American retaliatory power remained the chief deterrent. Since U.S. military assistance to Europe must eventually be reduced, it was imperative for the Western European nations, including West Germany, to build up their defenses quickly. In the Far East, as in Europe, any material increase in free world military strength would require the economic and military revival of another former enemy—Japan.

Throughout the coalition, NSC 162/2 warned, the effort to rearm and concert policies suffered from natural resentment against American domination, pressures to increase trade with the Soviet bloc, the high cost of rearmament, ancient antipathies such as those between France and Germany, the divisive colonial issue, and chronic governmental instability in certain countries, such as France and Italy. Moreover, many Europeans feared involvement in a general war to support American interests in the Far East, or indefinite prolongation of the cold war through policies inspired by a rigid and paranoid anticommunism. Rhetorical advocacy in this country of extremist or adventurous policies ranging from preemptive war and “liberation” to isolationism sapped confidence in the stability of American leadership. Finally, there existed a widespread tendency, rooted in the fear of general war, either to discount the threat of Soviet aggression or, accepting it, to write off defense as futile or too costly. Plans to rearm Germany and Japan aroused deep fears among their former victims. All these factors converged to build up pressure to reach accommodations with the Soviets, encouraged by the recent “peace gestures” launched by the new Soviet leadership.

Beyond the free world coalition lay the “uncommitted” areas, defined in NSC 162/2 as those mostly weak and underdeveloped countries outside the Soviet bloc that were presently “unwilling to align themselves actively with the United States.” These countries were permeated by “forces of unrest and of resentment against the West”—racial animosity, rising nationalism, social and economic ferment, overpopulation, static social patterns in process of disintegration, and religious and social philosophies
ally to Western culture. Perhaps more important, their governments were typically unstable, unreliable, and short-lived. This was not an encouraging environment for building firm government-to-government relations. Unfortunately, the “Third World,” as it came to be known, could not be ignored. With immense resources of raw materials, vast manpower, and high growth potential, the uncommitted areas could, if absorbed into the Soviet system, alter the world power balance to the detriment of the United States; conversely, if they could be transformed into “more stable and responsible nations, able and willing to participate in defense of the free world,” they would be a welcome addition.\footnote{11}

If it was important to cultivate cooperation in the uncommitted areas, the support of allies was absolutely indispensable. The United States depended on them to provide overseas bases for strategic airpower, especially in a war waged on the Eurasian continent. More generally, the United States needed on its side “the armed forces and economic resources and materials of the major highly-industrialized non-communist states. Progressive loss to the Soviet bloc of these states would . . . isolate the United States and alter the world balance.”

Fortunately, the need was reciprocal. The allies lacked the nuclear capability and most of them lacked the political and economic stability required to support their armed forces. Under existing treaties and policies, the United States would help to resist an attack on the NATO countries, West Germany, Berlin, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. Certain other countries, such as Indochina and Formosa, were so strategically important to the United States that it would probably react militarily to an attack on them as well.\footnote{12}

On the more controversial matter of foreign aid, which the administration hoped to wind down as rapidly as possible, NSC 162/2 proved cautious. “Essential” allies in Europe and the Near and Far East could expect to continue to receive military aid, although in diminishing amounts. Even in Europe, where American military assistance was indispensable, it should be reduced “as rapidly as United States interests permit.”\footnote{13}

*New Emphasis on Retaliation*

The American response to the Soviet military threat, according to NSC 162/2, would be, in essence, to contain it—that is, by deterring and, if necessary, repelling it: “The risk of Soviet aggression will be minimized by maintaining a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength and defensive strength. This must be based on massive atomic capability, including necessary bases; an integrated and
effective continental defense system; ready forces of the United States and its allies suitably deployed . . . and an adequate mobilization base; all supported by the determined spirit of the U.S. people." This was, to be sure, not quite containment in the old style, which stressed defensive responses at the point of aggression. Deterrence and retaliation now had a more prominent role, and defense less so, than before. But the essence of containment—reactive responses to aggression, and deterrence through the perceived capability to react effectively—remained at this stage of its evolution, the heart of the New Look strategy. The more radical and imaginative concept of retaliation decoupled from the place of aggression was not yet explicit, even though not far below the surface. What kind of security posture could emphasize both offensive strength and defensive strength? One might conclude that the ostensible sharing of "emphasis" between offensive retaliatory strength and defensive strength heavily favored the former. Significantly there was no provision for waging a general war other than an adequate mobilization base and sufficient forces to discharge "initial tasks."14 Such a war would, of course, require far more—a vast expansion of the industrial base and full mobilization of the nation's manpower, under the threat and perhaps the terrible reality of nuclear devastation—a contingency to which NSC 162/2 did not address itself except as a calamity to be deterred. Even for limited conflicts abroad, the New Look strategy envisaged that the United States would depend on its allies to provide most of the ground forces, as well as bases for American airpower and expeditionary forces.

Reduced to simplest terms, then, the new-style containment would depend primarily on offensive retaliatory power, chiefly strategic nuclear weapons plus continental defense. All other elements of military power would play a subordinate role, particularly conventional ground forces. The effort to incorporate in NSC 162/2 a single unequivocal statement of this fact, overriding the tenacious resistance of the military chiefs of the Army and the Navy, produced a major confrontation during the final debate on the paper.

Early on, NSC 162 had stipulated as a requirement for meeting the Soviet threat a capability "to inflict massive retaliatory damage by offensive strategic striking power." The Joint Chiefs had then recommended, at Admiral Carney's instance, an amendment that the U.S. military posture should merely "include" this capability, thus avoiding the implication that strategic airpower (which alone could inflict "massive" damage on the USSR) was the primary element of offensive strength. Admiral Radford and General Twining, who presumably preferred the original, may have accepted the amendment in the interests of unanimity. At the discussion
of NSC 162 on 7 October, the council merely noted the JCS comments. When, however, the revised document emerged from the Planning Board in mid-October as NSC 162/1, the statement had been amended to provide for “a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power.” From Carney’s point of view, this was little less objectionable than the original. At his instigation, the chiefs again submitted their proposed change to Secretary Wilson on the 27th.15

When Cutler introduced the issue in the council on the 29th, the president declared that the argument seemed “highly academic.” He liked the Planning Board’s version, he said, “because it provided some sense of priority for our military planning. Certainly we do not want to build up equally all types and varieties of military strength.” As the only member of the JCS present, Carney may have felt obligated to explain the chiefs’ position more fully. The JCS, he told the president, were “feeling the pinch of trimming their sails.” Since national commitments remained unchanged, the time had not yet come to alter the existing “character and composition of our forces,” the effect of the priorities implied by the statement. This reassertion of the standpat position underlying the chiefs’ 2 October force proposals apparently touched a raw nerve in Secretary Humphrey, who demanded, “with some heat,” when the admiral expected that time might come. Secretary Dulles also challenged, with “some impatience,” the implication that the existing mix and disposition of U.S. forces were tied rigidly to commitments.

Humphrey swung the discussion back to the central concepts of the New Look strategy. For the NSC to accept the JCS amendment would mean “abandoning all our attempts to secure a radically new and different military policy.” Emphasis on one type of military mission did not imply the exclusion of other important missions. Coming to Carney’s defense Wilson pointed out that additional expenditures would be required for other purposes besides retaliatory airpower, such as continental defense. Carney agreed; it would be unwise, he declared, “to put all our eggs in one basket of striking power.” The proposed amendment sought to express “a reasonable balance of military capabilities.”16

The president attempted to take a mediating stance. “No matter what we now decided as to the size and character of our military establishment, we could not effect changes in its present composition very rapidly.” The president reiterated his preference for the Planning Board’s version. “No deterrent to war could compare in importance with this retaliatory striking power. Why don’t we therefore say what we mean to emphasize?” But Carney would not back down. The term “emphasize,”
he argued, really meant “giving first priority to this attack force” and might lead to “many undesirable imbalances.” Humphrey retorted: “But are you not planning ultimately to change your strategy and the composition of your forces?” Carney plunged boldly ahead. The first task given the new chiefs, he said, was to study how the cost of the military establishment could be significantly reduced. They had concluded that the only way was to bring back forces from overseas, but, he pointedly added, the chiefs had not made “an immediate recommendation that such redeployment be initiated.” Humphrey pounced on this statement. His own understanding, he asserted, had been quite the contrary, that the chiefs “meant to begin such redeployment at once.” Carney finally declared that, “if, in the course of JCS analysis of the redeployment problem, the conclusions turned out to be different from those originally hoped for, the chiefs had no option but to change their views.”

It was a tense moment. Wilson, who must have been dismayed at Carney’s open defiance, was the first to speak. As the president had said, the nation’s military posture could not be changed overnight, nor could the State Department control political conditions abroad. The Defense Department, Wilson went on, recognized the need for economic stability at home but still had responsibility for maintaining military strength abroad; it favored the original JCS proposals for restructuring the military establishment but understood why, given still unchanged commitments, they opposed precipitate action. “Meanwhile, the budget has got to be prepared” for submission to Congress, and more money would have to be provided to strengthen continental defenses.17

If Wilson had hoped to change the subject, he failed, but his remarks seemed to relieve the tension. The president moved to terminate the argument by firmly restating his preference for the Planning Board’s amendment: “In effect, we should state what we propose to do, namely, to keep the minimum respectable posture of defense while emphasizing this particular offensive capability.” “Nobody,” he added sarcastically, “could possibly reduce from such a statement that we propose to abandon the defense of New York City.” When Cutler asked whether DoD dissent should be formally noted, the president replied that “he would tolerate no notice of a JCS dissent in the record of action.” It was for them to advise, for him to decide. If, “after a suitable interval” they had serious reservations about the statement in question, “he fully expected them to come to him and tell him so. He would then reconsider the problem.”18

So the emphasis on retaliatory offensive striking power was affirmed. At the end of the stormy meeting, Dulles attempted to soothe wounded feelings by stressing the delicacy and magnitude of the impending force withdrawals from overseas and the parallel shift of emphasis to offensive
retaliatory forces; these changes might well extend over a period of years. Nevertheless, "if we do not decide now on this change, no change will ever occur." His remarks, the president graciously acknowledged, expressed his own views "with greater clarity than he himself had been able to," and Wilson agreed that the issue was "sufficiently clarified." Carney said nothing.19

How all the Joint Chiefs except Carney "happened" to be out of town on 29 October, leaving him their sole spokesman during the climactic council debate on the New Look policy paper, deserves examination. Carney had an evident interest in defending his position before the council. Radford's absence (if it was not ordered) is more difficult to explain, as is, to a lesser degree, Twining's and Ridgway's. Both Radford and Twining supported the emphasis on offensive retaliatory striking power even though they had gone along with Carney's proposed changes in NSC 162/1. It may have been a matter of tactics and timing. That Carney's proposal would be defeated in the council may have seemed a foregone conclusion; it is possible that Radford may have received advance hints to this effect from Cutler. In that case, if Carney's position was unshakable, nothing would be gained by airing the chiefs' differences before the council.20

Carney's argument was not really academic, as the president seemed at first to think. In principle, Carney's proposal struck at the heart of the military New Look. To say that the U.S. military posture should merely "include" a capability to inflict "massive retaliatory damage" on the USSR was not really a major change; the United States already possessed such a capability within its existing, relatively balanced force structure. As he admitted when driven to the wall, Carney's real concern was that force restructuring might go too fast and too far, dangerously weakening capabilities to perform existing missions and fulfill existing overseas commitments. These missions and commitments might be reduced or modified, but the ultimate provision for them, under the New Look concept, would require normalization of nuclear weapons and increased reliance on allied manpower, shifts of emphasis that could not be achieved overnight. NSC 162/2 could only state the basic policy. The president's subsequent qualification of the "emphasis" clause, stating that "offensive striking power" embraced all forces possessing that capability, including aircraft carriers, did not alter the fact that it emphasized the specific

* Originally, Carney himself had planned to leave on an extended inspection tour, according to a press report, sometime after 27 October, Navy Day; the other chiefs had departed on the 25th, for similar tours. It is possible that Carney postponed his departure in order to defend his proposal in the NSC on the 29th.
capability to “inflict massive retaliatory damage.” That capability belonged preeminently to the Strategic Air Command; carrier aviation could not plausibly claim more than a small share of it.

As it turned out, the Navy would get funding for another new carrier in FY 1955 over and above one already under construction, and it incurred relatively modest manpower cuts in the general New Look cutback. Naval and Marine Corps aviation retained more than a one-third share of the nation’s total airpower.21 No such largesse was in the cards for the Army, whose leaders had caught a glimpse of its bleak future in the late October personnel guidelines issued by OSD. In pleading for a stay of execution in the New Look force restructuring, Carney was apparently defending the Army’s role along with the Navy’s, but Eisenhower evidently assumed that his chief concern was for the Navy’s carriers. Since the president had already tagged the Army to absorb the bulk of the New Look’s force reductions, his qualifying proviso to the “emphasis” policy in NSC 162/2, explicitly including aircraft carriers in “offensive striking power,” seems to have foreshadowed the impending heavy cuts in the Army.

What turn might the NSC discussion on 29 October have taken had Ridgway, rather than Carney, been the JCS spokesman? Unlike Carney, Ridgway outrightly rejected the fundamental premise of the New Look that modern limited wars could be fought and national security preserved by numerically small forces heavily weighted with strategic airpower and nuclear weapons, relegating ground forces to a minor role.22 Like most professional military men, Ridgway did endorse the idea of a mobile central reserve based in or near the United States, but he had serious reservations about the other side of this coin in New Look doctrine—the large-scale withdrawal of U.S. forces from overseas and an overall reduction in uniformed manpower. While agreeing with his colleagues that U.S. forces were overextended, and in particular favoring the withdrawal of most forces from Korea, he opposed similar redeployments from Europe, which he feared would result in the disintegration of NATO. The mobile central reserve, he believed, provided a supplemental and reinforcing base, not a substitute for deployed forces. And not ground forces alone. To the New Look contention that greater reliance on firepower and airpower would make the strategic air arm paramount over both the ground forces and the surface and submarine Navy, Ridgway defiantly reaffirmed the traditional concept of modernized, balanced forces of all arms.23

No traditionalist in his view of advanced military technology, Ridgway believed in full exploitation of the lethal power of the new weapons, as well as of the new technology of movement and communications, and he
was convinced that these developments could enhance the capabilities of the Army at least as much as those of the other services. He did not believe that nuclear weapons would reduce the need for manpower in any sphere of warfare. He thought it folly to assume, as some theorists seemed to, that the enemy would not also have and use them. Both sides must anticipate suffering enormous casualties and destruction, and must therefore develop new tactics, organization, and equipment. As chief of staff, Ridgway claimed that he had already begun to "lay the foundations for a totally different Army than any we have known to date—an Army trained, equipped, and organized to fight and win an atomic war."24

In October 1953, this undertaking lay mostly in the future. Still Ridgway did approach it with an emotional conviction amounting to faith that even in the atomic age wars would be won ultimately by the foot soldier. To the question, which service was best suited to "put out big fires or little ones wherever the Communists might set them," he answered: "That is the role of the foot soldier, the man with the rifle. The great intercontinental bombers cannot do it, even though they may be armed with the fission or the fusion bomb. . . . The Navy cannot do it, for modern wars are not won upon the sea. . . . Wars are still fought for little bits of bloody earth, and they are only ended when the enemy's will to resist is broken, and armed men stand victorious on his home soil."25

Reduction of the Soviet Threat

The provisions of NSC 162/2 for reducing (as opposed to responding to) the Soviet threat reflected a compromise between a hard-line and a relatively soft-line approach. The finally approved policy asserted that "the United States must seek to improve the power position of itself and the rest of the free world in relation to the Soviet bloc" while keeping the door open to negotiation of issues. It went on to express the cautious hope that the Soviet leadership might in time become amenable to negotiated settlements if the United States and its allies increased their strength and cohesion, or "if for any reason Soviet stability and influence are reduced." NSC 162/2 also renounced efforts (other than through propaganda) to "dictate the internal political and economic organization of the USSR."26

NSC 162/2 did advocate aggressive measures, both overt and covert, to reduce the Soviet threat. They included efforts to discredit Soviet prestige and ideology, reduce the strength of Communist and other pro-Soviet groups, and prevent Communist takeovers in other nations, as well as "selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-Communist
control over any areas of the free world." With a view to inducing the Soviet leadership to consider negotiated settlements, NSC 162/2 advocated propaganda and covert measures to make trouble for the Soviets generally—for example, by undermining Soviet relations with Communist China, Soviet control of satellites, and the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc. Omitted from this activist finale of the paper, evidently as a result of concerted pressure from the Defense, ODM, and FOA members and the JCS adviser of the Planning Board, was a provision renouncing "aggressive actions involving force against Soviet bloc territory." According to Dulles, who somewhat grudgingly consented to the omission, the provision was intended to forestall such adventures as those recently proposed to detach Albania from the Soviet bloc or to invade Hainan. Since such projects would have to pass muster in the NSC, the secretary yielded. 27

**Nuclear Weapons and Redeployment**

The interrelated issues of use of nuclear weapons and redeployment of forces from overseas remained central to the development of long-term policy in NSC 162/2. The Joint Chiefs had opened the debate in their August concept paper urging the enunciation of a firm policy on the first as a basis of the second. In their 2 October force proposals they had pointedly underlined the absence of such a policy as one justification for resisting an immediate reduction in U.S. forces. In NSC 162, which came up for its first NSC debate on the 7th, the Planning Board included a simple statement that "the United States should use special weapons whenever they are required by the national security," and should also obtain "understanding and approval" from other governments "as far as possible." This apparently represented a compromise between the chiefs' desire for an even less qualified statement and the State Department's desire for a more qualified one. 28

In the meeting the debate centered on the "understanding and approval" proviso, in which State wanted to insert a further clause limiting the policy to "hostilities resulting from aggression." But the president, it developed, wanted to qualify the statement even further, stipulating that "approval and understanding" must be secured before such weapons were used and before any public announcement. "Nothing would so upset the whole world," he said, "as an announcement at this time by the United States of a decision to use these weapons." Wilson objected that DoD needed to know for sure whether it could plan on the use of nuclear weapons. The president assured him that since the ultimate decision was
his, Wilson could be certain that the weapons would be used if the nation's security so demanded. Radford, still not satisfied, asked about using the weapons from U.S. bases, since no foreign government's permission would then be required. In planning for general war, Eisenhower told Radford, the JCS could count on using nuclear weapons, but not in "minor affairs." Moreover, there were certain places where, if the weapons were used, "it would look as though the U.S. were initiating global war." And there must be no public statements until "we have ... a chance to convince our friends" of the desirability of the policy. Ridgway interposed that both Prime Minister Churchill and Chancellor Adenauer had recently told him in confidence that they would not object to the launching of nuclear weapons from their territory in the event of war; the French, however, had not committed themselves. At the end of the discussion the president stated the two principal points: On the one hand, "we needed ... to be able to hit the Soviets, if necessary, from any point on the compass"; on the other, he found it "very undesirable to knock the coalition over the head by precipitate action on this issue." For the present, he implied, the former had to yield.29

With work still under way on NSC 162, on 13 October the council discussed DoD's first cut at the FY 1955 budget. When the nuclear weapon issue came up again, the impasse between the president and Radford hardened. The former insisted that the forthcoming revision of NSC 162 gave the JCS all the assurance they needed for planning the use of nuclear weapons, while the latter stubbornly asserted it did not, citing the contingency of resumed hostilities in Korea as a case in point.

It was a curious instance of opposing arguments failing to meet head on. The NSC 162 policy statement, as now revised, read: "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions. Where the consent of an ally is required for the use of these weapons from U.S. bases on the territory of such ally, the United States should promptly obtain the advance consent of such ally for such use. The United States should also seek, as and when feasible, the understanding and approval of this policy by free nations ... . This policy should not be made public without further consideration by the National Security Council." The president pronounced this perfect and not to be tinkered with further. It would permit the Joint Chiefs, he declared, to count on using nuclear weapons from U.S. bases in the event of an attack on the United States, the only kind of war we were "really scared of." This eliminated conventional general war, but in all other conflicts the decision on nuclear weapon use would be made on the merits of the case. When Radford put the president's ruling to the test with his query about a renewal of hostilities in Korea (which would be at least a
major limited war), first Dulles and then the president replied that in Korea a nuclear response would be justified—subject, however, to previous agreements with the other 16 allies; also, he did not contradict Dulles's remark that those allies should be consulted.30

The new policy clearly intended to normalize nuclear weapons by making their use a legitimate option in any kind of conflict. Previously military planners, lacking explicit guidance, had had to discount heavily their use in virtually all situations short of a nuclear attack on the United States. “We have now reached a stage,” Radford wrote Dulles, “where the number, diversity and power of atomic weapons, together with their application to tactical situations, makes necessary the adoption of a general policy for their use in the event of hostilities. Up to now our military services have not been furnished with any firm and clearly stated governmental policy which establishes how and when atomic weapons will be used. We have been embroiled in costly warfare for the past three years. During this period there has been reluctance to utilize atomic weapons. As a result, the military services when recommending and justifying their forces, have been forced to discount the use of these weapons.”31

The new policy did not dictate the nuclear option for any situation in advance, including even for the general war the president had assured the Joint Chiefs they would not be expected to wage with conventional weapons alone. Wilson and Radford justifiably felt that prudence dictated they be prepared to wage either conventional or nuclear war at any level of conflict, but the president’s personal assurance provided them only with predetermined choices at the top and the bottom of the scale—i.e., nuclear general war and conventional small wars.

It was not a policy calculated to slash costs or justify a radically smaller military establishment. Were those the sole aims, the new policy theoretically should have provided for use of nuclear weapons without restrictions on launchings from bases in allied territory. Such a policy was not really a practical possibility even if the restrictions might in time be negotiated away. A viable national strategy must above all be flexible.

On the other hand, the New Look reforms themselves would tend to reduce flexibility by restructuring the armed forces around a nuclear weapons strategy with significantly reduced conventional war capabilities. If pushed far enough, they could ultimately have the same effect as a positive (as opposed to permissive) nuclear weapons policy. New Look doctrine mitigated this risk by increased reliance on allied manpower, especially ground forces, to replace a large part of the U.S. forces deployed around the world. These considerations undoubtedly lay behind Radford’s insistence on 13 October that only a “blanket” (i.e., unrestricted)
nuclear weapons policy would permit an early inauguration of the New Look reforms in force structure and size. In effect he was reminding the council that the original New Look concept, as set forth in August, had envisaged a progressive shift of emphasis from conventional to nuclear weapons paralleling the pullback of forces from overseas and the buildup of indigenous allied forces to replace them. The president had already asserted, however, before this point came up, that the process of reducing the size of the armed forces could begin immediately with major cutbacks in FYs 1954 and 1955, independently of nuclear weapons policy and redeployment, simply by thinning out support elements, selectively reducing manning requirements, and in general "computing force levels on a genuine austerity basis." And this was how the required reductions were finally made in the FY 1955 Defense budget.32

Following the 13 October decisions, Dulles went to London where he held promising exploratory talks with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on the impending nuclear weapons normalization policy. Dulles took with him an explanatory statement drafted by Radford and approved by the president: "The United States will use atomic weapons in military operations in repelling aggression whenever it is of military advantage to do so in the following order of priority: (a) Immediately against military forces operating against us or our allies. (b) Against targets that would support the build-up of enemy military forces for renewed operations. (c) Unrestricted atomic operations in retaliation for such attack on the United States or its allies."33 The statement relegated "unrestricted" retaliatory strikes at the enemy homeland to third priority, after purely military targets (enemy forces and rear-area installations), implying that tactical, rather than strategic, nuclear weapons were expected to be the usual instrument of response to aggression.

From the first, the question of redeployment had been handled with kid gloves in the framing of NSC 162, primarily because of the sensitivity of the issue in Europe, and it was one of the split items in the paper discussed by the NSC on 7 October. No one disputed that U.S. forces were overextended and should be disengaged and repositioned; the differences concerned timing and degree. At Radford's behest, Cutler inserted a provision reflecting the considered view of the Joint Chiefs that "with the understanding of our allies . . . during the next few years . . . the bulk of our land forces and other forces not required to guard overseas bases" should be redeployed toward the United States. In the Far East, this would have to await an "acceptable settlement" in Korea. At the same time, a strong diplomatic effort would be mounted to persuade allied governments to go along.34
During the council discussion, however, it soon became evident that the president and Dulles regarded the issue of troop withdrawals from Europe as so delicate that, even though favoring them in principle, they were reluctant to risk a clear statement of policy, even in a highly classified document, for fear that it might leak to the public. Unless handled with the greatest delicacy, Dulles warned, it "could bring about the complete collapse of our coalition in Europe." The chiefs' proposed version was accordingly rejected, although some of its language was retained. As revised, the statement pointed out that U.S. forces were overextended and then went on to say that any major withdrawal of forces from the two principal overseas areas would have the effect of undermining allied solidarity. The concluding paragraph adroitly avoided any overt admission that U.S. forces would nevertheless be redeployed: "Our diplomacy must concentrate upon clarifying to our allies in parts of the world not gripped by war conditions that the best defense of the free world rests upon a deployment of U.S. forces which permits initiative, flexibility and support; upon our political commitment to strike back hard against any aggressor who attacks such allies; and upon such allies' own indigenous security efforts."35

This settled the broad policy of the redeployment question. In the final discussion on 29 October, the advocates of a more forthright statement did not conceal their unhappiness. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs, Carney argued that until U.S. commitments to defend Europe were modified, large U.S. forces would continue to be pinned down there, making impossible the structural reforms envisaged in the New Look. Humphrey impatiently sounded again the let's-get-on-with-it refrain. This time both Dulles and the president felt called on to defend themselves against the imputation of being soft on redeployment.36 The policy line held firm and the revised paragraph carried over intact when NSC 162/2 was approved on the 30th.

Even before that date, fears of a leak proved well-founded. When Dulles returned from London on the 21st, after his talks with Eden, he found to his dismay that, as he wrote the president, "there was a general impression among the press that plans were under way to withdraw some of our U.S. troops now in Europe." High administration officials, not underlings, had let the cat out of the bag. Wilson said in a press conference a few days before that the increased reliance on nuclear weapons would eventually permit major retrenchments overseas, and Deputy Secretary Kyes in a speech made a similar prediction with specific reference to Europe. Such statements, Dulles complained, were causing disastrous repercussions in Europe and might well scuttle the already waning prospects
for ratification of the European Defense Community treaty. Both the president and Dulles gave hasty reassurances that there were no plans to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe, and the president rapped Wilson's knuckles for his indiscretion.37

The issue would not die. Early in December Dulles, contemplating a NATO foreign ministers meeting, felt obliged to reprimand Wilson for "emanations from Defense and the military to the effect that we are planning to pull back troops from Europe." He reminded the defense secretary of the warning against such public statements written into NSC 162/2. Evidently he also complained to the president, for the latter on 10 December delivered a stern lecture on the subject to the NSC. "Philosophical dissertations" on the relationship between strategy and the new weapons were permissible, he warned, but not comments on how they might affect the U.S. force posture in Europe. On this matter he "wanted everybody to keep still."

Wilson spoke up. Was it not advisable, he asked, in talking publicly about future U.S. forces in NATO, to at least suggest the possibility of gradual reductions, so that the U.S. position would not become frozen? Humphrey quickly picked up the point and expatiated on it. The president should, he thought, lay out in an early public statement "the pattern of our new defense posture" in order to answer the speculation certain to be stimulated by the forthcoming announcement that two divisions were to be pulled out of Korea, following earlier publicity about total force reductions and budget cuts. The president did not disagree, but again stressed the "very touchy feelings" in Europe and pointed out that the British, with not even a single division in their home islands, justly "regarded themselves as far more 'stretched out' than we are." When Wilson remarked that "we now seemed hopelessly caught between the fear of the Europeans as to the use of atomic weapons, and our own desire to bring our forces home," the president "reacted with some warmth." Our first priority, he replied, was to secure ratification of the European Defense Community, which depended on allaying the "almost hysterical fear" of the French that the Americans and British would one day abandon Europe and leave them alone on the continent with a superior German army. We could not afford "even to talk about redeployment" until we reached this objective.38

Meanwhile, the obstacles to early withdrawals from the Far East unexpectedly lifted. At the beginning of November, General John B. Hull, the theater commander, urged initiation of the exodus of U.S. forces from Korea as soon as a political settlement with the Communists could be reached. In December, with no such settlement yet in sight and a
prolonged stalemate likely, the president abruptly decided during a meeting of the NSC, under prodding from Humphrey and Wilson, that two divisions should be brought back from Korea and demobilized, leaving their equipment behind for newly activated ROK divisions. This gave Wilson a small slice of the Army’s required personnel reduction in FY 1955, and inaugurated the planned contraction of the vast overseas establishment.39

Nuclear weapons policy received a final airing by the NSC on 29 October in connection with Dulles’s report on his recent talks in London. These had been encouraging but inconclusive. The British ambassador had called to ask for further clarification. Did the United States want to modify the existing agreement that no nuclear weapons would be launched from U.S. bases in Britain without prior consultation? Precisely, Dulles answered: The United States hoped to obtain prior consent to such launching in event of general war. The ambassador then suggested that it might be appropriate to raise also the question of exchange of information between the two governments on nuclear energy—a hint, Dulles inferred, that this might be a bargaining point. He suggested that the matter might be taken up with Radford who would visit London soon.

The president observed that only in the event of a Pearl Harbor type of attack, requiring an immediate response, could prior consent to the use of British bases be requested. “In a war which broke out in, so to speak, normal fashion,” the British could hardly be expected to grant what amounted to sovereignty over part of their territory “by allowing us to make the sole decision as to using these bases for an atomic attack.”

Although Carney was present to represent the Joint Chiefs in Radford’s absence, Dulles now undertook to set forth their position. They had, he said,

repeatedly insisted on the necessity of knowing whether they could count in advance on being able to launch such attacks from bases in allied countries . . . . As he understood it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in view of vital considerations of economy, felt that it was impossible to continue our military buildup with both conventional and special weapons. Accordingly they want to know now, and with assurance, that they can plan on the use of atomic weapons. Paragraph 39-b (of NSC 162/1) gives them a green light to do so in so far as atomic weapons are launched from bases in the United States. But what the Joint Chiefs are seeking is the same clarity of decision with regard to the launching of atomic attacks from U.S. bases in foreign countries.40
Since Carney made no objection, this presumably was an accurate paraphrase of the JCS position. But paragraph 39b did not give the chiefs a green light to plan on launching retaliatory nuclear attacks from U.S. bases, or indeed to do anything else; it merely held this out as an option for the president. The assurance the JCS desired derived from the president's oral (and duly recorded) pledge to the council on 7 October and again on the 13th. For all other contingencies, the JCS still had to make provision for conventional as well as nuclear responses to an attack. Conceivably, the chiefs now hoped to get from the president another personal pledge ("the same clarity of decision"), this time that he would, when the occasion arose, authorize a nuclear response from U.S. bases in foreign countries, irrespective of the outcome of the negotiations for prior consent called for in NSC 162/1. Such a rash and far-reaching commitment defying a solemnly registered basic national security policy was not in the president's style, particularly in a matter involving his favorite ally, Great Britain.

Eisenhower saw the point immediately. In that case, he replied, it would be necessary to pose the issue in different terms. Both governments must "decide now that henceforth atomic weapons would be considered in the same light as any other weapon." Dulles agreed but pointed out that the British seemed to want to bargain, seeking a freer exchange of atomic information as a quid pro quo for their prior consent on the base issue. The president accordingly authorized continued negotiations, remarking that, in his view, "we were idiots to deprive the British of significant information on this subject." Evidently, however, he clung to the idea of seeking a basic identity of policy with the British on the use of nuclear weapons, remarking a few moments later that "he wished paragraph 39b to look like a bilateral decision of the two governments." By this time, of course, paragraph 39b was virtually set in concrete, and was in fact approved by the president as it stood in the final document the following day, 30 October. Eisenhower proved a good prophet, nevertheless. More than a year later, in December 1954, after prolonged negotiations, the North Atlantic Council would authorize SHAPE to plan on the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war.

So much could not, of course, be foreseen in October 1953, and developments in the next few weeks were not encouraging. In adopting NSC 162/2 on 29 October the council had directed prompt action to "conform existing arrangements regarding atomic weapons to sub-paragraph 39b," and formed a special committee to deal with the matter. It soon developed that State and DoD had opposing interpretations. Evidently Wilson and Radford had agreed to continue to press, at this
level, their view that the new policy amounted to a decision that nuclear weapons would be used, if militarily useful, in any future hostilities. State, conceding that the military could now make plans on the assumption the weapons would be available for use, insisted that the decision to use them must be made by the president in the light of circumstances at the time. No doubt in certain extreme situations, such as an atomic Pearl Harbor, the use of such weapons would be “virtually automatic,” and as tactical atomic weapons became more numerous and versatile, “certain kinds of tactical use” might be envisaged in reacting to aggression. But the State Department held that paragraph 39b had not decided these issues and that they ought to be “further explored to establish suitable procedures which will take account of the political issues in deciding upon use of atomic weapons in a particular case.”

Dulles had an opportunity on 3 December to press State’s view in the NSC during a discussion of the JCS war plan to meet a sudden Communist resumption of hostilities in Korea. He pointed out that the JCS proposal for massive initial nuclear air strikes at Chinese forces in Korea and North China would almost certainly involve the United States in a general war not only with China but with the Soviet Union as well. The consequences would be to isolate the United States from the United Nations, propel the European allies toward neutrality pacts with the USSR, lead to a large-scale Chinese invasion of Indochina, and a long list of other dread possibilities. Dulles did not oppose the use of nuclear weapons as such in Korea; he proposed instead a graduated course of action confined as far as possible to the peninsula itself and calculated to “produce a victory in Korea,” with a good chance that the Soviets would not intervene, rather than aiming, as in the JCS plan, at a “total victory over China,” which almost certainly would bring an immediate Soviet entry. In the discussion that followed, Radford, in effect, backed down, acknowledging that the JCS plan had erred in making assumptions as to ultimate objectives, the prerogative of the NSC.

When the question of predetermined use of nuclear weapons, with particular reference to Korea, came up at the Bermuda summit conference early in December both the British and the French expressed their aversion bluntly. Churchill opposed unleashing nuclear weapons in Korea except by agreement of all United Nations allies at the time, and warned that any first-use by the United States there or elsewhere would cause a worldwide revulsion. Dulles, reporting the Bermuda talks to the NSC on 10 December, remarked resignedly that “our thinking on the atomic weapon was several years in advance of the rest of the free world.” The president expanded on the theme: “We, more than any other people, have
accepted the atomic age. Many European peoples are lagging far behind us and think of themselves only as the defenseless targets of atomic warfare." Dulles pointed out that Churchill, while concerned about world opinion, also understandably worried that "the British people . . ., on account of their exposed position . . ., would suffer if the Soviets retaliated against our use of atomic weapons by attacking the population centers of the British Isles." He stressed, however, that no final conclusions had been reached in the talks and that the United States "had not renounced its right to use atomic weapons if war were forced upon us by the Soviets."

The president added an encouraging sequel, reporting that in his private conversations with Churchill the latter had shown more concern over publicity than the actual use of nuclear weapons, making the telling point that people would have difficulty squaring a U.S. public announcement of an intention to use the weapons with the president's forthcoming speech to the United Nations on peaceful uses of atomic energy. The old statesman had said, in effect, "let us plan to use these weapons if necessity arose, but let us not talk about these plans."44

Nuclear weapons policy was only one of the host of factors and decisions that faced the Defense Department at every major juncture in taking necessary actions to carry out the broad and compelling mandates of the New Look. Like all overarching policy guides, the New Look confronted DoD with an imperative challenge to make it work. For Wilson and the Joint Chiefs, trying to do more with less would be a continuing and vexing annual struggle requiring much resolution, flexibility, perseverance, and compromise.
In a directive to the Joint Chiefs on 16 October 1953, Secretary Wilson initiated the formulation of a military strategy and program to implement NSC policy paper 162/2, while that document was still in its final stages of revision. “It is of urgent importance that we determine now the broad outline for the size and composition of our armed forces for some years ahead in the light of foreseeable developments in order to establish a sound basis for planning.” He asked the chiefs to develop a military strategy “to implement the national strategy,” together with recommendations for the size and composition of the armed forces during the next three fiscal years. The desired military strength by the end of this period was to be between 2.5 and 3 million. As he had told the NSC a few days earlier, he wanted a posture that would provide “reasonable security (1) without causing financial and economic unrest at home, (2) without raising fear abroad that we were proposing to unleash global war, and (3) without raising apprehensions among our allies that we were withdrawing from the arena.”

It would be a military establishment that would be appropriate to the cautiously optimistic containment strategy of the New Look and that the nation could afford. For guidance as to “feasible annual expenditures and new appropriations” Wilson referred the chiefs to information provided by Treasury and BoB. In particular, he called the chiefs’ attention to the problem of defending the continent against air attack, the importance of a sound free world economy, and the new policy that nuclear weapons would be used “whenever it is to military advantage to do so.” Wilson wanted the study by 15 December.
The chiefs delegated the task of producing a first draft to a committee headed by Director of the Joint Staff Lt. Gen. Frank F. Everest, USAF. Thereupon, they departed on separate tours of base inspection and fact-finding in Europe, North Africa, the Pacific, and the Far East, returning in mid-November. For unexplained reasons, when the committee submitted its report on 30 November it recommended "level-off" overall force and strength levels for only FY 1957. Even with this simplification the committee could not reach agreement. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps members wanted a strength of 2,750,000, while the Army wanted 2,765,000. More serious were the differences among the services over the composition and distribution of the total force, on which they divided along service lines, as shown in the following tabulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel (recommended by)</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy-MC</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,060,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>693,000</td>
<td>630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>207,000</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>950,000</td>
<td>950,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,765,000</td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Levels (recommended by)</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy-MC</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army (divs)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy (ships)</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps (divs/wings)*</td>
<td>2+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force (wings)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers of divisions with associated air wings.

Considering the earlier strong resistance by all the services to reductions for FY 1955, the committee's acceptance of additional cuts seems more remarkable than its disagreements. The Army members understandably were the most adamant about cuts, insisting that the 14 divisions proposed were an absolute minimum, acceptable only on the assumption that by 1957 Japan would have mobilized 8 divisions and that all U.S. Army forces would have been withdrawn from the Far East.
Faced with the inevitable, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had by now reconciled themselves to their own reduced strength and the expansion of the Air Force.5

General Ridgway later charged, and it was widely believed at the time, that the final manpower totals were cut to the cloth of a dollar ceiling. "We could have had a substantially higher [strength] figure," Ridgway told a House subcommittee early in 1956, "had the dollar ceiling been higher."6 That the spending total projected for Defense in FY 1957 was dictated can hardly be disputed. The budget authorities had given the Everest committee guidance on projected expenditure limits. Projected total revenues of $60 billion and expenditures of $19.6 billion for non-security activities left a "remainder" of $40.4 billion for the security programs. After allowing $1.9 billion for the Atomic Energy Commission and $4.7 billion for the Mutual Security Program, both radically reduced from existing levels, DoD would get $33.8 billion.7 The committee thus had the task of contriving an acceptable mix of personnel, materiel, and operating and maintenance costs that would price out at or near this figure.

Establishing an accurate relationship between the strength of the armed forces and the total cost of their support in any given year is, to say the least, elusive, because of the host of mediating assumptions concerning the structure and composition of the force, plans and programs for equipping it, and the norms governing its training, supply, maintenance, state of readiness, and operations. Direct military personnel costs ranged from less than 25 percent (Air Force) to about 42 percent (Army) of the service budgets envisaged in the 2,750,000-man force. Other budgetary components, such as operations and maintenance, major procurement and production, reserve components, and military public works, were only indirectly affected by the assumed personnel strength. The number and types of Army divisions and Air Force wings, for example, not the manpower strengths, were the primary determinants of the budgets; and the number of divisions and air wings varied depending on the size of the force, types of units involved, state of their manning and equipment, and a variety of other factors. A principal source of the growth in operating and maintenance costs, virtually unrelated to personnel strength, was the increasing proportion of jet aircraft in the Air Force and the Navy; another was the flight training and routine flying, or (in the Navy) steaming, factors affecting fuel consumption. Thus, personnel strength was only one of many determinants of cost.

The Everest committee could not agree on a single price tag for the competing forces and activities projected, settling finally on ranges of cost within some of the major budget categories between what the
individual services considered to be irreducible minimums and negotiable higher figures. The annual costs for the aggregate 2,750,000-man force on which the Navy and Air Force had agreed ranged from $31.1 billion to $35.9 billion; the Army, demanding a slightly larger total force, priced it at $34.235 billion. For aircraft procurement, for instance, the Navy’s estimated cost spread covered projected buys ranging from 1,600 to 2,475 aircraft; the Air Force’s estimates ranged from 4,750 to 7,340 aircraft.

Except for redeployment from Europe, the Everest committee evidently had little difficulty in agreeing on the outline strategy called for in Wilson’s directive. In the full report submitted to the chiefs on 30 November only the Army members protested the prescription of manpower and dollar guidelines as firm ceilings, which, they asserted, had forced the committee to make overly optimistic assumptions and to accept unwarranted risks. The other members deemed the risks acceptable. The chiefs generally supported the position taken by their committee representatives. General Twining endorsed the strategy and the proposed 2,750,000-man force. Admiral Carney and Marine Commandant General Shepherd approved the strategy in general, but called for a more balanced force structure that could react to various contingencies. General Ridgway presumably made his views known during the JCS discussions and later submitted a highly critical report to Army Secretary Stevens.

The chiefs finally reached formal agreement on the Everest committee’s recommendations on strategy and force posture and raised slightly the total proposed strength level. Their final recommendations to Wilson on force and strength goals for FY 1957 were as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Forces</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>14 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>1,030 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>3 divs/3 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>975,000</td>
<td>137 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,815,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The whole pricing exercise, in the final submission, was labeled an “approximation ... pending detailed costing,” and each of the chiefs declared that higher levels of major procurement should have been provided for. The outcome would appear to belie Ridgway’s later complaint that the final strength level of 2,815,000, well below Wilson’s original limit of 3 million, was dictated by the imposed ceiling on spending. With more money to spend, the chiefs could, of course, have financed a larger total force, but it seems clear that the Navy and Air Force chiefs preferred to buy more, or perhaps more expensive, aircraft, raising their procurement
accounts substantially. For his own, relatively low-technology, more man- 
power-intensive service, Ridgway obviously wanted a higher mission 
recognition that would open the way for a larger force, with a larger 
overseas establishment. Yet in the final negotiations, the Army yielded a 
smaller percentage of its original manpower goal than did the Navy, and 
the whole 2,815,000-man force was priced lower than even the BoB dollar 
ceiling of $33.8 billion. Evidently the principal barrier to a higher total 
strength ceiling was Wilson’s determination, probably reflecting direct 
guidance from the president, to hold military manpower appreciably below 
the three-million level, not primarily to save money but rather because of 
anticipated shrinkage in the nation’s pool of qualified manpower. 13

The New Strategy and Posture

The Joint Chiefs’ outline strategy amounted to little more than a re- 
statement of the military policies and courses of actions already set forth 
in NSC 162/2. It recapitulated the central New Look doctrine of mainte- 
nance of effective military strength for the “long pull,” within the limits 
of available funds and manpower. The report then walked through the 
catalogue of New Look postulates: (1) present overextension and over- 
commitment of U.S. forces; (2) greater reliance on nuclear weapons; 
(3) emphasis on massive strategic retaliatory striking power and nuclear 
capability as “the major deterrent to aggression” as well as a principal 
weapon for waging general war; (4) an “integrated and adequate” 
continental defense system; (5) control of essential sea and air communica- 
tion lines; and (6) maintenance of an adequate mobilization base for 
general war. The summary section included an item not heretofore made 
explicit, although recalling Radford’s 13 October formulation of nuclear 
weapons policy: “the provision of tactical atomic support for U.S. or 
allied military forces in general war or in a local aggression whenever the 
employment of atomic weapons would be militarily advantageous. 14

Predictably, redeployment received more extended treatment. In the 
Everest committee, the Army members had stonewalled their colleagues’ 
try to prescribe a limit of three U.S. divisions in Europe by 1957. The 
JCS paper, prescribing a “global regroupment,” asserted the need for a 
substantial reduction of ground forces deployed overseas as a prerequisite 
to establishment of a strategic reserve in the United States. The chiefs 
concluded that a maximum of six Army divisions would be available for 
station overseas and recommended only unspecified “changes in the 
present U.S. deployments in some forward areas.” Implementing actions
included early withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea (except for a military advisory group and logistical support for ROK forces), but no other significant prospective withdrawals. In the Far East, since the United States would help defend the Japanese offshore islands and South Korea and would retain its bases, "suitably deployed" forces would be required. Moreover, "certain other countries," including Indochina, were so vital to the United States that any attack on them would probably compel a military response. The chiefs proposed, however, that U.S. forces in the Far East be given immediately a nuclear capability, both for retaliatory (i.e., strategic) attacks on the mainland and for support (i.e., tactical) of ROK forces. This implied that only air and naval forces would be required, a point made explicitly by the Everest committee and reinforced by the chiefs' recommendation that overseas force requirements be continually reviewed and reassessed in the light of developing nuclear capabilities. The chiefs also urged that Japan be "encouraged" to speed the organization of its own defense forces, noting that Japanese awareness of the U.S. intention to withdraw would tend to accelerate the process.

As for Europe, the chiefs finessed their disagreement by suggesting that it might be necessary to retain U.S. ground forces there beyond FY 1957. They recommended an "educational program to promote understanding among our allies "of the contribution to their security made by American nuclear capabilities and massive retaliatory striking power. They noted particularly the great advantage in flexibility to be gained from the constitution of a combat-ready strategic reserve in the Western Hemisphere and the growing importance of U.S. tactical atomic support. The other side of this coin called for the allies to provide the major share of ground forces for their own defense, and a policy of "discrimination" in the distribution of U.S. foreign aid. Meanwhile, "the full German potential for creating and maintaining military forces must be utilized." 15

In transmitting the JCS paper to Wilson, Radford stated that the JCS had agreed on the size and composition of the military establishment and had settled on an outline strategy as directed. The recommended establishment was expected to be maintainable "in a qualitatively improved state of readiness over an indefinite period of time." It also should provide an improved mobilization base for a general war as well as fully ready forces to deal with "peripheral" aggressions and enable the United States "promptly to furnish an atomic contribution to supplement the indigenous forces of our allies." Any increase in danger or reduction in threat would require new studies and estimates. 16
Ridgway Objects, Stevens Demurs

These qualifications became the focus of much attention as a result of Ridgway's public references to the "stated assumptions and limitations" under which the chiefs had concurred in the recommendations. In testifying on the FY 1957 budget two years later, Ridgway stressed the general condition of "no substantial deterioration in the world situation, as well as a whole lot of others relating to western Europe, and the Far East, and the growth of the Japanese force." Whether deliberately or from lapse of memory, Ridgway overstated the qualifications in the JCS report. Ridgway may well have forgotten the distinction made in December 1953 between conditions and "implementing actions." At the time, he apparently attached little importance to it. Writing to Secretary Stevens on 9 December 1953, Ridgway expressed his concern over the "prescribed limitations of personnel, money and time" imposed by higher authority. The subject, he wrote, "has had my studied consideration to the practical exclusion of all other official business for the past six days." The position he and the other chiefs had taken amounted to a "directed verdict, the only one possible under the prescribed limitations placed upon them." Ridgway did not contest the legality of this procedure. He accepted the "verdict"—i.e., recommended forces virtually dictated by the imposed limitations as "a basically sound view" under the no change conditions the chiefs, for their own protection, had stipulated regarding the world situation. But to stipulate such conditions made the whole exercise unreal, since the international situation that would exist in 1957 was totally unpredictable, partly because the effects of the resulting reductions in U.S. military strength on relations with allies could not be foreseen. The Army was in a dilemma, without a proper basis for estimating force requirements and, as seemed likely, without adequate funds to carry out the missions it prescribed for itself. If he did not articulate the thought, Ridgway may well have been asking himself how the Army could possibly have the manpower it needed under proposed manpower ceilings that would shrink it from a strength of 1,481,000 as of December 1953 to 1 million in FY 1957, a loss of 33 percent.

Ridgway contended that the Joint Chiefs had been forced to conduct an exercise that amounted to "an inversion of the normal process." They had not been furnished an adequate statement of missions, and their military judgment had been "circumscribed at the outset by the fixing of...

* Ridgway's actual words, in the light of what followed, were misleading: "verdict which could only be reached within prescribed limitations." Later paragraphs indicate that the paraphrase used here is more accurate.
an overall control, namely, the funds expected to be available." Approval of the JCS recommendations would, he feared, begin the process of reducing the military establishment to the level envisaged for 1957. The Army's undoubted overextension needed correcting, but to attempt to do this by 1957 would be disruptive and would have "severe and undetermined effects" on the free world coalition.

Ridgway may have felt that the decision to recommend strength and force levels only for 1957, rather than for 1955-57, as Wilson had requested, was intended to make more feasible a speedup in force reductions, particularly in the Army. Under the BoB dollar ceilings the chiefs might have faced the same kind of "directed verdict" for 1955 and 1956 as they did for 1957, forcing them to commit themselves to a three-year downward slide to the level-off point in FY 1957. Ridgway's plea to Secretary Stevens aimed to slow down what he regarded as the radical restructuring and shrinking of the armed forces aimed at in the New Look. He urged Stevens to try to hold the line of Army strength at 1,305,000.18

Stevens forwarded Ridgway's memorandum to Wilson on the same day along with a reinforcing message of his own. His message emphasized, however, not Ridgway's go-slow plea on strength reductions but rather his disquisition on the proper role of the military adviser in national policymaking. Stevens had discovered what apparently seemed to him a powerful argument to support Ridgway's case: congressional testimony in June 1947 by none other than then Army Chief of Staff General Eisenhower, who had declared that he appeared before the Senate committee "only as a professional soldier .... It is my duty as Chief of Staff to tell you gentlemen what I believe is necessary for national security. The issue is then in the hands of the Congress." Similarly, in the current situation, Stevens went on, it was "not correct procedure to place the professional military man in the position of having his military advice circumscribed by economic and fiscal considerations in which he does not claim to be expert." Having thus supported Ridgway, Stevens concluded by assuring Wilson of his "complete acceptance of the new Army strength figures provided in your memorandum of 4 December."19

Apparently neither Ridgway's protest nor Stevens's endorsement of it made much impression on Wilson, or, indeed, went beyond his office. Both documents were notably weak in tactics as well as in logic. Ridgway and Stevens both seemed absorbed by the effort at defining the legal and ethical boundaries of their roles as advisers and commanders. To a man of Wilson's pragmatic temperament and background this could only have seemed a waste of intellectual energy if not pure pedantry. From his perspective, since neither challenged the legality of the constraints imposed
on the JCS study, Ridgway and Stevens faced the same simple choice of either doing the president's bidding, or, if in good conscience they could not, resigning.

Finally, Ridgway's explanation of his concurrence in the JCS recommendations must have seemed to Wilson a tortured rationalization. As a member of the Joint Chiefs, he seemed to argue, he had a responsibility to concur in the action agreed to by his colleagues, whereas, as Army chief of staff, he also had a responsibility to express his "personal" views to his statutory commander, the secretary of the Army. These, it turned out, did not flatly contradict the position he had endorsed as a member of the JCS, which, after all, he asserted to be "basically sound" under the conditions stated. What seems even less defensible, he then urged rejection of that position as dangerous to the nation's security. Nor did his "directed verdict" argument stand up under examination. As noted earlier, the aggregate manpower ceiling imposed by Wilson remained negotiable, although within rather narrow limits; the distribution of that figure among the services was, in fact, vigorously negotiated both in the Everest committee and among the chiefs; and the program finally recommended amounted to almost $1 billion less than the dollar ceiling imposed by BoB. Ridgway still had the option of formally taking his case to higher authority, to Wilson, and perhaps the president, with resignation the probable outcome. Since Ridgway did not mention these alternatives to Stevens, his decision to go along with the so-called "directed verdict" suggests a capitulation to pressures for conformity.

Wilson forwarded the JCS recommendations to the president on 11 December, with a pro forma comment that they would "materially assist us in the final preparations of the 1955 budget." In fact, they contributed little if anything. Nothing in the proposed strategy and force posture was inconsistent with the budget as it now stood, and Wilson finally provided the missing strength figures for FY 1955, which the JCS had failed to recommend. On 16 December, both the DoD budget and the three-year strategy-and-posture paper were presented to the NSC, with the service secretaries and JCS in attendance. In presenting the JCS report, Radford emphasized the chiefs' qualifying conditions and warned of the difficulty of convincing allied countries that withdrawal of U.S. forces would be in their mutual interest. In Wilson's absence McNeil summarized the DoD budget, noting the emphasis on airpower, continental defense, and a strengthened reserve, with estimated expenditures of $37.6 billion (as contrasted with current spending at an annual rate of $44 billion). He requested appropriations of $31.2 billion.
Discussion was perfunctory, the council members taking their cue from the president's obvious satisfaction with both documents. The only hint of dissent came from Stevens who, at the president's invitation, read a short statement recording his objections to the cutback in Army manpower. Much of the four minutes Stevens allowed himself he devoted to declarations of loyalty, freedom from service bias, constructive intent, and incomplete knowledge. What he objected to was less the cutback itself than its timing. To reduce the Army within 18 months by 350,000 (actually 317,000) "in this period of international uncertainties" was "too drastic" and should be postponed to a later date.22

Unmoved by Stevens's little speech, the president graciously thanked him, adding that the proposed manpower reductions would be subject to review over the next three years. He wound up the meeting with a few soothing words primarily for the Army, though addressing ostensibly all the service representatives present, voicing his pride in the way they had subordinated personal and professional concerns to the national interest. He expressed particular sympathy for the Army, which had a special place in his heart, and felt sure that the Army's traditional sense of discipline would sustain its morale and help it to continue working as an important member of the team.23

Eisenhower must have known that he was asking for more self-denial and breadth of vision than it was reasonable to expect of mere mortals in a competitive bureaucratic environment. The planned shrinking of the Army would reduce its strength by one-third over the next 3 1/2 years, and by 21 percent during the first 18 months of that period. The armed forces as a whole would be dwindling at the same time, but at a much slower pace—by only 17 percent over the entire period and 11 percent during the first 18 months. From its current 43 percent of the armed forces, the Army would drop by mid-1957 to only 36 percent. The destined rise of the Air Force to paramountcy in the service hierarchy was now clear, and for most members of the other services probably no longer galling. But the magnitude of the amputations to be inflicted on the Army placed it in a class by itself, with no other service to share its distress. Stevens might accept the president's decision, but he spoke only for himself. The Army as a whole viewed its diminished status with genuine alarm.

_Selling the New Look_

By the time President Eisenhower unveiled the FY 1955 Defense budget in January 1954, the main outlines of the New Look had taken
shape. The president previewed its principal themes in his State of the Union message on the 7th and provided detailed highlights in his formal budget message to Congress on the 21st. These two important addresses gave the national security budget prominent billing in a well-orchestrated effort to focus public attention on the administration's "purposes and accomplishments." This major promotion effort cast the president as a star performer, with news conferences almost every week, a barrage of special messages to Congress on a variety of topics, and a radio-television address on taxes on 15 March.24

An important theme in the publicity campaign to sell the FY 1955 DoD budget was its asserted close link with the New Look. According to the official line, this budget was not a product of the economy axe, and its substantial reductions involved no decrease in military strength or risk to national security. Rather, it projected the first of a planned series of New Look budgets shaped to the new long-haul strategy and the planned restructuring of the armed forces that would, as the president assured the nation, "make and keep America strong in an age of peril." It was, he said, "based on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by me."25 The public presentation of the new DoD budget and the New Look thus went hand in hand.

The New Look's unveiling had occurred in December 1953, even though by then the term itself was a byword and the policy had been widely, if not yet authoritatively, reported. Admiral Radford made two speeches on the subject early in December, his first since his appointment as JCS chairman.26 The New Look, he said, was really not new except in being prepared by the "new" Joint Chiefs and in being based on a guiding precept of preparing for the "long pull, not a year-of-crisis." As a starter a tentative military posture had been projected over the next three years. International communism and the "tremendous destructive power of atomic weapons" imposed on the United States two requirements: "We must be ready for tremendous, vast retaliatory and counteroffensive blows in the event of a global war, and we must be ready for lesser military actions short of all-out war." Radford used uncharacteristically effusive rhetoric in describing the role of airpower. Emphasis in the armed forces, he declared, was "pointed toward the creation, the maintenance, and the exploitation of modern air power .... Offensively, defensively, and in support of other forces, it is a primary requirement." He stressed that he meant national airpower, including the military aviation of all the services and the civil aviation systems and aircraft industry backing them up—airpower already "superior to that of any other nation."27
Radford said little in either speech about the FY 1955 budget and the service manpower cuts, alluding to the current force planning for FY 1955 as an “interim look.” As late as 14 December he told reporters that he knew nothing of the planned (by then directed) manpower cuts beyond what he had read in the newspapers, and recalled his earlier statements that in FY 1955 no significant force changes were planned except in the Air Force and continental defense.\(^{28}\) Evidently Radford still believed, as he had late in October, that the big decisions on New Look strategy would not be made until the spring of 1954 at the earliest. He was avowing publicly, as the president had already conceded privately, that FY 1955 would not be a New Look year, and the FY 1955 Defense budget would be at most a prelude to the New Look budgets of 1956 and beyond.

Unfortunately, this was not the official line, as became apparent on 7 January when the president announced in his State of the Union message that the new DoD budget was “based on” the Joint Chiefs’ recently completed long-range plan. In his budget message two weeks later he made the same point with references to the national security budget as a whole. DoD spokesmen routinely echoed the line during the weeks following, and it quickly became conventional wisdom. Meanwhile, on 12 January Secretary of State Dulles launched the real promotion of the New Look with a new focus.

**Massive Retaliation**

Dulles’s celebrated 12 January address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, broadcast on radio and television, evoked responses ranging from angry denunciation to enthusiastic acclaim.\(^{29}\) It merited attention not only as an important statement of administration policy, but for its substance and presentational skill as well. Dulles carefully delimited his subject at the outset as “an over-all view of those [foreign] policies which relate to our security.” He thus detached it from the mainstream of official New Look pronouncements (the term was not mentioned in the speech), keeping to the higher altitudes of generalized foreign policy interpretation.

The secretary conceded that the previous administration had acted promptly and vigorously to meet the Soviet threat, once it became manifest, but “what we did was in the main emergency action, imposed on us by our enemies.” The Soviets were planning “gradually to divide and weaken the free nations by over-extending them,” so that, according to Lenin, “they
come to practical bankruptcy.” It was not enough to ward off immediate dangers; “it is also essential to do so without exhausting ourselves.” Dulles then moved to his two principal points. Permanent security at affordable cost required, first, collective action, and second, “more reliance on deterrent power, and less dependence on local defensive power.”

In stressing the shift of emphasis from local defense to deterrence, Dulles gave the New Look concept a new and significant twist, portraying nuclear weapons as both more formidable and more narrowly focused than previous spokesmen had done. With a few deft strokes he enhanced his initial dichotomy of local defense and deterrent power. “So long as our basic policy concepts were unclear, our military leaders could not be selective in building our military power. If an enemy could pick his time and place and method of warfare—and if our policy was to remain the traditional one of meeting aggression by direct and local opposition—then we needed to be ready to fight in the arctic and in the tropics; in Asia, the Near East and in Europe; by sea, by land, and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.”

The economic and monetary burdens imposed by this disadvantage had been ruinous, and Dulles recited a few budgetary figures to dramatize the point. Of course, local defense remained a primary requirement, but no local defense alone could contain Communist land power. Accordingly, the administration had taken a basic decision “to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing . . . . Instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy’s many choices . . . . it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost.”

The new policy, Dulles declared, had already demonstrated its effectiveness in Korea, where a cease-fire had been negotiated “on honorable terms” because the enemy, after being forced back by traditional means, “was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods which he had selected.” Moreover, the Communists had received warning that the response to a renewal of aggression “would not necessarily be confined to Korea.” A similar warning had been issued to Communist China regarding intervention in Indochina. A major withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea was under way, but the United States would continue to maintain highly mobile naval, air, and amphibious forces in the Far East, with an even greater capacity to oppose aggression than before. In Europe, the North Atlantic Council had recently accepted the U.S. “long haul” concept, aiming at the steady development of defensive strength at an affordable rate.
There was plenty in the speech for critics to quibble over, and Dulles could probably agree with some of his critics. Presumably, however, he was more concerned with effect than with strict accuracy. Indeed, Dulles’s image of a monolithic Communist world systematically overwhelming local defenses in detail bore little resemblance to the actual course of events since World War II. With the major exceptions of Indochina and the Communist revolution in China, which in the climate of 1954 were assumed to have been made-in-Moscow operations, the free world had demonstrated an impressive capacity to mobilize for its own defense, while the ostensibly cohesive and centrally directed Communist world had been conspicuously unsuccessful in its foreign aggressions—notably in Iran, Greece and Malaya—and little less so in its fomented revolutions.

Dulles knew all of this, of course, better than his critics. His real answer to the charge of exaggerating the Communist menace was probably that it was imperative to arouse the public to a greater sense of urgency in order to make the counterthreat of nuclear retaliation credible. And credible deterrence seemed to Dulles the only way, in the long run, to deal effectively with the threat of recurring Communist aggression and subversion. As President Eisenhower said early in 1954, “We shall not be aggressors, but we and our allies have and will maintain a massive capability to strike back.” Communist leaders in Moscow and Peiping must be made to fear the possible consequences of even local and limited aggression.

What would the consequences be? On this matter Dulles spoke pointedly—“local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.” Massive retaliation gained immediate perception as the operative concept. His hearers and readers generally assumed, as Dulles knew they would, that he meant strategic nuclear bombing, an assumption reinforced by the omission of any mention of tactical nuclear weapons. The omission was conspicuous, even more so perhaps than the studied avoidance of the words “atomic” or “nuclear.” Some might consider tactical “nukes” part of massive retaliatory power, but they were more distinctively associated with local defense and counteroffense. Even so, for the architects of the New Look they appeared the wave of the future, an essential complement to the strategic bomber and the element of flexibility and versatility in the nuclear arsenal. Dulles may have ignored them because the distinction between strategic and tactical weapons may have seemed overly technical and not really essential to his argument. Moreover, calculated ambiguity had its uses. Thus far tactical weapons had been deployed to only a few
areas, and their future deployment was still undetermined. To link them explicitly with deterrence would be to suggest a graduated scale of response proportionate to the provocation. Why encourage the listeners in the Kremlin to assume that in areas where these weapons were not available, small aggressions would still beget only small and local responses?

The convoluted psychology of deterrence was only beginning to be studied in 1954; we cannot be sure how deeply Dulles had explored its ramifications in his own mind. But the 12 January address, beneath its rhetoric of reassurance, exhortation, and threat, had many hallmarks of a carefully crafted message beamed to the top decisionmakers of the Communist world. Dulles obviously understood that the effectiveness of a deterrent threat depended not so much on its being fully believed (not an easy requirement to meet for a threat of nuclear annihilation), but only on its being not wholly disbelieved. It may be assumed that the secretary did not really expect SAC bombers to be unleashed in retaliation for a Communist coup in, say, Central America or the Near East, or even for a Soviet occupation of an adjacent border area in Iran (as the Soviets had in fact done in 1946)—or that Communist leaders would seriously expect such a response. For more serious provocations Dulles had shown himself a counselor of caution, notably in his opposition in December to the JCS plan for an automatic “massive” response to a Communist renewal of major hostilities in Korea. In the same spirit he had refused to go along with DoD’s argument that the policy of normalization of nuclear weapons laid down in NSC 162/2 meant that they would be used automatically, if militarily useful, in any future conflict.

But in his 12 January speech none of this caution was evident. Dulles seemed to be warning Communist leaders that massive aggression would doubtless bring massive retaliation, and even for small provocations the United States would consider all its options. In the Kremlin, Communist leaders were not likely to be deterred from limited aggression in remote nonstrategic areas, particularly if they used proxies, by the theoretical risk that SAC bombers might retaliate against Moscow. But that risk would appear less and less theoretical as they contemplated increasingly serious provocations. Deterrence by uncertainty would then become operative.

Dulles confessed that he did not expect Communist leaders always to be deterred. At some times there might be setbacks, presumably because local defenses were too weak, rescue operations (a la Korea) could not be mounted in time, or, most important, the United States was unwilling to invoke massive retaliation. This prospect was preferable, he implied, to the exhausting drain of repeated tit-for-tat emergency responses to
aggression over the past eight years. Henceforth, Dulles said, liberation of captive peoples would be sought through diplomacy, while rigidly avoiding "diplomatic moves which would seem to endorse captivity"; already, for example, the Soviets had agreed to discuss ending the occupation of Austria at the forthcoming conference in Berlin.55

The Debate Begins

How the men in the Kremlin would read, or misread, Dulles's address remained to be seen, but Dulles had plenty of misreaders at home. Generally speaking, his idea of deterrence through uncertainty, as opposed to fully credible deterrent threats, was over the heads of many reporters and the press initially almost ignored it. On the assumption that a deterrent threat must imply a firm decision to carry it out if deterrence failed, it was widely believed that Dulles had proclaimed a policy of responding to any Communist aggression primarily by instant massive retaliation. This interpretation, in turn, frequently gave way to the assumption that this would be the predetermined response to massive aggression, i.e., an all-out attack on the United States—leaving the policy for dealing with lesser aggressions still unclear. After the president's budget message on 21 January, public analysis tended to become both more critical and more penetrating. Hanson Baldwin, senior military analyst of the New York Times, concluded that the administration had basically decided to prepare primarily for "one type of war rather than . . . for all kinds of war everywhere," the kind in which its great retaliatory power could be brought to bear. If so, it contradicted Admiral Radford's recent, presumably authoritative assertion that the United States now faced a twofold preparedness requirement for both all-out retaliatory strikes and lesser offensive and defensive actions employing ready mobile forces.

Baldwin and Walter Millis of the New York Herald Tribune reminded readers that the central ideas of the New Look had been around for some time. In important respects, indeed, the policy was really the pre-1950 policy of the Truman administration with a higher price tag. Before the Korean War the United States relied on the threat of atomic retaliation against the Russian heartland to deter war, and in 1950 and 1951 both former President Hoover and Sen. Robert A. Taft were urging a general pullback from Europe and Asia, concentration of military strength in the Western Hemisphere, and primary reliance on air and sea power. Then the invasion of South Korea showed the futility of invoking the threat of atomic devastation to deter such aggression. The United
States had been forced hurriedly to rebuild its land and naval forces, while simultaneously expanding its air forces, and to execute large-scale deployments not only to Korea but worldwide. "Now that the fighting in Korea is finished," wrote Baldwin, "and the costs of maintaining very strong land, sea and air forces overseas seem prohibitive, we are reverting once again to a military policy based essentially upon much smaller land forces, a somewhat smaller Navy, and a strengthened Air Force keyed to the threat of massive and instant atomic retaliation."34

Why should the pre-1950 policy prove more effective in the future than it had in the past? Apart from Dulles's strong intimation (which reporters generally ignored) that the threat of atomic reprisals had brought the Communists to the conference table in Korea, administration supporters also pointed out that the U.S. nuclear weapons menu was now both larger and more varied than in 1950. The president had made this point indirectly in his State of the Union address. To some critics, this argument seemed pure self-deception. "We can no more 'choose' places at which to retaliate effectively than we could in 1950," declared Millis, "when we had the bombs but when we discovered that the only effective retaliation open to us was with infantrymen and tankers." General Alfred M. Gruenther, Ridgway's successor as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, noted that it was not at all certain that the introduction of nuclear weapons would reduce the need for conventional ground forces; more likely, the need would increase. Millis argued that to make nuclear weapons a tool of what might be called "strategic" warfare might well gain victory, but "only at the cost of a universality of destruction and death which must defeat any rational reason for resorting to military means to begin with." Finally, Baldwin registered the point so often overlooked: since the Soviets also possessed nuclear weapons this was a game that two could play.35

For every sophisticated critic like Baldwin or Millis there were apparently a dozen who saw nothing in Dulles's 12 January speech beyond the phrase "massive retaliatory power." Dr. Harold Urey, Nobel prize-winning nuclear physicist, criticized the administration for adopting the threat of atomic war "as its policy for policing the world." America's new commitment to air-atomic power and reduced ground forces, charged Rep. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., could well become Russia's "secret weapon."36

On 2 February Wilson tried to counter what looked like a growing public obsession with the issue of massive retaliation. Asked to define the role of nuclear weapons under the new defense policy, he replied that it was to "use all kinds of new weapons" if war came; he added a plaintive wish that "we could quit rattling the atom bomb," especially since the Soviets had been careful to play down such talk.37
These efforts at damage limitation were dutifully reported by the media, but Wilson's effusions got more attention than a plea the president had made for sobriety. Dulles, unfortunately, was away in Berlin attending the Four-Power Conference, and thus not on hand to mend his own fences. The whole effort was swamped by the daily menu of news that tended to keep the massive retaliation issue in the forefront of public attention—the worsening situation in Indochina, new Soviet weapons, the ongoing reduction and reshaping of the Army, proposed atomic information-sharing with the British, and a series of vivid feature articles on the Strategic Air Command.

Even more important, the Soviet response to Dulles's 12 January speech made clear that massive retaliation was a two-way street. An article in Izvestia, as reported by the alarmist Alsop brothers at the end of January, drove home the point with chilling force, describing in detail the various ways in which the "destructive forces of modern weapons will descend with all their power" on Western Europe and the American continent, and mocking Dulles's evident assumption that America alone possessed the technical means of implementing an intercontinental strategy. Especially disturbing were hints in an article by an East German military commentator that the Soviets could now launch nuclear-tipped missiles from submarines in the Atlantic and had developed a "twin" rocket with trans-Atlantic range. 38

In a second article two weeks later, on 15 February, the Alsops described two new heavy Soviet bomber equivalents of the B-36 and the B-52, reportedly already in production, capable of round-trip nuclear attacks on the United States. The new bombers were already in squadron formations, asserted the article, while the U.S. Strategic Air Command would get nothing comparable for many months. "It is plain dishonest," they concluded, "for the Pentagon to go on smugly boasting about American air-atomic striking power, without at least uttering a warning word or two now and then about Soviet air-atomic striking power." The information about Soviet heavy bombers purveyed by the Alsops may have been planted Soviet propaganda, but it served to fan the flames of debate over the New Look. On the same day that the Alsops' article appeared, Sen. Stuart Symington made a blistering attack on Wilson in the Senate based on the same information and warned of the dire consequences of underestimating Soviet ability to produce long-range bombers. 39

If massive retaliation was, or soon would be, a two-way street, the headlines from Indochina reminded daily that it also was an unusable weapon for a distant colonial war. Early in February the administration's decision, at the request of the hard-pressed French, to send some Air Force
technicians to Indochina raised fears among leading Senate Democrats that the move would lead to deepening U.S. involvement in a land war in Asia. Peppered by questions at his news conference on 10 February, the president avowed his passionate determination to avoid any such involvement but refused to "try to predict the drift of world events." One columnist subsequently reported that senators were asking how the problem could be dealt with by a strategy that placed more reliance on deterrence and less dependence on local defenses.

As a test of the administration's new strategy, the deepening Indochina crisis brought to a head the debate triggered by Dulles's "massive retaliation" speech. Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith and Admiral Radford appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session on 16 February to explain how the new strategy might apply to Indochina and what role Congress would play. They encountered a barrage of questions to which they could not supply instant answers. If the Chinese intervened in force, would instant massive retaliation then be invoked against China's coastal cities? Would such a decision be first cleared with Congress? Would the allies be consulted? Or, even without Chinese intervention, what if it developed that American combat forces would be needed to avert a French defeat, despite recent official assurances that such action was not contemplated? Would Congress be presented with a fait accompli? In both houses, the Democratic leadership made plans to exploit the whole issue of the New Look in committee hearings and floor debates.

A Party Line Takes Shape

Partisan criticism of the New Look reached a climax on 6 March with a speech by Adlai Stevenson broadly attacking the administration. Witty and elegant, his analysis of the new strategy seemed also blatantly political and not particularly penetrating. The former Democratic presidential nominee remarked on the irony that the administration, after cutting back and then only partially restoring the buildup of airpower, was now "acting as if air-atomic power were a completely satisfactory substitute for reduced military and naval power." The administration mobilized its heavy artillery to reply. Speaking separately on 10 March, Wilson, Radford, and Navy Secretary Robert B. Anderson (just nominated to succeed Roger Kyes as Wilson's deputy) rebutted Stevenson's principal charge, that the new strategy as expounded by Dulles in January constituted an invitation to general war and a weak tool for dealing with lesser
cresses. In the process they significantly diluted the emphasis on massive retaliation that had aroused such alarm. Wilson explained to reporters that there was no predetermined policy on the kind or level of retaliation that would be visited upon an aggressor in any given situation. Radford's explanation of the New Look was the most methodical and comprehensive, enlarging considerably the narrow focus on massive retaliation conveyed in Dulles's 12 January speech. At the end of it he addressed the misunderstandings that had emerged in recent public discussion. "It is not correct to say that we are relying exclusively on one weapon, or one service, or that we are anticipating one kind of war. I believe that this Nation could be a prisoner of its own military posture if it had no capability, other than one to deliver a massive atomic attack . . . . It certainly should be evident from the forces we intend to maintain that we are not relying solely upon air power." These forces, he reminded his audience, would include a million-man Army and the most powerful Navy in the world; never before in its history had the United States attempted to maintain so strong a military posture indefinitely during peacetime. In effect, said Radford, the new strategy served notice on the Communists that if they struck at one point the United States might, but not necessarily would, strike back at another; the idea was, as Wilson had said, to keep them guessing. In a news conference on 12 March Radford stated unequivocally that the first response to limited aggression anywhere would be by whatever allied forces were immediately involved. If the situation got out of control, the United States would consider sending air and naval forces to the scene. In the last resort, nuclear weapons might be used, "if it were to our military advantage to do so," but all available options would have to be examined.

The president himself undertook to deal with the politically sensitive issue of "instant" retaliation as it affected the constitutional prerogative of Congress to declare war. Stevenson had earlier attacked Dulles's reference to this capability as implying that the American response to, say, a Communist try at another Korea would be to "retaliate by dropping atom bombs on Moscow or Peiping or wherever we choose." Democratic Sen. John C. Stennis (Miss.) had promptly followed up by expressing fears that this outcome might even be brought about by the killing of one American technician in Indochina. On 10 March the president gave a firm, evidently prepared response, significantly not limited to the hypothetical situation Stennis had posited: "I will say . . . there is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result of the constitutional process that is placed upon the Congress to declare it. Now let us have that clear."
Almost immediately it became apparent that the president had overreached himself. In his anxiety to allay fears that he might act recklessly and in defiance of the Constitution, he had now committed himself, some thought, to inaction in an emergency until Congress declared a state of war, regardless of the severity of the crisis and even if Congress were not in session. How could the United States be counted on to retaliate instantly in any situation in the light of the president's new commitment? It was recalled that President Truman, in the Korean emergency of 1950, had justified ordering the armed forces into action under his implied authority as commander in chief. Allied officials,ironically, were beset by twin fears: would the president precipitate American retaliation in a crisis that might have been resolved without a massive response, or would he wait for a congressional declaration of war before unleashing SAC. 50 Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson stated that Dulles's 12 January speech had clearly implied collective consultation and collective action by the free community, not response by just one nation. 51

Dulles provided a lawyer's answer to some of these questions in a news conference on 16 March, his first in two months. Under the Constitution, he said, the president had full power to order immediate retaliation for any direct attack on the United States, but use of American bases in foreign countries such as Great Britain and Morocco would require the consent of the host governments; consultation with allies was thus implicit in any such situation. As for the president's basic authority to order retaliatory action, Dulles pointed out that Senate approval of both the North Atlantic and the Rio de Janeiro treaties meant that he had the authority to act, without consulting Congress, in response to an attack on either the United States or its treaty allies. An attack on the United States when Congress was in recess would call for immediate response, and the president's remark about "constitutional process" at his 10 March news conference did not imply that he would necessarily wait to call Congress back into session before taking action. The hypothesis of Chinese intervention in Indochina was a different matter altogether, since the latter, despite its relationship to France, was not allied to the United States. In general, in some instances the president had clear legal authority to act without consulting Congress and in others he did not. In between, Dulles admitted, was a twilight zone in which precedents were unclear and the lawyers had no precise answers. 52

At his own news conference the next day (17 March) the president expanded on his obligation under the Constitution to act promptly to protect the nation in the event of a large-scale surprise attack. Any
president who failed so to act, he said, "should be worse than impeached, he should be hanged." On the other hand, the exclusive authority of Congress under the Constitution to declare war, as opposed to taking emergency action, was not in dispute, and when time permitted, he implied, Congress should be consulted on the important decisions leading to involvement in a major conflict. "After all, you can't carry on a war without Congress." 53

Dulles's Second Thoughts

In the press, the week following brought a flood of sober, generally sympathetic editorials and analytical pieces on the New Look that played down the massive retaliation theme. 54 Their most important source was Dulles, who now took center stage to confound his critics principally through a short article written over his name in the April issue of Foreign Affairs.* The article hewed rather closely to the 12 January speech, using much of the same phraseology; somewhat longer, it was less a revision than a straightforward elaboration of it. It abandoned the notion of a single "basic" decision to rely on great retaliatory capacity in deterring Communist aggression and portrayed the deterrent strategy as one that the United States had hammered out pragmatically under the Eisenhower administration and hoped to concert with its allies and other free nations. In net effect, it softened the earlier emphasis on massive retaliation and corrected the implication that such action would henceforth be the predetermined, or even the preferred, response to all Communist aggressions, great and small.

The central question, Dulles again asserted, was how to organize collective security for the free world so as to provide maximum protection at minimum cost. The simple answer was to deter aggression, not merely prepare for attack, by ensuring that a potential aggressor "be left in no doubt that he would be certain to suffer damage outweighing any possible gains from aggression." Against the immense manpower of the Soviet-Chinese bloc the free world must devise a strategy based on exploiting its "special assets," including "air and naval power and atomic weapons which are now available in a wide range, suitable not only for strategic bombing but also for extensive tactical use." 55

* The Foreign Affairs article, "Policy for Security and Peace," was drafted by Robert R. Bowie, head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and was released by the State Department under the same title, as Press Release No. 139, 16 Mar 54. For a somewhat different reading of the article from that suggested here, see Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "The Origins of Massive Retaliation," Political Science Quarterly (Spring 81), 31-52.
Much of the article centered on refuting the charge that the exploitation of “special assets” would result in “turning every local war into a world war.” Effective deterrence, Dulles asserted, depended on having the “flexibility and the facilities which make various responses available.” Some areas, most notably Western Europe, were so valuable that they must be defended at any cost. Even in less vital areas, a local capacity for defense was essential, not only to deal with subversion and minor aggressions, but also to demonstrate credibly a determination to resist. Nuclear bombs would not “necessarily” rain on the great industrial centers of China or Russia in retaliation for a Communist attack “somewhere in Asia.” The essential aim was that aggression of any kind be perceived by the enemy as “too risky and too expensive to be tempting.”

Taken out of context, the “not necessarily” attached to the bombing of enemy industrial centers could have left the impression that massive retaliation for minor aggressions was still more than a remote possibility. But the numerous administration protestations to the contrary, together with the heavy emphasis placed on local self-defense as the initial and main response to aggression, helped downplay the massive retaliation threat that had come through so ominously in the 12 January speech. The president himself sought to add the clincher in his earlier news conference on 17 March. Replying to the inevitable query about bombing Moscow and Peiping, he observed that any suggestion that such a response would be justified merely by a small attack somewhere “on the fringe or periphery of our interests . . . I wouldn’t hold with for a moment.” Secretary Dulles, he said, had meant only that it was useful to have a capability “of doing certain things” to deter aggression.

The New Look Demystified

Not content merely to neutralize the massive retaliation issue, the president sought also to “de-mystify” the New Look itself. This, indeed, had been an undercurrent in Radford’s remarks for some time, including even the statement that the current strategy was a logical response to trends already evident when the administration came to Washington and would have been adopted “no matter what administration was in power.” At his news conference on 17 March Eisenhower spoke of the use of the term New Look: “I just don’t like this expression because it doesn’t mean much to me . . . . This ‘new look’ . . . is just our effort to solve in one field, that of the direct military attack, to produce the
best results we can for the protection of America." This would seem to leave little to argue about—perhaps the state of affairs the president hoped to bring about.

The barrage of official reassurances on the implications of massive retaliation and the president’s deflation of the mystique of radical newness that the public had come to attribute to the administration’s defense strategy evidently had the desired effect. Media response was predominantly favorable and the New Look gradually, if temporarily, receded from the headlines. Looking back over the whole brouhaha triggered by Dulles’s now famous speech, Walter Lippmann wryly noted that there had been no official reluctance to explain, but an evident inability to clarify, the complexities of the issue. What had been said since 12 January by Dulles and the Joint Chiefs made it clear that “there has been no radical change in our strategic policy.” Confusion and controversy could have been avoided if the new developments to which strategy must be responsive “had been described soberly without playing to the gallery and without trying to smooth down the ruffled feathers of the isolationists.” The Dulles speech, Lippmann wrote, amounted to an announcement that the United States would never repeat the Korean experience, accompanied by dire threats of what might happen to any aggressor who attempted to exploit this determination. Dulles’s verbal violence had succeeded only in frightening America’s allies, probably without impressing the Soviet Union.

The administration’s success in deflating the public image of the New Look strategy in the aftermath of Dulles’s 12 January speech temporarily relieved the strains on bipartisan harmony and public receptivity. While friends at home and abroad might now take comfort in official assurances that the United States had many strings to its bow and would not recklessly unleash a nuclear holocaust, Communist leaders, hearing the same assurances, presumably were equally comforted. U.S. responses to future Communist aggressions might well be prompt, flexible, and not wholly predictable, but official spokesmen had made it clear that the present intention was, in general, to make the punishment fit the crime. As Walter Millis put it, recognizing that Dulles’s primary message might have been addressed to the Kremlin, “one could not help wondering a little at the diplomatic efficacy of a declaration for foreign consumption which almost immediately has to be explained away for the domestic market.” In the long run, however, Dulles had the last word. In the

* Lippmann cited the British White Paper of 19 February, describing Britain’s program for building a strategic nuclear deterrent complementary to the American, as an example showing that new developments affecting strategy could be stated soberly.
popular mind, if not in the studies of specialists, massive retaliation was to become virtually synonymous with the New Look, certainly its centerpiece.

For the short run, the prospects of effective deterrence of limited aggression based on the threat of massive retaliation had probably been undermined if not dissipated. The cost of deflating the massive retaliation threat was difficult to assess, particularly since its credibility, given the Soviet Union's possession of a formidable and growing atomic power of its own, was already limited for provocations less serious than, say, a renewal of large-scale hostilities in Korea. The deflation of the threat in March reduced its credibility still further, and in April and May the president's decisions not to risk the escalation that might have resulted from mounting a rescue operation for the beleaguered French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina provided Communist leaders an additional, more concrete indication of what they might in the future regard as a safe level of aggression.

With the official deflation of massive retaliation virtually to a single-scenario role, that of deterring an all-out attack on the continental United States, the New Look by mid-March had acquired a new focus. The administration seemed to be telling the public that the new strategy, apart from this one paramount but somewhat remote contingency, was really a long-haul, cold-war doctrine designed to deter and, if necessary, wage limited and brush-fire wars, mainly with conventional weapons and capabilities. Most editorialists and commentators stressed what the New Look was not, reassuring their readers that massive retaliation almost certainly would not be resorted to in any crisis less serious than the ultimate one, even though the option to do so would be kept open for talking purposes.

Walter Millis bluntly discounted the "basic policy decision . . . to depend primarily on a great capacity to retaliate instantly." The basic premise of the New Look planners, he thought, was that "once the Korean truce had been signed, there would be very little danger of any more shooting war" for the foreseeable future. Hence the decision to plan for the "long pull" rather than for a "crisis year." This made it feasible and not too risky to yield to the demands of the powerful advocates of fiscal orthodoxy for radical reductions in defense spending.

In Millis's view, the New Look did not rely, even "primarily," on "instant massive retaliation." During the next few years the principal reliance would obviously be on large conventional forces. The New Look would not provide "more defense for less money." Economy measures involved real sacrifices of combat power, while the increases in airpower
would bring commensurately higher costs. Nor would the reductions in combat strength be offset, despite official affirmations, by "new weapons" and "improved mobility." The former, except for strategic nuclear bombs, were still "pretty much an unknown quantity," while little was being done to improve mobility.

Yet, despite this disparaging analysis, Millis assessed the New Look as, on balance, "a quite sound and self-consistent response to the actual conditions it has been designed to meet."

Of the structure as it stands, one may say that it will probably be proportionately more efficient (largely because of technical advances), on its reduced base, than any military structure designed in the Truman years could have been; that, even counting in Allied resources, it still is probably quite inadequate to meet the shock of all-out war tomorrow; that it is probably sufficient, on the other hand, to reduce the danger of such a war to nearly negligible proportions, and that its conventional forces, though reduced, are reasonably adequate, in all likelihood, to take care of any "brush fire" wars likely now to develop.

"And what more than that," he asked, "do the national interest and safety really demand?"
When the House Appropriations Committee opened hearings on the FY 1955 budget at the beginning of February 1954, the promotion of the New Look was part and parcel of the exposition of the proposed DoD budget. There existed, of course, a broad division of labor between the principal civilian spokesmen, who tended to focus on dollars and other budget numbers, and the military chiefs and their aides, who were cast as experts on strategy, weapons, military manpower, and force structure. The line was often crossed in both directions, but the primary focus of discussion in the hearing rooms remained on the budget, which most legislators construed broadly to cover the whole field of Defense administration. With a few exceptions, senators and representatives showed little interest in the New Look as a political-military strategy or as a body of strategic doctrine and did not question its official rationale. As one uncharitable but perceptive critic described the prevailing attitude: “Most members of the Congress received the New Look sympathetically. Few did so thoughtfully . . . . The question of what actually might be the military and political effects of the New Look stirred only a ripple of curiosity within Congress and within the defense appropriations subcommittees.”

First New Look Budget: Presidential Preview

The president set the stage and the official tone for the hearings in his budget message to Congress on 21 January. The document breathed confidence, stressing that this was the administration’s first budget for which, unlike the revised FY 1954, it could claim full responsibility. The
president spoke forthrightly to the public demand for government economy and lower taxes, flogging Truman's wartime spending and the proposed budget for FY 1954 his predecessor had left behind. Actual spending for the current fiscal year, he declared, would be about $7 billion less than the Truman administration had proposed, and the FY 1955 budget would reduce spending by a further $5 billion. Appropriation requests also had been held below the level of estimated revenues, thus reducing the huge accumulation of unfinanced obligations incurred from past appropriations. Despite major revenue losses through tax reductions, lowered spending would bring the new budget closer to a balance, with an estimated deficit of only $2.9 billion. This was about one-fifth of the deficit projected by Truman for FY 1955, and $7 billion less than Truman had projected for FY 1954. Finally, $2.9 billion was only a long-range estimate; there was every expectation that it would be further reduced in the course of the year.²

National security programs (including atomic energy, military assistance, and stockpiling) accounted for $44.86 billion (68 percent) of the total expenditures and $34.86 billion (62 percent) of the total new obligational authority requested in the proposed budget.³ The DoD budget still dwarfed the other three programs, although spending for

| Table 5 |
| National Security Budgets, 1950-55 |
| ($ million) |

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<td>919</td>
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<td>Stockpiling</td>
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both military assistance and atomic energy was slated to increase in FY 1955. This continued the rising trend since the inception of these programs, accounting for 9.5 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively, of national security expenditures. Only the stockpiling program was reduced.

The new DoD budget accounted for 84 percent of the estimated national security expenditures in FY 1955, and 89 percent of the requested new obligational authority. The military departments had, of course, asked for much more. Their requests for new obligational authority added up to $35.1 billion—$10.076 billion for the Army, $11.516 billion for the Navy, $13.515 for the Air Force. McNeil's staff had shaved more than $4 billion off these amounts. As scheduled, the reduced budget had gone to BoB on 19 December.4

In his budget message the president pointed out that the projected $37.6 billion of expenditures for DoD was $4 billion less than those now estimated for FY 1954, which in turn were $2.1 billion less than actual spending in FY 1953—belying the prediction of the previous administration that FY 1954 spending would continue the rising wartime curve. These welcome developments, he said, resulted in large part from the administration's achievement in ending hostilities in Korea and the heavy costs associated with them. The process of shrinking the war-inflated military establishment from its peak uniformed strength of 3.7 million in the spring of 1952, putting it on a peacetime footing, and restructuring it for the years of uneasy peace ahead was now well under way, substantively as well as rhetorically. Regrettably, the level of spending in FY 1955, as in FY 1954, would remain higher than new appropriations, because of the still large backlog of unexpended dollars remaining from earlier appropriations, mostly obligated for long lead-time procurement, but this imbalance would soon be rectified as war programs were phased out or ran their course and current expenses were reduced.5

Administration spokesmen insisted that reduced spending involved no reduction, but rather a real increase, in military strength. The new DoD budget, declared the president, "points toward the creation, maintenance and full exploitation of modern airpower," on which would be lavished more generous outlays than in any year since World War II. During the next three years the current active inventory of 33,000 aircraft (one-third jet-powered) of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps would increase to more than 40,000, more than half jet-powered. By mid-1957 the Air Force would have 137 wings; naval airpower would comprise 16 carrier groups and 15 antisubmarine squadrons; Marine airpower would remain at its current level of three wings. At the same time the defenses of the U.S. continent were being expanded, with record expenditures, to counter the
threat of growing Soviet air-atomic capabilities, and civil defense was being strengthened to help provide earlier warning of impending attack and more effective evacuation and dispersal planning for major cities. 

Complementing this emphasis on airpower, the budget provided for strong naval, amphibious, and ground forces. The message tried hard to sugarcoat the December ground force cutbacks: In all forces, combat effectiveness would be enhanced and reduced numbers compensated for by modernization—applying new weapons, tools, and techniques to old military tasks. Since this emphasis had already been built into earlier budgets, it was not dramatically reflected in the new one. Even so, estimated expenditures for aircraft procurement in FY 1955 were only slightly less than in 1954 and accounted for 22 percent of the entire DoD budget, compared to less than 13 percent in 1952. Across the board, major procurement expenditures were estimated at about 15 percent below 1954 levels, while research and development funding was only slightly reduced.

The president stepped carefully around the prickly issue of manpower cutbacks. "After 3 years of hostilities," he said, "we are now in the first year of an armed peace." With the new emphasis on airpower and modern weapons, it had become possible to "support strong national security programs over an indefinite period with less of a drain on our manpower, material, and financial resources." He recalled the massive mobilization of manpower for the Korean War, from a strength of 1.5 million at the outbreak to a peak of 3.7 million two years later. Even now, six months into the truce period, total strength still exceeded 3.4 million. He planned to bring this down to 3.3 million by the end of June, and to a little over 3 million a year later, averaging 3.2 million during the budget year. The reduction would be paralleled by withdrawal of substantial forces from abroad, starting with the two Army divisions recently scheduled for early return from Korea, but without impairing capacity to oppose any renewal of Communist aggression. Republic of Korea forces would also be supported at a "high level of effectiveness." On the planned reduction in Army divisions, the president waffled: The number "may be less" than currently, but "increased mobility and . . . modern weapons" would give each division "increasingly greater striking power." He noted the increase in antiaircraft battalions for the expanding continental defense and the handsome budgetary payoff in FY 1955 from personnel cutbacks—almost $600 million less in direct military personnel costs than in FY 1954. Reduced personnel strength would also bring reductions in operation and maintenance costs.
Presentation: Briefing the Committees

With Republican majorities in both houses, the proposed DoD budget did not encounter serious criticism in the hearings, which for the most part turned out to be little more contentious than free-form briefing sessions. The opposition was now split between champions of the Army and the Air Force. An aggrieved band of partisans charged that the Army had been singled out to bear the brunt of irresponsible budgetary economics because, as the manpower-intensive service, it was most vulnerable to quick dollar-saving personnel reductions. The airpower partisans, ascendant during the FY 1954 budget debate, were now a spent force, reduced to a hard-core minority through defection of moderates who had been seduced by the continued preferred status of airpower in the post-Korea hierarchy. Senator Symington, airpower's chief and almost only effective congressional spokesman, served on the Armed Services Committee but not the Appropriations Committee. Barred from the budget hearings, he could only attack occasionally from the Senate floor. Among government witnesses, with General Vandenberg's voice now stilled, the airpower spokesmen were all firm administration supporters. The opposition's center of gravity had shifted to the Army partisans. Vandenberg's ostensible successor as dissenter in the FY 1955 budget debate, General Ridgway, the Army chief of staff, commanded wide respect and was an authentic military hero, but he could not quite match Vandenberg's single-minded and passionate commitment to the cause he championed, nor, of course, could he attract the kind of sympathy that flowed naturally to a dying man pleading that cause.

Personalities aside, the FY 1955 budget debate lacked the pyrotechnics of its predecessor, and its outcome was even more predictable, because both the administration and Congress had correctly sensed the popular mood—the usual craving after an unpopular war for a return to peacetime pursuits, lower taxes, lower tensions, and lower government spending—all, of course, without endangering national security.

Secretary Wilson led off the formal presentations in both houses. For backup he relied mainly on McNeil, again the principal architect and repository of budget "numbers" and procedures, and Assistant Secretary for Manpower John Hannah. Admiral Radford again spoke as chief expositor of the New Look's military aspects. These four carried the main burden of the budget presentation. For interrogation by the separate service subcommittees, each military department fielded a similar, somewhat larger, team headed by the secretary and military chief.
Like its predecessor, this new budget reflected a preponderance of expenditures over new appropriations, reversing the proportions of the budgets during the Korean War buildup. The requested total of almost $31 billion of new obligational authority, about 10 percent less than provided the year before, included $1.1 billion for new military construction, mostly Air Force bases, to be submitted later. The Army's budget had taken by far the deepest cuts; its $8.2 billion of requested new obligational authority fell $4.8 billion below the FY 1954 level, a 37 percent reduction. The Air Force budget, $11.2 billion, showed only a slight reduction; the Navy's $9.9 billion, a half-billion increase. Added to an anticipated $51.6 billion unexpended carryover from prior-year appropriations ($10.5 billion less than a year earlier), the new budget would make available $82.6 billion for expenditure in FY 1955 and (mostly) later. FY 1955 expenditures were projected at a little under $37.6 billion, almost $4 billion less than the amount estimated for FY 1954. Expected reductions in spending rates during FY 1955 were mostly in military personnel costs, operations and maintenance, and procurement of vehicles, ammunition, and production equipment.9

The end of hostilities in Korea had already permitted substantial reductions in FY 1954 expenditures. Almost all of the $2.2 billion originally provided for Korea in that year's budget was still unobligated and would remain so, a circumstance taken into account in determining the need for new money in FY 1955. The $2.2 billion of aggregate savings resulting from cessation of hostilities came from operation and maintenance ($1 billion), major procurement ($800 million), and military personnel ($400 million).10

Military Personnel

The same three budget categories—military personnel, operation and maintenance, and major procurement and production—accounted for 87 percent ($27 billion) of the new obligational authority requested for FY 1955. Of these, military personnel costs (pay, subsistence, clothing, travel, etc.), even after the deep personnel cuts ordered in December 1953, still remained the largest, although substantially reduced from FY 1954.11 As the largest service, the Army received the lion's share (almost 40 percent) of the $10.7 billion requested for military personnel, even though, on a per capita basis, soldiers came "cheaper" than sailors or airmen, whose costs reflected the more expensive skills and hardware of the "high tech" services. The military strength reductions underlying the new budget contemplated a shrinkage of more than 8 percent (290,000) of the armed
forces during FY 1955, more than two-thirds during the last six months of the year. But the reduction would be very unequally distributed among the services, 79 percent of it falling on the Army alone, which would lose 17 percent of its strength during the fiscal year. The Navy-Marine Corps loss would be only 21 percent, while the Air Force would gain 1.5 percent (15,000).12

The services underwent heavy pressure to carry out these reductions with the least possible impairment of combat strength—i.e., by eliminating primarily non-combat people and, within that category, primarily those ambiguously labeled as "supporting." In practice this proved difficult since most units included both combat and non-combat personnel. The Army's projected three-division cut, for example, would remove some 52,000 combat troops, only partly balanced by the support personnel who would go with them. By November 1953, the four services had marked 160,000 jobs for elimination, predominantly in non-combat categories. Some 69,000 were eliminated, but the remaining 91,000 were transferred to newly activated combat units or priority projects. In FY 1954, the Army lost only one of its three divisions slated to go, and the Air Force activated nine new combat wings while reducing its total strength. The net effect was a dramatic increase in combat strength during that year, both absolute and relative, the increases in the Army and Air Force swamping small declines in the other two services. In FY 1955, the Army's loss of two more divisions would be offset by the creation of more antiaircraft battalions for continental defense. The Air Force would activate eight more combat wings and deactivate three non-combat ones in an expanding force. The Navy's relative combat strength would continue to decline, but the Marine Corps would make good the losses of the preceding year. Over the two-year span, the projections indicated a gratifying achievement of the basic objective: an overall increase in relative combat strength from 54 to over 60 percent of total strength while losing more than a half million people.

The Army's performance looked by far the most impressive. By the end of FY 1955 its combat forces were expected to comprise almost 63 percent of its drastically reduced strength, 11 percent more than two years earlier. The Marine Corps, too, projected a remarkable increase of 6,500 men in its fighting forces despite an overall reduction of 10,000. The Air Force planned to increase its combat strength from less than 50 to 57 percent of its total by the end of FY 1955.

The services faced different manpower problems, of course, and dealt with them in different ways. The Army's problems were especially daunting. Its dependence on two-year draftees to supply about two-thirds of
its total strength created a monumental turnover every other year beginning in 1951; the next one would occur in 1955, when the Army expected to lose 620,000 trained men, almost half its enlisted strength, through expiring terms of service. Since in this same year the Army would have to reduce its strength by about 243,000, not all these losses would have to be replaced, but the training load would be heavy enough, particularly under the continuing pressure to reduce the ratio of non-combat personnel. Anticipating this condition, the Army had already instituted procedural changes. Numbers of recruits, after completing the first eight weeks of basic training, were now being assigned to active units to complete the remaining eight weeks, thus reducing the requirement for training overhead.\(^\text{13}\)

The Air Force handled its manpower problems less impressively than the Army, although they were less intractable. Nevertheless Wilson gave the committees a glowing portrayal of that service’s recent exploits in manpower management, particularly the vigorous effort launched by General Twining, Vandenberg’s successor as chief of staff, to achieve expansion goals under radically reduced personnel ceilings. In the Defense-wide review of manning tables, for example, the Air Force had scored a higher “kill rate” of unneeded positions than any of the other services. On the other hand, the Air Force resisted admonitions to reduce its high ratio (compared with other services) of overhead personnel to trainees.\(^\text{14}\)

As a “high tech” service, the Air Force found it especially difficult to maintain the proper mix of technical and non-technical military skills, the hasty wartime expansion having produced a combination of shortages in the former and surpluses in the latter. The postwar contraction reduced the demand for both, but the emphasis on modernization created higher requirements for technically skilled personnel while making it harder to find useful employment for the large numbers of unskilled, low-skill, and hard-to-train people. Compounding the difficulty were the four-year enlistees not due to leave until 1955 and 1956. All this created a prospect of high peaks and deep valleys in personnel input over the next two years, and of violent fluctuations in training loads and staffing needs, requiring both closing and reactivation of facilities. To deal with this, the Air Force had instituted in 1953 an early-release program to hasten clearing out surplus and unsuitable enlisted personnel. About 67,000 airmen were being released in FY 1954.\(^\text{15}\)

These measures produced impressive statistics. From a military strength of 980,000 in April 1953, the Air Force, Secretary Wilson reported, without pressure from above had cut back by the end of December to 912,000. It now expected by the end of FY 1954 to produce not only the 110 wings OSD wanted but also 5 more; this meant adding 9 combat wings
to the 90 combat and 16 troop carrier wings in being in June 1953, all under a military personnel ceiling of 955,000. Over the next three years a corresponding acceleration was promised, still within modest manpower limits. The contrast with earlier Air Force expectations was startling:

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The 137-wing objective was the Air Force's revised version of the 143-wing force approved during the Korean War. It comprised substantially the same number of combat wings (126) with a reduced complement of troop carrier wings (11).16

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE (O&M)

For operation and maintenance, the "housekeeping" account, Defense requested $9.064 billion in new money, $594 million less than in FY 1954. This net reduction combined a $500 million increase in the Air Force budget and reductions of $1 billion in the Army and $76 million in the Navy budgets.17

Overall, the reduction reflected the shrinking of the armed forces, the cessation of Korean hostilities, and, of course, the continuing effort throughout DoD to economize and improve efficiency. Much of this effort, Wilson readily conceded, grew out of studies and programs launched by his predecessors; but unlike them, he artfully added, he was trying to replace "protracted studies" by finding new ways to save. Wilson and McNeil described in some detail the management and reduction of the huge inventories of materiel built up during the war. Until 1953 the Navy had been the only service with a financial property accounting system; only in that year did the Army and the Air Force take the first steps to maintain dollar figures on inventories and issues in their continental U.S. depots. OSD aimed to extend the system as rapidly as possible in all three services to overseas depots and to posts, camps, stations, and bases worldwide.18 At the same time, an establishment-wide drive, Operation Cleansweep, had begun to purge military warehouses of unserviceable, obsolete, and surplus material.19

Wilson reported with especial pride his progress in reducing Defense's civilian work force from 1,329,795 when the administration took office to 1,179,438 eleven months later, an 11 percent reduction
carried out largely by attrition and at an estimated saving of more than a half billion dollars. McNeil reported another noteworthy achievement—the Navy's administration of the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) under "industrial fund" management, which was "saving Uncle Sam about $250 million a year over what it cost 3 years ago to handle the same volume of traffic." This system of management, which DoD was instituting in many areas, sought to create a buyer-seller relationship between an activity and its military "customers," and permitted coordination of operating and fiscal responsibilities under a single management and reduction of overlapping and duplication of services and facilities.

How much in the aggregate the Defense managers expected to save by more efficient management in FY 1955 was a question that, curiously, the economy-minded legislators of the 83d Congress did not ask, even though such savings were supposed to be "credited" in the budget. Witnesses supplied numbers in great profusion bearing on the question, but they added up to a collection of apples and oranges that defied aggregation into a total of management savings. As noted earlier, the new money requested for the O&M account showed a net reduction of $594 million from the FY 1954 budget, attributable in part to savings from improved management. No one on the House committee picked up on the point, but inasmuch as the termination of Korean hostilities had freed about $1 billion in O&M money for deferred obligation in FY 1955, and the availability of this sum had been taken into account in determining the new request, not $9 billion but at least $10 billion would be available for O&M needs in FY 1955—more than had been provided in FY 1954.

In budget discussions during 1953 a round estimate of $1 billion had often been mentioned as the probable size of management savings to be expected from Wilson's economy effort. Even with the handsome payoffs from the expanding stock funds, the aggregate savings DoD's top managers were willing to claim were well under this figure. It is tempting to suspect that they were guided by the bureaucrat's ancient rule that it is always prudent to promise less than one hopes to deliver, since it is better to disappoint oneself than one's superior.

**MAJOR PROCUREMENT**

Major procurement and production was the third of the "top three" FY 1955 DoD budget accounts, with an appropriation request of $7.3 billion. Unlike the Personnel and O&M accounts, which had held fairly stable through the war years and FY 1954, it was 30 percent lower than its FY 1954 predecessor, and little more than one-third the size of the
FY 1955 request. The reason for the precipitous drop was not so much the expectation of diminished procurement activity in FY 1955, although spending in that year was expected to be about $2.7 billion less than in FY 1954, as the availability of large sums carried over from previous years. Out of the $83 billion provided by Congress for major procurement during the four years 1951 through 1954, the department expected to have at the beginning of the next fiscal year $36.3 billion still unspent, including $6.6 billion still unobligated. With the new money requested, the services would thus have $13.9 billion available for obligation and $43.6 billion available to spend in FY 1955 and beyond.24

None of the new major procurement money requested was intended for the Army. By the end of FY 1954 it expected to have an unexpended balance of $7.3 billion in its major procurement account, of which about $4 billion would be available for obligation. Since the Army expected to spend less than $2.1 billion for this purpose in FY 1955, the funds on hand would suffice to meet its needs in that year and beyond, particularly with its basic equipment requirements largely filled and, in the absence of a shooting war, ammunition and fuel expenditure at a low ebb.25

Aircraft constituted by far the largest procurement item, with projected Air Force and Navy expenditures of $8.3 billion in FY 1955—about the same as in FY 1954 and almost a billion more than in FY 1953. In new obligational authority for aircraft, the Navy would receive $1.919 billion and the Air Force only $2.48 billion, more than a half billion less than in FY 1954, reflecting the planned tapering off of new contracting. Both services were making an effort to reduce production peaks and smooth the flow of aircraft to combat units. New models would be held back from production until fully proved; after going into production they would be held at a low monthly rate for as long as 18 months while being further tested. Under this plan the development and production phases overlapped and kept factory output low to avoid the high costs of erratic output and modification. Savings could run into hundreds of millions of dollars.26

For ships and harbor craft the president expected the Navy to spend $990 million in FY 1955, slightly less than in FY 1954, and asked for $1.15 billion in new money to help overcome block obsolescence of an aging fleet built largely during World War II. For combat vehicles, only the Marine Corps needed new money, $34 million. Both the Marines and the Army had by now practically completed equipping their active forces with combat vehicles and were stretching out production for mobilization reserves in order to keep production lines active for a longer time. Estimated expenditures were $280 million, down from $700 million in FY 1954.
Ammunition production had been sustained at high rates after the end of Korean hostilities in order to build up mobilization reserves. The plan was to maintain output at low rates in order to avoid shutting the production lines down completely. The new money request of $513 million amounted to less than one-fifth of the FY 1954 provision; estimated expenditures of $1.9 billion fell well below the $3.4 billion in FY 1954. Guided missile procurement, a high priority under the New Look, was ticketed for increased spending by all three services in FY 1955, $660 million as compared with $442 million in FY 1954, and $295 million in FY 1953. With $1 billion remaining from the $2.5 billion provided for missiles in FYs 1951-54, however, DoD requested only $401 million in new funds, down from $748 million in FY 1954 and $896 million in FY 1953.

The budget request for electronics and communication equipment was $419 million, slightly less than in FY 1954; expenditures were estimated at $675 million, as compared with $863 million in FY 1954 and about $1 billion the preceding year. For military production equipment and facilities Congress had provided $6.2 billion over the past four fiscal years, of which about $2.3 billion was expected to remain at the end of the fiscal year. Expenditures in this category were estimated at $932 million, down from $1.3 billion in FY 1954 and $1.7 billion in FY 1953.27

The Military Perspective

The military leaders had to speak also to issues—strategy, weapons, missions, the threat, force composition—that went beyond budget numbers although obviously interacting with them. These issues came to the fore as the Joint Chiefs appeared before congressional committees in their chiefs of services capacity and received public attention.

"Pros in Pentagon Cool to New Look" blared a headline in the New York Times about a week before the House hearings began in February 1954. The reservations of the professional military, according to the article, concerned the administration's basic proposition: "that the United States in the next three years can somehow buy more security for less money and with fewer men under arms than in the recent past." General Ridgway was the only officer mentioned by name, but chiefly to make the point that he and the service he represented had decided to "live with" the administration's decision "rather than carry its fight to Capitol Hill as the Air Force did a year ago." In a recent speech, the article reported, Ridgway had hinted at his misgivings but had also "made clear his reluctance to challenge the new policy in public." Other officers,
unnamed, had expressed doubts about the effectiveness of untested atomic weapons against troops in the field, about "bomb[ing] an aggressor nation into submission" with nuclear weapons, and about withdrawing major ground forces from the Far East. The reader was left to draw his own conclusions as to the service affiliation of the skeptics.

In the hearings, Ridgway sounded the only discordant note in the military high command, but his dissent was tempered and selective. His colleagues, in brief prepared statements, all voiced the undiluted official line and under interrogation supported it undeviatingly. Admiral Radford, firing the opening shot before a House committee, weighed his emphases carefully, stressing two fundamentals: the long-haul, no-year-of-crisis concept, and the overriding importance of airpower. He simply listed other features: an expanded continental defense, collective security and the complementary role of allied forces, the three-year program of manpower reduction and force restructuring, a healthy economy, an adequate mobilization base, and strengthened reserves. Evidently trying to offset Dulles's excessive emphasis on massive strategic retaliation and deterrence-by-threat, Radford's treatment of atomic weapons was low-key, but he was careful to point out that they were, "presently and prospectively," a family of weapons available to all the services and thus, by implication, usable at many levels of conflict. Similarly he stressed the need for limited-war capabilities, as well as an ability to deliver "tremendous, vast retaliatory and counteroffensive blows" in a global war. He also made a point of correcting his December gaffe of decoupling the FY 1955 budget from the New Look. The budget, he now declared, was based on and constituted the first step in the implementation of the Joint Chiefs' new three-year military program.

General Twining's presentation naturally portrayed the Air Force as the centerpiece of the New Look. He provided full and vivid confirmation of Dulles's generalized allusions to an overwhelming strategic retaliatory power that was, he declared, "the principal deterrent to aggression." At the same time, legislators haunted by visions of SAC bombers taking off for Moscow or Peiping while Communist armies overwhelmed allied defenses on the ground, may have been reassured by his description of the diversified capabilities of "air-atomic power." Strategic air forces, Twining said, would be able to take part in land-air battles, as they had done in World War II and in Korea, and tactical air forces carrying atomic weapons could attack strategic targets within their range.

On the air defense mission, both for the continental United States and for bases abroad, Twining proved less reassuring. An attacker had an inherent advantage, accentuated in air warfare, in being able to choose
the time, place, and method of attack, and Soviet capabilities for long-range air attack were growing at an alarming rate. "One grand-scale atomic blow by the Soviets on our industrial and population centers could be decisive if allowed to be conducted without interference." The air defense mission, therefore, was becoming more and more important and must not be neglected, despite its high costs and inherent difficulties. Twining gave the legislators a highly reassuring picture of an Air Force rapidly approaching state-of-the-art modernization, with the conversion to jet fighters virtually complete, the introduction of supersonic models getting under way, eight bomber wings already equipped with the medium B-47, and the first operational B-52s scheduled for the following year.

The 137-wing program, said Twining, cautiously approaching that dangerous subject, was "not simply a reduced version of our previous 143-wing program. Its size and composition are based on the latest Air Force views on air requirements, and reflect the concepts of our new national strategy." The vast effort poured into the 143-wing program, he concluded, had served the important purpose of strengthening the U.S. military position and evidencing capability for rapid development of our airpower; this may have had an effect on Soviet actions in the cold war. 30

Twining had obvious reasons for embracing a national strategy that ensured the dominant status of his own service for years to come. Equally clearly, Admiral Carney's official attitude toward the New Look was colored by the fact that he could envisage no such future for his service, although it did not fare badly in the proposed budget. Committee members listening to his opening presentation on 10 February (the day before Twining's testimony) may well have wondered whether he really believed that the new strategy had much relevance to the Navy's mission. He began with an earnest discourse on sea power, expounding the Mahanian thesis that the United States must command the seas in order to project its military strength overseas and act in concert with its allies. The Navy, he asserted, was the chosen and essential instrument for performing this mission.

Alluding to the New Look's major reductions in the personnel strength and combat units of all the services except the Air Force, Carney declared that the Navy understood and accepted the changes. He then came to his main point: "The shift in emphasis within the military concept has in no way altered the roles and missions of the services . . . . The Navy continues to be responsible for maintaining control of the sea, and the importance of that task continues undiminished, especially since the Soviet Union manifests increasing interest in seapower. Our ability to project our armed strength overseas and to sustain and operate our
overseas bases depends entirely upon the ability of the Navy to do its job." Carney then proceeded to a nuts-and-bolts exposition of the Navy's program. In FY 1955 it would maintain its fighting forces with undiminished effectiveness while at the same time reducing the size of the active fleet and supporting establishment. Antisubmarine and mine warfare would continue to receive heavy emphasis, and continental defense would get increased attention. Although some active fleet units would be inactivated, there would be no reduction in the effectiveness of the air arm, Navy or Marine: The number of operating aircraft, 9,941, would remain the same as in FY 1954. With the purchase of 1,450 aircraft, most to be delivered during 1956, the Navy would reach 87 percent of its modernization goal in December 1956. For the active fleet the Navy planned to construct a fourth Forrestal carrier, a third nuclear submarine, and 28 other vessels and modernize 17 more. Later in the day, General Shepherd briefly described the Marine Corps' planned programs for FY 1955, centering on the three-division force with associated air wings.

Carney appeared to have decided that the New Look was a strategy he could live with. At this juncture, just before the dawn of the ballistic missile era, the Navy had relatively few areas of serious friction with the Army. As for the Air Force, its primacy in the service constellation ruled out a revived "first line of defense" role for the Navy. All three services would have to share that role, with the Army and Navy relegated to junior-partner status. But if the Navy could not yet match the intercontinental nuclear-armed bomber in the armory of massive retaliation, the attack carrier and the Marine Corps' amphibious and heavily armed ground forces with built-in air support were instruments superior to anything the Air Force possessed for projecting and using military power around the world in the most probable scenarios of cold-war rivalry—and in the long run this might prove to be a more useful and enduring role than that of deterrence through the threat of massive retaliation. Under the new budget, happily, New Look doctrine protected the Navy against cutbacks in its air arm, provided for continued modernization of the fleet, and kept overall strength reductions within tolerable limits.

Ridgway's misgivings over the probable impact of the new strategy and proposed budget on the Army had hardened by the time the hearings began. Secretary Stevens, whose own misgivings, though real, were neither so strong nor so deep, had made his peace with the new dispensation and supported it in the hearings. Evidently respectful of each other's views and disinclined to air their differences in public, they managed to avoid a direct clash, Ridgway in particular being inhibited by an apparently ingrained deference toward civilian superiors. His replies
to questions were guarded, and generally limited to factual information, but he said enough to raise serious questions about the validity of the assumptions on which the New Look rested. In his prepared statement he asserted that the reduction of the Army's strength already under way would weaken its capabilities, "while our responsibilities for meeting the continuing enemy threat have yet to be correspondingly lessened."33

Under the new expenditure ceilings, Ridgway told the appropriations committees in both houses, the Army had been forced to cut its procurement programs to the bone. Over the preceding two years, the policy had been to keep production lines operating and reduce the rate of accumulation of reserve stocks, with a view to improving materiel readiness while maintaining a rapidly expansible production base. Now, however, "cutbacks and even cancellations of procurement contracts have had to be ordered and many currently active production lines are being placed in standby or will return to civilian production. This will narrow the operating production base and thereby reduce its capability after D-day. The Army will increase its materiel readiness at a much slower rate than planned earlier."34

In addition to its multiple commitments around the world, the Army had responsibility for maintenance of a mobilization base for general war, operation of a network of military missions and military assistance groups in 28 countries, and military intelligence and civil affairs/military government services. To meet these responsibilities, the Army would have, as a result of the latest cutbacks, a strength of 1,172,000 at the end of FY 1955, about a quarter-million down from a year earlier. Ridgway stressed how much of the Army's strength went to functions other than manning the nation's defenses. About one-quarter of the Army consisted of trainees, instructors, transients, patients in hospitals, and doers of other odd jobs required by law, and about one-fifth of the remainder performed logistical and support functions. This would leave fewer than 700,000 of the Army's end FY 1955 strength for combat units. Of the 1.4 million on-hand strength forecast for 30 June 1954, expiring service terms would remove about 707,000 during the ensuing 12 months; only about 463,000 replacements would be brought in. These figures made concrete Walter Millis's assertion that "almost the whole working force has to be recruited and trained and shipped anew every two years."35

Ridgway especially doubted the New Look tenet that "new weapons" would prove a substitute for manpower. No skeptic regarding the power of technological modernization to multiply and expand the capabilities of his own service, as well as of the more technology-intensive Navy and Air Force, he provided figures showing that the current infantry division,
with only 15 percent more personnel than its World War II predecessor, "theoretically" could generate 84 percent greater firepower. The new Nike antiaircraft battalions, with a strength of 481 men as compared with 610 in the regular gun battalions, had demonstrated something like a 5-to-1 superiority over the latter in general effectiveness and perhaps as much as a 10-to-1 superiority in target kills. On the other hand, personnel savings in units were probably offset by heavier requirements for maintenance and training personnel. 36 Ridgway warned that much of the new lethal gadgetry being talked about, and too often assumed to be already available, was operationally far down the road. Meanwhile the Army would have to make do with the mixture of old and new weapons it now had. 37

Ridgway also made the point that most of the "whole range of modern weapons" the president was fond of alluding to would be of limited value in many potential "brush fire" environments. The mountains and rice paddies of Korea and Indochina, he reminded his audience, had proved inhospitable to tanks and mechanized vehicles and demanded large concentrations of ground troops. Even in Europe, where American superiority in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons was counted on most heavily, the Soviets still held a strong card in their ability to overrun the continent and exploit its industrial potential—forcing the United States to choose whether or not to devastate its allies' homelands in order to deny the occupiers the use of their resources. Strong ground forces, as the Korean War had conclusively demonstrated, remained indispensable. 38

Testimony during the hearings also tended to undermine the credibility of another supposed offset to numerical weakness—the anticipated increase in mobility and flexibility. When Secretary Stevens suggested that troops could be airlifted more quickly from the United States than from places where they were currently tied down, Florida Rep. Robert Sikes asked him whether that could be done more quickly in 1955 than in 1954. "With every year that goes by," Stevens replied, "we hope we will have a greater capability of airlift." "How much greater?" Sikes queried. Stevens confessed he could not say and looked to Ridgway for help. "I would have to go into Air Force plans to consider that," said Ridgway. Whereupon the colloquy went off the record, presumably to make the point that (as Ridgway well knew) the Air Force's 137-wing program called for a cutback of troop carrier wings from 17 to 11. At a hearing later in the month, an Air Force spokesman claimed that there were adequate aircraft to meet the Army's requirements. 39

In addition to enhancing the firepower and other capabilities of the Army's shrunken standing force, the administration counted on supplementing it, at modest cost, from two sources: the large pool of veterans
still obligated for service and the potentially abundant manpower of allied countries. Under a new approach still in the mill, the Army hoped to induce obligated reservists to participate actively in the organized reserve (they had no legal requirement to do so) by taking mobilization assignments with periodic stints of training in Reserve, National Guard, or active Army units near their homes. The Army, together with the reorganized reserve and the three-division Marine Corps, constituted an adequate standing force. In turn, testified Radford, they formed part of the "larger system of collective Allied forces." Given the astronomical cost of maintaining standing modern military forces indefinitely, no other course was economically feasible. "We cannot do it by ourselves, but by helping our allies we can generate collectively sufficient strength."

Ridgway tried to be fair in assessing how allied manpower and advanced weapons affected the ability of the Army, with dwindling strength, to fulfill its responsibilities. He professed to be "very optimistic" that the new reserve plan would work, but less so regarding the buildup of effective allied forces. The recent expansion and improvement of the ROK army was encouraging, he thought, noting that 18 of the planned 20 divisions were now combat-worthy. NATO forces had grown rapidly at first, but their expansion had slowed markedly during the past year. He was skeptical about the prospective addition of German forces to NATO. As for the Japanese defense force, it was disappointingly small. In general, he saw no security gain for the United States or the free world in a wholesale withdrawal of the Army from its overseas stations, which would tend to weaken the American commitment to defend its own and its allies' interests abroad.

Understandably, Ridgway was proud of the Army and confident of its prowess. "There is nothing as good that I know of in any other first-class military organization anywhere in the world." Three fewer divisions, however, would make a difference in the capacity to defend exposed but vital positions, such as Japan. Ridgway believed that a 20-division Army came very close to being an irreducible requirement to fulfill the Army's responsibilities under existing circumstances. The 17 divisions to which he insisted the Army must reduce in FY 1955 to match its strength of 1,164,000 men at the end of that year represented a division slice only slightly smaller than that of the existing 20-division force. Convinced that the 20 divisions and supporting forces represented a substantively exact calculation of what the Army needed now, he could concede, as Stevens did, that it might somehow manage to make do with three divisions and a quarter-million men less in FY 1955, but only if its responsibilities were correspondingly reduced.
Rigid within his professional sphere of competence, Ridgway re­
mained ambivalent outside it. A question that had tortured Stevens—
whether the reduction of the Army represented a top-level decision to
gamble that its adequacy would not be put to the test—Ridgway simply
rejected as outside his competence, saying “the Army is not in the busi­
ness of making foreign policy.” His strongest resistance to making a
forthright statement was on the bottom-line question—did he agree to
the reduction of the Army? During the Senate hearing, Sen. Burnet Maybank
of South Carolina unexpectedly asked Ridgway whether he was “perfectly
satisfied” with the budget allocation to the Army. Ridgway said he
“accepted” it:

Maybank: I did not ask you if you accept it. I can understand
that . . . a career officer will accept orders from above . . . . But
you do not recommend that?

Ridgway: The time for recommendation is past, sir.

Maybank: I understand that, but did you recommend it to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Ridgway: I believe, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to submit to
you the propriety of answering these particular questions in
executive session.

The following day Radford, who had been present during this
exchange, told the committee that the Joint Chiefs in December had
agreed “unanimously” to the whole military program. When Sen. Homer
Ferguson reminded him of Ridgway’s recent comments, they were,
Radford said, “not exactly clear to me.” Ferguson pressed him further:
Was the military program truly a joint product reflecting the views of all
the JCS, or was it presented to them on a take-it-or-I-eave-it basis? Radford
suggested that perhaps the disagreement Ridgway implied had been over
the question whether it was proper for the chiefs, as military advisers,
to examine the economic feasibility of the program rather than restrict
their study to the purely military aspects, and whether in following this
procedure the chiefs were acting voluntarily or under a directive. He,
Radford, believed the problem before the chiefs was historically unprece­
dented and required them to probe the question of economic feasibility.
“As military men, . . . we must take economic factors into consideration,”
and it was his recollection that all his colleagues had agreed. “I did not
feel in this case that we were operating under a ceiling or directive.” All
the chiefs had the privilege of dissenting. None did.
In effect, Radford seemed to be saying, Ridgway's insistence that he had "accepted" the program without being fully satisfied with it at the time, or being willing to "recommend" it to the Joint Chiefs, was a distinction without a difference. To Radford, the important point was that the Army chief of staff had failed to exercise his prerogative of formally dissenting. Most of the senators, whatever their public stance, probably agreed with Radford. Radford's was the last word. Even though Ridgway got the executive session he had asked for, by that time senatorial apathy had set in. Neither Maybank nor any of his colleagues pressed further the question of Ridgway's "acceptance" of the New Look. Radford, on the other hand, received plaudits for his exposition.48

The reduction of the Army's status and weight in the service hierarchy touched Ridgway on a sensitive nerve—his profound belief in the central role in warfare of the individual soldier and in the enduring primacy of ground forces and land warfare in armed conflict. In his prepared statements in both chambers, he devoted his entire conclusion, a carefully written, deliberately rhetorical peroration of two to three minutes' duration, to an unabashed affirmation of his personal service bias. It was an impressive performance, particularly since the other service chiefs all adhered strictly to the conventions of pedestrian language and a "team play" portrayal of interservice relations. Ridgway stressed the human qualities of the individual soldier, which made him, he declared, the ultimate key to victory. "No machine can replace the intangible qualities of the human spirit nor the adaptability of the human mind."49

No spokesman for the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the administration was likely to disagree publicly with such an assertion. But in the context in which it was delivered, it obviously implied the superiority of the "manpower-intensive" Army over the "machine-intensive" Air Force and Navy. Ridgway also took issue with the proposition that the new technologies of airpower, and to a lesser extent sea power, had raised those two services to a paramount role in modern warfare. New weapons and the growing importance of airpower had, indeed, given "new meaning" and "wider scope" to land warfare, but "without changing war's nature and basic objectives." In deference to the interservice code, he stopped there, refraining from claiming for the Army, as the service rooted in the land, primacy in the effort to control the land. But in later writings he would go further, asserting the Army's superior inherent capabilities for achieving the objectives sought by the New Look.50
Wrap-up

Even before the House committee got to work on the DoD budget early in February, the Army had volunteered some $127 million of additional reductions; during the course of the hearings the services offered another $183 million for a total of $310 million. To this was soon added $355 million, the result of the committee’s decision to relieve DoD of the requirement to budget for goods and services it expected U.S. troops to receive from foreign governments. Beyond these, the committee’s further cuts of $541 million from the president’s original $29.99 billion brought the total reduction to $1.2 billion and the finally recommended appropriation, on 26 April, to $28.7 billion in new obligational authority.

The Army’s final total, $7.6 billion, was $5.3 billion less than in FY 1954. The committee’s only contribution to this excision was a handful of minuscule cuts adding up to $139 million (1.7 percent of the Army budget). Otherwise, the total was a consequence of the absence of any new requirement for procurement funding or of expenses for ongoing hostilities, both of which had been major budget items in FY 1954, and of the preliminary reductions noted above.51

By contrast, the Navy’s request for $9.9 billion in new money represented an increase of almost a half billion dollars over FY 1954. The committee’s net cut of only $209 million in the Navy’s request, spread thinly over a hodge-podge of small appropriations, hardly scratched the surface.52 In the Navy’s two big-ticket items—aircraft and shipbuilding—the new money requested amounted to only a fraction of the planned spending in FY 1955 and beyond. For aircraft, the almost $2 billion requested would be added to at least $6.2 billion of unexpended funds, to finance production through December 1956. By that time the level of modernization (the proportion of first-line aircraft to the total) would have risen from its current 45 percent to 87 percent.53 For shipbuilding and conversion, the Navy expected to end FY 1954 with an unexpended balance of $1.8 billion, mostly unliquidated obligations. For FY 1955 the committee went along with the service’s request for just over $1 billion for shipbuilding. The Navy expected to have by the end of the year an unexpended balance of $2 billion to help finance the later stages of its expansion.54 The Marine Corps, with four small appropriation requests totaling $951 million, took a cut of about $24 million, most of it resulting from discovery of errors in calculation or overstatements of costs.55

The committee paid tribute to the recent spectacular reduction of Air Force military manpower goals, and the dramatic actual drop in strength from 977,600 on 30 June 1953 to 912,500 six months later.
Strength levels were now rising again toward a planned total of 955,000 on 30 June 1954. During this banner fiscal year the Air Force expected to activate 9 combat wings, 10 air transport squadrons, and several other support units; increase the annual pilot training rate from 7,200 to 7,800; expand the North American air defense net by activating 10 new sites and re-equipping 19 old ones; increase support of NATO; establish 20 new operating bases; and maintain its forces at combat-ready status.\footnote{56}

The committee rewarded these achievements by making only a small cut ($43 million) in the $3.4 billion request for Air Force military personnel. It also left untouched the big aircraft fund of $2.7 billion and was forbearing in its treatment of the remainder of the Air Force budget. Its entire reduction, including the preliminary excisions already noted, amounted to only 3.4 percent of the original budget, leaving the Air Force with a final total of $10.819 billion.\footnote{57}

Following the gentle scrutiny and general acceptance of the administration's DoD budget by its appropriations committee, the House opened floor debate on 28-29 April, with only flashes of parochial-interest oratory,\footnote{58} including a proposed but ruled-out-of-order amendment to increase the daily milk ration in the armed forces, an idea enthusiastically supported by dairy-state delegations. Little criticism of the committee's report emerged, and no amendments were offered. But Representative Sikes denounced the deep cuts inflicted on the Army budget before it reached the committee, and charged that they seriously weakened the service at a time when the country faced growing threats from abroad. Minutes before, Rep. George Mahon had raised the possibility of a "new look at the New Look."\footnote{59}

In the Senate, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, after hearing a few top DoD officials on 15-16 March, awaited conclusion of House action on the budget. The most successful of several efforts\footnote{60} during this hiatus to focus the senatorial mind on the New Look was a speech by Senator Symington who rose on 30 March "to protest certain aspects of the so-called New Look," which, he complained, neither he, nor the public, nor many of his colleagues, fully understood. One of his aims, it soon became apparent, was to inject the Armed Services Committee, of which he was a member, into the upcoming debate on the New Look. He believed that the Appropriations Committee, which handled most questions of military strategy and policy at budget time, was preoccupied with money almost to the exclusion of policy. He recalled the shameful treatment given General Vandenberg, who during the FY 1954 budget debate had "stressed to the Congress the importance of security as
against money," thereby incurring the wrath of the "new inexperienced Pentagon civilian chiefs."  
Symington repeated the familiar charge that the $5 billion cut in the original FY 1954 Air Force budget had dangerously slowed the buildup of U.S. airpower by stretching out the 143-wing objective an additional two years, disrupting its momentum by an interposed 120-wing program fraudulently labeled as "interim," and finally reducing the end goal to 137 wings. He now introduced a new argument, challenging the administration's claim of heavy budgetary emphasis on airpower based on comparative FY 1955 expenditure projections ($10 billion plus, each, for the Army and Navy, against $16 billion plus for the Air Force). Almost all of the $16 billion the Air Force expected to spend, he pointed out, was money appropriated by the Democrats as far back as 1951 and represented delayed fulfillment of the Truman administration's programs. The Eisenhower administration's program for building up airpower, on the other hand, included a meager request for only $11.2 billion of new money, little more than for the other two services and less than in FY 1954. Even allowing for some trimming down for a 137-wing force and for recent advances in weaponry, "the gap between [ $16 billion] and the $11.2 figure in the budget request is far too great for anyone to feel comfortable."  

The Senate committee soon had before it, along with the House committee report and the House appropriations bill, Wilson's formal reclama seeking restoration of $371 million of the cuts as well as some of the rescissions from earlier appropriations. In its report, submitted to the Senate on 11 June, the committee proposed no substantial changes in either the original budget or the House recommendations; it restored less than half, $177 million, of the House's proposed cut and a few smaller items. DoD officials, evidently pleased, gave assurance that the remaining reductions could be absorbed without damage to the defense effort.

The full Senate took up the report on 15 June in an atmosphere dramatically different from that of the House floor debate six weeks earlier. In Vietnam Dien Bien Phu had fallen on 7 May, French forces had begun to withdraw into the Mekong Delta, and two days later at the Geneva Conference France had proposed an armistice with the Communists in Indochina. As the crisis deepened, Washington alarm increased. At his news conference on 10 June the president talked worriedly about combating the worldwide resurgence of communism and the impossibility of being strong everywhere while the enemy held the initiative. Still, he had no plans to change the budget; "merely to go wage a battle somewhere is perfectly useless, costly and useless."
The Senate floor debate on the budget began on 16 June. Before Senator Ferguson, the Defense subcommittee chairman and administration floor manager, could finish his preliminary review, a group of mostly junior Democratic senators—Gore of Tennessee, Kennedy of Massachusetts, Monroney of Oklahoma, Lehman of New York, Mansfield of Montana, Humphrey of Minnesota, and Douglas of Illinois—launched an evidently coordinated attack. They used the argument of the radically changed world situation, the weakening of American defenses, and the administration's public misrepresentations. Humphrey best articulated their position, pointing to the uncertainties of a world situation that was changing day by day in both Europe and Asia.

Kennedy finally brought the debate into focus by introducing two amendments intended to restore $350 million to enable the Army to keep the two divisions scheduled for elimination. He listed six co-sponsors, including Symington. The resulting debate on the amendments dominated the following day's (17 June) proceedings, but the vote was 50 to 38 against. Although a clear administration victory, it was no walkover. Later in the day, the Senate moved swiftly to pass the appropriation bill as recommended by the committee. In conference with the House, on 23 June the resulting compromise gave the Senate a little better than the usual split-the-difference outcome. Overall, the numbers seemed to add up to an administration victory: a little over a billion lopped off a $29.9 billion budget, including voluntary and purely bookkeeping cuts of more than half that amount. Even had the Kennedy amendments passed in the Senate, the conference with the House would surely have drastically reduced the amount finally restored to the Army. On 30 June the president signed the bill into law.

### Table 6
The FY 1955 Defense Budget in Congress
($ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>President’s Budget</th>
<th>Passed by House</th>
<th>Passed by Senate</th>
<th>Passed by Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSD &amp; Interservice</td>
<td>561.0</td>
<td>540.0</td>
<td>540.5</td>
<td>540.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>8,211.0</td>
<td>7,619.1</td>
<td>7,890.1</td>
<td>7,619.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy/Marine Corps</td>
<td>9,915.0</td>
<td>9,705.8</td>
<td>9,725.6</td>
<td>9,712.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>11,200.0</td>
<td>10,819.3</td>
<td>11,060.9</td>
<td>10,927.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29,887.0</td>
<td>28,684.2</td>
<td>29,217.1</td>
<td>28,800.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table in Cong Rec, 83 Cong, 2 sess, 1954, 100, pt 12:15493.
The administration had won a victory, but so had Ridgway, whose name had been repeatedly invoked during the debate. For prying from Congress the relatively austere budget they had asked for, the administration and the DoD leadership could thank, at opposite ends of a wide range of influences, the legislative skills of Senator Ferguson in successfully thwarting an opposition counterattack on his side of the Capitol, and an inchoate craving among the general public for an end to threats of war. Finely tuned ears on Capitol Hill were acutely sensitive to this craving. They were equally sensitive, however, to persisting signs that the public also loved a military hero, particularly one perceived to be a victim of service and bureaucratic politics. Practically every speaker in either House who rose to comment pro or con on the New Look or the budget made ritual obeisance, by suitable quotations, to Ridgway, who since December had become the most controversial figure in the ongoing New Look drama. Ridgway now knew that he and the Army had a strong following on the Hill and that, at least for the present, the administration's treatment of the Army was the weakest spot in the New Look's armor. So Ridgway, too, was preparing for the FY 1956 budget battle.
CHAPTER XII

Basic Strategy and the FY 1956 Budget: Pressures to Expand

When planning for the FY 1956 Defense budget got under way early in 1954, the country was in the depths of the longest (13 months) recession of the first post-World War II decade. The gross national product fell steadily through the middle of 1954, while unemployment rose from under three percent to almost six percent. As in other post-World War II downturns, industrial production declined, inventories became excessive, and farm prices plunged. Sharp cutbacks in defense spending were the most readily identifiable cause of the "slight contraction of business," as the president referred to the recession in his economic report to the Congress in January. Eisenhower had pledged to use the full resources of the federal government to prevent "another 1929," and his economic report described in detail the arsenal of anti-recession measures available. During the winter and spring, pressures on the administration multiplied to bring them to bear. Labor leaders called for action by the federal government and in Congress leading Democrats charged the president with "a persistent policy of glossing over the economic facts of life." Former President Truman coined a more quotable label—"creeping McKinleyism."2

Reactions to Recession and the Indochina Crisis

The president evidently remained determined, at least for the present, to permit market forces to do their work. Regarding taxes as a necessary evil, he had allowed the wartime excess profits tax and increased personal income tax to lapse at the end of 1953, thus "turning back" to the people,
as he put it, about $5 billion in potential federal revenue. A comprehensive tax reform program enacted in August 1953 reduced taxes by almost $1.5 billion and a new omnibus excise tax bill enacted on 31 March 1954 shaved another billion. Other features of the administration's 1954 legislative program (e.g., housing, social security, highway construction, and agriculture) were designed to benefit the economy; Congress eventually passed most of them. "But at this time," Eisenhower told the nation in a 15 March broadcast, "economic conditions do not call for an emergency program that would justify larger Federal deficits and further inflation through large additional tax reductions."3

Eisenhower believed, on the other hand, that the government should be ready to apply more drastic remedies if necessary to head off a depression. He directed that departments and agencies "provide sufficient flexibility in their respective programs so that Federal expenditures can be appropriately and promptly directed toward preventing or countering adverse trends in the U.S. economy." The order caused a flurry of alarm in DoD. Given the current emphasis on economy, some officials feared the effects of even discussing the president's order to direct spending into anti-recession measures. Fortunately, the recession soon showed signs of winding down, and the president's package of remedies remained untouched. Briefing the NSC on 20 May on the fiscal outlook, Budget Director Rowland Hughes (the New York banker who had succeeded Dodge in March) said that budget planning was proceeding under the assumptions that the economy would continue to grow through FY 1957, while prices would stabilize at present levels and unemployment at about 2.5 million. He also postulated no significant increase in international tensions.4 As it turned out, 1954 was to be one of the most prosperous years of the Eisenhower administration, although persisting unemployment would help the Democrats regain control of Congress in the fall.

In the spring of that year, however, with GNP (in constant dollars) four percent lower than it had been a year earlier and March unemployment at a peak of four million, the recession was real enough.5 For budget planners it posed the danger that it might reverse the steady march toward a balanced budget, one of the president's most abiding goals, by squeezing the inflow of tax receipts and piling the costs of anti-recession measures on already budgeted outlays. The March tax cuts had already added perhaps another billion to the $2.9 billion deficit predicted in January for FY 1955, although declining expenditures provided some offset. For FY 1954, when the books were balanced in July it turned out that the actual deficit was slightly lower than predicted in January, and considerably less than earlier predictions. For FY 1955, on the other hand, deficit forecasts were climbing as high as $4.7 billion.6
The looming FY 1955 deficit could thus be blamed largely on the 1953-54 recession. Looking beyond, Hughes warned the NSC on 20 May that to balance the budget in either FY 1956 or FY 1957 would require reductions in national security spending again by amounts at least equal to the reductions made in the FY 1955 budget. If additional tax cuts already contemplated by the Treasury occurred, the FY 1956 deficit could rise to $9.7 billion and the FY 1957 deficit to $12 billion.7

The council was confronted with these disturbing numbers at a time when it had other pressing matters engaging its attention. Within the past few weeks the long Indochina “crisis” had abruptly climaxed. The fall of Dien Bien Phu in early May now looked like a disaster of major proportions for the West. The French had asked for a cease-fire. At the Geneva Conference, called to negotiate a settlement for Southeast Asia, the Western powers found themselves without military leverage against the victorious Viet Minh. In the classic manner of allies in adversity, they were more than ever in disarray.

It was against this troublesome backdrop that the NSC took up its budget discussion on 20 May. Treasury Secretary Humphrey, attempting to hold to the long-haul focus of Hughes’s briefing, expounded his familiar thesis of the perils of deficit financing and the need for balance between the demands of national defense and a sound economy. We could not undertake, he argued, to prepare for two or three or more different kinds of wars at once; we should concentrate on only one. Dulles immediately objected. An all-nuclear war might seem to be the cheapest of all possible wars, but if the United States prepared only for nuclear war it would have to fight without allies and to escalate every small war into a big one. International tensions were mounting, not diminishing; it was not a time to allow either allies or enemies to conclude that the United States was sacrificing security for economy.8

Both men pulled punches. Humphrey stopped short of asserting that the country could not afford to prepare for any kind of war except a nuclear one, or that the logical way to avoid deficit financing, after defense spending had been cut to the bone, was to raise taxes. Dulles, warning against sacrificing security for economy, refrained from overtly endorsing deficit financing. Through it all the president had little to say, but what he did say was revealing. As usual, he emphatically agreed with his secretary of state. Under no circumstances should we ever decide that “we cannot afford to defend our country.” Still, much could be done to save money in defense. But after defense costs had been pared down to an “irreducible minimum,” efforts to cut more must be resisted uncompro­misingly, and if the irreducible minimum for defense required new taxes, then “we must be prepared to fight for them.”9
The FY 1956 Defense budget would represent the second year's financing of a three-year (1955-57) program, drawn up in outline by the Joint Chiefs and approved by the president in December 1953, that was intended to reshape American forces for the long haul in a relatively stable post-Korea world. It set forth terminal personnel strengths and force goals for FY 1957, the end point of the three-year contraction begun with the big personnel cuts for FY 1955 directed by Secretary Wilson about the same time. It thus remained only to determine strengths and force objectives for FY 1956 on the downward slope toward the terminal objectives of FY 1957. When determined, they would constitute basic guidance for developing the dollar dimensions of the FY 1956 budget. 10

In March 1954 the service planners, replying to a mid-December directive from the Joint Chiefs, submitted proposed FY 1956 programs and budget estimates for reaching the approved FY 1957 levels. It became apparent the Army was rebelling against the directed New Look program of strength and force reductions. Ridgway proposed instead what amounted to a level-off at the approved strength by the end of FY 1955—152,000 personnel and three divisions more than the FY 1957 level-off that the chiefs had recommended and the president had approved in December. The justification for this stand was simply that the assumed conditions on which the prescribed manpower levels had been based had not yet materialized. "The Army should not be forced to program itself," Army planners argued, "into a position of inability to meet national commitments on the basis of 'arbitrary assumptions' . . . that these commitments will be reduced."11 The other military chiefs generally went along with the guidelines, but all served notice that if the Army was not held to the December guidelines, they too intended to seek revisions. 12

Ridgway's opinion of the treatment meted out to the Army under the New Look was no secret. With the basic aims of the New Look he had no quarrel, but he saw the Army as an equal, not a junior partner, in the undertaking, with indispensable missions that it alone could perform. He recognized the eventual necessity of deflating the swollen Army built up to fight in Korea and to man the ramparts in Europe, but he could not accept the New Look rationale of replacing ground forces by nuclear firepower, whether airborne in strategic bombers or in tactical weapons used by ground forces. Large ground armies would still be needed to do the many jobs that the big bombers could not do, and tactical "nukes" would vastly raise the casualty toll on both sides. Heavier reliance on allied manpower, particularly in Japan, Korea, and Germany, had been explicit conditions for Army agreement in the Everest committee in November 1953 to a 14-division Army for 1957. In Ridgway's mind these were among the "assumptions" underlying the Joint Chiefs' allegedly "unanimous" approval of JCS 2101/113, their December recommendations. 13
By February 1954, when Ridgway gave his House testimony, the outlook was even more alarming, especially in Indochina, and the prospects for Japanese and German army buildups were not encouraging. Ridgway now had serious misgivings over the New Look concept of a wholesale pullback of Army forces from abroad. The crucial question posed by the rapidly intensifying Indochina crisis was whether it would be safe to begin to withdraw American forces from the Far East. Planning for withdrawal, under way since the summer of 1953, looked toward its initiation in late 1954 following a political settlement in Korea, and aimed at an ultimate reduction of U.S. forces to two divisions in a three-division United Nations corps. Ridgway favored early withdrawal from Korea but wanted to keep the bulk of the forces in or near the Western Pacific, available for either renewed hostilities in the Far East or redeployment elsewhere. Early in December 1953 the president short-circuited the leisurely pace of this planning by deciding, partly for budgetary reasons, to bring two divisions back from Korea and disband them before the middle of 1954. Later in the same month he made the decision public—and thus virtually irrevocable.¹⁴

On 1 April 1954 the JCS sent Secretary Wilson a plan for redeployment of American forces from the Far East that would leave only two

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**Table 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Forces</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>975,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,815,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Service Proposals (Mar 54)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1956</td>
<td>FY 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,164,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 divs</td>
<td>17 divs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>666,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1034 active ships</td>
<td>1032 active ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>205,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 divs/3 tac wings</td>
<td>3 divs/3 tac wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>975,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127 wings</td>
<td>137 wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,010,435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

American divisions (one Army, one Marine Corps) in Korea. The plan had, however, already been overtaken by the desperate situation in Indochina. On 6 April Secretary Wilson, presumably with the president's approval, informed the NSC that all major redeployments from the Far East, except the movement of the two National Guard divisions already ordered home by the president, would be suspended until 1 June. When that date came, and the JCS reviewed the situation, it looked even worse: Dien Bien Phu had fallen and Viet Minh forces were advancing, while diplomats in Geneva wrangled over cease-fire terms. In Washington the NSC was about to discuss an offer by President Rhee to send South Korean troops to Indochina, and a new crisis began to take shape as the president authorized the Seventh Fleet to make "friendly" visits to the Nationalist-held Tachen Islands near the China coast in hopes of deterring an apparently impending Chinese Communist attack. The chiefs recommended suspension of all further redeployments from the Far East "for an indeterminate time." In late spring of 1954, American forces were still dangerously overextended.

In addressing manpower problems, the Joint Chiefs' 17 December 1953 directive had looked far beyond, to the final New Look strength and force reductions scheduled for FY 1956 and FY 1957, assuming as given the already approved goals for FY 1955, but these later reductions could not be divorced from the earlier ones. For Army planners the problem presented by the three-and-one-half-year program of cutbacks was its heavy front-loading. The FY 1955 goals reflected not merely the 176,000 cut ordered by Secretary Wilson on 4 December, but also the additional 143,000 ordered on the 11th (two days after Ridgway had urged Secretary Stevens to try to hold the line at the former figure). As matters now stood, the Army would shrink by almost 320,000 during the next 18 months (from December 1953), and by only another 162,000 during the two years following.

While the service manpower proposals worked their way slowly through the JCS system during March and April, rumors abounded that Ridgway was on the brink of resignation and that Radford, and even the Joint Chiefs as a body, appeared ready to demand a slowdown of the pace of restructuring and reductions. On 26 April 1954 Wilson himself provided apparent confirmation of the thrust of these rumors. "The next few months are obviously critical ones in world affairs, and what happens in Europe and Asia during this period may force a soul-searching review of our specific policies, plans, objectives and expenditures."

At a news conference three days later the president was noncommittal. But the chiefs on 21 May vented their concern. They saw manpower, especially ground forces, as a critical area of weakness, stemming from
dimming prospects for the formation of a strong mobile central reserve in the United States and for an early effective contribution by the Germans and the Japanese to their own regional defense. Echoing Wilson's comment a month earlier, the chiefs warned that the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia, uncertainty over the outcome of the Geneva negotiations, and a prolonged delay in the organization of the central reserve would probably dictate revision of planned military programs and budget estimates and re-examination of personnel and force ceilings for FY 1956 and FY 1957. In June what looked like the opening of a concerted assault on the approved strength and force goals for FY 1955 got under way as first Carney and then Ridgway proposed major increases: for the Navy and Marine Corps, strengths of 733,916 and 225,021, respectively; for the Army, 1,282,000.

With Wilson and the chiefs now seeing more or less eye to eye, they reached agreement in June that personnel strengths would level off in FY 1956 at the figures projected for the end of FY 1955 (except for a small increase for the Air Force): i.e., Army 1,173,000, Navy 682,000, Marine Corps 215,000, and Air Force 975,000, for a total of 3,045,000. Wilson disapproved the requested FY 1955 increases for the Army and Navy/Marine Corps, and strength goals for FY 1957 were held in abeyance, pending another JCS review in December 1954. On 15 July Wilson, and on the 28th the president, formally approved the new FY 1956 strength goals for budget planning purposes. In essence the Army was to proceed with the FY 1955 personnel reductions as originally directed, while suspending for the present the projected tapering off in FY 1956 and FY 1957. For FY 1956 this came very close to what the services had proposed in March.

The services had priced their proposed FY 1956 programs in March at about $37.4 billion. Not surprisingly, this approximated the predicted defense spending level shown in the president's FY 1955 budget and seemed to foreshadow a substantial deficit in the FY 1956 federal budget. During the summer, signs indicated that the DoD spending estimate would prove to be, if anything, too low. The decision to go ahead with the FY 1955 personnel cuts decreed in December was accompanied by strong pressure on the services to find ways (undermanning, reduction of support elements, etc.) to retain some of the major combat units that would normally be eliminated as a consequence of the reduction. This would of course wipe out some of the savings achieved by reductions in personnel. After prolonged discussions during the summer, Wilson approved on 26 August the JCS recommendation—again, for budget-planning purposes only—that the services maintain the following major forces at the end of FY 1956.
Two days later OSD directed the services to submit detailed budget estimates by 4 October.\textsuperscript{25}

It was time. On 23 July Budget Director Hughes had issued the annual letter to all departments and agencies setting forth approved assumptions and policies for use in preparation of the FY 1956 federal budget. To DoD officials who had kept abreast of the rising curve of informal estimates and indicators of FY 1956 defense spending, Hughes’s letter must have come as a jolt. Noting the prospect of another deficit in FY 1955, Hughes called on all departments and agencies to hold requests for new appropriations and expenditures in FY 1956 below FY 1955 levels. The proposed DoD budget was to be submitted to BoB by 15 September. The letter contained no explicit statement that total expenditures must be reduced.\textsuperscript{26}

When the Joint Secretaries\textsuperscript{*} met with Acting Defense Secretary Anderson on 23 August to discuss the proposed FY 1956 personnel and force levels, the 15 September deadline was already down the drain. Of more concern to the secretaries, since March no updated price tag had been put on the Defense program as a whole. They thought that as soon as possible one should be submitted to the president along with personnel and force levels for his tentative approval. Although the service budget staffs and advisory committees had been working on estimates for months, the only totals they could come up with at this point were

\* The name for the three service secretaries after Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson had them meet regularly as a body beginning in July 1950. They became the Joint Secretaries Group when Secretary of Defense Lovett in September 1952 included in their membership the secretary and the deputy secretary of defense. See Condit, \textit{Test of War}, 31, 524.
partial updates of those submitted in March—about $37.5 billion in new obligational authority and almost $38 billion in expenditures. The gap between these figures and their lower counterparts in the FY 1955 budget (respectively, $28.8 billion and $37.5 billion) was perhaps sufficient reason for not bringing them to the president's attention immediately. When Anderson forwarded the Joint Secretaries' request to the services, their budget staffs objected strenuously to this short-circuiting of the normal budgetary process; until they had firm budget estimates ready for submission to OSD they wanted no circulation of preliminary estimates outside the department. 27

There was reason to expect that the rough estimates being bandied about would prove to be inflated. Since their original formulation in March, Congress had completed action on the FY 1955 budget, reducing the president's request by almost $1.1 billion and by another $400 million in the supplemental public works bill. Moreover, the carryover of unobligated funds into FY 1955 was almost twice as large as the amount ($8.5 billion) assumed in framing the FY 1955 budget; the Army, for example, would now have more than $5.5 billion available for obligation in FY 1955 against earlier expectations of only half that amount. Requests for FY 1956 new obligational authority were likely, therefore, to be lower than predicted in March, and the cuts in requested appropriations for FY 1955 would likely result in lower-than-predicted expenditure rates in FY 1956. To forestall action to reduce proposed forces, a quick but realistic price tag was needed for the force levels Wilson had recently approved. 28

The Guidelines Debate: A New Look at NSC 162/2?

The intensifying Southeast Asia crisis helped shape the emerging structural framework (forces, strength, dollars) of the FY 1956 budget and forced serious reconsideration of its policy foundations. Since late winter 1954 anxiety had been growing over what many perceived as a fundamental threat revealed by the crisis—the crumbling of Western solidarity in the face of Communist aggression and growing Soviet military power. To some, these developments seemed to undermine the premises and assumptions underlying the basic national security policies spelled out only a few months before in NSC 162/2—the inherent strengths of the Western alliance, a possible alleviation of tensions with the Soviet Union through negotiation, and the normal gradualness of change in the power relationships among great nations. Discussion of these issues in the NSC Planning Board and elsewhere came to a head in March 1954 over whether NSC 162/2 as it stood could be used as a basis for detailed
guidelines, or did it already require fundamental revision? Some updating, remarked the chairman of the Planning Board's special coordinating committee, "might be found desirable." To start the process the Planning Board requested feeder studies on the outlook for the period 1956-59; all this input was to be completed by 1 May, aiming at submission of the board's recommended guidelines to the NSC about the beginning of June. 29

The requested studies flowed in during May. 30 One of the tardier submissions, a 21 May JCS paper forecasting the free world's military posture, reached OSD too late for careful review. Consequently it did not reflect an integrated Defense position. Deputy Secretary Anderson forwarded it to the Planning Board without delay.

The Joint Chiefs predicted that any further deterioration of the international situation and a continued suspension of redeployments from the Far East would probably necessitate changes in planned forces and programs. They urged stronger efforts to ensure early German and Japanese contributions to the free world's defense, which they regarded as essential to the formation of a mobile strategic reserve in the United States. On the whole, however, their assessment of the national military posture was not pessimistic. They expected the United States to retain significant superiority in offensive retaliatory power and in atomic tactical support. While less confident of the continental defense system in the face of expected Soviet offensive improvements, they rated as generally adequate the program already in place, except for intelligence, which needed "greatly increased emphasis," specifically pre-hostilities reconnaissance of enemy territory. 31 The chiefs foresaw no serious threat to sea and air communications except in areas close to the Soviet bloc and counted on American atomic tactical weapons to offset the Communists' huge advantage in manpower and quantitative superiority in tactical aviation.

On the other hand, they saw both a looming manpower problem and the perennial and growing demands of a modernizing military machine for advanced technical and combat skills. More worrisome, the continued decline in military spending would narrow the nation's mobilization base. The chiefs proposed a reinvigoration of industrial preparedness for the most important categories of military hard goods, renewed building of war reserves, and new modernized tanker construction. The deterioration of the mobilization base, they warned, appeared particularly ominous in the light of the Soviet Union's superior capacity to expand its own military production base rapidly at the beginning of a general war.

A substantial part of the JCS paper presented a somber analysis of anticipated military capabilities elsewhere in the free world. America's allies were expected to contribute to the common defense most of the ground forces along with base sites and certain other facilities. The
American contribution would be the atomic capability, selective military assistance, certain D-day forces deployed in strategic areas, an industrial base sufficient to provide the major support for a general war, and a ready mobile strategic reserve. Only American and British forces could be expected to have significant strategic mobility, but NATO Europe collectively, with German forces, could mount a formidable defense. Elsewhere, except for South Korea and Formosa, defensive capabilities ranged from poor to negligible. But the most pervasive weakness of the free world remained the inability of any nation except the United States, Britain, and Canada to sustain major combat operations for more than a month or two. If allied nations could not or would not build up their own mobilization bases, the United States, would have to take the shortage into account in its planning. For the present and the foreseeable future the free world’s military forces would depend on a continuing flow of American military assistance. NSC 162/2 recognized this need insofar as it concerned essential allies, but stipulated a declining flow and emphasized the importance of economic and trade policies designed to enhance self-help capabilities in allied countries.

The JCS found most worrisome a phenomenon that the Indochina crisis had thrust to center stage: the apparent inability of the United States and its principal allies to act in concert when faced with a threat to their common security. “Fundamental to the attainment of an effective Free World military posture,” the chiefs declared, “... is the development and maintenance of solidarity on the part of our Allies to the point where they will not only unite in the determination of measures vital to the common security, but will support those measures when the need arises. Recent developments indicate that the firm foundation requisite to prompt and effective action ... has not yet been fully achieved.”

In concluding, the chiefs (like NSC 162/2) judged that “the Soviets might well elect to pursue their ultimate objective of world domination through a succession of local aggressions, either overt or covert, all of which could not be successfully opposed by the Allies through localized counteraction, without unacceptable commitment of resources. The Free World would then be confronted with a situation in which the only alternative to acquiescence ... would be a deliberate decision to react with military force against the real source of the aggression.” Was this then—to strike directly at the “real source of the aggression”—the chiefs’ preferred course of action? Not necessarily. They danced around the question, emphasizing the importance of a mobile strategic reserve for reacting quickly to local aggressions, and even suggesting that partial mobilization might be desirable “commensurate with the increased risk of general war.” In general, the JCS betrayed an evident reluctance to
propose radical remedies for problems that had emerged since the approval of NSC 162/2.35

The JCS paper stirred some ripples as it passed through OSD on its way to the NSC Planning Board. ISA found it “generally sound.”36 McNeil’s deputy, Lyle Garlock, criticized it harshly. Generally, he read the chiefs’ analysis as an overreaction to the Southeast Asia crisis, blurred in its conclusions and recommendations. One recommendation, he pointed out, might be interpreted to mean that “we must be prepared to fight a war either with or without atomic weapons,” a notion that had appalling cost implications and incidentally conflicted with the policy of integration of nuclear weapons. Garlock noted that the JCS seemed to feel that the existing plan of “orderly” expansion of the continental defense system should be replaced by a crash effort, contrary to recent assurances to the Congress by the president and the secretary of defense that the system as currently planned would provide a “reasonable” defense. Finally, Garlock unleashed a counter-barrage of figures. In the past four years, the United States had spent some $60 billion for major equipment, spares and spare parts, organizational equipment, and supplies, and expected to spend another $28.5 billion in the coming two years—a total of more than $88 billion by mid-1956. By mid-1957 the full buildup of American airpower would be complete, with extensive conventional and nuclear weapon capabilities. In addition, substantial numbers of tactical guided missiles, ballistic missiles, and atomic guns would be deployed. Added firepower would be realized in the 1957-59 period from new medium-range strategic guided missiles. Garlock concluded: “We cannot afford to shift our course with every change in the wind. We will seriously weaken the U.S. economy if we increase and decrease the degree of mobilization each time the Soviets provoke a new crisis or appear to relax world tensions.”37

While the Planning Board was assembling and analyzing data for the guidelines paper, evidence emerged of disturbing growth in Soviet military capabilities. Perhaps the most spectacular was the display in formation flight, visible to thousands of spectators at the Moscow Air Show on May Day 1954, of nine twin-engine jet medium bombers (Type 39) seemingly comparable to the American B-47, and one four-engine jet heavy bomber (Type 37). Assuming that the medium bomber was already in series production, intelligence predicted a total of about 120 by mid-1955 and 600 by mid-1959, advancing by a year previous estimates of the appearance of Soviet jet medium bombers. Appraisals of the Type 37 bomber, more cautious, left unchanged previous estimates that a few might be in operational units by mid-1957 and about 100 by mid-1959—possibly earlier.38
On 3 June the Joint Advanced Study Committee of the JCS briefed the NSC on new Soviet nuclear weapons. Avowedly conservative forecasts suggested that in 1954 the Soviets were expected to test thermonuclear weapons “with yields well in excess of one million tons of TNT,” increasing the total energy yield obtainable from the Soviet stockpile (estimated in 1953 at 150 to 200 million tons of TNT) by a factor of 5 to 25. By 1957, although the United States would still lead the Soviets in nuclear weapons, the latter would achieve “comparable” capabilities, including that of mounting a surprise attack on the United States and inflicting massive damage, largely by virtue of reduced accuracy requirements for thermonuclear weapons. Radford was more specific: By 1958, he warned, the United States might have to face the threat of Soviet intercontinental missiles armed with thermonuclear warheads. It was clear, however, that he referred to relatively slow long-range pilotless vehicles; no predictions were yet being made on Soviet acquisition of an ICBM.39

The president complimented the briefers but seemed unimpressed. He remarked that his World War II experience made him skeptical of the “completeness and accuracy” of the destruction predicted in the briefing.40 The Joint Chiefs evidently saw nothing in the new intelligence that warranted changes in their 21 May military posture paper, the conclusion of which appeared intact as one of the annexes of the Planning Board’s guidelines paper (NSC 5422) circulated on 14 June. The introductory section of the 21 May paper summarized the chiefs’ relatively bland projection of the East-West military balance and the widening fissures in the Western alliance. The summary of Soviet capabilities that accompanied it, on the other hand, showing some of the more dramatic comparisons between 1953 and current predictions of improved Soviet capabilities in key categories of weaponry in 1957 and 1959, carried less reassurance.41 Those capabilities, the JCS special assistant for NSC affairs had asserted earlier, “will increase the Soviet air threat to a point extremely difficult to counter . . . [and] may, beginning in 1958, allow the USSR to force the Free World into a series of political retreats designed to isolate the United

* For example, 1953 estimates of Soviet development of surface-to-surface guided missiles had been largely theoretical, without substantiating evidence as to the priority or pace of effort; the mid-1954 estimates predicted as “likely” a V-2-type missile of 450-500-mile range by 1956, and by 1959 series production of a pilotless aircraft of intercontinental range. 1953 estimates of the Soviets’ 1957 stockpile of nuclear weapons projected 25 megatons (500 weapons averaging 50 kilotons); mid-1954 estimates projected 172 MT in 1959, including weapons as large as 10,000 KT, more than 10 times the yield of those earlier estimated for 1957. See NSC 5422, Tentative Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956, 14 Jun 54, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:651-52; Annex 4, CIA study, “Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy Through Mid-1959,” ibid, 677.
States from the Free World. On the other hand, Soviet possession of such strength may force the Free World to take preemptive action to insure its survival." The CIA adviser to the Planning Board took an even more alarmist line, pronouncing the increasing Soviet power a "basic change in the world situation" that, under NSC 162/2, should dictate immediate subordination of the administration's balanced-budget goal to the requirements of national security.  

When the draft guidelines paper emerged from the Planning Board, it stimulated a weed-like growth of informal staff writing on the more contentious issues. Several papers conjectured that the Soviets were likely to be tempted to follow the safer route of aggrandizement through local aggression and more covert methods—subversion, infiltration, coups, proxy wars, and instigation or exploitation of civil wars in free world countries such as Indochina. Few disputed the reality of the Soviet threat. Some board members were unhappy, however, with the tendency of the Joint Chiefs to view it as a budding problem that must never be allowed to divert resources from the overriding necessity of being prepared to fight and win a general war. Reflecting the Army point of view, the board's Defense member, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, saw the "creeping expansion" strategy of the Soviet Union as a here-and-now peril in such places as Indochina, and one likely to grow. The Soviets, he asserted, already sensitive to the risks of general war, which would endanger the base of the global Soviet revolution, were pursuing a new strategy calculated to "recapture their pre-atomic security and yet not forego the continued expansion of Communist control." Over a period of time the process of piecemeal conquest and nibbling erosion "could bring such a preponderance of over-all power to the Kremlin as to make the Free World fear that it would be suicidal to oppose later stages of expansion by military means." Bonesteel concluded that the United States henceforth must reserve its freedom to act in defense of its perceived security interests regardless of the sensibilities of its allies, even with respect to use of nuclear weapons. NSC 162/2, after all, had declared them to be "as available for use as other weapons."  

This damn-the-torpedoes approach, one ISA analyst pointed out, ignored numerous ambiguities in the many areas around the world where the United States had no explicit commitments—precisely the areas where the threat was most likely to be posed, and where any major military response might be least appropriate or feasible. The most likely image of the future was probably not a series of large Korea- and Indochina-type conflagrations, and it was hard to imagine any small country asking to be rescued by American atomic bombs from threatened Communist invasion or revolution—or an American president contemplating such action.
Would it not be more prudent to "adopt a middle course, on a case-by-case basis, never foreclosing (the nuclear option)"?45

Maj. Gen. John K. Gerhart, USAF, the JCS adviser on the Planning Board, shared with Bonesteel and ISA Assistant Secretary Hensel an urgent, "immediate danger" view of the Communist creeping expansion threat, which Gerhart's bosses had dismissed as unlikely to materialize for several years. Like his fellow Air Force generals, he believed that an all-out war, now or later, remained a far greater peril that the United States must at any cost be prepared to deal with, and he worried that preoccupation with the emerging Communist strategy of creeping expansion might divert American policy from its sharp focus on massive retaliation and normalized use of nuclear weapons. Bold response to Communist aggressions carried the risk of precipitating a general war, but the risk had to be faced.46

What worried Gerhart most was the paralyzing effect of the prevailing fear of general war throughout the free world, including the United States. The Soviets were already exploiting this fear, and would do so in increasing measure as their own nuclear capability grew. "When the nuclear equation approaches a balance, the clear advantage will rest with the power bloc least reluctant to assume the risk of general war"—that is, given the nature of their political system, with the Soviets. Unfortunately, an "aura of uncertainty" clouded all U.S. planning for use of nuclear weapons—largely owing to official fears that "our Allies will desert us."47

The NSC Planning Board draft guidelines paper NSC 5422, circulated on 14 June, analyzed, with numerous "splits," the various issues under three headings: nuclear trends (i.e., the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of the power of nuclear weapons themselves), free world cohesion, and mobilization for general war.48 The drafters of NSC 5422 generally followed the line embodied in the chiefs' 21 May military posture paper, not General Gerhart's recent proposed amendment. That is, "creeping expansion" could be expected to come fully into play only with the approach to nuclear balance between the superpowers, when Soviet leaders would likely see declining risks in limited and indirect aggression. Until then the American retaliatory capability could be relied on to deter both general war and more limited but overt aggressions; the latter should be dealt with, if possible, by less than massive responses. If these failed, stronger medicine would be called for: "The Communists

* The "split," by now standard in NSC draft papers and of long standing in JCS staff procedure, compressed all differing views on an issue into two contrasting or opposing statements, one or the other of which all proponents could be persuaded to endorse. Scholars may debate whether this device reflected the basic dualism of Western thought or the aim of squeezing opposing views into two parallel columns permitting comparative reading on a sheet of paper eight inches wide (standard in the Pentagon in this period).
must be convinced of U.S. determination to take . . . whatever action its security position requires, even to the extent of general war.” The covert forms of Communist aggression would require more complex responses involving many nations and “determined” American leadership: economic and military aid, special counter-guerrilla training, covert operations, even direct military intervention in cases of Communist-exploited civil war. NSC 5422 reserved general war (including strategic retaliation) as the last-resort response to overt aggressions only.49

Noting the threat to allied unity, NSC 5422 stressed the continuing dependence of the United States on its major partners to help prevent gradual isolation as a result of Communist “creeping expansion” and listed confidence-building behavior and policies that would tend to strengthen the cohesion of the alliance—ample retaliatory capacity, concern for the security problems of allied countries, and special attention to Western Europe as a principal source of free world power. Opinion divided on the issue of unilateral U.S. responses to aggression. The board agreed on a general statement that the United States should not be inhibited by allied opposition from resorting to nuclear weapons “to prevent significant Communist territorial gains when such action is clearly necessary to U.S. security,” but split on the types of circumstances that would warrant unilateral action of any kind.50

Under the premise that the free world could not afford to allow communism to engulf the material resources, manpower, and strategic positions of underdeveloped countries in Asia and the Middle East, NSC 5422 proposed that Communist powers be warned that overt aggression against these countries would bring U.S. military responses. It also suggested a new multilateral initiative to strengthen the will and ability of these countries to defend themselves, through economic development aid and cooperation, encouragement of regional groupings to promote economic growth, promotion of freer trade and payments, and selective increases in end-item military assistance and economic aid to support indigenous military forces. On the thorny issue of support for Third World nationalism and anti-colonialism, the paper offered a carefully hedged warning against actions that “needlessly” antagonized those forces and urged greater U.S. independence of European allies on Third World issues. Despite all the foregoing, NSC 5422 still reflected an overwhelming concern with general war. Indeed, it rejected Bonesteel’s proposed statement subordinating the general war threat to the “more pronounced” one of “creeping expansion,” and presented a closely reasoned analysis of the former threat, besides an entire additional section on the issues of mobilization.51
The NSC 5422 analysis opened with a warning that strategic use by both sides of nuclear weapons could inflict such devastation as to threaten the survival of civilization itself. Fear of this eventuality had become a significant influence on thinking. If equally shared by both sides as the superpowers approached nuclear parity, it could lead ultimately to a condition of mutual deterrence. Unfortunately, earlier and grimmer outcomes were also possible, particularly a Soviet attempt to wipe out the U.S. retaliatory capacity by a surprise nuclear attack. For the United States, therefore, it was of critical importance not only to maintain and protect its retaliatory striking forces but to build an effective continental defense system capable of reducing "to manageable proportions" the damage and casualties likely to be inflicted by a surprise attack. Even if a rough nuclear balance were attained, the arms race would go on and technology continue to advance. Therefore the United States must make a sustained effort "to invent and develop capabilities which will provide decisive preponderance to U.S. power." In a general war, the United States must also be prepared to see some of its overseas bases, essential for retaliatory operations, either destroyed by enemy attack or neutralized by fearful host governments. Along with continued efforts to strengthen collective defense arrangements for use of these bases, NSC 5422 urged more emphasis on making effective strategic retaliation less dependent on them.

Concerning disarmament negotiations with the Soviets, NSC 5422 stated that they should be explored, arguing that a "practicable" arrangement for limiting armaments "would be a more certain and economical method of meeting the threat posed by growing Soviet nuclear capabilities than any other course of action discussed in this paper." The merits of the case, however, were confused because current U.S. policy opposed nuclear disarmament in the absence of conventional arms reduction. The USSR, for its part, had first rejected proposals for total nuclear disarmament and later for balanced reduction of conventional and unconventional arms. NSC 5422 held that the United States should re-examine its position, along with the knottier matter of verification, on the premise that even imperfect safeguards might involve less risk to national security than no limitations at all. In OSD, this proposal ran into a stone wall. Assistant Secretary Hensel thought the issue irrelevant to NSC 5422 and that security programs could not prudently be based on the assumed possibility of disarmament.

The strongest dissent came from the Joint Chiefs, who on 23 June submitted a nine-page screed to Secretary Wilson opposing any negotiations with the Soviets on any issue whatsoever. Arguing that the Soviets had "evaded and perverted" all their treaties and commitments with the West
"in unbroken sequence from Yalta to Korea," the chiefs saw no grounds for hope that, "barring a basic change in the attitude of the Soviet regime," it would honor any future agreements. The chiefs asked for discussion of their paper by the NSC in connection with NSC 5422. Their purpose went beyond a restatement in that forum of their well-known views on negotiations with the Soviets, although this was the main burden of the paper. Evidently, more than any other participant in the national security policy debate, especially the State Department, they felt a real sense of time running out in the East-West conflict. The greatest dangers, in the JCS view, lurked in those negotiations to which America's principal allies were a party. They voiced a familiar complaint that was frequently echoed thereafter: "Our principal Allies, possibly impelled by a mounting fear of Soviet atomic capability, have shown an increasing disposition to seek agreements at whatever cost, apparently without adequate realization of the vital Western security interests at stake, or in disregard of those interests." The chiefs felt strongly "a pressing necessity that our Allies be brought to view the world situation in the same light and with the same urgency as does the United States." Otherwise, "on occasion," the United States might find it necessary to take measures "which not all of our Allies would endorse or be willing to join."

Another major issue had to do with the nuclear balance and mutual deterrence. State suggested that the New Look strategy of reliance on strategic nuclear weaponry for general war might be undermined by a decline in credibility and public acceptance. By 1956-59 both the USSR and America's allies might doubt the U.S. readiness and the American public might not "be as ready then to risk devastation of U.S. cities as it is now to risk scattered attacks upon them. Under such conditions, we could probably continue to attract the support of the U.S. public and our allies for our present foreign policy, and continue to deter the USSR from more aggressive actions only by making clear that the United States was able to wage general war without initiating the use of nuclear weapons for strategic purposes." Accordingly, as NSC 5422 put the proposal, the United States should maintain maximum strategic nuclear capabilities and increase its capability and that of its allies "to wage war effectively without strategic use of nuclear weapons." The opposition to this view, following the JCS line, simply rejected State's proposal as riskier than the existing strategy, arguing that deterrence of general war depended on maintaining a qualitative edge over the Soviets and making clear American determination to meet an attack with all available weapons. If deterrence failed, general war would almost certainly involve unrestricted use of nuclear weapons. McNeil's office pointed out the cost implications of State's proposal, which NSC 5422 ignored. The
additional resources required to build up the needed conventional force capability would involve total government control of the economy leading eventually to a garrison state.\textsuperscript{56}

A third major issue over general war concerned the additional measures and costs entailed in addressing the threat. One side held that greater efforts than planned would be required to accumulate war reserves and broaden the mobilization base sufficiently to support allied and U.S. forces in a general war. Facing an expected decline in mobilization potential through FY 1956 under current procurement and production policies, NSC 5422 listed a formidable array of measures needed to prepare and strengthen the mobilization base for its wartime mission, including relocation of key industrial plants to safe areas, amassing larger reserves of critical items, prewar procurement of long-lead-time tools and certain materials, sustaining or increasing mobilization capacity, etc. The initiative for this "do something" push came from the Office of Defense Management (ODM). In OSD Bonesteel, with strong support from Hensel, was the point man against the ODM view. Garlock, speaking for McNeil, was more noncommittal, noting that logistic support of allied forces in wartime was still an unresolved issue, and that current military aid programs called for a 90-day reserve of ammunition and spare parts. The "stand-patters" on this issue of preparation for general war, and indeed in the overall guidelines debate, were the Joint Chiefs, who took the position that the "present and planned implementation of programs" directed under NSC 162/2 would adequately solve all problems.\textsuperscript{57}

With the FY 1956 budget still in embryo, Budget Director Hughes's "fiscal and budgetary" section in NSC 5422 merely repeated his late May projection of receipts and expenditures for FY 1956 and FY 1957 and the indicated deficits for those years, assuming national security spending continued at FY 1955 levels. DoD officials did not appear to anticipate a need, in dealing with the twin threat of Communist creeping expansion and growing Soviet nuclear capabilities, for major additional expenditures in FY 1956. Indeed, Bonesteel's briefing paper for Wilson noted, as one of the issues for the forthcoming NSC meeting, the question whether the threat as portrayed would justify any increase in spending. For a document that breathed doom and disaster on almost every page, NSC 5422 showed a remarkable absence of the American tendency to throw money at the problem. Other remedies seemed to be called for.\textsuperscript{58}

Even in contemplating the enormous destructiveness of general nuclear war, planners seemed at a loss on how to prepare for it, beyond the taken-for-granted budgeting for massive retaliation. The only available calculated requirements for a general war derived from a 1950 war plan, and no systematic effort had been made to estimate the damage that
might be inflicted on the mobilization base by a Soviet nuclear attack. "It seems to be generally agreed," stated the ODM feeder study, "that damage of more than a substantial character can now be counted on throughout the entire period under consideration. Present intelligence would seem to justify provisions in the mobilization base ... for adding to the protection and for reducing the vulnerability and increasing the capacity of the mobilization base to recuperate."59

To a startling degree, contributors to NSC 5422 differed in their assumptions regarding the use of nuclear and conventional forces in a general war. ODM assumed that the use of strategic nuclear weapons would be "crippling, but not decisive, so that the recuperative power of the economy and tenacity of spirit [of the population] will determine the outcome." The United States and its allies would have sufficient conventional forces, including land armies, to deal with peripheral aggression without resorting to nuclear weapons and, in the major theater, to hold Soviet and satellite armies in check until reserves could be brought to bear in decisive strength. State bucked the tide by seriously examining the implications of fighting a general war either without nuclear weapons altogether or with only tactical nuclear weapons, while still holding in reserve the full panoply of strategic nuclear capabilities. OSD analysts pointed out that the economic effort needed to build and maintain such a posture would transform the United States into a totally regimented society. The Joint Chiefs, while assuming a Soviet nuclear attack followed by massive American retaliation, alluded only in passing to the damage and casualties that would result, and otherwise seemed to envisage a large-scale clash of conventional forces with some use of tactical nuclear weapons on the Eurasian land mass. Whether this would be the Defense view remained to be seen. OSD staff comment did not challenge the JCS image of general war, but McNeil's office noted the possibility that "in a general war involving the use of nuclear weapons our post D-Day requirements for conventional weapons may be quite limited."60 Budget and Treasury, by contrast, shared with ODM the image of a "crippling but not decisive" exchange of nuclear attacks between the two homelands, with ultimate victory going to the side having more staying and recuperative power. On the budgetary implications of all this NSC 5422 kept silent.61

After 10 days of dissection both in the Planning Board and in the home offices of its members, NSC 5422 received its first working over by the NSC on 24 June, the day before the opening of formal talks in Washington between the president and Prime Minister Churchill. The council's discussion left most issues unresolved, and further examination was postponed until 1 July.62 Cutler hoped to wrap up the discussion of NSC 5422 at that time, leaving almost a month to revise the paper for a final
decision meeting late in July. To precede NSC 5422 on the 1 July agenda, Cutler had deliberately scheduled the DoD and other agency progress reports called for by NSC 5408, the continental defense policy paper approved in February. These reports, discussed by the Planning Board during the last two weeks of June, made it clear that continental defense could no longer be viewed as the "back burner" problem that NSC 5408 and the president had suggested it would be. It had to be examined as an important, perhaps indispensable, element of the larger national security design.
Almost from the beginning of the Eisenhower years the New Look had to take account of continental defense as a major factor in the overall DoD equation. Its importance as an issue in the strategy and budget debates of 1954-56 waxed and waned in response to analyses of changing circumstances, especially the Soviet nuclear strategic threat, U.S. technological progress, and budgetary pressures. An unchanging circumstance was the unwillingness of the Joint Chiefs and the military services in the forums afforded them in DoD and NSC to accord continental defense a priority that would allow it to compete effectively with other programs that the chiefs valued more highly.

For more than three months after the approval of NSC 5408 in February 1954 continental defense had not been high on the DoD worry list. In April and May the chiefs, supported by OSD, engaged in a lively dispute with the CIA, supported by State, over a CIA proposal to establish a subcommittee of the NSC to assess the net capabilities of the Soviets "to inflict direct injury" on the United States and its key installations abroad. The JCS insisted that the proposed subcommittee would encroach on their exclusive war-planning jurisdiction. After Admiral Radford and CIA Director Allen Dulles failed to reach agreement, the president early in June ruled against the JCS, but with stipulations that met some of the chiefs' objections. The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC), headed by Radford, was promptly established in time to play a role in the unfolding continental defense crisis.¹

¹ This original NESC consisted of Radford and CIA Director Dulles. In February 1955, NSC 5511 changed the name to Net Evaluation Subcommittee and added four members.
That continental defense had, for the moment at least, achieved a watchful waiting status became evident in the blessing bestowed on the approved plans and programs by Robert C. Sprague, special consultant to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Possessing special clearances and apparently endowed with a sponge-like capacity to soak up and digest information, he had rapidly achieved recognition as the government's reigning expert on continental defense. On 25 March Sprague gave the Senate committee, behind closed doors, a long and reassuring report. He ran down the list of planned improvements: a technically more advanced radar net, more fighter-interceptors and more antiaircraft batteries, eventual conversion from protection of single cities and other targets to area protection, detection and deterrence of covert introduction of atomic bombs, more effective civil defense, a surer and better protected industrial base, and assurance of continuity in government. Sprague presented an especially optimistic analysis of probable "kills" by fighter-interceptors and antiaircraft guns against attacking bombers. Early in World War II, he pointed out, the Luftwaffe had broken off its strategic bombing campaign against Britain when its attrition rate reached 10 percent. Now the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons made such a rate "entirely inadequate and unacceptable." Happily, Sprague noted, DoD was already phasing in a new generation of weapons with very high "single pass 'kill'" capabilities. In the contest between attacking bombers and ground and air defense, moreover, the high cost of weapons and planes on both sides had made most small cities and towns not "worth" attacking or defending. This "privileging" of large urban areas tended to make effective air defense both possible and affordable.

Sprague's report circulated under extraordinary security wraps to a limited circle of officials under special safeguards. The mostly concrete and technical recommendations reflected the prosaic character of the report. The Joint Chiefs found little to disagree with. Of 21 recommendations, they pronounced almost all either valid or valid with qualifications; they rejected only two as invalid.

By the latter part of May, however, concern over continental defense was again on the rise. On the 13th the NSC was briefed on two Soviet jet bombers displayed in the recent May Day air parade. The Joint Chiefs, in their military posture paper on the 21st, expressed some doubt as to the adequacy of current programs for defense against air attack. At its 13 May meeting the NSC decided to invite Sprague to help the Planning Board review the reports.
The picture of continental defense presented in the DoD progress report in June was strikingly less reassuring than the one Sprague had given to the Senate committee. Since approval of NSC 5408 in February, the Joint Chiefs admitted, "progress made to date . . . is insufficient either to prevent, neutralize, or deter the military attacks which the USSR is capable of launching." By about 1956, the aggregate of these measures would add up to a "reasonable defense effort" but one still insufficient to "eliminate the possibility of attacks, which could gravely damage our war-making capacity." Even this limited capability through the 1956-59 period would depend on vigorous implementation, vigilant and continuous modernization, and quantitative increases in weaponry "consistent with any significant increase in the size or performance of the Soviet long-range air force."7

Looking at the existing state of the system as of 1 June 1954, it appeared from the DoD report that most of its elements were in what might be called a medium state of readiness. Only 25 out of 63 anti-aircraft batteries and 5 out of 64 fighter-interceptor squadrons, for example, received a "high" rating. Sprague ascertained that as of 11 March only 68 fighter-interceptors could be airborne in the first five minutes and only 457 in three hours, somewhat more than a third of the whole current force of 1,219 aircraft. According to the report, the existing system would give a maximum warning time of only 30 minutes against subsonic aircraft attacking many of the critical targets, and "tests have shown that many raids could penetrate the system undetected, particularly at very low and very high altitudes."8

Prospects for improving warning time depended on several measures. The existing heavy continental ground radar complex would be supplemented by large numbers of unattended small gap-filler radars for low-altitude surveillance (down to 500 feet) that eventually would replace the ground observer corps. The two seacoast radar nets were to be extended about 300 miles outward, with six naval picket-ship stations off each coast. Plans also called for seven squadrons of USAF land-based airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) and "Texas Towers," heavy radar stations on platforms built in shoal waters about 100 miles off the northern Atlantic coast south of Nova Scotia to augment the Air Defense Command's existing 75 permanent on-shore heavy radar stations. The preceding November the U.S. and Canadian governments had agreed to the building of a mid-Canadian early warning line roughly along the 55th parallel and extending northwest into Alaska. U.S.-controlled seaward extensions of this line ultimately to the Azores and Hawaii would employ converted destroyer escorts as radar picket ships (DERs)—eventually 36—
and naval airborne early warning aircraft (AEWs)—eventually 12 squadrons. Still farther over the horizon was a distant early warning line (DEW) to run from the southern coast of Greenland across northern Canada to the northern coast of Alaska.9

Combing through the DoD progress report, presidential assistant Robert Cutler felt uneasy about the stretched-out character of the whole program. A listing of projected operational readiness dates of the key elements showed scarcely any before 1957, with some reaching to 1962 and beyond. The two most promising, the mid-Canada and far northern radar lines, were as yet hardly more than proposals. The seaward radar extensions from the mid-Canada line were projected to mid-1958 (Atlantic) and mid-1959 (Pacific). In the all-important aircraft control system, the report admitted that until the semiautomatic control centers were fully operational (1960-62), the existing manual system would be unable to “fully utilize” aircraft currently programmed—such as the F-102 and the F-86D.10

On the brighter side, over the next several years improved radars promised a revolution in the coordination of defense operations during an attack. The new advanced single-seater F-102 jet fighter was scheduled to become operational in 1955-56. Antiaircraft defense made a strong advance with the Army’s surface-to-air Nike I against aircraft flying at middle and high altitudes (5,000 to 60,000 feet) within ranges of 25 nautical miles; nine of the 150 antiaircraft battalions already had the weapon. The longer-range NB under development would have an atomic warhead, as would two new surface-to-air missiles, Talos and Bomarc, all to be operational by 1959.11 Meanwhile, the Air Force GAR-1 Falcon air-to-air guided missile system was coming along on schedule, with 28 operational squadrons of F-102s and F-89s scheduled to have it by June 1957.12

All this was impressive. But there were, and would continue to be, gaping holes. Below 5,000 feet attacking aircraft, even if spotted by radar, were virtually invulnerable. At levels under 1,000 feet no defense was in sight. Antisubmarine defense, at the moment, seemed reasonably effective; the weapons under development or being installed could probably destroy existing Soviet submarines before they could get into position to launch missiles or mine U.S. harbors and coastal waters. The Navy was putting much money and effort into a pilot network of shore-based, deep-water Low-Frequency Acquisition and Ranging (LOFAR) stations that could detect diesel-powered snorkeling subs from 150 to 300 nautical miles out. But the old problem of locating, neutralizing, or sweeping mines, conventional or atomic, remained unsolved and no one expected it to be solved for 10 years or more. No one had found a way other than
by physical search to detect atomic weapons hidden on merchant ships. And “no defense can yet be foreseen against air or surface launched supersonic guided missiles.” The report prompted second thoughts on Sprague's optimistic remarks about the promise of new “high kill” weapons in the face of the quantum leap in explosive and damage power represented by thermonuclear weapons. Here, Cutler said, lay the major challenge.

Sprague's Alarms and Reactions

Even before the DoD report was submitted in June, a new intelligence development caused greatly increased concern about continental defense. Sometime before the middle of the month Sprague learned that the Soviets had recently detonated a one-megaton thermonuclear device containing materials that atmospheric tests identified as capable of producing detonations up to 10 megatons. The recent U.S. Castle tests had shown that weapons of such yield would greatly increase radioactive fallout. This intelligence, into which Sprague read more serious implications than most other analysts, wrought a 180-degree turnaround in his perception of the Soviet threat.

On 22 June Sprague expounded his views in a meeting with Admiral Radford and Senators Leverett Saltonstall, Harry F. Byrd, and Styles Bridges. On 1 July he briefed the NSC. By about mid-1957, and “certainly before 1959,” he predicted, the Soviets would have a “significant stockpile” of 5-to-10-MT bombs and bombers capable, with in-flight refueling, of delivering them on the North American continent. The effectiveness of the massive retaliation strategy would dwindle as both powers entered the era of nuclear plenty. Time would work against the United States and for the USSR, because of our greater vulnerability to attack, Soviet possession of the initiative, and the moral insensitivity of the Soviet rulers to the horrors of nuclear war. Sprague believed the United States had only three options: (1) to build a defense system “capable of nullifying any USSR attack,” (2) if that was not possible to launch a preemptive attack, or (3) to “live with the USSR in a state of equilibrium brought about by mutual fear of atomic attack.” He believed continental defense would have to be restudied, probably resulting in a dramatic speedup of production of more and better defensive weapons.

Sprague recommended that the council direct the NESC to estimate the maximum acceptable damage from an assumed bombing attack about 1 July 1957. This in turn could be translated into required “kill”
percentages to be achieved by defending forces, needed force levels and weapons, and order-of-magnitude cost estimates. Candidly assuming that the required percentages could be attained only by use of nuclear-tipped air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles, Sprague suggested that DoD be directed also to accelerate development of these weapons sufficiently to assure that they would be operational by the target date. As a stopgap until these measures were completed, Sprague proposed immediate acceleration of the early warning, fighter-interceptor, and antiaircraft programs (particularly Nike battalions). 17

Could guided missiles be developed and perfected to the required "kill" capability within the stipulated time? When he came to the NSC 1 July meeting Sprague had no reason to believe that they could; the DoD progress report had not even suggested the possibility. But during the meeting the Air Force briefer mentioned that an atomic-tipped air-to-air rocket then under development was expected to be operational by 1958, and would have a "kill" probability of two—that is, two kills for a single "shot" or "pass." For Sprague, this revelation transformed the whole picture. With that capability, he told the council, a 95 percent "kill" probability could be achieved with only half the fighter-interceptors now programmed in NSC 5408. 18

Sprague recommended to Cutler "in the strongest terms" that development and production of the atomic air-to-air rocket be given the highest priority, and that a "high percentage" of all fighter-interceptors assigned to continental air defense be armed with it by 1 January 1957 at the latest. He urged also a major effort to increase combat readiness to the point where no less than 75 percent of the fighter-interceptor force could be airborne with two or three hours' warning. These measures, plus accelerated development of the early warning system and completion of the Navy's LOFAR system for detecting enemy submarines, would provide by 1 January 1957 "a very high order of defense against assumed Russian capabilities as of that date." 19

As Radford had told the three senators after Sprague's 22 June presentation, the consultant had "painted the picture as black as it could be painted at this time," knowing that some of his information was "subject to later and more precise evaluation" and might turn out to be wrong or exaggerated. Radford also recited the familiar JCS doctrine that national security was a seamless web in which continental defense was only a part. As for accelerating continental defense, money was not a bottleneck; rather progress in many areas depended on the pace of technological developments and provision of trained manpower. Sprague apparently now believed a seriously damaging attack on the continental United States during 1957-59 might come early rather than late in the period.
What it all meant, Radford held, was precisely the kind of question the new NESC had been set up to examine. Its first report was due in November. Even accelerating all the programs would not resolve the problem of devising adequate defenses against any nuclear bombing attack.20

At the 1 July meeting of the council Sprague delivered a brief but grim presentation. He was quizzed about the relative effects of ground-level and air bursts and the fallout from them. Vice President Nixon asked whether the Soviets were expected to have ICBMs by 1960. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development Donald Quarles stated that the CIA was studying the question and hoped to have an answer by autumn but there was no known defense against them. The president said little, remarking that Sprague's report on the spread of fallout after a 10-megaton ground-level burst—3,200 square miles—would appear to invalidate major reliance on evacuation and dispersal, favored by the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) because of the high cost and doubtful efficacy of shelters.21

Forewarned of Sprague's strong advocacy for accelerating the major continental defense programs, Wilson lined up solidly with Secretary Humphrey in opposition. Not even another $5 billion would buy the 95 percent "kill" rate needed against Soviet bombers. Dulles retorted that it was plain that it was not possible to "meet this mounting peril and at the same time balance the budget"; spending for a big, conventional arms buildup would not be cheap either. The president listened and said nothing. The council approved Sprague's recommendation for a study by the NESC on "maximum damage," to be incorporated in its report due on 1 November. It referred all other recommendations to DoD for early study and comment by 19 July.22

Two weeks later it became apparent that the Air Force briefer at the council meeting had promised too much too soon. Quarles, directed to collaborate with the Joint Chiefs in preparing DoD comments on Sprague's recommendations, reported separately on 16 July on the status of the atomic-tipped air-to-air rocket. Work on the atomic warhead was proceeding satisfactorily, but the all-important date of operational availability of the rocket was still unpredictable.23

The JCS reported on the same day. Their cautious comments on Sprague's recommendations reflected a judicious balance between normal avoidance of criticism of an individual known to enjoy favor in high places and their longstanding fear of being stampeded into a crash continental defense effort. They pronounced Sprague's recommendations "generally valid and with certain qualifications feasible"; many of the programs could be accelerated but would probably require more money, manpower, and production capacity. A detailed feasibility study would be delayed
but could be included in the next progress report in December. They tried hard to show that acceleration of some of the programs, notably the five that had been slated for implementation "with all practicable speed," would "not necessarily" run counter to existing policy. The five programs mentioned were the mid-Canada early warning line, the two sets of seaward extensions, fighter-interceptors, and antiaircraft forces. The first DoD progress report in June showed mixed results in the progress of programs. The chiefs recommended that Sprague's favored proposals "should be accelerated whenever such acceleration is determined to be feasible and operationally desirable by the Department of Defense." They had no trouble with Sprague's recommended incremental readiness speed-up of fighter-interceptors and approved in principle his recommendation concerning the air-to-air rocket, agreeing that it should be given a high priority—but not the "highest."24

When the JCS paper carrying Wilson's seal of approval reached the Planning Board on 19 July, it provoked an outraged reaction from the ODM member, William Y. Elliott. While the chiefs professed to agree with Sprague's recommendations, he charged they were clearly "not prepared at this time to anticipate additional expenditures" for continental defense. Elliott believed that the two early warning lines should be made operational much earlier than now planned—by 1 January 1956 for the mid-Canada line, by the end of summer 1956 for the northern Canada (DEW) line. In Planning Board discussions late in July, members from the State Department and the Civil Defense Administration supported Sprague's acceleration recommendations while military members Bonesteel and Gerhart went along with the Joint Chiefs' proposals.25

At the NSC meeting on 29 July Quarles summarized DoD views. Continental defense programs were already moving along at "all practicable speed," but Defense expected that its December progress report would include reconsideration of the estimated operational readiness dates Sprague wanted speeded up. Accelerated construction of the early-warning lines would, of course, depend on Canadian cooperation. He repeated the gist of his recent report on the air-to-air rocket, including the uncertain prospects of meeting a 1957 readiness date. Sprague did not appear unduly disappointed. Most of the continental defense projects, he pointed out, would likely be operational by then anyway, and he believed that the most important ones—particularly the far-north DEW line, the Hawaiian end of the Pacific seaward extension, and the gap-filler radars—could with a reasonable effort be brought up to that level without injury to other military work. He said nothing about earlier operational dates.

During the discussion the president raised the question no one was prepared to answer: how much would Sprague's accelerations cost?
Quarles said he could only guess—maybe a billion, probably not more, possibly less. The real difficulty would arise in using additional money effectively. The president wondered whether, as a practical matter, more money would really help at this time. Foreign Operations Director Harold Stassen, risking the president's annoyance, asked why the air-to-air rocket development should not be put immediately on a crash basis. Because, Eisenhower retorted, research and development programs moved at their own pace and could not be pushed. Over the next several months the question must be intensively studied. He was prepared, he said, to go to Congress for a supplemental appropriation in January if it could be demonstrated that the need existed and that this would really improve the nation's defenses. Meanwhile, he told Wilson, DoD should seek an answer to the question: is acceleration necessary and would it be effective?

When the Planning Board's revised guidelines paper (5422/1) appeared on 26 July it contained only two paragraphs pertinent to continental defense, one on maintenance and protection of retaliatory forces and the other on acceleration of continental defense projects. The former was no longer an issue, the president having decided on 24 June in favor of the words "take all practicable measures" instead of "take whatever measures are necessary." The second provision was, however, stronger than the original, which had said nothing about acceleration. The revised statement supported acceleration but with a qualification suggested by the chiefs: "The U.S. should accelerate its military and non-military programs for continental defense set forth in NSC 5408 to the fullest extent deemed feasible and operationally desirable." The second provision was, however, stronger than the original, which had said nothing about acceleration. The revised statement supported acceleration but with a qualification suggested by the chiefs: "The U.S. should accelerate its military and non-military programs for continental defense set forth in NSC 5408 to the fullest extent deemed feasible and operationally desirable." ODM and FCDA members wanted more emphatic, less qualified statements, opposed by Defense and JCS. When the revised paper tardily came up for discussion on 5 August, the Planning Board, responding to Sprague's recommendation, also proposed inserting the phrase "including the air-to-air rocket program." The discussion of the disputed paragraph on 5 August probably reflected a realization that the substantive decision on continental defense—no acceleration of the "acceleration" already under way pending further development and more study, particularly of costs—had been made on 29 July. On the other hand, no one, including the president, objected to the assertion, in a guidance paper for budget planners, that "the U.S. should accelerate" continental defense programs. The president wanted the statement as broad and noncommittal as possible without draining it of all meaning. But again he stressed, as he had a week earlier, the gravity of the threat—he took Sprague's recommendations "very seriously," believed the air-to-air rocket should have a very high priority, and conceded that the continental defense guidance paragraph might appropriately mention the estimated "time of greatest danger."
president thought it unfortunate that the air-to-air rocket had not been mentioned in NSC 5408, and said it would be appropriate for the council to recommend, in a separate paper, that it be given a top priority. He also suggested brief quarterly progress reports to the council on important continental defense activities.\(^{28}\)

*The President's Dilemma*

In the final version of the guidelines paper, issued on 7 August as NSC 5422/2, the paragraph on continental defense contained the basic statement favored by the Joint Chiefs but qualified by compromise wording proposed by Stassen: "The U.S. should accelerate its military programs and non-military programs for continental defense as set forth in NSC 5408 to the fullest extent deemed feasible and operationally desirable, and give to these programs very high priority, having in mind that it is estimated the Soviets will reach a high capability for strategic nuclear attacks by July 1957."\(^{29}\) Although it added little to the original, the president seemed to consider the revised statement a useful formulation. While still undecided and wary as always of "crash" responses, the president may have been sufficiently alarmed by the accumulating signs of mounting danger to fear that the measures he now shunned might later prove unavoidable. To the chiefs, offensive capabilities seemed more important than continental defense, and they wanted no budgetary competition for them. For the president the problem was more complex. Accountable to a larger constituency than Defense and JCS, the president, even if he shared their offensive weapons bias, could not afford to indulge it beyond a certain point.\(^{30}\)

Continental defense did not fit comfortably into the New Look scheme of things, with its assumption of a stable postwar world where change was manageable, the threat of aggression was neutralized by the counterthreat of nuclear retaliation, and the historic superiority of American technology guaranteed adequate modernization of American forces at modest cost. The two nasty Soviet surprises of the past 12 months—detonation of thermonuclear devices and development of two advanced bombers of intercontinental range—had evoked the specter of a massive, city-razing surprise attack on the American homeland. For all his conviction that the New Look offered a sound approach to postwar national security and that nuclear deterrence offered a useful, perhaps essential, adjunct to continental defense, Eisenhower never assumed that the threat of surprise attack could be dealt with solely within the ordered, economy-oriented framework of the New Look. All his instincts, on the
other hand, warned him that neither could it be buried beneath an avalanche of budget dollars.

Some months previously, in early 1954, the president apparently decided on a new approach. At a meeting on 27 March with a selected group of scientists to discuss the problem of surprise attack, he told them about recent intelligence findings concerning the new Soviet jet bombers and directly solicited their advice. As a result, a special task force headed by James R. Killian, Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was formed to undertake a comprehensive study in three main areas: offensive capabilities, continental defense, and intelligence, with supporting studies in communications and technical manpower. Eisenhower gave the undertaking his blessing on 26 July, three days before the NSC meeting at which the equivocal decision to accelerate continental defense programs was reached. The Killian panel had a broad mandate to study the country's technological capabilities "to meet some of its current problems" and report by February 1955.31

The November 1954 Progress Reports and Effects

With Sprague again in the role of analyst and interpreter, the NSC met on 24 November to consider agency progress reports on continental defense, detailing developments during the previous five months.32 Both Sprague and Cutler expressed high praise for the DoD report. According to Sprague, it appeared that complete contiguous radar coverage would be provided on the Atlantic coast by July 1956 and on the West Coast a year later; that the Hawaiian end of the Pacific seaward extensions would probably be in place by June 1958, a year earlier than previously scheduled; that three more LOFAR stations had been added to the Atlantic system and a similar line was planned for the Pacific by March 1958; and that the number of Nike batteries that could engage attacking aircraft with one hour of warning had increased from 1 to 42 (out of 67 now on site). In addition, the United States and Canada had reached agreement on the mid-Canada early warning line and the need for the Distant Early Warning line, which had a good chance of being operational by June 1957. The new joint Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), established effective 1 September 1954, with the Air Force as designated executive agent, would exercise operational control over all forces from all services assigned or available in the event of an air attack.33

The report that aircraft armed with high-kill atomic air-to-air rockets might begin to be phased into the interceptor force during 1957 excited great interest. Warhead development by AEC was not expected to be a
hindering problem. The F-102A interceptor had been earmarked as the carrier, with a capacity for three rockets, thus giving it a multi-pass capability.34

The bad news, disturbing and extensive, was that the outlook for an integrated defense system capable of fending off a massive surprise nuclear attack in 1957 promised only marginal improvement. This finding by Sprague grew out of his correlation of the continental defense reports and related information from other sources with the presentation by the NESC to the NSC on 4 November concerning Soviet ability to inflict damage on the United States. In war-gaming a mid-1957 attack, the subcommittee had made certain assumptions as to the state of continental defenses at the time, specifically that the radars would have sufficient reach to track enemy bombers above 50,000 feet and that available interceptors would be able to “fight effectively” to altitudes of 60,000 feet. Such capabilities, Sprague asserted, were not in sight as early as mid-1957. B-47s were “regularly overflying our entire radar net without detection at altitudes above 40,000 feet.” Measures to remedy the deficiency, Sprague noted, were merely under study. As for interceptor capabilities, the experts did not agree. Against high-altitude attacks the capabilities were improving, but Sprague remained skeptical, complaining of “important differences of opinion.” Finally, the subcommittee assumed, and the progress report confirmed, that against low-altitude attack the system’s deficiencies were not correctable by mid-1957.35 Apparently the subcommittee’s report drove the point further home to Sprague by making vivid the enormous devastation that would be inflicted by a few 10-megaton bombs.36

ODM’s Elliott, who heard the subcommittee’s briefing, also voiced concern about the impact of a thermonuclear attack on the nation’s mobilization base. What he feared, he informed Arthur Flemming, his chief, was the crippling of the industrial complex producing key weapons and materials—guided missiles, bombers, nuclear warheads—needed for continuing and “finishing off” the war. To anticipate this threat, he proposed the immediate establishment in a heavily protected “citadel” area, probably in the southwest, of a highly organized and integrated industrial complex for the production of such weapons, equipped to operate as much as possible independently of the rest of the industrial base.37

Sprague’s presentation on 24 November apparently included a comparative time chart offered as a possible basis for determining national policy. Some time during 1956 the United States would accumulate sufficient megaton bombs to give it a knockout capability before the Soviets had built up their home defense adequately to blunt a surprise attack. This comfortable state of affairs, unhappily, would last only two or three
years, and possibly as early as mid-1957 the Soviets would learn how to build megaton bombs, thus acquiring their own knockout capability. This development might be limited, or delayed, if the United States, at the same time, accelerated the buildup of its continental defenses, providing assured early warning and the capability of inflicting unacceptable losses on attacking bombers at all altitudes. Eventually, perhaps within a decade, both powers would acquire abundant nuclear stockpiles and sophisticated delivery vehicles, ushering in the era of nuclear plenty and what would later be called “mutual assured destruction.”

The NSC responded with restraint to Sprague’s presentation on 24 November, duly noting his analysis, the several progress reports, and the report of the NESC three weeks earlier. It passed on his first seven recommendations without comment to DoD for “consideration.” Wilson farmed them out for comment about two-and-a-half weeks later; the responses trickled in early in February 1955. Sprague’s recommendations concerned various measures, some of which he had proposed earlier and now asked to be reconsidered, i.e., improvement of detection, interception, and kill capabilities, especially at very high and very low altitudes, by mid-1957.

The service bureaucracies did not fully accept the asserted overriding urgency of the mid-1957 deadline, particularly where the effort to meet it by crash accelerations of ongoing programs would risk disruptions and technical failures that might delay progress even more. The Air Force affirmed the need for new fighter-interceptors rather than expensively-modified existing aircraft. Bureaucrats may well have seen in Sprague a meddlesome outside “expert” who either had not done his homework or was not himself fully convinced of the feasibility of his proposals. Moreover, some sectors of the defense system, most notably the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) system, apparently defied acceleration at this particular juncture.

The Wedemeyer Committee

But if the service bureaucracies remained resistant to disruptive accelerations of continental defense work, Sprague’s November report and the NESC’s war game had produced a mounting sense of urgency in OSD. The idea that even a blunted thermonuclear attack might be only degrees less catastrophic than a successful one was not new. Yet the notion that what had happened to Bikini could also happen to Kansas City or Chicago seemed not to have sunk deeply into public consciousness. In the Pentagon, since civil defense—i.e., passive protection and evacuation of
the civil population and maintenance of civil order in wartime—was not a DoD responsibility, the planning and discussion focused mainly on defense of military installations (except for the as yet very limited anti-aircraft defenses provided around a few major cities), above all the precious SAC and continental defense bases. Widespread devastation of cities was assumed as an unavoidable consequence of the Soviet capability to penetrate U.S. defenses but was not much discussed in staff papers.

The imperative of halting a Soviet air attack before it reached U.S. borders may have come from a report submitted to the president late in January by the Continental Defense Panel of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The Wedemeyer Committee, as the panel was called after its chairman, General Albert C. Wedemeyer (Ret.),* had been asked to report on "how atomic weapons can best be utilized in the defense of the Continental United States in the event of an attack," but on its own initiative had decided to extend the inquiry to the question of how such an attack could be completely avoided. The opening paragraphs, with their litany of perils, set the tone: disappearance of the U.S. atomic monopoly and its declining superiority in nuclear weapons; rapid growth of the Soviet stockpile; improvement "by orders of magnitude" in bomb yields and efficiency; wide diversification of atomic weapons and declining dollar cost of inflicting destruction; and emergence of the threat of radioactive fallout. Very high attrition on an invading air armada no longer sufficed; a single 10-megaton bomb detonated low over Washington would destroy all structures in an area of over 100 square miles, damage residences over an area of about 800 square miles, and start fires in a 300-square-mile area. Radioactive fallout, assuming southwesterly upper winds, could spread northeast over Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Trenton in a cigar-shaped pall with maximum width of 30 miles. Personnel continuously in the open would suffer lethal dosages in an area of 3,000 to 6,000 square miles. Since even the most simple cover during the period of most intense fallout could dramatically reduce dosage, a major evacuation of population in this period might actually serve to increase casualties.

The panel expressed the conviction that the people of the United States were "inadequately informed" and urged an intensive nationwide effort to remedy this defect. It regarded the continental defense system, existing and planned, as incapable of stopping a crippling thermonuclear attack. The overriding national security objective, the panel declared, "must be to prevent an atomic attack on the United States." The inevitability of such an attack must not be assumed, and ways must be explored to make it

less likely, including international control of atomic weapons. Ruling out preventive war as an option that American public opinion would never sanction, the panel decided that the most promising approach was to make more credible the threat of retaliation. Retaliation and defense were part of a seamless web. Sole reliance on air defense would be foolhardy, but an efficient air defense would also enhance the deterrent and thus help prevent an attack. Completion of the early warning lines should be accelerated and further extensions studied, even “out to the very political boundaries of the Soviet orbit.”

Mindful of its congressional sponsors, the panel devoted several paragraphs, laced with “hang the expense” exhortations, to proposals for weapon-oriented nuclear research. New research avenues should be vigorously explored even if they did not promise instant military dividends. Such work as nuclear propulsion for aircraft, the Navy's submarine and large ship reactors, and rocket propulsion systems (non-nuclear) also received endorsement, since they might ultimately serve to increase the size and flexibility of strategic retaliatory forces. The panel also urged much more effort on the problem of detecting creeping submarines, which could pose a major threat to U.S. coastal populations. Further, atomic warheads should be considered for all missile categories. The panel complained that it had been denied access to important data on stockpiling and production of fissionable material that might have enabled it to develop more specific proposals and to evaluate more intelligently the degree to which atomic energy could contribute to defense. Another area proposed for study was suggested by the risk that armed nuclear bombs might explode when enemy bombers were shot down over American territory—the challenge of destroying the bombs as well as the bomber. Conversely, should not bombs carried by U.S. aircraft be armed whenever over enemy territory, so that if attacked and destroyed they could still do some damage to the enemy?43

The Joint Chiefs read the panel's report with a lack of enthusiasm that their typically bland and opaque written comments to Secretary Wilson did little to conceal. They simply ignored the panel's key recommendation, that prevention of an atomic attack be made an “overriding objective,” and dismissed most of the others with brief comments to the effect that they had already been done or would be. The chiefs also expressed mild annoyance that the panel had failed to note progress already made and had indiscriminately urged “highest” priority for this or that project without regard to possible effects on other projects or on the defense budget. They agreed that the American people needed to be educated about nuclear weapon effects and the threat of a Soviet attack. But they objected strongly to the implication that war plans concentrated only on general war initiated by thermonuclear weapons; it was also imperative to make
adequate provision for a strong mobilization base to support subsequent operations as well as for limited war capabilities over the long haul. Recognizing the imprudence of counting on winning a general war by an initial knockout blow, the best course would be "to assure that the damage suffered by the enemy will be greater than our own."

Concerning the risk of confusion in the communication of key decisions in a surprise attack, the chiefs noted the distinction between authority to intercept and authority to retaliate: the former was delegated to commanders in the field, the latter was reserved to the president. They expressed some reservations on extending early warning lines all the way to Soviet political boundaries. They cautioned that the atomic warhead was not suited for all missiles. Although automatically arming bombs when carried over enemy territory was technically feasible, they preferred the existing procedure aimed at "assuring that the bomb will not be detonated except as intended by the airplane commander."44

Wilson forwarded the JCS comments on the Wedemeyer report, with his concurrence and a few minor additions, to the White House on 28 March. In effect, the Department of Defense affirmed the chiefs' standpat position against greater acceleration or improvement in continental defense.45

The No-Hurry Approach

For a while in 1955 it seemed that there might indeed be a strong inclination to beef up continental defense despite the notable lack of support from the JCS. This was largely the effect of the Killian Panel report submitted to the president in February, a month after the Wedemeyer report.* The product of a group of prestigious national scientific leaders, its recommendations on continental defense evidently made an impression on Cutler and Flemming when they learned its contents shortly after its submission. Although it succeeded in focusing high-level attention on continental defense weaknesses, the report's impact was diminished by its failure to specify target dates for most of its recommendations on accelerated improvements.

Thus, DoD and other responsible agencies could endorse all but a few of the Killian report's recommendations with varying shades of enthusiasm (e.g., as "valid, feasible and desirable"), assure the NSC that they were already working on the matters, and seize the opportunity to state further funding needs. The impact of the Killian report on continental defense proved to be short-lived. By the end of 1955 the general

* For the Killian report, see Chapter XIX.
sense of urgency it had aroused had already waned perceptibly; most of what remained had come to focus on a few salient areas such as the long-range ballistic missile programs and the vulnerability of SAC. Attention turned to more routine tasks, notably the long-deferred revision of NSC 5408, the continental defense policy paper, pending which the president cancelled the scheduled mid-December 1955 agency progress reports on continental defense.\(^46\)

The administration’s response to the threat of growing Soviet air-nuclear power in 1955 had stopped well short of the call to arms that many true believers in airpower felt it warranted. Acceleration and expansion of long-range ballistic missile programs, the most dramatic and far-reaching measure undertaken, seemed the action most appropriate to the dimensions of the threat. To deal with the more immediate menace of the new Soviet intercontinental bombers and advanced interceptors the Pentagon, after insistent congressional prodding, offered only modest and grudging increases in production of corresponding types of U.S. aircraft and implementation of continental defense measures still on the “accelerated” schedule adopted the preceding autumn. The thrust of the response overall was to expand the retaliatory element of U.S. airpower—bombers and ballistic missiles—the one consistently favored by the Air Force and most of the Joint Chiefs. Defensive systems had to take second place. Continental defense, then, still remained at the bottom of the combat airpower totem pole. Like other airpower programs, its projected costs were rising dramatically—from $3.7 billion in FY 1956 to $4.9 billion in FY 1957—an even greater increase than in the year before.\(^47\)

A symptom of the “no hurry” thinking in continental defense matters became evident in the Air Force decision in January 1956 to abandon the accelerated delivery of computers for SAGE, the semiautomatic system of electronic coordination and control intended to tie together all elements of the continental defense system, enabling it to function as an integrated whole. This, one of OSD Comptroller McNeil’s aides reported, would delay the SAGE operational date almost three years (from November 1960 to about August 1963). Meanwhile, with the elements of continental defense (warning, detection, and interception) dependent on manual coordination, the whole system could be overwhelmed by a saturation attack. Nevertheless, Secretary Wilson decided to let this issue ride and include it in the next progress report to the NSC, scheduled for June 1956.\(^48\)

Seaward extension of the recently approved DEW line across northern Canada fared better in the “no-hurry” environment than did the SAGE system. These extensions into the Atlantic and Pacific were of particular concern because flank attacks from the south could be lethal to vulnerable SAC bases. By the spring of 1956 the JCS had made significant decisions
to create means to counter this threat; both Atlantic and Pacific extensions had gained fresh urgency from the Killian panel’s recommendations. From the beginning, the Navy and Air Force had disagreed on the location of the extensions in the Atlantic (the Army joined the controversy only later in 1955, generally siding with the Air Force). The Navy proposed a line in the far northern Atlantic from Greenland to the United Kingdom, where it could link with European defense systems. The Air Force wanted a longer, admittedly more expensive one extending to the Azores, but in January 1956 General Twining in essence accepted the Navy’s version of the DEW line’s Atlantic extension, with a supplementary “action line” to cover the long Greenland-Azores span. As finally approved by the JCS on 31 January and the Canadian Joint Chiefs on 17 April, the Atlantic extensions would consist of five radar sites across Greenland, one more on Iceland, and another in the Faroes. Radar picket ships and AEW aircraft would provide supplementary coverage of the water gaps between Greenland and Scotland. For the Pacific, in March 1956 Wilson approved the extension of the DEW line along the Adak-Midway axis.

Little Progress

Meanwhile, the Planning Board, pursuant to the NSC’s approval on 4 August 1955 of the Killian recommendations, had begun revision of NSC 5408. At the end of October a subcommittee of the board undertook the task. The Armed Forces Policy Council believed that the revised paper should concentrate on “basic policy and priorities” without going into the detailed military aspects of continental defense, which might rather be incorporated in the basic national security paper. The subcommittee quickly churned out eight fat policy drafts. The eighth, submitted to the Planning Board on 17 February 1956 and circulated for comment, promptly ran into trouble. The drafters had indeed confined themselves to policy, and the DoD contingent had no problem with this approach, but the other agencies, especially ODM, evidently found the resulting policy statements too upbeat to be reconciled with the dangerous threat and U.S. capabilities for dealing with it.

The most recent indication of the growing capability of the USSR to attack the United States by air, the draft stated, was a successful test in late November 1955 of a “high-yield thermonuclear weapon of advanced design.” Evidently the Soviets could now produce nuclear weapons with yields ranging from a few kilotons to more than a megaton. Moreover, in at least two other recent tests, they had used thermonuclear boosting principles to achieve high yields. This demonstrated capability made it
possible for them to obtain a total yield from fissionable material of more than 10 times that obtainable theretofore. By mid-1956 they would probably have nuclear warheads for missiles also.\textsuperscript{53}

Soviet missile development, according to current intelligence, was moving briskly ahead, faster than estimated a year before, with surface-to-air missiles being incorporated into the defenses of Moscow and other vital points, and air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles expected to be available within two years. The 5,500-n.m. ICBM was still projected for 1960-61 ("probably one operational unit") and it was believed that by then all Soviet guided missiles could probably be equipped with nuclear warheads. Soviet airpower—numbering perhaps 20,000 aircraft—was expected, if current trends continued, to be able to challenge U.S. and allied air-nuclear superiority in 1960. The rapidly growing Soviet submarine force would have more than 350 mostly new undersea craft beginning in 1956, about three-quarters with long-range capability.\textsuperscript{54}

The draft paper repeated a previous conclusion, that by 1958 the USSR "almost certainly" would be able to strike a "crippling" blow at the United States, but that the latter would have an equal or greater capability than the USSR, provided, of course, that its effective retaliatory power were maintained and protected.\textsuperscript{7} In January a presentation by the NESC assessed mutual damage in a hypothetical Soviet surprise attack on the United States in mid-1958, involving no warning until the attackers reached the DEW line. In this scenario, the United States "experienced practically total economic collapse" precluding recovery "to any kind of operative conditions" in less than 6 to 12 months, complete disintegration of the federal government requiring regression to local government, and 65 percent casualties requiring medical care with "in most instances no opportunity whatsoever to get it." U.S. defenses were less of a limitation on the attackers than the capacity of the Soviet nuclear stockpile. The assumed U.S. retaliatory strike would inflict about three times as much damage on the Soviet Union—in effect, total obliteration of its war-making capacity. A second scenario, assuming a month of strategic warning, involved primary targeting of U.S. air bases rather than population areas—but with no significant difference in the resulting damage. Warning time had little effect on the outcome: very little could be done to limit damage, and a preemptive strike was considered infeasible. Over the next five years the most likely mode of attack would be primarily by manned aircraft.

* "Crippling" was defined as less disabling than "decisive" (resulting in total inability to continue fighting); it would involve "destruction, disruption and loss of life that . . . would raise serious question as to the ability . . . of the U.S. to recover and regain its status as a great industrial nation for a considerable period of years."
Medium-range missiles might be available by 1958-59 for attacks on outlying areas such as Alaska. From 1960-61 on, the probable advent of the ICBM "would substantially alter the nature of the Soviet threat."55

Against this imposing threat, the report continued, the United States could array impressive and constantly improving continental defenses. Unfortunately, "increasing Soviet nuclear and delivery capabilities have made any relative gain questionable." The early warning system currently projected would become operational in 1960. In the air defense system, the vast medium-altitude spectrum (2,000 to 50,000 feet) was now reasonably well covered, but capabilities for detection and defense against aircraft above and below it were very limited. As for the not-too-distant menace of long-range ballistic missiles, detection within minutes was technically feasible, and defensive weapons were believed to be possible, but none yet existed or were in prospect.

Against submarine-launched missiles in the Atlantic the Navy looked to completion in 1957 of its LOFAR system for offshore detection, tracking, and (possibly) identification of waterborne targets. A similar system was scheduled for the Pacific in 1958. But the country remained generally vulnerable to clandestine nuclear attack, biological warfare, and conventional sabotage by a variety of means—use of diplomatic immunity, low-flying light aircraft, merchant ships and small craft. Measures to reduce the vulnerability of SAC's nuclear retaliatory forces were still under study and long-term action to disperse its bases was under way. Except for establishment of emergency relocation sites away from Washington, little had been done to assure continuity of essential government operations or to protect facilities against nuclear attack.

The real capabilities of the civil defense system, clearly very weak in most respects, were hard to appraise. Accomplishments over the past few years included an operational air warning system still deficient in many respects; planning for evacuation or shelter in many large cities, with increasing federal support; and a $30 million stockpile of medical supplies distributed to dispersed storage sites and now being relocated in the light of the fallout problem and the threat of larger weapons. Despite wide and urgent publicity, "the average citizen is still not fully aware of the dangers that he faces or not convinced of the necessity for his participation in defense measures." Overall, the system appeared "capable of reducing casualties and damage to a limited but indeterminate degree."

Equally or more depressing was the picture of industrial unreadiness for a nuclear attack. All manufacturing industry and 54 percent of the manufacturing work force inhabited 50 large population centers, with 70 percent of the total production capacity for each of several principal weapon components concentrated in a single target area. A nuclear attack
might destroy so much production capacity that little or no output could be expected for 6 to 12 months. Much of the nation's transportation system would be wrecked; many ports would be unusable. Limited steps had been taken to disperse industry, and active defenses had been concentrated to protect some industrial areas. 56

The Air Staff recommended that this gloomy portrayal be suppressed for the time being. 57 ODM, perhaps hoping to bypass this argument, preferred a greatly compressed but trenchant statement of salient weaknesses in terms of current and prospective unreadiness. It also wanted more emphasis on the lack of planned improvements in key areas, stressing civilian population evacuation and shelter programs, regional civil defense organizations and regional and local continuity-of-government command posts, overconcentration of production facilities in several categories, defenses against clandestine nuclear attack, and the Communist technological threat in general. 58

**New Alarms**

The leisurely pace of continental defense planning was disrupted early in March 1956 by the latest report from Robert Sprague, the NSC defense consultant. Recent intelligence, he asserted, revealed a new Soviet capability to deliver a decisive, not merely crippling, surprise air attack on the United States during 1958. This threat, Sprague believed, called for a redirection of effort from the cities-and-industry thrust of continental defense to defense of SAC bases and bombers against obliteration in a saturation attack. The most recent intelligence on the Soviet nuclear stockpile left “little doubt,” he declared, that by 1958 the Russians could have much more than the 2,000-megaton stockpile that the NESC believed might permit a “decisive” Soviet surprise attack. Sprague proposed accelerated measures not to strengthen the system as a whole but to preserve SAC's capability to retaliate massively in response to a surprise air attack in mid-1958. 59

Sprague's bombshell, within the restricted circle aware of it, upset a lot of people. The president's special assistant, Dillon Anderson (replacing Cutler), promptly sought comments from OSD and the Joint Chiefs. 60 Through their Planning Board adviser, Maj. Gen. Thomas F. Farrell, the chiefs declared that there was no agreed estimate, particularly for any future given date, on the extent of the Soviet capability and that Sprague had “no firm foundation on which to develop conclusions.” Farrell stated that no crash action was justified until all estimates could be checked for accuracy and appropriate cost and feasibility studies carried out. 61
The president evidently intended to deal with Sprague's report constructively and without delay. His point men were Dillon Anderson in the White House and ISA Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray in the Pentagon. On 15 March Gray presented a detailed analysis of Sprague's proposals to the Planning Board, implying that while awaiting authoritative rulings on Sprague's interpretation of recent intelligence DoD would proceed with implementation of his proposals. Relocation of the Pacific early warning line westward, he reported, was now approved, with a new sea barrier from Adak in the western Aleutians to Midway in operation by mid-1958, and a land-based radar line from Adak eastward along the Aleutians and then north to the western terminus of the continental DEW line at Cape Lisbourne in northwestern Alaska. In the Atlantic the planned seaward extension to the Azores was expected to be operational by mid-1957. The 60,000-foot altitude detection objective for land-based portions of the DEW line seemed definitely attainable by mid-1958. For the sea barriers it seemed technically feasible, although the timing might be affected by the withdrawal of picket ships for modification. For the radars of the control system the 60,000-foot altitude detection capability also appeared technically feasible, but a number of problems remained to be worked out relative to the mid-1958 deadline. The big question mark in Gray's briefing concerned Sprague's third proposal—reduction of SAC's reaction time. Gray stated he had been unable to develop useful comments on it in the short time available.62

About two weeks later Dillon Anderson suggested to Gray that the latter arrange a straight-from-the-shoulder Air Force briefing for the Planning Board on SAC's plans for reducing vulnerability. When Gray subsequently pursued the matter, the Air Force replied that it would be difficult and inadvisable for SAC to brief the Planning Board on reaction time alone ahead of a larger Air Force presentation intended for DoD on 1 June. A full-scale briefing could be offered to the Planning Board after Defense had heard it—say, in July. Gray yielded, and so informed Anderson, pointing out that it was better if the Planning Board briefing reflected a fully coordinated and approved DoD point of view rather than the unilateral views of SAC.63

The Growing Nuclear Threat

On 24 April 1956 the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) handed down its long-delayed intelligence ruling on the Soviet U-235 stockpile. Cumulative production for 1956 through 1959 was now possibly larger by a factor of four than earlier estimates. The report must have disappointed
those who had been hoping for, and to some degree counting on, a much lower estimate. Aware that the intelligence committee had confirmed his assessment of Soviet nuclear capabilities, on 10 May Sprague presented his latest views to the Planning Board on the three recommendations he had made some months before. Evidently some members wanted further confirmation. DoD stood pat on its plans for the seaward extensions of the early warning system and joined BoB in reserving positions on a majority proposal to assure an operational capability for the aircraft control and warning network up to 60,000 feet by mid-1958. Sprague's views were noted and the discussion was carried over to the next meeting. On 15 May Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs to give him, by 15 June, their analysis of the effect of the new information on DoD programs, pointing out that "if correct, this new intelligence will invalidate the Timetable set forth in the [Killian report]." The next day the president directed that the NESC submit a written statement on how the latest estimates affected its 1955 conclusions regarding Soviet capabilities to damage the United States.*

The NESC's reply on 31 May came from Admiral Radford, doubling in brass as chairman of both the Joint Chiefs and the subcommittee. Recalling the 1955 net evaluation that in essence the Soviets' 1958 nuclear stockpile and delivery capability would not suffice to knock out the United States, even though it could inflict damage "on a scale unprecedented in human experience," Radford compared the estimated Soviet weapons stockpile and available supply of nuclear materials on which that conclusion was based with the corresponding figures for 1958 in the new estimate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons (bombs)</th>
<th>NIE 11-2-55</th>
<th>NESC Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large-yield</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-yield</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-yield</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-235</td>
<td>7,200 kg</td>
<td>37,700 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium</td>
<td>4,600 kg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, with the 37,700 kilograms of U-235 estimated to be available in 1958, the Soviets could produce about three-and-one-half times as many large-yield weapons as in the 1955 estimate. Still, Radford was not yet ready to concede the immediate need for a crash continental defense buildup competitive with strategic retaliatory power. He did not consider

* See Chapter XIX.
“the size of the Soviet nuclear stockpile . . . the sole criterion of Soviet net capability.” He recommended “that no final conclusions be drawn from the revised estimate of the size of the Soviet nuclear stockpile pending the completion of the 1956 Net Evaluation.”

A few days later CIA Director Allen Dulles, also a member of the NESC, chimed agreement with Radford—incidentally noting that two members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee had dissented (downward) from the latest U-235 figure for the Soviet stockpile. The Radford and Dulles reports went to the NSC with other papers for discussion at the council meeting on 15 June.

These two high-level pronouncements, Radford’s particularly, set off alarm bells for ODM’s Elliott. Although the council was not likely to reach final decisions on continental defense at the June meeting, pending the Air Force’s crucial briefing in July on reducing SAC vulnerability, the discussion, Elliott felt, might well amount to a showdown for Sprague’s view of the crisis and the measures he proposed for dealing with it. Elliott accordingly fired off three lengthy memos to his boss, Arthur Flemming, detailing the arguments he hoped the latter would use at the meeting.

Elliott made the central point that the growth in offensive capabilities now authoritatively attributed to the Soviets, when matched against the most probable readiness dates projected for the various sectors of U.S. defenses, gave the Soviets a highly probable net capability to execute a decisive surprise attack before 1958—perhaps late in 1957. In the Planning Board, the JCS and OSD members, unwilling to accept the view of the intelligence community as definitive, had forced compromise language that had the effect of watering down Soviet nuclear capabilities. They added a sentence saying that the Soviets might be able to strike a “crippling” blow at the United States; this was in contrast to “decisive.”

Elliott’s opposition to the change had little effect, but he urged Flemming to pursue the issue in the council discussion. He feared that adoption of Radford’s view, expressed in the NESC report of 31 May, would postpone any response to the new threat until November. Even if no final conclusions need be drawn at this time, Elliott urged, “working conclusions must be drawn as to Soviet capabilities for the year 1957 as well as subsequent years, if we are to accelerate programs authoritatively and effectively in time to meet the acknowledged change in Soviet capabilities.” By the end of 1957 the Soviets were expected to have at least 500 high-ceiling jet bombers in addition to almost as many of their Tu-4 piston bombers for use in second-wave attacks—a potential total of 1,000 usable bombers for delivering nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Soviets had developed an aerial refueling capability that would allow them by 1958 to end-run the early warning lines, even if extended to the Azores
and Midway, and they had the capability to launch short-range missiles offshore from their growing fleet of submarines. Elliott concluded that the peril point to which all vital defense programs should be geared was early 1958 at a minimum—and at a maximum, six months to a year earlier. Particularly scornful of budgetary objections, Elliott argued that acceleration would merely consume funds—an estimated additional $500 million through 1960—earlier than planned.

As Elliott had feared, the NSC meeting on 15 June brought a showdown on continental defense. Radford tried hard to play down the significance of the new intelligence estimate, set forth by Allen Dulles in his opening “significant world developments” briefing. Radford warned that council members “should not get the erroneous impression that they had been listening to undoubted facts.” Moreover, it was really old news, for all planning to date had “assumed that the Soviet Union would have a multimegaton nuclear capability at some future date.” Dulles agreed, but replied affirmatively when Humphrey asked him whether the new estimate was more reliable than previous ones; it was supported, he said, by “much more evidence.” Both Vice President Nixon (who presided*) and Lewis Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission considered the estimate to be of “enormous significance,” whether the increase proved to be fourfold or only twofold.

Forearmed by Elliott’s briefing memos, Flemming forcefully argued the case for acceleration of continental defense efforts, even though the issue was not on the day’s council agenda. It was pointless, he declared, to debate whether an attack would be “crippling” or “decisive” when the lesser of the two could involve casualties of 24 million. The Killian panel had predicted this threat might materialize as early as 1958; now it seemed likely to come even earlier, “and might even now be imminent.” Soon the council would have to face the issue of accelerating continental defense measures; it might turn out that the cost problem was one of timing rather than of cumulative totals over several years.

More precisely and in starker terms, Sprague put it that “there was little that we could do . . . to prevent the killing of millions of our people if the Soviet Union chose to launch an attack. We could, however . . . destroy the USSR if the latter should undertake to attack the United States.” By mid-1958, and possibly sooner, the Soviets would be able to launch a decisive, rather than merely crippling attack—unless “certain of our continental defense programs” were promptly accelerated. “The ability of SAC to retaliate,” Sprague insisted (making clear what he had in mind),

* The president had been hospitalized on 7 June by an attack of ileitis, with subsequent surgery.
“must, above all other things, be made secure,” and he urged that this “vital­ly important” fact be explicitly enshrined in both NSC 5606 and NSC 5602/1, the basic national security policy paper. 72

The Humphrey Factor

Sprague’s was not the last word on this subject. Unhappily for him, it was not Allen Dulles, or Flemming, or even Vice President Nixon who called the tune, but Secretary Humphrey. Less interested in intelligence estimates, whose interpretation he was content to leave to the experts, than in the federal budget and the economy, on which he deferred to no one except the president, Humphrey spoke with the assurance of one who knew he had the president’s ear. He simply rejected as unreal, since the experts themselves disagreed, the threat to national survival posed by an all-out Soviet air attack. The real threat, in his view, was national bankruptcy resulting from rising defense costs. The draft policy paper on continental defense, NSC 5606, now before the council, projected estimated costs starting with $2.9 billion in FY 1955 and rising steeply to $11.5 billion in FY 1960, for an aggregate of just under $40 billion. These figures Humphrey found “incredible.” Piling new or expanded old programs on the budget, said Humphrey, must cease. Consideration of NSC 5606 should await the submission of the annual status reports ordered by the president. Told that this might not happen until some time in the fall, Humphrey demanded, why not earlier? 73

Every speaker during the discussion of NSC 5606, including Flemming and Acting Defense Secretary Reuben Robertson, began with a symbolic bow to Humphrey. Flemming’s and Sprague’s brief remarks encountered an audience plainly hostile to their “spend more” implications, and indis­posed to debate the issue. Humphrey quickly turned the discussion back to the status report question. The council finally agreed to defer action on NSC 5606 until July, when the president could preside and three-year cost projections might be available. 74

Unmentioned in the 15 June discussions was the Air Force’s still pend­ing SAC vulnerability study, expected to be the key feature of any response to the Soviet threat. In point of fact, the RAND Corporation had completed the study in May and briefed components of OSD in June. Formal present­ations to the Armed Forces Policy Council and the NSC awaited Air Force decisions. RAND’s principal finding held that short of gargantuan expend­itures there was “no simple solution” to SAC’s “many major vulnerabili­ties.” It would not do merely to multiply the numbers of bombers or bases or interceptors; some 50 specific measures were proposed. 75
On 9 August the NSC heard the long-postponed vulnerability report, which, as the Air Force briefer, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay, explained, actually addressed more positively and broadly the goal of increasing SAC's deterrent capability and strike potential. The core requirement called for dispersal of SAC's total force by construction of a large number of additional bases in the interior of the country. To implement a new war-fighting concept the Air Force also examined a more basic structural change. Since overseas bases were increasingly vulnerable, instead of immediate deployment in wartime of all medium-bomber wings overseas all SAC bomber wings would operate from continental bases, refueling as necessary. To this end the Air Force was looking into possible development of forward tanker bases in northern Canada and use of additional civilian airports in the United States and abroad.

Against the ballistic missile threat from offshore submarines the Air Force was evaluating, not very hopefully, the feasibility of putting a significant portion of the total force on 15-minute alert; the minimum one-third needed to ensure effective retaliation did not appear attainable. For protection against ballistic missiles, the Air Force now leaned toward use of shelters. Little had been done, on the other hand, to protect or disperse SAC's vulnerable weapons stockpile. As of January 1957 over half of the nuclear weapons would be concentrated on only 13 sites, and 38 of the 45 sites used for weapons storage would be located at SAC bases, ripe for "bonus" hits on those primary targets. Lindsay concluded his exposition with minimum cost estimates, which, he noted, were not a part of current budgetary considerations.

A supplementary Air Force-Navy briefing showed no effort to meet the indicated increase in Soviet offensive capabilities—projected readiness dates for key elements of the continental defense system were still in mid-1958 and later. It seemed that the threat of a Soviet surprise attack late in 1957 or early 1958, based on the intelligence assessment made in April, had been swept under the rug. NSC 5606, still an unapproved draft, remained in the limbo where the council had consigned it in a mood of revulsion against rising defense costs—and would remain so awaiting completion of a new integrated continental defense plan by CONAD.

Nowhere was the mood of pessimism, irritability, and lethargy that pervaded discussions of continental defense in the summer of 1956 more evident than in the reaction of the NSC to the unwelcome intrusion of the almost invisible subject of civil defense. During the council's 15 June discussion of NSC 5606 Flemming made a strong argument for this program (not an ODM responsibility), declaring it to be "the single most important proposal in this new policy statement." Yet the administration "had never come to grips with the problem of civil defense" and less than $100
million of federal money had been spent on it. The NSC 5606 draft called for an “improved and strengthened civil defense program,” over the dissent of Treasury and BoB.78

For the centerpiece of its new civil defense program, an ambitious shelter undertaking beginning in FY 1958, the Federal Civil Defense Administration projected expenditures through FY 1960 of $2.8 billion, with total civil defense expenditures for FY 1957 through FY 1960 amounting to $3.7 billion. Facing the prospect of long-range ballistic missile attacks with only a few minutes of warning, shelters seemed to be the answer. FCDA, unable up to now to get appropriations for a shelter effort of any size, felt that while council approval of NSC 5606 in itself would not guarantee needed funding, it would give a green light for development of a plan that could then go through the normal budgetary process. Lacking information on which a realistic estimate could be based, FCDA estimated that the total cost might ultimately reach $20 billion. The anti-spending mood of the council that Humphrey sustained augured ill for future consideration of civil defense. As Vice President Nixon grimly noted, civil defense’s only rival for rapidly rising projected costs in the continental defense category was the whole group of programs concerned with defense against aircraft and missiles.79

Civil defense underwent its final NSC scrutiny of the summer in August, when the whole national security package, and its cost projections, was reviewed. After Val Peterson, the FCDA administrator, had concluded his presentation, the president wryly asked whether anyone wanted to comment, “or whether everyone was scared to death.” He went on to call the shelter problem virtually unsolvable.80

Looking ahead to the end of FY 1960 the United States would still have no effective defense against the ICBM: some research and development on detection and tracking, and perhaps an antiballistic missile, but, as yet, no operational units. SAC’s alert system might have started, but the goal of getting one-third of the force airborne would still be years away—perhaps by 1964 or 1965. Overall, except for the SAC aircraft alert plan and research and development on defense against ballistic missiles, continental defense efforts through FY 1960 still aimed at defense against manned aircraft, a necessary focus. Defense against ballistic missiles still remained little more than a hope. The Air Force and the Army had ongoing research, begun the preceding year, for detection, tracking, and development of a countermissile, on which thus far (through FY 1956) they had spent about $13.3 million. To this they planned to add, through FY 1960, $265.3 million more.81 But a committee appointed in March, at Wilson’s direction, by ASD(R&D) Clifford C. Furnas and headed by
Hector R. Skifter to study the feasibility of an anti-ICBM missile, submitted a report on 13 June stating that development of a system to detect incoming missiles with up to 25 minutes of warning was feasible and worth attempting, particularly in order to predict the area of impact. Far more difficult would be the development of an active defensive weapon that could deactivate or detonate an incoming ICBM or limit significantly the damage it could cause. The committee concluded, “firmly” but cautiously, that an active defense “short of 100 percent” could be developed, perhaps within 10 years, and that any crash effort to shorten this time would almost certainly fail. The group also cast doubt on the economic viability of the project, and urged careful evaluation of the advisability of doing it at all.82

As for manned bombers, the need for effective defenses would remain for years to come, while the race intensified to deploy long-range missiles and to develop an effective defense against them. Facing this grim prospect, and an administration more than ever resistant to increased defense spending, it was understandable, if certainly open to criticism, that the Air Force and OSD should reject crash diversionary projects and choose to put their money on strengthening and protecting the retaliatory forces for the long haul, counting on the unlikelihood that the Soviets, under the threat of annihilating retaliation, would launch an attack as early as late 1957 or early 1958 that might or might not prove decisive. Sprague and Elliott agreed with DoD on the imperative need to strengthen and protect the retaliatory power—but they wanted an accelerated schedule that would make the gamble less dangerous. Evidently DoD leaders preferred to gamble rather than confront the president with a “take-it-or-leave-it” demand for the additional funds that acceleration would cost.

McNeil, less disturbed by the immediate than by the more distant prospect, noted that through 1960 about three-quarters of the cost of continental defense would have gone for weapon systems and their control. Warning systems accounted for less than 15 percent of the total, reduction of SAC vulnerability and reaction time only about 8 percent. The disproportion, McNeil thought, suggested the possibility of misplaced emphasis. If, no matter how much was spent on air defense weapons, a sufficient number of attacking enemy aircraft could get through to severely damage the United States, it might be better to develop a truly effective tactical warning system and to reduce the vulnerability and reaction time of SAC to a point where it had an assured capability to retaliate. As a corollary, the size of the SAC bomber force might be reduced as its vulnerability decreased and its readiness increased—for example, by reducing the size of bomber wings from 45 to 30 aircraft (their original
size). If one-half of the reduced force were put on alert, the equivalent of a one-third alert status in the present force would be achieved.83

Only somewhat more fanciful than this line of speculation would have been the effect of injecting the FCDA's $13 billion shelter proposal into the equation. Civil defense would then account for almost one-third of the cumulative continental defense cost through FY 1960, instead of only 1 percent by McNeil's calculation. Warning systems would drop to 11 percent, reduction of SAC vulnerability to 3.5 percent, weapons and weapons control to 46 percent. McNeil might well have stuck to his proposed shift of emphasis to improve warning systems, which could conceivably save several million civilian lives, thus permitting more modest shelter construction as well as some cutbacks in defensive weaponry. More than a year later, in the wake of the Gaither report, * and with Humphrey having departed from office, such ideas would command serious attention.

Overall, continental defense represented a strategy of reaction, based on technologies whose successful completion in this period seemed distant and uncertain. Even were their prospects more clear, they faced strong competition, both strategic and fiscal, from those who favored strengthening atomic retaliatory forces on the theory that the best defense was a good offense. Fiscal restraint, as practiced and preached by Eisenhower and Humphrey, ensured that when hard choices on distribution of funds had to be made, millions would not be poured into continental defense.

The New Look meant massive retaliation, fiscal responsibility, and more bang for the buck. That left little for continental defense. Such a cautious approach seemed sensible also in light of the uncertainty of the threat. Continental defense policy had a stop-and-go nature about it, as reactions to the threat of new Russian bombers, the dangers laid out in the Killian report, and the prospect of greatly increased Soviet nuclear capability periodically alarmed the president and his cabinet. In the final event, however, U.S. leaders hesitated over the costs, particularly in light of the future threat of a nuclear missile attack for which there was no defense at all in 1956.

* See Watson, Into the Missile Age, 136-41.
CHAPTER XIV

Basic Strategy and the FY 1956 Budget: Decision to Retrench

By the end of July 1954 the draft guidelines paper (NSC 5422) for carrying out national security policy had gone through two inconclusive NSC discussions (on 24 June and 1 July) along with continuing debate within the agencies concerned. Following its 1 July meeting the NSC directed the Planning Board to prepare a revised version for final discussion by the council late in the month, taking into account conclusions reached thus far and impending reviews of continental defense progress reports submitted in June. The new version, NSC 5422/1, submitted to the NSC on 26 July, still remained a document riddled with disagreement marginalia. Acting Navy Secretary Thomas S. Gates, Jr., thought it lacked focus, merely noting worsening situations without providing intelligible guidelines that could be acted upon. Acting Army Secretary John Slezak charged that it failed to deal adequately with the Soviet “creeping expansion” threat, which he saw as calling for much larger ground forces than indicated in the paper.

The Joint Chiefs shared Gates's low opinion of the paper; they now perceived the problem as not residing in the guidelines paper itself but in NSC 162/2, in which, as recently as 22 June, Admiral Radford had found “nothing basically wrong.” It was time, the chiefs thought, for “a complete revision of NSC 162/2, including a clarification of our world-wide commitments of which NATO and the Far East are of most immediate concern.” Wilson forwarded the JCS comments, with his concurrence, to the NSC.

* The 1 July meeting was concerned with continental defense. See Chapter XIII.
Cutler led the council on 4 August through a methodical discussion of NSC 5422/1, noting at the outset the Planning Board’s recommendation that it be approved as guidelines under NSC 162/2, i.e., without challenging that document’s status as the policy bible for national security. He explained the new paper’s most basic guidelines:

- protection of nuclear retaliatory forces and acceleration of continental defense programs;
- coping with “brush fire” aggressions: main reliance on American-supported indigenous forces aided as necessary by mobile U.S. forces;
- countering Communist “creeping expansion” and subversion: cooperative economic growth programs, especially in Asia and parts of Latin America; political support, covert operations, military assistance; military support for friendly governments against local Communists, in concert with other nations;
- willingness to act unilaterally in strengthening free world cohesion against Communist expansion, and to be less influenced by European allies in increasing efforts to check Communist expansion in Asia, while continuing to build strength and cohesion of Western Europe as major power source;
- readiness to increase certain military and mobilization programs, regardless of NSC 162/2, if necessary to meet anticipated increases in Soviet capabilities.

A proposed State Department statement on the desirability of exploring the admittedly remote possibility of making safe and enforceable arms limitation arrangements with the Soviet Union was also included. Several splits reflected the Planning Board’s continuing difficulty in reaching consensus on prickly issues, including acceleration of the continental defense program. On the use of nuclear weapons in general war, the revised paper stated that the United States would employ “all available weapons and [an addition favored by OSD and the JCS] should continue to make clear its determination to do so.” Make clear to whom? asked the president. Secretary Dulles suggested omission of the last part of the statement. Then Wilson reported the Army’s advocacy of a dual capability to wage general war with either or both nuclear and conventional weapons. Humphrey asked whether the United States was in fact seeking
such a capability. This triggered an exasperated outburst from the president, who expressed astonishment that no one seemed to take seriously his repeated statements over the past 18 months that atomic weapons would be used in a general war from the opening day. The council agreed to omit the offending clause, leaving only "planning should be on the assumption that, if general war should occur, the United States will wage it with all available weapons."5

The paragraphs on local aggression also drew some dissent. Dulles and Wilson both objected to the implication that American as well as indigenous forces might have to be committed. Wilson wanted to eliminate the whole paragraph since local aggressions would have to be dealt with on their individual merits anyway. The president agreed in part with the paragraph, but he saw this as a limited obligation; the United States could not afford to become an armed camp or tie down divisions around the world. The pertinent sentence was amended to read: "For this purpose the U.S. should be prepared to assist, with U.S. logistical support and if necessary with mobile U.S. forces, indigenous forces supplemented by available support from other nations acting under UN or regional commitments."6

A long revised paragraph on Communist expansion through non-overt means such as subversion and indirect aggression characterized the threat as "immediate and most serious," and proposed specific measures that placed new emphasis on non-military solutions. The council approved these provisions with little discussion.7

In the section on free world cohesion, NSC 5422/1 strengthened earlier language, stating that the United States "should . . . act independently of its major allies when the advantage of achieving U.S. objectives by such action clearly outweighs the danger of lasting damage to its alliances." The paragraph concluded with a warning that the United States should not be inhibited from taking action, including use of nuclear weapons, when clearly necessary to its security or to prevent Communist territorial gains. Dulles, who had opposed DoD and the Joint Chiefs on this issue in June, acquiesced in this new formulation, but he declared firmly that the allies would not resort to general war to stop indirect aggression.8

Another paragraph in the same section, urging a major effort to block Communist expansion in Asia, contained a provision sponsored by DoD: "... and eventually to contract Communist-controlled areas and power." This evocation of the ghost of "liberation," little heard of since being laid to rest by the Solarium study more than a year earlier, prompted Stassen to point out that it was the only such provision in the paper. Dulles thought the provision should be deleted, but the president suggested instead a new version that appeared as paragraph 20 in the paper:
“Although the time for a significant rollback of Soviet power may appear to be in the future, the U.S. should be prepared, by feasible current actions or future planning, to take advantage of any earlier opportunity to contract Communist-controlled areas and power.”

Foreign aid, the paper stated, might be provided selectively where it could be used effectively—possibly even on a larger scale than existing programs in the particular country targeted, but, at the same time, the total level of economic aid worldwide must be progressively reduced. Finally, the paper favored continued military assistance, including defense (budgetary) support, in the light of increasing U.S. dependence on foreign forces.

Back in June 1954, uncertainties regarding federal tax receipts, the economic outlook, and levels of defense and non-defense spending had rendered the fiscal and budgetary section of NSC 5422 virtually irrelevant to the paper’s other content. The uncertainties remained. BoB projected expenditures for non-defense programs slightly higher than before, especially in FY 1957. For the NSC programs, however, instead of projecting expenditures at FY 1955 levels, Budget Director Hughes had assumed continued reductions at rates indicated by current expenditure trends. This assumption resulted in much lower security spending estimates for FY 1956 and FY 1957, bringing the earlier estimated deficit for FY 1956 down to $2.2 billion, and the $5.9 billion deficit for FY 1957 down to $700 million. Taking note of the pressures to further reduce individual income and corporate taxes, Hughes more realistically projected deficits of $5.1 billion and $5.4 billion, respectively, for FY 1956 and FY 1957.

Concerned about the possibility of deficit spending, Hughes, through his representative on the Planning Board, had secured the insertion of the phrase “through revision of priorities” in a paragraph stating that increased expenditures might be required to meet anticipated increases in Soviet capabilities. Wilson wanted the whole paragraph deleted: “Defense should not always be asked to knock out something old in order to get something new.” Hughes’s proposed phrase was deleted, and at Cutler's suggestion the paragraph was revised by adding a statement that “final determination on all budget requests will be made by the President after normal budgetary review,” which, of course, added nothing to established procedure.

Even more strongly than Humphrey, apparently, Hughes felt that the overreaction of the defense community to disturbing world developments was threatening to upset the delicate balance between security and solvency that he and Humphrey regarded as the supreme goal of the administration. Late in June he had vented his feelings in a long, emotional
memorandum to the president castigating the Planning Board's initial draft of NSC 5422 for its "extreme" proposals, which, he warned, would "require an abrupt reversal of our present fiscal and budgetary policies." The board, he complained, had overreacted to threats and ignored the vast defense expenditures and steady growth in military strength over the past four years.\(^\text{13}\)

Some particulars in Hughes's memorandum caught the president's eye and gave him pause. Recalling his own forecast in May of a FY 1956 deficit of $6.8 billion—"the second largest peacetime deficit in our history"—if security expenditures were projected at their FY 1955 level, Hughes dwelt on the horrendous effects of piling atop it the "untold additional billions" now contemplated by the guidelines paper. All hope of balancing the budget in the administration's first four years would go glimmering, and the country would be saddled in FY 1956 and FY 1957 with the largest peacetime deficits in its history.\(^\text{14}\)

The president's general response to this and similar warnings in June and July could be read in his approval of Hughes's 23 July broadside to departments and agencies directing a downward turn in the FY 1956 budget from FY 1955 appropriation requests and spending levels, and a head start on spending and obligation reductions during the latter part of FY 1955.\(^\text{15}\) But it was a qualified response. Eisenhower's most conspicuous exception, made late in July, suspended for budget planning purposes the big cuts in uniformed personnel planned for FY 1956 and FY 1957. About the same time he exempted production of atomic weapons, civil defense, and measures to maintain the mobilization base.\(^\text{16}\) Finally, he decided on 29 July to accelerate the principal continental defense programs.

The revised NSC 5422/1—approved on 7 August as NSC 5422/2—offered hardly a clue as to prospects for spending and saving, since none of its forecasts and admonitions carried a price tag. Outwardly the paper was hardly recognizable as the offspring of NSC 5422. But the original policy lines and emphases remained, along with the uncorrected anomaly of a guidance paper that purported to provide guidance for implementation of basic policy while detailing the changed circumstances that had already made the paper largely obsolete. Still, it was generally assumed to be only a stopgap pending a complete rewrite of NSC 162/2—a task that would, in fact, be undertaken within two months.\(^\text{17}\)

**The Mobilization Base: Wilson's About-Face**

Meanwhile, NSC 5422/2 itself still needed work, since the entire section on mobilization had to be redone by ODM, in collaboration with
The first draft submitted to the Planning Board on 10 September reflected ODM's concern over the weakening of the country's mobilization potential under the policy of allowing the industrial base to shrink as defense production dropped to peacetime levels. Conceding that mobilization potential continued stronger than ever before in peacetime, the paper argued that declining production of military hard goods, as projected, would not (except for nuclear components) leave adequate expansible capacity, particularly to produce the newer weapons that would be needed after D-day to replace obsolete ones. ODM's now updated estimates indicated that by mid-1957 the shrinking mobilization base would have an annual delivery capacity of only $15 billion of military hard goods (compared with actual deliveries of $24 billion in FY 1954), and an estimated mobilizable capacity in the first year, assuming no damage from enemy bombing, of only $41 billion (compared with a current first-year estimate, based on an immediate M-day, of about $55 billion).  

ODM lacked agreed joint estimates of general war requirements to make its case fully persuasive. The absence of joint estimates resulted from the inability of the Joint Chiefs, owing to internal differences over war strategy, to produce a Joint Strategic Operations Plan (JSOP) providing guidance for mobilization and strategy in a general war beginning in mid-1957. The draft mobilization paper for NSC 5422/2 skirted this problem and trailed off inconclusively without recommendations.

From this unpromising beginning the Planning Board succeeded by 5 October in producing a revised version clearly split between a Defense-BoB and an ODM position. Using the same array of projections and estimates, the Defense and BoB members took a "half-full" and the ODM member a "half-empty" view. ODM held that NSC 5422/2 should recognize explicitly the probable need for increased expenditures in adjusting to increases in Soviet net capabilities. Defense and BoB proposed only that the implementation of NSC 162/2 should be "related" to increases in Soviet capabilities. Both sides agreed, however, that until requirements of logistic support for U.S. allies could be determined and then combined with U.S. joint estimates, it could not be known whether the U.S. mobilization base was adequate in the event of war.

DoD's position in this dispute reflected Wilson's familiar preference for a concentrated mobilization base over a broad one. A few months after coming to the Pentagon he had told a congressional committee that he planned no major changes in his predecessors' policy of spreading procurement contracts among numerous firms in order to develop a production base that could be quickly expanded in an emergency. On the other hand, he had made it clear that he intended to rely heavily on large, experienced
firms (like his own alma mater, General Motors), capable of diversification and therefore of shifting from military to civilian production—e.g., from tanks to autos—without wholesale layoffs of workers after completing a defense contract—the so-called “dual purpose” plant. The new administration, eager to reduce defense spending and anticipating the approaching end of hostilities in Korea, was beginning to narrow the mobilization base by squeezing out secondary suppliers converted from civilian to military production during the Korean War, concentrating output of particular weapon systems in single, efficient producers rather than several firms, and building up reserve stocks of end items and critical materials to tide over the early stages of an emergency. 21

Immersed for some time in the problems of reorganization and planning, by October 1953 ODM had obtained a commitment from DoD to provide a list of requirements for the thousand most critical defense production items needed in an all-out mobilization—an important step toward development of a comprehensive industrial mobilization plan. This would inevitably bring to the surface the incompatibility between Wilson's approach and the broad-base concept. 22

Meanwhile, growing concern over the vulnerability of the nation's population and industrial centers to air attack was forcing mobilization planners to take heed of the necessity for systematic geographic dispersal. At the same time, Wilson's economy-oriented policy of concentrating defense orders in a few large firms was increasingly making the prime targets of air attack more inviting, while reducing their number. Production of tanks, trucks, self-propelled guns, jet engines, and other key weapons and components was cut back and concentrated in single plants, while alternate producers were closed down and their machinery laid away. In one such case, Ford's tank plant at Livonia, Michigan, converted to production of automobile transmissions. Army ordnance officers testified that it would take about a year to retrieve the government-owned tools from the adjacent warehouse where they were stored, reinstall them, and get the plant back into production of tanks. 23

In September 1954, as the off-year congressional election campaign neared its climax, Democratic Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington attacked the concentrated procurement policy for allegedly favoring General Motors over other auto makers, thus inflicting hardship on the smaller producers while General Motors enjoyed huge profits and peak employment. Wilson dismissed the attack as politically motivated, pointing out that most of the contracts in question were initiated by the Truman administration. As it happened, about this time DoD switched its tank sole-source procurement from General Motors back to Chrysler on
the basis of a low bid. Jackson, applauding General Motors' fall from grace, promptly shifted his attack to "the Wilson policy of concentrating production in the single plant," which, he said, "will not make tank production less vulnerable to enemy attack." 24

The apparent standoff between Defense-BoB and ODM over the Planning Board's 5 October draft was broken when on the 21st the Joint Chiefs sent Wilson a rewrite of the board's draft, unanimously supporting the ODM position on all points with un wonted forthrightness. Owing to deficits, imbalance, obsolescence in end-item reserves, and declining production capacity, U.S. mobilization potential would be weaker in FY 1956. Until wartime requirements of the allies for American logistic support could be determined and U.S. requirements updated by early completion of joint mobilization plans, it could not be accurately known "in what type and by what quantity of materiel the U.S. mobilization base will [not "may"] fall short of providing necessary logistic support in the event of war." Finally, the chiefs agreed that specific measures should be taken to improve the mobilization base. 25

In OSD the arrival of the JCS response on the 22d caused a stir. Wilson forwarded the chiefs' views to the NSC on the 25th with a covering note: "This is a very complicated problem and I am not in complete agreement with the assumptions that were made nor the conclusions that were drawn from them. A great deal more work will have to be done on this problem." 26

For Wilson, the NSC meeting that discussed the mobilization draft on the 26th became an ordeal. In his opening briefing Cutler remarked that the chiefs' position "must have caused some pain to Secretary Wilson, in view of the fact that in at least three significant instances their views were closer to those of the ODM than they were to those of the Secretary of Defense." On the defensive, Wilson declared that much more work needed to be done, "especially within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization," to produce a "reasonable" policy; moreover the chiefs disagreed among themselves. Finally the proposed policy was based on "incorrect military assumptions." His remarks did not sit well with the president, who retorted that "after all of our bitter experience in two world wars, he had supposed that we could have reached agreement on the basic structure of our mobilization policy." But now Wilson was proposing a restudy of the fundamentals. Nevertheless, Wilson "again insisted that the council should start all over again on its study of mobilization policy," pointing to the lack of agreement on the requirements (civilian as well as military), duration, and probable course of a future war. Cost factors, he said, had been insufficiently studied. The president demanded to
know why it was necessary to "keep recomputing [mobilization] requirements year after year." Wilson, with Flemming's support, insisted they changed continually and had to be updated.

Most of the discussion centered, at Flemming's suggestion, on specific measures needed to improve mobilization potential. Flemming made it clear, answering a query by the president, that acceleration of steps to disperse important facilities to safer areas or provide more safely located alternative production sources meant offering tax amortization advantages not only to businessmen who would build new defense plants in safe areas, which was the current policy, but also to induce manufacturers to move existing plants to safer areas. Despite an approving rejoinder from the president, Humphrey immediately expressed alarm over the revenue loss this policy might involve. Was Flemming proposing, he demanded, that we abandon all the defense plants in Detroit and saddle the government with half the costs of rebuilding them somewhere in West Virginia? Surely, Flemming argued, this was preferable to having the government itself build the plants. The president was dubious; perhaps Humphrey's objection could be met by offering tax amortization on a competitive basis. Wilson noted the special problems posed by the aircraft industry's immobility and the looming problem of the missile industry. It might be wise to approach the dispersal problem "by pieces" instead of as a whole. Flemming agreed to this and also to the president's suggestion.

After summarizing the discussion Cutler proposed that the council adopt the Joint Chiefs' rewrite as the approved input to NSC 5422/2 and re-examine it on 3 December. Wilson and the president agreed, but Hughes questioned the opening paragraph of the JCS paper, hitherto ignored, that contained a no-competition-for-funds proviso. Unqualified as it was, Hughes thought it a "dangerous invitation to spend money." The president quickly settled the matter by adding at the end of the paragraph the phrase, "subject to decisions on the budget," and the council then tentatively adopted the JCS-proposed version.

Subsequently, Wilson complained that the new mobilization guidelines needed more work to make them "fully meaningful" in implementation. But on 23 November ODM took the first step toward implementation with a mobilization order directing government agencies to harmonize their current procurement activities with their long-range production requirements in an all-out mobilization. It sanctioned the waiving of economy considerations in current procurement in the interests of maintaining a sound mobilization base. This, along with the focus on dispersion in the new guidelines, pointed directly at the Wilson single-source concentrated procurement policy. Wilson responded on 7 December with a directive to
the military departments to review current procurement plans for a re­stricted list of about 1,000 key articles of military hardware comprising about three-quarters of the dollar procurement of weapon systems—the so-called DoD Preferential Planning List—in order to integrate them more closely with mobilization plans. "The implementation of these policies," OSD explained, "should keep a maximum number of plants in military pro­duction, thereby providing facilities that can be rapidly accelerated to full capacity on relatively short notice." Opportunities for small businesses would not be affected. Despite the restated emphasis (which he insisted was nothing new) on geographical dispersal of facilities and multiple sourcing, Wilson clearly still considered dollar economy the driving cri­terion in defense procurement, and he did not seem much worried by the state of the mobilization base. About two weeks later McNeil, in a published by-line article, reasserted on his boss's behalf the continuity-of-policy thesis.

As deliveries declined, some defense plants were shutting down or going on standby, but more were slowing their military output and switch­ing over to civilian goods. This gave increased importance to economic maintenance of an effective mobilization base over the long haul. Puzzled reporters, refusing to buy the "no change" party line sounded by DoD spokesmen, could only surmise that the policy was intended to deny congressional Democrats "a target on which their guns had been trained for the last several months."

**Cuts and Reclamas: "Adjusting" the Service Budgets**

On 4 October 1954 the services forwarded their proposed FY 1956 budgets to OSD where a team from McNeil's office and BoB, scalpels in hand, awaited them. Apparently Hughes's exhortations had fallen on deaf ears. The services were now asking for a whopping $36.6 billion in new obligational authority, which (even without allowing for OSD's expenses and other extras) amounted to some $8.3 billion more than Congress had recently granted for FY 1955. The Air Force claimed the bulk of the increase, $6 billion more than the $10.9 billion it had re­ceived in the final FY 1955 budget. Aggregate projected spending levels also rose, only the Army registering a slight decline. A BoB staff paper of 15 October, recalling December projections of DoD spending leveling off in FY 1957 at $33 billion, predicted that if military planning con­tinued on course, expenditure rates $3-to-4 billion higher than that could
The FY 1956 Budget: Decision to Retrench

TABLE 8
Service Budget Submissions for FY 1956, 4 October 1954 ($ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>New Obligational Authority FY 1955</th>
<th>New Obligational Authority FY 1956</th>
<th>Projected Expenditures FY 1955</th>
<th>Projected Expenditures FY 1956</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>7,619.1</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>28,259.8</td>
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<td>Total Defense</td>
<td>28,800.1</td>
<td>37,396.8</td>
<td>36,769</td>
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Source: Table in Cong Rec, 83 Cong, 2 sess, 1954, pt 12:15493; DoD FY 1956 Budget Est, 30 Nov 54, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

be expected. The service secretaries made no apologies for these increases; indeed, all three avowed that the constraints and assumptions imposed on them had forced them to budget well below the limits of prudence. 33

For seven weeks during October and November the OSD-BoB review team labored over the service budgets, the main effort going into the bloated Air Force budget. Despite a 55 percent increase over its FY 1955 NOA, the Air Force described its budget as a "sincere and conscientious effort" to comply with announced objectives. Aircraft and related procurement called for $6.8 billion (40 percent of the entire requested funding), more than $6 billion of it for purchase of aircraft. The OSD-BoB review staff noticed that even after the proposed large funding increase, the Air Force still anticipated significant shortages in a long list of important types of aircraft by mid-1957, when the full 137-wing force was supposed to be in place, and some even larger shortages thereafter. The staff recommended an early review of aircraft requirements for the entire 137-wing force and a reduction of $882 million in the aircraft and related procurement account, achieved mainly by stretching out procurement programs into FY 1957 and later. Funding for electronic and communication equipment proved especially vulnerable to scrutiny owing to its high content of developmental items optimistically forecast for early production. Overall, the reviewers reduced the Air Force's $17 billion budget request by 15 percent, to $14.4 billion. 34

McNeil sent the staff analysis to the Air Force on 23 November. Six days later Secretary of the Air Force Talbott's one-inch-thick reclama, as bulky as the analysis to which it responded, arrived on his desk. The original request had been "revised" downward, the secretary reported, to
$16.8 billion—a trifling $130 million less. The Air Force had, in fact, yielded nothing of consequence, and in some categories wanted more than before. Conceding guided missile developmental difficulties and the probability that Atlas would eventually nudge out its two rivals in the intercontinental class, the reclama contended that any reductions or cancellations at this time would be premature. It objected most vehemently to a proposed $800 million cut in the $1.2 billion for military construction; facilities construction was the Air Force's most serious problem. The deep cut proposed could wreck the 137-wing program.\textsuperscript{35}

For the Navy the OSD-BoB review staff proposed a cut proportionately deeper than for the Air Force—$1.9 billion or 18 percent of the requested $10.7 billion in NOA—and mostly from procurement and production, maintenance and operations, and military public works. The deepest procurement cuts occurred in aircraft, support vehicles, ammunition, and production equipment and facilities. For one program—aircraft procurement—the review staff expressed high praise for its realistic production schedules. The initial $1.6 billion aircraft procurement request wound up sustaining a two-thirds cut of $1.067 billion.\textsuperscript{36}

The Marine Corps, less forthcoming, requested $306 million for ammunition, more than double that of the preceding year, reflecting a radical increase in prescribed combat rates of fire: from 10 to 20 rounds per weapon per day, for example, for the 30-cal. rifle. The Army, by contrast, had recently lowered its rate for the same weapon from 6 to 3 rounds. For other ammunition types, the Marines' rate of fire averaged two to three times that of the Army. These rates, the review staff quickly determined, derived from a crude statistical analysis of certain amphibious assault operations in World War II (mostly Okinawa) and short periods of high activity in Korea. The staff recommended a modest allowance for training and provision of newer types of ammunition, while deferring to FY 1957 the funding of reserves over and above the ample stocks already on hand.\textsuperscript{37}

Less defiant than the Air Force, the Navy Department proposed to split the difference between the Navy/Marine Corps total estimate and the proposed cut, asking for restoration of $914 million, thus providing a total of $9.8 billion. For most budget accounts, however, the Navy's reclama sought full or almost full restoration, and for R&D a sizeable increase.\textsuperscript{38}

The Army was the only service with a legitimate claim to have adhered to the official guidelines by proposing budget totals below the FY 1955 levels. This did not deter the review staff from trimming them by $1.1 billion, more than 12 percent, a smaller cut both absolutely and percentage-wise than those of the other services. Like theirs, the Army's military construction request was drastically reduced (by one-half); unlike.
their R&D request was also deeply slashed (30 percent). In the main, however, the review staff dealt gently with the Army's budget, especially with military personnel funding, cut less than three percent. Ironically, the estimates of obligation for procurement and production, for which the Army proposed to rely wholly on unobligated prior-year funds, fared worst. The $2.25 billion estimate was reduced by $1.3 billion, almost 60 percent, in effect raising the 12 percent cut in requested NOA to a 21.5 percent cut in total NOA.* To the Army it seemed that its capacity to fulfill its mission would be diminished.

Stevens submitted a detailed reclama on 24 November asking for restoration of all but a few hundred million of his original $8.9 billion request. Wilson countered by urging him to try to trim another $600 million. Stevens respectfully refused. From FY 1953 through FY 1956, he pointed out, the Army had reduced its expenditures (actual and planned) by $6.8 billion, nearly all of the $7.6 billion total reduction in DoD spending for that period. "There comes," he said, "a point in Army retrenchment beyond which . . . we should not go."39

Thus, by the beginning of December the OSD-BoB team had slashed service requests for $36.6 billion by more than $5.5 billion, over 15 percent. This was not, of course, the end of the line. All of the services had promptly struck back with counterproposals. But with only a few days remaining before the decision deadline it looked as though the final figures might in fact fall within the $30-32 billion range predicted by McNeil's staff back in mid-September. The system seemed to be working.

**BoB Sounds the Alarm: The Add-on Threat**

Budget Director Hughes, kept informed about the budget review, was not reassured by what he heard. It seemed to the BoB staff that the services were riding high, ignoring guidelines and recklessly expanding budgets. Ominously, all seemed to anticipate rising, not falling, levels of spending.40 In mid-November Hughes informed the president that the current budgetary projections, assuming continuation of taxes at current levels, a modest five percent reduction in defense spending, and a world still tense but without a major war, pointed to a moderate deficit in FY 1956 of $2.2 billion and, in the year following, only $700 million—in short, what might be called an approach to a balanced budget, perhaps

* This is computed from a total NOA of $11.126 billion, comprised of the $8.876 billion Army request for NOA and the $2.25 billion from unobligated prior-year funds.
attainable in the year following. More ominously, however, a variety of new legislative and military proposals now under discussion, together with the armed services' unreduced budgetary estimates, could swell the 1956 and 1957 deficits, respectively, to $9.7 and $13.3 billion.\(^4\)

Hughes's "add-on" estimates were deliberately astronomical, intended to capture the president's attention and focus it on the dangers of a runaway budget. He concentrated on the merits and reasonableness of an austere FY 1956 budget continuing the downward trends since 1953 of appropriations, unexpended carryover balances, and expenditures in order to approach balance in FY 1957. If all possible "add-ons" materialized, the federal expenditure trend would of course soar skyward, from $64.2 billion in FY 1955 to $75.3 billion in FY 1957.\(^4\)

All but a small fraction of Hughes's dreaded "add-ons" related to national security, including three major programs already under NSC consideration for possible increase. For these—continental defense, the defense mobilization base, and military manpower reserves—Hughes projected possible total costs of $2.7 billion and $4.9 billion, respectively, in FY 1956 and FY 1957.\(^4\)

Developments in October and November 1954 seemed to be moving in the direction that Hughes feared. The three major programs of immediate concern to the NSC in this period all reached stages that focused attention on their probable budgetary impact. In the reserve program, prospectively the largest of the three, ostensibly the question at issue centered on the kind and size of organization needed to meet military manpower mobilization demands in a major war, especially during the first six months. The practical problem, however, was to devise a peacetime reserve system that the country would support as fair and affordable. These might be irreconcilable aims. On 29 July 1954 the NSC approved a Defense-OMD "statement of objectives and requirements" for the reserve program (NSC 5420/1). The two agencies proceeded to develop a program that, despite continued misgivings by the JCS, the president approved on 17 November as a basis for proposed legislation to be submitted to Congress.\(^4\)

The prospective cost of the program had been a disputed point ever since McNeil's office, in March 1954, had hurriedly priced one recently submitted study at $7.6 billion in NOA in FY 1955, leveling off at $6 billion after FY 1959. The estimate provoked a prompt challenge from Assistant Secretary for Manpower Hannah for its inclusion of such large costs as planes and other heavy equipment that ought properly to be charged to the mobilization base.\(^4\) The plan was rushed to completion early in November without detailed costing by the JCS or the services, and McNeil again had to produce an "order of magnitude" cost estimate.
Following Hannah's original line of reasoning, he wrote that the plan "should be concerned largely with the training of personnel" rather than the equipping of forces, and on 9 November the Armed Forces Policy Council confirmed this approach. The final cost version included the following refined figures (in billions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NOA Expenditures</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers were smaller than those used by Hughes in his "add-on" warning to the president on the same day, but the difference probably mattered little to the president since he was already worried about "add-ons" and what the Democratic Congress would do to his proposed national reserve plan.

Hughes's fears of a big "add-on" to the budget stemmed most recently from the decisions reached at the NSC meeting of 26 October 1954 when a JCS rewrite of the draft mobilization section of NSC 5422/2 received tentative approval. At the meeting he had protested the proviso the chiefs had inserted to ensure that any funding for mobilization would not be at the expense of funding for forces in being. The draft mobilization paper raised, without answering, two disturbing questions that service planners, for the most part, had resolutely refused to come to grips with—should the United States provide the post-D-day materiel needs of its major allies and should planning for post-D-day industrial mobilization take into account the damage likely to be inflicted, particularly in the opening nuclear exchanges? The Joint Chiefs had been asked to examine the first question, and the upcoming report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC), scheduled for 4 November, was expected to illuminate, if not answer, the second.

Meanwhile, there appeared for the first time to be a prospect of removing the basic obstacle to coherent mobilization planning—lack of agreed joint estimates of materiel requirements for general war. On 25 October the Joint Chiefs, unable to resolve the differences that had held up completion of the Joint Mid-Range War Plan, passed the problem up to Secretary Wilson. They disagreed, in essence, over the question whether planning for a general war should assume (in the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view) an extended, all-out wartime mobilization of the nation's resources, human and material, to support massive and prolonged operations by land, sea, and air forces abroad—a replay of World War II with nuclear weapons added—or (in the Air Force view) either a "quick and clean" American victory won by strategic airpower or a more prolonged "broken-backed" conflict following an initial exchange of
destructive air strikes. The Army-Navy-Marine Corps scenario visualized the opening nuclear exchange as only a preliminary to major offensive and defensive operations worldwide. The Air Force expected that the initial strikes would be so destructive to one side or both as to preclude either mobilization or military operations comparable to those of World War II. The paramount aim of prewar planning and preparation, it argued, was to develop strong combat-ready forces-in-being to meet and counter the enemy's initial onslaught and to build a mobilization base adequate to sustain these forces and those that could be quickly mustered in the early months of the war. To prepare in peacetime for the mobilization and support of larger forces thereafter (e.g., by stockpiling and broadening the defense production base) would dangerously detract from the primary effort. 49

Between these two positions Radford took what purported to be a mediating stance, but for all practical purposes he supported the Air Force view. The primary aim, he held, should be to develop a mobilization base capable of supporting the forces that could be generated in the first six months of a war and their sustained operations thereafter: those needed "to absorb the initial shock, to deliver our own atomic offensive, and to form the nucleus for such expanded offensives as may then be plainly necessary." It could not be assumed, of course, that all-out mobilization might not subsequently be required, and the services should continue to plan for this contingency. But they should limit their peacetime requests for funds to develop forces and the mobilization base to their estimated needs during the first six months of a war, except for specified exemptions of critical long lead-time items granted by the secretary of defense. Along with this "D-plus-six" concept, Radford also had recommendations on the two principal points in contention. He suggested allowance of a suitable margin of capacity to cover estimated enemy damage to the production base. He opposed any determination of definitive requirements for aid to allies until after hostilities began, when both the need and the remaining productive capacity could be assessed. 50

What Radford presented to the secretary on behalf of the chiefs amounted to both something less and something more than a choice between two objectively stated opposing positions. The Army-Navy-Marine Corps position received short shrift: a single 23-line paragraph, the Air Force position ran about 60 lines and Radford's views made up the rest of the five-page memorandum. The three members of the "losing" majority could have had few doubts as to the outcome. 51 As expected, Wilson promptly approved Radford's "compromise" on 2 November, noting its congruence with the Air Force position but calling it "the best foreseeable
resolution of this problem" and agreeing with Radford's belief that it would "best satisfy all points of view without prejudice to any." Assuming a 1 July 1957 identical D-day and M-day, he prescribed as guidance for service mobilization planning the forces and manpower totals that the services had stated they could muster from all sources (active and reserve forces plus new draftees and recruits) during the first six months:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,840,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This included a tentative total of 2,900,000 for the Service Callable Reserve.

Evidently Wilson felt uneasy about manpower mobilization on this scale and at this speed; the manpower total, he remarked, might prove to be more than the national economy could or would support, along with the added burden of aid to allies and after allowing for enemy-inflicted damage. He also noted that DoD would have to make appropriate recommendations to include in the U.S. mobilization base factors concerning expected damage to the United States and aid to U.S. allies during a general war.

Mobilization manpower was not, however, the principal issue. Air Force planners criticized the mobilization plans developed by the other services for projecting huge force mobilizations that portended equally huge deficits of materiel when requirements were matched against shrunken production capacities. Mobilization on such a scale would dictate prompt and costly peacetime measures to reverse the shrinkage and begin expanding the production base, while building up stocks of materials and end-items to sustain the mobilizing forces until expanding production could take up the slack. On the other hand, the D+6 month plan, although cheaper in requirements, would bring new questions of timing in a stop-and-go mobilization, particularly for the Army. Limiting the Army's capability to fight a war of survival by holding it to a mobilization base tailored to its D+6 month forces, Secretary Stevens protested to Wilson, would jeopardize the Army's current active and standby industrial mobilization base. The new plan, he feared, would halt the Army's force buildup at 22 divisions by D+6 months while full deployment would require another 12 months and leave no backup forces at home to reinforce units overseas or replace battle losses. Barring a liberal policy by OSD in granting exceptions for long lead-time equipment for additional
forces, the Army, Stevens warned, "would be forced to curtail mobilization after D+6 months or modify its deployment schedule," either of which would threaten the survival of forces engaged with the enemy overseas.\textsuperscript{54}

The Army apparently could not bring itself to believe that Wilson had adopted the Air Force concept of a short, cataclysmic war, leaning heavily on the probability of American victory (even after heavy damage from a Soviet first strike). Wilson also seemed oblivious to his own planners' unwillingness to face up to the problem of a massive transatlantic movement of American ground forces a la World War II under enemy air and submarine attack. The D+6 plan, Stevens told Wilson, "would result in a series of measures suited neither to a short war nor a long war." He urged that the Army be allowed to plan for maximum mobilization; in addition, he requested early guidance on the questions of wartime aid to allies and provisions in mobilization planning to compensate for damage from enemy action.\textsuperscript{55}

For Wilson, any risks inherent in the D+6 plan evidently yielded to the overriding current advantage of neutralizing the threat that defense mobilization planning posed to the FY 1956 budget. This was not, indeed, immediately apparent. On 5 November 1954 McNeil promptly passed on to the budget review staff Wilson's recently announced guidance as pertinent to their current endeavors, and Hughes's "add-on" paper later that month projected an additional FY 1956 cost of $500 million for development of the mobilization base, twice that amount in FY 1957, and an eventual full annual cost of $5 billion.\textsuperscript{56}

By the end of the month, however, when OSD began to prepare further guidance to supplement Wilson's 2 November directive, it became clear that the services could not develop detailed mobilization requirements until completion of the Joint Mid-Range War Plan, which in turn was awaiting the results of current discussions of NATO strategy. On 1 December, following a presentation to the NSC by Defense and ODM on the status of the mobilization base through FY 1957, the president directed preparation of a revised presentation to be based on the new war plan, when approved, with allowance for estimated bomb damage and post-D-day aid to allies. On 9 December Wilson directed that the services compute their mobilization requirements on the basis of the new war plan, when approved, by 1 August 1955, in time for inclusion in FY 1957 budget preparations. The president, McNeil told the secretary, was not likely to get his revised presentation on the mobilization base before the following October or November.\textsuperscript{57} For the FY 1956 budget, at least, the prewar presentation of a mobilization base had become a backburner matter.
Hughes's third possible big "add-on" to the mushrooming FY 1956 budget—continental defense—had been advancing during the summer and fall of 1954 "with all practicable speed." NSC 5422/2, the guidelines paper approved early in August, stipulated, as guidance for the FY 1956 budget, that continental defense programs should be accelerated under a very high priority—instead of merely the "increased emphasis" prescribed in NSC 5408, the basic policy document—in light of the seeming probability that by mid-1957 the Soviets could have a highly developed capability for strategic nuclear attack. There was no mistaking the rising temperature of concern resulting from the late spring intelligence on growing Soviet air and nuclear power and Robert Sprague's presentations to the NSC in June and July 1954. The president had left no room for doubt that he was worried and by approving the new guidance had served notice that he considered acceleration, even if it meant greatly increased funding, a serious option. But he was not yet convinced that this would be necessary or prudent.

Budget builders thus had to decide for themselves what the situation demanded and what the president was likely to approve. Starting with their usual predisposition to ask for more, not less, the services interpreted the new guidance to mean that the president had, in effect, approved a "semi-crash" program, as a disapproving OSD official put it, "with emphasis upon achieving the maximum degree of readiness by July 1957." The huge overruns in the budgets submitted by the services on 4 October were clearly responsive to the pervasive sense of rising peril evident in the prolonged discussion of new budget guidelines in the late spring and summer.

How much money the services proposed for continental defense could not be determined since no budgetary continental defense program as such existed; the various operations involved were funded in appropriations that also served other missions. When pressed for cost figures, DoD officials responded (reluctantly) with estimates carrying some such label as "indications of general orders of magnitude." That the acceleration called for by NSC 5422/2 had already begun became apparent, however, in mid-November when the NSC Planning Board received the continental defense reports detailing developments during the almost seven months that had elapsed since the last ones. The services' reclamas against the budget review staff's proposed reductions naturally made the most of the argument that accelerations had been responsive to NSC guidance and pressure. Apparently, the services suffered little, if any, net loss.

*See Chapter XIII.
from the review staff's changes. Accordingly, the president's budget for FY 1956, when submitted to Congress in January 1955, contained an estimated $3.319 billion for continental defense, almost $1 billion more than its budget predecessor: $938 million for the Army, $399 million for the Navy, and $1.982 billion for the Air Force. Approval of this increase—40 percent above FY 1955 funding levels compared with the 22 percent increase forecast back in February 1954—offered a measure of sorts of how much more seriously the president now viewed the threat to the "continental vitals."59

The New Look Back on Track

The FY 1956 DoD budget appeared on the NSC agenda for 3 December. Previously the services' proposed oversized budgets, submitted to OSD on 4 October, had undergone the prescribed review by the OSD-BoB review team, which had reached the final stages of negotiating with the services the proposed reductions of some $5.5 billion in new obligating authority and $3.3 billion in expenditures. If carried out, these cuts could bring the DoD budget down to levels compatible with Hughes's early November model of a lean, low-deficit, attainable federal budget that would "approach" balance. But this hope was now dimmed by prospective add-ons under NSC consideration that Hughes had recently called to the president's attention. The most alarming add-on, for the nation's shrinking mobilization base, by now had receded far enough over the horizon not to threaten the FY 1956 budget, but others—including the new reserve program (about $1.7 billion), accelerated continental defense, and a new military pay bill and career incentive proposal (about $1 billion)—remained to be reckoned with.60

The 3 December council meeting heard presentations on manpower and the budget. On the 6th a smaller group at the White House heard a presentation by Assistant Secretary Burgess on the new reserve proposal and the military pay bill. The president talked about waste and "padding" in DoD and of the tendency of the military to pile "program on program" in the effort to provide for "all possible contingencies." He warned that it might be necessary to accept "lower relative security" as new threats appeared on the horizon.61

Despite these straws in the wind, apparently no one expected anything dramatic at a final budget meeting on the 8th. On 30 November Wilson, in a jovial mood, had told the press that he expected FY 1956 expenditures to run about $35 billion and requests for new money
between $29 billion and $34 billion (the totals for FY 1955 and FY 1954, respectively). At the next week’s conference he confirmed $35 billion as the probable spending total, “plus or minus two billion.” The New Look economy drive seemed to have come to a halt, temporarily at least.62

Before the meeting on the 8th, the Joint Chiefs met with Wilson to submit informally a scheme recently drawn up by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for an increase in service strengths and force levels by the end of FY 1957. For the Army it was a follow-on from the plan approved by the president at the end of September to expand the Army’s force structure from 19 to 24 divisions with no increase in manpower by upgrading 5 “training” divisions to combat status and assigning the training function to the divisions themselves. The increase in divisions was illusory, despite some savings in training personnel, since the five training divisions would have to be trained before they could perform useful missions. Because of needs elsewhere, only 13 divisions remained to meet the Army’s commitment to provide NATO 17 divisions within six months after war began.63

To meet its NATO commitment, in November the Army proposed to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee creation of four more divisions by the end of FY 1957, involving an increase of 179,000 above the strength ceiling of 1,173,000 approved in July. In the committee, the Army member won the support of his Navy and Marine Corps colleagues for this increase while, in return, endorsing the Navy’s request for beginning and end strengths of 698,000 and 740,000 in FY 1957, along with an additional carrier. The Air Force member went along with the carrier but opposed all the personnel increases. The committee as a whole agreed on the currently approved strengths for the Marine Corps and the Air Force, and on the Air Force’s 137-wing goal. In presenting this plan to Wilson on the morning of 8 December, the chiefs took no position as a body, while Ridgway strongly defended the Army’s proposal. Wilson, too, decided to pass; he took the matter with him to the meeting with the president.64

The meeting in the president’s office on 8 December included only the key individuals concerned with the Defense budget—Cutler and Sherman Adams, Secretaries Dulles, Humphrey, and Wilson (accompanied by Deputy Secretary Anderson and Admiral Radford), Hughes, and Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Arthur Burns. When Wilson mentioned the JCS split position on strengths and force levels for FY 1957, the president promptly branded the JSPC proposals “unacceptable” and proceeded to spell out his decisions. In essence, he had decided to go back to the reduction goals announced in December 1953 and to move up their
fulfillment from the end of FY 1957 to a full year earlier. At the same time, some of the cutbacks—and, in the case of the Air Force, a small increase—were to be carried out before the end of the current fiscal year. The totals finally decided on, after some discussion, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approved by president</th>
<th>Estimated</th>
<th>Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 Jul 54 for</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>8 Dec 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>budget purposes (begin &amp; end FY 56)</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>for 30 Jun 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,173,000</td>
<td>1,370,285</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>682,000</td>
<td>702,129</td>
<td>870,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>221,352</td>
<td>215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>975,000</td>
<td>963,500</td>
<td>970,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,045,000</td>
<td>3,257,266</td>
<td>2,940,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Combined Navy and Marine Corps
Source: See note 6.

The president explained the reasons for his decision. The commitment to reinforce NATO during the first six months of a war, he said, would be virtually a dead letter in a nuclear conflict; the divisions simply could not be moved overseas. The "real use for the Army" would be to "help keep the civilian population in order." More money for continental defense and technological improvements would mean "we would have to cut down somewhere." The Army seemed the logical place to start. It still had a lot of fat, with less than half of its strength in combat divisions and regimental combat teams; forces in Korea need not be maintained at full authorized strength. Smaller cuts might be made in the Navy and Marine Corps, and even some of the Air Force's "cushy" jobs could be eliminated.65

The next day Eisenhower announced his decisions to the NSC; it was time to get the New Look back on track. He emphasized the new foci of effort: continental defense, advanced technology (mainly missilery), reserve forces available for mobilization in the month following an attack, pay increases and benefits for servicemen, and a strengthened mobilization base, especially for protection of critical components. Money saved by personnel reductions would go for these new priorities, and the strengthened reserve forces would also offset, to some extent, the reductions in regular forces.66
Over the next two weeks the actions were made public, starting with the president informing congressional leaders on 13 and 14 December and the press in his news conference on the 15th. On the 20th Wilson publicly disclosed the specifics of the cut, but not its rationale except for a comment that the threat of global war seemed to have diminished—an unfortunate gaffe. The next day Secretary Dulles, just back from meetings in Paris to report on decisions to incorporate normal use of tactical atomic weapons into NATO war planning, pronounced that Soviet long-range aims had \textit{not} changed, and the danger of war had \textit{not} diminished. Planned reductions in manpower reflected rather the availability of improved weapons, which promised greater strength with fewer men. The press played up the personnel cuts, and Democratic politicians vowed to make it an issue in the forthcoming session of Congress.\textsuperscript{67}

It was time to call a halt to debate and ensure that key administration spokesmen sang in unison—something not to be taken for granted. While the Army was the only service seriously affected by the new personnel cuts, the Joint Chiefs and the three service secretaries remained united in opposition to an impending revision of basic national security policy, spearheaded by State and clearly favored by the president, that they believed reflected a dangerous underestimation of the threat posed by the growing military strength of the Soviet Union. Wilson stood with the president, but he presided over a potentially rebellious department. In the approaching review of the FY 1956 budget by the Democratic-controlled Congress, the testimony given by the chiefs and the service secretaries before the appropriations committees might be less than enthusiastic.

On 22 December Wilson and the Joint Chiefs gathered at the White House, where the president undertook to ensure that the chiefs understood what was expected of them. As usual he emphasized that real security rested on a sound economy. The nation faced the prospect of an armed truce of indefinite duration and for the first time in its history the United States faced the threat of being “knocked out within the first thirty days of combat.” First and foremost, it was essential to deter or blunt the enemy’s initial blow; this meant having an assured capacity for massive retaliation and effective continental defense. Also, large forces of trained reserves must be available during the period of early hostilities to help the Army and Marine Corps maintain order—a big job—and to prepare for eventual deployment overseas. Large-scale early deployments overseas were not in the cards. Third, through the initial period of hostilities it was imperative to protect the industrial base so that the United States could “outproduce the rest of the world” and go on to win the war.\textsuperscript{68}
The president's succinct statement left much unsaid. Ridgway, obviously unhappy over the relegation of the Army to a wartime role of directing traffic, chasing looters, burying dead civilians in mass graves, training reserves, and similar duties, raised the embarrassing question of what would happen to the forces already abroad (two divisions in Korea, five in Europe) cut off from reinforcements and supplies. The president reminded him that they would have tactical atomic weapons but admitted that troops and their dependents might be threatened. In the last analysis, "the first essential is to take care of the threat that endangers our very existence." A large active Army ready to go on D-day would still have to wait many months before its deployment could get under way. Reserves were cheaper, and there would be time to train them. The crucial question, the president concluded, was how expensive a defense establishment the country was willing to support under a free enterprise system.

The president used the remainder of the short 22 December meeting to impress on the Joint Chiefs his insistence that they wholeheartedly support his decision. He mingled admonition and exhortation in roughly equal measure: The cuts, he said, reflected his own judgment arrived at after long and careful thought; everyone present was welcome to come to him and express his own views, but now that the decision had been made, he was entitled as commander in chief to the loyal support of all his subordinates—and he expected to get it. Wilson added his own statement—administration officials testifying before congressional committees should present a positive and confident bearing and make the most of the real merits of the administration's actions.69

The unnamed primary target of the president's exhortations was, of course, Ridgway, who was by now shaping up as the probable star adversary in the approaching hearings. The accelerated reductions imposed on the Army consistently captured headlines from mid-December on, as reports of planned implementing measures kept the issue alive; the reports cited the service having to reduce its draft calls by almost half, releasing draftees and reserve officers ahead of schedule, and extending deferment of ROTC graduates from active duty.70

Ridgway had previously formally protested the proposed cuts on 17 December in a letter through channels to the president. Recalling his similar protest a year earlier, he now stated his opinion that his views had not been sufficiently considered—perhaps had not even reached the president. Affirming "profound respect, with no claim to clairvoyance," he asserted his "professional military opinion" that the prescribed end-strengths for the Army would make impossible the fulfillment of its commitments in a general war, especially during the critical first six months.
"Peripheral wars," moreover, posed the further danger of sucking in forces from the general reserve and thus making them unavailable to reinforce NATO in the event of escalation to a general war. Stevens forwarded the memo to Wilson with a short letter expressing his own "deep concern" over the Army cuts. Perhaps influenced by it, the president granted DoD a token restoration of 35,000 in the end-totals for 30 June 1956. Early in January the JCS allocated it as follows: Army 25,000, Navy 7,000, Marine Corps 3,000, resulting in the following revised end-totals:

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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>Marine Corps</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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On New Year's Day 1955 the incoming new Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Richard B. Russell of Georgia, promised a prompt and "thorough" investigation by his committee of the administration's whole plan for slashing the armed forces. Earlier, his opposite number in the House, Rep. Carl Vinson, had weighed in with a similar announcement. Secretary Wilson, he assured reporters, would be expected to give Congress a "complete briefing and justification." Both indicated that the views of the Army chief of staff would also be listened to with great interest.

When the proposed DoD budget for FY 1956 incorporating the new strength reductions went to BoB on 21 December, the total new money request amounted to $31.377 billion. Eventually, additional proposed legislation raised the amount to $34.360 billion. To the naked eye the dollar impact of the strength reductions was invisible, but reasonable inferences could be drawn. The rule of thumb for estimating savings from a reduction in military personnel held that each 100,000 reduction would save about $500 million annually. In this instance the problem was complicated by the decision to begin the reduction immediately, in mid-fiscal 1955. For the Army this meant plunging from its current strength of almost 1,370,000 to 1,100,000 by 30 June 1955, a 20 percent loss in little more than six months. This would leave only 100,000 of the total reduction (only 75,000 after the president's second decision) to be spread over the remaining 12 months. Theoretically the savings that would have come in FY 1956 from a less "front loaded" reduction program would now accrue instead in FY 1955. But the acceleration would also bring with it additional costs from turbulence, loss of efficiency, and mass discharges. Wilson's military assistant, Col. Carey Randall, USMC, warned him that the
Army might have to bring units back from overseas and disband others, and even temporarily stop the draft in order to reduce the intake. He advised Wilson to ask the president to allow several months' leeway in reaching the FY 1955 goal. The less demanding FY 1956 program—75,000 for the Army, 20,000 for the Navy and Marines—may have represented monetary savings of under $400 million.\(^{74}\)

Thus the president's dramatic and highly publicized decision to put the New Look personnel reduction program back on an accelerated course had only a modest impact on the DoD budget for FY 1956. In the negotiations over proposed cuts, the original service budget requests were pared almost $4 billion instead of the $5.5 billion proposed by the review staff. This left $34.36 billion in new obligational authority, but Wilson proposed to finance $1.5 billion of it by another levy on the Army: $700 million from the Army stock fund and $800 million from the Army's hoarded unobligated procurement funds left over from wartime appropriations. BoB and the president on 29 December approved these figures, and the request to Congress (minus later supplementals) came to a mere $31.377 billion. FY 1956 expenditures were still projected at $35.75 billion, but Wilson, under pressure from BoB to keep spending down to $34 billion, promised that he would try, and this became the official projection.\(^{75}\)

On 4 January 1955, two days before the president's State of the Union address to the Democratic-controlled Congress appealing for bipartisan support of his legislative program, the *New York Times* ran a lengthy review of a three-months-old revision of Army Field Manual FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations—Operations*. The manual expounded the Army's views on massive retaliation (without mentioning the term), the needlessly destructive impact of strategic airpower, and political limitations on use of airpower in "little wars." It set forth a doctrine of limited war. "Indiscriminate destruction," as a policy, was unjustifiable. Of all the services, the Army could best serve the needs of national policy, barring only a war deliberately aimed at "ruthless annihilation" of the enemy. Army forces constituted the "decisive component" of the military "by virtue of their unique ability to close with and destroy the organized and irregular forces of an enemy power or coalition of powers; to seize and control land areas and enemy lines of communication and bases of production and supply; and to defend those areas essential to the prosecution of a war." Normally, the manual also pointed out, the Army commander exercised overall command in joint, unified operations.
What made the manual newsworthy was its underscoring of the deep-seated institutional contention between the Army and the Air Force over money, manpower, and their respective roles and missions. The *Times* reviewer noted Ridgway's bitter opposition to the impending manpower cuts but discounted the widespread expectation that he might resign as a gesture of protest. If summoned to testify before congressional committees, the article predicted, he would "make the best case he can for maintaining Army current strength, but would accept the decision like a good soldier." Another reporter thought he would "speak his mind," proclaim his disapproval—and be fired. Either outcome would make headlines.
With the submission to the president of the FY 1956 Defense budget in mid-December 1954, NSC 5422/2 had served its main purpose of providing policy guidance for the budget makers, although its purpose had never been altogether clear. Some officials tended to think of it as a simple updated NSC 162/2, the security policy bible, which, many agreed, had been overtaken in part by the ominous events and portents of the first half of 1954. Even the most steadfast believers in the usefulness of NSC 5422/2 as a supplement to a still basically valid NSC 162/2, the Joint Chiefs (over General Ridgway's dissent) complained as it took form that it was assuming too much the character of a replacement for that document. On the eve of approval of 5422/2 at the beginning of August 1954 the chiefs finally agreed that NSC 162/2 should be completely rewritten. This sealed the ultimate fate of NSC 5422/2, but for the next five months seekers of guidance on national security policy still had to consult first the basic writ, NSC 162/2, and then the gloss, NSC 5422/2, which might or might not agree with it, not to mention scattered bits of wisdom in other documents. To these two papers the Planning Board, on 11 October, added another, not to be taken as an authoritative restatement—the "Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy"—compressing and paraphrasing in 24 pages policy statements from the two basic documents and other sources for the use of the council and those engaged in revision of NSC 162/2.¹ Cutler planned that the council would discuss suggested changes to basic policy on 18 November, in the light of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee's report (then scheduled for 9 November), ongoing talks on NATO strategy and German rearmament, and other recent developments. The Planning Board would then
draft a new policy statement for the council’s final consideration on 9 December. Meanwhile, Secretary Wilson solicited recommendations for changes from the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries for discussion by the council on the 18th.

DoD’s New Hard Line

Most of the issues that had emerged in the production of NSC 5422/2 surfaced again, and the think piece writers seemed to have found the earlier effort useful in their work. Papers for the revision of NSC 162/2, written mainly in ISA’s Policy Planning Staff during October and November, reflected urgency and a nearly unanimous perception of impending national peril. General Bonesteel’s own contribution—meaningfully titled “The Survival of a Free United States”—may fairly be analyzed as representative of the intellectual and emotional climate in which the revision of national security policy was undertaken.

Bonesteel announced his bleak and hyperbolic theme at the outset: The United States, even though at the peak of its power, was “fundamentally insecure for the first time in its history.” The nation faced “a peril more insidious and profound than we have ever before faced” and was likely soon to become “directly vulnerable to devastating attack.” The “Soviet-Communists intend ultimately to destroy or neutralize the power and the free institutions of the United States.” The Soviet military threat, Bonesteel went on, was increasing rapidly, foreshadowing possible achievement of nuclear parity with the United States before 1960, and enormously enhancing the Soviet potential for nuclear blackmail. Achievement of either an effective air defense or an intercontinental missile capacity ahead of the United States would make an attack on the United States a safe option, enabling the Soviets to use their great preponderance in conventional arms to take control of all Eurasia.

Meanwhile, in Bonesteel’s estimation, the Communists’ strategy of creeping expansion through subversion and insurrection was rapidly eroding the free world position in Asia. America was also losing the propaganda war. The Communists had won successes despite inferior material resources, partly through subversive propaganda portraying communism as the wave of the future. The United States and other Western nations were tarred as status quo powers clinging to riches extorted through exploitation of the masses. In the free world American strategy was coming to be regarded as excessively reliant on nuclear weapons and on military responses to essentially political, economic, or spiritual challenges.
There existed widespread fear of both superpowers and of the consequences for mankind of a confrontation between them. On the other hand, the threat of Communist aggression was often taken less seriously abroad than in the United States, although in Asia the free world had been unable to resist Communist expansion except by force of arms.

Bonesteel proposed to relax NSC 162/2’s budgetary constraints on defense spending, originally carefully crafted to balance two potentially incompatible values: meeting the “necessary” costs of national security, and maintaining a “strong, healthy, and expanding U.S. economy.” “Barring basic change in the world situation,” said NSC 162/2, the government should “make a determined effort” to balance its total annual expenditures with its total annual revenues. But just such a basic change, Bonesteel protested, was “taking place right now,” and Bonesteel was confident the American people would readily support a higher tax burden if they understood the need. The need for a new national strategy was crucial, Bonesteel and his colleagues believed. They were appalled by the absence in the public and the government of a common perception of the Communist threat. In the face of the baffling but apparently coordinated Communist cold war tactics, there must be a common, “genuinely accepted” understanding of the Communist threat throughout the national security apparatus, and a new integrated cold war strategy designed to seize the initiative and win. The strategy should not merely attack the Soviet bloc directly; it should encompass positive efforts to strengthen the free world. In every sector of the global conflict the enemy must be harassed, undermined, and kept on the defensive by relentlessly aggressive tactics. Bonesteel drew up lists of “positive” courses of action, in effect, a revival of the “rollback” thinking of the early weeks of the administration.

The Joint Chiefs, meanwhile, had been developing their own hard line, foreshadowed in June by their proposal that all negotiations with the Soviets should be avoided pending a fundamental change in behavior for the better on their part. On 3 November 1954 they forwarded to Wilson a terse, four-paragraph manifesto, written by General Ridgway, opening with the assertion that “the struggle between the Communist and non-Communist world is now in a critical era and within a period of relatively few years will probably reach a decisive stage.” The growing threat of Communist aggression had caused fear of nuclear war to spread throughout the non-Communist world, with a corollary drift toward neutralism. The non-Communist world had ample means to deal with this threat, through “positive and timely dynamic countermeasures,” probably without resort to war, and, if war proved unavoidable, could probably win “beyond any reasonable doubt.” But failing such countermeasures, the
President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower at Pentagon with Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar N. Bradley, November 1952.
Above: Secretary-Designate Charles E. Wilson (right) at press conference with Secretary of Defense Lovett, 26 November 1952.
Truce signing at Munsan, Korea, July 1953. General Mark W. Clark, UN commander in chief, is seated center.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur W. Radford, 1953-57.


Admiral Robert B. Carney, chief of naval operations, 1953-55.

Above: Secretary Wilson presides as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel John A. Hannah (left) and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank C. Nash are sworn in by Director of Administration Ralph N. Stohl.

Below: Secretary Wilson, JCS Chairman Radford, and Army Chief of Staff Ridgway meet with French General Paul Ely, March 1954.

Charles S. Thomas, secretary of the Navy, 1954-57.

Secretary of Defense Wilson with Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens (center) during visit to Nike site, April 1955.
Above: Air Force B-36 bomber.

Nike, U.S. Army's first antiaircraft guided missile, on display in France in June 1956.
Above: Aircraft carrier USS Forrestal running trials just prior to commissioning, on 29 September 1955.
Below: USS Nautilus entering New York harbor.
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, 1955-61.


Secretary of the Air Force Donald A. Quarles with fighter pilots.
Air Force fighter aircraft, from top, F-86F, F-89 Scorpion, F-102.
Left to right: U.S. Army Honest John, Nike, and Corporal.
Launch of Navy Regulus.

Navy A3D bomber landing on USS Forrestal.

Texas Tower radar installation 100 miles offshore.
Rep. George H. Mahon, member of House Appropriations Committee and chairman of Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations.

Key senators on defense matters, clockwise from top left, Richard B. Russell, Leverett Saltonstall, Stuart Symington, and Henry M. Jackson.
Trevor Gardner sworn in as assistant secretary of the Air Force (R&D) by Secretary Harold E. Talbott, March 1955.

Secretary of Defense Wilson meets the press.
Clockwise from top: Defense contractors assemble booster component for Thor IRBM; KC-97 refueling of a B-47 in flight; paratroopers jumping from an H-21 helicopter.
United States might within a few years find itself isolated and facing the alternatives of either submission to Soviet demands or resisting them “under conditions not favorable to our success.”

On 12 November the chiefs followed up with an explanation of why NSC 162/2, while still basically sound, had tended to promote weak and reactive implementation measures. They called for a security policy “of unmistakably positive quality,” written in a manner calculated not merely to inform but also to persuade, and reflecting throughout the “greater urgency of the present situation.” Implementation measures could and should include some that courted the risk of war but without deliberately provoking it, and the United States must not be required “to defer to the counsel of the most cautious among our Allies.”

This aggressive line spoke for all the chiefs, and Ridgway signed it as acting chairman. He attached some “additional thoughts” as an appendix, in which he rejected two of the cardinal points of NSC 162/2 and the New Look, which the other chiefs tacitly still accepted. Ridgway argued that the valid claims of national security should always override financial considerations and that rather than reliance on retaliatory striking power, effective deterrence required balanced and flexible armed forces capable of countering all levels of aggression. Wilson did not forward these separate views of Ridgway’s along with the basic JCS memorandums.

A week later, Army Secretary Stevens also lashed out at the New Look, criticizing the continued reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence despite the approaching nuclear parity between the two superpowers. With the advent of mutual atomic plenty, he argued, the mere possession of superiority in atomic weapons would become relatively unimportant. American strategy was already becoming incompatible with allied nations’ perception of their own security needs. Owing to the “inability of any nuclear strategy to assure [their] territorial integrity and population survival . . . they are being sorely tempted to stake their chances on surviving as neutrals rather than victors in a [nuclear] war.”

Ridgway’s and Stevens’s renewed attack on the New Look was for the moment only a side issue in the developing debate over basic national security policy. Ridgway evidently had no difficulty in concurring with his colleagues in their 12 November paper, and they accepted the inclusion of his “additional thoughts” as an appendix—since the paper itself did not address the New Look as an issue. The call for a harder line even at the risk of war was a course that Ridgway could only applaud. Stevens similarly aligned himself with the other two service secretaries on 21 November when the Armed Forces Policy Council formally recommended that the 12 November paper, sans appendix, be accepted as the DoD position in the current policy review.
With the Joint Chiefs, the three service secretaries, and the "little State Department" in ISA now expounding a common view, Wilson faced a clearly dominant constituency in his own department backing a fundamental change in national security policy that could conceivably tear apart the free world coalition, isolate the United States, and bring on a confrontation, possibly even war, with the Soviet Union. Not that it was likely that the president would ever approve so dangerous a reversal of policy. What Wilson had to face was the decidedly unwelcome task of having to defend before the president and the NSC a course of policy and action that might be regarded, in that conservative forum, as possibly leading to a near-term military showdown with the Soviet Union.

The Emerging Soft Line: Dulles Takes Charge

By mid-November Wilson must have known what stand the State Department would take on the NSC 162/2 revision. Secretary Dulles's "Suggestions," forwarded to the NSC on the 17th, reflected a perspective of the world situation radically different from that prevailing in DoD. He recognized, as all did, the growth of Soviet nuclear power, the approach of nuclear parity, the threat posed by modern weapons to the survival of civilization, and the risks of a general war with the USSR through miscalculation. But Soviet "soft" tactics since Stalin's death were, in his estimation, a "major new factor," probably indicative of a change of attitude on the Soviet side. "The evidence so far does not prove that the USSR has modified its basic hostility toward the U.S. and the free world. As of now, however, the USSR appears anxious to avoid general war with the U.S. and probably will refrain from actions likely to bring on such a war, and may be seeking an extended period of lower tensions." Even Communist China, still hostile and bent on ultimately regaining Formosa, would limit itself mainly to subversion of its neighbors. Reviewing trends in the free world, Dulles noted as hopeful developments the recent settling of disputes in Egypt, Iran, and Trieste; the Manila Pact and the London-Paris accords on West German rearmament and admission to NATO; and the liquidation of the Communist regime in Guatemala. He conceded adverse long-term trends in underdeveloped areas and growing strains on alliances resulting from fear of nuclear war and the new Soviet "soft" line.

Dulles rated existing basic national security policy as "generally valid" but urged a stronger effort to counter the Communists' cold war strategy, mainly through increased economic and technical aid, especially in South and Southeast Asia. Military aid should be applied with caution to bolster local defense and internal security but without destabilizing local
economies. The rearming of West Germany and Japan should be carried out "at a pace and in a manner to minimize dangers of militarist revival." The United States should continue to encourage economic and political integration in Western Europe and reduction of world trade barriers.

Two final recommendations put Dulles on a collision course with the DoD hard line. One, a sore point with the Joint Chiefs since the NSC 5422 debate, was that the United States should be prepared to negotiate with the Communists on disarmament and other areas of tension, forcing the Communists to "put up or shut up"; either their "soft" tactics and "peace offensive" would be exposed as false or they would be driven to make real concessions and compromises. His other recommendation retorted uncompromisingly to Defense's proposed "risk war" stance. U.S. policy, Dulles declared, "should take full account of the fact that total war would be an incalculable disaster." The United States and its allies should seek to deter any Communist aggression by convincing Communist rulers that their adversaries had both the means and the will to ensure that aggression would not pay. More importantly, however, "the U.S. . . . should (1) forego actions which would generally be regarded as provocative, and (2) be prepared, if hostilities occur, to meet them, where feasible, in a manner and on a scale which will not inevitably broaden them into total nuclear war." In Europe, the most dangerous arena, the organization of NATO defense around nuclear weapons, currently under negotiation, should, while preserving their deterrent effect, avoid exclusive dependence on them. Otherwise, the strategy would "strain the will to fight and spur neutralism."12

The CIA took at least as grave a view of the Soviet Union's growing military power as did the Joint Chiefs, estimating that it would have a net capability from 1957 on to "inflict increasingly serious injury on the US," with the further prospect of developing an intercontinental missile by the early 1960s. Our major allies in Western Europe and Japan, in the CIA appraisal, would inevitably lose appetite for risking war by resisting Communist subversion or minor aggression in Third World areas. On the other hand, there were indications that the top Soviet leadership might genuinely desire several years of coexistence with reduced tensions and risk-taking. Western European governments and publics were avid to explore this possibility, following the expected ratification of the German rearmament agreements, and the United States would be under strong pressure to seek a general settlement with the Soviets. Provided the West maintained an adequate military posture, the CIA analysis concluded, the USSR would refrain from overt aggression for the next five years and would restrain its allies and satellites, while, at the same time, exploiting
weaknesses and division in the free world. This, not the military threat, was the real danger.¹³

In State's view the world was by no means the ticking time bomb pictured by the Cassandras in the Pentagon. The leaders in Moscow and Peiping had not renounced the goal of world domination, but neither were they megalomaniacs. Things had not gone altogether as they wished during the past two years, even in Indochina, certainly not in Korea. Their total resources were still far inferior to those of the free world. So the apparent hankering of the Kremlin for a few years' respite from wars and threats of wars was wholly believable—especially considering the possibilities of low-cost gains from continued "creeping expansion" under the Communist definition of coexistence. For the West this was a prospect worth gambling on. It meant maintaining a firm and vigilant deterrent posture against Communist aggression and threats while refraining from provocative actions and pursuing all avenues that might foster the peace process, using the vast economic power of the United States and, cautiously, its military resources, to help its European allies and Third World nations to stand on their own feet.

Wilson thus knew that Dulles would be his principal adversary in the coming NSC debate, and ODM's Arthur Flemming his only hard-line ally. FOA Director Stassen, as might be expected, favored more emphasis on economic and technical aid programs and a re-examination of the relative roles of U.S. and allied forces in dealing with local aggressions; his general view of the state of the world was, like State's, meliorist and pragmatic.¹⁴ On 21 November the service secretaries recommended that DoD adopt the JCS position of 12 November. The next day Wilson bit the bullet and sent the JCS paper to the NSC, noting that the three service secretaries agreed with it, "as do I."¹⁵

Wilson Backs Off

At the 24 November NSC meeting Cutler started the discussion in the usual way with initial presentations by the protagonists.¹⁶ Dulles led off with a succinct statement. The weakest areas of national security policy, in his opinion, concerned economic policy and the organization of counter-subversive operations that the CIA hoped to correct. In the political and military spheres, however, he thought "our basic policy on the whole was pretty good"—even if, he added sarcastically, it had not resulted in the war the Joint Chiefs seemed willing to risk without actually provoking it. American policy was in no sense "craven." We had
avoided war for good reasons in Indochina; Chinese war planes had been shot down in a recent incident over Hainan Island; U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were overflying Soviet territory; the soon-to-be-signed defense treaty with Formosa would be a "major challenge" to Communist China; the collapse of the EDC treaty had been promptly offset within a month by allied agreement on German rearmament, a diplomatic victory of the first order. No one could argue "that our policies are not strong, firm, and indicative of a willingness to take risks." On the other hand, they had stopped short of "actually provoking war." Only in the relentless approach of atomic plenty and nuclear parity with the USSR was the position of the United States deteriorating. But how could this be prevented without precipitating war?17

Wilson's rejoinder was brief but startling. He "looked at the situation," he said, "very much as Secretary Dulles did." He urged "patience in our effort to defer another world war for long enough to permit the seeds of decay which were inherent in Communism to have their effect." Flemming cautiously said that he too would not differ with Secretary Dulles, other than in putting more stress on the threat of approaching nuclear parity.18

Left alone to defend the DoD position, Admiral Radford grimly restated it: Once the Soviets attained nuclear parity, one could no longer count on them to hold back from launching a general war, and the Joint Chiefs could no longer guarantee a successful outcome. The chiefs believed that only a limited time remained for the United States to "reach an accommodation." Since 1945 the Soviets had pursued the strategy that the chiefs now advocated for the United States—risking war without deliberately provoking it—with the aim of dividing and subverting the free world. In the chiefs' view, the Soviets had been very successful in Indochina and they were likely to repeat that success in North Africa, where the United States would have to choose between affronting the whole Arab world by supporting the French or disrupting NATO by abandoning them.

Pressed by a now testy Dulles to explain "how the military people would solve the problem of North Africa," Radford answered that they would favor supporting the Arabs against the French. This, Dulles retorted, was a political not a military decision and outside Radford's jurisdiction; besides, it had obviously not been thought through, which was State's responsibility. If told now that they were to be abandoned in North Africa, the French would undoubtedly refuse to ratify the London and Paris accords, thus killing all hope of German rearmament, "on which he understood the Chiefs of Staff to place great store." Radford denied any intention of invading State's prerogatives, but he stubbornly insisted that unless the
United States stopped reacting, seized the initiative, and began to forestall Communist aggression, "we cannot hope for anything but a showdown . . . by 1959 or 1960."  

Dulles summed up the difference between his and the JCS position: they wanted to take "greater risks for bigger goals." His guess was that "what the military was really advocating was that we should tell the Soviets that they must restore freedom to Czechoslovakia by a certain date 'or else.' Was this correct? In any event, the U.S. had already taken many risks and, except for the setback in Indochina, with pretty good results . . . . Thus we come back to the question of what we can do now to prevent the Soviets from achieving nuclear balance with the United States . . . . The Joint Chiefs' views don't suggest any way of stopping it."  

The president followed the sometimes acerbic debate, occasionally intervening. Like Wilson, he said, he wanted a more dynamic policy, but policy should be "responsive to specific cases and situations." A little later he again broke in, with some vehemence, to declare himself "completely unable as yet to perceive a fundamental difference" between the departments, and he repeated the assertion at least three times. More dynamic, yes, "but where and how?" Finally he pronounced national security policies, in his opinion, as "now well stated," but he wanted in addition "advance identification on problems that were coming up . . . . He was tired of abstractions."  

Wilson supported, not very coherently, the president's effort to find a common ground between the State and Defense positions, in the process making even more evident his abandonment of the latter. There was nothing basically the matter with existing security policies, he asserted. It was natural that the DoD recommendations, primarily military in nature, would seem to differ radically from those of other departments. Wilson also dwelt briefly on the familiar theme that too much military power was as bad as too little; there was a point of "optimum security"—just enough to deter aggression but not so much as to precipitate war—a historic tendency of oversized military establishments. Wilson then invited the service secretaries and the chiefs to "speak their minds" if they were so inclined. None responded.

The meeting produced no immediate decisions on basic national security policy. Despite the president's remark that existing policies were already "well stated," the Planning Board was instructed to draw up a restatement of them in the light of the discussion for the council's early consideration. The president also said he would talk with Wilson and Radford later about assigning to a high-level in-house group or an outside organization the task of formulating specific courses of action, calculated
to strengthen free world cohesion and weaken the Soviet bloc “at the risk of but without being provocative of war.”

It was an important meeting, despite the inconclusive ending. Evidently the emergence of the new DoD hard line had set off alarm bells in State. Dulles had promptly reacted, underscoring the dangers of deliberately seeking a confrontation with the Soviets. Item by item he challenged the chiefs’ gloomy scoring of gains and losses over the past year, ridiculed Radford’s proposed handling of the impending North African crisis, and as much as accused the chiefs of planning to institute the “rollback” strategy talked about during the 1952 presidential campaign. It left Radford licking his wounds.

The behavior of the president and Wilson must have been as puzzling then as it seems in retrospect. Eisenhower may have really believed that State and Defense were close together on the basic issues but Dulles, Radford, and Cutler clearly did not. To Dulles, and probably to Radford, the essential difference between them lay in the JCS willingness, before American nuclear superiority had evaporated and after other favorable “conditions” had been created, to go to the brink of war in an effort to force the Soviets to negotiate an accommodation mostly on American terms. All this Dulles had wrapped up in a succinct phrase, “greater risks for bigger goals.” His own 15 November paper had stated the primary aim of American security policy in dual terms: “to deter any Communist armed aggression and to avoid the danger that such aggression would develop into general nuclear war,” stressing that “total war would be an incalculable disaster.” He accepted the prospect of nuclear parity and mutual nuclear plenty between the superpowers as unavoidable but as permitting (without assuring) an uneasy coexistence, and he looked hopefully to the traditional processes of diplomatic negotiation, aided by gradual mellowing within the Communist world, to make coexistence increasingly tolerable.

It is difficult to see these positions as other than poles apart. For Wilson to argue that they merely seemed to be opposed because one was “military” and the other “political” appears almost fatuous. The president’s hypothesis was a little more plausible. He seemed to say that the “abstractions” about which the debate revolved were too fuzzy to reflect really meaningful differences; the important question was, how would the hard-liners propose to handle particular situations—with the implication that, being practical men, they would probably do the same as the soft-liners. Whether the president really believed this is at least doubtful.

Regardless of the merits of the arguments, however, the president had a good reason for trying to minimize the rift, especially in the NSC forum.
This was no ordinary policy debate. Dulles and Radford each genuinely believed—and the belief was widely shared in their staffs—that the other's proposals posed a threat, sooner or later, to the nation's survival. Of course this was not a public crisis, but within the national security community the crisis was seen as real, and tremors were felt in the larger bureaucracy and the world outside. Since the president shared Dulles's view and presumably intended to direct that basic national security policy be revised to reflect it, he had also to consider how this decision would affect true believers on the "losing" side; discontent would run deep. It might be alleviated if the president gave the impression of believing that there was an underlying common ground between the adversary positions. This suggests a possible explanation not only for Eisenhower's puzzling, almost perverse line of argument during the 24 November discussion, but also for Wilson's unexpected "cave in" at the beginning of the meeting. Both men could have been playing out a scenario.

Ridgway's Interlude

The Joint Chiefs' position on 24 November was not as unanimous as their paper seemed to indicate. As usual, Ridgway's was the dissenting voice. After writing the chiefs' 3 November paper to Wilson and endorsing the 12 November paper that incorporated and amplified it, Ridgway had found in Secretary Dulles's "Suggestions" certain points with which he agreed, notably the secretary's emphasis on negotiating a wide range of issues with the Communist powers. When the Joint Strategic Survey Committee circulated a harsh in-house criticism of Dulles's paper, Ridgway promptly responded with a rebuttal arguing that a liberal policy on negotiation with the Communists would be desirable and consistent with NSC 162/2 as long as it was backed up by adequate military strength. The chiefs took no action, however, on either the JSSC's comments or Ridgway's. At the NSC meeting on the 24th Ridgway was one of the silent audience ranged along the wall while the principals debated.

The president and Wilson had, however, already taken steps to give him another opportunity. On the 24th, Ridgway received a formal invitation from Cutler—"as a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are by statute Military Advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense"—requesting his attendance at the NSC meeting on 3 December. As first on the agenda, Cutler informed him, he had been allotted up to 30 minutes to present his "individual views" on basic national security policy and its revision. Attendance for this item would be limited with no preliminary circulation of papers.
In effect, Ridgway was to be kept on a short leash. The president clearly regarded him as a formidable adversary—"Ridgway has taken over Stevens," he noted sourly to Attorney General Herbert Brownell about this time. Among the Joint Chiefs, he had been the lone dissenter to proposals in April to bomb the Viet Minh besiegers of Dien Bien Phu and in September to allow the Chinese Nationalists to bomb mainland China during the Quemoy crisis—both times because he feared that such use of airpower would ultimately suck in American ground forces, something the dwindling, already over-committed Army wanted to avoid. Since Eisenhower had supported his view on both occasions, some pundits now professed to see Ridgway's star as rising, but the president's dramatic decision on 8 December to accelerate the Army personnel cutbacks showed him as still fundamentally at odds with Ridgway.27

Ridgway's chief difference with the other chiefs was not over the new hard line, but over the New Look force structure, peacetime deployments, and warfighting strategy. In his short address to the council on 3 December, Ridgway chose to air his differences on these points, with particular reference to the Army's role in a general war and—the worst heresy—the possibility and desirability of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons. On this point, he firmly believed that the Soviets would not resort to nuclear weapons unless the Americans did, and that the nation using them first would incur the undying hatred not only of its own allies, but also of all mankind. The United States had no choice, therefore, but to develop a capability to counter every threat of aggression at all levels. In an earlier meeting, Ridgway had already irritated the president by his remarks about large-scale deployments overseas in the early stages of a general war.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Ridgway's presentation met only stony silence; no one volunteered questions, the president thanked him, and he departed the cabinet room. A short post-mortem followed. Both the president and Humphrey ridiculed the idea that the Soviets would refrain from using nuclear weapons in a general war, and they reaffirmed the cardinal New Look dogma that the United States could not prepare to fight all kinds of wars without wrecking its economy and free institutions. The president was impressed by the general's fears, which he shared, of carrying on in a shattered post-nuclear world, and by the evident sincerity of Ridgway's views. Wilson seconded this point, but reminded the council that Ridgway was trying to justify a much larger Army and the council "should recognize what it was hearing."28
Ridgway's strong dissent from the party line that a general war with the Soviets would necessarily be a nuclear war was evidently on the president's mind when he made his closing remarks. He reiterated the necessity of relying primarily on nuclear weapons, because the country could not otherwise afford the burdens and strains of total defense readiness as a way of life, and because an all-out war with the Soviet Union could be won only by a paralyzing blow at the outset. Then he added a warning, which seemed to say it all: "We are not going to provoke the war, and that is why we have got to be patient. If war comes, the other fellow must have started it. Otherwise we would not be in a position to use the nuclear weapon, and we have got to be in a position to use that weapon if we are going to preserve our institutions in peace and win the victory in war." 29

To avoid provocation and to be patient under provocation had also been the theme of the president's news conference the day before, which reporters were already lauding as "historic." He promised that he would not be goaded by the Communists into precipitate action, as Senator Knowland and others were urging, in response to China's recent refusal to release 13 Americans who had been sentenced and jailed as spies. Secretary Dulles had made the same point in a major foreign policy speech a few days before, using the occasion also to modify his massive retaliation doctrine. The response to a local aggression, he assured his audience, would not "automatically" involve "atomic bombs being dropped all over the map." 30

By late fall, then, the Joint Chiefs and their supporters in ISA could have had no illusions as to the fate that awaited their "risk war" and other hard-line proposals in the next test before the NSC, scheduled for 21 December. 31 Rumors and leaks had alerted the public to the fact that the president faced some sort of "peace or war" decision. Something like a "war party" had formed in the Senate headed by Majority Leader William F. Knowland, who had been beating the drums for a much tougher and riskier policy toward the major Communist powers—in effect, a public and more provocative version of the Pentagon's hard line. In mid-November Knowland had called for a comprehensive congressional review of the administration's foreign and national security policies. 32

At the end of November the president summoned Ambassador Charles Bohlen back from Moscow to report on the latest "co-existence" bid. He had Bohlen meet on 1 December with the NSC Planning Board, which was then engaged in preparing its revised paper on basic security
policy. Bohlen was asked his views on, among other things, the problem posed in paragraph 45 of NSC 162/2, to which the Joint Chiefs had addressed their 12 November paper:

—Can the U.S. force the USSR prior to atomic plenty to accept a settlement?

—Can we take such measures before this situation arises to diminish the threat?

—Are more positive and dynamic policies needed now?

Bohlen’s response was blunt. Short of war, he said flatly, “the military threat can’t be reduced.” But in the long run, economic forces at work within the USSR would “sooner or later come into violent conflict with Marxist theory. When this happens, we may expect some changes.” He described a Russia cautious, conservative, and wholly defensive in outlook, with “no unrequited urge for territory except the Dardanelles,” and no conscious aim to dominate the world, since capitalism by their reckoning would ultimately be swept aside in the march of history. Russians were tired of turmoil and wanted stability and peace, even the new generation. Communist China, still in the “whoop-it-up,” “marijuana” stage of revolution, was a partner rather than a dependent, but regarded as both unreliable and unpredictable; Moscow held “no whip-hand over Mao.” A really serious American threat to China would alarm Moscow and, if prolonged, might lead to war. But Russia definitely had no desire to go to war over Formosa. The Soviet bloc was no monolith and no fine-tuned machine, as witness China’s aggressive tactics while the Kremlin preached coexistence. On coexistence—evidently a large preoccupation of the board—Bohlen characterized the Soviet leaders as not sincere but serious. “They want no war and no risks of general war because of their many domestic problems, many of which they inherited.” They saw coexistence, therefore, as peaceful but not inconsistent with continued subversion and agitation. “If the Free World can keep its nerve, they won’t blackmail us. If they think there is no risk, they will take what the traffic will bear. The growth of atomic capabilities, including their own, may act as a deterrent.”

Bohlen’s remarks provided ammunition for the soft-liners in the board and the NSC.

Bohlen may have contributed to the signs in December that the tide was flowing strongly at high administration levels against any real toughening of policy toward the Soviets. At the NSC meeting on 9 December the president explained the larger policy context of the
impending strength reductions: Strategic retaliatory forces remained the centerpiece, but with more emphasis on continental defense, guided missile development, readily mobilizable reserve forces, increased pay and benefits for the armed forces, and expansion of the mobilization base—and less emphasis, obviously, on active ground forces. All this would seem to point to an effort to build up defensive capabilities, both for limited and cold war and for the all-out conflict that was an ever-present possibility, while, for the longer haul, continuing to push the frontiers of advancing weapons technology.\textsuperscript{34}

The other side of this coin was an emerging shift in cold war strategy from military to economic aid for underdeveloped countries, particularly in Asia—one of Dulles's mid-November “Suggestions.” It was signaled on 1 December by the president's appointment of his former BoB director, Joseph M. Dodge, as his special assistant to review foreign economic policy and coordinate activities in this area.\textsuperscript{35} Dulles and Stassen stood as the principal promoters of the shift, which envisaged a long-range program of economic grants and loans. It would be “the free world's chief weapon in the cold war,” reflecting the view of both the president and Dulles that the struggle with communism had shifted from military to economic competition, and that the threat of global war had receded. Eisenhower had approved the idea in principle. Investment was seen as primarily a task for private capital, although government help was needed more in Asia than elsewhere because the political risks were greater there. All agreed that they contemplated no “Marshall Plan for Asia”; the area lacked the developed infrastructure that could rapidly absorb such capital infusion as had wrought an economic miracle in Europe.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{The Planning Board Compromises}

The Planning Board circulated its draft revision of basic national security policy (NSC 5440) on 13 December. Labeled as “tentative,” it had been prepared in haste to allow as much staff feedback as possible before consideration by the council on the 21st. The president had decided that the 21 December discussion would be only preliminary, since the principals would have had little time to review the paper, but he still wanted to hear their first reactions as possible input for his State of the Union address. The final council review would be postponed to the first week in January.\textsuperscript{37}

Instructed to draft the revised policy statement “in the light of” both the 24 November NSC discussion and the departmental position papers,
the drafting group attempted to produce a compromise paper reflecting both the hard-line and the soft-line positions in a reasonably balanced and coherent fashion but could not avoid some inconsistency. The Joint Chiefs, unhappy with the draft since it fell far short of adopting their position, did applaud the opening statement: "The Soviet-Communist challenge, including the approach of the USSR to nuclear plenty, constitutes a peril greater than any the United States has ever before faced."

The chiefs' fundamental objection was to the proposed national strategy, which they summed up as one of "persuasion leading to mutually acceptable settlements" and "the encouragement of tendencies that would lead the Communist Regimes to abandon their expansionist policies." In their view such a hope was totally illusory. They also found that NSC 5440 provided no statement of major objectives; failed to define the "conditions," called for in NSC 162/2, under which a settlement might be negotiated with the Soviets; and did not stress the urgency of realizing such conditions while the United States still retained nuclear superiority. They detected, moreover, "a discernible tendency" in the analysis of probable Communist intentions and strategy to underrate the threat of aggression during the era of nuclear plenty, and to overrate the likelihood that current Soviet "soft" tactics might reflect a meaningful shift in Soviet policies.

NSC 5440 took a curiously aloof approach to the prickly issue of the Joint Chiefs' proposed "risk war" strategy. The drafters presumably had had to choose between confronting the issue head-on by writing a strong statement either endorsing or rejecting that strategy, or avoiding the issue, as NSC 162/2 had done. The result was a compromise. Paragraph 35 opened with a positive statement rejecting preventive war "or acts intended to provoke war," and ended with one affirming a "determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war" and "to prevail if general war eventuates." Between the two appeared a bracketed passage, proposed by State: "The United States and its allies will also have to forego actions regarded as provocative, if such actions would foreclose the requisite domestic political support for the use of force should this become necessary. Moreover, if the Communist rulers should conclude that the United States is bent on aggressive war, they may feel that they have no choice but to initiate war themselves at their own time. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war." In their 17 December critique of NSC 5440, the chiefs did not even allude to their original proposal, and, with reference to the preventive war paragraph, merely recommended omission of State's proposed insertion as unduly restrictive.
Even before NSC 5440 came before the NSC, the Joint Chiefs had thus abandoned their demand for a provocative policy of risking war in order to bring the Soviets to acceptable terms while American nuclear superiority lasted. Their response to NSC 5440 also revealed a significant weakening on another issue, nuclear air retaliatory power—to which NSC 5440 no longer accorded primacy in the force hierarchy. NSC 5440 stressed the function of deterrence and went on to state that effective deterrence would require forces sufficiently strong, flexible, and mobile “to deal swiftly and severely” with any Communist overt aggression, including a general war. The word “massive” seemed to have disappeared from the lexicon. All this prompted only editorial reaction from the Joint Chiefs in their 17 December critique.

The most visible split between “soft-” and “hard-” liners in NSC 5440 came over the familiar issue of negotiating with the Soviets. Both sides agreed to a general statement to the effect that negotiations should be undertaken whenever they appeared likely to serve American interests, and also on such issues as atoms for peace, in order to put the Soviets on the defensive and gain public support. In their 17 December critique the chiefs stuck to their point regarding demonstrated good faith on the Soviet side, but suggested that, if this were retained, most of the remaining verbiage could probably be boiled down to a few sentences. As in the first go-around in November, Air Force Secretary Talbott and Navy Secretary Thomas lined up solidly behind the chiefs, Army Secretary Stevens somewhat less so.

On the eve of the crucial 21 December NSC meeting General Bonesteel faced the awkward task of preparing routine briefing notes on NSC 5440 for Secretary Wilson’s use in the meeting. Despite his awareness of Wilson’s abandonment of the JCS position at the 24 November meeting, Bonesteel wrote up his briefing notes as though he believed otherwise—perhaps with some lingering hope for an eleventh-hour change of heart by the secretary. Overtones of exasperation sounded through. NSC 5440 was “so compressed,” he advised the secretary, “that it requires a full reading”—and (violating the staff officer’s cardinal rule) he offered no summary. He recommended that Wilson criticize NSC 5440 for its lack of a sense of urgency, its failure to state objectives or define conditions that would assure their achievement, and its unrealistic expectation that the Soviet-Communist threat could be countered merely by a deterrent posture, counter-subversion activity, and economic aid throughout the free world.
NSC 5501 and the Soft Line

Anticlimax in the National Security Council

As it turned out, the DoD hard line had no defenders on 21 December. Radford did not attend the meeting, and Twining, who did, declined an invitation to speak. Dulles again dominated the discussion. He had some sympathy with the chiefs' craving for more dynamism in the American attitude, but experience indicated that it was "not easy to go very much beyond the point that this Administration had reached in translating a dynamic policy into courses of action, and in any case we had been more dynamic than our predecessors." Dulles reminded the council that preventive war had been ruled out, and that a rollback strategy of attempting to detach China and the European satellites from the USSR would probably lead to general war; if the strategy proved successful without leading to war, the "heart of the problem" would remain: an unimpaired and ample nuclear capability in the Soviet Union itself. Indeed, said Dulles, the only way that an aggressive strategy could succeed would be by precipitating a general war which the United States could win. And even if more aggressive policies should cause the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, they would surely break up the free world bloc as well, "for our allies ... would never go along." Of course, the growing military strength of the Soviet bloc was the fundamental threat. Still, Dulles suggested, "we need not . . . be too pessimistic. Time might well bring about many changes." It was altogether likely "that there will be in the future some disintegration of the present monolithic power structure of the Soviet orbit." In the main, therefore, Dulles considered existing security policies adequate—or, at least, better than any others he could think of, except in the Middle East, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

Humphrey backed up Dulles on most points and added some new thoughts. He envisaged "a world division of power so carefully balanced that neither side dares to 'jump' the other. For these reasons we should avoid provocative actions vis-a-vis the USSR." He listed the key areas that he believed the United States should concentrate on holding or dominating—Latin America, the Middle East, Japan, Indonesia, Western Europe, North Africa. Not India. "We should . . . not spend our time and resources anywhere else." He considered it "absolutely essential" to develop more trade with the Soviet bloc nations ("instead of constantly trying to kick Russia in the shins"). And in Latin America, "we should make it absolutely clear that we will not tolerate Communism anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. We should . . . support dictatorships of the right if their policies are pro-American." "You mean," the president interrupted with the already famous line, "they're OK if they're our s.o.b.'s?" Humphrey agreed. Finally, the treasury secretary was "not in the least afraid of
co-existence." The American system, he felt sure, was strong enough to win in any competition.48

The president could not swallow all of this. If the Communists took over India, a subcontinent of 350 million people, he pointed out, they would almost certainly take the Middle East, too. "This was a certain invitation to general war"—in fact, probably to preventive war. To let all of the free world except a few important areas "go by the board" was simply not feasible; each time the Soviets took over another country, "the rate of the process accelerates." But if, Humphrey retorted, we would eventually get pushed out of certain areas like Indochina, would it not be better to get out first? Humphrey's notion that dealings with the Communists could be purged of irritations merely by staying out of their way and trading with them—as Wilson had chimed in, by taking "the heat off certain hot spots"—made the president a little impatient. Unless we were prepared to "get off the earth," we would have to live with irritations. Without undertaking to defend all of South Asia, much could be done to prevent that vast area from slipping into the Communist orbit. The United States need not become an Atlas, "bearing the weight of the world," but "a couple of billions would not be wasted on them [South Asian countries] if we consider the size of our total defense budget."

Dulles supported the president. There was a "tenable ground," he suggested, between a military commitment to save nations from communism and abandoning them to communism. Historically the Soviets had usually been cautious in wielding power, relying more on subversion than on military force. "It will be very much worth our while to provide . . . vulnerable nations sufficient military and economic assistance as will enable them to provide for their internal security and for the bettering of their economic health." Vietnam, he noted, was not typical, because the French "had messed up the situation so thoroughly."49

No whisper of the DoD position (other than from Secretary Dulles in rebutting it) had been heard in what had been anticipated as the climactic confrontation of the hard-line vs. soft-line policy debate. After his de facto abdication as titular head of the hard-liners on 24 November, no one expected Secretary Wilson now to reclaim that role, nor did he. His remarks on this occasion were far more revealing and coherent than his musings a month earlier. He delivered a short credo on the principal issues of the controversy. The Soviet threat had not diminished, but global war seemed less likely than before. We should consider carefully "those areas where we can and should make our stand," economically as well as militarily. Unlike Humphrey, he did not propose backing out of areas now held by the West (e.g., Korea and Malaya)—and he opposed writing off India.
"Plainly, we must live for the time being with Communism," which he was confident would ultimately destroy itself. So, reluctantly, he favored coexistence, containment (for lack of a better word), and (cautiously) expanded trade with the Soviet bloc. Economic aid should be aimed at helping nations to help themselves, military aid at strengthening their internal security without encouraging foreign adventures.50

All this aligned Wilson unequivocally on the side of the president. The DoD hard line seemed to have evaporated. When Cutler asked for guidance on the State-JCS split in NSC 5440 over the issue of negotiating with the USSR, the president declared with some exasperation that if we always said "no" to proposals to negotiate, we would lose public support in the free world. The council decided to leave only the initial sentence of the paragraph: "The U.S. should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby."51

The NSC discussion on 21 December effectively ended the 1954 debate over basic national security policy. On the 28th the Planning Board circulated NSC 5440/1, a slightly revised version of NSC 5440, for final council consideration on 5 January. The Joint Chiefs found it only marginally preferable to its predecessor and so informed Wilson on the 30th. The basic policy set forth in NSC 5440, they thought, had "not been significantly altered." In general they considered their 17 December critique still valid and applicable.52

The Soft Line Affirmed (NSC 5501)

On 5 January 1955 the NSC, as scheduled, quickly ran through NSC 5440/1 and resolved the remaining differences—in most cases by ruling against the DoD position. The hard-liners had to accept the replacement of their preferred characterization of the Soviet-Communist challenge—"a peril greater than any the United States has ever before faced”—with a tamer "grave peril to the United States." The amended paper was approved by the president on the 7th and renumbered as the new year's first NSC paper, NSC 5501. The first in an annual series of "basic" national security policy papers, it superseded both NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2.53

NSC 5501, dominated by the State Department's perspective, foresaw a probably indefinite continuation of the current state of hostile coexistence, based on military stalemate, mutual deterrence, and mutual recognition of the "no win" nature of all-out nuclear war—always recognizing the risk of miscalculation or a Soviet technological breakthrough. The free world could match the growth of Communist military power—by improvement of NATO forces, introduction of West German forces,
"some" Japanese rearmament, and modernization of U.S. forces and expansion of the U.S. mobilization base. But the "most serious challenge and greatest danger" would come from the Communist strategy of subversion, insurrection, and limited aggression. The situation in Southeast Asia was particularly ominous. Also dangerous, if ambiguous, was the new flexibility of Soviet foreign policy under Malenkov, stressing "peace" and "coexistence." Undoubtedly aimed at dividing the free world, perhaps also a prelude to local aggressions after the advent of nuclear plenty, it might also reflect a desire for reduced tensions, conceivably even a willingness to negotiate on armaments control. 54

NSC 5501 defined the basic national objective as simply "to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions" without "seriously weakening the U.S. economy." The United States had only one acceptable means of doing this—to attempt to modify Soviet-Communist bloc policies. The only alternative—to physically destroy the power of the bloc—was not a viable option: "The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war," while seeking to hold the free world together. Programs for implementing this strategy before anticipated major increases in Soviet nuclear capabilities should be pursued as a matter of urgency. While much of NSC 5501 was a restatement of corresponding portions of NSC 162/2, it perceptibly blurred the old focus on massive retaliation. Nuclear air retaliatory power, although requiring special protection against a knockout blow, received mention merely as part of the varied forces, American and allied, needed to deal with Communist aggression. 55

This was a long step away from the second-class status accorded general purpose forces in NSC 162/2 and a significant concession to General Ridgway's well-known views. General Maxwell D. Taylor, then commanding the Eighth Army in Korea, later commented in retrospect that Army leaders had "found great hope" in the new policy as representing a "most encouraging trend away from reliance on Massive Retaliation ... [toward] a more flexible strategy." 56

At the heart of the problem of sustaining allied cooperation in resisting Communist aggression was the issue of using nuclear weapons and the growing fear of nuclear war. NSC 5501 warned: "The United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use will best advance U.S. security interests. In the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support,
the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security." NSC 5501, by rejecting preventive war and acts to provoke war, was not hospitable to a broad "risk war" strategy.57

In addressing how to strengthen free world cohesion, NSC 5501 was actually more aggressive than NSC 162/2, mainly within the realm of non-military action and covert operations. Communist subversion, NSC 5501 admitted, was a baffling and frustrating matter, which repeatedly confronted the United States with a choice between prompt action, inevitably inviting criticism as premature or over-reactive, and "allowing the situation to deteriorate" until more costly and less certain measures might become necessary. Against a threatened or actual Communist takeover, the United States should employ all feasible measures, even direct military action if necessary. But in the long run, success would depend mainly on the ability of the free world "to demonstrate progress toward meeting the basic [economic] needs and aspirations of its peoples."58

In a sense, however, the political strategy and the coordinated free world counter-subversion campaign, even though largely non-military, represented the positive response to the Communist threat. Against the military threat the paper proposed what the hard-liners regarded as a passive and dangerously wishful response—to accept and perpetuate a military standoff that simply rejected the premise that the Soviets' impending achievement of nuclear plenty would create a crisis of the first magnitude which the United States must anticipate by imposing an acceptable accommodation while its nuclear superiority still enabled it to do so. The State Department, whose position NSC 5501 embodied, held that the Soviet leaders were no more likely than their American counterparts to deliberately precipitate an all-out nuclear war; the threat, though real, was remote—perhaps even more so than the risk of war through miscalculation. The Soviets could not be prevented from developing their military capabilities except by force or the threat of force—measures that the United States of its own volition had ruled off-limits. NSC 5501's political strategy, still hardly more than a gleam in the eyes of State planners, would take form and, over the long haul, nurture the "seeds of decay" inside the Communist empire.59

The revision of the basic national security policy was a surprisingly well-kept secret. During the eight months after the inception of the undertaking echoes of the debate over it had reached the public in leaked accounts. It was widely known that the president had pursued a "soft line" in the Dien Bien Phu crisis and, thus far, in the Formosa crisis, against hawkish counsel from Radford and other hard-liners. But the existence of something akin to a "war party" in the Pentagon seeking a fundamental
shift across the board to a hard-line policy toward the major Communist powers was little more than a rumor. It was, of course, very much in the interests of the administration to keep this under wraps, and its success in doing so testified to the effectiveness of special measures employed to prevent leaks from a notoriously porous bureaucracy. By the same token, however, it was desirable to reassure the public of the constancy of the administration's basic war-avoidance policy, particularly as the Formosa crisis began to escalate early in January 1955.

At this juncture the *New York Herald Tribune*, in an obviously inspired article, reported a "new approach" in the administration's foreign and defense policy, dating back to a high-level re-examination initiated early in 1954. The new approach, which had been in effect without fanfare for some time, explained "much that was said and done during the last six months of 1954"—for example, the passing of the initiative for German rearmament to Great Britain and France after the failure of the European Defense Community, a policy that had become identified in the European mind as an American more than a European policy. The article noted that the administration had decided against a JCS-proposed "risk war" policy and had reacted cautiously to alarming reports of growing Soviet military power and the threat of surprise nuclear air attack. "The new approach," explained the article, "is not, as has been claimed in some quarters, the outcome of a new appraisal of Soviet policy. Rather it is the fruit of a new estimate of what is effective."

*Postscript*

Almost simultaneously with the approval of NSC 5501 as basic national security policy, the president signed another, equally authoritative policy document in the form of a letter dated 5 January to Secretary Wilson. Ostensibly this was a reply to a request by Wilson two days earlier for a publishable written statement setting forth Eisenhower's views underlying his decisions on personnel strengths of the armed services "to guide me in my consideration of those matters" during the coming year. Eisenhower's letter in fact ranged in broad terms over all major aspects of a general war and the nation's defense posture during the cold war. According to James C. Hagerty, the president's press secretary, the idea for the letter originated in the White House, as a response to Democratic allegations that the armed forces cutback was primarily a money-saving move.
Addressing the question of military personnel strength, the president seemed to back away from some of the figures he had approved on 8 December, implying that they might be adjusted up or down. He suggested a goal for 1956 of 2,850,000, with "any further material reductions dependent upon an improved world situation." On the other hand, it was clear that he considered the indicated strength a heavy burden for the country to carry over a period "which may last for decades." The president saw austerity and stability as the basic features of the nation's long-haul security arrangements. For the long term, the president stressed the nation's dependence on collective security: "The security of the United States is inextricably bound up with the security of the free world." Some of the key concepts advanced at the 22 December White House meeting and the 15 December news conference were now repeated, including no single "danger date" and giving priority to maintaining effective retaliatory power and continental defense.  

As on earlier occasions, the president's "big war" bias was conspicuous. He did, however, devote a short paragraph to the problem of dealing with "lesser hostile action" not involving a major aggressor power. To meet this threat "growing reliance can be placed upon the forces now being built and strengthened in many areas of the free world . . . . There remain certain contingencies for which the United States should be ready with mobile forces to help indigenous troops deter local aggression, direct or indirect." This passage, evidently intended to correspond to the "other ready forces" paragraph in NSC 5501, offset in some measure the president's casual treatment of "little wars" in his December statements. His view of the big-war problem, however, now betrayed an optimism difficult to understand against the background of the discussions during the fall and early winter of the growing threat to the U.S. mobilization base from shrinkage and vulnerability to attack. Retaliatory power and a continental defense system "of steadily increasing effectiveness," he now seemed to believe, would "assure that our industrial capacity can continue throughout a war to produce the gigantic amounts of equipment and supplies required. We can never be defeated so long as our relative superiority in productive capacity is sustained." Finally, the letter touched with a special note of seriousness on the theme of advancing technology. He stressed technology's classic role, through the achievement of enhanced firepower and more effective performance, in reducing manpower requirements. More generally, he warned against "fixed or frozen ideas" in an age of swiftly marching technology and bewildering change.  

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At the president's direction his letter was released to the press on the first day of the new session of Congress. Its obvious immediate purpose was to support the administration's case in the impending debate over the budget and military manpower. But the letter also afforded a large audience an illuminating glimpse of how the president viewed the whole national security picture, far above the level of detail and precise formulations in NSC 5501. To DoD policy implementers from Wilson on down, its simplicity, sharp focus, and explicitness on certain key points made it a more effective guidance instrument than NSC 5501. Without really contradicting NSC 5501, the letter in effect superimposed on it the president's big-war and airpower bias, his preoccupation with the great power arena, and, conversely, his near indifference to small wars and small countries, especially in the Third World. One slim paragraph reflected the measure of his unconcern for these problem areas, and he left undefined the "contingencies" for which he conceded that American mobile forces might be needed. Under lean peacetime budgets, with "priority in all planning" now assigned to retaliatory power and continental defense, and a large rebuilt Army reserve given pride of place over active ground forces in general war planning, provision of the "other ready forces" called for by NSC 5501 to deal with local aggression was likely to be mostly a matter, as Ridgway later put it, of "by-products or left-overs." The reduction of the active Army now in progress was the blueprint.
Like its predecessor, the FY 1956 budget submitted to Congress in January 1955 proposed to spend more for defense in a peacetime year than for all other needs of government. The Defense Department budget accounted for 54 percent of all estimated expenditures, and all the major national security programs (atomic energy, stockpiling, military assistance, and DoD) accounted for 65 percent. The percentages were almost identical with those of the year before. "Today the world is at peace," the president proclaimed in his State of the Union address on 6 January, "[but] it is, to be sure, an insecure peace." Overnight, the Formosa Strait crisis was blossoming into the most ominous war scare since Korea. During January the Chinese Communists attacked offshore islands held by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. On 29 January Congress authorized the president to use American forces as he saw fit to defend Formosa and the Pescadores together with "related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands." Two weeks later the president signed the Formosa mutual security treaty, following Senate approval. During the ensuing months the ongoing crisis provided a background drumbeat for the congressional hearings and debate on the FY 1956 budget.

While squeezing what credit he could from the technical absence of war in a perilous postwar world, the president also wooed the Democratic majority he now faced in both houses of Congress, whose leaders he had briefed on the new budget in December. Alluding to the dangerous state of the world, he made an unabashed plea for "unhesitating cooperation" between Congress and the executive branch in defense and foreign affairs, and for abandonment of politics as usual. It was not the campaign rhetoric that he had used in the fall, when he warned that a Democratic victory at the polls would bring paralysis and a cold war of partisan politics.
An Airpower Defense Budget

The full-dress budget message on 17 January formally opened the budget debate. It stressed the national security theme, the transition from war to peace, the insecurity of the times, the need for economic austerity and stability. Although total spending in FY 1956 would be $1.1 billion less than the expected $63.5 billion in FY 1955, there would still be a deficit of about $2.4 billion (approximately half of the predicted FY 1955 deficit) even if Congress accepted the president’s recommendation for a year's extension of excise and corporate income tax rates now scheduled for reduction on 1 April.4

While estimated spending was down, requests for new money were up: $1.3 billion more than was granted in FY 1955—again, mainly owing to military requirements. Major national security programs would need $2.4 billion more new money than in FY 1955, but new money requests for FY 1956 were still lower than estimated spending and anticipated revenue. For major national security programs the administration proposed to spend $40.5 billion in FY 1956, $34 billion by DoD. The Air Force's slice, $15.6 billion, took almost half of the Defense total and $400 million more than in FY 1955; the Navy's share came to $9.7 billion, the Army's to $8.8 billion, both slightly less than in FY 1955. The DoD budget also included about $1 billion for a new military pay and incentives bill and the proposed six-month training program for 17- to 19-year-olds under the new reserve plan.

The president briefly described his military personnel cutbacks, calling them a tentative “reaffirmation,” with changes in timing, of the long-range plan approved a year earlier. For now, he planned to reduce the armed forces by some 200,000 from their existing 3.2 million by mid-1955 and by another 200,000 a year later. Since the end of Korean hostilities 5 Army divisions had come home from the Far East and 1 1/3 Marine divisions were soon to follow, strongly increasing the central strategic reserve. The president noted that the Army was experimenting with new concepts for the “atomic battlefield” and would probably emerge with “smaller but more mobile and self-contained units with greater fire-power.” The Navy planned to operate about 1,000 active ships in FY 1956, 100 less than currently, but with the same number (400) of warships, all with reduced crews; its existing 14 attack carriers and 16 air carrier groups would each be increased by one, and its existing 15 antisubmarine squadrons would be maintained. The Marine Corps would retain its present structure of three divisions and three tactical air wings. The Air Force would continue to build toward its goal of 137 wings by mid-1957, aiming at an interim 121 wings by the beginning of FY 1956 and 130 wings by the end of the year.
Two-thirds of DoD expenditures would go into building and maintaining airpower. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps would increase their active aircraft inventory from 34,000 in mid-1954 to 36,000 two years later; the Air Force’s share of the latter figure would be 23,000. The Army’s force of 3,600 active aircraft would remain level but with a 20 percent increase in helicopters. By the end of FY 1956 Air Force combat units were expected to be equipped almost 100 percent with jet aircraft, while the Navy and Marines, converting more slowly, would increase their jets by about 15 percent. Much of this airpower would go into the expanding continental air defense system, now centralized operationally under the joint Continental Air Defense Command reporting directly to the JCS.

Procurement and production of major equipment would account for more than a third of DoD spending in FY 1956, about the same level as in the current year; two-thirds of this one-third would go into aircraft and guided missiles, also about as much as in FY 1955. Spending for shipbuilding would increase, nibbling at the fleet’s “block obsolescence” problem. The fifth Forrestal-class carrier was one of the scheduled new starts, and additional atomic submarines were to be funded in FY 1956.

Aggregate DoD spending on research and development would increase almost to the FY 1954 level, engaging about one-half of the nation’s research scientists and engineers. Military construction, also on the increase, would surpass not only the FY 1955 but also the higher FY 1954 level. The Air Force was to get one-half of the $1.9 billion requested, the other two services dividing the remainder about equally.

Earlier, in two special messages on 13 January the president requested legislation to authorize the new reserve plan, a four-year extension of the draft, and a package of higher military pay scales and allowances and improved career incentives. The pay raise cost amounted to $950 million, and the first year’s cost of one feature of the new reserve plan—six-months of initial training of 17- to 19-year old inductees into the reserves—was $123 million.

The largest non-DoD component of the national security budget related to that part of the mutual security program devoted to the buildup and support of allied and friendly military forces, administered by DoD although funded by the Foreign Operations Administration. For this military assistance the administration asked for more than $2 billion in new obligational authority and proposed expenditures of almost $3.7 billion in FY 1956.

By using some of the large accumulation of unobligated funds, built up by savings in construction costs, the new budget intended to make do with $1.3 billion in new obligational authority for the expanding atomic energy effort, substantially the same level as the previous year.
Spending was projected at about $2 billion, slightly less than in FY 1955. Operating expenditures, however, were expected to rise from $1.2 billion in FY 1955 to an unprecedented $1.5 billion, owing to expanded procurement of raw uranium ores and concentrates and anticipated increased production as new facilities were completed and placed in operation. Research and development would go forward in FY 1956 on improved submarine reactors, a reactor for large surface vessels, and atomic-powered aircraft and land vehicles.

For stockpiling strategic and critical materials in FY 1956 the administration requested substantially more new money while planning to spend less than the previous year. A new long-term level had been superimposed on the existing minimum objectives for additional security, aimed at adding $3.3 billion in materials to the present objective of $6.5 billion. Procurement was to be limited to purchases that would help maintain essential domestic production. Projections indicated that by the end of FY 1956 stocks would be built up to $5.1 billion toward the minimum goal and $1.2 billion toward the long-term goal, for a total of $6.3 billion. 8

### Table 10
Major National Security Programs Proposed for FY 1956
($ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>FY1954 actual</th>
<th>FY1955 estim</th>
<th>FY1956 estim</th>
<th>FY1954 actual</th>
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<td>OSD-directed activities</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>658</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>12,910</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
<td>11,293</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
<td>15,668</td>
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<td>Unallocated reduction in estimates</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Transfers of prior year appropriations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Total DoD</td>
<td>40,335</td>
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<td>34,000</td>
<td>34,591</td>
<td>30,783</td>
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<td>Atomic energy</td>
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<td>1,118</td>
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<td>651</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>380</td>
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<td>Military assistance &amp; support</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>3,675</td>
<td>3,763</td>
<td>1,939</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>46,522</td>
<td>40,644</td>
<td>40,458</td>
<td>39,472</td>
<td>34,386</td>
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The Squeeze Problem

With the Korean conflict fading into history and despite the storm clouds over the Formosa Strait, the new DoD budget posed a dilemma for Democrats. Their recent congressional gains notwithstanding, the country, like the administration, obviously wanted to get on with the business of peace; the president now promised that under his budget this could safely be done. For mere congressmen to call for more defense spending in a peacetime budget already larger than its predecessor might seem both excessive and presumptuous.

Ironically, most congressional criticism of the FY 1956 Defense Department budget focused on a handful of items—the military personnel cuts, pay increase, career incentives, and the expanded reserve—all together accounting for less than six percent of the new money requested. Generally, the critics nibbled at the edge of cost issues, concentrating on mainly non-monetary issues where the administration might prove more vulnerable. The proposed Army reduction seemed a natural target, since that service had in its chief of staff a champion whose record as a professional soldier might enable him to challenge the president’s military judgments, especially at a time when the threatening situation in the Far East cast fresh doubt on the wisdom of further cuts in military strength. Ridgway had the distinction of being the only Army officer who had held the three positions of Army chief of staff, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Europe, and Commander in Chief Far East Command. Nevertheless, this hope was to prove ill-founded, in part owing to Ridgway’s own shortcomings as a spokesman and advocate.

Looked at up close, the DoD budget and the manpower reductions built into it were less reassuring than the president pictured them. Down the drain was the Army’s plan, which the president had tentatively approved less than four months earlier, for increasing its 19 combat divisions to 24 with no additional manpower by converting “training” divisions to combat roles and shifting the training burden to the divisions themselves. By 1957 the accelerated reduction schedule would bring the Army down to 17 divisions and 12 separate regimental combat teams (RCTs). The only expansion would come in antiaircraft battalions for the continental air defense system, which would increase from the current 117 to 142 by mid-1957. Ridgway emphasized, in explaining the alternatives to Wilson in January, that the Army’s dwindling strength would no longer warrant an equal apportionment of its mobile forces between the European and Far East theaters; one or the other must be short-changed.
To thoughtful critics, questions raised by the DoD budget were larger than one of numbers of men and divisions, and the Army was not its only, although the principal, victim. As one critic, Hanson Baldwin, explained in a series of perceptive articles in the *New York Times*, the defense posture that the budget proposed to buy reflected a military policy riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions, embracing such contrasts as "the foot soldier with the bayonet and grenade in man-to-man struggle and the jet plane with hydrogen bomb wreaking impersonal devastation upon the cities and peoples of mankind." The net result, he argued, was a trend toward increasing dependence on nuclear weapons. "We can still fight... without using atomic arms. But we may not be able to if the present trend continues for another few years." Something had to give—either the drive for a balanced budget, or the needs of lower-priority claimants on defense dollars. Ergo, more "squeeze" on the Army, the Marines, and the Navy—in that order.

The "squeeze" had other aspects, Baldwin held. Reductions in money and manpower could only encourage America’s allies to follow suit—a consequence already evident in Western Europe—while the nuclear thrust of American strategy, paralleled by the growth in Soviet capabilities, was inducing something like paralysis in diplomacy, inhibiting resolute action. Fearing to trigger an explosion, "our own government threatens with the big stick but hesitates to use it in crises."12

*Ridgway and the Formosa Crisis*

The critic most awaited on Capitol Hill was General Ridgway, whom Democratic leaders in both houses had promised to call as a leading witness in the upcoming DoD hearings. This would be his last chance to state his position as chief of staff unless the president reappointed him for another two-year term.

The sudden eruption of the Formosa crisis late in January upstaged the budget hearings before they began. During the joint discussion of the Formosa resolution by the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in closed session on the 25th, Democratic senators evidently hoped to label the American response to the sudden Communist challenge in the Far East as crippled in advance by the administration's budget and manpower cuts. With the other chiefs lined up in support of the administration's contention that available forces were adequate, Ridgway seemed particularly qualified to challenge it because of his recent opposition to U.S. military intervention in Indochina in April 1954 and in the Quemoy crisis the following September.13
The Democratic senators made slow headway. When asked whether the Army could provide sufficient ground forces if needed (Radford had just testified that use of ground forces was not contemplated), Ridgway replied that, in a purely "localized" non-escalating situation, even on the mainland, the Army could at least initiate those operations, but that the ultimate requirements in a spreading crisis were purely speculative. Later, when asked whether any need was anticipated to put American ground forces on Quemoy, Radford and Twining answered with a flat "no." For this contingency Ridgway held (and Carney and Shepherd agreed) at least a reinforced division must be provided as a counterattack force against a major Communist assault.\textsuperscript{14}

Did the chiefs support the proposed resolution on Formosa that would authorize the president to employ U.S. armed forces to protect Formosa and the Pescadores? Ridgway, who feared escalation leading to involvement of ground forces, held back. He readily conceded, when pressed, that the United States could always decide not to land ground forces on the mainland; particularly if Soviet airpower entered the picture, it might be advisable to restrict mainland operations to air strikes and naval bombardment. But such a strategy always ran the risk of accidental escalation, say, by a local commander's action.\textsuperscript{15} Ridgway stated that he "wholeheartedly" agreed with the president's objectives, that is, to ensure that Formosa and the Pescadores remained in friendly hands; but, he said, "my opinion [on the resolution] was not asked."None of the chiefs, except Radford, had been closely involved in preparing the resolution. On the day that Radford briefed his colleagues, Ridgway had been out of town, and by the time he returned, the essential decisions had been taken. With his colleagues, he acceded to Radford's request that the president be told that the chiefs "unanimously supported the President's idea of stabilizing this area and his [directed] actions," but under senatorial quizzing Ridgway stubbornly refused to say that he supported the resolution. To express "approval or disapproval of a decision taken by the President of the United States" was, he insisted, out of his province.\textsuperscript{16}

It seemed that Ridgway had nothing against the resolution but did have deep misgivings about the consequences that might flow from it. Rigidly defining his own competence as "purely military," he would not pass judgment on it officially or publicly. Senators who attempted to re-articulate his views while interrogating him tended to flounder, distorting or oversimplifying them in the process. Ridgway, not always an articulate speaker, was usually less than lucid in expounding his ideas, so his ambiguous position on the Formosa resolution did not prove particularly useful to either its supporters or its detractors.\textsuperscript{17}
Stevens Backs the Army Cuts

On 26 January, during a briefing for the House Armed Services Committee, Wilson made public what had become common knowledge—that the Army chief of staff opposed the accelerated manpower cuts ordered in December. The Air Force, Wilson told the committee, had pronounced the FY 1956 defense program "good," the Navy and Marine Corps had "minor reservations," but the Army "from its point of view would still recommend some higher strength for [its] active forces." He went on to say that he foresaw no further strength or spending cuts nor, for that matter, any major spending increases for the indefinite future—short of war. He pooh-poohed the "Formosa business" as "just a little ripple" that called for no change in basic planning. The remark did not sit well with some of the committee members.

The committee grilled Wilson inconclusively on the manpower issue, and the discussion reached its climax on 31 January, when Stevens and Ridgway appeared as witnesses. The former carried most of the burden, Ridgway's testimony being limited to a short prepared statement and terse replies to a few questions. Stevens seemed a different person from the worried, sometimes confused official who for a year or more had alternately resisted and rationalized imposed personnel reductions and budget cuts. Now confident, he made it clear that on the manpower issue he supported the administration without reservation. Pressed by Chairman Vinson to recall whether, facing the dictated personnel reduction of the Army from 1.3 million to 1,027,000, he had not recommended a higher figure, the secretary said no, he had "adjusted [his] thinking completely to this balanced program."

The committee thus faced a conflict of testimony, since only five days earlier Wilson had told them that the Army wanted a higher level-off strength than that approved by the president. Vinson and other members pressed Stevens to explain the contradiction, but in vain. Under relentless questioning, Stevens faithfully recited, without waffling or embarrassment, all the party-line reasons for his changed position: allied forces being built up to deal with local aggressions, the strategically placed central reserve and expanded reserves, more efficient use of manpower, new manpower-saving weaponry, etc. When contradictions were pointed out, he simply restated his argument. Clearly he had returned to the fold.

The committee expressed particular interest in the secretary's views on what would happen if Congress failed to pass the reserve plan. Stevens

* Stevens had undergone a great deal of stress during the McCarthy hearings in 1953-54. By this time his ordeal was over.
admitted that if the Army could not get an adequate ready reserve to supplement its reduced standing forces in an emergency, the latter would have to be expanded. If the legislation failed to pass, would the Army then come back to Congress and ask to be given back the 140,000 men it was losing, or take a chance with no reserve? Stevens admitted, "we might have to come back." 23

Earlier Vinson had played another card, asserting that "last year [we] gave you what you said was the very minimum you could afford to have," and then DoD, without consulting Congress, had begun to reduce the strength. "These bills," he pontificated, "are not merely permissive laws. It is the law. And the executive branch is presumed to enforce the law, whether it likes it or not . . . . I think there has to be a showdown."24 Vinson's presumed purpose had been to come up with higher strength goals that could be sold to Congress and imposed on the administration. But Stevens's reluctance to stray from the official line had effectively stymied the effort. He did not, indeed, venture to challenge the constitutional doctrine Vinson had asserted. When Mendel Rivers of South Carolina asked Stevens whether the "last word was down town or up here on the Hill," Stevens unhesitatingly replied, "Right up here on the Hill." Other congressmen offered a contrary doctrine: Congress merely put a ceiling on money and manpower and could not force the executive branch to spend all the money or uniform all the men authorized. Caught in the middle, Stevens floundered between the two positions. Vinson decided for the present not to insist on a congressional constitutional prerogative to invalidate the administration's mandated strength goals.25

The last hope for making a strong case against the Army manpower cuts now rested on Ridgway, whose only helpful contribution to the debate thus far had been an assertion that more destructive weaponry and the inevitability of huge casualties would require more rather than fewer men. He pointed out that combat zones, which in World War II and even later had an assumed depth of 30 to 50 miles, were now being estimated at from 150 to 200 miles. Later, when asked whether the reduction of the Army during the current Far East crisis affected the safety of the country, his simple reply, "I think it does, sir," apparently startled everyone. He repeated the point and amplified it to stress that the problem went beyond the immediate crisis area and was global in scope. But he then interjected the now familiar qualification: "It isn't up to me or to any other officer in uniform to oppose a decision by the constituted authorities of our Government."26

Ridgway evidently had no more ammunition to give the opposition. His prepared statement added nothing significant to the debate over personnel cuts. Indeed, his characteristic emphasis on the Army's effort
to adjust to its reduced status and mounting challenges was, if anything, reassuring to champions of the New Look. Nevertheless, press accounts played up Ridgway's public testimony as signifying a clear break with the president. It made virtually certain, predicted the New York Times, "a bitter Congressional fight . . . to force the administration to keep military manpower at least at present levels."27

The president apparently decided to take no chances. Queried about Ridgway's testimony at his news conference on 2 February, he displayed neither annoyance nor concern, and disposed of the matter in a few brisk sentences. His decision on the Army cuts, he said, had been taken only after long study. The general had expressed his personal convictions, as was his right and duty, but his responsibility was "a special one, or, in a sense, parochial," as contrasted with the responsibility of the commander in chief in his recommendations to Congress. He was aware, he added, of the opinions of all the Joint Chiefs; "I know exactly who agrees with me and who doesn't."28

House Budget Hearings: Win Some, Lose Some

Meanwhile, on 31 January the budget hearings got under way in George H. Mahon's House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Two Democrats, Daniel J. Flood (Pa.) and Robert L. Sikes (Fla.), pressed the military manpower issue in their interrogation of Wilson. Flood used blatantly harassing tactics, initially with some success, in an effort to force Wilson into damaging or misleading statements, but although he rattled the secretary he elicited little noteworthy information. Sikes's interrogation, longer and calmer, proved more productive. Wilson admitted, in effect, that the Army's projected strength was a peacetime level only; larger forces would surely be needed in a "shooting war." As for tactical atomic weapons, Wilson pointed out that they had not yet been tested in battle and no one knew what their effect would be. What about mobility? He conceded that until "we improve our air transportation," the Army's mobility would be little changed. He admitted that the decision to reduce the Army had involved conscious discounting of Ridgway's view that modern weapons dictated more rather than fewer men. "If you listen to the military people only, they will bankrupt the nation or else create a military dictatorship. That is why our Constitution says that the civilians should say how big the Army should be."29

On the constitutional balance between the legislative and executive branches, Wilson now retreated into his shell. He was sure the reduction of the Army was "the right thing to do," but he was "not a constitutional
lawyer," had never thought much about the question, and didn't want to go into the "technicalities" or "protocol" of Congress's right to determine the size of the armed forces. What would he do, Sikes demanded, if Congress actually voted more money—buy more troops or return the money to the Treasury? Wilson said he had no plans to use more funds; the whole defense program would have to be restudied. Despite a few abrasive moments like these, Sikes wound up his long interrogation with a compliment: the secretary had been "a very patient man." Sikes had, in fact, scored a few damaging points. The arbitrary and abrupt nature of the president's decision to accelerate the reduction of the Army now appeared starker than before, and the failure to consult Congress or at least its leaders raised questions of constitutional propriety if not legality. Radiating loyalty to the president and uncritical acceptance of his judgment, Wilson's rather inexpert parroting of the official rationale could have been persuasive only to those already persuaded.

Admiral Radford, who appeared before the committee on 2 February, was an adversary of a different stripe. Where Wilson, uncertain and claiming no special military expertise, often said more than he needed to say, the admiral took refuge in a calculated "know nothing" mode. Every mention of budget dollars, even totals blazoned in newspaper headlines, was prefaced by a disclaimer that "I am not prepared to testify in detail on the budget," and further qualified by denials of personal knowledge. On one critical point Radford blandly denied what Wilson had readily admitted, that the president's decision to cut the armed forces had been sudden and unexpected; Radford described it as merely "continuing" the original New Look program. "I can say for myself that there were no decisions that were a surprise to me." To Flood's demand whether he would "support this budget and this Army reduction until the shooting starts," Radford cited the president's 5 January letter to Wilson and the message on the Formosa resolution to show that the FY 1956 strength targets were not cast in concrete and could be modified in the face of intelligence pointing to new dangers. But was the administration not counting prematurely on passage of the new reserve bill to offset cuts in the active forces? Radford, without argument, pointed out that large numbers of trained men were completing active service and entering the reserves every month.

On 7 February the entire House Military Appropriations Subcommittee turned out to hear Stevens and Ridgway testify at the opening session on the Army budget, which normally would have been held before Sikes's five-man Army panel. The Democrats dominated the first day's session, seeking to portray a deteriorating world situation (the threat to
Formosa, collapse of the Mendes-France government in Paris, a recent increase in Soviet military expenditures) in which the Army, with reduced capabilities, would be hard put to carry out its commitments. Ridgway confirmed the report that the Army had little warning of the December decision to accelerate its reduction, contradicting Radford's recent statement. But by the end of the day, the Democrats had failed to add much to their case against the Army personnel cuts or to breach Ridgway's and Stevens's solid support of the administration's position. The next day the senior Republican committee members launched a vigorous counter-attack. Stevens emphasized recent diplomatic successes and redeployments from the Far East and Ridgway testified that the projected FY 1955 and FY 1956 levels did not rest on expectations of early formation of a German army. Both admitted that their views had not been ignored at high levels at the time of the final decision on personnel cuts.

Under Republican quizzing, Ridgway discoursed volubly on the nature and significance of increasing firepower, a phenomenon that apparently baffled some of the committee members. Ridgway conceded that the firepower of an American division had grown theoretically by about 85 percent since World War II, with only a moderate increase in manpower. But he denied vehemently a suggestion that 20 divisions today would therefore be "worth" 35 or 36 World War II divisions, because nuclear weapons not only gave a division enormous firepower but also made it highly vulnerable, like the hypothetical single soldier armed with a nuclear hand grenade. Ridgway held the opinion, in fact, that the power ratio between the Soviet bloc and the free world, based on combat effectiveness, had "altered to our disadvantage in the last twenty-four months" as a result of the modernization and training of satellite air and ground forces, particularly the dramatic improvement of the Chinese Communist Army.

Ridgway's appearance on 7 and 8 February gave both parties a final opportunity to exploit his views and persona in an effort to influence House action on the military personnel reductions. With one exception, most of his testimony was too finespun to make a mark on the gross issues around which the ongoing debate revolved. The exception, one potentially disastrous to the case the Democrats were trying to build, was his off-the-record recommendation, assuming continued intensification of the overall threat, of an "optimum" strength of 1.3 million for the Army in FY 1956. Later, Rep. Gerald R. Ford unobtrusively asked Army Comptroller Lt. Gen. George Decker to estimate the extra cost of such an increase. The estimate, covering both FY 1955 and FY 1956, came to almost $1.3 billion. It provided the first concrete indication of the budgetary consequences to be expected if Congress should decide to implement Ridgway's views—as contrasted with estimated savings of about $700
million in FY 1956 from the proposed reduction of the Army from 1,173,000 to 1,025,000 men.35

By this time House Democratic leaders had taken a reading of the membership and concluded that, on this issue, the game was lost. Vinson subsequently retracted his earlier doubts and declared his wholehearted support for the personnel cuts. The president had assured him, he said, that the planned level-off strength of the armed forces (2,850,000) would remain stable for years to come. Together with the commitment to defend Formosa, he saw it as a firm barrier against further Communist aggression. That Congress could not force the administration to spend money it did not wish to spend,* or legally set a minimum strength for the armed forces, seemingly was now generally accepted.36

**Senate Hearings**

In the Senate also, hearings (again aimed mainly at the Army personnel reductions) were held by both the Armed Services Committee (in February) and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (beginning in April). In both committees administration spokesmen encountered more skepticism and resistance than in the House, primarily of course from the Democrats, but also from a few Republicans who on this issue opposed or only lukewarmly supported the administration.37 As in the House, Ridgway again offered the favorite target of interrogation. The resistance to DoD cutbacks in the Senate could be attributed in part to the rising threat of hostilities in the Formosa Strait area in March and early April, the uncertain prospects of new leadership in the Kremlin following Georgi M. Malenkov’s fall from power, and from mid-May on the rising clamor of public debate triggered by the Soviets’ surprise unveiling of new types of bombers and interceptors in their annual May Day air parade.3

Ridgway’s final appearance before the Armed Services Committee at the end of February was noteworthy for his recommendation that the Army should be built back up to a strength of 1.4 million, 100,000 more than he had recommended in the House.38 Six weeks later, however, and in a different forum (the Military Appropriations Subcommittee), he once more gave 1.3 million as his favored goal in the “distinctly deteriorated” world situation. Without departing from his self-defined “military” role,

* In 1962 Vinson would make an effort to force President Kennedy to spend money on the B-70 bomber. Once again the issue was resolved without a direct clash between the two branches.
† See Chapter XVII.
scrupulously avoiding value judgments on the decisions of his constitutional superiors, he stressed the costs, as he saw them, of the imposed reductions in the Army's strength. Among other measures, the Army had been forced to abandon the tested system of training recruits in separate centers and to shift the burden to the active divisions themselves, to the detriment of combat readiness. On the other hand, the large-scale redeployment from the Far East was actually salutary in relieving a risky overconcentration of the Army's effective strength in remote and difficult-to-defend areas. The peacetime Army, he said, could deal promptly with "small local aggressions," but not carry on beyond a limited time without expansion.39

Inevitably the appropriations subcommittee flogged the threadbare issues of whether the Joint Chiefs had "approved" the decision to cut the Army and who had proposed it. Ridgway pointed out—apparently to the astonishment of some senators—that the chiefs had been consulted on the matter but had not approved, because that was not their function. "When a decision is announced by civil authority . . . superior to the Joint Chiefs, [then] it is accepted with whole-hearted loyalty," he added sententiously.40

Thus to the end, Ridgway rebuffed the role of rebel that some of the legislators obviously sought to thrust upon him. As the president himself had put it, Ridgway's point of view was unavoidably "parochial." The distinction between "purely military" and "purely political" judgments was not, of course, universally accepted, even in Ridgway's profession, and in a few years would be widely rejected; but Ridgway was obviously comfortable with it.41

General Twining's testimony was skillfully crafted both to soothe and to worry his audience at the same time. Expansion of the Air Force was moving swiftly toward the 137-wing goal for 1957. Complete conversion of medium bombers from propeller-driven to jets was in sight, with completion of phasing-in of the medium B-47 by early 1956. The first B-52 heavy bombers would join SAC in summer 1955. New high-altitude jet tankers would increase the range of the jet bombers. In the tactical forces, all fighter bombers and light bombers could now carry atomic as well as conventional ordnance; aerial tankers and airlift would give these forces added range, mobility, and flexibility. Continental air defenses were improving across the board, but only SAC's long-range striking forces could prevent a repelled enemy from attacking again. The Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Reserve were being equipped with modern aircraft, and ANG fighter wings would be fully converted to jets by the end of FY 1956. Airpower was entering the missile era. Pilotless Matador surface-to-surface squadrons were already operational in
Europe, and the air-to-air Falcon and the surface-to-air Bomarc were doing well in tests. A trio of intercontinental missiles—Navaho, Snark, and the Atlas ICBM—were under development. Work continued on the still conceptual revolutionary nuclear-powered airplane. Skimming over a touchy subject, Twining noted that the troop carrier force “will continue to grow” and that a 50 percent increase in airlift was projected by 1960.

The threat posed by Soviet military power, Twining declared, was growing ominously; important stages in nuclear development had been reached “well ahead of our predictions.” Communist airpower posed the “number one threat to our security,” particularly the improving Soviet capacity to deliver nuclear weapons. New types of jet bombers and fighters, apparently now in quantity production, were capable of reaching most of Western Europe and all of Alaska, and much of the Far East; the new heavier types could extend this reach to all of Europe, Asia, North Africa, and, with air refueling, North America. The growing Chinese air force was also a threat, but a greater danger, especially in the current tense situation in the Far East, was China’s rapidly expanding network of air bases, which would enable the Soviets to move in their own aircraft and thus “double or triple their air strength in the Far East overnight.” The Soviet missile developments, including an ICBM, posed for the United States a defense problem “more difficult than any ever faced in history.” To offset it, Twining assured the senators, “the very highest priority” had been assigned to the Atlas ICBM.

Twining’s upbeat testimony echoed the cautious optimism the senators had already heard from Secretaries Talbott and Thomas (Navy), all three taking their cue from the official line expounded on the opening day by Radford and Wilson’s deputy, Robert B. Anderson. Admiral Carney and General Shepherd, on the other hand, were cool in endorsing it, Carney professing concern regarding the Navy’s ability, hit hard by personnel and budgetary cuts, to fulfill its general war missions. He would, of course, carry out the prescribed reductions, but “if conditions continue to put a heavy strain on us with respect to overseas deployments, I might feel called upon to ask for some adjustment.”

Carney’s lack of enthusiasm may have reflected cumulative strain caused by the mounting Formosa Strait crisis that had thrust Carney into unwelcome prominence. On 24 March he had allegedly predicted (off the record) that the Communists would attack Matsu about 15 April and Quemoy some weeks later. The news leaked, and garbled reports—Carney publicly denied the allegation—triggered a chain reaction, ballooning into one of the biggest news sensations since the end of the Korean War and portraying the luckless admiral as a leading hawk. Carney remained resolutely silent, while the administration tried frantically to smother the
fire by disavowals and a presidential statement that peace was not served by such speculation. At some point Carney was probably “taken to the woodshed,” although the president denied it.45

When his turn came before the Senate committee, General Shepherd had two well-turned paragraphs in his prepared statement about the effect of the personnel cuts on the Marine Corps. Cuts of this size, he admitted, would “involve some sacrifice,” but could be absorbed by disbanding some units and reducing Manning levels in others. The staying power of combat forces would be reduced somewhat, but otherwise the readiness of operating forces would not be diminished. After a lengthy grilling by the chairman, Shepherd reluctantly admitted that in an emergency “we would have to have more men, more materials” for sustained operations. Although he expressed support for the budget as submitted, eventually the commandant acknowledged that a strength of 210,000 to 215,000 would be an “ideal optimum peacetime strength” for the Corps. Shepherd had opposed the original decision to reduce active forces, but later accepted it and was prepared to make the best of it. Like Ridgway, he admitted to misgivings regarding the adequacy of the reduced force to cope with an emergency until reinforcements could be mobilized. In addition, Shepherd revealed that as a byproduct of the Navy’s force reduction the Marines would be provided amphibious lift for only one-and-one-third instead of two divisions as at present (one for each coast).46

The first round of Senate hearings wound down with Ridgway’s testimony on 6 April. Shepherd clearly had made an impression as Ridgway’s rival in the annual Capitol Hill game of how-to-get-more-money-without-actually-asking. Several Democratic senators now predicted that the Marine Corps personnel cuts would be restored. Both in the country and on the Hill, the constituency of the Corps was probably at least as large as the Army’s, and the price tag of $75 million for the restoration looked modest by comparison with the sums that would be needed to pay for even a portion of the additional manpower Ridgway wanted. By mid-April, the president was reported to have been warned that Ridgway’s testimony had made serious inroads in committee support for the budget and to have decided to write a personal letter to the chairman in an effort to turn the tide.47

House Hearings and Floor Debate

From the House, by contrast, the word was “not to worry.” The powerful chairman of the Appropriations Committee, 75-year-old Missouri
Rep. Clarence Cannon, in times past a legendary budget cutter and fiery debater, was convinced that every dollar of this particular budget, above all the DoD budget, was vital to the nation's security. But because he also had unshakable confidence in the president's judgment on military matters, he parted company with his Democratic colleagues on the issue of reducing the ground forces. "So far as the armed forces budget is concerned," he declared, "I intend to give him [the president] what he wants, no more and no less."48

On 5 May the House Appropriations Committee overwhelmingly approved and sent to the floor a DoD budget reduced by about $750 million in bookkeeping and technical money transfers, but in substance virtually intact as submitted. Flood fought a losing battle to restore approximately that amount in order to recoup some of the Army losses and vowed to renew the fight on the floor the following week. The committee report noted the opposition of some members and also the administration's assurance that more money would be requested promptly if the world situation worsened.49

The House floor debate, such as it was, consumed the better part of two days (11-12 May). Along the way, Rep. George Mahon pronounced that the Defense budget was "about as good as could be expected at this time." It did, however, contain much that he did not like, above all its "colossal failure" in the procurement field, "where losses to the taxpayer are greatest," especially for the big-ticket items such as airplanes, electronics, and industrial products generally. "We want to see big and little business do well." But some, Mahon said, were doing too well and at the taxpayers' expense, and their high-priced executives enjoyed an unfair advantage; "a few timid civilians and harassed lieutenant colonels are not equal to the task of meeting big business on even terms." What President Eisenhower would later call the "military-industrial complex" was not yet perceived as a peril of which the nation should beware. Representative Sikes, heading the Army subcommittee, voiced serious misgivings over the force reductions. He noted in particular the difficulty his group had experienced in determining who had been responsible for initiating the Army cuts. No witness believed that current world conditions warranted a general relaxation in defense preparations, despite the obvious current trend toward peace. Nevertheless, Sikes concluded, after careful deliberation, "our committee is supporting the budget figure that was presented to us."50

Almost the only sour note came from Representative Flood. Early in the session he announced a series of amendments restoring all the personnel to be eliminated, as well as the Navy's ship reductions—to the tune of almost $410 million.51 Representative Ford made the principal
argument in defense of the Army budget. Ford’s most important contribution to the debate was a methodical analysis of Ridgway’s statements during the hearings, demonstrating that Democratic spokesmen had singled out statements supporting the case against the personnel cuts. What might be called Ridgway’s net position, based on all his testimony, turned out to be a mixture of ambiguity, uncertainty, and simple wait-and-see noncommitment. Ford showed, moreover, that Ridgway’s widely cited view of the probable effects of atomic warfare on manpower requirements was really not relevant to the debate on the FY 1956 budget, since the Army was only now conducting field tests aimed at clarifying, if not resolving, this issue. Neither the manpower nor the dollar figures projected for FY 1956 reflected expectations that the new reserve program would be passed and produce, in that period, large numbers of trained reservists. They did assume growth of the National Guard and Reserve forces by some 271,000. Ford also reviewed in some detail the Army’s impressive record in improving the ratio of combat to non-combat personnel, increasing firepower and mobility, and improving communications. The clear implication was that the Army could make do with fewer men.  

Committee Chairman Cannon mostly held aloof during the long session. His one significant intervention came late on the second day. “We cling to the old ways, the old times, the old weapons, and the old strategy,” he began. “Always there are those who want to fight the next war like they fought the last war. And invariably it has ended in disaster.” His main point, accepting the Air Force “big bang” image of a general war, held that the Army would be virtually useless in a major conflict except to control riots and bury the dead; moreover, the Navy would take two weeks to go into action, and the Army a whole year. He urged the members to vote for the bill as presented. At the end of a long day (12 May), which went into a night session, the members shouted down all the Flood amendments so resoundingly that he did not bother to ask for a hand count. The House passed the Defense budget, substantially as reported by the committee, by a vote of 382 to 0.  

The Senate: Symington Wins One for the Marines

The ho-hum mood of the House during the 12 May floor debate owed much to the relative calm that had prevailed for several weeks on the world scene. The Formosa Strait crisis was still a crisis, but Admiral Carney’s predicted Communist assault on the Matsus in mid-April had failed to materialize and pressure on the administration to negotiate a
cease-fire by the two sides was increasing. On the other side of the world, the promising negotiations for an Austrian peace treaty (consummated in May) and the impending Big Four summit conference seemed to signal a new relaxation of East-West tension.

But on the day following the House budget vote, official announcement of the appearance in a Moscow air parade of two new Soviet jet bombers, a turboprop bomber, and a new all-weather fighter caused a firestorm of scare publicity that the administration tried, at first with little success, to dampen. By the end of the month, the heat had abated somewhat, and the administration responded to the pressure by a decision to accelerate production of B-52 bombers, reminding its critics meanwhile that the United States retained superiority in medium bombers. The administration seemed to be winning the airpower debate in the budget struggle. From the outset, airpower had been a potential rather than an actual budget issue, not merely because the administration had taken the minimum steps to defuse it, but more fundamentally because the opposition consisted of two groups, airpower and ground force partisans, whose alliance was as uneasy now as it had been during the battles over the 1954 and 1955 budgets. As early as the end of May, senior Democrats gave reporters the impression that they had little hope of being able to override the president's influence as the nation's top military expert; he had always won such battles in the past. 54

On 14 June the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a DoD appropriations bill funding the requested stepped-up B-52 production. It also restored to the Air Force an authorization to spend for various purposes $380 million of carried-over funds that the House had ruled off limits. The cost of the B-52 acceleration was $356 million; the whole bill provided a net increase of about $348 million over the House bill, for a total of $31.8 billion. 55

A languid floor debate on the 20th revealed the extent to which the issues had been exhausted in the press and committee hearing rooms. Symington, chief ball-carrier for the Democrats, spoke at some length but added little of substance to his previous pronouncements. During the discussion on the 20th the question of accelerating fighter production became a non-issue when Senator Dennis Chavez read a letter from Secretary Talbott reporting that the two newest supersonic fighters then under development, the F-101 and F-104, had been determined to be "ready to be placed in quantity production," and that he had so recommended to Secretary Wilson. No need for additional appropriations was anticipated, Talbott noted. Symington then gave up any thought of adding a further $200 million to the Air Force budget for this purpose. 56
Symington said little about the B-52 acceleration: that it fell far short of what was needed; that in the air the United States was much worse off than before, with clear superiority only in one limited category, medium jet bombers. Regarding the ICBM, the weapon that “should cause us the most concern,” Symington claimed that the Soviets were “well ahead,” his most sweeping assertion to date. On the airpower issue, he was thus reduced to simply challenging, on the basis of past performance, the administration’s credibility in promising future superiority. Accordingly, Symington shifted the debate back to the cuts in ground forces, urging that they be suspended while the issue was reappraised. To start the ball rolling, he had already introduced an amendment adding about $46 million to the Navy budget to halt the reduction of the Marine Corps and bring it back up to an end strength of 215,000 in FY 1956, the number originally authorized in the 1955 appropriation bill for the end of that year.57

Symington received little vocal support from his Democratic colleagues, except for Senator Russell of Georgia, who branded the cut in the Marine Corps as the “most inexplicable” of all the planned reductions and ridiculed the anomaly of refusing reenlistment to Marine veterans while drafting thousands of young men who had no wish to serve.58 The vote on Symington’s amendment was a cliffhanger, the winning vote (40 to 39) provided by a last-minute switch by Louisiana Democrat Russell Long. The Senate divided mainly along party lines. Eventually the Democrats decided not to push their luck and gave up the struggle against the Army reductions. The purely symbolic character of Symington’s victory was generally recognized: Even if it were sustained in conference, the president could not be forced to spend the money. No other important issue arose, and the Senate voted 80-to-0 to approve the committee bill as amended.59 On the 29th Senate-House conferees quickly agreed to the Senate’s actions in adding funds to halt the Marine Corps’ reduction and to finance acceleration of the B-52 program. Both chambers subsequently approved their conferees’ reports. The final budget stood at $31.8 billion in new appropriations. The Army received $7.3 billion, the Navy/Marine Corps $9.1 billion, the Air Force $14.7 billion, and the remainder went to OSD and interservice and other activities.60
Early in May 1955 the House was nearing the end of its review of the FY 1956 Defense budget. Abroad, war clouds over the Formosa Strait seemed to be dissipating, and elsewhere the international scene was relatively calm. Then, on the 14th the New York Times carried a two-paragraph Defense Department press release about the recent appearance of new Soviet aircraft—a medium jet bomber, a heavy bomber, a turbo-prop bomber, and a jet fighter—over Moscow.1 This, it soon appeared, was the tip of a large, intrusive iceberg, which would not merely disrupt the budget review but shake the foundations of the New Look itself.

The Moscow Flybys

The 14 May announcement, “terse to the point of ambiguity,” as defense expert Hanson Baldwin described it, provoked interest less by what it said than by what it failed to say. It was mostly old news. One of the Type-37 bombers (similar to the American B-52) had been among the 175 aircraft flown over Red Square in the 1954 May Day parade. Observers then had publicly labeled it a prototype, but during the following summer and fall as many as two or three were seen flying together on several occasions. Also observed in the 1954 May Day parade was a formation of nine Type-39 medium bombers (similar to the American B-47), by then known to be in series production. A year later, May Day 1955, bad weather prevented the customary air parade over Red Square, but during a three-week period straddling that date observers saw some 13 flights of new aircraft types, including the two jet bombers.

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These flights, promptly reported by news media in Europe and other countries, did not receive public attention in the United States until the 14 May news release. Information was, of course, available earlier in the Pentagon; Allen Dulles, in his regular intelligence briefing to the NSC on 28 April, noted the flights observed up to that time. Why the Defense Department waited almost two weeks to release the information, and then only in a hoarse whisper, baffled reporters at the time and remains unclear. To be sure the flybys were intermittent, making the story cumulative and ongoing—much of the news was stale, and on its face, the story was good news for the Democrats, bad for the administration. If released before or during the House floor debate on the budget, for example, it might have changed some votes, though hardly enough to stem the landslide that buried the bill's opponents on the 12th.

In the Pentagon and the intelligence community, moreover, the fierce dispute that had immediately erupted over the interpretation to be placed on Moscow's sudden and dramatic display of these particular aircraft argued for holding back as long as possible while answers were being sought. In assessing Soviet intentions and capabilities, Wilson always tended to go slow and underrate. He was also not a militant champion of the public's right to know about national security matters. Wilson seems to have regarded any important news release as a potential time bomb.

Obviously, however, the story could not be held back indefinitely, and each successive day's delay aggravated the damage that could be expected when it finally broke. Secretary Talbott who, it turned out, had released it after clearance by his superiors, lamely noted that "I thought the American people should know the facts," since the London papers had already carried the story. Wilson, already under orders to play down the story, decided in favor of the "terse" version finally released, not, as in Hanson Baldwin's acid comment, "for information but for effect and restricted to partial truth."

The full story, dribbled out over the next two or three weeks, described the five new aircraft types (with their American names) seen over Moscow as follows:

**Bison** (Type 37): a very long-range, swept-wing, four-engine jet bomber; one-way range about 6,000 miles.

**Badger** (Type 39): a medium-range, swept-wing, twin-engine bomber, comparable to the B-47.

**Bear**: a very long-range (one-way about 8,000 miles), swept-wing, four-engine turboprop aircraft tentatively designated a bomber, but could be a tanker.
Farmer: a twin-engine, swept-wing, air-supremacy supersonic day fighter, never seen before; configuration suggested 800-mph class.

Flashlight: all-weather interceptor, first such aircraft revealed by Soviets.

What had been seen seemed to indicate that the Soviet air forces were in process of being rapidly equipped with at least five up-to-date types of combat aircraft; two of the five had never before been seen, two had been seen but had been presumed to be prototypes still years away from large-scale production. Only the Badger was known to be in series production and flying in combat units. The real mystery plane, the turboprop Bear, could not equal the speed of a jet over the target, but its lower fuel consumption gave it a significantly longer unrefueled range, an important asset for the Soviets in view of their lack of forward bases close to the North American continent. The unexpected appearance of the Bear along with the Bison raised the question whether the Soviets planned to develop and produce two intercontinental jet bombers, or to use the Bear as a tanker for the Bison. Since the Bison's estimated range barely qualified it for an intercontinental role, the latter possibility seemed more likely. With a refueling capability, a long-range striking force of Bisons would pose what one Air Force official in May 1955 called an "appalling" threat. Air Force intelligence was forecasting that within three years the Soviets could have a fleet of 350 Bisons and 250 Bears, more than enough for a crippling attack on the continental United States. Actually in 1958 the Soviets had only 50 and 150, respectively, and long before that date had switched emphasis from bombers to ballistic missiles.

Publicity Firestorm

The debate touched off by the disclosure quickly attained the proportions of a headline firestorm. Three days after the first news reports of the Moscow flybys based on the Pentagon's tardy press release, Senator Symington, now a prospective presidential candidate, charged that the government's limited revelations showed that the United States was losing control of the air to the Soviets. He called for a full-dress Senate inquiry into all aspects of American versus Soviet military strength. The Soviet air force, he told the Senate, had not long ago been characterized by Secretary Wilson as "defensive." "It is now clear that the United States, along with the rest of the free world, may have lost control of the air
except for the possibility we still have advantages in base location and training." Sen. Richard Russell, meanwhile, announced that his Armed Services Committee would conduct a closed-door investigation of Air Force readiness, probably through the Preparedness Subcommittee headed by Sen. Lyndon Johnson. In his news conference the next day, the president tried to play down the whole affair. He admitted that "we may not have as many B-52s as we should like at this moment," and that Soviet achievements had sometimes "exceeded predictions," but he ridiculed the notion that the United States could have lost "in a twinkling" its longstanding qualitative superiority over the Soviets.

In less than a week the ill-conceived 14 May news release had thus triggered the kind of escalating public debate over national security that the administration had hoped to avoid as the DoD budget, emerging almost unscathed from the House, moved into the more hostile arena of the Senate. Top officials, attempting to enforce the president's low-key treatment of the matter, quickly discovered that many of their own troops, especially in the Air Force, more or less openly agreed with the alarmist opposition line. When the administration attempted to mobilize official speechmaking over the Armed Forces Day weekend (20-22 May) to counteract the recent scare stories, it turned out that several speeches submitted by high officials for clearance read as though they had been framed for the opposite purpose. In haste, the word went out that they should be rewritten to hew to the official line. Secretary Talbott, under instructions from the White House and Secretary Wilson, revised his own speech and advised General Twining to do likewise; Lt. Gen. Thomas Power and others down the line received similar guidance. Also the Air Force put out an order reminding its personnel that all public statements on intelligence matters must be cleared with the Pentagon and admonished officials to be careful in their public utterances. As always, however, some apparently failed to get the word. General Thomas D. White, Air Force vice chief of staff, in his Armed Forces Day speech, declared that America's lead in scientific manpower "is going, if it has not already gone." He confirmed reports that the Soviets had "thousands" of the supersonic MiG-17s, as compared with fewer than 100 U.S. F-100s now in combat units.

As the debate moved into its second week, the Democrats stepped up their attacks. On 23 May Symington demanded that the administration confirm or correct a detailed critical analysis of recent Soviet gains in airpower published that day by *Aviation Week*. Senator Russell expressed unhappiness over the administration's failure to ask for more defense money, since "Congress cannot itself create or operate an Air Force."
Senator Johnson, Democratic floor leader, seconded both his colleagues, and declared that Secretary Wilson "ought to step in to clear up confusion about Pentagon statements on Soviet power."\(^{11}\)

The next day Wilson, flanked by Air Force Assistant Secretary Roger Lewis, faced newsmen with a new formal statement ostensibly providing the clarification demanded by Senator Johnson. The statement listed the aircraft observed in the Moscow flybys earlier that month, the numbers agreeing substantially with those published in various earlier published reports. These facts, it said, were "not new to the Defense Department" and were recognized as demonstrating "an ability to produce long-range aircraft." Wilson added that the president had correctly stated recently that the United States still enjoyed air superiority over the Soviet Union, and he then reasserted the familiar New Look claim of "adequate overall defense" for the long haul.\(^{12}\)

Refusing to be deflected, the reporters honed in on the sticky issue of air superiority. Wearying under their relentless pursuit of numbers, Wilson produced a recent statement by General Twining to the effect that straight numerical comparisons did not reveal much about the relative power of opposing air forces, since many other elements had to be considered—e.g., degree of modernization, weaponry, base systems, experience and skill, ability to fly long distances and hit targets, ability to operate and maintain complex equipment, ability to supply a force and keep it fighting. On the other hand, numerical disadvantages could not be ignored. As Twining put it, "We must recognize any advantage they [the Soviets] have in quantity as a gap that must be bridged by our superiority in quality and technology."\(^{13}\) Wilson and Lewis insisted that the only real surprise in the Moscow flybys was the numbers of several advanced models of aircraft the Soviets were able to muster at one time. The technology itself was state-of-the-art, within demonstrated Soviet capabilities. The numbers displayed were sufficient to suggest the probability of series production rather than handmade prototypes. What must not be forgotten, Wilson warned, was that "we just saw what they wanted us to see." Still, it seemed a "fair assumption" that the Soviets were now bent on building a long-range bomber force similar to SAC; his estimate a year ago, based on the continued heavy production of MiG fighters, that their air force was basically "defensive," now appeared to be out of date. But he stuck to his prediction that the Soviets would not be able to mount a sustained bombing offensive against the United States before 1957 at the earliest.\(^{14}\)

For all his discounting of mere numbers, Wilson was probably more worried about them than he seemed, particularly the numbers of Bisons
now in existence and yet to come. A week earlier Radford had sent him a somber warning, apparently unsolicited. It reviewed the erratic course of official estimates of Soviet heavy bomber development over the past two years. In 1953 U.S. intelligence credited the Soviets with no jet bombers at all, heavy or medium. By now, according to some estimates, enough Bisons could have been produced to equip the equivalent of a SAC wing (about 30), and current production might be running at 6 a month and might rise to 20 by late 1956. Radford gave an intelligence estimate of 20 Bisons and 200 Badgers in operational units at mid-1955, rising to 200 and 650, respectively, by mid-1957. In short, Bisons almost certainly were now coming off the line faster than B-52s—of which as yet only 26 existed. The Air Force had asked a select panel of airframe manufacturers whether a four-year design-to-production cycle, for a bomber with the Bison's specifications and under a number of stated assumptions, was within Soviet capabilities. The panel concluded that it was.

The B-52 had experienced a more leisurely birth and growth—first specifications drawn in November 1945 and first flight in April 1952. The Bison evidently was a product of a crash program from the outset, one still roaring ahead at full throttle, whereas the B-52 had been conceived and launched in a period when the Soviets' only long-range bomber was the Tu-4 and it was widely believed that they lacked the industrial potential to build a long-range air force. As late as December 1952 only about 60 B-52s were on order; output in the spring of 1955 was about one or two per month, aiming at eight by December, for a projected total of 399 by mid-1959.

Radford clearly considered accelerated B-52 production imperative. "If present B-52 production schedules are continued," he warned Wilson, "it would appear that the Soviet program will give them numerical superiority in the heavy jet bomber field," beginning in 1956 and rising to a 7-to-4 ratio of Bisons to B-52s by the end of 1959. Intelligence estimates of Soviet jet bomber production over the past two years, he wrote, had "grossly underestimated" Soviet capabilities. Clearly the Soviets had demonstrated "exceptional ability to accomplish the task of executing a large aircraft project from design through production to probable operational status in a short period of time" while simultaneously carrying forward development and production of the Bear—perhaps the prospective tanker for the future Bison fleet. Congress, Radford warned (this was only two days after the 14 May press release), would surely react sharply to the intelligence activity that had failed to detect this buildup in only a few years of a formidable offensive Soviet airpower.
Worried Pentagon observers viewed the B-47 medium bomber as the most reassuring feature of the visible landscape, with more than 1,000 on hand and now operational in 80 percent of SAC's medium-bomber wings. With its 3,000-mile range, doubled by in-flight refueling, it would be the principal carrier of American air-atomic power during the long transition from the B-36 to the B-52, enabling SAC to threaten the entire area of the Soviet Union from American forward bases. The B-47 was thus, and for some time would remain, the mainstay of American offensive airpower—according to Symington and other critics, the only type in which the United States enjoyed a clear advantage. Symington himself could claim some parentage for the B-47 since he, as Truman's first Air Force secretary in 1948, had made the decision to order it into production from prototype. The Soviet Badger evidently was intended mainly, in Soviet counter-deterrent strategy, to neutralize the B-47 by knocking out American forward bases at the outset of a war. Since it had been in quantity production for well over a year, its current output was assumed to be at least equal to that of the B-47.

Wilson's "no surprise" stance at his 24 May news conference had more credence with respect to the new Soviet fighter and all-weather interceptor than to the new bombers. The fighters reflected, after all, the classic image of Soviet air strategy dating back to World War II. Hence Wilson's characterization of the Soviet air force in 1954 as essentially "defensive," which critics now threw back at him at every opportunity. But the image retained some validity, despite the clear signs of an emerging offensive capability. Beginning in 1952, the legendary MiG-15 was superseded by the larger, faster, and more potent MiG-17. By mid-1955 an estimated 7,000 of these had been produced and about 4,000 were in combat formations, with production probably running at more than 300 per month. The comparable American F-100 Supersabre had as yet reached only a small fraction of these numbers; fewer than a hundred were flying in combat units. Air Force Assistant Secretary Lewis, when quizzed on 24 May regarding the "comparability" of the MiG-17 and the F-100, waffled unhappily; superiority, he said, was a "matter of judgment." 

Suitably arrayed, all these facts and apparent facts could add up to a highly disturbing picture. The Russians, one worried critic summed up (somewhat hyperbolically),

are ahead of the United States in the design and construction of large jet and turboprop engines and of interceptors, and . . . have matched us in the design of medium and heavy bombers and in getting heavy bombers into production. In spite of
American skill in production, the Russians have a supersonic interceptor in combat formations while we have none; they have thousands of trans-sonic interceptors in combat formations while the United States has a few hundred; they started two years later than we to make a jet intercontinental bomber and now have it in formations while we don't; they have developed jet engines which, when first shown a year ago, had about twice the thrust of anything developed in the West; they have built more jet aircraft of a single type—the MiG-15—than we have of all jet aircraft combined and have built more light two-engined jet bombers than all the free world put together. . . . At the same time that the Soviets were involved in crash programs for medium and heavy bombers, they also had crash programs on long-range missiles. The United States, in contrast, completely dropped its intercontinental ballistic missile for two years and was progressing at a leisurely pace until Soviet progress forced a top priority on our missile programs.

Equally disturbing, the administration had tried to cover up: first in the cryptic 14 May press release and even in the subsequent belated release and accompanying press conference on the 24th.22

Had the United States, then, lost its air superiority? Superiority involved more than "numbers and performance of aircraft." As Hanson Baldwin, a sympathetic critic, pointed out, the United States had a "decided edge" in most of the basic factors that went into airpower: a cushion of distance between North America and the nearest Communist bases, a network of bases ringing the enemy heartland, superiority in oil and fuel production, capacity to produce aluminum, overall industrial power, technical know-how, and design and engineering skill (although the Soviets were fast closing the gap in numbers of scientists and engineers). Indeed, geography alone had saddled the Soviet Union with a virtually insoluble air defense problem in its immense frontier and numerous axes of attack open to its enemies, whereas the United States and Canada were vulnerable only on the north behind a vast buffer of sparsely inhabited wilderness and polar wastes. In sheer numbers of military aircraft and productive capacity in being, the Soviets at the moment seemed to have a lead, but more than half of their total aircraft were support types or in storage or reserve, and many were World War II leftovers. Their operating force was estimated at 18,000 to 22,000 aircraft, against an "active" U.S. inventory of 31,000. The debate, however, focusing on land-based aircraft only, overlooked the American monopoly of ship-based airpower, as well as modern troop and cargo transports, and airborne nuclear weapons.23
Qualitative comparisons seemed, on the whole, to favor American airpower. "The best qualitative yardstick," Baldwin commented, "was the Korean War," where American pilots flying the F-86 Sabrejet ultimately racked up a 10-to-1 ratio of combat kills over the MiG-15s. As General Gruenther had asserted more than once, the Soviets still had nothing capable of stopping the B-47 and had no organization remotely comparable in training and experience to the Strategic Air Command. These qualities, to a degree, underpinned American airpower as a whole. The USAF, its spokesmen were fond of saying, was "more modern in total" than any other air force.

But, as Baldwin warned, "comfortable comparisons of current situations are not enough." The total Soviet effort devoted to expanding their airpower seemed to be larger than the American. Their ability to sustain multiple crash programs over periods of many years—heavy and medium bombers, fighters, turboprops and jets—was not even approached in American experience since World War II. In more specific terms, the new Soviet interceptors, especially the all-weather Flashlight, had made the old B-36 obsolete, even for night attacks. To absorb losses, much larger formations of bombers would be needed since, to permit diversionary tactics and electronic countermeasures, proportionately fewer planes would actually carry bombs. The Strategic Air Command would have to be vastly enlarged, which meant increasing the already huge Air Force budget. On the receiving end, the United States could expect within two years to face the threat of massive attacks by modern Soviet intercontinental bombers, but without comparably modern interceptors to meet them.

Without accepting all the exaggerations and urgings of the critics, Wilson and his advisers still could hardly avoid concluding that the two-to-three years lead that the defense secretary had verbally bestowed on American airpower in 1954 had shrunk. But how much? And what must be done to restore it, or even arrest the shrinkage? The Air Force buildup had now reached the 124-wing level and the Air Force spending budget was planned to level off at about $15 billion. The president remained determined to balance the federal budget in FY 1956, mainly at the expense of the DoD budget. Air Force procurement schedules called for an intake of only 2,500 new aircraft in FY 1956, slightly less the year following. These numbers reflected a slowdown, since the Air Force needed an annual intake of at least 4,000. When reporters asked Wilson on 24 May whether he intended to do anything specific in response to the threat of growing Soviet air strength, he said no: no request for larger appropriations and no expansion of the 137-wing force goal.
Wilson was less than candid with the reporters, for a decision to accelerate the B-52 was already in the mill. Meanwhile Senator Russell had lined up Talbott and Twining to give his committee a full secret briefing on 26 May. On the morning of the briefing Wilson submitted to the NSC, and the president approved, a recommendation to accelerate B-52 production. Evidently Russell was informed, or got wind of the impending decision, in advance; that morning, before his committee assembled, he issued a statement that he favored accelerated production of both the B-52 and late-model supersonic fighters sufficient to assure continued American air superiority. The briefing, which consumed most of the day, portrayed a situation that some of the members afterward characterized as "grim" but not beyond remedy. After the briefing Talbott released to the press an announcement that Boeing was being directed to speed up B-52 production at both the Seattle and Wichita plants by 35 percent, permitting completion of the replacement of B-36s "well ahead" of schedule. Senators present expressed gratification at the news.28

The mounting pressure from the Democratic senators seems the most likely influence shaping the decision, from the moment they began to exploit the unfortunate 14 May news release and the administration's subsequent efforts to play down the issue. After two weeks the uproar they fomented and nourished had risen to such a pitch that the issue of a lagging, pinch-penny response to surging Soviet airpower seemed on the way to dominating the impending budget debate in the Senate. The administration bowed to the clamor, making what it presumably judged to be the minimum acceptable concession.29

It was not clear whether the cost of accelerating B-52 production would require an additional appropriation or come from available Air Force funds. Legislators vied with one another to proclaim publicly their willingness to provide whatever sums might be needed. The formal request from DoD on 6 June proposed an addition of $356 million to the Air Force portion of the appropriation bill that the House had sent to the Senate; it represented a net increase of $206 million over the president's original budget, which the House had cut by $150 million. For the B-52 program the dollar increase of more than one-third was expected to boost FY 1956 production from 91 to 133, but there would be no increase in the total program of 399, now to be completed by mid-1958, about a year earlier than the original target.30

On 6 June Wilson spent a large part of his news conference explaining the dollar arithmetic and other aspects of the acceleration. Why, he was finally asked, was it decided to accelerate? The time was
ripe, Wilson answered in effect; production was moving along and was ready to be "pushed." About this time of year all programs were reviewed routinely, and the recent Moscow flybys were not a factor. Then why 35 percent? If the Soviets now had interceptors that could outrun the B-36, why not go all-out to build B-52s? Wilson insisted that 35 percent was what the Air Force recommended, and what he had promptly approved—as did the president. \(^{31}\)

The decision to step up output of the B-52, culminating in the official announcement of 6 June, did not, of course, appease the critics or lower the noise level of the public debate. The Democratic chorus welcomed the production speedup but simultaneously denounced it as a "shocking admission" of foot-dragging and negligence and accused the administration of putting "greater value on dollars than on national security." Symington and Jackson repeated earlier charges that the Soviets "probably" were now ahead in development of the ICBM. Secretary Talbott proclaimed that the U.S. Air Force was and would continue to be the most powerful in the world. \(^{32}\)

*The Sci-Tech Threat*

About the second week of June the debate acquired a second focus—the long-range threat implicit in resurgent Soviet science and technology. Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) Donald A. Quarles spoke of a "comprehensive effort" by the Soviets "to search out and educate talent," dramatically evidenced in their increasing production of graduate scientists capable of working on defense problems—about 6,800 in 1954, compared with only 4,000 in the United States. The main Soviet effort, it appeared, was in the area where the United States was most deficient— theoretical scientists. "We Americans," said Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, Air Force deputy chief of staff for development, in an address at the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, "are great at the application of fundamental knowledge to develop useful things and to produce those things in great quantities. Conversely, it is sobering to reflect that much of the basic research and knowledge which forms the basis of our many marvels of invention—nuclear power and weapons, radar, jet and rocket propulsion, and others—came from foreign lands. . . . We must see to it that we have our own fountains of knowledge from which to draw. . . . I gravely doubt that the flow is anywhere near adequate." \(^{33}\)

The most prestigious voice sounding this warning, CIA Director Allen Dulles, was especially scornful of some of the more cherished tenets of current conventional wisdom in America. "Generally speaking,"
Dulles asserted, "their TOP men appear to be the equal of the TOP men in the West," even though as yet there were fewer of them at most levels. In the vital fields of mathematics and meteorology the Soviets were "clearly on a par" with the West and "even ahead in some respects." "Unless we quickly take new measures to increase our own facilities for scientific education," Dulles warned, "Soviet scientific manpower in key areas may well outnumber ours in the next decade."³⁴

This line of comment gave point and urgency to the Hoover Commission's critical report on military research, released at the end of May and quickly picked up by the press. The commission charged the armed services were "not sufficiently daring and imaginative" in developing "radically" new weapons systems. It felt that the $20 million the Defense Department spent in FY 1954 on basic research, vital to all progress in new weapons, was inadequate; for FY 1956, DoD was expected to spend about $77 million. "Only to the extent that research and development provide superior design of weapons," said the commission, could the United States keep ahead of its enemies in strategy and tactics. It gave relatively high marks, however, to the Air Force's performance and organization in research and development.³⁵

When asked at his press conference on 6 June what he thought about the commission's adverse report, Wilson replied that he intended to study thoroughly its recommendations and "implement the ones that are workable and good." Did he think that $20 million for basic research was enough, in a total DoD research budget of $1.37 billion? Wilson parried the question with a bromide, illustrating his notion of basic research: "I think of it like drilling for oil." To drill a hole just anywhere was basic research; to drill one "in a likely place" was what "smart people in the oil business" did. The Defense Department should spend its R&D money where it was likely to be of "some use to us," and maybe basic research should be the responsibility of some other department, not his.³⁶

As it happened, Wilson had supported the Air Force's request for $35 million for emergency research and development, plus another $50 million, if needed, by transfer from other funds. In addition, he had requested authority to transfer to the R&D program in any military department up to two percent of the unobligated procurement funds available to that department. Wilson's only allusion to this request at the press conference was a cryptic remark that he was "trying to get some flexibility so I can move a little more money in there if I can find any place to do it."³⁷ As amazed critics later pointed out, that "little more money" could (although this was not likely to happen) amount to $500 million or more, which would increase by more than one-third the total R&D budget of
the department.\textsuperscript{38} This was not, of course, a reversal of his concept of basic research, but only of his settled feeling that the current level of Defense spending on general research and development was about the maximum that could be put to good use. The additional funds would be available immediately to exploit unforeseen "technological breakthroughs."\textsuperscript{39}

Wilson's view that the existing share of total national research and development going for defense—about half—was about right, and that defense R&D had already tapped virtually the entire pool of available qualified scientists and engineers, had many supporters. But so did the Hoover Commission's contrary view based on the urgency of responding to the Soviet threat, and Wilson's unexpected move to preserve the option of diverting large additional funds from procurement to R&D targets of opportunity was hailed as an encouraging sign. A serious obstacle to any major expansion of defense-oriented basic research was the difficulty experienced by the nation's universities and laboratories in absorbing more than they were already carrying without harm to their primary educational function. In the long run, however, the best hope for a significant expansion of defense R&D seemed to lie in increasing the general pool of scientists and engineers.\textsuperscript{40}

"The era of the unmanned missile in warfare," wrote Trevor Gardner, "is very much at hand," and he predicted that, more than any other type of weapon, it would define the air force of the future. In the Air Force Gardner presided over the largest missile development effort in the armed services and was the most ardent crusader in the Pentagon for an all-out effort to accelerate the already galloping technology of airpower. The real Soviet threat, he insisted, came from technology, not production. To maintain its technological superiority, the United States must have "weapons of such superior ingenuity, performance and effect as override the enemy's ability to attack or defend himself." A more explicit warning came from Air Force General Putt. "In the next five or six years," he said, "the Russians are perfectly capable of confronting us with a technological surprise" and gaining an advantage very difficult to overcome, simply by concentrating their resources on development of a "new super intercontinental guided missile."\textsuperscript{41} The advanced technology thrust of the airpower debate received further impetus from publicity attending the series of underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Proving Ground (mid-February to mid-May), an underwater explosion in the mid-Pacific, and new revelations concerning the unexpected power of the thermonuclear device detonated in the Bikini (Castle) test of March 1954. It seemed reasonable to assume that in development of long-range missiles and nuclear warheads the Soviets were not lagging behind the United States.\textsuperscript{42}
Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 11 June, Admiral Radford appeared to single out the Soviet guided missiles program as the main threat, giving only passing mention to the growing Soviet long-range bomber capability. Since there was as yet no known defense against an intercontinental ballistic missile, it was imperative, he told them, for the United States to lead in development of this weapon. It might be possible eventually to achieve the same kind of standoff between the superpowers' long-range missile forces as seemed now to be emerging between their long-range bomber forces. Radford spoke at length about the dual problem of secrecy and communication in this new arms race. The situation he envisaged was asymmetrical—i.e., involving American superiority in missile forces—but a standoff nevertheless in that the Soviets, although weaker, could still penetrate American defenses and destroy many cities. Accordingly, they must be made aware that their own cities would suffer a like fate in the inevitable retaliatory attack.

Unlike the debate triggered by the ill-fated 14 May press release, which had pushed the administration into a defensive posture of denying charges of negligence and suppression of information, administration spokesmen took the lead in the public discussion of the emerging Soviet threat in advanced weaponry and military research. Senator Jackson's was almost the only opposition voice raised in this area on the eve of the Senate budget debate, calling publicly for increased production of both atomic weapons and delivery systems and denouncing the current economy policy in defense spending as the "No. 1 enemy in trying to maintain military superiority." For many senators, numbers of supersonic interceptors remained a live issue, along with bombers, and in the final hearings the appropriations committee pushed it hard. Wilson and Air Force spokesmen assured the senators that the program was being re-evaluated and that a decision on accelerating production would be reached before Congress adjourned.

On balance, the administration seemed on the way to extricating itself from an awkward position at a reasonable cost, particularly if some of the production accelerations could be financed from available Air Force funds rather than through new budgetary requests. As the DoD budget headed for the showdown votes in the Senate, the administration evidently no longer expected a serious challenge, an expectation that turned out to be justified, on the whole, by the outcome. The decision to accelerate B-52 production and the administration's apparent readiness to do likewise for advanced fighter production effectively deprived Senator Symington, the opposition leader, of his major issues.
The 1955 Bomber Gap Flap

**Senator Jackson’s Twelve Questions**

The airpower debate was, however, far from dead. On 21 June, the day following the Senate floor debate, Senator Jackson called for an end to the administration’s budget-balancing approach to national security. He demanded an all-out effort on a wartime scale to develop the intercontinental ballistic missile, to produce massive numbers of all the new combat aircraft, and to expand production of atomic weapons. The key race for the ICBM, the “absolute weapon,” was “nip and tuck”; this project should immediately be assigned “supreme and overriding importance in our defense effort.” Jackson clearly was looking beyond the FY 1956 budget. But the kind of countrywide sense of emergency he seemed to want to arouse could conceivably lead to a vast expansion of defense spending beginning very soon, with huge supplemental appropriations and the other trappings of wartime budgeting. He proposed a major expansion of aircraft production, with around-the-clock, seven days-per-week operations, and “as an absolute minimum,” maintenance of active ground forces at their present level. As he candidly admitted, what he had in mind was a partial mobilization; “we must now build up our armed strength to wartime footing in time of peace.”

Meanwhile, Jackson had seen to it that the airpower debate would continue. On 27 June he asked Wilson for “explicit and categorical”—and early—answers to 12 questions on comparative U.S.-Soviet air strength. Wilson refused, alleging security difficulties and reminding the senator that full information had already been given to the proper congressional committees, including several of which he was a member. Wilson declined more requests that he testify. There, for the moment, the matter rested, but the reviving public debate received a new push on 3 July from the annual Moscow air show, featuring even larger numbers of all-weather fighters than in the early May displays, a large formation of a new supersonic single-jet fighter, new twin-rotor helicopters, and a new swept-wing jet transport. A few Bisons and Bears also appeared. It proved, Symington declared, that the United States had lost another “degree” of its air superiority, and he demanded again that the administration give the public “the facts,” including still secret photographs of the widely seen and publicly photographed flights over Moscow in May.

Official speakers at the annual DoD conference held at Quantico in mid-July assured their audiences of high-level officials that American qualitative air superiority held firm but that this was no reason for complacency. General Twining reported that the recent air display over Moscow underlined what the May flights had already shown, and Admiral Radford
warned, "We can expect our difficulties in maintaining a technical superi­ority in weapons to increase." 50

Jackson got his answers, finally, in the last week of July—classified "Secret" and backed up by the secretary in person appearing before Jack­son's Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. Afterward Jackson reported that the secretary had given "complete answers" but failed to change his (Jackson's) view "that we are not making the effort that should or could be made on our air delivery systems." 51 Despite its "Secret" label Wilson's statement was perhaps little more candid than a press release would have been. Much that had been vehemently denied or evaded or minimized in May and June Wilson now readily conceded. Estimates had indeed grossly underestimated the speed with which the Bison bomber would be developed and put into production and squadron service; for some reason, earlier estimates had proved more accurate than later ones. Available evidence indicated that the Soviets not only now had more Bisons than the United States had B-52s, but might have still more in 1958. The Soviets also had "a great many more" advanced day interceptors than the United States (but not all­weather or night fighters), and much more powerful jet engines. Would the Soviets, by 1960, have more scientists and engineers working on airpower than the United States? Probably—certainly they would have more aeronautical engineers, since their annual crop of students in this field had more than doubled that of the United States since 1950 even though their training courses ran for 5 1/2 years, against only four in the United States. 52

Underlying most of these admissions was a basic qualification: in effect, "we do it differently and, we hope, better." Thus the U.S. military could now, and in future would be able, to bring to bear against the Soviet homeland a much larger atomic bomber force than the Soviets could mount against the United States, taking into account B-36s, B-47s, fighter-bombers (land and naval), advanced bases, and in-flight refueling capabilities. Soviet fighter forces appeared designed for defense against massed deep-penetration bombing attacks, whereas American doctrine aimed at intercepting smaller numbers of penetrating attackers, if pos­sible before they reached U.S. borders. As for tooling up for mass pro­duction, Wilson told Jackson "we believe that as a rule we get larger numbers of superior aircraft in a shorter over-all time if we proceed more slowly with development and do extensive testing." Conceding the possibility of Soviet numerical superiority by 1960 in every category of aircraft, "we do not believe that they will have a better qualitative solution of their air power problem than we will have of ours." The Soviets would
likely achieve a continental (i.e., 1,500- to 2,000-mile range) ballistic missile before the United States, but they were not expected to be first with an effective intercontinental missile. The ICBM was only one of four U.S. strategic airpower components, which also included manned bombers and two kinds of guided missiles: the subsonic Snark and the supersonic Navaho, both under development. The Atlas ICBM, also under development, "now has the very highest priority rating."53

Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

Except among the totally uninformed, the current relative standing of the two contestants in the race to build airpower was no longer at issue, but the future standing was. Many thoughtful and informed critics, both within and outside the Air Force, believed that the recent moves to produce more heavy bombers and fighters came too little and too late, leaving the Soviets still ahead in output of their own advanced types in both categories. The Soviets were believed to be now producing more heavies and at least as many mediums, and to be far ahead in light bombers. American output of B-52s, slated to increase but at a glacial pace, would reach its peak only in mid-1958. The supersonic F-101 and F-104 interceptors recently ordered into production could not be expected to attain full-scale output until 1958, along with the B-52, while the equivalent Soviet types were already in volume production.54

This line of reasoning and speculation by critics pointed to a situation, three years down the road, in which the full-grown Strategic Air Command, with its core of B-52 heavies, would face much strengthened Soviet defenses and a vastly larger target system. When they encountered the more advanced interceptors that the Soviets would have, 500 B-52s might not be enough to absorb probable attrition, much less cover all their targets. A similar problem might be looming for the B-47. On the receiving end, to deal with attacking Soviet bombers, Continental Air Defense Command would still depend mainly on its F-100 transonic interceptors and probably the F-89, F-94, and F-86D subsonic all-weather fighters—unless production of the newest supersonic types were immediately and dramatically increased. True, a technically superior air force would not in itself give the Soviets overall air superiority, given offsetting American advantages of geography, better trained pilots and air and ground crews, and superior organization and experience. But over Europe and its own homeland the Soviet air force would probably rule the skies.55
Such critics did not necessarily reflect prevailing views in the Air Force high command and staff. But the data that informed their analysis could only have come from those sources, and it is reasonable to assume that the conclusions, as well, were widely shared there. Twining had hinted that 137 wings might not be enough, and Air Force Assistant Secretary Trevor Gardner had publicly revealed that the Air Force needed at least another $100 million, perhaps twice that amount, in the current year for research. The additional funds would be requested, he said, when Congress returned in January.\textsuperscript{56}

With the budget battles safely behind him, Wilson paid little heed to either the critics without or the rumblings of dissent within. Meanwhile the Air Force, moving at its own pace, gave response to some of the specific criticisms. In July it ordered into accelerated production an all-weather interceptor version of the F-101 and an advanced model (with a new engine) of the F-104, both aircraft capable of supersonic speeds approaching Mach 2.\textsuperscript{57} On 3 August it awarded speedup development contracts for three brand new supersonic aircraft—a long-range interceptor, a fighter-bomber, and a tactical bomber. The accelerated process was expected to compress the seven-to-eight-year design-development process by one or two years—an improvement, but hardly a radical one.\textsuperscript{58}

Coincidentally, Wilson had chosen Donald Quarles, his assistant secretary for R&D, to replace Harold Talbott as Air Force secretary. The appointment was widely hailed as foreshadowing greater emphasis on guided missiles, atomic-powered aircraft, and other advanced technologies. Quarles sardonically assured reporters that he had no plans to “discontinue” manned aircraft. In one of his early actions—probably dictated by Wilson—he killed Gardner’s recent bid for an additional $100 million in research money, and Wilson offered no help with his emergency research funds. Congress cut $122 million from the Air Force’s $1.2 billion construction request, and before the end of the month Quarles found himself fighting more spending cuts as Wilson, under White House pressure, tried to enforce the $34 billion DoD expenditure ceiling for the current fiscal year.\textsuperscript{59}

\textit{A New Doomsday Prediction}

In September the airpower debate took a new turn. One of the administration’s best-kept secrets, since its submission to the president in February, had been the report of the top-drawer panel on scientific and technological aspects of national security headed by James R. Killian,
Jr., the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.* Its contents assured it a prominent place on the agenda of all the national security agencies. On 19 September the veil was slightly lifted when Joseph Alsop published a garbled summary, describing it as "the most important and intensive high-level study of the relative curves of Soviet and American armed strength that has yet been attempted."60

By this time, of course, the report had long since been thoroughly studied at the highest levels, including the NSC, and discussion of its implementation was well advanced. On 8 September, the NSC, warning that Soviet achievement of an operational ICBM capability ahead of the U.S. would have "the gravest repercussions on the national security and on the cohesion of the free world," had designated the Air Force ICBM research and development "a program of the highest priority above all others." On the 13th the NSC also approved a program to develop land- and sea-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). Both actions responded to recommendations by the Killian panel and may have played a part in the leaking of the report at this particular juncture.61

According to Alsop, the principal revelation in the report was that the Soviets were expected by 1960 to have a "decided superiority" in ICBMs, assuring them overall military superiority during the period 1960-65. The United States might produce an ICBM by 1960, but the Killian committee, said Alsop, thought this unlikely barring a major and immediate escalation of effort, and even then the Soviet lead could prove decisive. This did not portend, the committee had concluded, an all-out Soviet onslaught when the new missiles were ready, but, starting much earlier, a steady erosion of the American and Western bargaining position as the power balance shifted. Alsop did not profess to know in detail what measures the committee had recommended to counter the Soviet threat, but he assumed they added up to an across-the-board acceleration and expansion of the whole airpower buildup, offensive and defensive.62

Alsop's bombshell caught the president on vacation in the Colorado Rockies. "The story is inaccurate," stated Murray Snyder, the acting press secretary. Two days later, however, the Washington Star published what appeared to be an approved (and much shorter) version, this time on the authority of the Joint Chiefs: the United States, they were reported to say, now had a "sound lead" over the Soviets in the atomic arms race and would retain it until 1960; after that, they were not sure. The report was described as a wide-ranging study of the applications of science and technology to weapon development. The main worry of the president's

* See Chapter XIX.
scientific and military advisers was that the Soviets might be first to go into ICBM production and develop a new weapon after 1960 that would give them a clear, if temporary, advantage over the United States, thus breaking the existing atomic stalemate.63

For all its apocalyptic overtones, the public reaction to Alsop's "revelation" of the Killian report was little more vehement than a stifled yawn. This seems puzzling in retrospect, considering the report's intrinsic importance. Symington naturally exploited it promptly, telling reporters the same day that Alsop's article, if correct, merely confirmed his own repeated charges that the ICBM program, like other vital weapon developments, was a victim of DoD's business-as-usual approach. He denounced Wilson for his alleged proposal that Air Force research funds be cut another $200 million.64 But at Wilson's news conference 10 days later no one even mentioned the subject. One reason for the lack of response may have been, ironically, Alsop's portrayal of the report as no more than an amplification, with conclusions and recommendations, of what had already been revealed in more concrete terms by the Moscow flybys of April-May: an accelerating resurgence of Soviet airpower that in due course, it had to be assumed, would be capped by the dreaded ICBM. There was irony, too, in the reality. The administration's response to the Killian report had been appropriately prompt and vigorous, commensurate with the seriousness of the threat it revealed, but it was necessarily veiled from the public and extended in time. The Moscow flybys added little to an already disturbing picture except the prospect of some acceleration in the estimated timetable of Soviet production of strategic bombers and supersonic interceptors.65

In net effect, Alsop's article came across as added fallout from the Moscow flybys with new emphasis on the early possibility of a Soviet "first" with the ICBM. It also sought to alert a jaded public to expect a major new effort by the administration, by implementing the Killian recommendations, to match Soviet momentum and ensure continued American air superiority. Whether the Killian panel's report would in fact produce such an effort, and what the magnitude of its budgetary impact would be, remained to be seen. What seemed certain was that the airpower debate would continue and that the administration would have to endure persistent criticism of major features of its military policy.
CHAPTER XVIII
Minutemen and Veterans

Historically, America has stumbled into war unprepared. The Korean War was a stroke of luck, at least in its timing, because there were then available hundreds of thousands of still young World War II veterans whose fighting skills were only slightly rusted. More than 600,000 were called back into service because about 2 million physically qualified young men who had reached military age between 1946 and 1950 had received no military training, and another 450,000 very little after entering the reserves. "For the second time in a decade," wrote the National Security Training Commission (NSTC) after the Korean War,

these veterans suffered extended interruptions of their civilian lives and careers. They were called away from their wives and children and catapulted into the front lines, sometimes within a few weeks . . . . Farm and industrial workers, scientists, teachers, managers—all were recalled . . . . The selective principle was applied to inducting nonveterans for service but not to veterans recalled for their second tour of duty. Veteran reservists are older, more highly skilled, and more essential to their families, their professions, their communities, . . . yet we have made them more liable for service in limited emergencies than nonveterans.¹

The 1951 Universal Military Training and Service Act (PL 82-51) renewed the draft until 1951, requiring all males between ages 18 and 26 to register and making all those over 18 ½ liable to induction for eight years of military service, two on active duty and six in the reserves. Looking to the future, the act also provided for eventual institution, through new legislation, of a national service system under which all young men

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reaching age 18 and not needed for active military service would be inducted for six months of military training with an obligation of future service in the reserves. The independent five-man National Security Training Commission, appointed to develop the plan, draft the legislation, and supervise the system's operation, because of wartime pressures and the unpopularity of universal military training (UMT), could do nothing during the war to advance the project. By the end of the fighting almost a million reservists had been called to active duty, more than 60 percent of them World War II veterans. Yet of about 3.6 million qualified young men who reached military age between July 1946 and July 1950, some 2 million had not served in either the active or reserve forces by June 1950. In the months following the end of the war in Korea, their number continued to grow as both draft calls and enlistments dwindled. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (PL 82-476) organized the reserves in three categories—ready, standby, and retired—the first subject to mobilization by presidential order, the other two by congressional action. As inductees completed their active service they passed automatically into the ready reserve, becoming eligible after three years of satisfactory participation for transfer to the standby reserve. In the post-Korea climate, however, the system virtually lapsed. As returning veterans were mustered out, many simply melted into the population, ignoring or unaware of their still unfilled reserve obligation. At the end of 1953 only four percent of the Army's Korean War veteran reservists and only one in four of all ready reservists were training with units. With the 1951 UMT plan still unimplemented, and veterans comprising 75 percent of the nation's two million reservists (including virtually all of the Army's), a repetition of the Korean War experience in the next emergency seemed inevitable.

"20th Century Minutemen" and Its Critics

When President Eisenhower assumed office in 1953 he was well aware that the military reserve system badly needed overhaul. During the election campaign he had promised to do something about it. As events subsequently proved, it was a knotty and emotional issue over which powerful and complex political and military interests clashed

*The World War II Selective Service Act expired in 1947. Selective service was reinstated in 1948, but heavy enlistments permitted discontinuance of inductions in February 1949. After the onset of Korean hostilities in June 1950, inductions were resumed.
repeatedly. Legislative outcomes inevitably represented compromises at a level that left the administration dissatisfied and invited continued efforts for further change.

Countrywide the need for reforms in the reserve system to shield veterans against double or multiple jeopardy was an urgent issue. In the military services and the Joint Chiefs, however, a different perspective prevailed. They regarded the diminishing numbers of veterans as too precious a military asset to be released into any kind of sanctuary from which they could not be plucked as needed in an emergency—an unjust and unfair fate, no doubt, but with dwindling standing force budgets in a dangerous world, that was the way it was. Nonveterans were also a resource, but mainly as a pool of eligible young manpower, diversely skilled and rich in potential, ripe for recruiting, a future more than a current asset. The services split on this point. The Army, original champion of UMT, needed a large ready reserve in peacetime, generally because it alone contemplated mass mobilization in an all-out war, when trained reserve units and individuals would be needed for immediate post-D-day expansion and deployments while new divisions were building. Also, as the Army began to feel the squeeze of New Look reductions in its active forces, it foresaw a need for trained reserves as a supplement in limited emergencies. Like its sister services the Army preferred veterans and wanted them immediately callable in the ready reserve, but since it could transform inexperienced youths into competent soldiers more quickly than the other services could remake them into skilled airmen, sailors, or Marines, it looked more favorably than they on a reserve composed of young men drafted directly for training before entering active service. The Air Force and the Navy, anticipating only limited mobilizations and a short Big War, had less interest in reserves.

Promptly following the end of hostilities in Korea the president, on 1 August, directed the National Security Training Commission, chaired by Reserve Maj. Gen. Julius O. Adler, to examine the subject. On 1 December 1953 the commission submitted its report, a slick but substantial, professionally-written pamphlet. Titled *20th Century Minutemen*, the publication circulated widely in government and was available to the public for 50 cents. It resoundingly endorsed the six-month "national security training" program authorized by the 1951 act as the best remedy for the inequities of the prevailing system and the best safeguard against a repetition of the double jeopardy inflicted on World War II veterans during the Korean War, which it documented in harrowing detail. It urged that the program begin immediately (or no later than 1 January
1955) with an initial increment of at least 100,000, to be chosen by lot from a pool of 18-year-old selective service registrants after allotments to the services for maintaining active forces at authorized levels were filled (also by lot). After six months of training, graduates would transfer to the ready reserve for 7 1/2 years of reserve service, with liability to recall in an emergency ahead of veterans; the latter, in turn, would receive the option of reassignment to standby status for completion of their obligated service. The commission had no doubt that sufficient manpower would be available for the program. Its more conservative estimates indicated that, even in the unlikely event that the armed forces maintained an active strength of 3,360,000, about 840,000 young men "qualified in every way" under present laws and regulations would have escaped military service by 1960. With armed forces reduced to 3,128,000, the total would rise to an astonishing 1,440,000.

The commission knew that the services would likely resist any requirement that in an emergency half-trained nonveteran reservists must be called up ahead of veterans. In that event, from the professional military vantage point, the vast pool of veteran reservists—variously sullen, bitter, apathetic, a dwindling asset—remained the nation's best hope for quickly expanding the active forces if an emergency came soon. How soon was debatable. "The veteran reservist," warned the commission's report, "is aging, increasing in civilian essentiality, and developing physical limitations. What is needed is a continuing flow of trained reservists, not a static number of veterans who will outgrow their military usefulness." Periodic unit training could retard the process but most veteran reservists would have none of it and, as a practical matter, could not be forced. Nevertheless, to mobilization planners looking only a few years down the road, 1.5 million veteran reservists, who in a serious emergency could be called immediately back into active service, represented a bird-in-hand argument more compelling than considerations of equity and more real than prospective "20th century minutemen."

When the commission gave the Joint Chiefs a preview of its report on 20 November, stressing the military usefulness of a large pool of trained nonveteran reservists, the reception was thus noticeably cool. Admiral Radford warned that any program that competed with the active forces for budget dollars would be unwelcome, and Air Force General Thomas D. White, speaking for General Twining, indicated that the Air Force had relatively little interest in the mobilization of manpower after D-day. 20th Century Minutemen in fact drew decidedly mixed reviews after release to the public in mid-December. Critics branded the report as another
attempt to sell UMT, and dismissed its recommendations as unfair, arbitrary, infeasible, ill-conceived, and hastily contrived. The congressional reaction, with an election year in prospect, was predictably adverse. Even supporters of universal military training in principle doubted whether sufficient manpower would be available to support training of non-veteran reservists concurrently with the draft, questioned the fairness of lottery selection of young men for either six months of training or two years of service, and challenged the need for large armies and reserves in the atomic age.5

The president—attentive to the strength of opposition sentiments—decided not to expose his administration to the wrath of the public by sending a bill to Congress at that time. The recommendation and the rationale for delay were provided by ODM Director Arthur S. Flemming, who on 6 January 1954 submitted the report of the Special Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security (Appley Committee*) that had been ordered the preceding August to examine the feasibility of the proposed nonveteran reserve training program. Without flatly contradicting the Adler Commission's more optimistic findings, the committee concluded that even a token program of 100,000 men per year would be difficult to maintain if the active armed forces were held at 3.36 million, and would have to be abandoned forthwith if that level were raised. If the estimates were correct, and if a sudden emergency should make it necessary to increase rather than reduce active forces, as currently planned, an ongoing nonveteran reserve training program might prove an embarrassment or worse. Urging caution and further study of manpower resources before launching such a program, the committee recommended that the Defense Department determine the proper size and composition of reserve forces in two categories, one for immediate call in an emergency, the other to be called selectively. The president expressed deep appreciation to the commission for the report and ordered all federal agencies concerned to help develop a new reserve program, indicating that for the present he would hold in abeyance proposals for implementing the training provisions of PL 82-51. ODM and the Defense Department, in consultation with the Adler Commission, undertook the task of developing an organization plan for the reserves, to be presented to the NSC by 1 April.6

* After Lawrence A. Appley, a business executive, manpower and management expert, and adviser to the U.S. government.
The Military Take Charge: The Wensinger Plan and NSC 5420

On 13 January 1954 Secretary Wilson established an interservice task force of high-ranking regular officers headed by Maj. Gen. Walter W. Wensinger, USMC, to develop the plan. The task force submitted its plan to Wilson early in March and he referred it to the Joint Chiefs for their recommendation. Despite initial unqualified endorsement of the whole plan by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, the Joint Chiefs disagreed among themselves on a number of points and told Wilson on 9 April that the plan needed further study. They were still studying the plan when Wilson approved it without their endorsement and forwarded it on 14 May to the ODM director virtually intact. Before the end of the month it appeared on the NSC agenda as NSC 5420.

The new Defense Department reserve plan came up for decision just as the Indochina crisis peaked with the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the convening of the Geneva Conference, generating enormous pressure for reconsideration of the whole New Look program. Secretary Wilson spoke cryptically on 26 April of a “second new look” which might be dictated by events in the Far East and Europe, and Assistant Secretary Hannah told the Senate Armed Services Committee about the same time that the new DoD reserve plan, involving “radical and dynamic changes” in the existing system, was nearing final approval at the highest levels and might soon be submitted to Congress. Details of the reserve plan began to seep through the security wraps enclosing it. Many were more or less accurately reported but one effect was to tag the plan, in the public mind, as an outgrowth of the Adler Commission and Appley Committee studies, and as a “UMT” plan reflecting the Pentagon’s acceptance of the former group’s proposals.

What DoD totally failed to communicate was the extent to which the Defense plan, incorporated in NSC 5420, although adopting some structural features of the Adler Commission’s concept, had rejected its essence. The framers of NSC 5420 clearly regarded 20th Century Minute-men, with its egalitarian “citizen army” philosophy, as their principal doctrinal adversary. One of the opening paragraphs asserted: “The critical nature of existing international relations demands that national security take precedence over all other considerations. Equity among individuals must be given due consideration, but in consonance with this principle.” The reserves, NSC 5420 argued, required a “substantial proportion” of militarily competent prior-service personnel qualified by “extensive training and experience.” An “influx of large numbers of relatively untrained individuals” might fatally weaken the capability of the reserves to perform their mission.
NSC 5420 set forth a requirement for a "service callable reserve" over three million strong, composed of "trained individuals and units instantly available for call by the military services," to augment the active forces, expand the training base, replace losses, and begin the buildup of forces during the first six months of a major war. The plan also called for an unorganized "selectively callable reserve" of individuals subject to call only by Congress, numbering at a minimum 760,000. The service callable reserve would be divided into a "front line reserve" and an "auxiliary reserve," each comprising units and individuals. The frontliners, slated for immediate combat availability, would undergo the full annual training program of 48 weekly drills, possibly additional weekends, and two weeks of summer active duty. A 30-day active-duty tour was a possible alternative for those unable to attend weekly drills. The auxiliary reserve would receive lesser amounts of training as prescribed by the services.

On M-day the Army would be the least mobilized service since the reserves it would call up would comprise more than 60 percent of its total force. Its "service callable reserve" of 1.7 million was 70 percent greater than the Army's projected end-FY 1957 strength of 1 million. This reserve would be organized primarily into units intended to be mobilized and to operate as such. Most individual reservists not directly assigned to units would be trained to fill vacancies in the active forces or to provide initial loss replacements. The Air Force, the most fully mobilized service in peacetime, would account for only 10 percent of the reserves, essentially an M-day force consisting mainly of flying units "designed to be so highly trained and proficient that they can be immediately employed as units or used as a source of replacements for early losses."

The Army's huge service callable reserve was the centerpiece of the plan. Into it would be swept most able-bodied veteran reservists, and most of its intensively trained first-line reserve of 1.7 million would serve out the remainder of their obligated eight years. The lucky few who had already served four years or more in the active forces (the Wensinger task force had recommended a more liberal 21-months minimum) would become eligible for transfer to the auxiliary reserve to complete their obligated service under a less arduous training program, when their total active and reserve service added up to six years. Only veterans who had seen actual combat—still a sizable number in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War—could, if they wished and at the discretion of their service, be transferred forthwith to the selectively callable reserve, which had no training requirement at all. Veterans who volunteered for the service callable reserve, despite eligibility for transfer or exemption, were especially prized and would be enticed by "special benefits."
Not surprisingly, the bitterest criticism of the Defense reserve plan came from the Adler Commission. "We . . . cannot accept," General Adler wrote ODM Director Flemming on 24 May, "those parts of the Defense Department report which not only continue present inequities to the veteran reservists but increase and compound them. It remains our conviction that no program can be workable so long as it is unfair and inequitable." On the other side of the coin, by requiring reserve training for only a fraction of the hundreds of thousands of young men crowding into the draft-eligible pool, and doing nothing to close the existing "escape hatch" of deferment and exemption policies, the DoD plan plainly rejected the principle of universality of obligation inherent in the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which was still the law of the land. The plan, declared General Adler, was "morally wrong" and he pointedly reminded the ODM director of the commission's understanding that its criticisms were to be "submitted intact" to the NSC and the president.\textsuperscript{11}

Among the services the Army alone lodged a sharp dissent, primarily on the issue of the inequitable treatment of veterans. Yet no hint of its views was discernible in the Joint Chiefs' defense of NSC 5420 that General Twining, in Admiral Radford's absence, forwarded to Wilson on 15 June. The purpose of the whole exercise, the chiefs announced, was to design a program "from the military point of view to meet the requirement . . . for immediately employable trained reserves, both as units and as individuals . . . and to permit a rapid and orderly mobilization when necessary to meet the threats of a local war or general war." This aim, the chiefs emphasized, took precedence over equitable sharing of military service, universality of obligation, and other worthy purposes.\textsuperscript{12}

In the NSC on 17 June Wilson and Hannah, presenting the Defense position, faced a mostly unfriendly audience, including ODM's Flemming, Army Assistant Secretary Hugh Milton, Labor Assistant Secretary Rocco Siciliano, Treasury Secretary Humphrey, and Budget Director Hughes. Twining and Carney, without Ridgway, represented the Joint Chiefs. Tersely, President Eisenhower laid down the law. He would support any "effective" reserve program, but "the burden should not fall on veterans . . . . No program can be sold to the American people unless there is more of a flavor of equity in it. The present proposals for using so many veterans and so few others . . . would be difficult to get through Congress." The NSC directed Defense and ODM to collaborate on a revised paper with cost estimates; in particular they were to examine "the desirability of providing for service by all militarily eligible men." They were also to come up with proposals for ensuring effective federal control of the National Guard.\textsuperscript{13}

Given the leaning of a majority of the National Security Council toward equity of service, the president's instruction that the desirability of
universal military service be re-examined in this context was, for the present at least, an important turning point. It represented a victory for the Adler Commission and, not least, for the Army, over the "equity-be-damned" views of the Wensinger task force, the Joint Chiefs, and OSD. It put the developing reserve plan back on the "citizen army" track marked out by the president's 1 August 1953 directive.

Back to the Drawing Board

After the NSC meeting, with some sort of universal service system now no longer an option but a requirement, and submission of a revised plan to Congress in the current session no longer a possibility, the OSD-ODM planners spent the next five weeks in an exhaustive examination of the available options and took several more months to agree on a first-draft revision of NSC 5420. The first product of their labors, NSC 5420/1—a working paper—was submitted to the NSC on 26 July. Ostensibly obedient to its mandate, the paper stressed equity of service (no mention of veterans) in the sense that all eligible men would be required to serve in the armed forces, including the reserves. From the planners' perspective, the overriding and immediate need was to make reserve service truly compulsory, in order to bring the vast pool of now idle veterans effectively into the system and thus provide a quickly mobilizable and nearly ready reserve for any emergency in the next few years. Compulsory reserve service, they assumed, could win public acceptance only as part of a system of universal military service, which, ironically, the president had mandated in order to ensure equity.

Responding to the president's second requirement, the planners also recommended that the National Guard be permanently separated from the states and federalized. As the National Guard of the United States it would become the "principal reserve component of the Army and Air Force," manned initially by involuntarily assigned reservists. Legislative authority should be sought for this purpose. To replace the Guard, the individual states could form their own militias.14

Skeptical of these priorities, the Joint Chiefs (again with no dissent from Ridgway) intensified their stand against equity and universal service, reasserting their overriding concern to provide adequate active and reserve forces to meet an emergency. The chiefs roundly condemned as a "dangerous and expensive theory" the whole idea of seeking equity; its ultimate effect, they warned, would be to reduce the combat capability of the armed forces by diluting the existing level of military experience. They urged that the equity policy be reconsidered.15
The mouse finally brought forth by these labors early in November—NSC 5420/2—was a lengthened military obligation for young non-veterans volunteering for service in the reserves, which, together with other restrictions and burdens, was intended to offset the lure of suspended liability to the draft. The volunteer, if under 19 years of age and not yet summoned, would have two options: an 8-year military obligation with concurrent liability to induction for at least 2 years of active service, or a 10-year obligation with the active service liability suspended subject to satisfactory participation. In an emergency all reservists could of course be called up. The 10-year volunteers would begin their service with recruit training for at least six months, for which they would be paid only $30 per month, and they would not be entitled to veterans’ benefits after completing their obligated service. The planners evidently hoped that volunteer reservists choosing this option would spend the entire remaining nine years of their service in the service callable reserve. But pressure from the Adler Commission and Selective Service during the final week before the NSC presentation led to the inclusion of provisions for intensified training that would allow reservists to serve out as much as their last two years, free of training obligations, in the selectively callable reserve. The 10-year option would be offered only by the Army, Marine Corps, and National Guard; volunteers for the Navy or Air Force reserves were limited to the 8-year option, which was also acceptable to the other services.\textsuperscript{16}

NSC 5420/2 stressed that the secretary of defense would prescribe quotas and conditions for acceptance of volunteers for the 10-year option and that the draft could be invoked if quotas were not filled. But it did not state how many trainees were expected or needed. During the week or two preceding the NSC presentation, this question, along with some larger ones, evidently provoked hot debate in OSD. The Army was the only service that needed significant numbers of nonveteran trainees in its reserves, including the National Guard; the Marine Corps would take a few, but it relied mainly on three-year active duty enlistees. The other services were either lukewarm or hostile, fearing competition with their recruitment programs. From outside DoD, however, OSD planners came under countervailing pressure from the Adler Commission and the Selective Service System. Generals Adler and McLain of the NSTC told Assistant Secretary Burgess, when he cautiously suggested a token figure of 50,000 trainees, that this was not nearly enough. \textit{20th Century Minutemen} had proposed to start with double that number, to double that in the second year, and perhaps continue to increase thereafter. Burgess settled on 100,000 as a starting figure and for each of the remaining three years the
program was projected to run. This was only two-thirds of the number the Army alone expected to require in the third year and only half of that proposed by the Wensinger task force. Approved as an estimate for costing purposes, this figure was written into NSC 5420/3, the abbreviated paper reviewed by the NSC on 15 November.17

In the NSC Burgess defended his decision with such vigor as to suggest that a larger issue was involved, as was indeed so. The Defense leadership had clearly decided to put its money on veterans rather than nonveterans. Burgess argued that a flow of 100,000 men per year out of the manpower pool through six months of initial training and into the reserves would be just enough, and not too many, when added to those inducted and enlisted directly into the armed forces, to “insure the equitable principle that everyone participate in military service.” To dump a larger number of ill-trained men into the reserves every year could seriously weaken the whole force.18

Consistent with this emphasis, the reserve plan ultimately sent to the NSC did not constitute an unqualified triumph for the principle of equity. As a declaratory ideal it was, indeed, now enshrined as an “objective” in NSC 5420/3, but on the same footing as, not above, national security considerations. The more specific issue of equity for veterans was compromised in the final version: combat veterans would have first consideration for transfer to the standby reserve, but virtually all others would have to serve for several years (two to six) in the ready reserve; only five-year men could go into standby status immediately after completing active service. This ensured that for the full term of the plan the ready reserve would be manned, in the main, by veterans.19

In the press conference on 17 December that unveiled the new reserve program to the public, Assistant Secretary Burgess drew unkind laughter from reporters when he admitted that the term “combat veteran” was “subject to definition” (by the services). In effect, the “price” paid by DoD for a reserve program that in most respects hewed fairly closely to the line drawn by the Wensinger task force—especially in its heavy reliance on veterans to man the first-line defense in an emergency—was a vague commitment to some form of universal military service, which the phrase “equitable sharing of military obligation” was widely assumed to mean. DoD officials in fact resisted the assumption, fearing (prophetically) that the unpopularity of “UMT” in Congress and with the public would wreck the program’s chance of acceptance. But their arguments smacked of quibbling.20

Granting, however, that universal military service of some kind was the purported aim, would the program in fact fulfill it? The asserted
automaticity of the system that was supposed to ensure that no physically fit male would escape the net raised the eyebrows of natural skeptics who knew anything about the complexity and dynamics of population growth. In mid-December, as the program was being unveiled, the president's decision to accelerate the reduction of the active forces by mid-1956 to 2,815,000 undermined the basic arithmetic of the program. Caught off guard at their 17 December press conference, Wilson and Burgess floundered and finally stonewalled questions that the president, two days earlier, had told reporters to save for them. The implications seemed clear enough. A conservative projection of the effects of the reduction in military manpower requirements showed that as early as 1957 the expanding pool of eligible manpower would burst through the 1,000,000-man ceiling—the level that had been projected as necessary to ensure that all males eligible for military service served either in the reserves or with the active-duty military.

Worst-case projections were even more alarming. There was also good reason to doubt whether the manpower pool ceiling of one million, even while it held, would in fact keep the average age of induction low enough to prevent growing numbers of men from reaching the magic age of 27, when they would no longer be exposed to the draft. Because inductions were from the top age down, older men were drafted before younger ones, but most enlistees came from the "bottom," thus raising the average age of those who remained in the pool. At the beginning of 1955 the average age of induction was over 21 and apparently rising. Beyond 1959, as DoD spokesmen insisted in every briefing, forecasts were too speculative to be worth much; military manpower needs were hardly more than guesses. 21

After December Defense spokesmen stopped asserting that the system would ensure that no one except the physically unfit escaped service. The president's special message on 13 January 1955 submitting the new reserve plan and requesting implementing legislation said little about equity and nothing at all about universal service. The plan's paramount aim, Eisenhower declared, was to provide strengthened reserve forces capable of augmenting the active force in an emergency "with the least possible disruptive impact on the life of the individual citizen and the civilian economy," and relying "as heavily as possible on voluntary service." New legislation was also requested to authorize the states to create organized militia in peacetime to replace federalized National Guard units.

* Projections for the manpower pool had covered a wide range but the figure of one million had been generally accepted as a goal.
for civil defense and other domestic missions in time of war. The equity theme surfaced only at the end of the message. Each young man, the president summed up, would be offered several choices for meeting his military obligations—"the maximum possible right of self-determination." The plan also aimed at a "more equitable sharing" of those obligations by giving reservists who had seen combat service some assurance that in an emergency they would not be called ahead of men who had not. Thus in some measure one of the glaring inequities of the Korean War mobilization would be avoided. About the corollary inequity of that period and its possible recurrence—that many had lived through their years of vulnerability without serving at all—the president had nothing to say. 22

As the time drew near for the House hearings, OSD mounted a vigorous campaign to mobilize support both within and outside the defense community in order to present a united front to the legislators. In the end all of the service military chiefs dutifully endorsed the National Reserve Plan but with notable lack of fervor, most conspicuously in the Air Force. As Wilson sardonically told the House subcommittee, "the services have varying degrees of enthusiasm over [the plan]." 23 Considering the buzz-saw awaiting the plan on Capitol Hill, its limp endorsement by the military may not have significantly affected its already dismal prospects, but administration leaders were taking no chances. The president made it clear that he expected all cabinet officials to issue public statements of support for the reserve plan, and Secretary Wilson "invited" similar statements from his own hierarchy and the military services. 24

The new military reserve plan announced by the president on 13 January 1955 was part of a package of three DoD legislative bills submitted to Congress on the 21st. The other two provided for a four-year extension of the Selective Service Act drafting young men for two years of active service and a two-year extension of the doctors' and dentists' draft. Both were due to expire on 30 June. The three-way split had been dictated by the new Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Carl Vinson of Georgia, who intended to assign each bill to a separate subcommittee—a decision viewed with misgivings by several members of the corresponding Senate body as well as veterans' groups, who regarded the draft extensions as inseparable from the reserve plan. As a matter of tactics, separate treatment of the former, which was expected to encounter little opposition, seemed likely to weaken the chances of the latter. 25

The administration had ample reason to expect that the reserve plan would run into trouble on the Hill. After its announcement in December, legislators of both parties had warned that the bill would get a thorough working-over in both houses. Moreover, the now dominant Democrats
could be counted on to exploit it for whatever political gains it might yield. Service partisans in Congress naturally reflected the attitudes, ranging from tepid support to antipathy, evident in the services themselves; the various rival systems proposed over the past year by the NSTC, Selective Service, and veterans’ groups similarly had their supporters on the Hill. The most obvious obstacle to passage of the reserve bill was the UMT label which, despite insistent denials by administration spokesmen, was invariably attached to it. Rightly or wrongly, almost all legislators assumed that the American people remained overwhelmingly hostile to universal military training in any form or degree. Numerous members of both houses, notably Rep. Dewey Short (Mo.), senior Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, were already on record as opposed to the reserve plan for this reason, and congressional supporters of UMT were pessimistic about its chances. This mindset posed a no-win problem for promoters of the plan. Universality of military obligation had, after all, been written into the plan at the explicit direction of the president. Supporters could hardly be expected to argue that it was only a theory, which would in a few years be wiped out by the rising flood of surplus manpower.26

The House: Trainees and Race

In the House the reserve forces subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Overton Brooks (D-La.), seemed in no hurry to act on the reserve plan. Hearings droned on through February and into March while the press reported a steady stream of endorsements by government officials responding to the president’s order. Several alternative plans surfaced.27 On 6 March 1955 two members of the subcommittee, a Democrat and a Republican, predicted on national radio that Congress would scrap the administration’s plan and write its own; specifically, they criticized the uncertainties facing young men approaching draft age, the 10-year obligation of volunteers for six months of training, and the small number to be admitted in the program. Four days later, as predicted, the subcommittee announced that it had rejected the government plan and started to draft another, more “voluntary” one, purged of any taint of universal military training and with reduced compulsion.28

Working fast, the subcommittee had a draft ready by 18 March and invited further DoD testimony. As promised, it removed some of the compulsion in the administration plan, but the drafters had also kept in mind the asserted need for a guaranteed three million ready reservists by 1959. The six-month training program would be wholly voluntary, with
no standby power to draft if quotas were not filled, and the major penalty in the administration plan—less than honorable discharge and loss of benefits for reservists who shirked prescribed training—was eliminated. Instead, they might be called back to active duty for 45 days and, if they continued in noncompliance, face a court-martial. In addition, exemption from required reserve training was extended to all veterans who had seen active service before the official end of the Korean War, and all ready reservists would have a choice of either weekly drills plus two weeks of summer camp or 30 days of summer camp. Instead of a fixed quota of 100,000, up to 250,000 would be accepted for six months of training in the first year and their pay was raised from $30 to $50 a month. The required term of service, active and reserve, went down from 10 to 8 years, with provision for proportionate reduction of the training requirement by additional increments of active duty. 29

As the hearings proceeded, the debate focused on the trainee-draft issue and a proposal to give the president authority to call up as many as 750,000 ready reservists for active duty in a limited emergency, without consulting Congress. Split on these two points, the subcommittee passed the buck to the full committee, while approving the remainder of the bill, including a provision giving the NSTC custody of the "health and welfare" of the volunteer trainees—in order, as Rep. Victor Wickersham (D-Okla.) put it, to protect them from "liquor and lewd women." By mid-April, however, the political climate—or at least expectations of it—had changed. Subcommittee Chairman Brooks and Vinson, chairman of the full committee, both predicted that the members would reject the trainee draft, presumably on the basis of their individual appraisals of how the bill was likely to fare when it reached the floor of the House. Public pressure was mounting, with growing agitation by pacifist and religious opponents of conscription and UMT. On the 27th, Secretary Wilson dissipated what uncertainty remained regarding the fate of the bill's key provision by telling the committee that, although the administration had not changed its mind on the trainee draft, "it doesn't ruin the bill if you go the other way." The next day the Armed Services Committee voted 31 to 5 to send the bill to the House floor, with authority for the president to call up a million ready reservists without consulting Congress but without power to draft youths for the six-month training plan. As Vinson had promised earlier that month, the bill now did not have a single "line of UMT in it." 30

On 17 May the bill finally came up for debate on the House floor. Its opponents, mobilized by Representative Short, held the floor for most of the day, stressing objections to the penalties remaining in the bill. Short contended that offering the six-month training option to escape the draft
was comparable to "offering an Ozark jackass an ear of corn in order to get the critter close enough to slip a halter over his head." Supporters of the bill, mostly Democrats, counterattacked the following day.31

The bill seemed headed toward passage when Adam Clayton Powell, Democratic congressman from Harlem, and one of three blacks in the House, introduced an amendment to prohibit assignment of reservists to racially segregated National Guard or reserve units, which, he noted, could be found in some 21 states. After a brief startled rejoinder by Subcommittee Chairman Brooks, the amendment passed on a standing vote of 126 to 87. Whatever Powell's primary motive, the effect was to align some 70 southern Democrats, who had previously formed an almost solid block supporting the bill, just as solidly against it. Acting quickly, Vinson moved and won an adjournment for the night. After conferring with White House and Pentagon officials, he tried a new maneuver the next day, offering an amendment that eliminated from the bill the language to which Powell had objected and Powell's own amendment as well as some of the remaining elements of compulsion. The maneuver failed. Opponents of the bill were not won over and joined northern civil rightsists in an improbable alliance to smother the Vinson amendment. Smelling victory, opponents clamored for continued debate and a vote on the bill itself. Vinson, showing the parliamentary agility he had developed over almost 42 years in the House, saved the bill from imminent defeat by moving that it "go back to the Speaker's table" until recalled for further consideration. His motion carried, but his action left the bill in a coma from which House leaders and knowledgeable observers had little hope of soon arousing it. A few days later Rep. Joseph Martin, the minority leader, predicted that the House would eventually pass some version of the reserve bill, but other members considered it dead until the next session. The Senate also seemed disinclined to pick up the ball. If the House could not agree on a bill, said Sen. Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic leader, "the Senate is not going to march up the hill and down again."32

The setback to the reserve bill, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory, spurred President Eisenhower to quick action. On 8 June, immediately after a meeting with Republican legislative leaders, he came to his regular news conference primed to speak his mind. The reserve bill was vital, he declared in answer to a question, and if the House could not get it out promptly, then he "most urgently" hoped that the Senate could "do something about it." He characterized Powell's anti-segregation amendment as "extraneous" and the attempt to make vital national security legislation hostage to it as selfish and "erroneous," particularly in view of his administration's good civil rights record. The reserve bill, even
though somewhat weakened by changes, still "represented a tremendous advance" and was "terrifically important" in providing trained, disciplined manpower ready and available everywhere in the country to maintain order and prevent panic in a major emergency, to flesh out the National Guard, to relieve veterans who had already served in war from the double jeopardy of being called again. He put down the idea, already bruited about, that beefing up the active forces might be a practicable alternative to having a reserve. "No increase in the Armed Forces, active forces, of a logical size," he declared, "could possibly compensate for not having a reserve. We must have it." Perhaps the strongest plea he had made for any legislation since becoming president, his message was heard by millions over radio and television. A few days later the president made another, more dramatic plea during a radio broadcast from his secret underground "Pentagon," winding up Operation Alert, a nationwide civil defense exercise. Appealing candidly over Congress's head for public support of the bogged-down reserve bill, he declared, "This matter is so important we cannot possibly allow any extraneous matter of any kind to impede progress of the bills through Congress .... This is no place to attach social, political or any other kind of legislation. This . . . is completely non-partisan. It must be done for the security and safety of the United States and its 165 million people."^33

The Harlem congressman's response to the president's rebuke was prompt and characteristically defiant. In a half-hour speech to the House on the day following the president's news conference, Powell asserted he would "not retreat one inch" from his amendments and was in fact prepared to offer another one to tie up the school construction bill by barring federal grants to any state that violated the Supreme Court's ruling against segregation in public schools. He had found, he said, that such "riders" provided the only practical way to get legislators' attention on civil rights matters, since "road blocks" built into the process made it impossible to bring the issue before Congress on its merits.\^34

In the next several days Armed Services Committee Chairman Vinson evidently brought to consummation backstage committee maneuvers aimed at breaking the logjam. On 17 June he announced, and a few days later held up for public view, a watered-down version of the reserve bill calculated to win over most of the objectors. Among those persuaded was Powell, who gleefully called the new version "a complete victory for me" and even claimed authorship of its key feature, the simple elimination of all provisions pertaining to the National Guard—thus bypassing the segregation issue. Vinson had also eliminated the six-month voluntary training period, reduced the total military obligation from eight to six
years (five to be served in active and ready reserve status), and eliminated the president's authority to call up reservists without consulting Congress. Vinson retained the exemption of Korean War veterans from training obligations, the original House bill's mechanisms for enforcing reserve training, and the administration's ready reserve manpower goal of 2.9 million men, which he felt confident could be attained under his bill.35

Vinson's bill was obviously designed to win House votes, not to please the White House or the Pentagon, neither of which had been consulted. The president promptly let it be known that he was not pleased and would try to have the bill amended on the House floor if it got that far. This was problematical since it turned out that the chairman had also failed to consult his own committee, particularly the Brooks subcommittee charged with handling reserve legislation, and affronted it further by demanding that the full committee consider and approve the bill immediately (on 21 June) so that the House leadership could pass it on the 23d. The subcommittee rebelled. Brooks complained angrily that Vinson's action was a "rebuke" to the subcommittee, and Rep. James Van Zandt (R-Pa.), "sick and tired of Vinson running the show," successfully moved that the bill be referred to the subcommittee for five days of hearings and study.36

Wasting no time, the subcommittee reported its revised version the next day, following hurried discussions with DoD officials the night before. On the key issues it leaned back toward administration views, as Vinson's version had leaned away from them. In effect, volunteers would be offered a contract providing for six months' training followed by 7½ years in the ready reserve, with draft deferment as long as they kept up their reserve training. Like Vinson's bill, and without objection by Defense officials, the subcommittee's version tried to skirt the segregation pitfall by avoiding all mention of the National Guard. By now, however, Powell had had second thoughts. He had already telegraphed the president urging reconsideration of a long dormant bill to abolish segregation in the National Guard, although he was not inclined to introduce his original amendments again when the new reserve bill reached the House floor. When the president, unchastened by Powell's earlier rebuff, asked him to refrain—"it is a fact of history that no legislation, however meritorious, containing such a provision has ever passed the Senate"—the congressman's hackles rose again. Calling a press conference, he charged that the president had "bowed to the will of a minority" and vowed that the anti-segregation amendments would be introduced—definitely for the school construction and housing bills and maybe for the reserve bill as well.37
But by late June more than a month had passed since Powell had introduced his original amendments. Many members who had supported him then had now changed positions after their own assessment of the impact of the president's sharp public rebuke of the New York congressman for attempting to give an "extraneous" civil rights measure a free ride on the back of a bill vital to the nation's security. Among them were Vinson, who now took over full management of the revised version, and, more remarkably, Dewey Short. Both were among the 29 members of the committee who approved the bill on 28 June and sent it to the House floor for what Vinson vowed would be a "show-down" vote to "defeat the efforts of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People" to compel an end to segregation in the National Guard. The next day President Eisenhower found an opportunity during his news conference for a final thrust. Dodging a barbed question about whether a Republican-controlled House would have been more likely to pass an anti-segregation amendment, he answered: "All I have ever said on that is that I would like to see one bill, which is so terrifically important to the United States, be handled specifically on its own merits and without the introduction of any other kind of matter, no matter how desirable."

Two days later, on 1 July, Powell submitted his amendment as promised, and the House beat it down by a vote of 156 to 105. Before the vote Powell made a long speech, calling the president a "great and good man" who "has been and is now being used by a distinct minority." Vinson retorted that the amendment was irrelevant to the bill as then written and was "purely and simply a method of attaining a political goal of the National Association of Colored People." The bill's managers did not attempt to engineer reversal of the approval by an overwhelming voice vote of an amendment providing that young men volunteering for reserve service must either have reached the age of 19 or have graduated from high school. With amendments disposed of, the House rejected a motion to send the bill back to committee, then on a voice vote shouted approval of the bill—thus leaving individual members safely anonymous against any future attempt to disinter the dead past. "A good strong bill," Vinson applauded, "the kind the President wants."

*Senate: Further Compromise*

The kind of bill the president really wanted was, of course, the one he had submitted in January, now shelved and gathering dust in the House Armed Services Committee. Whether the administration had a formulated strategy of accepting with good grace the weakened version
passed by the House in hopes of improving on it later in the Senate is not clear, but it hardly mattered. No sooner had the battered bill emerged from the House than it became evident that, far from recouping its fortunes in the Senate, the administration would do well to keep even the meager remnants the House had left it. The first warning came on the morrow of the House passage, when Sen. Richard Russell, Vinson's counterpart in that body and, like him, a Georgia Democrat, announced that he wanted to make at least one major change. No veteran of 1 1/2 years' active service or more, he said, should have to undergo the drudgery of weekly reserve drills and summer camp, as long as other young men were available who had had no training. All regular draftees and enlistees, not merely men who had served during the Korean War and earlier, should pass directly from active service into the standby reserve and be liable to recall by Congress only in a major emergency. A week later Russell followed up with a proposal to offer enlisted men and non-commissioned officers leaving active service a $400 bonus as an inducement to sign up for three years of part-time training with combat units of the Army and Marine Corps reserves, the only services, he argued, that had reserve manpower difficulties.

Worried that Russell's changes would result in an even weaker bill than the one passed by the House, administration strategists evidently decided on an all-out effort to go for a tough bill. They had little time. The chairman had scheduled only three days of hearings, ending on 11 July, and hoped to get a revised bill to the floor later that week. His own version of the bill seemed to be gathering support. Within a few days several leading members and probably a majority of the committee lined up behind his voluntary service and bonus-incentive proposals. The Pentagon mobilized its heavy artillery for the 11th, with a parade of high-ranking witnesses and a full-dress presentation by Assistant Secretary Burgess rivaling the one given the National Security Council the previous November.

Burgess methodically rated the bill, point by point, as attaining or not attaining the objectives of the president's original plan, and in so doing was able to shift the focus of debate back to the latter, away from the competing proposals of the legislators. Whether or not he changed any minds in the process, it was a psychologically effective tactic, since it forced his hearers individually to view their own preferred proposals in the context of the original model, where the legislative alternatives might reveal defects not apparent in the more familiar debating environment of the past few months. Burgess's task was complex in that, while supporting the House bill in general, Defense wanted it changed in
important particulars—especially restoration of the eight-year military obligation—and also hoped to bar the Russell amendments, which would squeeze out most of what little compulsion remained in the bill and put the whole program largely on a voluntary, bonus-incentive basis. The six-year obligation would seriously slow the buildup of both ready and standby reserves and was shorter than the service terms of NATO countries. Defense also wanted the original age qualifications for the six-month program—17-18½—reinstated.42

Burgess spent some time on the National Guard, not even mentioned in the House bill. Under existing law, which would govern, men in the 17 to 18½ age bracket could enlist in the Guard with draft liability to age 28 and deferment contingent on satisfactory participation. The issue for the services here was the absence of any requirement for basic training, or even provision for voluntary training with incentives. (The Army and the Air Force currently operated limited voluntary training programs.) As a consequence, 7 out of 10 enlisted men in the Guard had received no basic training, which meant that a large proportion of the strength of Guard divisions slated to go overseas in an emergency would not be qualified for early deployment—a situation aggravated by a 30 percent turnover rate in the enlisted ranks. Burgess alluded bitterly to the recent testimony of the National Guard Association that it was content with the Guard's voluntary status. Adequate basic training was the paramount need. DoD held that all reserve components should observe the same minimum standards of initial training. In short, apply the six-month initial training requirement to membership in the Guard.43

The Senate hearings on 11 July were the swan song for the president's reserve plan, sung to a less than enraptured audience. Most of the committee members reacted coolly or not at all to Burgess's plea for retention of the compulsory features of the House bill. Russell, viewing these as a bludgeon with which the Pentagon would force young veterans, who had already paid their dues, to pay again with several years of part-time training and liability to first call in a limited emergency, offered one small concession: compulsion might be applied but only to the subsequent reserve duty of men who entered active service, as volunteers or enlistees, starting 30 days after the reserve bill became law.

Wasting no time and evidently with little debate, the Armed Services Committee two days later reported out a revised bill that the chairman sardonically labeled a "compromise between what the Administration wanted and nothing." Actually, it included one major concession to administration wishes—restoration of the eight-year obligation—along with a number of compromises. Compulsory reserve duty was retained but, as
Russell had proposed, only for men who would enter active service 30 days or more after enactment of the bill; all others (except direct-enlistment reservists) would be exempted from the training requirement. To bridge the two-year gap between the enactment date plus 30 and the time when men then entering active service would begin to leave it, the committee's revised bill provided that men discharged after 18 months or more of active duty in Army or Marine Corps combat units would be offered in the interim a bonus equivalent to two months' pay if they signed up for three years' reserve duty with those services, subject to acceptance. As "post-enactment" men completed their active duty, they would enter the ready reserve for one to three years depending on the length of their active service, for a total of five years including the latter—followed by three more in the standby reserve.44

The duration of the training was also made flexible, from three to six months, at the discretion of the secretary of defense. As in the House bill, volunteers would be paid $50 a month while in training and would spend 7 1/2 more years in the reserves. The senators replaced the annual ceiling of 250,000 for this program with a provision for annual determination by Congress through the appropriation mechanism. As in the House bill, direct enlistment in both the regular reserves and the National Guard, with draft deferment to age 28 and no requirement for basic training, was restricted to youths between 17 and 18 1/2. To encourage Guardsmen to take basic training, however, the revised bill provided that they could reduce their total obligation to 8 years (instead of serving until age 28, which would impose a total of 11 years upon a 17-year-old enlistee) by volunteering for a three-month regular Army or Marine Corps basic training course. The committee again skirted the segregation pitfall by prohibiting the transfer of six-month trainees to the National Guard, while permitting them to switch to regular reserve units.45

Conference: The National Reserve Plan

When the conference of the House and Senate convened on 20-21 July, the senators had their way, mostly, on the beginning date for inauguration of compulsory reserve training, but they yielded to the House members on the issues of duration of the military obligation and use of bonus incentives. The conferees agreed that any person who entered active service before the effective date of the act would not be required to participate in reserve training following his discharge—although he would remain liable to recall to active duty in an emergency. Also, "in all fairness," as Brooks explained to the House, he would incur the full eight-year
military obligation. The man entering service after the enactment date, who would be required to participate in ready reserve training, would incur only a six-year obligation. The conferees also scrapped what remained of Russell's bonus plan. Facing the question of how to keep men flowing into the reserves during the two-year gap before inauguration of compulsory training, they devised two new incentive schemes. Until 1 July 1955, draftees or enlistees (who had entered service before enactment) after completing at least 12 months of active service could be transferred immediately to the ready reserve if they agreed to participate in training for three more years or less, as necessary, to complete a total of four years of combined active duty and reserve training. Or, those who preferred to reduce their reserve service could complete their full stint of active duty and then enlist for only one year of training in the ready reserve. In both instances, the reservists would then be transferred to the standby reserve to sit out the remaining time of their eight-year military obligation. Brooks believed that the programs would funnel 700,000 into the ready reserve during the next two years. These would be prior service volunteers, Brooks reminded the congressmen, "the backbone of the Reserve." Added to the 800,000-plus already training, said Brooks, these new reservists would make a substantial advance toward the 2,900,000 goal for 1959.46

Russell, less upbeat after watching his pet bonus plan die, pointed out that the president's goal probably would not be attained until 1961 or 1962. "We now have a workable bill, and this is as far as we can go at this time." His counterpart in the "other body," Carl Vinson, evidently feeling that the House had come out on top in the compromise, pronounced it a "very fine bill" that would challenge the Pentagon to build a strong reserve. For many, perhaps most, House members, Dewey Short defined what made the conference measure a fine bill. "There is by no stretch of the imagination," he declaimed on the House floor, "a side-door, front-door, back-door, top-door, or bottom-door way to call this a universal military training act. There is no compulsion; it is wholly voluntary."47

On 25 July the House passed the revised bill on a roll call vote of 315 to 78, with a remarkably even party split on both sides: 169 Democrats joined 146 Republicans to pass the bill, swamping 38 Democrats and 40 Republicans opposing. Next day the Senate followed suit, but by voice vote. Outside the legislative halls hardly an utterance was heard in favor of the bill, but no one seemed to believe that a better one could have been achieved. It was, in short, the classic compromise. As expected, Wilson advised the president to sign; his soothing letter emphasized the
bill's good points. Eisenhower took the advice but was not soothed. Clearly unhappy with the bill, he conceded in his public statement a week later that it would "strengthen the Reserve structure"; it nevertheless fell well short of what he had requested in January. He acknowledged as much by dwelling on the bill's deficiencies.48

As 1955 wound down, House Armed Services Committee members were talking of summoning DoD officials for an accounting soon after Congress returned. Some openly suspected the Pentagon of dragging its feet with the new program, as it had with reserve programs in the past, in order to pressure Congress into granting authority to draft men into the reserve. Burgess, clearly worried over the dwindling flow of volunteers, insisted the Pentagon had not given up and that the real test would come in the spring. Six months later, 30 June 1956, the picture had not improved. In the bellwether Army program, since the preceding August only 13,000 had volunteered for the six-year enlistment (two years active, three years ready, one year standby) and only 27,000 in the more attractive eight-year draft-deferred program (six months active, 7 1/2 years ready)—against a goal of 90,000 enlistments for the period. Almost 2 million names were on the Army's ready reserve rolls, but fewer than 200,000 of them represented men actually in training; the corresponding figures a year earlier had been 1.6 million and 163,000. In other words, the new system, like the old one, was actually training only 10 percent of the paper ready reserve. On paper the total strength of the Army's ready reserve had soared far above its goal of 1 million, but the 197,000 men actually in training were 71 percent short of the reserve plan goal of 690,000. By contrast, the National Guard was getting along nicely under its traditionally relaxed system with nearly all of its 420,000 registered members actually participating in training.49

This chapter in the history of American military reserve policy followed a familiar pattern and had a familiar ending that reflected the experience of both past and future administrations. Powerful political, economic, and social factors influenced the judgment of the nation's lawmakers and significantly shaped the legislative debate on an issue of great sensitivity. Eisenhower and the Department of Defense had to contend with these influences in trying to develop and secure passage of reserve legislation. Successor administrations encountered the same tensions and tradeoffs and had to settle for less-than-desired results. The inevitable outcome was periodic compromise that was not to the satisfaction of DoD, particularly the Army, which relied most heavily on reserve forces and was the most affected of the military services by the failure to come to grips with this chronic long-term problem.
CHAPTER XIX

Surprise Attack and Nuclear Parity

The need to revisit the great strategic policy issues of the time occurred frequently during the early years of the New Look. Completion on 14 February 1955 of the Killian panel’s report, “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,” opened a new chapter in the evolution of basic security policy.¹ NSC 5501 had been completed on 7 January, a little more than a month before,² but the new arrival challenged much of the thinking in that document and would command the attention of war and strategy planners for most of the year.

Alarm Bells

The Killian panel, officially the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP), numbered 42 professional members, almost all distinguished scientists or administrators,³ whose 190-page report demonstrated a deep, clear, and fresh grasp of its immensely complex subject. An opening summary stressed the effect of the thermonuclear weapon revolution in magnifying the rewards of surprise to an attacker and, for the defender, the penalties of mistakes, miscalculations, or lapses in alertness. “The possible

¹ The steering committee comprised, besides Killian (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and the deputy director, James Fisk (Bell Telephone Laboratories): three project directors—Marshall G. Holloway of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (nuclear strike power), Leland J. Haworth of Brookhaven National Laboratory (continental defense), and Edwin H. Land of Polaroid Corp. (intelligence); three at-large members—Lee A. DuBridge (California Institute of Technology), James H. Doolittle (Shell Oil Co.), and James P. Baxter (Williams College); and one of the special consultants, Robert C. Sprague (Sprague Electric Co.). The panel was served by a military advisory committee consisting of Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer (Army), Rear Adm. Harry D. Felt (Navy), and Brig. Gen. Bruce K. Holloway (Air Force).
penalty of inadequate dispersal or for a failure of strategic intelligence or early warning looms as portentous as an atomic cloud.” A 10-megaton bomb dropped on Washington might cause 1.3 million casualties. “For the first time in history, a striking force could have such power that the first battle could be the final battle, the first punch a knockout.” The Russians were known to have tested a bomb of approximately one-megaton yield; they were also producing plutonium and uranium-235. Soviet Tu-4 bombers on one-way missions could reach most targets in the United States; with refueling, all of them. The Soviets also had a large fleet of oceangoing submarines capable of reaching U.S. harbors, and they could infiltrate nuclear weapons, or parts thereof, into the country in many different ways. Considering an air attack alone, against the 50 or so critical U.S. targets, the Killian panel believed that “200 nuclear bombs of megaton and kiloton yield, if delivered on selected targets with practical accuracy, could decisively defeat us, and that a first attack could be fatal if we were surprised and unprepared. Indeed, two hundred or more bombs of kiloton yield delivered on target, while not decisive, could be devastating if not catastrophic.”

This conclusion rested in part on serious observed flaws in the nation’s capacity to blunt an attack at the source. The most obvious U.S. weakness was the extreme vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command to even a small-scale surprise attack, owing to a high concentration of bombers on a small number of ill-defended bases. Apart from expansion of the base system, the panel looked to the development of lightweight thermonuclear weapons for carrier-borne and other small aircraft to expand nuclear strike capabilities. High-energy fuels could reduce dependence on overseas bases and tankers, and ultimately ballistic missiles might eliminate it altogether.

More serious were the weaknesses in continental defenses. While applauding the creation of the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) and all the measures already taken and under way to improve capabilities, the panel found the defense system as a whole still “embryonic,” still far short of “being planned as an integrated entity.” Numerically and qualitatively deficient, the defenses “could be avoided or overwhelmed and might even be unaware of an attack until the first bomb exploded. Under these circumstances our cities could suffer millions of casualties and crippling damage, and enough SAC bombers and bases could be destroyed to reduce drastically our ability to retaliate.” In short, the panel declared, the country was “at present unacceptably vulnerable to surprise attack.” And the threat would continue.

Although nuclear striking power and continental defense were the primary focus of the Killian panel’s report, it urged immediate study of how
thermonuclear weapons, especially radioactive fallout from them, would affect protecting the population and maintaining civil order under air attack, and it expressed concern over the concentration of civilian supporting industries in critical target areas. The report stressed enemy capabilities to conceal, confuse, and invert the indicators relied on for strategic warning of an impending attack, i.e., before it was actually launched. For the most part, however, this portion of the report was optimistic, full of wide-eyed descriptions of ingenious applications of advanced technology to the complex art of determining what the other side was up to. 7

The Killian Timetable

The panel's conclusions as to the long-term implications of the twin vulnerabilities of offensive and defensive systems were set forth in a timetable projecting changes in the relative military strength of the two superpowers. The "Killian Timetable" was a modified and more elaborate version of the one Robert Sprague had presented to the NSC in November 1954. (His position as a special consultant on the panel creates a plausible presumption that he was its author.) The timetable, like Sprague's, listed four periods. Period I, already in progress, was characterized by American superiority in air-atomic power but accompanied by a dangerously weak air defense system which left the United States vulnerable to surprise attack. Consequently, neither power could yet decisively injure the other, although either side might inflict massive damage, and a sustained U.S. air offensive would probably be decisive in a general war. 8

Sometime in 1956-57 this period would give way to Period II, as the United States amassed enough multimegaton bombs along with improved delivery means to decisively damage the Soviet homeland. Improved Soviet delivery capability, despite improvement in American defenses, would leave the United States still vulnerable to surprise attack but able to "emerge a battered victor" in the ensuing war. This period of American superiority would probably end sometime in 1958-60 as the Soviets acquired their own significant multimegaton and jet bomber capability.

Soviet testing of a true multimegaton weapon would signal the start of Period III, although American superiority, assuming continued improvement of thermonuclear, delivery, and defense capabilities, would remain decisive until the Soviets had actually amassed a stockpile of thermonuclear bombs and possessed an assured means of delivering them. Overall American superiority at the beginning could be reversed overnight (from Period IIIA to Period IIIB) if Soviet progress in attack capability should overtake American progress in continental defense, giving the
Soviets the ability in a surprise attack of overwhelming American defenses and crippling the retaliatory forces. "This situation," the panel warned, "might develop as early as 1958."

Period III would eventually yield to a nightmarish Period IV, when each side would possess the means of obliterating the other by saturating attacks of thermonuclear weapons, including intercontinental ballistic missiles. Whichever power acquired this monstrous capability first would thereby gain a major, if temporary, advantage, giving it an even more assured means of destroying the other. "Period IV is so fraught with danger to the U.S. that we should push all promising technological development so that we may stay in Periods II and IIIA as long as possible." Because the post-1960 vista looked so bleak, the panel believed that the late fifties (Period II), since "our military superiority may never be so great again," offered a now-or-never opportunity for a major diplomatic and political effort to exercise the threat of war with the Soviet Union, but it did not specify how.9

The panel thus restated a perennial question: how to make hay in responding to the Soviet threat while the sun of American military superiority was still shining. The unspoken assumption was that military superiority provided an effective lever for persuading the Soviets to reach an acceptable accommodation. Once American superiority had waned or disappeared, so too would the possibility of accommodation. That a situation of mutual deterrence in an era of nuclear plenty might prove more propitious for an accommodation was alien to this line of reasoning, if only because the kind of accommodation the planners had in mind was probably not the kind the Soviets could accept, given equality of bargaining power. Still, NSC 5501, approved over strong objections from the Joint Chiefs and most of the DoD leadership (other than Wilson), rejected preemptive war and accepted as facts of life continuing cold war, persisting threats of limited war and "creeping" Communist expansion, and further growth of Soviet air-atomic power.

The Joint Chiefs had less confidence than the Killian panel in the predicted inability of the Soviets to mount a decisive attack during the so-called Period II. Unless U.S. defenses improved more rapidly than seemed likely, the chiefs believed it dangerous to assume that the Soviets would be unable to break through and inflict crippling damage. Otherwise, the Joint Chiefs readily went along with most of the panel's recommendations—which, in most cases, they said were already being implemented.10

Killian and his steering committee presented an extensive briefing to the National Security Council on 17 March. The NSC staff then assigned the report's 15 general and 90 specific recommendations to concerned departments and agencies for study and responses by 15 May. At least half
of the recommendations addressed continental defense; about 16, nuclear striking power; most of the remainder, intelligence and communications. DoD wound up with primary responsibility for about 50 and a secondary interest in another 20.\textsuperscript{11} Almost a month before the NSC meeting, OSD had sent copies of the report to the military departments and asked for comments, recommendations, and cost estimates. These were to be sent to Assistant Secretary Quarles and combined into a single DoD reply before the NSC-imposed deadline.\textsuperscript{12}

McNeil's office, already working on cost estimates, found that the preliminary figures submitted unilaterally by the services added up to a mind-boggling total of $19 billion over the next five years, about $1.4 billion of it for research and development. The estimates were riddled with duplication and guesswork, particularly for the last three of the five years. McNeil recommended that the future year estimates be ignored for the present, and his staff whittled down the totals for FY 1956 and FY 1957 from $5.5 billion to a more reasonable $3.9 billion. In the end it was decided to shelve the pricing exercise altogether for the present and ask Congress only for modest increases in the secretary's emergency research funds and transfer authority.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Continental Defense on Trial}

In the midst of the activity generated by the Killian panel report, there appeared alarming news from Western reporters and diplomats about numerous sightings around Moscow of large formations of advanced types of Soviet bombers and fighters rehearsing for the annual May Day flyby (eventually cancelled because of bad weather). Perhaps most disturbing was the appearance of as many as a dozen Bison intercontinental jet bombers comparable to the American B-52; only a single one had flown in the air parade a year earlier. This signified an advance by as much as two years (to 1958) their expected availability in sufficient numbers to mount a massive attack on the United States, igniting a firestorm of publicity and causing Wilson to hastily propose and the president quickly to agree to accelerate B-52 and F-100 production.*

The Soviet flights provided a backdrop for the latest continental defense progress reports (as of 15 April), which worried officials took under review in the latter part of May and early June. The Joint Chiefs found that despite improvements, the nation's defense system, even when completed, would not \textsuperscript{*}prevent an attack which could cause grave damage to our

\* See Chapter XVII.
ability to fight and win a war." Not ready to propose yet another general acceleration of continental defense programs, the chiefs left the door slightly ajar to a selective expansion and noted that recommendations for improvements in the system were under preparation.¹⁴

When the NSC took up the DoD progress report on 16 June, Robert Sprague, again officiating as principal gadfly, went right to the point. By mid-1957 the Soviets seemed likely to have operational 200 Bisons, 650 Badgers, and 150 Bears—a total of 1,000 modern bombers compared with the November estimate of 750. The first test of a multimegaton weapon as distinct from a device was expected before the end of the year. Clearly the basic policy on continental defense, NSC 5408, should be revised. Sprague urged, at a minimum, acceleration of 10 specific programs in order to achieve adequate defense against high- and low-altitude Soviet attacks by mid-1957, and that this action take precedence even over implementing the Killian report.¹⁵

Sprague’s dramatic plea for emergency action wrought no miracle. The council, clearly impatient to get back to the Killian review, briefly discussed and formally "noted" the progress reports and postponed revision of NSC 5408 until after consideration of the detailed responses to the Killian panel’s recommendations. Meanwhile, work on key continental defense elements would go forward more or less at its current already accelerated pace. Sprague’s favored 10 proposals were referred to the Defense Department for review.¹⁶

Most DoD officials, the president, and especially the Joint Chiefs found Sprague’s proposal a turnoff; they continued to emphasize the concept of balance. Back in April 1955 the Joint Chiefs, while recognizing the nation’s vulnerability to surprise attack, had implicitly warned against an unbalanced effort to make it less vulnerable, since "offensive-defensive power" formed a seamless web that contributed in toto to deterring attack and to destroying enemy power. The chiefs did not discount the possibility that the Soviets might attack and seriously damage the nation’s war-making capacity and society—but they seemed willing to accept the risk.¹⁷

For all the sense of urgency ("without despair") that pervaded the Killian report, few of its recommendations for action carried deadlines for implementation. This may have had more than a little to do with the phenomenal approval rating they received from the agencies assigned to review them. As of mid-July, 50 of the recommendations on nuclear striking power and continental defense had been concurred in and only 9 rejected. The general pattern of responses within DoD was to “concur in principle,” declare the recommendation valid, feasible, and indeed already being implemented, and then list further financial and other requirements for full implementation.¹⁸
Dissecting the Timetable

When the Planning Board got around to considering the Killian Timetable in July, attention focused particularly on the assumption that Period II, when the balance of military advantage supposedly would most favor the United States, offered a propitious time for U.S. political and diplomatic moves. Challenging this view, Robert Amory, the CIA adviser to the board, argued that the Moscow flybys together with recent intelligence on Soviet nuclear capabilities had seriously undermined the Timetable. The new estimated figure for Soviet heavy bombers in 1958 was one that the Soviets were not expected to attain before 1959 or 1960. As for Soviet nuclear capabilities, Amory noted that the Soviets "almost certainly now have a one-megaton order of capability," and by mid-1958 could have a respectable stockpile of somewhere between 115 and 460 weapons of one-half to one megaton yield. He concluded that the anticipated second period of overwhelming American superiority might never materialize, or at best might end by mid-1958.19

Sprague countered this argument by restating that the critical element in the definition of Period II, American acquisition of a large stockpile of multimegaton weapons, together with an adequate delivery capability, would confer the ability to decisively damage the USSR. Until they too acquired these weapons in large numbers, the Soviets could not similarly damage the United States. Vulnerability to surprise attack, which weighed heavily in Amory's reasoning, actually characterized the posture of both powers during Periods I and II. Sprague did not challenge Amory's conclusion that Period II (if it materialized at all) might end as early as mid-1958. He concluded that, on balance, the Killian panel's recommendation of an intensive study of diplomatic and political measures to exploit American military superiority during Period II was a good idea.20

Amory's salvo against the Killian Timetable also brought rejoinders from the Army and Air Force planners, who found fault with both the Timetable and its critic. The Army spokesman on the board criticized the report for its narrow focus on the technological aspects of national power and on nuclear air warfare. More particularly, he pointed out, the report's analysis of the Timetable ignored the probability that each successive period would see an increase in local aggression and limited wars, especially after Period II, when the Soviets would rely on fear of nuclear war in the free world to inhibit retaliation. The Air Staff, perceiving only limited utility in this or any other timetable, still remained confident that a Period II of significant duration was in the offing—even if the Soviets achieved a large increase in air-atomic capability during the 1958-60 period.21
was predictable, since it touched sensitive nerves in both services—the Army's belief that wars were won ultimately by the man in the foxhole, the Air Force's proud conviction that its pilots and flying machines were the best in the world. On the other hand the prospect of a period of overwhelming American air-atomic superiority, however short, spurred wishful thinking in both services. Amory's attack on the Killian Timetable received its coup de grace at the end of August when the executive officer of ODM's Science Advisory Committee revealed the data that had led the Killian panel to unanimous acceptance of the Period II hypothesis. As this official put it, the power advantage inherent in fusion over fission weapons was really one of kind more than degree. The prospective growth of the U.S. multimegaton stockpile by 1957-58 would theoretically enable American bombers to drop 25,000 MT on the USSR—a one-hundredfold increase over current capacity. The Soviets were expected to have a corresponding capacity in the same period of only 274 megatons. This favorable ratio—25,000 to 274—would diminish greatly in Periods II and IIIA in the Timetable, but the United States would retain an edge.\(^22\)

During August 1955 the dispute over what the Timetable meant and how recent intelligence affected it appeared to be diminishing. On 4 August the NSC directed the Planning Board to examine and report on how this question would affect the forthcoming review of basic national security policy. In consultation with Sprague, the board readily endorsed the Period II hypothesis as a general proposition—that is, the prediction that a period of "relative U.S. military advantage" would occur soon, probably beginning in mid-1956 and ending about mid-1958. During this period the United States would possess the capability of mounting a decisive attack against its adversary; the USSR would not. As the new Soviet intercontinental bomber force grew and improved, the United States would become increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack, but the Soviets would not, in this period, be able to knock out the U.S. retaliatory capability.\(^23\)

The board reached these conclusions in the face of indications in July and August of rapid Soviet progress in developing a long-range ballistic missile, possibly pointing to a two-year lead over its American counterpart. Early in September, in fact, the NSC took steps to accelerate the ICBM program. But by the Killian panel's analysis the advent of a new Soviet delivery vehicle, however formidable, would not in itself threaten American overall superiority so long as the Soviets lacked the additional megatons of explosive power needed to saturate American defenses and obliterate U.S. retaliatory forces. With no new intelligence on Soviet multimegaton weapons, the old estimate of mid-1958 as the
earliest date when the Soviet stockpile of these weapons might attain significant proportions still held.24

The Planning Board submitted its final validation of the Killian Timetable to the NSC in early November, accepting the Killian panel's description of Periods III and IV as plausible. If a Period IIIB could be avoided, the board stated, the United States could maintain a capability from the beginning of Period II continuously, and indefinitely, through Period IV "to deal an annihilating blow to the USSR." On 15 November the NSC noted the board's analysis along with its intent, as earlier directed, to examine the policy implications of the Timetable in connection with its current review of basic national security policy.25

The Ballistic Missile Threat

The unexpected apparition during July and August of the prospect of Soviet long-range missiles before the end of the decade was the second nasty surprise sprung on American planners in 1955. Like the May Day revelations, it upset American perceptions of the enemy threat. Back in January 1955, NSC 5501 had registered the curiously comfortable official view that assuming an intensive effort, the Soviets might achieve operational intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1963, or, at the earliest, 1960, and urged that the U.S. program "should approximate this timetable."26

The only American ICBM, the Air Force Atlas, under development since 1951, was still in its infancy. But during the first three years, Atlas had remained "a low priority venture, accorded only routine attention, authorized a minimum of financial support, and beset by tremendous [technical] problems." New Look budget economies inflicted major cutbacks on all missile R&D programs during the first two years of the Eisenhower administration. Moreover, ballistic missiles, and indeed guided missiles in general, were not the favorite weapons of the military pilots who dominated the Air Force leadership. Formidable technical obstacles abounded—accurate guidance, design of a small thermonuclear warhead, the trauma of reentry. Solution of the reentry and warhead problems by early 1954 brought the corollary benefit of a relaxed accuracy requirement.27

Ballistic missile development reached a turning point with the report in February 1954 of the Air Force's Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee (Tea Pot Committee) headed by John von Neumann. The appointment of the committee the preceding October had been engineered by Trevor Gardner, Air Force Secretary Talbott's special assistant for R&D, who,
with Talbott's full blessing, was to be the principal driving force in strategic missile development for the next two years. As chairman of the interdepartmental Special Study Group on Guided Missiles ordered by Secretary Wilson in June 1953 to examine ways to eliminate duplication in DoD guided missile programs, Gardner had called attention to the brightening prospects for small, lightweight thermonuclear warheads and other recent developments. At his instigation the von Neumann group of leading scientists studied the long-range missile types being developed by the Air Force—the subsonic turbojet Snark, the supersonic ramjet aerodynamic Navaho, and the supersonic ballistic Atlas.28

Gardner’s group submitted its report in late January, but its recommendations, essentially an endorsement of the ongoing programs, were overshadowed by the Tea Pot Committee’s report, which followed shortly. The Tea Pot Committee captured its audience’s attention both by the prestige of its membership and its persuasive sense of urgency. It faulted all three of the strategic missile programs and considered their availability schedules optimistic. If its suggested changes were adopted the committee believed there was no technical reason an operational Atlas, in sufficient numbers to pose a threat, could not be achieved by 1962-63, with a first successful launching as early as 1960 or 1961.29

The urgency of the acceleration of all three missiles stemmed from the belief of most of the members that the Soviets were probably significantly ahead in long-range ballistic missiles. Although the statement was stricken from the final version of the report, even the more skeptical members did not rule out the possibility. Gardner complained to Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles a few days later of the poor quality of technical intelligence on Soviet capabilities, citing four "substantially different" estimates all pointing to a significant Soviet lead. But the whole thrust of the Tea Pot Committee report spoke to the need to face the real threat of an operational Soviet ICBM by 1960. If, as it appeared, Atlas could not be brought on line until two or three years after that, Snark and Navaho, poor substitutes though they were, should be hurriedly redesigned and thrown into the breach as interim weapons. Overstepping its charter, the committee ventured to suggest that “some qualified agency” should examine the need for a medium-range ballistic missile (up to 1,500 nautical miles) as another stopgap weapon.30 Behind these proposals lay the unspoken assumption that the long reign of the manned bomber, at least as the backbone of American strategic airpower, was drawing to an end. Still, any measures to prolong the usefulness of manned bombers deserved serious consideration.31
Gardner made good use of the Tea Pot report in pushing his campaign to accelerate the Air Force's long-range missile development. Following Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes's directive in April 1954 to push Atlas "with all practicable speed," in May the Air Force assigned Atlas its highest development priority. In April also the Tea Pot group, with a few changes in membership, was reconstituted as the Air Force ICBM Scientific Advisory Committee. That summer the Air Force set up a separate organization, Western Development Division (WDD), of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), to operate the program, with Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation as the systems engineering and technical director. Subsequent intelligence about Soviet missile progress led to the October estimate, later written into NSC 5501, that the Soviets could have an operational ICBM possibly as early as 1960.

Still, because Atlas was only a fledgling, its funding amounted to peanuts compared to big weapon production programs—$20 million for R&D costs in FY 1955, and a like amount for the year following. Related costs for facility expansion amounted to $46 million for FY 1955 and $50 million for FY 1956. Money for procurement would increase from $87.7 million in FY 1955 to $233.0 million in FY 1956.32 For SAC Commander General LeMay, not surprisingly, the manned bomber remained the wave of the present and the future and the nuclear-powered bomber remained SAC's top priority. At the end of the year the Air Council endorsed that project along with an advanced subsonic conventionally powered bomber, both aimed at a 1963 operational date. As for Atlas, top OSD and Air Force officials apparently agreed that it was moving along about as well as could be expected; more money probably would not help much since most of the bottlenecks were technical.33

The Killian panel recommended strongly that the NSC accord development of the Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile the highest priority, but its schedule, aiming at a first full-scale test launching late in 1958, was pronounced "optimistic." Achieving a militarily significant ICBM capability before about 1965 was unlikely. A Soviet "first" in producing an ICBM, stated the report, would represent "an even greater jump in capability" than would a "first" by the United States, since it would largely erase the geographical advantages now enjoyed by the latter. No other weapon received comparable treatment in the Killian report.34

Looking at a possible Soviet "first" in the ICBM contest, the Killian panel emphasized the Tea Pot Committee's proposal for parallel development of a medium-range (about 1,500 nautical miles) ballistic missile. Apparently it saw little promise in Snark or Navaho, both by now in trouble. An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) from advanced
land bases could cover a large part of European Russia, and, if ship-based, a much larger part of the USSR. To the Soviets it would be almost as useful as an ICBM, providing coverage of Europe, Alaska, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines from bases in the USSR and China—and, if launched from ships, most of the United States. The panel believed that an IRBM would be easier to develop, possibly as a by-product of the ICBM, and would offer greater assurance of success in a substantially shorter time than the latter. Finally, looking far down the road, the panel recommended a strong program of research aimed at developing a defense against ballistic missiles—most immediately a radar system capable of providing at least 15 minutes of warning time.35

Although long-range ballistic missiles were the most urgent of the Killian panel’s proposed nuclear strike proposals, there were others, most notably the existing program to develop a nuclear-powered aircraft, which the panel seemed to find especially appealing because of its unlimited radii of action. Since nuclear propulsion’s future was still uncertain, however, the panel conceded the wisdom of continuing to develop improved intercontinental bombers and also endorsed the development of high-energy fuels to extend their range and thus reduce dependence on foreign bases. Even with ballistic missiles, the report warned, “there will be a continuing need for manned bombers.”36

The Tea Pot Committee report was more than a year old by the spring of 1955 and by then most of the technical obstacles to long-range ballistic missile development had been overcome or were crumbling. The Air Force manned bomber “establishment” saw the new Soviet bombers paraded over Moscow and the ensuing public furor as a kind of reinsurance of its dominance. The feeling found some confirmation in the haste of Congress to fund accelerated procurement of B-52s and new interceptors. The Joint Chiefs promptly applauded the Killian report’s proposal to give the ICBM a top national priority and the corollary proposal to build an IRBM, noting that the latter was already under development and should be pushed—initially with the same priority as the ICBM. At about the same time (28 April) Secretary Talbott, on the recommendation of his new ICBM Scientific Advisory Committee, approved the development of an alternate ICBM (Titan). By the beginning of June, the Air Force could claim that it had anticipated the proposed acceleration of the Atlas program by increasing its planned funding during FY 1955 almost 600 percent.37

No approved specific program for a 1,500-mile ballistic missile yet existed in mid-1955 and none would until late in the year. The Air Force hoped to get one “free,” or at least cheap, as a fallout from Atlas. The Army similarly had hopes of upgrading its Redstone tactical ballistic missile to medium-range status.38
Thus far, no specific action to accelerate ballistic missile programs seems to have been discussed at the highest levels, although the NSC proposed to consider the matter, along with certain other Killian panel recommendations, early in July. In the world outside, however, the air-power debate precipitated by the Moscow flybys spread in June to include the Soviet missile threat, primarily, it appears, because Senators Symington and Jackson and several administration spokesmen raised the issue publicly. On 11 June Admiral Radford, with reporters present, spoke to the Senate Armed Services Committee about the danger in a surprisingly sober vein, without explicitly denying its possibility or minimizing its implications, and also describing at some length the intelligence problems involved. During the Senate floor debate on the DoD budget on 20 June Symington, asserting that he had “full information,” reiterated his charge that the Soviets might be “well ahead” in the ICBM contest. The next day Jackson, in a rousing call-to-arms address in Olympia, Washington, demanded a peacetime mobilization on a wartime scale to push development and production of all the key weaponry of airpower, particularly the ICBM, which should receive “supreme and overriding importance in our defense effort.”

The speech echoed a similar theme that Jackson had heard less than a month earlier from Trevor Gardner in a briefing on the Atlas-Titan program to the Atomic Energy Subcommittee on Military Application. High on Gardner’s agenda stood assignment of a top national priority and a separate budget. That they also stood high on Jackson’s agenda became apparent on 30 June when he and his colleague, Sen. Clinton P. Anderson, chairman of the parent Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, jointly wrote the president of their fears that a commanding Soviet lead in ballistic missile development could lead ultimately to atomic blackmail, disintegration of NATO, and defeat in an all-out war. They called for an immediate presidential directive assigning the ICBM “unique and overriding priority within the entire defense establishment.”

Eisenhower, backed by Wilson, Talbott, and Gardner, quickly agreed to consideration of the senators’ proposals. Meanwhile, the CIA came up with revised estimates of prospective Soviet output, which it presented to the NSC on 12 July. It seemed possible that the Soviet ICBM could be as much as two years ahead of the American. Jackson informed the NSC that his subcommittee had reason to believe that the Soviets had a lead in both ICBM and IRBM development. Earlier in written answers to questions from Jackson’s subcommittee, OSD had conceded such a lead for the IRBM alone. Jackson repeated his recommendation that the ICBM should be treated as “the single most important project in our entire defense program.”
Impressed by the intelligence briefing and the ICBM status briefing at the NSC meeting on 28 July, the president directed the Joint Chiefs to war-game "a war in which it is assumed that both sides use significant numbers of ICBMs." At the NSC meeting on 4 August, the Planning Board and DoD received the task of preparing recommended council actions on the Killian report's ICBM proposals. For the less urgent IRBM, Defense was allowed until 1 December to decide which development proposals it would implement. In the Planning Board ODM wanted a "unique highest" priority for the ICBM, prosecuted with "the utmost speed," while Defense would settle for the "highest" priority, but pursued with "all practicable speed." The same issue had been debated by the same protagonists the year before in the formulation of continental defense policy. In defending their low-key approach, DoD spokesmen pointed to the Killian report, which had not recommended an overriding priority ("highest" but not the highest) for the ICBM. Achievement of an operational ICBM at the "earliest practicable" date had been a DoD objective, they argued, well before the Killian panel got around to studying the subject. An "absolute over-riding priority" (as Defense characterized the ODM proposal) reflected a "one weapon" approach to national security and was, besides, "not necessarily the most effective way to utilize national resources."

ODM assailed this line of argument in a vigorous and ingenious rebuttal by William Y. Elliott. The key aim of the Killian panel's proposal, he argued, was national recognition of the Air Force ICBM program as a unique national program of "highest priority"; no other program was accorded this kind of treatment. ODM's proposed "unique highest priority" for the ICBM, Elliott asserted, would not be "absolute" or "overriding" as Defense claimed. Thus far, under the highest priority among Air Force programs, no serious conflicts had occurred. Elliott seemed to be saying that the ICBM program, in its present infantile state, was no competitive threat to anyone, whatever its priority. The real need for a top priority would come later, when the program attained robust size and had to compete with other major programs. ODM visualized the impending NSC approval of a high priority for the ICBM program as only a stopgap. It was not confident, however, that any priority could be effective enough to recoup the presumed two-year lag behind the USSR.

Elliott's alarm bells evidently had some effect. The compromise that emerged from the Planning Board's discussion on 29 August came, on the whole, closer to the ODM than to the Defense version. The Joint Chiefs and Wilson approved it on 2 September, and on the 8th the NSC, with the
vice president in the chair, reviewed the draft and bought almost all of it. One significant change in the key priority clause in effect assigned the unique priority resisted by Defense and the JCS. When this version was flown out to the president, vacationing in Colorado, he made some other small changes, also favoring the ODM position. The final statement, approved by the president on the 13th, read in part as follows:

(1) There would be the gravest repercussions on the national security and on the cohesion of the free world, should the USSR achieve an operational capability with the ICBM substantially in advance of the U.S.

(2) In view of known Soviet progress in this field, the development by the U.S. of an operational capability with the ICBM is a matter of great urgency.

(3) The U.S. ICBM program is therefore a research and development program of the highest priority above all others, unless modified by future decision of the President.

(4) The Secretary of Defense will prosecute the program with maximum urgency, and all other Executive departments and agencies will assist the Department of Defense as required . . . .

By substituting the phrase "maximum urgency" for DoD's "all practicable speed," the president gave a decisive "full speed ahead" to the priority's implementation. The ICBM now had, in effect, the overriding priority that the JCS had dreaded, with the conspicuous and unequivocal presidential recognition that ODM considered indispensable. At the high policy level ODM had won and DoD had lost. What this would mean at the operating level remained to be seen. Still the president was not convinced that the exotic new technologies would produce a genuine weapons revolution in the early 1960s. He had little confidence that the military services could muster the discipline needed to work together in a coordinated effort, but at this juncture he was sufficiently worried by the evidence of Soviet progress to support a major acceleration of the ICBM.

The Great IRBM Competition

The most promising hedge against what the president feared, as the Killian panel had urged in February 1955, was to develop an IRBM concurrently with the ICBM. Army Secretary Brucker had also proposed
this course on 6 September, arguing that an IRBM was a “reasonable extension of existing technology” and therefore a safer gamble than the ICBM. He was confident that if adequately funded, an IRBM could be operational in 1960, five years earlier than the date skeptics were predicting for the Atlas and would cost only one-sixth to one-fourth as much.47

Defense had under consideration five missile development possibilities in which all three services would be involved.48 Before the end of the month the Army formally proposed that it take on the task of developing both land-based and ship-based versions of a 1,500-mile missile, using its Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama. The Army could offer impressive qualifications for the assignment. Its tactical Redstone missile, slated for operational availability in 1958, designed and built by the same scientists and engineers who had produced the German V-2 rocket in World War II, was the longest-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile yet flown by the United States (175 nautical miles with a 6,400-pound payload). Development of the Redstone thus far had been highly successful. Many of the features, particularly the guidance system, could be incorporated with little or no modification in the projected 1,500-mile version, thus offering reduced development time and cost.49

The Army’s bid raised the obvious question of whether it had a legitimate interest in a long-range strategic ballistic missile. Under the basic functions directive of 1948, the Army had primary interest in all operations on land, with specific exceptions. Missile responsibilities assigned by the Joint Chiefs in 1949 gave the Army and Navy control over surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles that would “supplement, extend the capabilities of, or replace” artillery, and to the Air Force and Navy control over missiles related to aircraft. However, any service might use any missile for which it could demonstrate a need, and the Joint Chiefs were supposed to keep on the lookout for unwarranted duplication among missile development projects.50

The most touchy feature of surface-to-surface missiles affecting service responsibilities related, of course, to their range. The Air Force had sought to limit the range of Army missiles, and the issue between the two services became more intense as technological advances increased operational horizons. On 13 November 1954 Acting Secretary Anderson approved the JCS proposal that the Army be permitted to develop and employ surface-to-surface missiles for use against tactical targets “within the zone of Army combat operations.” The new formula placed no real restriction on the range of the Army’s tactical missiles, except as implied by the term “tactical.” By the beginning of 1955 the Army, pursuing its
extension of artillery concept, had already deployed Corporal, a mobile bombardment rocket of about 75 miles range, and had under development the 175-mile Redstone and Sergeant, a solid-propellant rocket intended to succeed Corporal in the early 1960s. As yet, however, the Army had no missile that approached a range of 500 miles and had none on the drawing board. At the end of 1954 the chiefs had still not decided on service responsibility for medium-range missile development.51

Thus, at the beginning of 1955, the Army was clearly a potential contender in the looming competition to develop an IRBM; its Redstone Arsenal, ready to go into action, possessed a repository of experience in ballistic missile engineering that even the Air Force could not match. After General Maxwell Taylor succeeded Ridgway as chief of staff and Wilbur Brucker replaced Secretary Stevens, three new proposals to OSD for medium-range Redstone-derived missiles in the 1,000-mile range quickly followed.52

OSD meanwhile was preparing for the 1 December report to the NSC on IRBM candidates. During the summer Deputy Secretary Reuben Robertson had set up a Technical Advisory Committee under his chairmanship to examine the problems of coordinating service and supplier efforts in developing an operational missile. Not unexpectedly the committee soon encountered sharp conceptual differences between the Air Force and the Army. At one point Robertson was reportedly prepared to recommend that the Air Force (as the "air" service) be given exclusive jurisdiction in this field, at another that the task be turned over to a "super" agency like the World War II Manhattan District. But he and the committee were finally persuaded by the Huntsville engineers that contrary to the Air Force view, an IRBM probably could not be developed as a direct derivative of the ICBM and should be treated as a separate program. They also concluded that the Huntsville team constituted too valuable an asset to be excluded from ballistic missile development.53

A latecomer to the game, the Navy encountered strong in-house resistance to development of a sea-launched ballistic missile. Many doubted the technical feasibility of firing it from a submerged submarine, and the technology of solid-fuel propellants, generally preferred for shipboard use on safety grounds, lagged behind that of liquid-fuel propellants. Others, remembering the losing battle with the Air Force over the B-36 in 1949, shrank from a venture likely to trigger another dispute with the dominant service, particularly one in which the Navy, reversing its role in the 1949 squabble, might find itself again backing an "immoral" weapon inherently less accurate and discriminating than comparable land-based missiles. In the Navy internal bureaucratic competition impeded consensus.54
Late in 1954 the Navy submitted to the Killian panel an analysis of the potential of a sea-based ballistic missile, which may have influenced the panel's strong endorsement of such a weapon in its final report. Senior officers of the old school, however, including Chief of Naval Operations Carney, continued to oppose a major effort in this field. Others, led by Rear Adm. James S. Russell, head of the Bureau of Aeronautics, agitated for a high-priority Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, as it came to be called; Assistant Secretary for Air James H. Smith helped to win over high civilian officials including Secretary Thomas. The real turning point, however, came with the advent of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who succeeded Carney as CNO on 17 August 1955. Burke had been selected for the job ahead of 92 more senior admirals in part because Secretary Thomas, according to a biographer of Burke, "wanted a CNO who would promote new technology so that the navy could keep pace with the air force in innovative weapon systems." In October, Burke, with Thomas's hearty approval, overrode the formal opposition of a group of senior admirals: the Navy would pursue a ballistic missile capability as a major effort while continuing work on other missiles. 55

Each service, however, became more conscious of competing pressures from the other two and of the imminence of preemptive decisions by OSD. These pressures tended to foster a fragile spirit of collaboration between the Army and Navy against the front-running Air Force. Navy officials made informal overtures to Werner von Braun's team at Huntsville looking toward collaboration. On 21 September 1955 Thomas expressed to Wilson his "unqualified support" for the Army's proposal earlier that month to raise the IRBM to equal status with the ICBM. 56

By mid-October Wilson had decided that the urgent need for the IRBM entitled it to an equal priority with the ICBM. Wilson had also agreed with the Robertson committee that the technical differences between the Air Force and the Army dictated separate and parallel IRBM developments. 57 This solution would allow development of a backup weapon with alternate technology and broaden the technological and industrial base of the missile and space effort. The rationale for duplication seemed to come down to unwillingness to choose between two apparently equal competing capabilities. In retrospect, the assumption of equality seems questionable given the Army's demonstrated capability to build operational ballistic missiles, but excluding the Air Force from the competition was no doubt a political impossibility.

But which services would use the IRBM? While the old principle still held that a service could use any missile for which it could establish a valid need legitimized by its assigned roles and missions, the JCS ruling of 1954 rested on the assumption that normally each service would
design, build, and deploy its own missiles. For the IRBM this assumption could not be made with any confidence: the Army had a strong claim to build it but only a tenuous one to use it; the Air Force was the most likely prospective user of the land-based version and the Navy the only prospective user of the sea-based version. 58

As a first solution to the development dilemma the OSD staff on 12 October proposed, in effect, to make the Army's Redstone Arsenal available as a major contractor to the Air Force's Western Development Division, which would be given development responsibility for the IRBM. Not surprisingly, the Air Force liked the idea and the Army did not. The Navy also opposed the arrangement. Instead, it proposed adding a new twist to the contest—to employ the Redstone Arsenal "in the capacity of an 'independent contractor' under terms mutually acceptable to the Army and Navy"—thus signifying that the recently solemnized marriage of convenience could become a functioning partnership, and incidentally placing the Huntsville team in the enviable position of being wooed by the two principal competitors. By the end of October the positions of the three services had crystallized. All agreed on equal priorities for the IRBM and ICBM, on the need for two parallel IRBM developments covering both land- and ship-based applications, and on the broad outlines of a streamlined ballistic missile organization. They also agreed that the Navy had a valid need for a ship-borne IRBM, but the Army alone supported its own need for a land-based version; views of the Air Force's requirement were unclear. Army and Navy presented a solid front on a joint program leaning heavily on Redstone Arsenal. 59

Meanwhile Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs on 20 October to try again to resolve their longstanding differences on the "contemplated Service use of the [IRBM] in relation to assigned Service roles and missions." The chiefs undertook to advise the secretary on both development and use. Radford sided with Twining and they were joined by Burke, leaving Taylor the lone dissenter. The majority held that current roles and missions "and those which might logically be assigned in the foreseeable future" warranted assignment of a user responsibility for the IRBM to the Air Force and the Navy but not the Army. The IRBM program should be given the same priority as the ICBM, with the Air Force developing the land-based version and the Navy the sea-based version. Burke's acquiescence in this proposed Air Force-Navy development of the IRBM is difficult to explain in the light of his previous support for a joint development effort based on use of Redstone Arsenal. 60

Taylor pointed out that all three services could usefully employ an IRBM in executing their assigned missions. With capabilities and potential need so widely shared, Taylor implied, assignments of development
responsibility should turn on more pragmatic considerations than compatibility with assigned roles and missions. He evidently intended this line of argument to support his concluding point, a recommendation that the development of the IRBM including the sea-borne version be assigned jointly to the Army and Navy. Taylor, however, seemed unwilling to assert that the Army's capability was superior to the Navy's, even though the strong implication that this was so was an essential part of his case. Moreover, he failed to address the Air Force's claim to develop its own land-based IRBM. Taylor's paper seemed, in fact, to have been prepared as the JCS reply to Wilson should the other chiefs approve it. Disparaging references to the other two services would not have been useful, but the omissions seriously weakened his argument. 61

Taylor had, in fact, already submitted a much stronger paper to OSD, where the final decision would be made. On 27 October he forwarded to Robertson, in what purported to be a briefing for Brucker, a vigorous, bare-knuckled attack on the impending (as it then seemed) assignment of IRBM development to the Air Force. "It appears clear," the paper stated, "that the Air Force feels that the control of guided missiles is essential to survival or at least to the maintaining of their position as the most glamorous of the three Services." Taylor made a strong case for Army development of the IRBM as against the Air Force, particularly Redstone Arsenal as a key asset with the experience to do the job. By contrast, the Air Force and its contractors had little experience with ballistic missiles. The Army stood ready to begin work on a 1,500-mile missile as the next logical step beyond the Redstone.

Moreover, Redstone Arsenal could deliver the IRBM at a lower cost than any other development agency. To duplicate the arsenal's facilities for IRBM development would add greatly to the cost. Finally, Taylor argued, assignment of the IRBM to the Air Force would effectively hamstring Army activity in the guided missile field. "The Air Force . . . will oppose initiation of Army ballistic missile developments. The Air Force will use the identical arguments they have used with respect to the IRBM for any subsequent development, and, if these arguments are considered valid now, they must certainly prevail after the Redstone team has been dissipated. The Army will have been forced out of the large surface-to-surface guided missile field." 62

On 2 November, as Taylor had anticipated, Radford sent Wilson the previously noted split paper indicating his own concurrence with the majority Air Force-Navy position. Soon thereafter Wilson also had in hand the IRBM staff studies prepared for the scheduled 1 December report to the NSC. It now appeared that a full-fledged "fall out" IRBM using the second stage of the ICBM rocket would not be feasible—a significant
limitation on the Air Force's participation in an IRBM program. Another expectation now confirmed was that a land-based IRBM could be achieved substantially earlier than a ship-launched version, and a surface ship-launching capability earlier than a submarine-launching capability. The options thus narrowed down to a pair of land-based IRBMs (one Air Force and one Army) and a Navy ship-borne IRBM, which the Army could derive from its land-based version.63

OSD Comptroller McNeil summed up the essentials of the problem and his own views. He saw the central issue as whether the IRBM was primarily a strategic or a tactical missile. He, at least, had no doubt that it was the former, and that the Army had no legitimate need for it. "The idea that the tactical type of targets immediately in the rear of an opposing land force would be attacked by missiles 1200 to 1500 miles in the rear of our own forces is patently without foundation." On the other hand, McNeil pointed out, the Navy-Air Force position ignored the possible advantages of a dual approach in developing a land-based IRBM and merely asserted the "fall out" argument to support the Air Force's exclusive claim; it also ignored the value of the Army's Redstone experience. The Army was the only service, in fact, with actual experience in launching ballistic missiles. "Under any circumstances, therefore, it would seem that the Redstone and Navy efforts must be combined, and I see no reason why in such a combination that one of the objectives should not be the development of a land-based IRBM, even though there was a decision now that the Army would not use it operationally."64

Wilson's IRBM Decision

Wilson did not linger over his decision. Although the scheduled date for NSC consideration of the IRBM problem was still three weeks off, on 8 November 1955 he issued a bundle of directives dealing with responsibility and organization within DoD for directing and coordinating both ICBM and IRBM development. He proposed to recommend to the NSC that the IRBM have the same priority as the ICBM, but without interfering with it. Two IRBM development programs were established: A land-based one (IRBM #1) under Air Force management, the other (IRBM #2) to be conducted jointly by the Army and the Navy, each with the same priority. The IRBM #2 would have the dual objective of achieving an early ship-launched capability and a land-based alternative to the Air Force IRBM. Redstone Arsenal would develop the basic missile system for both IRBM #2 versions, with the Navy responsible for modifying the ship-launched weapon system. An OSD Ballistic Missiles
Committee (OSD-BMC) chaired by the deputy secretary of defense would act as the central DoD management reviewing agency for the ICBM and IRBM, assisted by an elaborate committee structure.\textsuperscript{65}

Wilson thus followed McNeil's advice on the IRBM development issue, although he had probably already made up his mind. The decision could not have been easy, since it meant rejecting the expertise of the JCS, formally registered by a top-heavy majority of its members, including Radford, whose views he seldom questioned, and even challenging the well-known pessimism of the president regarding cooperative interservice ventures. Wilson left unresolved the question of which services should use the IRBM. He probably agreed with McNeil's rejection of the Army's claim—a view also shared by the president—but shrank from announcing it at this particular juncture.\textsuperscript{66}

Wilson seemed to regard service responsibility for development and for use of a weapon as separate issues. Also, he may have feared the demoralizing effect on the Army of a decision to deny it the right to deploy and use its own strategic missiles. As it turned out, the Army did make an all-out effort to develop the Jupiter, as its land-based IRBM was called, and in tests during 1956, at least, Jupiter seemed to forge ahead of Thor, its Air Force competitor. Wilson's decision left the Army still ostensibly a contender for the ultimate prize, operational use of the "winning" IRBM. How the Army might have reacted to an immediate decision putting the prize forever beyond its reach was indicated a year later by Taylor's bitter comment on Wilson's "fatal" delayed decision giving operational control of Jupiter to the Air Force. The decision, he assumed, "amounted to virtually killing the program, because this Army-built weapon has never appealed to the Air Force." In fact, both IRBMs went into production late in 1957 and both were subsequently deployed overseas.\textsuperscript{67}

Wilson's 8 November actions all fell within the scope of his authority but remained subject to review by the NSC and the president. Still, considering their critical strategic implications, it was unusual for Wilson to take such actions on his own, against the advice of the JCS, without consulting the president. The latter, to be sure, was convalescing from his 24 September heart attack. On 1 December, with the president attending, the missile programs came up for discussion before the NSC as scheduled. The council approved DoD's report and actions taken, adding, at Eisenhower's direction, a requirement for monthly reports to him on both missiles. The council's obvious, though unstated, conclusion was that anything less than a "first" in the IRBM race would be a losing outcome for the United States.\textsuperscript{68}

On 21 December, in approving the NSC actions, Eisenhower made it clear that his sense of urgency had not abated. He reassured Wilson of
his approval of the 8 November decisions but expressed qualms and strong doubts about overcoming service rivalry. In approving equal priority ratings for the ICBM and IRBM, he strengthened them by the stipulation that any serious conflict between the two should be promptly referred to the president. He also directed that the following language be added to the approved actions of the 1 December meeting: "... the political and psychological impact ... of an effective ballistic missile with a range in the 1000-1700 mile range would be so great that early development of such a missile would be of critical importance to the national security interests of the United States."69

The Vulnerable Deterrent

"Today the Strategic Air Command," noted the Killian panel in its February 1955 report, "represents essentially the entire U.S. nuclear striking force." Ultimately long-range ballistic missiles would take over part of this mission, but meanwhile the threat of a surprise air attack on SAC's bombers, concentrated on a few poorly defended bases at home and abroad, was in a sense more deadly than that to the nation's cities and population. With the SAC bases eliminated, the enemy could at his leisure overwhelm city and area defenses and dictate terms. The panel estimated that within two or three years the completion of the DEW line should offer for all bases a minimum of two hours' warning of any sizable bomber attack. Prompt reaction to warning was the next essential. With acquisition of more tankers, use of aerial refueling could eliminate dependence on advanced bases for a retaliatory first strike. The panel also urged careful consideration by the NSC of certain emergency measures to reduce vulnerability, particularly providing SAC with enough additional bases to permit it to launch its bombers within the warning interval.70

The DoD response followed the pattern of those to other recommendations: concur in principle, much is already being done, to do more will cost more. The report noted that the Air Force already had substantial base dispersion under way, looking to 66 air bases by 1965 in the United States; in 1956, however, SAC expected to have only 27. Not only was base expansion extremely expensive, but it raised thorny questions of balance between the cost-effectiveness of this and other means of preserving SAC's retaliatory capability—e.g., stronger local defenses, warning systems, and alert measures—that might reduce the need for more bases. Moreover, dispersion would lower efficiency, complicate coordination, and increase SAC's burdens in many ways.71 The JCS reported that as of 30 June operational readiness of some of the retaliatory forces
had been improved by storing atomic bombs on the SAC bases; within the coming year most of the bombs required for initial strikes would be thus dispersed, and the remainder would be available at AEC storage sites adjacent to the bases. In an emergency SAC planned to use more than 200 additional airfields, military and civilian.\textsuperscript{72}

On 4 August the president asked that DoD representatives brief the NSC at an early date on SAC’s ground vulnerability.\textsuperscript{73} Dress-rehearsed before the Armed Forces Policy Council in mid-October, the Air Force briefing focused on the currently planned dispersal plan for a buildup from 34 to 55 bases. The Killian panel’s recommendations for emergency measures were ignored, major topics were either skipped or skimmed, and in general the briefing raised more questions than it answered. OSD found it unsuitable for presentation to the NSC.\textsuperscript{74} Secretary of the Air Force Quarles, agreeing that more dispersion was imperative for SAC’s survival, nevertheless asked for approval to go ahead with the 55-base program as “the one action we can take immediately without incurring completely unacceptable expenses.” Robertson approved this proposal on 23 November, but at the same time directed the Air Force to make a new and comprehensive analysis (with a 15 February deadline) of the whole vulnerability problem. The NSC briefing, originally scheduled for late 1955, was postponed to 1 June 1956.\textsuperscript{75}

The more far-reaching study directed by Secretary Robertson on 23 November involved a calculated risk by delaying most concrete actions. Only on completion of the Air Force study would it be possible to develop a comprehensive plan of action. A new OSD study in January 1956 confirmed the findings of the Killian panel that through 1958 at least SAC vulnerability was not likely to be significantly reduced by measures now in effect or planned. By the time the DEW line was completed and most of the gaps plugged in the continental radar net, the Soviets were expected to have substantial numbers of Bison and Bear bombers, whose anticipated speed and range would enable them to reduce warning time to less than one hour for two-thirds of the SAC bases in 1958. SAC bases, still few in 1958, would invite attack by a small force with vastly increased chances of escaping detection.\textsuperscript{76}

The January OSD study sought to clarify the issues, most immediate of which was the need to increase the warning interval by plugging gaps in the continental radar net, including the contiguous offshore systems. To meet this threat, the whole warning system (including most of Eurasia), moreover, would require continuous upgrading to keep pace with increases in bomber speeds. The warning interval could also be increased by locating new SAC bases toward the center of the country and by
placing aircraft in the interior. Dispersion together with hardening the most vital base targets would force the enemy to employ a large attacking force, thus losing the advantage of a sneak attack. This would result in increased warning time. Improved active defenses—e.g., interceptor aircraft and missiles along the avenues of approach—would also serve the same purpose. With the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, warning systems would require new technologies for detecting incoming missiles and their launching as well. Defense systems would require new weapons to intercept the missiles in flight, and vital immobile assets on the ground would depend for survival on superhardened protection, concealment, or dispersion. Although lacking in precision, the first enemy ICBMs would strike literally as a “bolt from the blue,” and the abrupt reduction of warning time would throw the main burden of defense on traditional passive technologies rather than exotic new ones.

For the near term, the hope was that the various measures described would assure a counterattack capability that would “increasingly deter the enemy from launching general war.” A really major program, by ensuring strategic warning (through better intelligence), would either deter an attack altogether or dissuade the enemy from committing large offensive forces to a possibly very costly venture. Accordingly, the report concluded, “the reduction of SAC’s ground vulnerability will remain for several years the most important single military step that can be taken to deter the sudden outbreak of general war, i.e., a surprise air attack on the United States.” As a corollary, American awareness of this danger at such a time might create a strong incentive to strike preemptively. The resulting scenario could be grim.

How much the proposed corrective measures would cost, the report did not even hint. Firm decisions on preferred measures would have to await the Air Force cost-effectiveness study directed by OSD the preceding November. Even that could not show how far vulnerability needed to be reduced—a top-level determination in the context of the overall national and military situation. But the report left little doubt that the cost of making SAC reasonably secure against attack, in time to meet the fast growing threat of resurgent Soviet airpower, would be immense. Why was the Air Force seemingly content, for the present, with a base dispersal program that would not be completed until 1962? Where was the sense of urgency? The OSD study apparently found the explanation, above all, in the fear of calling attention to huge new money requirements just as the FY 1957 budget was being submitted to Congress. With the postponement of the Air Force study to June, the burden of vulnerability reduction would fall on the FY 1958 and later budgets.
Counting the Costs—For Now

OSD's report on funding Killian panel recommendations, submitted early in December 1955, asserted that existing programs covered most of the recommendations in some fashion, making implementation and funding a matter of determining how much additional effort or change of emphasis was involved. It listed the increased funds made available for a number of important R&D projects. 80

By the end of 1955 the large bundle of developmental actions recommended by the Killian report which, in the main, the Defense Department and the NSC had endorsed without argument, was under way at a cost of more than $800 million in FY 1956 money.* OSD had a backlog of unreviewed proposals and the services had more coming. In its funding report, however, OSD cautiously stated its belief that urgent FY 1956 R&D requirements for additional money could be covered "within the total funding flexibility available" (i.e., Wilson's emergency fund). Therefore supplemental FY 1956 funding would not be required. Looking farther down the road, OSD set up a similar fund for emergency R&D projects in the FY 1957 budget. Ongoing Killian-related projects would presumably be the principal recipients of this money. The department contemplated no additional funding requests beyond those already incorporated in the FY 1957 budget. Defense would report again on Killian-related programs as part of its Annual Status Report on Major Security Programs as of 30 June 1956. 81

* Not specific FY 1956 appropriations, but funds available for obligation in this fiscal year.
Implementation of the Killian panel's recommendations represented a primarily military response to perceived Soviet capabilities, spurred on by further indications, starting with the Moscow flybys in May 1955, that the Soviets had still greater capabilities of which the panel had been unaware. Understandably, most of the recommendations met with a favorable reception in the Pentagon, since without challenging established priorities they offered prestigious leverage for increased military spending. At the NSC level DoD generally called the tune on Killian recommendations. Rather different was the related task of revising basic national security policy to respond to perceived changes in Soviet strategic intentions, to which the Planning Board had only just addressed itself at the time the Killian report appeared. This endeavor went to the heart of foreign policy and engaged the State Department as a principal participant. Ineluctably, it unfolded as a replay, against a markedly changed international backdrop, of the hard-line vs. soft-line debate between Defense and State played out in 1954 during the writing of NSC 5501.

_Beware the Spirit of Geneva!_

As finally approved in January 1955, NSC 5501 did not win high marks in the Pentagon. Possibly its only important defender there was Wilson, who after initially endorsing the strong resistance of the service secretaries, ISA, and the Joint Chiefs, in the end, nudged by the president, had reversed himself and in the NSC joined its chief sponsor, Secretary Dulles, in applauding the final paper. Pentagon critics considered NSC 5501 a cravenly soft-line document which, out of fear that a confrontational
stance toward the Communist powers might lead to defection of allies and even nuclear war, prescribed a basic policy of deterrence without resort to force except out of dire necessity, with increased reliance on conciliation and non-military means of resisting Communist "creeping expansion." The Joint Chiefs faulted it for failing to "stress the urgent need" of bringing about, while the United States still enjoyed a marked nuclear superiority, a state of affairs under which, as NSC 162/2 had warned in 1953, "the United States and the free world coalition [would be] prepared to meet the Soviet-Communist threat with resolution and to negotiate for its alleviation under proper safeguards." Instead, they said, NSC 5501 laid down a strategy of persuasion looking to "mutually acceptable settlements." Given the basic hostility and recognized aims of the Communist regimes, the chiefs declared, "it would be illusory to expect that any overtures on the part of the United States, consistent with United States security interests, would be effective in ameliorating the danger now confronting us."! Ironically, NSC 5501 became approved policy at precisely the time that Communist China launched a fresh attack on the offshore islands held by the Nationalists. The ensuing crisis, through the winter and into the spring of 1955, brought the United States perhaps closer to war than at any time since the armistice in Korea. By the end of March Admiral Carney, to Eisenhower's dismay and anger, was predicting (in a remark promptly leaked to the press) a full-scale Communist assault on Quemoy in mid-April. When that date arrived, however, the crisis was already subsiding; on the 24th it came to an abrupt end when Premier Chou En-lai announced at the Bandung Conference that his government wanted no war with the United States and was prepared to negotiate the Formosa question. The following August negotiations began at Geneva.2 Meanwhile, since the death of Stalin in March 1953, there had been some abatement of the propaganda war. At the beginning of 1955 Soviet Premier Malenkov made a public statement, widely reported even in the Soviet press, that the two superpowers should mutually recognize the necessity of peaceful coexistence and respect for "each other's legitimate interests." His government, he said, was ready to settle existing differences, assuming a like readiness on the part of the United States. The months that followed brought a significant thaw in the superpower cold war, largely as a result of conciliatory Soviet responses to Western initiatives—notably conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty by the Big Four in May guaranteeing that country's neutrality and ending the allied military occupation, a step resisted by the Soviets for nine years. That same month, in the ongoing disarmament talks in London, the Soviets submitted a comprehensive arms control plan that included for the first time provisions for reductions in conventional forces and for limited inspection, a major
concession to earlier Western proposals. In June Malenkov's successor, Nikolai A. Bulganin, and the new Communist Party First Secretary, Nikita S. Khrushchev, visited Belgrade to mend the seven-year breach with Marshal Tito by acknowledging Soviet responsibility for it. Other Soviet initiatives included the return of the Porkkala base to Finland, Port Arthur to China, and some lend-lease freighters to the United States. Moscow also announced a 640,000-man reduction in the Soviet armed forces.3

The year's most spectacular event, the Four-Power Geneva Summit Conference in July, represented in some measure a response to widespread public demand in Europe for a negotiated settlement of outstanding issues to reduce tensions. The Western powers' agreement late in 1954 to include a sovereign rearmed West Germany in an expanded Western European Union and in NATO caused Moscow to create the Warsaw Pact, bringing together the European satellites in a military alliance with the Soviet Union and East Germany, also recognized as sovereign. The Western powers' strong actions surprised and shocked the new Soviet leaders. They perceived the need for a revision of objectives and a more active diplomacy aimed at blocking or delaying German rearmament. The Austrian treaty gave a clear signal of Soviet readiness to negotiate outstanding differences, since Eisenhower had conceded in November that such an action would be regarded as evidence of Russian good faith. Accordingly the three Western powers formally proposed to Moscow on 10 May a heads-of-government meeting for an initial exchange of views, to be followed by detailed negotiations at the foreign ministerial and lower levels.4

Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal for a system of mutual aerial inspection provided the most dramatic moment at the Geneva Conference, which took place between 18 and 25 July 1955. Although the proposal was warmly applauded by the president's Western colleagues and trumpeted around the world (beginning with an unscheduled clap of thunder just as he finished speaking), the Soviet representatives, caught off guard, were not pleased. Bulganin conceded that the proposal might have merit and promised that it would be sympathetically studied. But Khrushchev, the real power in the Soviet troika (Marshal Zhukov was the third member), bluntly told Eisenhower that he did not agree, and, according to Ambassador Bohlen, who was translating, branded the proposal as a transparent espionage device. Nor did progress transpire toward an understanding on the German question or other outstanding issues. Overall, the conference fell far short of Eisenhower's goal "to change the spirit that has characterized the intergovernmental relationships of the world during the past ten years." Yet the "Open Skies" vision had a profound propaganda impact both at home and abroad, giving substance to a "spirit of Geneva" that did not soon dissipate.5
Even if Eisenhower had no illusions as to the likelihood that Russian leaders would go along with the plan, he may have hoped that they would be prodded by a mobilized world opinion into modifying their behavior in many desirable ways short of that goal. Indeed, even before the conference ended, there emerged signs that something like this was already happening: Bulganin offered to contribute to an Atoms for Peace pool and proposed withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe. Everyone agreed that a total nuclear war would be suicidal for both sides. And there was agreement on the usefulness of future cultural exchanges.6

To DoD hard-liners—the JCS, ISA’s Policy Planning Staff, the service secretaries and their planning staffs—the developing thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations during the spring and summer was cause for deep foreboding.7 The Air Staff, representing the most aggressively pessimistic view, perceived the primary motivation of Soviet policy in the following terms: “The USSR has decided to buy time by disingenuous diplomatic maneuvers while it consolidates its internal position and engages in a major armament effort, with the possibility of exploiting its nuclear capability at a later date.”8 By contrast, intelligence estimates on the eve of the Geneva conference, while finding no evidence as yet that Soviet expansionist aims or the doctrine of ineradicable hostility between the “two world camps” had been abandoned, showed cautious optimism: “Recent Soviet moves represent a change from the sterile negativism of Soviet policy in recent years, and they open up the possibility that the USSR is ready to see the stalemate on certain issues broken.” For both internal and external reasons the Soviets “almost certainly” were looking for a reduction in tensions.9

In the few weeks preceding the summit conference, Defense planners lobbyed hard to keep the CIA’s relatively optimistic assessment of Soviet motives out of the guidance paper the Planning Board was preparing to submit to the NSC. It was an uphill battle. The conference was to be a State Department show with no formal DoD representation (an ISA observer would be allowed to attend). On the Planning Board the State member mostly called the tune. State’s position, confident and temperate but not notably “soft-line,” was persuasively argued. By comparison, DoD criticisms tended to come across as narrow and shrill. Accepting the current intelligence assessment that the USSR remained “basically hostile” toward the United States and the non-Communist world, State nevertheless saw recent Soviet moves as less rigid than earlier and its agreement to a summit without China as “evidence of greater realism and possibly of a serious intention to negotiate.” The Paris Accords, by paving the way for German rearmament, had made it likely that Western Europe would become more secure against attack, giving the Western powers much greater leverage in the cold war and future negotiations with the USSR. It could be expected
that the Soviets would seek to prevent German rearmament within NATO. In State’s view, these developments dictated no change in the basic national strategy laid out in NSC 5501, especially willingness to negotiate. To disgruntled DoD critics, this give-and-take approach seemed precisely “the kind of policy which the Soviets would like to write into this paper for us.”

The Joint Chiefs in their comments did not quibble much over nuances. Evidently someone had discovered that NSC 5501, once regarded as soft on the Communist threat, and also a recent National Intelligence Estimate, actually contained some sonorous hard-line rhetoric. The chiefs now proposed to lard the current Planning Board draft with long passages from those documents conspicuously spotted at prominent points. Their paper, with Deputy Secretary Anderson’s endorsement, reached the NSC on 7 July at the same time as the final version of the Planning Board’s proposed guidance (NSC 5524), and the two were considered together. Given the unimpeachable authority of the sources of the insertions, Secretary Dulles and his supporters on the council evidently found it difficult to raise serious objections to the changed tone of the document. Of course, it was redundant and presumptuous to instruct Dulles and his aides not to “trust” the Russians or be taken in by their negotiating tactics or to forget their basically hostile aims. The council approved almost all of the chiefs’ proposed changes, but added a statement that since Stalin’s death the power struggle within Soviet ruling circles had created a “confused situation” that, in foreign policy, tended to “produce compromises rather than clear direction.” The amended paper (NSC 5524/1) received approval “as supplementing but not superseding existing policy.”

The DoD hard-liners had made their point and could count this a small victory. But the “spirit of Geneva” remained alive and well and would not be put down. Early insider reports from Geneva as the summit conference drew to a close portrayed the Soviets as wary, excessively polite, and offering no concessions—but clearly unwarlike. “One good result of the conference,” noted the president’s special assistant for national security affairs, Dillon Anderson, “is that the Soviets realize that we are not warmongers. This idea was definitely sold by the President.”

Nothing had been settled at the summit, but the adversaries had taken one another’s measure, traded ideas, and cranked up the engine of diplomacy with scheduled meetings and agreed agendas. Until one side or the other brought it to a halt the machine would move ahead under its own momentum. A few days after the conference ended, Wilson directed the Joint Chiefs to prepare, by mid-September, a preliminary outline of actions needed to implement the president’s aerial inspection scheme, just in case the Soviets wanted more details or accepted the plan conditionally.
Revision of NSC 5501 Gets Under Way

Distracted by the attention given the Killian proposals and preparations for the Geneva summit and subsequent four-power negotiations, the Planning Board worked by fits and starts during the summer on the revision of NSC 5501. A draft study program launched in May 1955 produced its first coherent scheme by early July. This 8 July Planning Board paper had a strong hard-line flavor, not even mentioning the current trend of events toward reduction of tensions. Its origins could be traced to a DoD draft, but by 15 August the board agreed that the crux of the whole review rested on the validity of NSC 5501's estimate of the situation. Theoretically, the review of the policy sections of NSC 5501 should have awaited a judgment as to the validity of the estimate of the situation on which the paper rested. As a practical matter, each planner formed his own estimate of the situation and reached conclusions early on as to the kind of revision NSC 5501 needed. Thus both review and revision of the old estimate of basic security policy had to march together for lack of time to march in sequence.

Defense planners became increasingly unhappy as the "spirit of Geneva" persisted in the weeks following the conference. Army Secretary Brucker thought the intensified Soviet peace offensive was "an ominous portent" and should be so characterized in the revised NSC 5501. In ISA, Vice Adm. A. C. Davis predicted that the situation of mutual deterrence and nuclear plenty, which seemed to be impending, would require the United States to devote increasing resources to counter local aggression, subversion, and paramilitary operations. Navy Secretary Thomas gloomily pointed out that the American people were evidently just as susceptible as the publics in allied countries to the new Soviet "soft line." Especially worried about the possible effects of the president's dramatic overture at Geneva, he saw the new Soviet tactics as accelerating the growth of neutralism and the erosion of popular support for NATO in Europe, already threatened by the spectacle of a massive American continental defense buildup perceived as a harbinger of a resurrected "fortress America" strategy.

Remarkably, there emerged a near consensus in the Pentagon that NSC 5501 remained, as Thomas put it, a "fundamentally sound and far-sighted statement of basic national security policy," requiring no major changes. Magically, the lamentations that had greeted the promulgation of that document had faded away. Thus far no one seemed to believe that the Soviets had significantly altered their policies and aims as set forth in NSC 5501's estimate of the situation: dissolution of NATO,
prevention of German rearmament, forced withdrawal of American and British forces from the continent, "tomorrow the world."17

Beyond this consensus, most of the DoD responses exploited the opportunity to promote service or agency interests. The Army, for example, with some help from the Navy, pressed its case for more emphasis on capabilities for limited war and low-level conflict. Secretary Brucker held that a national strategy "must provide for the rapid expansion of military strength capable of fighting either an atomic or non-atomic [general] war." Ready conventional forces in being were needed both to deter and defeat local aggression and to perform initial tasks in a general war, especially in a situation of nuclear standoff.18

Not for the first time, Assistant Secretary McNeil dissented from mainstream thinking on basic security policy. He criticized NSC 5501 chiefly for its inadequate treatment of arms control and disarmament. "Events in this area during the last nine months," he wrote, "have moved far beyond the range of policy guidance furnished in that document .... President Eisenhower, at the Geneva meeting of the Big Four, introduced an entirely new concept into the disarmament discussions [with] his plan for mutual aerial surveillance .... The President has stated that it is but the first essential step towards eventual arms reduction or disarmament. Our basic national security policy must now ... reflect not only this essential first step but also the nature of the succeeding steps and the conditions under which the U.S. would undertake them."19

The possibility of Soviet acceptance of the "Open Skies" plan raised profound questions for U.S. security policy, McNeil went on. Would aerial surveillance in peacetime warrant any reduction or change in U.S. military forces—say, in the number of SAC reconnaissance wings? Major reductions might be made in the whole force structure other than continental air defense and retaliatory elements. Beyond the president's plan lay the broader question of U.S. policy on limitation or reduction of armaments, almost ignored in NSC 5501. McNeil also raised the question of U.S. policy toward neutrals in the developing world. NSC 5501 seemed to take the position that U.S. security required de facto alignment, political and military, of all non-Communist nations not formally allied with the United States, although a growing number of them clearly resisted alignment with either superpower. Genuinely neutral free nations might prove to be more of an asset to the United States in the long run than nations whose compliance with American wishes had to be bought.20

The State Department submitted that NSC 5501 reflected the international climate at the start of 1955—the beginnings of flexibility in Soviet policy and a shift from imminent aggression to long-term competition.21
The Soviet Union now seemed to recognize that general war would not advance its national interests, and its diplomacy might seek to place more emphasis on “amiability and lure than on threat.” The Soviets indicated interest in negotiating on some major issues (e.g., disarmament) but a hardening on others (e.g., Germany). It was unclear whether the Soviets viewed detente as a “durable modus vivendi or a short-term modus operandi.” In the West the leading powers seemed to consider Soviet aggression as unlikely and to dread general war more than ever. As a result, the drift toward neutralism and disengagement had accelerated and aversion to military expenditures had deepened. In the years ahead the Soviet Union would seek “to impair will and capability to resist in the free world,” without reducing its own “offensive capabilities, expansionist ambitions, and the internal strait-jacketing of its people.” Its strategy would probably seek to “disrupt alliances; promote neutralism; lower political and military vigor; reduce U.S. influence; and isolate the U.S. from its allies and from the uncommitted states.” The U.S. strategy, essentially defensive, should be to resist Soviet disruptive efforts in the free world, while seeking to influence the Soviets “to modify their conduct and . . . induce them to reduce their military capabilities.”

State proposed certain additions to NSC 5501. An improved military capability to respond “flexibly and selectively” to Communist moves in “vulnerable local situations” could discourage Communist opportunism at this level. Measures to enhance unity and staying power in U.S. alliances should also receive more emphasis. It behooved the United States, therefore, to support “healthy” nationalist governments to achieve stability. To open up the Communist world, East-West contacts should be expanded, making it more difficult for the Soviets to back off from their current flirtation with detente. Defense planners could hardly object to some of these proposals; indeed, the encouragement of nationalism might have come right out of their own book. But they found disturbing State’s desire to press vigorously for mutual reductions in military establishments, as when State argued that “agreement on effective disarmament is the only promising approach in affecting the growth of a Soviet capability to imperil the continental U.S.”

Estimate of the Situation: Old Wine in a New Bottle

On 1 November, publication of a new overall intelligence estimate somewhat narrowed the scope of the State-Defense debate, giving the Planning Board a green light to update the old estimate of the situation.
This update had the potential to influence significantly the board’s revision of NSC 5501. Most insiders did not expect to be surprised by the new estimate—nor were they. For the most part it set forth in precise, guarded terms what was already known or suspected: Soviet air-nuclear power was steadily growing, as was Communist China’s conventional military strength; there was no sign of significant friction between the two governments, of any abatement of their basic hostility to the West, or of renunciation of the goal of world domination. During the 1960-65 period the Soviets would probably “acquire militarily significant quantities of intercontinental ballistic missiles.”

One of the more contentious issues in the drafting of the revision involved the interpretation of recent Soviet “soft” tactics. DoD saw these tactics as “in no way” inconsistent with long-term Soviet objectives inimical to the West; State thought they were “not necessarily” so. Both sides agreed that to reduce the risk of surprise attack and all-out nuclear war the Soviets probably favored some sort of arms limitation agreement without unrestricted inspection. But Defense wanted to make a further point of continued Soviet promotion of a ban on nuclear weapons, which, in the absence of unrestricted inspection, would allow the Soviets surreptitiously to build up their own nuclear stockpile. State objected that intelligence did not support this supposition, arguing further that the Soviet support of a nuclear weapons ban might be genuine since, if effected, it would eliminate the West’s only offset to Soviet superiority in conventional armaments. DoD critics found State’s position on this split especially galling because it came verbatim from the current intelligence estimate, which State’s representatives themselves repeatedly cited as authoritative. Defense planners found equally upsetting State’s evident belief that a reduction of tensions remained, even after Geneva, a Soviet goal that could be exploited to the West’s benefit. In the draft revision State argued, for example, that a prolonged reduction of tensions “might also eventually tend to alter the nature of Communist control over the satellites,” presenting problems for the Soviet bloc as well as the West, language that the Defense representatives found too optimistic.

The Debate Polarizes

By the afternoon of 8 November 1955, the “spirit of Geneva” seemed to be evaporating. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, who earlier had left the foreign ministers conference in Geneva to confer with his superiors in Moscow, returned to deliver what Dulles called “one of the most
cynical and uncompromising speeches" he had ever heard. It involved, he cabled the president, "a sweeping rejection of all Western proposals for European security and German reunification . . . . There was not in all of his speech a single phrase which was conciliatory or which gave even lip service to your agreement at 'summit.'" Dulles believed that the Soviet position had been taken quite deliberately, "with full recognition" that it would lead to "a sharp increase of tension and resumption of cold-war struggle." By breaching the summit directive the Soviets had created a "condition where no confidence can be placed on agreements with Soviet Government." Further discussion of other outstanding questions including disarmament would, he feared, "have little substance."²⁴

The "spirit of Geneva" did not totally dissipate. Talks went on, including the United Nations disarmament discussions in London. East-West contacts at various levels increased: exchanges of trade exhibitions, among scientists and artists, and reciprocal visits by high officials, including Khrushchev's famous tour of the United States in 1959. For DoD planners, however, the "spirit" had never seemed other than a naive fantasy that undermined realistic planning and policymaking. They greeted the 8th of November with some relief as signifying a failure of the State Department efforts to relax tension.²⁵

State planners did not share the view of their DoD colleagues that after the Soviet rebuff at Geneva in November the only prudent course was to circle the wagons and break out the ammunition.²⁶ Well before the foreign ministers conference, they had begun downplaying the "spirit of Geneva." State's pre-Geneva Conference position had accepted as probable that the Soviets had stiffened against significant concessions on most major issues (e.g., the German question) but still wanted some respite from tensions and, more particularly, had not yet rejected compromise on arms control. The president's "Open Skies" plan and Molotov's 10 May disarmament proposal involving mutual ground inspection of arms were both still on the table.

State regarded as simplistic the Defense conviction that the Soviet leopard had changed neither its spots nor, to any significant degree, its ways. The change in tactics, insisted the State member, was clear for all to see; the question was, how deep did it go? Of the two kinds of change envisaged—basic internal and tactical—State saw the former as inevitable and unpredictable. In turn, it would influence Soviet external conduct—tactical change—that could also be affected by changes in the external environment. "Open Skies" did seem to have been especially effective in creating at least a temporary paralysis of decision in the Kremlin. State planners hoped that the German question might yet offer opportunities
for exploitation. Conversely, failure to develop direct diplomatic relations with Peiping or to support Yugoslavia's bid for a seat in the UN Security Council had foreclosed other opportunities.

DoD Planning Board representatives took vigorous exception to this approach, seeing it as a corollary of State's tension-reducing strategy, for which they had developed a strong antipathy. They preferred pressure through challenge and confrontation, aimed at keeping the Soviet leadership off balance and on the defensive at a time when, aware of the huge American superiority in nuclear capabilities, the Soviets had to be more than normally fearful of going to the brink. DoD planners argued that the recent Soviet bloc (Czech) arms deal with Egypt should have been promptly challenged as a provocative move likely to invite retaliation. Soviet leaders might disagree on many questions, but they were more likely than not to agree on a strategy of challenging the West, especially when, as in the recent instance, the policy seemed to be succeeding. State, by contrast, interpreted the Soviet rapprochement with Egypt as a defensive move responding to what they saw as an effort to organize a West-oriented bloc [the Northern Tier] on their flank.* Defense advanced its own interpretation of State's "Open Skies" success story: Maybe the appearance of indecision in the Kremlin meant that the Soviets had not yet fully probed all of the proposal's implications; maybe they were just "stalling for time." State viewed the whole pressure strategy as dangerously provocative and likely to be counterproductive in that it would tend to make the Soviet leadership suppress their differences and close ranks.

From the "possibility of change" issue flowed most of the differences over the strategy and tactics of dealing with the Communists. DoD's position required approaching all transactions with the Communists as worst-case expectations of Communist motives, thus limiting prospects of a profitable outcome to those unlikely occasions on which the Communists lacked bargaining power and were willing to concede what the United States wanted without a quid pro quo. This left very little room for classic "give-and-take" negotiations in which both sides would hope to derive a net benefit by trading demands and concessions. In principle Defense accepted the possibility of negotiating with the Communists, but only with qualifications that drained the concession of practical value.

State and DoD positions on basic security policy had thus polarized well before the foreign ministers conference, lending the debate something of the tone of the one that Sovietologists perceived in Moscow between pragmatic nationalists and hard-shell Communists. The abrupt Soviet back-off at Geneva in November accentuated the polarization. State, for all

* See below, p. 462.
Dulles's indignant immediate reaction, found nothing in the Soviet action that had not been anticipated as a real possibility and therefore no reason to modify its position. DoD hard-liners felt triumphantly vindicated and intensified their resistance to State's persisting "soft" line.\textsuperscript{27}

The Planning Board's draft revision of NSC 5501, transmitted on 13 February 1956 as NSC 5602, reflected the mood of crisis. Most alarming was the prediction that during 1958 the USSR would "almost certainly develop and maintain" the net capability to strike a crippling blow at the United States. NSC 5501 had predicted this eventuality only "over approximately the next five years." Similarly, the prediction of a Soviet operational intercontinental ballistic missile was now advanced from 1963 to 1960-61, and a 1,500-mile ballistic missile with a high-yield warhead was expected by 1959, a date that the United States might, under its current accelerated schedule, be able to match. Both NSC documents reminded readers that there existed, as yet, no known defense against ballistic missiles. The highly publicized Soviet reductions in force levels were "likely to be offset by improved combat effectiveness of remaining forces, and Soviet ability to mobilize massive forces rapidly . . . [would] be unimpaired." Their submarine construction program had accelerated; their strategic and tactical doctrine now stressed the advantage of surprise; and their nuclear and chemical weapons were being integrated in conventional force operations. By 1958 both powers would likely have operational surface-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads; the United States would also have nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles, but the Soviets might succeed in matching this capability.\textsuperscript{28}

NSC 5501 a year earlier had noted the "approaching" possibility of total war, which would, if it occurred, "bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of both Western civilization and the Soviet system." But the board had then appraised this possibility as highly unlikely in view of mutual inhibitions against deliberately initiating such a catastrophe. War would remain a possibility only as a result of miscalculation by either side or a major Soviet technological breakthrough. In NSC 5602 the board restated this optimistic appraisal almost verbatim, adding only a warning that "in an era of rapid technological change, it is always possible that a condition of nuclear stalemate will prove transitory; much will depend upon which side can acquire or maintain technological superiority."\textsuperscript{29}

Similarly challenging, Soviet science and technology had attained in recent years a level of excellence that posed a dangerous threat to Western superiority. Some Communist weapons, now becoming operational, appeared to match the best U.S. counterparts. The Soviets had developed
rapid and efficient procedures for translating research into serial production. Soviet output of scientists and engineers already equaled or surpassed that of the United States; more ominous, the Soviets were producing more teachers and were providing superior primary and secondary school instruction. In absolute numbers of scientists and engineers the Soviets were rapidly overtaking the United States and were efficiently concentrating them on military applications.

The Soviet shift in cold war policies in 1955, the revised draft noted, from emphasis on violence and the threat of violence to reliance on divisive tactics, enticement, and duplicity opened many opportunities for enhancing Soviet and undermining U.S. influence throughout the world. Growing industrialization and advancing technology enabled the Soviet Union to foster profitable aid-and-trade relations with underdeveloped Third World countries, exploiting their raw materials and cheap labor. Participation in the Geneva summit bought the Soviets prestige, acceptance, and some alleviation of the stigma of atheistic barbarism, helping promote the Communist "peace offensive." In the NATO area, the Soviet tactics weakened confidence in the United States, nourished "popular front" movements, fostered neutralism and fears of nuclear war, and increased pressures for withdrawal of American forces. In the Middle and Far East they exploited nationalist and anticolonialist feeling and discredited U.S. efforts to build defensive alliances. The NSC believed that the present structure of U.S. alliances, while in no danger of imminent collapse, might become less cohesive as a result of these developments.30

The Local Aggression/Subversion Threat

Early in November, a State-Defense-JCS-CIA working group completed the first of the feeder studies that the Planning Board had assigned in September 1955. It addressed Communist local aggression and subversion.31 Many DoD planners, and NSC 5501 itself, considered this the principal emerging threat in the immediate future. When the problem had received examination late in 1954, State did not altogether share this view, while the Air Force and the Navy gave it only lukewarm support; its chief advocate, the Army, stood to gain increased funds and forces from its adoption.

Within the working group, the DoD members had to face up to the embarrassing fact that current intelligence did not fully support their initial premise, even though enshrined in NSC 5501, that the threat of Communist local aggression and subversion was imminent, formidable, and
growing. In September the State and CIA members underlined the point in a summary of current intelligence findings and in the section of the draft report reviewing the area-by-area situation and outlook. Communist local aggression, stated William P. Bundy, the CIA member, was a serious and pressing threat in South Vietnam and Laos, which were menaced by the victorious Viet Minh in North Vietnam—but almost nowhere else. Elsewhere in East Asia, the looming military presence of Communist China kept all countries in the region psychologically, though in varying measure, "under the gun." But the intelligence community held the general view that Communist local aggression anywhere, worldwide, was unlikely for the next few years because Communist leaders were believed to fear that any armed attack across recognized state frontiers would provoke reactions that might lead to general war, which they wanted at all costs to avoid. 32

In the Middle East, the only other area where the threat of Communist local aggression was considered a significant factor, Bundy noted that it was not "overhanging" as in Southeast Asia, partly owing to the current Soviet pursuit of coexistence, partly to the fact that nowhere in the area, since World War II, had communism gained a foothold—this a result of earlier resolute U.S.-backed counteraction in Iran in 1946 (Azerbaijan province) and 1953. Through the pro-Western "Northern Tier" (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan) and of course through its own forces in or near the area, the United States, Bundy wrote, now had the ingredients of a persuasive shield. 33 French North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria), beyond the physical reach of the Soviets, was a special case, racked by nationalist agitation, terrorism, and uprisings seeking independence from France. Tunisia had been granted internal autonomy and negotiations were under way toward complete sovereignty; here the situation was relatively tranquil. But in Morocco and Algeria the rising tide of terrorism and rural guerrilla warfare already engaged the bulk of France's armed forces, and the outlook for peace was dim. Communist agents were assumed to be involved and Bundy saw no basis for optimism. Trying to avoid the stigma of supporting colonialism without losing its waning influence over the French, the United States urged moderate reform in a situation long since polarized. 34

DoD planners derived no reassurance from the rather calm tone of this intelligence picture, and their objections evidently proved forceful enough to bring about a complete rewriting of the working group's final version submitted in November 1955. 35 The rewrite analyzed only the two most critical areas—Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It clearly reflected, in the former case, an effort to meet the criticism of over-optimism. The intelligence estimate's "reprieve" of South Vietnam and Laos from imminent aggression, it pointed out, extended only to mid-1956; thereafter
the situation in those countries would become increasingly perilous. The Viet Minh, dedicated to the unification of Vietnam under the Communist banner, posed the real and present danger—but they, at least for the present, were on their own, exhausted by eight years of war and abandoned by Peiping in the great-power settlement at Geneva in 1954. For Southeast Asia as a whole, the report estimated what it called the "persuasive shield" against Communist aggression as "not wholly adequate" and likely to become less so over time. All in all, this still did not add up to an appraisal likely to trigger alarm bells. In opposition to this view Defense planners saw every reason to conclude that compulsive Communist expansionism continued its relentless march, coordinated worldwide from the Kremlin. Unless this outward expansion of the Communist world by "piecemeal absorption" of countries on or near its periphery was checked, neutralism would intensify and "force further political and economic accommodations to Communist objectives," thus eventually isolating the United States. The immediate threat seemed most serious in the emerging nations of Southeast Asia and later in the Middle East.36

DoD planners believed it essential that the free world develop "a credible will and obvious capability to defeat and punish overt local aggression without necessarily bringing on general war." They advocated creation of "an effective and persuasive deterrent" to local aggression in the form of a composite American initial-action "show window" force, deployed for quick and effective response to prospective danger spots and designed to operate with and in support of local indigenous forces, but in a primary, not subordinate, role. Local ground forces would make up the bulk of in-being forces in contemporary Asian countries. The force should be atomic-capable, without being fully dependent on atomic weapons. Effective deterrence required that it not be denied any applicable weapon—a point that allied governments should be willing to concede.

This emphasis on the deterrent function of the proposed system, likening the deterrence of local aggression to the deterrence of general war, bespoke its distinctive feature. The mere threat of a nuclear response would ensure that it would not have to be invoked—provided, of course, that would-be aggressors themselves believed that it would be invoked. Communist rulers must be persuaded, in fact, that any resort to local aggression would surely bring rapid and effective military counteraction—by the United States unilaterally if necessary. Moreover, potential victims needed assurance that aggressors, if they persisted, would be punished without attendant devastation of their victims, and that the latter need not fear Communist reprisals if they acted vigorously to stamp out internal Communist subversion and violence. As for cost, the modest resources required for the proposed deterrent were as vital to national security, the
study insisted, as those for the general war deterrent. However, the costs were modest. The intent was not to fight “brush fires” all over the world, but to minimize the need for doing so by “the investment in a reasonable insurance premium.” Deployment of small initial-action forces would make fully obvious a “military capability which in large part already exists,” together with the will to use the capability if necessary. An effective deterrent to local aggression would, in turn, greatly reduce the risk of general war.37

The section of the working group report on internal subversion and insurrection, prepared by the group’s State member and chairman, Elbert G. Mathews, perceived the threat as distinct from armed aggression, since its tools consisted mainly of organized non-violent measures—i.e., persuasion, manipulation, and propaganda. It could occur far from the centers of Communist power, for example in Guatemala and British Guiana, where in a period of detente it could be difficult to combat. In striking contrast to the tone and concept of the Defense members’ treatment of the local aggression threat, Mathews developed the State Department themes of compromise, negotiation, sensitivity to the needs and feelings of foreign governments and peoples, avoidance of confrontation, and adaptation to practical realities. The United States, Mathews cautioned, must assess realistically what it could and could not do in attempting to right the wrongs of the world. But in most situations the deterrence of subversion and insurrection was the primary responsibility of local governments, strengthened as needed by the United States.

Controlling Communist subversion and insurrection required strong and able, not necessarily democratic, free world governments. It was not essential that they enjoy large popular support; it was essential that they seek, and be seen to seek, to satisfy popular national aspirations. Weak and incompetent governments, because they were vulnerable to Communist penetration, posed a serious threat to the whole free world that the United States could not afford to ignore, and to which it should not hesitate to apply the remedy of forceful removal—i.e., a coup—by “alternative political forces which it can overtly and covertly assist, support and bring to power.”38

The report on local aggression, insurrection, and subversion thus turned out to be three separate reports reflecting markedly dissimilar views. The Defense thesis—essentially Army-developed and authored by General Bonesteel*—appeared in the first section and dominated the whole.

* Bonesteel was the only one of the three authors who expounded a thesis, essentially the doctrine of flexible response.
The Navy seemed to have little interest in this issue and had no representative on the working group. Neither did the Air Force, but it was far from uninterested. To the Air Force's leaders the Army's portrayal of Communist local aggression as a current and future threat to U.S. security on a par with all-out war seemed a flank attack on the primacy of nuclear airpower, aimed at raising ground forces to equal status with strategic air and, of course, at bringing about a revolution in funding among the three services. Col. Robert Dixon, Air Force spokesman on NSC matters, argued that the only way to prepare simultaneously for general and local wars was to rely on the "most effective military weapons available" for both; to develop and maintain a long-term dual capability was a budgetary impossibility. He voiced uncompromising hostility to the whole notion of a separate "show window" force deployed primarily to deter local aggression. Let the unified commanders designate suitable elements for use against local aggression. Most of the "suitable" forces Dixon had in mind were, of course, nuclear armed tactical aviation.

In formulating the overall DoD position on this issue, the Army appeared, in the main, to have come out on top, prevailing over the Air Force view that the problem should be left to overseas commanders, using tactical nuclear aviation as needed. The most persuasive deterrent to Communist local aggression would be ready U.S. forces suitably equipped and deployed to act promptly when and where needed. State did not have a primary interest in the issue, but the board's final revision of NSC 5501's "ready forces" paragraph showed the scars of a bruising intramural battle over the Army's concept of a "show window initial action" force designed mainly for this mission. The revised paragraph stipulated that ready forces must be included in the total establishment, suitably deployed to deal with local threats, accepting "some degree of maldeployment" for general war. Anti-aggression forces must indeed, the board stated (echoing the working group report), "be sufficiently versatile to use both conventional and nuclear weapons" and have a "flexible and selective" capability for such use, since the United States would not deny itself the use of nuclear weapons. But (rejecting the Air Force view) "such forces must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons." When confronted by the choice of acquiescing in Communist aggression or taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States would have to be prepared to take those risks necessary for its security.
NSC 5602 met an unenthusiastic reception in Defense almost matching the disfavor heaped on NSC 5501 a year earlier—but this time around Wilson took the lead. On 23 February 1956, he presided over the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting, in effect, as a “council of war” to devise tactics to toughen the NSC 5602 draft. In his opinion, the paper was “some small improvement in detail over NSC 5501,” but so lacking in specifics that it could be read to support almost any course of action. It “might not do any harm, [but] it would not do much good either.” He reported to the NSC executive secretary the unanimous view of the AFPC that the new paper “does not represent the incisive and clear statement of the basic U.S. security policies which we believe is needed to meet the challenge of new Soviet moves.”

In the AFPC meeting Radford labeled NSC 5602 “a longer, not so straightforward redraft of the basic policy paper written in 1953.” He wanted a “more realistic statement of national policy.” Wilson agreed and asked him, along with the chiefs and service secretaries, since he (Wilson) would not be present, to repeat these views at the NSC meeting scheduled for 27 February. He added his familiar bromide: a tough defense policy would not necessarily require spending more money. Bonesteel, the DoD member of the Planning Board, which had written the paper, expressed his disappointment in the way 5602 had turned out. 41

Of the service secretaries, Navy Secretary Thomas expressed the most contempt for NSC 5602. Except for its rather weak statement on use of nuclear weapons, he saw it as only a “minor revision” of its predecessor and unacceptable. The paper was defensive, obsessed with enemy strength and the threat of a crippling attack on the continental United States. It should rather show appreciation of the “tremendous advantages held by us and our allies,” military, economic, industrial, moral, and spiritual. 42

United in their dislike of the paper for its lack of specificity and clear direction, the AFPC bickered over rival specific proposals, particularly over whether, in dealing with local aggression, use of nuclear weapons should be normalized (Air Force) or reserved only as a last resort (Army). The council finally agreed to accept as a valid statement of its views the comments that the Joint Chiefs were to submit to Wilson on the following day. In these, apart from a few substantive amendments, the chiefs had stressed their principal worry over the “marked deterioration of the Free World position in the past year, due mainly to a new and more flexible approach on the part of the Communist Bloc (USSR).” They recommended that, whatever action the NSC might take on NSC 5602, “a complete re-study of the Basic National Security Policy be made as a matter of
urgency." Wilson promptly forwarded the JCS paper to the NSC with a terse "I concur in these views," and added a reinforcing recommendation of his own for "a much shorter, positive and affirmative statement of U.S. policy to meet the challenge of the new Soviet cold war offensive."43

On 27 February 1956 the NSC, with the president in the chair, opened its review of NSC 5602 by accepting virtually the entire 12-page Annex (Estimate of the Situation). The Joint Chiefs suggested only the addition of a short sentence, elaborating on a point already made in the same paragraph: "general war might occur as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions which neither side originally intended to lead to general war." The new "estimate," then, was essentially its predecessor writ large, an editorial updating of NSC 5501; it portrayed the cold war arena in a moderate blend of pessimistic and optimistic colors.44

The council soon bogged down in a prolonged discussion of a single five-line paragraph, one of the few new ones in the paper, concerning the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs had proposed to expand it as follows: "Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and will be used in military operations short of general war when the effectiveness of the operations of the U.S. forces employed will be enhanced thereby. For such operations, the decision as to specific uses will be made by the President." Asked to elucidate, Radford explained that he and his colleagues wanted to correct the widespread impression that nuclear weapons were useful only for offense. "It would make a tremendous difference defensively if our U.S. forces could not use nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves."45

The president intervened. Agreeing with Radford from a military point of view, he called attention to the political fact that world opinion adamantly opposed the use of nuclear weapons in small wars. But when Dulles then suggested that the use of nuclear weapons in small wars, but not in general war, should require advance presidential authorization, the president backtracked, conceding that a military commander under direct attack must be expected to use every weapon at hand if needed to defend himself, and he broadened the point to apply to all available weapons in any situation involving direct attack on U.S. forces. Secretary Humphrey then insisted, as on numerous earlier occasions, that the United States could not afford a different set of weapons for each type of war. "We have got to use nuclear weapons in . . . [any] future war." Apparently, Dulles retorted, "we must choose between having all the military flexibility we wished and losing all our allies." He agreed with the president, however, that whenever U.S. forces were directly attacked, they should use any weapons available to them. The president finally decided that the council should suspend action on the nuclear weapons
paragraph pending further study. Ironically, the final decision some three weeks later, not discussed by the council, was to revert to the paragraph as originally written by the Planning Board with the addition of a single sentence: “Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the president.”

The council made short work of the section dealing with the use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons in general war, if military effectiveness would be thereby enhanced. State wanted to insert a provision for consulting allies if time permitted; Robertson proposed a further addition, “and if an attack on U.S. forces is not involved.” These changes were later formally approved, after AEC Chairman Strauss reminded the council that radiological weapons did not yet exist.

One of the proposals adopted by the AFPC and submitted to the NSC, but not included in NSC 5602, sought to delineate in general terms the anticipated roles of the Army and Navy in the early stages of a general war—i.e., the Navy to clear the ocean lanes, the Army “to do its part in meeting critical land situations.” Evidently the president was waiting for this one. The chief task of the ground forces in a general war he suspected would be to preserve order at home, and “God only knew what the Navy would be doing in a nuclear attack.” The matter in question concerned the decisive role of nuclear airpower in deterring or winning a general war, not how particular services should deploy their forces at a particular stage of it. “A basic policy paper,” he said, addressing Radford directly, “is not a war plan.”

No one disputed the president’s argument, and he moved on to the next point, concerning forces required to meet or deter local Communist aggression. In this context he questioned the validity of the distinction between general and so-called “peripheral” war, inevitably opening again the Pandora’s box of nuclear weapons. In the future, he said, peripheral wars must not be allowed to drag out, but must be fought “on the same basis” as a general war. “Had we not made up our minds that if the Communists renewed their aggression against Korea we would go ‘all-out’ to meet it?” Testing the assertion, Dulles asked him what he would do if the Viet Minh attacked South Vietnam; would he drop atomic bombs on Peking? Well, perhaps not, the president replied, but “we would certainly bomb the bases in China which were supporting the aggression.” Humphrey called for a “unanimous decision on what kind of a war the United States was going to be prepared to fight if it occurred.” Harold Stassen voiced a solitary dissenting note, warning of serious trouble “if the free world came to believe that the United States was only capable of fighting with nuclear weapons.” Radford made his familiar prediction that the use of
these weapons "would become accepted throughout the world just as soon as people could lay their hands upon them." With the discussion seemingly headed for the decision that Humphrey had called for, the president effectively postponed further discussion by invoking the Planning Board's recommendation for a study and presentation of the local aggression problem. This postponement was, of course, a corollary of the earlier one concerning integration and use of nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs wanted unequivocal assurance that in any future emergency, nuclear weapons could be used automatically if militarily desirable—regardless of objections by allies, or State, or any other authority below the president.

On 1 March the NSC continued its discussion of NSC 5602, taking up the Planning Board's statement on the mobilization base that reflected a split between the two major views of the kind of war the base would have to support. A majority of the board wanted to provide for support of both general war and operations short of general war. The Treasury and BoB members wanted mobilization base preparations limited to support of general war. The Joint Chiefs generally agreed with the majority position. Their proposed statement simply called for readiness for hostilities "ranging from local to general war" and asserted that the mobilization base should be "predicated on approved war plans." The brief discussion had a fatalistic tone, typified by Radford's comment that little could be done to diminish the total vulnerability of the whole mobilization base. But the practical question regarding the mobilization base concerned whether allowance should be made for enemy bomb damage and for provision of support for U.S. allies. Sooner or later, warned ODM's Arthur Flemming, this problem would have to be dealt with. The president made no comment. The Joint Chiefs' recommended language was adopted in the final revision.

The circulation of the amended NSC 5602 and its approval as NSC 5602/1 on 15 March left a mass of unfinished business in the form of decisions to defer particular issues pending further study. It also left an even larger residue of discontent, particularly in the JCS, which felt that the new policy contained too many critical areas open to interpretation, such as the division of effort and resources for dealing with major and with lesser aggressions, or the use of nuclear weapons. In an eleventh-hour effort apparently to modify the paper or delay its approval, the JCS had written Wilson on 12 March reiterating the misgivings they had expressed two weeks earlier. Despite the general adequacy of the national military strategy, they said, "the free world situation is gradually deteriorating," and unless the trend was arrested, the United States would, within a few years, be "placed in great jeopardy." The leadership problems of
the United States in the free world, they felt, were not military but political, social and psychological, and centered mainly in the widespread fear abroad that, in a real crisis, the United States might not rise to the occasion. They urged certain measures calculated to restore the free world's confidence in American leadership: congressional authorization for the president to take prompt action in a crisis, including use of troops, and for expedited expenditure of funds for military and economic aid.

"Over-concern for the acquiescence of allies in major crises," the chiefs also declared, had been, in its harmful effect on the national interest, the most objectionable single feature of national security policy during the past few years.51

The chiefs' foot-in-the-door effort had no visible effect; it did not receive any notice when the president approved the amended paper three days later. Wilson clearly regarded the matter as settled and did not give the chiefs even the satisfaction of a reply. On 12 April Navy Under Secretary Thomas Gates tried to reopen the issue. NSC 5602/1 was still deficient, he wrote Wilson, cutting too many corners and, according to his information, "not satisfactory to the Department of Defense." If so, would it not be "worthwhile" for the JCS to start work immediately to prepare a "better document" for the 1957 revision of the BNSP? Gates's overture, routed to the JCS for comment, was effectively quashed in that forum, which evidently felt that both the president and Wilson were ready to call it quits, as was indeed the case.52 Yet, once again this experience demonstrated the enormous difficulties in arriving at a firm and explicit statement of national security policy, especially at a time of rapid and unsettling change in the global environment and subject to powerful domestic political pressures. The outcome of the labyrinthine, almost Byzantine, nature of the process as contending interests vied for position was a juggling act that involved all of the major elements in policymaking—politics, money, strategy, technology, and perceptions of the international scene. This usually guaranteed, as with NSC 5602/1, that the end product would be much less than the definitive guide to action that it was intended to be. There was generally enough ambiguity, both calculated and unintentional, to permit interpretations of policy that best suited the outlook and interests of the parties that helped shape the document, from the president on down.

A JCS historian has observed that despite the imperfections of NSC 5602/1, life went on. In the process of preparing strategic plans, for example, many issues that NSC 5602/1 had left dangling were worked over further and eventually decided at higher levels, providing a corpus of "case law," so to speak, that supplemented the basic paper.53
Preparing the Last New Look Budget

The unhappy experience of Budget Director Hughes with the late 1954 "add-ons" to the FY 1956 Defense budget was evidently still fresh in his memory the following spring. On 13 May 1955, with the cabinet scheduled to discuss the FY 1957 budget as its first order of business, he came armed with a plan, apparently cleared with the president, calculated to reduce the likelihood of this happening again.

Hughes's Abortive Budget Exercise

Hughes's review of the budgetary outlook, which opened the meeting, revealed a tantalizing possibility that the FY 1957 budget might finally produce a tiny (only $400 million) black-ink balance. To be sure, the arithmetic behind this figure, to those who took the trouble to examine it, must have seemed optimistic. It projected receipts of $62.8 billion (as against $61.5 billion projected for FY 1956)—$3.3 billion more than in the fiscal year almost completed and about $2.8 billion more than had been projected for FY 1956 in the budget submitted the previous January. Estimated Defense expenditures remained at the same rock-bottom figure as the FY 1957 $34 billion spending "goal," inserted in that document at Hughes's behest and now widely regarded as unattainable. Hughes's projected surplus depended heavily on both steadily and rapidly rising revenues and tightly constricted defense spending—a conjunction of circumstances not likely to be realized. Nevertheless, the president and Treasury Secretary Humphrey both made a strong pitch for a balanced budget in 1957, and Humphrey, noting the projected three-year (FY 1955-57)
leveling-off of expenditures "in the $62 billion area," urged a major
effort to bend the curve down in FY 1956 and FY 1957 to accom­
modate a tax cut in the latter year, which he believed the economy
needed. The president demurred on this point, stressing that budget­
balancing came before tax reduction, not vice versa. The action record
noted that after meeting the actual needs of national security and
"necessary and valid functions of government, . . . a balanced adminis­
trative budget in FY 1957 is to take precedence over other desirable
objectives, including further tax reduction, until such objectives can
be achieved within the context of a balanced budget."2

The cabinet also approved Hughes's proposed change in budget
procedure. In recent years, he recalled, agencies' projected budgets
had tended increasingly to exceed the initial ceilings established by
the president in June or July. "Too many major issues have been
raised for decision in the fall when there is not adequate time to . . .
make decisions . . . because of the pressures in meeting the deadline for
the transmission of the budget document to Congress in January." Hughes
proposed to raise and resolve issues earlier in the process, in
May and June. Agency heads would participate more actively in this
stage of the process as well as in the development of their own agen­
cies' ceilings, and BoB would also get into the act, before ceilings were
fixed, "with a view to reaching agreement or identifying areas of differ­
ence." The president would thus be in a position to rule on unresolved
issues and take these rulings into account in making his ceiling deter­
minations in June or July. Hughes proposed that agency heads submit to
him their preliminary estimates for FY 1957 by 31 May—i.e., within
less than three weeks.3

Underlying this scheme was the unspoken premise that budget­
making was a negotiating process between those who dispensed money
and those who asked for it. Wielding theoretically despotic power, the
president could not, as a practical matter, arbitrarily impose budgetary
ceilings on the military services in take-it-or-leave-it fashion; he had to
consider Congress and the public, where the services had powerful
allies, as well as the morale of service leaders and personnel. Also, un­
expected events could abruptly increase military needs. Realizing all
this, Hughes evidently hoped that by lengthening the negotiating
process and injecting his own agency into it early on, at least some of
the contentious issues could be resolved and more viable ceilings
arrived at. Still, the scheme's fundamental weakness could hardly be
disguised. Agencies competed among themselves for scarce dollars, and
although the administration might favor some over others, all wanted
more than the administration was willing to seek from Congress.
Hughes followed up his cabinet presentation of 13 May with a similar one to the NSC on the 19th, to which the president added the same points he had previously made. Meanwhile, Hughes had sent reminders to Wilson and other agency heads of the requirement to submit preliminary budget estimates by 31 May, noting that he wanted to talk with each of them after reviewing the estimates, and before recommending ceilings to the president. Despite the imminence of the deadline, it took some time to crank up the Pentagon's ponderous budget machinery for the task. Not until the 25th, with the deadline a week away, were service budget officers briefed and instructions sent out to the service secretaries requesting data showing obligations and expenditures for fiscal years 1955 through 1957 and new obligational authority for FY 1957. Apparently the sudden demand for so much information on short notice did not create the chaos that one might have expected, perhaps because OSD told the staffs to use the policies, assumptions, and force levels already approved for the FY 1956 budget; most of the data may thus have been available off the shelf. Of this phenomenon, McNeil's subordinate in charge of the operation commented on the 25th that the services seemed to "have the capacity to provide the data by the morning of 1 June 1955."

The Army met the deadline, and when submissions for the Navy and Air Force reached Wilson's desk a week later he forwarded all three to BoB on 9 June without waiting to complete his own review. It was clear from these "flash" estimates that the service chiefs had not agonized unduly over the injunction to determine "maximum amounts consistent with" the general budget policy, either for FY 1956 or FY 1957. Estimated DoD expenditures for FY 1956 rose from the FY 1955 total of $35.3 billion to $36.6 billion, and for FY 1957 to $39.7 billion, leaving far behind Hughes's recent goal of $34 billion. The two highest leapers, the Army and Air Force, projected FY 1957 spending of $1.6 billion and 1.5 billion greater, respectively, than their FY 1955 levels. Even more dramatic, DoD's new obligational authority estimates for FY 1957 initially shot up a staggering $13.3 billion over the FY 1955 figure. Hughes was not pleased with the Defense wish lists, which in fact faded into history as a footnote listing what the military services, in the late spring of 1955, would have liked to have. At that time, the practical business of developing official estimates for submission to OSD in October was getting under way. By August, both in BoB and the Pentagon, the "flash" estimates of June were apparently forgotten.
Hughes's chief worry at this point, as he wrote Wilson on 11 August, centered on the upward spiral of DoD spending estimates for the fiscal year just begun, which would affect the prospects for meeting the president's goal of achieving budgetary balance in both that year and the one following. Hughes failed to mention that as DoD spending estimates soared, so did revenue estimates, responding to an obviously booming economy. By the middle of September the official revenue projection for FY 1956 had reached $62.1 billion, $600 million higher than the forecast Hughes had given the cabinet and the NSC in May. A balanced budget appeared in sight, brightening the outlook for FY 1957 as well.\(^8\)

*Guidelines: "Spend Less!"

Of course neither Hughes nor Wilson considered it politic at this juncture to admit the possibility of a balanced budget. Both were under heavy pressure from the White House to reduce outlays for FY 1956 and FY 1957, while current and projected military spending was zooming relentlessly upward. Wilson felt beleaguered, caught between almost defiant resistance by the services to further spending curbs and Treasury Secretary Humphrey's public insistence that DoD could, if it would, squeeze out another billion in savings without harm to the nation's security. On 14 October Wilson circulated a seven-page "general guidelines" paper for FY 1956 and FY 1957 which, without mentioning the word "budget" or a single dollar figure, made it clear that Defense spending must come down. In the main, the paper listed methodically, category by category, familiar money-saving measures (e.g., identification of excess military personnel and "promotion of only well qualified personnel"). The bulk of the measures were humdrum, but a handful of major procurement and production particulars were startlingly comprehensive and raised such fundamental policy questions as review of all requirements for conventional weapons in the light of the availability of more modern ones, presumably including nuclear weapons, and reevaluation of all outstanding procurement and production contracts, project orders, and plans for additional procurement.\(^9\) While perhaps within the competence of a single service to initiate, such far-reaching reforms would ultimately involve OSD, the JCS, and non-Defense agencies and even go to the NSC for approval. Whatever their merits, they could not bear fruit in time to affect the FY 1957 budget.
The pervasive "spend less!" message of this numbingly bureaucratic document probably should have been read as Wilson's response to the combination of heavy pressure for economy and lack of specific direction by the White House and BoB. The FY 1957 budget ceilings promised for June or July were still not forthcoming. To meet the FY 1956 spending objective Wilson had tried, and failed, to hold the line at the $34 billion promised in January. Now, in mid-October, his new fallback position was $34.5 billion, but it too was beginning to crumble. Meanwhile, the services had substantially completed their FY 1957 budget estimates, without benefit of ceilings or even of Wilson's 14 October guidance paper, which, to serve its purpose, should have appeared at least two months earlier. When Wilson visited the president in the hospital in Denver on 17 October, perhaps mindful of the patient's condition, he said nothing about the new budget estimates and reported only that he had set a target of $35 billion for FY 1957 spending, conceding that this optimistic figure would be difficult to achieve. Also FY 1957 would bring big new expenses—the SAGE warning system, the DEW line, additional Nike installations, the ICBM program, accelerated production of B-52 bombers and F-102 and F-104 interceptors, and other programs. The president showed "no surprise or disagreement" over the prospective rise in spending.\(^{10}\)

**Manpower Targets**

If dollar ceilings were still elusive, strength ceilings by now were fairly firm. On 18 August Wilson had asked the Joint Chiefs for their recommendations on FY 1957 force structure and personnel strengths, admonishing them to take into account the implications of improved design and increased availability of weapons along with strategic requirements and to justify any proposed changes from the strengths and force levels approved in January. A week later he notified Navy Secretary Thomas of his decision on the requested increase in Marine Corps strength for the current fiscal year from 193,000 to 215,000, which Congress had recently financed by appropriating an additional $46 million. "For the time being," he told the secretary, he would split the difference, approving a strength of 205,000 to be reached by 1 January 1956 pending the president's decisions on military personnel strengths for FY 1957 in the context of the new budget. At that time the Marine Corps' end strength for FY 1956 would be adjusted accordingly.\(^{11}\)
In mid-September the Joint Chiefs received from the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) the separate recommendations of the services. The Marine Corps of course still wanted the Congress-supported 215,000 men. The Army sought an increase of 20,750 over its current authorization. The Navy wanted an increase of some 29,000. Only the Air Force asked no increase, either for itself or for the other services. The major recommended structural change came from the Army, which wanted to add 2 mobile divisions within its currently authorized strength of 1,025,000, making a grand total, with training and static divisions, of 19. The JSPC recommended acceptance of the service proposals; the Air Force member opposed them, arguing that Soviet gains in military strength had been offset by superior improvements, especially in nuclear weaponry, by the United States and its allies.

Since the Joint Chiefs tended to share the views of their JSPC subordinates, the inability of the latter to reach a consensus foreshadowed a similar split among the chiefs, in which a “losing majority,” resisting New Look economies, would finally be overruled by higher authority supporting the views of the “winning minority.” This had happened before, and the chiefs seemed to sense that it would happen again. They concluded and so informed Wilson on 6 October “that the United States should not reduce the present major forces of the Services through FY 1957,” and that their combat effectiveness must be ensured by provision of adequate numbers of trained personnel. They recognized the services’ need for additional personnel resulting from the advent of complex new weapons, the loss of highly trained personnel to better paying jobs in the civilian economy, and the demands of new and expanding programs.

But JCS consensus dissolved in the face of further proposed changes—chiefly decreases in proposed additions, except for the Army’s request for a further increase. The impasse among the service chiefs was broken by JCS Chairman Radford who, as usual, had the final word. Although the requested increases that emerged were modest—about 48,000—and were not enough to materially affect that year’s budget, on balance he believed that the requested personnel increases should not be granted at this time, “pending developments within the next few months.” Wilson promptly bought this solution, and on 7 October approved for preparation of the FY 1957 budget the then approved FY 1956 end strengths—namely, Army 1,025,000, Navy 657,000, Marine Corps 193,000, Air Force 975,000, for a total of 2,850,000.

Wilson reported this decision to the president when he and Radford visited him in the hospital in Denver on 17 October. The secretary stressed the interim nature of the decision. Since the proposed increases were so
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small, Wilson said the matter should be reviewed about 1 December, by which time the results of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference would be known. The proposed increases were indeed small, Eisenhower commented, and "not out of order." He felt that "the Chiefs should be supported in their request for increases of this magnitude," looking to a total strength of "about 2,900,000."\(^\text{15}\)

**BoB Dissects the Service Budget Estimates**

The FY 1957 budget estimates submitted by the services in October 1955 seemed, at first blush, to have left behind the fantasies of the June "flash" estimates.\(^\text{16}\) They showed an aggregate NOA of $40.6 billion, compared with $42.9 billion in June, and expenditures of $37.6 billion, compared with $39.7 billion in June, with most of the cuts by the Army. However, since by now the June estimates had been relegated to the back files, the more appropriate comparison was with the FY 1956 budget. This comparison revealed the most dramatic figure of all: an increase in NOA of $6.1 billion. Expenditure projections, by contrast, were only $1 billion higher than the $36.6 billion now being projected for FY 1956. The $40.6 billion in new obligatory authority for FY 1957 reflected, in part, the deferred needs excluded from the modest FY 1956 budget.\(^\text{17}\)

The BoB staff took a gloomy view of the service budget estimates. Although they rated them as "firmer" than in previous years, this merely meant a more detailed and documented justification of estimated costs. The customary program review alone would not suffice to reduce the NOA requests to acceptable levels, since the increases stemmed mainly from new, rather than established, programs. The Air Force planned to complete its 137-wing force, expand the air defense system, deploy guided missile squadrons, and enlarge its reserve forces, all of which pointed to ultimate expenditures of $20 billion a year. The Navy was "looking forward to a complete new look with atomic ships and guided missiles," with annual spending of at least $12 billion. Only the Army, for the present, seemed prepared to live at approximately its current level of outlays, about $8.5 billion a year. BoB officials worried about the interaction of rising expenditures and larger influxes of new money.

Demands for more NOA in FY 1957 were, in part, a response to heavier outlays in the current year, which reduced the amount of unobligated funds that would be carried over for spending in FY 1957 and later years. A larger influx of newly appropriated money in FY 1957,
in turn, would generate more spending, some in that year but even more subsequently, resulting in increasing expenditures in 1957 and later, substantially above Wilson's current fiscal year expenditure program of $34.5 billion. This was a cause for "most serious concern."

FY 1957 spending could be held down to the current FY 1956 target of $34.5 billion without altering the existing structure of forces and manpower by such practices as stretching out modernization of equipment and public works construction, selective emphasis in procurement on newly developed items, and reduction or cessation of production of obsolescent materiel. Of course there were "political implications," and austerity measures would not be easy to enforce. Ironically, the BoB analysts seemed to regard the Army's FY 1957 estimates as the most inviting reduction target, even though the other two departments had submitted much higher estimates. The Army's proposed FY 1957 budget, they said, simply superimposed on its 1956 predecessor a variety of more advanced materiel, while also continuing to fund the older conventional types. "The development and procurement of such items as guided missiles, rockets, aircraft and related equipment for airborne operations and nuclear capability will depreciate the effective value of much of the present equipment very sharply in the relatively near future." Why not cut back the 1956 budget and its 1957 extension since the materiel they produced would soon be obsolete anyway? The Army's budget might also be significantly diminished by a recomputation of mobilization reserve requirements currently under way aimed at both modernization and quantitative reductions.

_The Army Is Different_

Overlapping requirements for new and old weaponry performing the same or similar functions in a time of rapidly advancing technology and tight peacetime budgets, although not peculiar to the Army, did have distinctive features there. The Air Force already dreaded the day when it would have to begin phasing out heavy bombers in favor of ICBMs; soon the ingenious notion of the deterrent Triad* would spare it this unpleasant necessity, as the Navy would also find good

* Triad would be the term applied, beginning in 1961, to the balanced combination of long-range bombers, long-range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched intermediate-range missiles constituting the nation's strategic nuclear offensive forces. In 1956 it still lacked the second and third elements.
reasons for building both nuclear-powered and diesel-powered submarines. In the Army, battlefield missiles theoretically competed with conventional artillery for budget dollars. Yet the two continued to coexist, for essentially the same reasons that the Air Force retained its bombers and ICBMs. The two types were sufficiently different and useful to warrant the additional cost of keeping both. Moreover, in the main the Army still fielded a conventional force in firepower, mobility, and basic structure. Significant improvements had occurred, even since 1953, but exotic new weapons—the 280-mm. atomic cannon, the Honest John rocket, the Corporal and Nike missiles—existed as yet in such small numbers that they had made hardly a dent in the organization or tactics of the field forces, although active experimentation was in progress.

Army Chief of Staff Ridgway's arguments against using the growing availability of increased firepower to justify reducing the Army’s manpower were by now widely known. He developed these arguments further in his memoirs published in 1956. Since it could be assumed that any major adversary would deploy similar battlefield nuclear weapons, not to mention those deliverable by air, staggering numbers of casualties would result on both sides. Consequently, Ridgway seemed to regard the task of developing effective countermeasures, even more than the development of new, more lethal weaponry, as a prime necessity. He saw the Army's response to the challenge of the nuclear age mainly in terms of tactical adaptation of ground forces to the threat of instant obliteration by the new weapons, without impairing their capacity for effective offensive action. He stressed small self-contained "battle groups" transportable by air within the battle zone and intercontinentally, superior firepower, and use of aircraft for all purposes related to military operations. "It is obvious," he concluded, "that the Army described above bears little resemblance to the massed, slow-moving armies of World War II. It is an Army in the process of evolutionary change."20

The BoB analysts underestimated both the Army's dedication to modernization and the obstacles it faced in attempting to modernize. Ridgway's book made clear his acceptance of the nuclear weapon revolution and the dawning missile age. Both he and General Taylor, his successor, gave the highest priority to the development and integration of new weapons into the Army's force structure and tactical doctrine. Redstone Arsenal's work on tactical ballistic missiles had put the Army at the forefront of ballistic missile technology. The Army was now contesting leadership with the Air Force in the race to develop an operational IRBM. Its Nike antiaircraft missile, to which a nuclear-tipped version
would soon be added, was a pillar of the continental defense system. In signal communications, armored vehicles, motor transport, short-range tactical aviation, and other materiel important to its mission the Army kept abreast of the state of the art.

Since the advent of the New Look, however, OSD, over bitter Army protests, had kept a tight lid on Army R&D budgets. In 1955 it received only $361 million, 13 percent less than the Navy, 27 percent less than the Air Force. In 1956 its R&D budget was further reduced to $333 million, 23 percent less than the Navy's, 42 percent less than the Air Force's—both of these services receiving more than in 1955. Even so, R&D budgets usually took a larger slice of the Army's meager total budget than the other services' as a percentage of theirs. For FY 1957 BoB proposed to impose on the Army the same level in R&D funding as in FY 1956. Again the Army balked. If held to this level, it maintained, it would be unable to undertake any new projects in air defense or long-range surface-to-surface missiles. It would have to stretch out or postpone work on one or more guided missiles, Army aviation, and planned improvements in air-transportability of equipment and weapons; current development programs for tanks, guns, rockets, and ammunition would have to be cut back. For FY 1957 the Army asked for $400 million in new obligational authority for R&D.

Not surprisingly, the Army did not agree with the BoB analysts' view that in FYs 1956 and 1957 it was expected to continue buying the same old-fashioned materiel. It declared its emphasis on "procurement of the most modern combat items at the expense, where necessary, of increased readiness in the more conventional-type weapons, and items shortly to be replaced by newly developed materiel." It was not apparent that Army procurement differed significantly from that of the Air Force in the balance between new and old materiel except in the amount of publicity accorded it. Both services were cautiously phasing in improved versions of older workhorse weapons while continuing to procure large numbers of the older weapons and postponing the plunge into production of new models while testing for flaws that could force expensive shutdowns after production had begun to roll. Indeed the Air Force, not the Army, became the object of strong criticism in Congress and the media in the summer and fall of 1955 for having earlier held back production of the latest heavy bombers and interceptors while Soviet factories appeared to be turning out such aircraft in increasing numbers.

In its pursuit of modernization, however, the Army had to make do with a much smaller budget than the other services. Three quarters of its NOA for FY 1957 had to go for military personnel and operation
and maintenance, compared with about 46 percent for the Navy and the Air Force. Since the Army received no procurement NOA for FY 1957, it had to rely on diminishing carryover funds for procurement.24

Through November and into the first week of December the OSD-BoB review staff whittled away at the services' budget estimates. From the outset BoB analysts clearly visualized a more austere budget than their OSD counterparts, seeking a realistic spending target of $34.5 billion. This was only a half-billion higher than Hughes had proposed to the NSC six months earlier, and less by the same amount than the one Wilson had suggested to the president in October. Much of the problem, the review staff believed, derived from the evident unwillingness of the services to hold FY 1956 spending down to $34.5 billion (Wilson himself had by now abandoned this target), because the momentum of increased spending would carry over into FY 1957 and raise the demand for new money.

The services' requests for NOA in FY 1957 totaled $40.6 billion, to which they intended to add about $2.4 billion in carried-over unobligated funds to finance their programs. Estimated expenditures were $37.6 billion. In a preliminary analysis early in November the BoB staff explored the feasibility of reducing these totals by applying the "restrictive" interpretation of Wilson's 14 October guidelines mentioned earlier. This was essentially a reasonable rather than a radical approach to austerity (for example, they rejected a proposed deactivation of some 30 less-than-indispensable military installations as not worth the political uproar it would cause). Hypothetically, this exercise reduced the $40.6 billion in NOA to $36.4 billion, with associated expenditures of $35.6 billion. Trying again, and harder, the staff aimed at specific targets of $34 billion in NOA and $34.5 billion in expenditures. This would require scrapping the Air Force's plan to build up heavy-bomber wings from 30 to 45 B-52s in order to accommodate the accelerated production (17 B-52s per month) ordered the previous spring. In addition, several major continental defense programs would be stretched out; the expanded guided missile effort would be slowed down; naval shipbuilding would be held to $1.2 billion and naval aircraft procurement to $1.8 billion. Army procurement would be cut another $200 million to $1 billion (prior-year funds) to keep expenditures down, and public works for all three services would be held to $1.5 billion NOA, against $1.9 billion in 1956.

The distribution of cuts in this exercise was instructive. Evidently the BoB staff believed that the Army budget had been so thoroughly worked over before its submission that little pay dirt remained and only small downward adjustments were required. Only a little over one billion
was excised even in the draconian $34 billion exercise. The richer high-tech services were harder hit than the Army, especially the Navy, whose NOA would be cut 21 percent as compared with 15 percent for the Air Force. The BoB analysts ended their report on a warning note. Given all the suggested reductions, expenditures in 1958 and 1959 would still rise substantially with the across-the-board increase in living and operating costs, higher maintenance costs for modern equipment, and the necessity to replenish stocks. The only escape would come via further cuts in strength or reduction in the pace and level of modernization and readiness. 25

Wilson Raises the Spending Target

In mid-November Wilson raised his FY 1957 expenditure target to $35.8 billion, $800 million over the figure he had given the president a month earlier. In justification of this target he cited the greater complexity of modern equipment and generally higher costs of modernization, higher military and civilian pay (even with fewer people), and recent new and accelerated programs such as continental defense, long-range ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, etc. Hughes lost no time in reporting Wilson's move to the president and in notifying Wilson that he had done so. 26 Evidently Hughes hoped, by invoking the president's immediate intervention, to forestall Wilson from offering the services an eleventh-hour compromise, below their current high budget requests but above the austere levels required to keep defense costs under control in FY 1957 and the years beyond.

Hughes's paper listed what needed to be done. The FY 1957 estimates would be reduced in anticipation of a series of measures to be taken by the services in 1957-58: a general stretchout of such major procurements as shipbuilding, heavy bombers, naval aircraft, and public works; keeping B-52 wings at their current size; and holding reserve training requirements to "feasibility of accomplishment." In many procurement areas the availability of large unobligated balances from prior years created a built-in pressure to spend. Even if all these things were done, "the demands for additional dollars inherent in the current programs will require that expenditures be increased . . . subsequent to 1957" unless modernization was slowed down and readiness skimmed, or personnel strength and force structure were reduced. 27

Wilson did not announce his new spending target to the services or call for new estimates from them. But word may have filtered out that OSD might now be a little more charitable to the services, perhaps
even recognize that the $34.5 billion spending target was negotiable. The effects surfaced in a comprehensive set of “preliminary” estimates put together by McNeil’s office at the beginning of December, showing the still tentative status of budget negotiations. The spending total was still above Wilson’s new target, by about $150 million. Clearly the services were more resistant to cutbacks in their spending projections than to cutbacks in new money or higher levels of obligational activity. Reductions in spending meant waiting longer for delivery of important new weapons and equipment, particularly those needed for key sectors of the continental defense system now nearing completion, whereas postponing NOA requests and obligation of funds for new contracts would only delay fulfillment of more distant goals.28

For the Air Force the preliminary estimates meant reasonable assurance of achieving its 137-wing goal on schedule. As usual, the Army had to sacrifice most. Its 7 percent cut in total planned spending, which included 10 percent in operations and maintenance and 8 percent in procurement, offset the skimpy Air Force and Navy cuts, accounting for most of the 5 percent slash in DoD spending for FY 1957. Army NOA and planned obligations showed a substantial 10 percent reduction. Responsive to BoB criticism, the Army pledged significant FY 1957 procurement changes, with emphasis on guided missiles rather than conventional armament, and no more tanks, presumably pending development of a new model; current contracts would be allowed to run out. Additional facility expansion and modernization would be deferred except as needed to support the guided missile effort. The FY 1957 estimates of obligations reflected this emphasis.29

The President Decides

On 2 December, while the preliminary estimates were still in the typewriter, Wilson and Radford drove over icy roads up to Gettysburg to update the president on the budget review. Wilson brought with him draft directives authorizing the military personnel strengths the services had recommended and the president, at his meeting with Wilson in Denver on 17 October, had indicated he favored. Eisenhower readily approved them, including the transfer to the Army of responsibility for overseas air base construction and repair, along with 7,500 additional engineer spaces to perform the function. Previously, the Air Force had had the responsibility, using Army personnel charged to the Air Force budget and strength allotment. This would increase the Army’s FY 1957 strength ceiling to 1,053,250 and the DoD total to 2,905,985. The Air
Force retained its strength at 975,000, while the Navy and Marine Corps received small augmentations that raised their strength to 672,000 and 205,735 respectively. The president seemed still worried about manpower and suggested that strict justification of personnel increases be required. Manpower savings, the president went on, would help to finance the advanced types of materiel needed, and in the process would "keep men in industry where they would be producing." He stressed particularly his desire to push ahead with ballistic missile development "at the fastest possible rate."

Little time was spent on the budget itself, although Wilson had come armed with detailed figures and tables. The president did not argue with Wilson's recommended spending ceiling of $36 billion, but at the end of the discussion he asked Wilson "to see whether by rigorous economy the expenditure figure could not be gotten just under $35 billion." Evidently this was more than an afterthought. After Wilson left, the president asked Radford, who had stayed behind, "personally to go through the itemized budget sheets . . . take up each item, and justify it to himself." As one who had worked with all three services and knew their habits, he explained, the admiral should be able to sniff out areas "where funds could be saved without hurting the program." Still not satisfied, after Radford had left he assigned the same chore to his assistant, Colonel Goodpaster.30

Still, Wilson could not be sure whether he had been given new marching orders or not. The president's "just under $35 billion," translated as $34.950 billion, was duly penciled in as a "target" on one of the OSD preliminary estimate tables. But it smacked of the classic salesman's trick of pricing an item at 99 cents instead of a dollar, and there was no indication that it received any publicity or was even taken seriously in OSD. Wilson himself could not, of course, afford to ignore it, but he may well have suspected that the president's commitment to it was less than total.

The same day OSD went public with the current status of the FY 1957 budget. "The Pentagon," according to the New York Times, "will strive to shave the new budget below $35,000,000,000 [in spending], but officials are not hopeful it can be done. They are sure they cannot get down to $34,500,000,000 because each service has just about completed and justified its budget requests."31

What the president thought of all this is not recorded, but at his next meeting with Wilson, on 6 December, with Hughes, McNeil, and others present, he did not mention the "just under $35 billion" goal. Wilson talked vaguely of "tightening up" in order to keep expenditures
below $36 billion; he mentioned a target of $35.750 billion "for existing programs," and spoke of taking another $500 million out of "forward programs" (a reference to NOA). Wilson's $35.750 billion spending goal was added to the other penciled inserts in the office copy of the preliminary estimates.

If the president had decided to give a little, he was not about to trumpet the gift to the outside world. Press reports over the next few days reflected a virtuoso performance in what a later era would call "spin control." Reporting on the 6 December meeting, the Baltimore Sun announced that FY 1957 Defense expenditures would be "in the neighborhood of $34,500,000,000." Wilson was quoted as commenting, "It will be pretty tough, but we can make it." The Washington Post on 8 December, evidently fed a slightly different line, provided an alternate interpretation. Pentagon sources, it reported, said the $34.5 billion figure released at Gettysburg really meant "about $35 billion" in new spending; a lower figure might crop up in the president's budget message "as a goal for further reduction through greater efficiency." The president's "figure fuzzing" strategy became clearer on the 13th, when, at a bipartisan meeting of congressional leaders at the White House, he announced an increase of about $700 million in FY 1957 Defense spending to a total of more than $35 billion. After the meeting some Democrats praised the prospective budget as well-balanced, noting ruefully that it had deprived them of one of their best lines of attack in the forthcoming budget debate; others, however, disagreed.

The president himself had already concluded that the budget was now on track and needed no further massaging by him. His final order to the troops on the eve of the impending battle with Congress, issued to the NSC at its afternoon meeting on the 8th, was purely hortatory:

Budget-making time is always difficult and expenses are mounting. Nevertheless, no official of this Government is truly performing his duty unless he clearly realizes that he is engaged in defending a way of life over a prolonged period and unless he is constantly aware of the weight of financial burden that our citizens are willing and able to bear. Our Government could force upon our citizens defense and other spending at much higher levels, and our abundant economy could stand it—for a while; but you cannot do it for the long pull without destroying incentives, inflating the currency, and increasing government controls. This would require an authoritarian system of government, and destroy the health of our free society.
On 14 December Deputy Secretary Robertson formally transmitted DoD's FY 1957 budget request to the Bureau of the Budget. After two weeks of negotiations the review staffs now had little to show for their labors. The new expenditure forecast of $35.54 billion approximated what some Pentagon officials had publicly predicted it would be and much exceeded the ceiling the president had originally asked for. Overall, the proposed budget looked substantially larger than its predecessor: almost two billion more in new appropriations requested than Congress had granted for FY 1956, and a billion more in projected spending. 35

Presumably the final product gave no pleasure to Hughes. Its NOA total stood six percent higher than the figure he had floated in the waning days of negotiations. The Air Force and Navy totals, only slightly offset by the lean Army budget, were seven percent and nine percent higher, respectively, than his. The president's "just under" $35 billion spending target had been ignored, evidently with his acquiescence. On the other hand, a more retrospective view, particularly from OSD's vantage point, offered some encouragement. During November and early December the review staffs had deflated the services' October NOA estimates by almost $6 billion. Half ($2.9 billion) of that amount was taken from Air Force estimates and a further $2 billion from the Navy's, while the Army lost just under $1 billion. For projected spending the reductions—from $37.6 billion to $35.5 billion—were smaller, amounting to less than six percent for Defense overall. 36 The reductions were gratifying to the staffs that had wrought them and galling to their victims, but Congress, the press, and the public at this time knew little and cared less about how much money the services had asked for in October. What mattered in this arena, and would be the focus of interest from now on, was how this budget compared with its FY 1956 predecessor, a complex exercise that would baffle many of the analysts.

Even after formal transmission of the FY 1957 DoD budget to BoB on 14 December, the game was not quite over. In last-minute negotiations a few days before Christmas, OSD agreed to seek an increase in the NOA request by $700 million; the largest slice, $335 million, went to meet a revised Air Force requirement for procurement of B-52s, interceptors, and tankers; higher ICBM costs accounted for another $108 million. The Navy Department's share ($182 million) covered additional shipbuilding, ship conversion, and money for the recently approved strength increase in the Marine Corps. The Air Force and the Army also received small additions for military construction ($50 million and $20
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million, respectively), and the Army was authorized more for procurement of a variety of weapons. On 22 December these requested changes went to BoB.37

The proposed FY 1957 budget, which the president promptly approved, was little affected by the eleventh-hour addition. The gross NOA total thus came to $35.7 billion (including $785 million in construction money to come from service stock funds), and the net sum to be requested from Congress to $34.907 billion. Estimated expenditures, which the department was pledged not to exceed, remained at $35.547 billion for FY 1957, and $34.575 billion for FY 1956.38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President’s Defense Budget for FY 1957</td>
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<tr>
<td>($ million)</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Obligational Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD &amp; Interservice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy/Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For later transmission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Military construction. Allows for deduction of $785 million to be financed by transfers from service stock funds.


DoD officials preparing for the selling campaign about to begin in the Congress drafted a presentation for the president to use in briefing congressional leaders. They had to face up to the certainty that this budget, regardless of its complexities, would come out larger than its predecessor, primarily because of the rising cost of everything in an exploding technology. Operation and maintenance costs continued to mount, even as military and civilian personnel strengths declined. Newer and more complex equipment, especially high-speed jet aircraft, cost more to operate and maintain, and there were more air bases as well as radar, antiaircraft artillery, and missile sites to support. Major procurement programs would be about as large as in the current year—larger for the Air Force and Navy, smaller for the Army; spending for aircraft would continue at about the FY 1956 level, higher for advanced
types, lower for older ones, but guided missile expenditures would increase by about one-third over 1956, doubling those in FY 1955. ICBM and IRBM development now had the top priority; air defense and antiaircraft missiles would receive continued emphasis. Spending for conventional hardware would decline as requirements were met from prior-year appropriations, but electronics expenditures would have to rise to meet the demand for electronic countermeasures and continental defense systems.

Keeping pace with fleet modernization, Navy shipbuilding would increase slightly to include a sixth carrier of the Forrestal class—unfortunately not nuclear-powered as earlier hoped, a feature not yet feasible for vessels of this size. But there would be additional nuclear submarines, guided missile destroyers and frigates, and an experimental nuclear-powered cruiser. Plans called for replacement of conventional armament on some older ships with guided missiles and conversion of some to carry modern high-speed aircraft. Military public works construction would continue slightly below current levels, primarily for air bases, guided missile facilities, and continental defense. Spending for reserve forces, under the National Reserve Plan, was rising to meet the expected larger numbers of reservists in drill pay status and the new six-month active duty training program. R&D spending would increase, particularly for guided missiles, continental air defense, and nuclear propulsion applications. The FY 1957 budget estimates screened and reviewed first by the service staffs and high commands, then more rigorously by the OSD and BoB staffs working together, were "undoubtedly . . . the tightest budgets [the services] have submitted over the past few years." Overall, the budgetary increase simply reflected "the cost of keeping our forces modern and in a high state of readiness."39

It remained to convince Congress that the DoD FY 1957 budget would provide the people and weapons that would permit the armed forces to fulfill their mission at what the administration considered affordable cost. In its passage through the hazardous congressional waters the budget would have to brave more than the usual critical examinations because of the growing concern about the sensational Soviet progress in the development and apparent deployment of advanced weapons.
CHAPTER XXII

Military Assistance

One of the longer continuities of American defense policy in the twentieth century has been the use of the nation's industrial and financial power to arm the manpower of allies, thereby reducing the drain on its own. This "weapons-instead-of-armies" policy found its fullest expression in the lend-lease program of World War II, when American industry produced munitions far in excess of the needs of American armed forces in order to help arm the British, French, Soviet, Chinese, and other allies. Truman and Eisenhower adapted the lend-lease concept to the cold war, subsidizing the "free world" contest with communism by military and economic aid on a global scale. After initial focus on economic aid, to Greece* and Turkey and the Marshall Plan countries in the late 1940s, the emphasis shifted to military assistance during the Korean War years and the rush to rearm Western Europe. Foreign aid appropriations peaked at more than $8 billion in FY 1952, and expenditures at $5.72 billion the following year. Three-quarters of aid appropriations in FY 1952 and 84 percent of expenditures in FY 1953 went to military assistance. Then foreign aid totals dipped as New Look economies took hold. Economic assistance, in the eyes of some officials, thereafter deserved an increasing share, although the objective remained predominantly one of equipping and supplying allied armed forces.

The incoming Eisenhower administration set about reorganizing foreign aid even before tackling its funding. Late in January 1953 the president assigned the task, along with that of proposing organizational changes in the Defense Department, to the newly formed Rockefeller Committee. On 7 April the committee proposed several measures for

* Greece also received substantial military aid beginning in 1947.
reorganizing the structure for foreign aid that the president approved and then presented to Congress on 1 June as Reorganization Plan No. 7. The plan aimed at clarifying and consolidating the “foreign policy primacy” of the secretary of state, while freeing him from operational responsibilities, and, within the foreign policy framework, ensuring the primacy of the secretary of defense in the “formulation and direction of military policy.”* To this end it recommended replacing the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) with a single agency that would provide centralized direction of foreign assistance and economic operations. Another agency would be similarly responsible for foreign information activities. Both agencies would be “subject to foreign policy as determined by the Secretary of State, and military policy as determined by the Secretary of Defense.” In general, the new foreign operations agency would direct economic and technical assistance and supervise and direct the administration of military assistance by DoD.† Harold Stassen, head of the soon-to-be-abolished Mutual Security Agency, was named head of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), as it was to be called, reporting directly to the president and sitting on the National Security Council. The plan went into effect on 1 August 1953.‡

*Squeezing the Truman Program*

The FY 1954 mutual security proposal that Truman left on the doorstep of the new administration had been inserted in his proposed FY 1954 budget as a one-line total, leaving to the heirs the task of fighting over the division of the bequest—$7.6 billion in new obligational authority for military and economic aid combined. On 3 February 1953, Eisenhower’s budget director, Joseph M. Dodge, publicly opened the administration’s attack on all Truman budget proposals in a widely circulated letter that left no doubt that foreign aid on anything like the scale Truman had advanced was no longer in the cards. The letter precipitated a wholesale budget review in the midst of which, a month later, Dodge introduced a more specific proposal in the National Security Council.⁴

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* For the reorganization of the Defense Department, see Chapter II.
† In his message the president noted that the plan provided for abolition of the offices of special representative in Europe and deputy special representative, to be replaced by a new U.S. Mission to NATO and the European Regional Organizations, representing State, Defense, Treasury, and FOA and reporting to the secretary of state. See FRUS 1952-54, I, pt 1:628-30.
‡ For Dodge’s 3 February letter and discussion of the FY 1954 Defense budget, see Chapter V.
Promptly approved by the council, it signaled the administration's determination to achieve a balanced budget, not in FY 1954 as Dodge and Humphrey had demanded, but definitely in the year following. To start the ball rolling, the plan assigned "illustrative" spending ceilings for all major programs for the two years—in effect dictating the pace of retrenchment—and directed each responsible agency to work out, in less than three weeks, the optimum distribution of its assets to this end.³

Foreign aid presented the principal target of the "illustrative" spending ceilings. Truman's projected $7.6 billion of NOA in FY 1954 was slashed by 28 percent, his $7.8 billion for FY 1955 by almost half. DoD's military assistance allocation was reduced to $4.3 billion for FY 1954 and to $3.1 billion for FY 1955.⁴ For Mutual Security Director Harold Stassen it was not a happy prospect. The consequences of the reductions, he told the NSC on 18 March, could well be an end of French efforts to save Indochina and French refusal to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) treaties. "Similar grim repercussions . . . in other crucial areas of the free world" in which the United States was thinly spread could also be anticipated. The timing was particularly unfortunate, said Stassen, since much of the training and infrastructure of foreign forces had been completed and materiel was beginning to flow in considerable volume. Similarly, a JCS report to Wilson, presented to the NSC on 25 March, matched Stassen's gloom. By abruptly halting the steady expansion in output of munitions during the past three years, Dodge's ceilings would, the JCS declared, cripple the whole effort to achieve a "rapid and sustained build-up of the military strength of the free world."⁵

The climax of the in-house debate over FY 1954 foreign aid came during the all-day NSC meeting on 31 March, when it was discussed along with other basic national security issues. At this meeting, the "Seven Wise Men" (a committee of distinguished personages, mostly industrialists, appointed by the president to examine the whole range of basic security matters) served as a chorus backing up Dodge and Humphrey in their attack on defense spending: the budget could and should be balanced in FY 1954, they agreed, and foreign aid was a "giveaway" based on the vain hope of buying friendship abroad. The president and Dulles vigorously rejected this view. Foreign assistance, Dulles warned, was both "absolutely indispensable" and a real bargain for the approximately $6 billion per year request. Any sudden and deep cut could cause a panic abroad in view of the widespread belief that the advent of a Republican administration portended a return to isolationism. He and the president emphatically insisted that it was absolutely impossible to withdraw a single American division from Europe at this juncture.
The president also vigorously challenged some of the special consultants' remarks about buying friendship abroad. Many European countries "would certainly have gone Communist had it not been for the money we had spent on them in recent years." In Latin America, too, he felt that the few millions requested would be money well spent. By the meeting's end the consultants had backed off. Stassen indicated that he was willing to reduce FY 1954 expenditures by $1.5 billion and the appropriation request by a billion, provided spending tapered off gradually, reaching the desired lower levels by about the beginning of 1954. The president was pleased, and even Humphrey called the proposed reductions "not too bad." On 28 April the NSC adopted NSC 149/1,* which dealt with basic national security policies in relation to costs; paragraph 11 established target figures for the mutual security program.6

On 5 May, as congressional hearings formally opened, Eisenhower's special message on the proposed budget was read to a joint session of the two foreign relations committees. It stressed the predominantly military character of the $5.8 billion requested in obligatory authority of which $5.25 billion was "for military weapons and support directly to the defense efforts of our friends and allies," and only $550 million for "technical, economic, and developmental purposes, designed to promote more effective use of the resources of the free nations." The president explained that the "devotion of so large a portion of this request to military purposes is a measure of the peril in which free nations continue to live." He also announced a significant shift of focus: "It is necessary to do more in the Far East," particularly to help the French in Indochina.7

The $5.8 billion request corresponded to the target set in NSC 149/2, but the change in focus and emphasis from the Truman proposal was dramatic—a 27 percent reduction overall with the deepest cut occurring in Europe. This cut, together with a smaller one for the Near East-Africa area, made possible a 34 percent increase for the Far East. Two months later, after a bitter bicameral wrangle, Senate conferees succeeded in overriding punitive cuts demanded by their House colleagues. Even so, in July Congress voted only just over three-fourths of the funds requested.8

The final FY 1954 Mutual Security Assistance bill—$4.5 billion in new obligatory authority—received a large augmentation when Congress later made available for reappropriation up to $2.12 billion in unobligated prior-year funds for a total of $6.65 billion. Military assistance received $3.18 billion in new money, $845 million less than requested, but with an

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* Approved by the president as amended (NSC 149/2), 29 April 1953. See FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:305-07.
add-on of up to $1.93 billion in unobligated old money. Since the fungibility of unobligated prior-year funds was restricted in several ways, these were not dollar-for-dollar additions to the new appropriations, but they closed most of the gap. Half of the $1.86 billion in NOA money allotted to Western Europe was specified to go to the European Defense Community, when it came into being, or for its potential member nations if it did not. Earmarked for the Far East was $1.03 billion (including at least $301 million for Nationalist China), and for the Near East and Africa $270 million. Only $50 million was assigned to the development of promising new weapons by U.S. allies. Economic and technical aid received $482.5 million, $427.5 million of it in new appropriations.9

Aid and the Economy Drive

Although preparation of the FY 1955 military assistance budget had begun almost simultaneously with the attack on the Truman FY 1954 version, the administration’s economy drive took on added emphasis in October 1953, with parallel efforts to develop a long-haul grand strategy for dealing with the Communist threat and the formulation of an affordable budget to support it. On 13 October, when Stassen presented to the NSC a $5 billion unrefined spending estimate for military assistance (within a larger total for mutual security), he was told to redo his sums. His pared down revision of $4.5 billion, submitted on the 29th, fared little better.10

The administration’s concerted attack on defense spending had an immediate effect on military assistance budget planning. It erased any lingering idea that military assistance could coast along at about the current or even a slowly rising level, nourished by the rationale that it could support more allied military manpower per dollar than the same amount spent on American forces. Although the rationale was sound enough and often stated, the emerging New Look clearly stood for immediate fiscal austerity and major force reductions except for airpower and modern weaponry. NSC 162/2, bible of the new order issued at the end of October, gave short shrift to foreign aid. It grudgingly conceded a capability “for the foreseeable future” to provide military assistance “in more limited amounts than heretofore” to essential allies. This implied a kind of triage in dispensing aid among the many countries dependent on the United States for security, based not on need but on capacity to use effectively. In Western Europe, Britain, France, and West Germany would be so favored, at least in terms of priorities; in the Far East, Japan and South Korea; in the Middle East, Turkey, Pakistan, and perhaps Iran. Elsewhere,
military aid would be doled out sparingly, economic and technical aid even more so, "according to the calculated advantage of such aid to the U.S. world position." Eventually military aid must be reduced; in the near future economic grants would be phased out altogether and increasingly replaced by loans.¹¹

As the budget crunch tightened, congressional aversion to "giveaways" also complicated planning. The Senate debate over the FY 1954 budget, in which some of the staunchest friends of foreign aid clamored for its termination, had sent danger signals. To one State Department official it seemed clear that the target of the Senate attack was not foreign aid as such but economic aid. This sensibility—widely shared in Congress—helped produce two new strategies for preserving foreign aid. First, the State Department became convinced that FY 1955 military aid should be incorporated into the DoD budget and justified as part of the total defense effort, an approach endorsed by Dulles and the president. Second, State broadened the definition of military assistance to include economic aid "directly related to maintaining the defense effort of our allies." In practice this meant that much economic assistance could now be repackaged as critical components of military assistance.¹²

With these strategies in place, there remained the question of how large an aid package Congress could be expected to swallow. Defense planners proposed as part of FOA's FY 1955 budget a slimmed-down estimate of $2.4 billion in new obligational authority for military assistance, almost $800 million less than Congress had recently voted for FY 1954. With some misgivings about the political effects of the cutback in Europe, State supported the estimate as a rock-bottom figure, which implied a greater effort in the coming year to use accumulated unexpended prior-year funds to make up for the cut.¹³

To BoB budget cutters and congressional budget balancers the overriding vulnerability of military assistance was that it had been heavily over-financed in the Truman years. Theoretically, unexpended funds from previous appropriations would suffice to continue the flow of materiel to allies for the next two to three years at least, without infusion of any new money. Against this consideration, BoB had to weigh the serious lag in deliveries and that weapons paid for from unexpended balances would go to fill past commitments, leaving current and future requirements to be met from funds not yet appropriated. FOA and Defense had negotiated the previous $2.4 billion estimate down to $2.1 billion. Accepting this figure as a "reasonable" statement of requirements, BoB decreed that only $1 billion of new money should be sought in FY 1955, with the remainder financed from unexpended balances and reimbursed later from future appropriations when the materiel was
delivered. As Dulles's mutual security adviser pointed out, this position created a double hazard: a future Congress would probably balk at appropriating more funds than requested in FY 1955, and allies would probably be skeptical of American ability to honor current commitments by future requests for funds. 14

The president settled the matter in his own fashion. On 18 December he approved, and on 21 January 1954 in his annual budget message to Congress for FY 1955 he asked for $3.51 billion in new obligational authority for mutual security, including $2.5 billion for military assistance to be appropriated to the Department of Defense and $1.010 billion in economic aid. Expenditures for the year would be $5.4 billion. 15

The large reduction in requested new money for military assistance, compared with a slight increase in economic aid, masked a major shift of emphasis. State's successful effort to incorporate defense-related economic aid in the military package had brought a radical alteration in the relative proportions of the two categories. In the FY 1954 budget the military-to-economic ratio was roughly four-to-one; in the FY 1955 proposed budget it was ostensibly about five-to-two. But because almost a billion in defense-support types of economic aid was masquerading as military assistance, the actual new military-to-economic ratio now favored economic aid about four to three. This transformation—achieved by the device of changing labels—was, of course, not mentioned in the president's budget message and other public utterances that emphasized the greater "military" aspect of foreign aid.

On 23 June 1954 the president sent Congress a special message on the FY 1955 mutual security budget. Sounding the familiar themes of collective defense—the global threat and purchase of equivalent fighting power more cheaply abroad than at home—and "the continued ruthless drive of communist imperialists for world domination," Eisenhower pleaded with Congress not to cut the proposed funds, especially those aimed at the crisis in Southeast Asia. The overall request, he pointed out, culminated a two-year reduction of about 40 percent. Almost 80 percent of the requested NOA ($2.75 billion) was "essentially of a military nature"—i.e., comprising core (end-item and training) military assistance plus defense-related economic and financial aid now labeled "direct forces support" and "defense support." Economic grant aid, the president said, was on the way out; in Europe it had virtually disappeared except for a few local but essentially needed items. He also underlined how the emphasis had shifted from Europe, where the cold war seemed stabilized and free world defenses relatively solid, to the active hot-war and dangerously threatened theaters of the Far East, now slated to receive almost twice as much aid as Europe. 16
Despite the president's plea and the continuing tension during the spring and summer over the French debacle in Indochina, foreign aid critics in both houses, for the most part, had their way. In the bill signed by the president on 26 August the final NOA amount for all titles was $2.78 billion—more than $700 million below the administration's original request of $3.5 billion. Underlying these figures, however, was a message which Defense officials were not slow to read. The administration's proposal to use almost $2.6 billion in prior-year unobligated funds was cut an insignificant four percent, making available for FY 1955 a total of $5.24 billion in new and old money.17

The Accounting Mess: Partial Cleanup

Considering the importance of prior-year funds to military assistance operations, other actions taken by Congress had major significance. In the rush to recess in the summer of 1953 Congress had stopped just short of instituting a significant reform in the administration of military assistance, thereby delaying for a full year the fundamental recasting of foreign aid that the president had promised. Late in April 1953 the General Accounting Office (GAO) had reported to the House Appropriations Committee a mess of gargantuan proportions in the mutual defense system for controlling, recording, and reporting obligations. As the comptroller general himself later described it, existing policies and practices were "so irregular that the amount of obligations reported to the Congress were [sic] overstated, distorted and misleading" and wholly unreliable for serving the intended purpose. Some of the deficiencies, the GAO report concluded, extended beyond the Defense Department and would require prolonged cooperative effort by BoB, GAO, and Congress to develop and implement the necessary remedies. But many deficiencies, happily, seemed susceptible to cure within DoD through straightforward administrative improvements. Consequently, at the end of April, at the urging of the comptroller general, Secretary Wilson directed a systematic review by the military departments of unliquidated obligations for common-items, which comprised the bulk of the invalid records.18

The practices associated with the recording of obligations constituted one major difficulty. The other involved the accounting method used for tracking military items procured for foreign assistance. Lamenting the disarray surrounding this process, Congress in July 1953 directed Defense, MSA, BoB, and the GAO to reform the procedure. Nine months later, in April 1954, BoB informed Congress that the task had
been completed. The proposed plan envisaged procurement of common-
items for military assistance from regular DoD appropriations and
vendors—a merger of military assistance and Defense funds—and also
that military assistance funds would be accounted for solely on the basis
of delivery of materiel to recipient countries. The new proposal stipu-
lated that the allocated funds would be "programmed and earmarked" by
OSD after coordination with State and FOA and would remain unobligated
in a master account in OSD until needed for reimbursement to applicable
regular DoD appropriations when deliveries occurred, normally in a
year subsequent to the one when procurement was initiated. To ensure
uninterrupted procurement, the plan also provided that funds in the
master account could be obligated when applicable Defense funds were
not available to finance lead time. Under this plan, both initial obligations
and expenditures would be charged to one source of funds (the pertinent
appropriation of the military department). Since the appropriation would
be reimbursed only upon delivery of the end-item to the recipient country,
usually in a later year, the plan contemplated no-year appropriations of
military assistance. The plan was duly enacted as Section 110 of the FY
1955 Mutual Security Appropriation Act (PL 778), which the president
signed on 3 September 1954.19

The other piece of legislation passed at about the same time ad-
dressed the lack of a precise definition and categorization of obligations.
The House Appropriations Committee report on the mutual security bill
late in July 1954 had devoted several blistering paragraphs to the phe-
nomenon of "June buying," the rush to obligate unexpended "hot money"
just before the end of the fiscal year in order to ensure its availability in
the following year rather than have it revert to the Treasury. Various factors
prevented the orderly spreading of the obligation of military assistance
funds over the fiscal year—delayed appropriations, protracted negotia-
tions with recipient governments over force levels and aid requirements,
the complexity and time-consuming details of preparing the new aid
budget, to name a few—resulting in the bunching of obligations in the
closing months and weeks of the fiscal year. What made this bunch-
ing administratively feasible was the looseness or absence of official
definitions, which allowed harried officials pressed for time to open the
floodgates and certify as legal obligations a variety of written commit-
ments and understandings reflecting various stages of the contractual
process. "For decades," OSD Comptroller McNeil confessed later in
retrospect, "there had never been a statutory definition of what consti-
tuted an obligation of the United States. The practice had been .
approved by everybody, including in some cases the Comptroller General,
that once you thought a transaction would be a liability to the Government, it was to be posted as an obligation.  

In an otherwise tersely written report, the House Appropriations Committee exploded in outrage over the "questionable practices, involving substantial sums," that its staff, working with GAO, had uncovered in an extensive survey of obligating practices of the military departments. They ranged from simple clerical errors ($47.8 million) to exceeding limitations specified in letters of intent not yet converted to definitive contract. All this, the report concluded, underlined a need that happily had already been recognized in the supplemental appropriation bill then pending for a "clean-cut definition of obligations." In Section 1311 of the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1955 (PL 663), for the first time Congress specified what could be recorded on the books of the government as an obligation, although it was both more and less than a clean-cut definition. Section 1311 required "documentary evidence" of at least one of seven different types of listed activities, such as an agreement properly executed in writing between the parties or a valid loan agreement showing terms of repayment or "any other legal liability of the United States against an appropriation or fund legally available therefor." As McNeil later observed, the new law prescribed only broad criteria and certain procedures, stating in effect that when there was a transaction between two parties and documents were properly executed and had a certain degree of specificity, it could be considered an obligation.

These two elements of legislation were acclaimed as needed and well-conceived reforms, long overdue, in a system that had seemed to be teetering on the brink of administrative chaos. They were not, however, a quick fix. As yet they were only laws that would remain verbiage until implemented by appropriate internal policies, regulations, and procedures, a process that promised to be long and fraught with missteps. Some of the existing problem areas, moreover, seemed to lie beyond the reach of the new legislation. Section 110 of the FY 1955 Mutual Security Appropriation Act (PL 778) gave the secretary of defense authority to integrate the financing of military assistance with other military programs, and, within the former, to institute a relatively simple accounting and reporting basis for performance in terms of deliveries and services rendered. Section 1311 of the 1955 Supplemental Appropriations Act (PL 663) defined obligations more precisely and provided criteria for a more rigorous policing of the obligating process. These reforms, even when implemented, were not likely in and of themselves to correct the pervasive and ingrained ills of existing accounting systems and obligating practices. "The unreliability of fiscal data flowing therefrom," declared the House
Appropriations Committee, "has become legendary and... cannot be permitted to continue." Most members of the committee no doubt suspected it would.22

The FY 1956 Program

On 3 December 1954, Stassen and Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Hensel jointly presented the proposed FY 1956 mutual security budget to the NSC. The total request came to $3.4 billion. On the 6th McNeil notified Budget Director Hughes that military assistance would require "as a minimum" and under a long list of assumptions $1.4 billion in new obligational authority.23 When the president approved the funding proposal a week later, DoD's foreign aid empire had grown to include responsibility for direct forces support, which would appear as a separate $630 million item in the new budget, and the total NOA had grown to $3.53 billion. As of mid-December, the FY 1956 mutual security budget shaped up as follows:24

($ million)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>New Obligational Authority</th>
<th>1955</th>
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<tr>
<td>Military assistance</td>
<td>2,675</td>
<td>3,075</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>(2,500)</td>
<td>(3,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other agencies</td>
<td>(175)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct forces support</td>
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<td>4,300</td>
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The president included these principal totals in his annual budget message on 17 January 1955. It was an inconspicuous item in a large, complex package. The $3.1 billion expected to be spent for military assistance in FY 1956, the president pointed out, was about midway between the amounts expended in FY 1954 ($3.6 billion) and those anticipated in FY 1955 ($2.7 billion). He said that these ups and downs over the three-year period should not be taken as an indicator of probable deliveries in
FY 1956, which were expected to remain, as in the two preceding years, at about $3 billion. The projected increase in spending actually reflected the shift of military assistance procurement financing from mutual security to Defense appropriations. Most of the FY 1956 spending would be for materiel and training already funded in earlier appropriations. The $1.4 billion new money would permit advance financing of certain new and continuing activities in Asia, such as support for Korea (hitherto financed in the DoD budget), Formosa, and Japan. Direct forces support, for which Defense was now responsible, was aimed at a few selected countries, mainly in Asia, with projected spending of $600 million.25

With its overall dimensions and thrust thus determined, Hensel lost little time filling in the blanks of the budget request being sent to Congress. Normally the next step would have been to ask the JCS to update the foreign force ceilings, but Hensel had something different in mind. Acting Secretary Anderson told the Joint Chiefs on 15 January that FY 1956 military assistance would be explained to Congress as reflecting “the broad concept of the needs of strategic geographic areas throughout the world, rather than by the presentation of detailed illustrative programs on an item-by-item and a country-by-country basis as in prior Congressional presentations.” The chiefs were asked to flesh out and update their program guidance, “so that . . . a comprehensive International Security Plan may be prepared.” The list of desired information was elaborate and detailed, adding up to an informed look ahead at the likely shape and size of MDAP-supported forces two-and-one-half years down the road.26

After the chiefs balked at releasing information of such sensitivity for congressional scrutiny, they were asked merely to recommend allocation of the money expected to be available for the materiel and training program from FY 1955-56 appropriations. Between the four geographical regions (Europe, Near East, Far East, Western Hemisphere) the chiefs recommended a 52-17-29-2 percentage split. They remained stubbornly Euro-centered when considering the allocation of a hypothetical additional $500 million even though at the moment Chinese Communist armies seemed to be readying for a major assault on Quemoy and the Matsus, islands in the Formosa Strait, and on 28 January the Senate had authorized the president to take whatever measures he deemed necessary to defend Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions.27

After weighing this and other advice, the president on 20 April 1955 (by which time the Formosa Strait crisis had somewhat abated) sent to Congress his special message on FY 1956 mutual security assistance. It reflected, he asserted, “the greatly improved conditions in Europe and . . . [provided] for the critical needs of Asia” where “the immediate threats to world security and stability are now centered,” and where most of the
funds requested would be put to work. The assistance package aimed to accelerate cooperative development of the region's nations, leaving them with most of the responsibility since "foreign capital as well as foreign aid can only launch or stimulate the process of creating dynamic economies." He asked for $712.5 million in economic programs, with more than half specifically for Asia. Another $100 million was set aside as a contingent fund for the president. Defense support—economic aid labeled "military" since its purpose was to enable needy countries to support larger military forces than they could otherwise afford—claimed $1 billion. By including this in the "military" portion of the budget, officials could show that the "nonmilitary" part, which to many congressmen meant "economic," amounted to only 23 percent of the whole, even though defense support was administered not by DoD but by FOA, along with the other economic and technical aid. In reality, economic aid added up to $1.8 billion, slightly over half the total. Like the FY 1955 budget, this budget was aimed at the congressional client. 28

The remaining $1.7 billion was for military assistance and direct forces support. The geographical distribution remained to be determined but substantial amounts, the president said, would go to combat the threat of Communist aggression and subversion in Asia, beef up the defenses of Formosa, and support Korean and Japanese rearmament. Stassen had stated earlier, and an aid official confirmed at this time, that about $2 billion would go to Asia, split evenly between economic and military aid. Overall the requested FY 1956 appropriation now came to $3.53 billion. 29

In his message the president also noted the congressional mandate in the FY 1955 Mutual Security Appropriation Act to terminate FaA as of June 1955 and transfer its aid functions to a new semiautonomous State Department unit, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). He planned to ask an extension of FOA's life for six months to permit an orderly transition. Direct forces support responsibilities were assigned to Defense. 30

Congressional Actions

The president's efforts to "hide" his big economic-aid-for-Asia package inside the military aid portion of the budget reflected administration fears of an unfriendly reception in Congress. Almost a month earlier, in March 1955, the two most powerful members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, John M. Vorys (R-Ohio), the second-ranking Republican, and its chairman, James P. Richards (D-S.C.), reporting on an 18-nation trip to
the Far and Middle East the previous autumn, had warned that in those regions economic aid carried the odor of colonial paternalism to nations still suffering from colonial or post-colonial exploitation. Military and technical aid, on the other hand, including even some “defense support” aid, might be helpful, particularly if based on agreements for joint planning and action. Although Eisenhower clearly heeded the warning in framing his aid proposal, it drew lightning on Capitol Hill even before it could be formally considered, with calls ranging from a half-billion-dollar cut in economic aid to total elimination. Further critical comments, particularly on the economic aspects, emerged during a bipartisan meeting of congressional leaders at the White House on 3 May.31

At the opening session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing two days later, Dulles was the administration’s point man in explaining the mutual security proposal and selling its unpalatable Asia-aid package. Since the small purely economic aid portion of the bill focused mainly on Asia, Dulles sketched a somewhat lurid picture of economic development in Communist countries. American economic aid would be provided to free Asian countries in measured amounts, without pressure, to help them along the path of genuine, long-term, self-propelled economic development suited to their capabilities, culture, and resources. The Marshall Plan, brilliantly successful in reviving the industrial economies of Western Europe, did not offer an appropriate model for Asia, where only Japan and to a lesser extent India had ever experienced sustained, large-scale industrialization.32

In executive session it became clear that most of the authorization committee members supported the administration bill, its economic aid provisions notwithstanding. Even so, the committee added an amendment offered by Sen. Mike Mansfield that limited to $200 million the amount of unobligated and unreserved funds that could be carried over into the next fiscal year. The committee bill reported out on 27 May emerged without a scratch from three days of sometimes bitter debate and was resoundingly approved by the full Senate on 2 June by a vote of 59 to 18. By now, moreover, most senators and representatives seemed to feel that fierce debate over authorizations was not worth the likely damage to personal relations and were inclined to leave the bloodletting to the appropriations committees.33

The House Foreign Affairs Committee opened hearings on 25 May. Action there and in the full House eventually trimmed the administration’s authorization request by $145 million in military assistance.34 In conference on 6 July the Senate members accepted the House cut. The conferees expressed shock at the flood of “reservations” made by
Military Assistance

DoD in the last few days of the fiscal year in the effort to avoid losing unobligated funds. Urging "prompt study and action" by both the executive and legislative branches to stem the annual eleventh-hour rush to obligate, they also recommended that mutual security legislation be submitted to Congress earlier each year. The $3.285 billion authorization total was about $245 million less than the president had requested. Congress passed the authorization bill on 7 July and Eisenhower signed it the next day. 35

The appropriations hearings did not go nearly as well as the authorization hearings because of a dispute between OSD and key House members, including the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee chairman, Rep. Otto Passman (D-La.). The conflict involved a contested arrangement negotiated in June between DoD liaison Maj. Gen. Robert S. Moore and Reps. Passman, John Taber, and Richard Wigglesworth. The representatives believed a binding deal had been struck to reduce the ensuing fiscal year's carryover funds by $420 million. Moore subsequently challenged that understanding, the funds in question were not forfeited, and the House furor precipitated by the disagreement resulted in a slashing of the administration request. 36 On 11 July, after a day of debate, the House approved, 251 to 123, the appropriations committee bill. Cuts in military assistance, direct forces support, and economic aid brought the final mutual security total down to $2.638 billion, a 24 percent reduction from the president's request. The reduced amount of $705 million for military assistance and the $305 million for direct forces support brought DoD's portion of the mutual security bill to $1.011 billion, representing a large cut in the president's request. 37

Even before the debacle in the House the administration had written off the outcome in that inhospitable forum and now hoped to recoup its losses in the traditionally friendlier Senate. The hope proved well-founded. As the Senate Appropriations Committee began hearings on the bill in the week following the House action, several Republican senators rushed into print announcing their intention to attack the House cuts. After only two or three days of hearings the committee, as predicted, reported out a markup on 19 July that virtually restored the status quo ante. The House cuts in military assistance and direct forces support were eliminated, as were most of those for economic aid. The recommended mutual security total, $3.205 billion, was $566.6 million higher than in the House bill. All but $100 million of the unexpended balances were continued available through FY 1956. After some huffing and puffing over the issue of snowballing end-of-the-year obligations, the committee lowered the ceiling on them during the final two months of a fiscal year from 25 percent to 20
percent of total appropriations but added a further provision that the president could waive the restriction in an emergency. After a sometimes sharp debate the full Senate voted its approval on 22 July.\(^{38}\)

The showdown conference on 27 July was swift and anticlimactic. With remarkably little fuss, the conferees eliminated the military assistance funds that the House had cut from the original bill and the Senate had restored. This was not quite the abject senatorial cave-in that it seemed. Out of the blue the Air Force reported that during its review of old accounts it had surfaced a long-buried credit to MDAP of $302 million representing a reimbursement in 1950 for military assistance equipment diverted to Korea. Rather than require return of these funds to the Treasury, the conferees agreed that they should be made available for military assistance as originally intended, thus partially offsetting the conference cut of $420 million. In the House, the compromise was viewed as a technical adjustment not really related to the vindication of the House on the issue. The conferees also voted the full request of $317.2 million for direct forces support and restored some of the House cuts in economic aid. Since the $302 million Air Force windfall was not included in the bill passed by both houses on 28 July, the president received only $2.765 billion, a cut of more than $700 million from his original request of $3.53 billion. Including the windfall, however, he received more than $3 billion in spendable new money, enough to induce him on 2 August to sign the bill without protest.\(^{39}\)

The FY 1957 Program

Assistant Secretary Hensel undertook to reduce the influence of the Joint Chiefs over military assistance requirements by going directly to the unified commanders in the field, asking them to submit their real needs for FY 1957. In memoranda signed on 13 April by Deputy Secretary Anderson, informing them of what the chiefs had already recommended, he asked them to make their evaluation “realistic” since the secretary required a “frank and detailed analysis of the practicability of seeking to attain the JCS force objectives” for 1956-1958.\(^{40}\)

It was a good try but doomed to fail. The men on the ground were unlikely to disagree with the JCS pronouncements. The results of Hensel’s scheme did not reach OSD until after he had left office on 30 June, but when they were tallied by his successor Gordon Gray in September 1955 it was apparent that the effort to induce field commanders and staffs to “think small” had failed. The commanders estimated that to outfit, train, and maintain allied forces of the size proposed would
cost more than $7 billion in FY 1957, substantially as recommended by the chiefs the year before.

Under a December deadline to send the estimates back through channels to their regional authors for revision, Gray turned the task over to the JCS, who in a sense had created the problem. He asked them to review the figures with the aim of presenting, under a $2 billion ceiling (including fixed charges and previous commitments amounting to almost half this sum), a “sound” FY 1957 MDAP budget “reflecting realistic requirements” that could be justified. Asked to comment on the national security implications of such austere funding and to perform a similar exercise with a $2.5 billion ceiling, not surprisingly the chiefs balked. On 4 November they protested to Wilson that the $2 billion ceiling would not “permit satisfactory progress” toward approved objectives and reminded him that the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) had already submitted “confirmed requirements” of over $7 billion. Rejecting the Gray guidelines, the JCS submitted a new proposal, priced at $2.717 billion for materiel and training alone. They characterized this proposal as still dangerously austere and full of crippling deficiencies. As for the $2 billion ceiling, it was an invitation to disaster.

Without lingering over the JCS position, on 15 November Gray submitted his own budget request for $3.104 billion in new obligational authority, cleared with Assistant Secretary McNeil and International Cooperation Agency Director John Hollister. Of the $2.480 billion earmarked for materiel and training—only $237 million less than the JCS proposal—more than 90 percent went to Europe and the Far East. This budget proposal rested mostly on “no change” assumptions: persistence of the Communist threat, continued prosperity at home, no major free world setbacks abroad, and continued reluctance on the part of recipient countries to pay for larger forces. An important additional assumption was that in FY 1957 the new Federal Republic of Germany would launch a rapid buildup of forces with no further military assistance beyond the FY 1950-56 programs. The United Kingdom was also dropped from the recipient list. The relative prosperity of both countries had already permitted major cutbacks in their aid benefits. An eleventh-hour addition to the program provided $80 million for four Baghdad Pact countries—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan—over and above amounts already included. 41

Hollister’s proposed appropriation request for non-military aid totaled $1.9 billion. He called to NSC attention that five recipients—Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, Formosa, and Vietnam—“countries with poorly developed economies in which military force goals are far in excess of those which can be maintained . . . out of their own resources”—would
receive almost half of the total. In such countries the economy required support "in direct relationship to the size of the force goals. Only a reduction in these goals will permit a substantial reduction in the amount of economic aid necessary if collapse is to be avoided." On 6 December the president, at a meeting with Wilson, Budget Director Hughes, and others, approved Gray's MDAP totals but seemed mainly interested in economic aid, for which he said he needed "some elbow room" for the inescapable increases looming ahead.42

At the end of October 1955 the NSC had launched a major review of foreign aid. An interagency committee, established by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB)* and including representatives from State, Defense, ICA, and Treasury, was charged with examining coordination of military and economic aid programs and the relationship of military and economic aid to overall political, economic, and military considerations.

Gray represented Defense. Chaired by the State member, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Herbert V. Prochnow, the committee also undertook to examine "special country situations where U.S.-supported military programs might impose undue burdens on the economy of the country." The strongly implied aim, in spite of recognized congressional opposition, was to find reasons for shifting emphasis from military to economic aid. The committee was asked to study 13 countries—most notably Turkey and Pakistan—where large additional infusions of economic aid had become necessary to attain both economic and military objectives. The other 11 candidates were: Greece, Spain, Japan, Korea, Formosa, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Iran. The proposed modus operandi was to establish an interagency working group for each country to conduct detailed studies and pass recommendations on to the parent committee, which would in turn make its own recommendations to the OCB.43

While the Prochnow committee prepared its report the NSC Planning Board completed an analysis of foreign aid that it presented to the council on 29 November. It painted a depressing picture of a program that had developed reactively to Soviet moves and pressures rather than as U.S. initiatives and that now manifested powerful built-in tendencies to perpetuate itself and expand. A country program usually emerged from a country's economic inability to support the U.S.-proposed forces, and this weakness tended to persist. The decision to build up indigenous forces usually generated requirements for additional dollar aid such

* One of the two principal arms of the NSC (the other being the Planning Board), OCB was charged with coordinating the actions flowing from NSC decisions.
as direct forces support and defense support. The country soon became accustomed to and dependent on the flow of aid and expected it to continue and even increase. With this pattern in mind, the Planning Board proposed at the council's meeting on 8 December that it consider reduction of the Prochnow committee's list of "problem countries" by about half (leaving only Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, Formosa, and Korea) and that these countries be urgently studied by an appropriate group. A majority of the board also proposed following up on the president's idea to ask Congress for a discretionary or contingency fund of several hundred million dollars over and above specific foreign aid appropriations. Bob and Treasury representatives objected to requesting additional discretionary funds, while the JCS adviser objected to both proposals. The chiefs confirmed this position to Secretary Wilson, arguing that an earmarked contingency fund might endanger the funding of an orderly buildup toward worldwide objectives; they would agree to it only if Congress were also asked to support their proposed $2.7 billion military assistance package. As for the listed "problem countries," they disapproved of the whole approach. 44

At the NSC meeting on 8 December, Admiral Radford restated the JCS position. Individual countries should not be singled out for special scrutiny because the force levels maintained by recipient countries "derived directly from the national security policies of the United States," and not from their own particular needs and capabilities. If the resulting burden of support was more than the United States was prepared to bear, then the policies themselves must be changed. Radford abandoned the JCS corporate rejection of a presidential contingency fund but came down in favor of an additive fund superimposed on appropriations for specific aid. Also, it would be hard to convince countries like Korea, Formosa, and Turkey that they could be adequately defended by reducing the forces which, their American patrons up to now had insisted, were the minimum needed. Dulles agreed; the unwillingness of many countries to rely on the deterrent power of the United States, he said, was the biggest single difficulty in administering the aid program: "what they wanted were visible military forces on their own soil." The ensuing discussion of the matter ended when the president assured Wilson, who had erupted in protest against using operating funds to increase the contingency fund, that he would not press the issue.45

With the decision to scrap the additive fund, the FY 1957 aid budget reverted to its status quo ante. The more substantive issue of what to do about the "problem countries," not one that could be solved overnight, devolved on the Prochnow committee, whose labors could affect only
later budgets. To participants, the outcome of the council debate may have looked like a successful hold-the-line effort by the president against pressure, mainly from the Joint Chiefs, to raise the budget ceiling on the eve of its submission to Congress. In a broader perspective, however, it appeared rather different. During the late summer and fall, the administration had seemed to be leaning toward what one newspaper editorial termed "pennywise" retrenchment in foreign aid. Hollister in November floated the idea of withholding up to 20 percent of appropriated funds to provide an emergency reserve. At the end of the month he and Dulles publicly announced that the administration had no plans to increase foreign aid as a counter to Soviet economic initiatives.46

In fact, Gray and Hollister had already submitted to BoB a FY 1957 aid budget almost twice as large as the one Congress had recently voted for FY 1956, with a military component almost three times as large. The appropriations totals for the two budgets were as follows ($ billion):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1956</th>
<th>FY 1957</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDAP</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-military</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.70</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.93</strong></td>
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It was the biggest aid request in four years, and it is reasonable to assume that Hollister had received his marching orders from the White House. In economic aid, his own bailiwick, the increase was a modest 13 percent. The huge increase—for military assistance—from $1.02 billion in FY 1956 to $3.03 billion—was a coup for Gray, who had successfully argued that during the past two years the program had subsisted largely on accumulated pipeline fat, spending far more than it received in new money. In consequence the pipeline carryover of unspent funds, both military and economic, had shrunk from $8.6 billion on 30 June 1954 to $6.3 billion a year later and was expected to be about $4.7 billion at the end of June 1956. Now it would be prudent to build it back up somewhat in order to finance the long lead-time materiel that consumed a disproportionate part of the money.47

**New Weapons**

In his budget message on 16 January 1956, the president mentioned a new consideration in the effort to refill the military assistance pipeline—a recently asserted requirement, mainly from NATO, for modern weapons—jet aircraft, missiles, electronic systems—that involved long
procurement lead times and disproportionately high costs. There was, of course, more behind this than met the eye. Earlier, in September 1955, the JCS, responding to a request from Gray, had provided a list of modern materiel for NATO forces—mostly Army conventional weaponry that might conceivably be programmed in FY 1957. The chiefs, however, made it clear that they had no enthusiasm for making these weapons available to NATO. Fundamentally, they contended that the "MDA programs should furnish a readily available medium which supports and enhances our own military readiness." As more advanced weapons became available for operational use by U.S. forces, "the less modern counterparts should be released to appropriate allies, especially . . . where such release would improve over-all allied readiness."\(^48\)

In November the question of modernizing NATO forces acquired greater urgency and sharper focus. General Alfred Gruenther (SACEUR) asked Secretary Wilson for immediate re-examination of military assistance aimed primarily at remedying NATO's most critical weakness—air defense. This had become more pressing because of the appearance of a new Soviet attack fighter capable of operating from grass runways and the apparently synchronous building of several hundred unpaved satellite air strips. More generally, Gruenther worried that the improvement and expansion of Soviet attack capabilities provided an ominous backdrop to the current Communist peace offensive that he feared was eroding the willingness of Western European governments and peoples to pay the heavy costs of increased defense preparations. A recent SHAPE study had indicated that a modest infusion of new defensive technology—anti-aircraft missiles and guns, early warning systems, and interceptor missiles and aircraft—would pay substantial dividends in improved defensive capabilities along the entire 4,000-mile front from Norway to Turkey. Remarkably, Gruenther would accept reductions or deferments in scheduled deliveries of more conventional materiel if Washington would respond favorably to his request.\(^49\)

At the December 1955 meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers, Dulles and Wilson discussed NATO's air defense needs with their allied counterparts and how recently developed U.S. weaponry could improve NATO's defense capabilities. The president's message to Congress on 16 January clearly signaled that Gruenther's appeal had been heard. Wilson appointed an ad hoc committee representing the JCS, SACEUR, USCINCEUR, and the military departments to look into providing advanced weapons for European defense. From its study there emerged in February a priority list of weapons deliverable in 1958-60 if initial funding could come from the FY 1957 MDAP. For about $450 million applied
to the priority list, SHAPE could obtain F-84 atomic delivery kits, early warning equipment, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, Matador missiles, and Honest John rockets.\textsuperscript{50}

The Joint Chiefs had misgivings, fearing that some or all of the cost might be taken from other MDAP allocations; consequently, they recommended an allocation of only $140 million for NATO modernization, the amount Gruenther had said could be squeezed out of his existing program for that purpose. They also raised the question of needs for advanced weapons by other commands. On 2 March they urged Wilson to consider carefully where this new course might be leading since requests for new weapons were “constantly being raised by our Allies” as well as by U.S. commanders and government officials. They recommended the issuance of a policy statement to the military departments “embodying the major considerations in this field.”\textsuperscript{51}

In their grudging concession that new weapons might under certain circumstances be released to allied forces, the chiefs were no doubt prompted by Wilson’s announcement the previous December 1955 at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council of U.S. intention to provide such weapons to NATO countries able to maintain and use them effectively. Moreover, Gray had moved early in 1956 to preempt the JCS, concerting with McNeil on issuance of a suitable policy statement. At the end of February McNeil sent Wilson a draft statement, concurred in by Gray, pointing out in a covering memorandum that the “considerable reluctance in certain military quarters” to provide new weapons to NATO allies stemmed from fear of restriction of their own access to these weapons if they could not “unload” their obsolescent material through the Military Assistance Program, and use the reimbursements freely for their own purposes.” The policy statement issued by Wilson on 9 March warned against using the MAP as a dumping ground for obsolescent weapons.\textsuperscript{52}

Whatever the chiefs’ fears, the president ignored them. His special message to Congress on 19 March 1956 promoting the FY 1957 mutual security budget gave special mention to helping allies develop more effective defenses. The program would provide “advanced weapons systems, including missiles, now being procured for our troops”—purely defensive weapons, he assured the legislators, no threat to peaceful neighbors. Of the $530 million requested for advanced weapons, NATO would receive $195 million, with the remainder distributed later where it could be effectively employed.\textsuperscript{53}
Military Assistance

\textit{Through the Congressional Wringer}

The FY 1957 bill submitted to Congress requested authorization of $4.672 billion and an appropriation of $4.860 billion.\(^*\) Following the tactic of the two preceding years, the actual magnitude of economic aid was obscured by grouping defense support with military assistance and direct forces support in an ostensibly “military” Title I, labeled Mutual Defense Assistance, with a requested appropriation of $4.1 billion, although ICA still administered defense support along with the other economic and technical aid, while DoD administered only military assistance. This arrangement left less than $800 million burdened by the invidious label “economic,” although, this year even more than the last, actual economic aid was the main focus of the president’s concern. Thus, while the ostensible ratio of military to economic aid was 85 to 15, actually it was 62 to 38.\(^{54}\)

During two months of hearings beginning on 20 March the House Foreign Affairs Committee heard persuasive arguments from many administration blue-ribbon spokesmen for the needs of the three major geographical areas competing for the $3 billion in requested military aid. Especially alarming was General Gruenther’s grim description of NATO’s primitive and uncoordinated national air defense systems (possibly effective as long as enemy bombers operated in daylight only from 8 to 4 o’clock daily, 5 days a week, and no higher than 20,000 feet!). It soon became apparent that for most committee members the real obstacle was the size of the authorization request—far larger than in FY 1956—and the unconvincing rationale for it, the alleged need to refill the pipeline. Moreover, the proposed distribution of the new funds reflected a continuing priority on Europe that many considered outdated.\(^{55}\)

The committee killed a proposed amendment for a huge cut and ultimately reported out on 23 May a bill authorizing only $1.925 billion for military assistance, a billion less than requested, and took another $109 million from economic aid, a total cut of more than $1.1 billion. The House proceeded to vote down an amendment to restore all the cuts by so large a margin that no count was called for. The crucial (not the final) vote, rejecting an amendment to restore $600 million, was a stunning defeat for the president, aligning a majority of both parties against him, the first time gallery veterans could recall that the House had refused an appeal from the president and the leadership of both parties.

\(^*\) The request for an appropriation larger than the authorization was explained by the fact that certain requested appropriations (e.g., NATO infrastructure) were continuing programs authorized in prior years.
Administration strategists saw in the Senate their only hope of forcing a more tolerable compromise.  

The action now shifted to the Senate, where on 13 June the Foreign Relations Committee, its own hearings completed, began to mark up the House bill. The auguries were not good. Two days before, members of the Appropriations Committee had heard a sensational briefing by SAC Commander General Curtis LeMay on his new requirements for bombers, tankers, bases, etc., to meet the resurgent threat of Soviet airpower. Estimated FY 1957 costs came to many billions. The senators remained deeply divided on restoring all or part of the cuts, and some wanted deeper cuts. In the authorization committee most members leaned toward some restoration of the House cuts, but a large minority supported the House bill in full. An amendment restored to DoD the $600 million the administration had failed to obtain from the House.

On the Senate floor the authorization bill passed by a comfortable majority on the 29th. Secretary Dulles promptly but prematurely declared victory, subject of course to passage by the appropriations committees and full House concurrence. On 7 July conferees of the two houses ritually sliced precisely in half the $600 million difference between the two bills and compromised on a $2.225 billion authorization for military assistance, $800 million less than the administration's request.

Meanwhile, the House Appropriations Committee began work, having decided not to wait for an approved authorization bill. Rejecting the administration's contention that unexpended funds from past appropriations were too firmly committed to be applied to FY 1957 and later requirements, the committee staff noted that the unexpended balance was probably adequate to cover two years at the FY 1956 spending rates. Weighing all this, the committee on 4 July voted a larger appropriations cut—$1.265 billion—in military aid than the $1 billion cut in the House authorization bill, while making small additional cuts in economic aid. These excisions brought the military assistance appropriation down to $1.735 billion, 42 percent less than requested and the total requested appropriation down to $3.425 billion, 30 percent less than originally asked. Without serious opposition, the House, on 11 July, passed the committee bill, 284 to 120.

In the Senate Appropriations Committee the pendulum swung in support of the foreign aid bill. After hearing final pleas from Dulles and Radford to restore the cuts inflicted by the House, the committee moved swiftly on 13 July to bring the appropriation in line with the recently passed authorization, voting 13 to 8 for an appropriation of $4.105 billion, including $2.3 billion for military assistance. Although well above
the House figures, these amounts still fell far short of the administration's original and now tacitly abandoned requests. After a sometimes bitter floor fight the Senate approved the bill on 24 July. The conference report with the customary fifty-fifty splits was sent to the two houses the next day. It provided $2.017 billion for military assistance in a total of $3.766 billion for all security assistance—about $1 billion and $1.1 billion, respectively, under the president's requests. The Senate went along without a murmur. In the less complaisant House some representatives lamented the indignities inflicted on the president's requests and pronounced the outcome "a very serious calculated risk." After final House passage on 26 July, Eisenhower approved the bill on 31 July.

Foreign Aid Prognosis: Poor

The deep congressional cut in the president's FY 1957 aid request was half of a double dose of bad news. The other half was the almost simultaneous arrival at the end of July of an unrelievedly gloomy report by the Prochnow committee on the six "problem" aid-receiving countries—Iran, Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, Formosa, and Vietnam. These countries, which in FY 1956 had received 54 percent of all of the mutual security and 58 percent of the military assistance money, suffered from the unlucky circumstance that they were strategically important but economically poor. Regarded as indispensable to the defense of the free world, they seemed to require inordinate and increasing infusions of American military and economic aid to achieve and maintain even a precarious, probably inadequate defense capability. Could the dilemma be resolved or mitigated by a different balance and phasing of military and economic aid—ideally by a heavier emphasis on relatively cheap economic aid and a sharp reduction in relatively expensive military aid?

For FY 1956 the six countries accounted for $1.7 billion of the $2.7 billion of foreign aid appropriations, plus $400 million carried over from prior years. In the FY 1957 administration proposal, $2.1 billion of the almost $4.9 billion requested was earmarked for them. Looking ahead, the committee estimated that the six would require American aid of $1.6 billion to $2.5 billion annually through 1960 to support their existing forces along with minimum economic development. Without American aid none could sustain an effective military force. They would be unable to complete the buildup now under way or, indeed, to prevent its rapid deterioration. This outcome could be averted only if their governments imposed austere consumption standards and reduced public
services. Such measures clearly were not in the cards, and on other grounds some of them were not even desirable.63

The committee made no explicit recommendations but offered several options: continue assistance along current lines, increase or reduce economic development (as opposed to budgetary) aid, or reduce military aid. An increase in military aid was conspicuously omitted, but the analysis of the no-change option was laced with warnings of rising costs and possible additional requirements such as modern weapons and support for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the Baghdad Pact that implicitly stigmatized it as unviable. A cutback in military aid seemed fraught with dire political and military consequences and likely to produce negligible economic benefits. Reduction in economic aid, similarly, would retard economic growth and ultimately lead to retrogression, while creating domestic instability, weakening resistance to Communist penetration, and undermining confidence in American promises and professed aims. In the long run, even without a reduction in military aid, the capacity to support military forces would be sapped.64

Prochnow’s personal report on 27 July to his boss, Secretary Dulles, omitted the ambiguities of the committee report and presented his own conclusions. Writing as deputy undersecretary of state for economic affairs rather than as committee chairman, he had no doubts as to the correct course of action. The current outlook was bleak and the military objectives were “beyond the capacity of the countries themselves to develop or, with the possible exception of Iran, to maintain . . . . In general, we are supporting the budgets and balance of payments of these countries.” The national military establishments thus supported were a heavy burden on them. Budgetary support, a large part of military aid, was difficult to reduce without provoking severe adverse reactions. This was especially unfortunate since the military programs showed little sign of having been modified in recognition of changing conditions such as the advent of new weapons or moderating Soviet bloc policies. “The longer we support budgets and balance of payments the greater would seem to be the problem of reducing our aid, since our support will tend to be more and more built into the budgets of these countries as anticipated income.” Prochnow recommended “a negotiated adjustment downward in military aid” along with greater emphasis on economic development financed from the resulting savings. This was the solution the committee had, in effect, been created to justify, but Prochnow’s enthusiasm for it was tempered.65

The NSC took up the Prochnow committee report late in October. Prochnow’s personal report to Dulles remained private, and neither he
nor Dulles alluded to it or its contents during the meeting. Prochnow presented the alternative courses of action the committee had defined: continue the program unchanged, reduce or increase economic development aid, or cut military aid. Finally, coming to the brink of his own recommendations to Dulles, he posed the principal issues that seemed to emerge: (1) Had the premises underlying the original program been modified by later developments? (2) Did the concept and execution of the program tend to “force us into a posture of inflexibility?” (3) Had we achieved “the best possible balance between our military and our economic assistance programs?”

In the ensuing discussion, the report drew faint praise and blunt criticism, although the absence of substantive comment suggested that few of those present had read it. Gray (who obviously had read the report) called it a “step forward” toward a solution that was not yet in sight, but he thought the committee “had neither the competence nor the authority to evaluate much more than the budgetary implications of the courses of actions which it had analyzed.” He considered the individual country approach faulty to begin with; he hoped the president would direct that the whole foreign aid picture be considered in any decisions on aid to particular countries. Dulles agreed with Gray that only the NSC could make the big decisions on foreign aid.

The discussion left the Prochnow committee report far behind as a narrowly focused study of limited application in the complex world of foreign aid. The thrust of the report—toward a shift of emphasis from military to economic development aid—seemed not to have been fully grasped; Dulles did not mention Prochnow’s personal proposal to this effect and the question of striking a proper balance between military and economic aid, one of the “issues” listed by Prochnow in his introduction, did not come up. Nevertheless, the idea of restructuring foreign aid in some way as a means of reducing its cost was not far below the surface. Winding down the discussion, the president said the Joint Chiefs should report the minimum level of indigenous forces needed to meet U.S. security demands in Pakistan, Turkey, Formosa, and Iran (Korea’s force levels were already under study); in this way it might be possible, he hoped, to “gradually approach” an answer to foreign aid. The council directed the Planning Board to recommend revisions in the aid program for these four countries and Korea.

What remained unanswered but must have been in every mind was the domestic dimension of the issue, the deepening resentment and disenchantment felt by the American public toward foreign aid. For months the “revolt against foreign aid” had been a leading topic of journalistic
comment—"by far the most significant phenomenon," wrote the Alsop brothers in July, "of the otherwise dull session of Congress now drawing to a close." Its most direct and accurate reflection was, of course, the speeches and votes in Congress. The House, for the first time in memory, had said "no" to the president and to the majority and minority leaders by voting crippling cuts. Analysts pointed to various probable causes, recalling that even in the glory days of the Marshall Plan popular support had been lukewarm, and members of Congress had always received mail complaining of foreign "giveaways." The mystique of the Marshall Plan had faded as the countries it had helped to salvage in the aftermath of the war recovered and prospered. Communism had become a global and not merely a European threat, demanding both defense and foreign aid outlays that dwarfed those of the early postwar years. Voters, resentful of countries that demanded more and more aid, criticized American policies and suspected American motives. Aid spokesmen warned that the current Soviet "peace campaign" was fraudulent and a mask for old sinister designs, that the threat had not diminished.

In the Marshall Plan days, the Alsops declared, "the need for foreign aid was at least defended with zest and conviction, whereas this year [1956] the defense has been about as formal, dispirited and inept as it is possible to imagine. Meanwhile the need for any real effort abroad has been consistently undercut by official protestations that every day in every way everything is getting better and better. Under the circumstances, it is surprising that the revolt has not cut deeper than it has."69

This unduly harsh judgment did not do justice to the efforts of Eisenhower and Dulles. They remained committed to the need for foreign aid to countries facing actual or potential threats to their existence and staunchly defended the policy against attacks from within the administration as well as from without. In the continuum of foreign policy from Truman to Eisenhower and succeeding administrations throughout the cold war, foreign aid remained an essential pillar of U.S. strategy for combating the Communist threat.
CHAPTER XXIII

Indochina: Roots of Engagement

As late as January 1953 the “other Asian war,” France’s grueling six-year-old conflict in Indochina, had only casual interest for the American public, not yet an American war nor a significant burden on the American taxpayer. Ho Chi Minh’s revolution against French colonialism in Southeast Asia and the portents of recent bloody battles in Vietnamese jungles were shunted to the back pages of American newspapers, behind reports of ongoing hostilities and truce negotiations in Korea. Within weeks this would change dramatically.

The American Dilemma

Two conflicting strains pervaded U.S. policy toward French Indochina after World War II: dislike of European colonialism and fear of aggressive communism. The anticolonial strain engendered sympathy with the nationalist revolution in Indochina, or at least inhibited support for French efforts to quell it and dictated conditions for that support—primarily pledges from the French that they would accelerate the granting of independence to the Indochinese. Anticommunism, on the other hand, fostered suspicion of, and antipathy toward, the revolution because its top leaders were Communists, who clearly controlled its policy and administration. Ardent anti-Communists thus tended to discount the nationalist aims and motivation of the insurgent Viet Minh and to equate support for France with resistance to a Communist conquest of Southeast Asia.¹

The French returned to Saigon in 1945 with American acquiescence though not active support. The following spring they were back in Hanoi,
by agreement with the occupying Chinese forces and the Viet Minh leader, Ho Chi Minh, who in 1945 had ejected the Japanese puppet ruler, Bao Dai, and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The French recognized the DRV as a free state within the French Union, but the agreement soon broke down. Open hostilities erupted in December 1946.

While clamoring for American help, the French fiercely resented American efforts to win concessions for the Vietnamese nationalists. Their most effective weapon, then and later, was exploitation of the growing American fear of communism, not only in Asia but of more immediate concern, in Europe, where the French Communist Party was a powerful political force. With the onset of the cold war in the late 1940s, U.S. foreign policy increasingly took on the character and motivation of an anticommunist crusade, perceiving the Kremlin as the nerve center of the threat, with Europe its prime target. By 1953 Europe seemed for the present relatively secure. In China, by the end of 1949 Mao Tse-tung's revolution had driven Chiang Kai-shek with the remnants of his army to offshore Formosa, and Mao's Communist armies stood on the border of Indochina. A third of humanity was now "lost" to the enemy, placing illimitable power at the disposal of the master-strategists in the Kremlin. Indochina appeared the likely next victim, with Thailand and Burma just beyond, and in June 1950 North Korean Communist armies invaded their southern neighbor. In June 1952 the NSC warned that Chinese Communist efforts to control any of the countries of Southeast Asia would, if not promptly countered, "probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this group." The "domino theory" thus became official, and the lingering anti-colonial bias in Washington was increasingly submerged by this growing sense of peril.

Ruling out any alignment with Ho Chi Minh, Washington pinned its hopes on the so-called "Bao Dai solution" as a means of building native barriers to communism while avoiding the stigma of propping up an archaic colonial regime. In 1949 the French had installed Bao Dai, former emperor of Annam, as ruler of an autonomous Vietnamese state comprising Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, in an Indochinese federation with the French Union. France retained control of the new state's armed forces and foreign policy and much of its administration as well. Washington formally recognized the three Associated States of Indochina—Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—on 7 February 1950, soon after Moscow and Peiping recognized Ho Chi Minh's government and the French National Assembly ratified the agreement setting up the Bao Dai regime. The first U.S. aid
survey mission left for Indochina that same month, and on 1 May President Truman approved $10 million in military assistance for the federated states, the first droplet of a flood that by the end of 1952 had swelled to almost $335 million in shipped war materiel.3

Bao Dai was, unfortunately, no solution, and after three years hardly anyone so regarded him. He was the antithesis of his adversary, the ascetic and iron-willed Ho Chi Minh—indecisive, excessively shy and given to chronic depression, afflicted with a liver ailment, recurrent malaria, and poor vision, but nevertheless something of an athlete and fond of the fleshpots. Many of his most trusted associates had grown rich from the vice and corruption of high colonial society; he himself enjoyed a substantial income from the same sources. Genuine patriots like Ngo Dinh Diem refused to serve him. In short, Bao Dai was totally unfit to capture the imagination and win the allegiance of the Vietnamese people. He so distrusted his own people that he feared an expanded Vietnamese army might go over en masse to the Viet Minh.

The United States, having reluctantly endorsed Bao Dai, saw no practicable alternative to supporting him. As time passed and the flow of American dollars and materiel expanded, the “slippery slope” of deepening involvement grew steeper. The parallel, but much larger, American involvement in Korea enabled France to claim the role of deserving and needy partner in the widespread war against Asian communism, along with that of indispensable ally in Europe. The United States supported Bao Dai essentially because France did, and the supposition was that France had to be supported in this, as in other matters, lest the French abandon the effort altogether and leave the United States to face the unwinning choice between taking France’s place or allowing the Communists to sweep over all of Southeast Asia.4

Western political rhetoric portrayed the three ongoing conflicts in Korea, Indochina, and Malaya* as a single East Asian front, directed on the Communist side from field headquarters in Peiping and masterminded in the Kremlin.5 Yet each was very much its own kind of war, and the one in Indochina was probably the most complex of the three. Without fixed fronts or even a clear distinction between front and rear, it was waged over immense, trackless distances and forbidding terrain—a war of maneuver, ambushes, patrols, and long overland movements, a war of small engagements without number and occasional bloody, protracted battles involving concentrations of division size on both sides. The French exploited their monopoly of airpower and superior firepower with isolated forward

*The British fought and defeated Communist insurgency in Malaya between 1948 and 1954.
airfields, air- and riverine-supply, wire-and-concrete field fortifications, and artillery bases; the Viet Minh used to advantage their manpower, off-road maneuverability, and popular support.  

For the duration of the war, the French and loyal Indochinese forces outnumbered their adversaries. In the spring of 1953 the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) numbered 171,500, of whom almost one-third were native Indochinese, backed by 126,000 regional troops, against an estimated 123,000 Viet Minh regulars and 62,000 full-time regional forces. But any numerical superiority was nullified by dispersion of French forces, partly a consequence of the futile attempt to dominate territory, partly also of a defensive strategy and psychology. From a half to two-thirds of the FEC was tied down in static defense duties, mostly in the Red River Delta.  

For the French, even as their military capabilities had increased, the war had gone mostly downhill since some victories in 1951. Jean De Lattre de Tassigny was the first and last really effective top military commander the French dared to put at risk in the Indochina morass, perhaps fearing that even their best might not survive a contest with the redoubtable Viet Minh commander, Vo Nguyen Giap.* De Lattre died of cancer in France in January 1952. Most of the major battles and campaigns—defeats and a few expensive victories—cost the French as heavily as the enemy, and the infiltration of the Delta continued. By the end of 1952, outside the Delta the French held only isolated outposts and a few forward airfields and coastal enclaves.  

In 1953 the flow of American aid to Indochina, already substantial in 1952, accelerated still more. In September 1952 DoD had raised combat requirements to a Korea-level priority, partly as a result of wasteful French maintenance procedures. Overall, deliveries in 1952 totaled slightly more than 300,000 tons for the year, compared with about 239,000 tons from the launching of the program in 1950 to the end of 1951. In 1953 the total of ocean-borne shipments reached 367,000 tons for the year, virtually eliminating materiel shortages among French Union forces. American materiel shipped to Indochina, valued at $334.7 million at the end of 1952, had grown to $616.8 million a year later. The cumulative total of shipments by the end of 1953 included 1,359 tanks and combat vehicles, 21,842 trucks, 169,508 small arms and machine guns, 4,100 artillery pieces, over 275,000,000 rounds of small arms and artillery ammunition, 309 naval vessels, and 375 aircraft.  

* Giap, a law graduate of Hanoi University and later a leader of the Indochinese Communist Party, fled to China and joined Ho Chi Minh at the beginning of World War II. As a Vietnamese patriot he had an abiding hatred for both the Chinese and the French, enhanced in the latter case by the death of his wife and her sister in a French prison.
The Letourneau Plan

The changing of the guard in Washington in January 1953 caused no significant break of continuity in the handling of the Indochina crisis. President Eisenhower came to the White House already oriented toward the Far East by a party platform and campaign rhetoric castigating his predecessor's alleged neglect of that region, and with impressions freshened by his highly publicized recent visit to Korea. Secretary of State Dulles, a veteran diplomatist and student of foreign affairs with long experience in the Far East, was well qualified to take on the Indochina problem. In Defense, where neither Secretary Wilson nor his deputy Roger Kyes could claim expertise in foreign affairs, they quickly immersed themselves in budgetary and internal management, leaving Assistant Secretary Frank Nash, one of the leading holdovers in OSD, to conduct DoD international matters virtually without interference.

The president's State of the Union address on 2 February linked the Korean War with the ongoing conflicts in Indochina and Malaya and the belcaguerment of Formosa in the worldwide struggle against communism. Early in February, Dulles and the new director for mutual security, Harold E. Stassen, met in Paris with French Premier René Mayer and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. Discussion of Indochina was brief but pointed. Mayer reminded his visitors of a recent North Atlantic Council resolution favoring NATO support of France's effort in Indochina. American assistance there, added Mayer, would help France make a military contribution to NATO sufficient to prevent her from being "submerged" militarily by Germany in Europe.

Dulles now regarded the Indochina crisis as more menacing than the Korean, since the consequences of losing that area to communism could not be localized. The word from Paris was that Mayer would present large new requests for aid for the expanding armed forces of the Associated Indochina States, which, along with an unreinforced FEC, were expected to be the principal instrument of French strategy in that area during the next three years. Under the program launched by De Lattre and Bao Dai early in 1952 the Vietnamese army had expanded to a nominal 100,000 regulars plus about 50,000 suppléta (auxiliaries), with a unit strength of 40 battalions. The projected grand total for all forces by 1955 including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and the French Expeditionary Corps (army, navy, and air force) of about 180,000, with 104,000 suppléta, came to almost 557,000 men.

Seizing the initiative at the opening meeting with visiting French Premier Mayer on 26 March aboard the Navy's yacht Williamsburg, the president advised him to emphasize, in any public speeches he might make
during his stay, that the struggle in Indochina was "not merely a French colonial effort," which regrettably many Americans thought it was. Until the American public was convinced that the Indochinese would win political autonomy in the present struggle, it would "be extremely difficult to do more than we are doing at present to help the French in Indochina." Now on the defensive, the French presented their national armies proposal as the core of their political policy and military strategy. Independence already granted to the Associated States in principle was "now being completed through the development of national armies." Popular support for the Bao Dai regime in Vietnam, they said, was visibly growing, as demonstrated by the heavy turnout and the rejection of Communist candidates in the January local elections and by the large numbers of volunteers, including officer candidates, for the army.

The French minister for the Associated States, Jean Letourneau, then outlined a broad strategic concept designed to defeat the Viet Minh in 1955. It included force and operational data and estimates of added costs for calendar years 1953-55. The grand total of additional aid to be assumed by the United States through calendar 1955 came to $730.1 million. At a farewell plenary meeting with the French at the White House on the 28th, the president declined to make a commitment to support the Letourneau plan but stated that this did not mean a refusal. Understandably, Mayer was taken aback. During the closing ceremonies, Mayer remarked that since military requirements for the Letourneau plan were not yet firm, perhaps the details could be worked out in Saigon with U.S. military officers sent by the Pentagon for the purpose. Whether or not he so intended, the French premier seemed to be proposing what successive French governments had heretofore rejected: American participation in French operational planning.

Laos: A New Theater?

The French visit did not change understandings concerning the prosecution of the war—the Americans dissatisfied but resigned, the French anxious but defiant. Post-mortems during the week following the talks reflected the feeling on the American side that, despite its imperfections, there was really no practicable alternative to supporting the Letourneau plan. The only alternative was to accept a stalemate, which in the long run would favor the Viet Minh.

On 9 April the Viet Minh launched their expected spring offensive, striking south from Dien Bien Phu into Laos and west and southwest
toward Thailand and Burma. During most of April the French high command seemed to regard the Viet offensive as a relatively limited foray without ambitious objectives. Only late in the month did the convergence of three divisions on the main centers of resistance in northern Laos precipitate a confused and panicky redeployment of reserves to oppose it. On 7 May, facing stiffened French defenses, Giap ordered the bulk of his forces back to Tonkin.\(^{18}\)

At the height of the crisis in late April many American officials, including Admiral Radford, commander in chief Pacific (CINCPAC), and others presumably as well informed, feared the worst. The president confessed that his former confidence in ultimate French victory had “now been shattered” by the demonstrated failure of the French to win the support of the Indochinese people. A convinced domino theorist, he feared that if Laos were lost, “the gateway to India, Burma, and Thailand would be open.” Radford urged renewed pressure on the French to reinforce the FEC.\(^{19}\) However, the only tangible American response to the crisis was to extend the loan of 13 C-47 transports and to lend 6 of the much larger C-119 Flying Boxcars.\(^{20}\)

In their formal evaluation of the Letourneau plan on 21 April, as the Laotian crisis was approaching its climax, the Joint Chiefs criticized it as insufficiently aggressive, strategically oriented south instead of north, and too reliant on small-unit operations. Although they felt the French lacked “determination and vigor,” they thought the plan “workable.”\(^{21}\) Uncertain whether all this added up to “yes” or “no,” and since Dulles and Wilson and other top officials were already in Paris for the NATO meetings, State Department Director of Policy Planning Paul Nitze asked the JCS to review the bidding. The meeting surfaced strong opinions but still failed to produce a clear verdict. “JCS views suggest caution,” Acting Secretary Bedell Smith cabled Dulles; the Joint Chiefs were unlikely to approve the plan unless the French amended it to meet their reservations.\(^{22}\)

Dulles had come to Paris prepared to take a sympathetic view of France’s financial difficulties in the context of NATO problems, and perhaps even to offer some concessions on aid in Indochina. But after receiving Nitze’s cable from Washington with its inconclusive “maybe” verdict, he reminded the French that the aid program for Indochina would have to be defended before Congress, which would be strongly influenced by U.S. military experts who were “not . . . wholly satisfied” with the Letourneau plan. In his closing remarks Dulles echoed the theme the president had stressed in the Washington talks: the war effort “must commend itself to the Congress and the American people.”\(^{23}\)
The French aid proposals were treated more gently. Dulles accepted the need for additional assistance and offered up to $560 million in aid for FY 1954 that would underwrite more than 40 percent of the current annual costs of the Indochina war. But the blank left for the financing of the Letourneau plan remained unfilled: the United States would finance an unspecified "moderate" portion of a "mutually agreed additional French effort."  

As the Laotian crisis moved toward its climax and abrupt resolution, Eisenhower made a determined effort with Premier Mayer to promote the replacement of General Raoul Salan as commander in Indochina. He proposed two candidates who were either unavailable or unacceptable. On 7 May Mayer publicly named Lt. Gen. Henri Navarre to replace Salan as commander in chief in Indochina. Navarre was not one of France's more distinguished senior generals and had never served in Indochina. Regarded as weak, indecisive, and reclusive by many U.S. officers in NATO who had known him, he was widely perceived as a "tame" sacrificial offering by his government in a doomed overseas post. Mayer, on the other hand, had known him in Germany and Algeria, and regarded him as a "strong leader who will see things objectively."  

The advent of a virtually unknown commander of French-Vietnamese forces did little to relieve the gloom in Washington. It was now evident that Premier Mayer could not command or induce the consensus at home needed to deal effectively with France's domestic and foreign difficulties. On 21 May the Mayer government fell and Letourneau departed with it, marking the end of a phase in the Indochina problem.  

Congressional displeasure with the magnitude of the FY 1954 aid request for Indochina and newspaper reports of blatant corruption in Indochina, together with charges that enough American war materiel had found its way into the hands of the Viet Minh to arm 40 battalions over a period of 14 months, led OSD to consider a proposal to send a "high-level State-Defense survey group" to Indochina to consult with General Navarre and assess the situation. Nash applauded the idea and advised that the mission be given a broad charter to include political meetings with high French officials in Paris.  

Premier Mayer's ambiguous offer at the end of the Washington talks to permit American technical participation in operational planning for the Letourneau plan offered the opening to send such a mission. The
State Department proposed to send a high-level military group with State representation to seek to determine how “American assistance can best be fitted into workable plans for aggressive pursuit of hostilities under present circumstances,” aiming at assuring a “firm prospect of reversing current military trend by beginning of next fighting season.” Although the Mayer government fell before the proposal could be discussed, State approved it with little delay on 2 June. By the 10th, Lt. Gen. John W. (“Iron Mike”) O’Daniel, U.S. Army commander in the Pacific, a “soldier’s soldier” and veteran of three wars, had been named to head the mission, reporting through CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs. It would have two officers each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force and a State Department representative. Two days later, Secretary Wilson approved the terms of reference, drawn up by the Joint Chiefs in collaboration with State.28

According to a Mutual Security Agency official who talked with O’Daniel soon after his appointment, the real purpose of the mission was to determine to what extent the United States “should have some say in how this effort is to be directed.” The American visitors would most want to learn what had been so difficult to pry from Mayer and Letourneau during the Washington talks—the current state of French planning for the conduct of the war. O’Daniel was to seek detailed knowledge of French military plans, the chances for and timing of final victory, and “the adequacy of coordination of programmed aid with military planning.”29

Fact-finding did not require the skills, or even the presence, of a three-star general. O’Daniel’s mission was really somewhat broader and more delicate. He was expected to persuade the French of the need for more aggressive strategy and tactics, early initiation of guerrilla warfare, a modernized and expanded training program, prompt transfer of leadership responsibility to the Associated States, and accelerated training of native military leaders. Finally, he was to urge the French, once again, to issue at the appropriate time a “clear and well advertised enunciation” of their future position in Indochina.30

O’Daniel arrived in Saigon with a small entourage on 20 June and plunged immediately into intense briefings and discussions with Navarre and his staff. Navarre and O’Daniel seemed to get along well together. O’Daniel’s initial report on 30 June confirmed that Navarre’s strategy, while resembling the old Letourneau plan, had improved the timetable somewhat by providing for aggressive local actions in the Tonkin area followed by a strategic offensive there about mid-September.31

After three weeks O’Daniel wrapped up the mission and departed. His final report, dated 14 July, sustained the optimistic tone of the earlier one. The Navarre Plan, characterized as a “new aggressive concept,”
comprised four features: (1) starting immediately, a series of mostly guerrilla actions—outside the Delta perimeter, in northern, southern, and western Annam; (2) launching, by 15 September, a three-division offensive in Tonkin; (3) formation of a battle corps from forces recovered from quiet areas; and (4) development of the Associated States' armies, with greater native leadership responsibility in the conduct of operations. Two new divisions were to be requested from French forces outside Indochina to reinforce the FEC, adding weight to the fall offensive. 32

O'Daniel's appraisal of the Navarre plan reflected a curious mixture of optimism and pessimism. He still believed that the forces already available to Navarre could win, if properly led and organized into regiments and divisions. But he conceded that this was improbable, since the French were unlikely to undertake the required but admittedly risky force re­dispositions planned, and probably were incapable of the psychological adjustments that would also be required. He made a strong plea for American support of Navarre's request to Paris for a short-term loan of two divisions, but hastened to add there was "no deficit of force in Indo­china." He thought that the new command would decisively defeat the Viet Minh by 1955. Two more divisions from France would "expedite" that outcome. 33

When the chiefs questioned O'Daniel in person on 17 July he told them that Navarre considered the two divisions an absolute prerequisite for "an all-out attack this fall." Without them, the campaign would be set back six months to a year. This statement amounted to a revision of O'Daniel's three-day-old report in which he had unequivocally predicted a decisive defeat of the Viet Minh in 1955, even earlier if the FEC were reinforced. Now O'Daniel said that unless Navarre was reinforced, victory would be delayed for up to a year. 34

Still, O'Daniel remained confident that, with or without reinforce­ments, the French would ultimately win. Having failed to convince Navarre that he should squeeze a five-division (or larger) battle corps out of his available scattered forces in order to seize and retain the initiative in Tonkin through the 1953-54 campaigning season, O'Daniel seemingly had concluded that with only a three-division force Navarre could perform the same feat against the enemy's undiminished eight-division battle corps. With two more divisions from France, the 1953-54 offensives would presumably be bigger and better and final victory would come sooner. A State Department position paper on the eve of the foreign ministers' talks with the French in Washington in mid-July warned that the two­division reinforcement was indispensable. 35
New Team in Paris

By this time the revolving door of French politics had brought a new government to power in Paris. On 27 June the National Assembly invested Joseph Laniel as prime minister. Laniel was a comparative unknown and, perhaps for that reason, he won acceptance by an overwhelming majority (398-206). On 3 July, the government announced that, with recognition of the independence of the Associated States in the 1949 accords and subsequent development of a brotherhood of arms and civil governmental institutions, there was now a basis for “perfecting” their independence and sovereignty. In Saigon the reaction was skeptical.

In France, the public demand to end the war, sharpened by the prospect of an armistice in Korea, had become “almost uncontrollable.” Satisfaction of Navarre’s demand for more troops was “out of the question.” In ministerial talks in Washington, 10-14 July, the crucial issue was the French demand that the expected peace negotiations in Korea be broadened to accommodate a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war in a comprehensive Far East settlement. Dulles would not oppose it, but he thought it unlikely that the other participants would be receptive after a conference dominated by “Korean problems and personalities.” Foreign Minister Bidault offered the simple imperative that the French people were fed up with the war and “want the same for Indochina that is being achieved in Korea.”

Dulles reminded him that negotiations, in whatever form, must be from strength not weakness. The best way to end the war, he advised, was as the Americans were attempting to do in Korea—“to make the other side want to end it”—and he recalled the thinly disguised preparations in the spring to use atomic weapons in Korea. The Navarre plan might serve the same purpose. That, Bidault retorted, might cut both ways; it would be easier to send Navarre the troops he needed “if the people in France see a possible end to the war . . . through negotiations.” Also, there was a difference between a threat of atomic destruction and a threat to send more troops to the theater. Bidault could only insist that “a way to do something about Indochina” must be found. Conclusion of the mid-July foreign ministers’ talks left all the important issues still hanging. On 29 July Laniel divulged to U.S. Ambassador Douglas Dillon his response to the crisis. Now determined “to win the war,” he had decided to grant Navarre about 9 of the 12 battalions he had requested. Coming to the

* It was agreed that the discussion of the American threat to use atomic weapons in Korea would not be released to the press.

† The reduction of the original two-division request had occurred during the past two weeks of negotiation. As late as the 17th the JCS were still talking of two divisions.
point, he said the whole plan would collapse if his request for additional aid were rebuffed. The government or its successor would have no choice but to withdraw from Indochina. He had instructed Navarre to prepare a plan for this eventuality. 38

Laniel's overture brought a prompt response from Washington in the person of Douglas MacArthur II, counselor to the State Department, who arrived in Paris on the 29th as the president's personal emissary. Reporting to Washington on the ensuing tense discussions, Dillon and MacArthur stressed that, without the requested help, Laniel's "chances of lasting much beyond October are not bright, and he will probably be replaced by a government which will be willing to let Indochina go down the drain." State now moved promptly, bringing the proposal for additional support before the National Security Council on 6 August for tentative approval after clearance by the Joint Chiefs and FOA. The additional budgetary help required for FY 1954 would bring the total of American aid to France for that year to $829 million, about half of the total budgeted cost of the war. The NSC recommended that the French proposal be explored, and if it looked promising, implemented. 39 Pronouncing Navarre's program sufficiently promising to warrant providing the additional aid requested, Radford, for the JCS, supported it in a memo to Wilson on 28 August with mild reservations. 40

Laniel and Bidault had been told emphatically, as had Mayer and Letourneau before them, that there would be no commitment of additional American aid until the French provided full information on the military plans, forces, and costs it was to support. Finally, on 3 September Laniel informed Dillon that execution of the long-awaited Navarre plan would get under way after assurance of availability of additional American aid funds. Reinforcements for the FEC totaling 7,200 men were expected to reach the theater by the beginning of November. 41

The principal theme of French strategic and operational plans was reassuring: to seize the initiative and take the offensive. Less so was the reluctant admission that this probably could not be done immediately, or even soon. First it was essential to build up a numerical preponderance, especially in elite units favorably positioned to annihilate the enemy's battle forces, and this would take time. The expansion of native forces would be vigorously pursued, even in the face of expected enemy offensives. In other words, the enemy would again be allowed to strike first, forcing the French, in the now familiar pattern, to react in piecemeal fashion. Navarre had, in fact, submitted a new timetable on 1 September that cancelled the 15 September offensive. It was evident that the modest reinforcements coming from France were intended primarily to help
Navarre contain the expected Viet Minh offensive in the fall and winter, when most of his mobile forces would still be dispersed. The evaporation of Navarre's promised fall offensive evidently disturbed neither the JCS nor State officials meeting on 4 and 9 September for a final review of the situation before the upcoming NSC meeting. There prevailed a feeling of relief that the French had finally agreed to send reinforcements to Indochina, had submitted a formal, documented request for aid, and were, to all appearances, now ready to proceed. Ridgway's was the only sour note: "Do we just give the French $385 million and then sit back and hope that they meet our conditions?" The administration's nervousness was palpable. Dulles reported that the president, vacationing in Denver, had suggested a possible supplemental request. The clear consensus reflected the conviction that the Navarre plan must not fail.

The discussion of the French aid request in the NSC meeting on the 9th was little more than a formality. State pushed for prompt action to meet the request and, as conditions, stipulated "no basic or permanent alteration" by France of NATO force programs and no more aid requests in 1954. Finally, the United States retained the option of terminating aid should France prove incapable of fulfilling its undertakings. Radford gave his expected resounding endorsement of the Navarre plan, but most of the discussion in the NSC concerned the technicalities of finding and providing the $385 million without asking Congress for a supplemental. With no dissent and very little discussion the NSC approved State's recommendations.

Negotiation of the final agreement in Paris consumed two weeks, culminating in a formal exchange of letters between Foreign Minister Bidault and Ambassador Dillon on 29 September and a perfunctory joint communiqué the next day. The total of budgetary aid for FY's 1953-54 came to $1.070 billion. Negotiations almost bogged down over French insistence that the communiqué not explicitly rule out the possibility of a negotiated settlement. The French won that point, but not the explicit sanction for negotiation that they would have preferred. The signing of the FY 1954 $385 million French budget-aid agreement at the end of September was an important diplomatic event, but it had no visible effect on the Indochina crisis. The French had made it abundantly clear that granting their demands would merely enable them to continue the struggle at its current level.
On 6 November the O'Daniel mission arrived in Saigon for its second visit, announced as a progress reporting exercise flowing from the original mission in July. Its upbeat report, submitted on the 19th, informed the JCS that in a series of operations during the summer and fall French Union forces had made "real progress in implementation of the Navarre Plan." Actually, most of these were of modest scope and low risk, yielding unimpressive returns for the effort expended. Overall, American observers gave the limited operations moderately high marks as "time-gaining manoeuvres" that had probably delayed a major Viet Minh effort against the Delta.46

The U.S. Army attaché in Indochina, reporting at this time, suggested that while some progress had been made under Navarre, "the French still have a defensive strategy." He did not think that French Union forces could take "decisive action to win the war in the foreseeable future." The Army's assistant chief of staff, G-2, commenting in Washington, said that the attaché's views conformed with those of other "high U.S. military officials" who thought General O'Daniel's report was "somewhat over-optimistic."47

In December, in a letter to the MAAG chief in Indochina, Navarre raised an old issue, challenging the basic principle of American military aid administration—the screening of requests and their justification. He reviewed points he made in an earlier letter—the need both to avoid modifying his requests for aid and to expedite deliveries to enable him to build up his forces. Navarre said he could not understand reductions being considered in American aid for his ground, air, and naval forces. He asked for assurances that within the next three months "an actual effort will be made taking the form of extensive deliveries."

In some respects Navarre's complaints were a transparent mask for defects in his own staff that he considered unimportant or of which he may not have been aware. By American standards, French staff work was inefficient and uncoordinated. Repeatedly the MAAG, in screening requests, uncovered discrepancies which, when shown to the French, they readily conceded. The careful screening to which the MAAG subjected French aid requests was a legal requirement imposed by Congress. The French considered it unreasonable to expect them, during an all-out war, to apply strict accounting procedures to the formulation of aid requests; in war waste was unavoidable, and for a wealthy country like the United States the waste entailed in the Indochina aid program was a trifling price to pay given the vital ends. It was a point of view some Americans were beginning to share. Sloppy accounting, moreover, did not necessarily or always result in waste. The practice, for example, of requisitioning
new items instead of repairing old ones or searching for replacements already in the system but difficult to find, sometimes paid off, especially in the high-pressure environment of an active theater. It was already institutionalized, to some extent, in the American system itself, particularly in the provision of spare parts. 48

Navarre had shrewdly taken the measure of his American adversaries on this issue. The threat that cuts in his requests might force him to "reconsider" his operational plans for 1954 set alarm bells ringing in the Pentagon. He was assured, in general, that all of his deliveries were being expedited, that Indochina requirements had the highest MDAP priority, and, most important, that henceforth his critical needs would be considered, to the extent possible, on an emergency ad hoc basis. To this end, the French staff would be invited to work with the MAAG in drawing up lists of critical items for submission to Washington, where they would receive priority attention. Navarre was even promised delivery of urgently needed FY 1954 items in time for use during the current dry season. 49

Reportedly, Navarre was pleased by the flurry of action his initiative produced in Washington. He said no more about changing his operational plans. The handling of French requests by the MAAG became markedly more accommodating after December, on the principle that in an active theater of operations requests to meet changes in the situation were to be expected. The essential features of the system, however, remained in place, including especially the key role of the MAAG as the first stage of the screening process. The MAAG staff continued to insist that French requests be justified by essentially the same criteria as before. Navarre, for his part, had not changed his views; he continued to employ end-run tactics on occasion, and manifested increasing impatience with the whole screening procedure. 50

Navarre's grand design, outlined in O'Daniel's report, aimed at securing possession of the whole country south of the 19th parallel before the end of the summer. He would be ready by October 1954 to launch his final offensive north of the 19th parallel in North Annam and areas north and west of the Delta. This was not merely a goal; it was also a deadline, since the minimum required political support both in France and Vietnam was not expected to endure longer than eight months. American aid, O'Daniel warned, must be concentrated and timed with a view to being most effective within that period. 51

O'Daniel's sanguine report in November 1953 was complemented on 8 December by an almost equally glowing version written in the State Department, exuding praise for the high command's "new offensive spirit." That the author could write, at this late date, as though Navarre still held the initiative attested to the lack of perception in official thinking. In reality, for the past six weeks Giap's elite divisions had been on the move,
watched at first languidly then anxiously by Navarre’s intelligence, and French Union forces were once more reacting defensively. The objective of the Viet Minh movement remained unclear. Navarre hesitated for a few days, awaiting clearer signals; then, on 20 November, he set in train his countermove, the reoccupation of Dien Bien Phu.42

This objective was inherited, like most of his strategy, from his predecessor, for whom Dien Bien Phu was to have been a base for offensive operations. Navarre’s aim was defensive—to bar a Viet Minh thrust into northern Laos. To that end Dien Bien Phu would be heavily reinforced with up to nine battalions and fortified as an airhead, capable of withstanding a major attack and siege, inflicting crippling losses on the attackers, and serving as a northern anchor for forces defending Laos and for forays into the surrounding area. The reoccupation was carried out without difficulty on 20-22 November by a surprise airdrop of five battalions of French and Vietnamese paratroops. But in the next few days three more Viet divisions were on the move southwestward, presaging that an invasion of Laos impended, with Dien Bien Phu’s five battalions (less than 5,000 men) standing squarely in their path. On 3 December Navarre made the momentous decision to hold Dien Bien Phu, reinforced and fortified, “at all costs.” It would replace the Delta as the firepower magnet that would attract and decimate the Viet Minh forces.43

Meanwhile, there were important diplomatic developments. On 27 November Moscow had accepted a Western offer of a four-power conference and proposed Berlin as the venue. This matter and others—French foot-dragging on EDC, and the known Soviet intention of proposing a five-power conference (i.e., with China)—occupied Eisenhower, Churchill, and Laniel at Bermuda during the first week of December. During this conference, it became clear that the Laniel government still considered negotiations in an international forum as its best hope for an honorable extrication from the war. But, as the conference drew to a close on 7 December, the French somewhat defiantly reserved their options—to negotiate a cease-fire and an armistice when and if the opportunity presented, or to promote the creation of an international forum in which a comprehensive peace settlement could be negotiated for Southeast Asia, whether independently or as part of a broader Far East settlement. They expected these options to open, moreover, possibly as early as the spring of 1954, when they hoped to be in a position to negotiate from strength.44 And by that time the crucible at Dien Bien Phu had created a crisis of confidence that dashed any high hopes of success that remained.

* Dien Bien Phu, eight miles north of the Laotian border, was on the historic invasion route southward into the Mekong basin.
CHAPTER XXIV
Dien Bien Phu and After

The beginning of the fateful year 1954 saw the stage set for the climactic act of the Indochina war at Dien Bien Phu. In four months of masterly maneuvering Viet Minh commander Vo Nguyen Giap had forced the French to abandon the concentration concept of the Navarre plan and to disperse their mobile reserves in fortified advanced airfields all around the theater. By late December 1953 Dien Bien Phu was so tightly ringed that French patrols were being thrown back a half-mile from the outer defenses. A month later Giap had concentrated his main battle force—five divisions and more coming—to engulf the French Union troops deployed to bar an invasion of Laos.¹

Yet few observers seemed seriously worried about Dien Bien Phu. From late November until mid-March a stream of high-ranking officials, French and American, visited the camp. One of the most influential in shaping official opinion in Washington, General O'Daniel, delivered the flat verdict on 5 February, after inspecting the position, that the French could “withstand any kind of an attack that the Viet Minh are capable of launching,” and certainly were “in no danger of suffering a major military reverse.” Eisenhower forwarded O’Daniel’s view to Dulles, then in Europe, with the remark that it was “more encouraging than that given you through French sources.”² But behind this official optimism there lurked the realization that a sudden shift in the delicate military balance could overnight compel a prompt decision on whether to intervene militarily in Indochina.³ Late in 1953, Army planners, no doubt remembering the nightmare of June 1950 in Korea and worried about the requirement for ground forces that might grow out of an initially limited air and naval intervention in Indochina, had suggested a “reevaluation of
On 8 January the NSC discussed the question of intervention at length. Secretary Dulles, who had assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee only the day before that the Navarre plan offered good prospects of success, now declared that the French position in Indochina was so critical that the United States might be forced to intervene. Eisenhower avowed his aversion to intervention, French colonialism, and the French, who wanted "to involve us secretly" in a war that would "absorb our troops by divisions!" The key to winning it was to get the Vietnamese to fight. He wanted no deployment of U.S. ground forces "anywhere in Southeast Asia" (except possibly Malaya), and no U.S. replacement of French forces in Indochina. Still, the president entertained suggestions—organizing a large U.S.-directed training program, providing the French with more B-26s, or sending American military mechanics to service American-built aircraft. Radford offered the boldest suggestion, that would carry his signature—a carrier-supported air strike against the forces besieging Dien Bien Phu.

This was too much for Secretary Wilson. A decision now to intervene, said Wilson, would amount to "an admission of the bankruptcy of our political policies re Southeast Asia and France." The French, with American help, could win in 1955. The council supported him, and on 16 January the president approved as a comprehensive policy for Southeast Asia NSC 5405, which saw the fundamental danger as more political than military. NSC 5405 reaffirmed continued U.S. aid to France, but only in the unlikely event of Chinese armed intervention would the United States provide naval, air, and logistical assistance for a "resolute defense of Indochina"—including, if necessary, direct action against China, preferably in a United Nations action or at a minimum in conjunction with France and Great Britain. Intervention with ground forces received no mention.

At a meeting in Berlin, foreign ministers of the three major Western powers and the USSR agreed to include China in a follow-on conference on Southeast Asia at Geneva in the spring. Secretary Dulles fought a losing battle with his own allies to deny China a place at the great-power conference table. Dulles reluctantly agreed on 18 February to the convening of a five-power conference on Korea and Indochina, beginning on 26 April, where, as he later tried to convince a skeptical Senate Foreign Relations Committee, China would be "called before the bar of justice" as an aggressor.

* The president ordered that the annex to NSC 5405, a closely held analysis of the alternatives and hypotheses of intervention, be withdrawn "for destruction," and henceforth be discussed only orally. Actually it was only shelved and retrieved for further discussion some weeks later.
By early March official Washington felt deep unease; both the French and the Viet Minh seemed to be leaning toward a cease-fire. Reviewing on 12 March the several possible courses of action on Indochina mentioned earlier by the secretary of defense—continuation of military action to seek a victory, a cease-fire, establishment of a coalition government, partition of the country, and self-determination through free elections—the Joint Chiefs argued that all but the first one would ultimately result in Communist control. A few days later a subcommittee of a special committee the president had established on Indochina stated that "no solution to the Indochina problem short of victory is acceptable." It recommended that the NSC determine "the extent of U.S. willingness . . . to commit U.S. air, naval and ultimately ground forces to the direct resolution of the war in Indochina."8

In Paris, following a French National Assembly resolution on 9 March demanding early negotiations with the Viet Minh, the government sent General Paul Ely, chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, to Washington with the specific mission of eliciting a written guarantee that if the Chinese should intervene by air, a threat the French were wholly unprepared to deal with, the United States would promptly come to the rescue.9 During February the French had already been given 22 B-26 bombers, with more to come, and the loan of 200 mechanics for B-26 and C-47 maintenance. Ely was instructed to seek more aid and to sound out American reactions to an increase in Chinese aid to the Viet Minh, particularly if it involved the introduction of ground forces.10

At this juncture, on 13 March, Giap launched his expected all-out assault on Dien Bien Phu. In four days the Viet Minh human-wave attacks, preceded by devastating artillery barrages, overwhelmed two of the outlying strongpoints and part of a third, leaving the main airstrip in full view of enemy gunners. The violence of the attack, particularly the volume and accuracy of the artillery fire, exceeded all expectations.11

Ely had instructions not to request American intervention, that option remaining contingent on a Chinese air attack, still regarded as the paramount threat. The president instructed Radford, in Ely's presence, to give top priority to all urgent French requests. Moreover, the United States would formally warn Peiping not to increase its support of the Viet Minh, and would initiate planning for prompt U.S. counteraction should the Chinese intervene.12

The Washington conversations reflected the current tensions of Franco-American relations. Dulles told Ely bluntly that the United States could not invest its prestige in high-risk military operations not involving
vital national security interests. He suggested more French “partnership” in burden-sharing than in the past.

Radford had confidence that intervention would lead to the Americans eventually taking over the actual running of the war, but for the present that seemed a remote prospect, unwanted by either party. The French, fixated on the threat from China, seemed less moved by the prospect of losing Dien Bien Phu, while the president had told the NSC on 25 March that he could not approve intervention in Indochina, even if formally and urgently requested, unless as part of a coalition and United Nations effort and with congressional support. Radford and Ely on 26 March discussed the possibility of an air strike against Dien Bien Phu. Subsequently each attributed the initiative to the other.13

Radford had in mind a modification of a contingency plan developed by the French and American air staffs in the theater, code-named Vulture (Vautour). In its new version it envisaged a night raid by 60 B-29 heavy bombers from Luzon escorted by 150 fighters from Seventh Fleet carriers, against Viet Minh troop concentrations and artillery emplacements around Dien Bien Phu. Radford described it as a limited, one-shot effort and doubted that the Chinese would regard it as cause for open intervention. As he cautioned Ely, however, Paris would have to formally request the operation, but he seemed confident that the president would support it. Ely remained noncommittal, remarking that his government might fear Chinese retaliation. Navarre’s prompt affirmative settled the question. On the night of 3-4 April Laniel requested “immediate armed intervention by U.S. carrier aircraft at Dien Bien Phu.”14

**Dulles’s Grand Design**

Radford’s confidence that the president would approve an air strike seemed well founded. On 29 March Dulles made a landmark speech blasting Western defeatism and hopes for a compromise settlement at Geneva. He catalogued expanding Chinese and Soviet assistance to the Viet Minh. The West should deal with this Communist threat to all Southeast Asia by the “United Action” of a coalition, led by the United States and including the free nations of Southeast Asia plus Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand. Dulles left unexplained the kind of action he had in mind.15

Radford, meanwhile, polled his JCS colleagues in an effort to win their support for air intervention at Dien Bien Phu should the French ask for help. To no avail. Spearheaded by Ridgway’s emphatic no, the Joint Chiefs lined up almost solidly against the chairman, only Twining giving a qualified assent hedged by conditions the French were sure to reject. When
the NSC on 5 April discussed whether the United States should intervene, Ridgway again said no, arguing that air and naval forces alone, even using tactical nuclear weapons, could not decisively prevail.16

Pursuing Eisenhower's strategy of testing congressional waters before making a major commitment, Dulles set up a secret briefing of legislative leaders for 3 April. The day before, in an apparent showdown meeting with the president and Radford, he bared his differences with Radford's positions. He intended a proposed resolution to serve as a deterrent to strengthen his hand in United Action negotiations by demonstrating that the proposed pact had congressional sanction. Radford envisioned any U.S. strike in Indochina primarily at Dien Bien Phu, but he thought that an outcome there was imminent and that the situation did not call for any U.S. participation. Dulles presented a draft congressional resolution giving the president a mandate to use naval and air power "to assist the forces that are resisting aggression in Indochina."17

Dulles, State, and DoD officials met with the legislators on 3 April. Dulles argued that Indochina was the "key" to Southeast Asia. If the Communists gained Indochina, in time all of Southeast Asia would fall, thus "imperiling our western island of defense." Radford analyzed the situation at Dien Bien Phu; he thought it too late for airpower to save the fortress. Radford did not deny the possibility that American ground forces might be needed. Would the Chinese be likely to intervene? Dulles thought they would back down. Finally, Radford had to admit that the other military chiefs had all opposed the plan. Dulles admitted that he had not lined up allied support. That, apparently, was the key point. The congressional attendees were unanimous in stating that "we want no more Koreas with the United States furnishing 90% of the manpower." And no blank check. An air strike would be only the beginning; ground forces would inevitably follow. The legislators stipulated as keys for their support of any intervention in Indochina formation of a 10-power coalition including the free nations of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and the British Commonwealth, all committed to participate; a firm French undertaking to accelerate independence for the Vietnamese; and French agreement to keep on fighting.18

These conditions left Dulles and Radford with little wiggle room for negotiations. When late the next evening, 4 April, Dillon reported from Paris the French request for an immediate air strike, Dulles promptly rebuffed the plea, listing the requirements that would have to be met to permit such an operation. Reading the message, Foreign Minister Bidault said he understood the U.S. position but declared that "the time for formulating coalitions has passed as the fate of Indochina will be decided within the next ten days at Dien Bien Phu." France would fight on alone.19
On 6 April the NSC met to discuss intervention. In the three weeks since the first assault, Dien Bien Phu’s garrison had lost 4 of its 12 battalions and replaced 3, and was low on food and ammunition. For the past two days radio contact with the garrison had been lost. Resumption of mass attacks was expected within a few days. Even if Dien Bien Phu should fall, declared the president, the loss would not really be a military defeat in view of the slaughter inflicted on the enemy. At the same time, Eisenhower stated emphatically that “there was no possibility whatever of U.S. unilateral intervention in Indochina.” Dulles told the NSC no “irremediable military disaster” during the next 30 days was likely. He then launched into an exposition of his effort to organize such formidable regional strength before the Geneva conference that military intervention might prove unnecessary. Wilson and Radford were skeptical, but the president was clearly not receptive to contrary views.

Following up on his plan for coalition building, between 10 and 15 April Dulles engaged in shuttle diplomacy. He went to London in a quest for British adherence to coalition action: Churchill and Eden emphatically rebuffed his overtures. In April’s final weekend, with Navarre warning that the fortress might capitulate within 72 hours, and a distraught Premier Laniel pleading anew for an emergency air strike, Dulles offered Laniel a new deal—a souped-up version of the old Vulture plan with limited British participation, to be carried out within Navarre’s 72-hour deadline. The price? French acceptance of American strategic command in the theater and exertion of friendly persuasion upon the British to formally participate in a regional coalition. Laniel, grasping at the straw, reportedly gave his tentative assent. But the plan fell apart before it could be executed. Radford, distrusted by the British as a hawk thirsting for a war with China, had been assigned the role of selling the plan. The British turned the proposal down forthwith, foreseeing large new ground force requirements and other risks. Britain, Churchill caustically remarked, was alive and well despite the loss of India; France could be likewise without Indochina. Eden was especially annoyed by Dulles’s back-door effort, as he viewed it, to buy French advocacy in persuading the British to endorse a joint allied declaration. The whole episode left sour feelings on both sides.

Meanwhile the French at Dien Bien Phu were enduring the tightening noose of Giap’s encirclement. Under intense and sustained pressure the perimeter steadily diminished and the garrison dwindled. On 23 April Bidault told Dulles that only “massive air intervention” could enable the garrison to hold out for the few weeks remaining before the monsoon rains. Eisenhower, unwilling to act unilaterally, rejected the plea. Radford continued to urge an air strike, but no viable or acceptable plan emerged.
At the end of April Dien Bien Phu had only a week to live, and the diplomatic effort to save it ground to a halt. On the 28th the Associated States signed a preliminary independence agreement with France, to take effect in two months. In Geneva Dulles was still bickering with Eden over the British refusal to encourage the French to keep fighting.24

The Debate Continues

On 7 May, after a final bloody melee, Dien Bien Phu's defense collapsed, signaling the end of French dominion in Indochina and redefining the dimensions and challenge of intervention. The following day at Geneva, as the Indochina phase of the conference began, Bidault called for an immediate cease-fire, with political negotiations to follow. On the 13th Pham Van Dong, the Viet Minh representative at Geneva, proposed concurrent military and political negotiations. Other "reasonable" Viet Minh provisions, such as respect for French cultural and economic interests in the postwar settlement and amnesty for collaborators, suggested an effort to outflank Bidault by appealing to his peace-at-any-price opponents at home.25

Earlier, on 9 May, feeling his foundations crumbling, Laniel asked Washington under what conditions the United States would intervene in Indochina. For Dulles the request posed a dilemma, since the NSC had decided on 8 May that the United States ought not to associate itself with any cease-fire in advance of an acceptable armistice agreement, including international controls. If the French were told now—as they had been told twice in April—that military intervention could be had only as a coalition undertaking, they might well refuse.26

Dulles decided to risk a refusal. The response delivered by Ambassador Dillon on 14 May provided for a formal coalition of intervening forces (air and naval only for the United States) that must not be offset by French withdrawals. There were other preconditions that constituted a clear warning to the French not to expect an armed coalition, or even preparations for one, to materialize in time to affect the negotiations at Geneva.27 Indeed, as Eisenhower later admitted, even if the French had accepted the offer, he felt no commitment to follow through with a request for congressional authorization to intervene. But the French were not about to reject the American offer out of hand. Rather, as soon became apparent, they wanted to keep alive the threat of American military support as a factor in the Geneva bargaining. Also, Bidault was reasonably sure by now that the Soviets and Chinese wanted an early termination of the war.28
An end to the war was far over the horizon. Meanwhile, as the military situation worsened, Paris increased the pressure on Washington to reconsider unilateral intervention. Early in June, Lt. Gen. Jean Valluy, French representative on the NATO Standing Group in Washington, gave a detailed and alarming report to Radford, and subsequently the members of the Five-Power Military Conference. The impact in Indochina of the loss of Dien Bien Phu had been catastrophic, creating a crisis of public morale and confidence, plunging the government into administrative disarray, and the whole military structure seemed to be on the verge of paralysis and disintegration. 29

Valluy's warning, not altogether unexpected, had the air of a last-chance plea. In Saigon and Geneva American officials generally agreed with Valluy's gloomy assessment, as did the Joint Chiefs. The JCS doubted that limited American intervention—i.e., air and naval only, and only within Indochina—could be decisive; they still believed that the only effective way to deal with Communist aggression in Indochina was to strike at the source, China, with whatever force was needed, including atomic weapons. 30

**Geneva and Manila**

France's last-chance effort to induce the United States to intervene in the war ran out of time. On 12 June Premier Laniel finally lost his majority and stepped down. His successor, Radical Socialist Pierre Mendes-France, an able and realistic negotiator, proposed a four-week "contract" to a skeptical Assembly to salvage at Geneva an honorable settlement from a recognizably unwinnable situation. With the Geneva conference deadlocked and formal negotiations suspended until 14 July, British and American leaders at the end of June traded British agreement to work toward a regional Southeast Asia defense pact for American acceptance, in principle, of a partition settlement in Vietnam. Dulles refused Mendes-France's request that he head the U.S. delegation as a visible symbol of Western solidarity. Instead, he assigned Under Secretary Bedell Smith to head the U.S. delegation with instructions to play a helpful but passive, non-guarantor role. In a statement on 11 July, Dulles announced that the United States would "respect" and not oppose an agreed settlement, but it would not be a "cosignatory with the Communists," or "acknowledge the legitimacy" of Communist control over "any segment of Southeast Asia." 31

The Geneva conferees reached a final consensus early in the morning of 21 July. The concessions that dissolved the impasse came from the Viet Minh's (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) great-power sponsors, the USSR
and China. Fearing American intervention and a renewal of hostilities, they imposed on their junior partner moderate settlement provisions on several key issues: e.g., a provisional partition line between North and South Vietnam at the 17th instead of the 13th parallel; all-Vietnam elections to be held in two years rather than in six months; and withdrawal of Communist Pathet Lao and Free Khmer "volunteers" from Laos and Cambodia.

In their Final Declaration on 21 July the conferees "took note" of these and other armistice agreements between the DRV and the three Associated States. Dulles went along with all but one proviso, an agreement to consult with the other conference participants on measures to "ensure respect for the agreements" when necessary, which he refused to recognize because he thought it would "imply multilateral engagement with Communists." His opposition to giving formal approval to the agreement, backed by the president, precipitated the remarkable result that the Final Declaration wound up with no signatories and thus no collective obligations. Instead, the participants issued unilateral statements defining their respective positions on specific issues. Vietnam's delegate refused to endorse either provisional partition or future elections likely to perpetuate it. Bedell Smith's unilateral declaration also warned that the United States would view any aggressive violation of the settlement as a threat to international peace. The warning could be interpreted to give the three free Indochina states a permanent unilateral American guarantee instead of the vitiated collective one. It would, in part, provide the basis for President Kennedy's commitment in 1961 to defend South Vietnam. In Eisenhower's press conference the same day the president slid quickly over the topic, explaining that the settlement contained "features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice."

Having opposed Geneva as a recipe for disaster, Dulles now looked to a collective defense pact for Southeast Asia. The proposed version of the pact came before the NSC on 12 August as part of NSC 5429, a review of U.S. policy in the Far East. Secretary Wilson objected to backing into a war over Indochina, where, unlike in the Philippines, the United States had never had vital interests. The president's only serious reservation was that the provision characterizing any attack on the treaty area, especially by China, as a threat to vital national interests, would be read as giving the president a legal basis for retaliating militarily "without need for further Congressional action." He wanted the "constitutional processes" proviso to remain, and he wanted no reference to bypassing Congress.

On 6 September representatives of the United States and seven other nations met in Manila to negotiate the proposed Southeast Asia security treaty. The pact that emerged two days later, threatening an aggressor
with “constitutional processes” retaliation, made a mockery of Dulles’s rousing call to arms, leaving the area, as Vice Adm. A. C. Davis, deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, reported to Wilson, “no better prepared than before to cope with Communist aggression,” and serving “more a psychological than a military purpose.” Only three Asian nations, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan, had dared to antagonize Communist China by enlisting in the regional coalition, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

All the signatories except the United States had wanted the treaty to present a solid front against any aggressor, Communist or otherwise, but Dulles insisted on a clause stipulating that the United States was obligated to act only against Communist aggression or subversion. The other parties to the treaty did not feel particularly threatened, indeed expected to coexist with China to their mutual profit. In the end, only a shred of Dulles’s original concept remained: a separate protocol to defend the three Associated States (whose only likely enemies were Communist). SEATO in fact remained a never-invoked dead letter.

*Making Do with Diem*

“Retained” Vietnam was especially vulnerable to a Communist takeover—economically ruined, ravaged by eight years of civil war, deluged by a massive influx of refugees from the North. Defeat and partition had left the army disintegrated as a fighting force and of dubious value to the government. Throughout South Vietnam, meanwhile, Viet Minh cadres were busily gnawing at the foundations, preparing for their expected takeover in the July 1956 scheduled elections. Since 7 July the government, a beleaguered enclave in this postwar landscape, had been headed by Ngo Dinh Diem, a reclusive, ultranationalist Catholic mandarin from the north, reputedly of “high moral character,” obsessively loyal to his family, politically agile but not astute. During travels and residence abroad he had made important political connections, especially in the United States. One circumstance particularly favored him—the support of Dulles, attracted by Diem’s passionate nationalism and anti-Communism. Dulles backed Diem unswervingly through the trials that followed.

Immediately after Geneva Mendes-France reaffirmed his predecessor’s formal recognition of Vietnam’s independence, but France had no intention of uprooting its economic and cultural ties with Indochina, or of permitting secession of its member states, above all Vietnam, from the French Union. In August General Ely, the new high commissioner,
arrived in Saigon with sweeping powers to execute the mandates of the Geneva Accords and promote economic and political development.

For the time being, the United States and France were partners in Indochina, but their basic difference—France wanted to remain in Vietnam as a permanent, though non-military presence, the United States wanted her to leave as soon as feasible—undermined the relationship. U.S. guidance called for direct dealings, including military and economic assistance, with the three Indochina states rather than through France, along with continued pressure on France to "promptly recognize" them as sovereign nations. The impracticability of this bypass-the-French policy became evident, however, with initiation of preparations for an American-directed training program for the disorganized Vietnamese army. Back in July, General O'Daniel, head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon, had pleaded for the wherewithal to initiate a comprehensive training plan. With typical "hen-and-egg" reasoning, as Dulles termed it, the JCS prescribed unrealistic "preconditions"—e.g., a "reasonably strong, stable civil government in control" and early withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps—that precluded even a beginning. 39

The Vietnamese army, the JCS assumed, would be expected to maintain internal security, and to repel an invasion, if only temporarily. The chiefs had in mind creating a 234,000-man army at a cost of $420 million for FY 1955 alone. Dulles considered this excessive, but the chiefs stuck to their original force estimate. As for the training function, they feared "it would be most difficult to do a satisfactory job of building up and training the Vietnamese native forces in the absence of a stable government." They recommended "from a military point of view" that the United States should not participate in the proposed training program unless political considerations were overriding, which by late October they were. 40

During that month strong opposition by U.S. Ambassador Donald H. Heath prevented two planned coups by the deposed army chief of staff, Nguyen Van Hinh, to overthrow Diem. General Ely loyally, if reluctantly, supported Diem, but the French, both in Vietnam and Paris, were antagonized by his unrelenting hostility toward them. 41

At the end of September the continuing threat to Diem's survival had prompted a more explicit U.S.-French agreement to work together. Washington undertook to help defray the cost of maintaining the French Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam until the Vietnamese army could take over, while the French grudgingly agreed to the funneling of American aid directly to the Associated States rather than through French channels. In mid-October State and Defense were directed to prepare guidance for a U.S.-directed military training program. The NSC's Operations Coordinating
Board overrode JCS opposition, directing on the 20th immediate launch­ing of a crash Vietnam training program. The NSC decided that O'Daniel should be authorized, working with Ambassador Heath, to develop an “urgent program to improve the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free Vietnam forces,” or, if they proved resistant, to organize a separate national constabulary.42

A principal weakness of the plan was its dependence on French coop­eration. Mendes-France himself told Dulles candidly that while he was prepared to support Diem until his government became “hopeless,” a ready substitute was needed to replace it “when and if it failed.” In Saigon, General Ely appeared to try in good faith to carry out the agreement, but many of his underlings, the Americans believed, had never accepted it. “[We should] . . . get out of Indochina completely and as soon as possible,” grumped Wilson; “these people should be left to stew in their own juice.”43

The Collins Mission

By the end of October 1954 Diem was more unyielding than ever. Dulles and the president decided that they needed a high-ranking trouble­shooter on the spot who could be given broad authority to act without fielding every decision to Washington. The assignment went to former Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins. With the title of special U.S. representative in Vietnam, and ambassadorial rank, Collins was given a temporary mission of up to 90 days with “broad authority to direct, utilize, and control” all American agencies and their resources in Vietnam.44

The Vietnamese premier, Collins found, measured up to advance notices: “a small, shy, diffident man” who seemed to have “an inherent distaste for decisive action”—hardly the leadership qualities the country needed during this critical period. Despite covert French resistance, however, Collins and Ely succeeded in drawing up a comprehensive pro­gram for restructuring and reforming Vietnam’s government.45

By mid-November Collins had produced a draft report proposing to reduce the 170,000-man army to less than 78,000 under Vietnamese command and control by July 1955. Collins recommended cutting back funding for the French Expeditionary Corps in FY 1955 by two-thirds, with no commitment beyond, while turning over Vietnamese Army (VNA) training (still under overall French command) almost immediately (January) to the MAAG and phasing out the French trainers by midyear. On 13 December Collins and Ely signed a formal understanding covering these arrangements, subject to review in Paris and Washington. The homeward redeployment of the FEC accelerated rapidly, impelled by
reduced U.S. funding and the rising demands of North Africa. The last units of the FEC departed in spring 1956. 46

Meanwhile, there remained the more intractable problem of dealing with the obstruction of Diem. Collins, too, had had enough of Diem. On 16 December he recommended that Bao Dai be brought back from France to dismiss Diem and head a new government; failing that, he saw no better option than withdrawing from Vietnam to a new defense line farther west. 47

By January 1955, however, Diem's future looked brighter. Along with a new army effort to contain Viet Minh infiltration, Diem was now vigorously pushing political and social reform, notably preparations for a national assembly and land reform measures. Impressed, Collins again changed his tune, declaring Diem the best available man for the job and his government reasonably likely to succeed. More important, Collins had decided that the United States should go all out to ensure Vietnam's survival. 48

In an oral report to the NSC on 27 January Collins attempted to come to grips with the problem of French foot-dragging and suspected double-dealing. He urged a showdown with the French government "once and for all." But the Planning Board shrank from a confrontation, and Dulles suggested that "we will . . . have to live with the problem." The president generally approved Collins's other recommendations: the reforms launched by Diem at his urging, and, in principle, U.S. aid programs for the three Indochinese states, aggregating about $327.3 million in 1955 and $196.6 million in 1956. Finally, the president and council reaffirmed the policy statement (NSC 5429/5) calling for all feasible measures to save Vietnam. Commented the president, "it was a good deal like repeating the Doxology." 49

By the end of April Diem had attracted enough support to establish him in a firm leadership position. On 7 May Dulles, who had considered dumping Diem, reversed course and told Premier Edgar Faure, who had succeeded Mendes-France in February, that Diem had "the best chance of anyone of staying on top of revolution and keeping it within 'tolerable' limits." 50

At the May trilateral (monthly U.S.-French-British) meetings in Paris, Faure declared it was time to speak frankly, asking: "What would you say if we were to retire entirely from Indochina," thereby laying to rest the nagging "colonialism" issue, pacifying and neutralizing Diem and the nationalists, and repatriating the FEC? Startled, Dulles responded with appropriate civilities and made a counteroffer of U.S. withdrawal, which incidentally, he noted, would save $400-500 million in aid. Faure's offer
looked like a veiled advance notice, even an ultimatum, aimed at transforming a forced withdrawal into a negotiation over terms. For the United States it promised to break the impasse with France over Diem and France's shady dealings with the Viet Minh. 51

When the three ministers met again on 10 May, Dulles came armed with the views of the JCS. Withdrawal of French forces now or any time soon, they said, would have disastrous consequences. For the present and some time to come capable outside forces were indispensable, but the Geneva Accords barred the United States from providing them. The current crisis, the JCS urged, required "the utmost in cooperation and energetic action" by all three principals, Washington, Paris, and Saigon, and they believed Diem's regime offered the best promise of stability. General Collins in Saigon also judged that French withdrawal would have adverse military, political, and economic consequences. 52

The JCS analysis proved conclusive. Dulles proposed as an interim arrangement that the French support Diem until a national assembly could establish a new, more legitimate government, with or without Diem. But when Faure attempted to bargain, Dulles rebuffed further discussion: he could not impose Faure's conditions on Diem, the head of a sovereign state and not an American puppet. After four days of discussion in Paris, Dulles indicated that the United States intended to state its own policy openly and pursue it independently, and hoped that France would do likewise. Faure agreed. 53

Exit French Indochina

Thus ended nine months of troubled and abrasive Franco-American "partnership" in Vietnam. The two former partners now had to deal independently with an increasingly self-confident and assertive South Vietnamese government. The principal issue was Diem's refusal to consult with his Viet Minh enemies on the July 1956 all-Vietnam elections, as called for in the Geneva settlement, which he had refused to sign. That decision, he insisted, must await the election of a national assembly. Diem's stance placed France, responsible under the Geneva Accords for carrying out the elections, in a dangerous position, since the DRV, if denied the elections on which it counted to complete the conquest of Vietnam, might reopen hostilities. The British joined the French in pressing Diem to negotiate with the Viet Minh, but Diem remained determined not to talk to the Viet Minh or to commit himself to all-Vietnam elections. 54

In pursuit of complete sovereignty and independence for South Vietnam, Diem sought to eliminate all vestiges of Vietnam's colonial past.
France must abolish the high command and withdraw the ground components of the FEC (leaving, under Vietnamese command, its air and naval elements and logistical support facilities for the VNA), and make other important changes recognizing South Vietnam's sovereignty. Diplomatic bickering over these matters continued for months.

Late in 1955 Diem abruptly terminated the 1954 financial and economic accords with France and withdrew his representatives from the French Union Assembly. Subsequently, he agreed in principle to respect the Geneva settlement, but with U.S. backing and no serious objections from British and Soviet sponsors he persisted in his refusal to hold all-Vietnam elections. In October, backed by a 98 percent vote of confidence in a well-managed (i.e., more votes than voters) national referendum, Diem abolished the monarchy, established Vietnam as a republic with himself as president, and created a commission to draft a constitution for submission to a future national assembly. France gave up, formalized her relations with Saigon as a coequal government, and accelerated the withdrawal of the expeditionary force—completed the following spring.55

The Training Program

By stages the JCS had become convinced that without American help the French could not create a loyal and effective native army. As late as March 1954 General Ely had rebuffed an American offer to take over the training mission, reflecting the longstanding French hostility to American involvement, which they perceived with some justice as a foot in the door for intrusion into their operational and strategic planning. But in April General O'Daniel, recently appointed to head the MAAG in Saigon, brought his forceful and persistent advocacy to bear. In June, following the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Ely formally requested that the United States take over the organization and training of Vietnamese forces. In American eyes, the rather sudden French interest in a U.S. training role at this juncture looked very much like a ploy to draw the United States into the ongoing conflict without having to fulfill the conditions for intervention. Dulles decided it would be too risky to commit personnel and prestige to an undertaking that might collapse before it was well under way. He instructed Ambassador Dillon on 10 June 1954 to tell the French that a training mission could be discussed only in the context of operational plans for intervention after fulfillment of stipulated conditions.56

There the matter stood for a few months, although efforts to revive it continued. By August, in the aftermath of Geneva, Dulles was eager to take over the training. The JCS, wary of Vietnam's chaotic political environment
and the Geneva settlement’s personnel restrictions and fearing deeper involvement, were not. Nevertheless, Dulles notified Paris on 18 August that a training mission would be assigned to MAAG Saigon. In October the president overrode the JCS and authorized an immediate crash effort “to improve the loyalty and effectiveness” of the Vietnamese army. Collins’s subsequent proposals of complete autonomy for a reduced army by July 1955, with American operational direction of organization and training and progressive replacement of French by American trainers, became, with minor modifications, a part of the Collins-Ely agreement on forces and training concluded by the two governments on 12 February 1955.57

O’Daniel’s new command, the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM), separate from the MAAG, gathered up all French and American advisory and training personnel attached to VNA units. During 1955 preparatory activities and other distractions delayed getting on with the training for pacification duties. The large French contingent of TRIM progressively declined and the program rapidly began to look American, even to such telltale visible signs as adoption of the American salute and American-style uniforms. By March 1956, when the last French trainers departed, the Americans numbered 189. TRIM’s headquarters staff included also a national security section headed by Diem’s psychological and political warfare adviser, Air Force Col. Edward G. Lansdale, charged with preparing the army to reoccupy and pacify formerly enemy-held areas infested by underground Viet Minh. The essence of pacification was “civic action,” based on the hopeful premise that the loyalty of the population could be won by propaganda and benign services (e.g., medical care) accompanied by strictly enforced troop discipline to curb the historic proclivity of Asian armies to prey upon the civilian population. “Up to the very end,” Lansdale observed, “the army was still stealing from the population.”58

In August 1955 the rapid pace of the French withdrawal and the threat of an expanding Viet Minh army in the DRV led O’Daniel to propose an increase in the authorized levels of U.S.-supported Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) from the existing 100,000 to 150,000, to be reached by mid-1956. O’Daniel also now planned to reorganize the army along the lines of the divisional system he had recommended in 1953—a structure better suited to resisting invasion. Although the RVNAF mission defined by the NSC in 1954 as limited to internal security was still on the books, the objective of the 1955 aid program explicitly included “limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh.” Secretary Wilson quickly approved O’Daniel’s proposal and the planned reorganization of the forces got under way.59
Along with its blessings, peace brought new problems to Vietnam, not the least of them an immense accumulation of military equipment and munitions that clogged ports and warehouses and rusted untended in many acres of open fields. Much of it, but far from all, was of American origin. A great deal of the incoming materiel had simply piled up, unidentifiable as to designated recipient or destination. The departing French claimed the most serviceable equipment as their own. Still, this vast inheritance of cast-off munitions was far more than the 100,000-man U.S.-supported Vietnamese army could use or maintain. But Diem and his generals were unwilling to part with any of the equipment in their possession, usable or not.  

During 1955 adverse rulings by the International Control Commission (ICC) thwarted O'Daniel's efforts to replace his staff losses by stretching the Geneva personnel restrictions. By year's end, Vietnamese forces were drowning in a sea of plenty; lacking accounting control, they had lost the capability of supplying themselves in the field. On 13 December Wilson suggested to Dulles that the Geneva Accords be reinterpreted to allow replacement of withdrawn French military training and technical personnel by Americans, thus end-running the 342-man MAAG ceiling without increasing the total level of foreign military personnel in South Vietnam. After initial resistance, Dulles yielded, and in February 1956 State and Defense agreed to send a one-year military logistics mission of 350 officers and men to Vietnam, supplemented by about 1,000 Filipino or Japanese civilian technicians. Named Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), separate from but subordinate to the MAAG, it would assist the MAAG staff in recovering and safeguarding excess aid materiel. Members of the first TERM increment arrived in Vietnam early in June 1956.  

Of TERM's two professed aims, the more challenging was the need for care and maintenance to prevent deterioration. This would require transforming the Vietnamese into efficient supply managers, at best a distant prospect. State rendered it more so by decreeing that TERM personnel should get on with the actual collection and shipment of substantial quantities out of the country.  

To Lt. Gen. Samuel Williams (who replaced O'Daniel in October 1955) and his hard-pressed staff in Saigon, the MAAG's essential mission was to prepare South Vietnamese forces for an inevitable, perhaps imminent, showdown with the Viet Minh. Not surprisingly, therefore, TERM largely evaded or ignored State's mission guidance. Most of the additional manpower brought in for TERM, more than doubling Williams's existing strength, was regularly assigned as logistical advisers to Vietnamese army units and
to major logistical installations, or to conduct training courses for Vietnamese logistics personnel, thus freeing MAAG officers for operational and staff training. The agency lived on until 1959, when it was absorbed by MAAG. Although it functioned primarily as a logistical training agency, during the last two years of its existence it processed $650 million of aid materiel and transferred $300 million worth of serviceable materiel to the Vietnamese forces and other agencies.63

For Secretary Wilson the Indochina crisis from late 1953 onward was a source of growing frustration as pressure mounted for American military intervention to avert a Communist takeover. He viewed intervention in any form, including the involvement that tended eventually to invite intervention, as a mistake because the United States had never had a vital interest in Indochina. His repeated assertions of this view in the NSC and other forums made him the most outspoken of a handful of dissenters to the ongoing effort of the president and Dulles to organize an anti-Communist coalition of European and Southeast Asian states. Since this was an issue on which the president did not welcome dissent, Wilson was relegated to an uncomfortable and humiliating role on the sidelines. Foreign intervention actually ran counter to the president's own instincts and, more concretely, to his fears of undermining a flourishing peacetime economy; hence his insistence on a coalition effort with costs and participation shared by allies. But his and Dulles's obsession with the perceived menace of worldwide Communism overrode these fears, leading the nation more than once to the brink of war. Wilson could at least usually count on the judgment of the Joint Chiefs to support his resistance to intervention proposals as expensive and imprudent, notably Radford's proposed air strikes at Dien Bien Phu. For similar reasons, the chiefs supported Wilson's objections to the installation of an American-directed training program in Vietnam, which the NSC ultimately ordered into effect over his opposition.

But the departure of the French left a vacuum into which the United States, sensitive to the persisting "domino" perceptions of its leaders, was to be irresistibly drawn by the inherited burdens of supporting a weak client state: the momentum of earlier commitments, the fragility of Vietnamese leadership and society, and the endless crises, internal and external, requiring American intervention. Successive U.S. administrations would have to deal with the grim and tragic consequences of the Truman and Eisenhower Indochina policies. A prophetic exasperation may have informed Wilson's exclamation, in October 1954, that the French and Vietnamese should be left to "stew in their own juice."64
Despite the absence of hostilities, the cold war in Europe seemed to offer the Eisenhower administration less assurance of a successful outcome than the armed conflict in Korea. To meet the Soviet threat the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, struggling to bring strategy into line with its members' reluctance to shoulder greater economic burdens, gradually embraced the New Look's reliance on nuclear weapons as a way to offset manpower shortfalls. Central to NATO's dilemma was how to utilize, yet control, Germany's potential military strength. To accomplish this objective the United States vigorously supported the European Defense Community (EDC), a proposed grouping of continental powers including West Germany. Footdragging on EDC by successive French governments, however, left the administration not only exasperated at French recalcitrance but also slow in adopting alternative courses of action once the French finally rejected EDC.

Picking Up the Reins

At Lisbon in February 1952, NATO's North Atlantic Council had agreed, in a burst of optimism, on a multiyear rearmament program of almost 90 divisions with associated air and naval forces, not counting prospective contributions by Greece and Turkey, formally admitted as members at that meeting.1 Fulfilling the goals would depend on a substantial German contribution, a need recognized long before the Lisbon conference. Negotiations to bring German forces into the NATO framework, under way since late 1950, culminated in the signature on
27 May of a treaty by six countries: France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany. The treaty would establish a European Defense Community (EDC) and a European army with a German component of twelve 15,000-man divisions under NATO supreme command, plus air and naval components. The treaty and related agreements would give West Germany essentially equal status with the other signatories, while also providing for common EDC political institutions, armed forces, and budgets. Protocols to both the NATO and the EDC treaties promised that an attack on the European territory of any EDC member would be regarded as an attack on all. On 26 May in Bonn, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and West Germany also signed the Contractual Agreements whereby West Germany was to be granted a substantial degree of sovereignty.  

For obvious reasons the United States strongly backed the EDC treaty, although with discreet concern as an outsider for the sensibilities of the member governments, especially France. From the beginning, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were cool toward this method of bringing West Germany into the framework of European defense, rightly fearing that it might delay the actual advent of German reinforcements for NATO's meager forces. The chiefs preferred the direct approach of admitting West Germany to NATO membership. They tended to discount the risk of alienating France, which, with its non-European colonial interests, generally unstable domestic politics, and strong Communist party, they felt likely to be an unreliable ally.  

For a few weeks following the signing of the EDC treaty and related documents U.S. officials remained hopeful that ratification by the respective parliaments would soon be completed. Within months, however, it became clear that ratification efforts had lost momentum, particularly in the two countries about which there was most concern, France and West Germany. As the likelihood of early ratification dimmed, the NATO bureaucracies struggled with the complex statistical data in the 1952 Annual Review. The undertaking was bedeviled by differences in purpose and approach and the perception by the European countries of a diminishing Soviet threat. The unity and sense of purpose evident at Lisbon disappeared, replaced by bickering and conflicting national agendas.  

It seemed unlikely that the Annual Review report could be ready for final consideration and action at the NATO Council meeting in Paris in December 1952. Moreover, European governments expressed reluctance  

* The Annual Review was an extended procedure that fixed force goals that took into account the overall defense needs of the alliance and the economic and financial capabilities of member countries.
to make firm 1953 commitments on force goals until the views of the new administration in Washington could be clarified. So the council met as planned, but conducted no Annual Review. The conferees had little to do except deliver speeches and pass resolutions. "Our colleagues treated us," Secretary of State Dean Acheson recalled, "with the gentle and affectionate solicitude that one might show to the dying, but asked neither help nor advice nor commitment for a future we would not share with them. For this they were waiting for our successors."5

Truman's secretary of state could hardly have been expected to see the new occupant of the White House as the future savior of NATO, but many others did. The new president-elect himself certainly placed that task near the top of his agenda. Weeks before his inauguration he had brought his influence to bear in an effort to revive the fortunes of the EDC treaty ratification, which at the moment seemed to be dead in the water, by sending well-publicized New Year's messages to Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Matthew B. Ridgway and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer stressing the importance of the treaty to the "peace and the security of the free world."6

In January 1953, a week after the new administration moved in, Secretary of State Dulles queried the Joint Chiefs about alternatives in the event EDC was not approved. JCS Chairman General Omar N. Bradley answered bluntly that the chiefs, while accepting EDC as the best available option, had always regarded full NATO membership for West Germany as preferable and were still worried about the restrictions on German munitions production the French were then trying to write into the contractual protocols. How soon was the German contribution needed? The time of greatest danger, Bradley answered, would be 1954-55; by then it was important that NATO forces be at least strong enough to make the Soviets uncertain of success. Twelve German divisions would make a real difference, forcing the Soviets to concentrate their forces and make them vulnerable to atomic attack. "We don't have enough atomic weapons to plaster all of Europe," observed Bradley.

What about the French? Mostly a liability, the JCS seemed to agree. Should France go Communist, as seemed possible, Germany would be in an untenable position. "It would become very difficult to decide whether to invest more of our resources in attempting to hold there," said Bradley, leaving the decision unspoken. France depended greatly on U.S. aid in Indochina. "We are faced with more and more demands from the French," Bradley complained. "Maybe what we should do is to tell them that they will receive nothing more until they do something about ratifying the EDC." Although the mood of the discussion was bleak, apocalyptic, and
sharply focused on France as the root of the problem, no decisions were reached.\textsuperscript{7}

To dramatize continuing American interest in Europe Eisenhower decided to send Dulles and Harold Stassen, his new mutual security director, on a brief tour of European capitals (31 January-8 February) to listen and reassure, but without making commitments. Before departing, Dulles made a television speech citing the nearly $30 billion in American aid to Western Europe since World War II and warning that, in the unlikely event the principal European partners should decide to "go their separate ways, then certainly it would be necessary to give a little rethinking to America's own foreign policy" in this part of the world. Results of the European mission were generally favorable. The EDC project, Dulles told the NSC afterward, had at least been taken "out of mothballs." He estimated the odds for ratification now at 60-40.\textsuperscript{8}

The administration's review of national security policy led off in February 1953 with a detailed budget/economy manifesto from Budget Director Joseph Dodge, followed by debates in the NSC over the FY 1954 and 1955 budgets and political/strategic concepts that would later be packaged as the New Look.\textsuperscript{*} The task of balancing NATO's needs with the administration's cost-cutting program fell heavily on Stassen. His presentation to the NSC covered both the economic and military components of the aid program. Of all the disasters Stassen envisaged as possibly resulting from the spending ceilings, should they be implemented, some of the worst fell in the NATO area. He predicted that cuts in economic aid would change the whole U.S. relationship to the European defense effort, causing a drop of $3 billion in European defense spending in FY 1954 and perhaps $700 million more in the year following, with attendant balance of payments and trade difficulties, reduced economic activity, higher unemployment, and pressures to expand trade with the Soviet bloc. Some of these negative effects, Stassen suggested, might be mitigated by shifting money from military to economic aid. For NATO the effect would be to reduce the total aid package to $4.2 billion in FY 1954 and $2.7 billion in FY 1955, while increasing its economic aid component from $810 million to $1,085 million in the first year and from $460 million to $630 million in the second. He estimated total aid expenditures of $6.5 billion for FY 1954, restoring a billion of Dodge's $2.5 billion cut.\textsuperscript{9} Despite reservations voiced by Wilson and Dulles about the magnitude of the reductions, the revised program seemed to please the president and even Treasury Secretary Humphrey and was duly inserted into

\textsuperscript{*} See Chapter V for details of the Dodge budget exercise and Chapter XXII for treatment of the military assistance budget.
Defense of Western Europe

NSC 149/2, the basic guidance document for the cost of the national security program soon to be presented to Congress.\(^\text{10}\)

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*Paris in the Springtime: Retreat from Lisbon*

The North Atlantic Council meeting in Paris 23-25 April 1953 clarified the intentions of the Eisenhower administration regarding the defense of Western Europe, thereby giving the European governments a firmer basis for planning. Soviet peace moves and rumors of a palace revolution following Stalin's death at the beginning of March, warned U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council William H. Draper, were raising false hopes in Europe and undermining solidarity. Communicating directly to the president his own sense of discouragement over NATO's prospects, Draper recommended a new "top-level U.S. evaluation of our overall strategy" aimed at "finding a better system of defense that would be within NATO's political and economic capacity to finance." Eisenhower replied briefly and sympathetically a few days later, observing that "new weapons and new methods may, in the long run, bring about some fundamental changes that will tend to outmode what we are now trying to do. But what we are presently trying to do seems to me absolutely essential to the meeting of the immediate threat. . . . I am quite sure that the adoption, at this moment, of a different defense policy could not lessen the need for the very modest number of military units that we are now striving to produce in Western Europe."\(^\text{11}\)

Draper's anxious views received reinforcement on the eve of the NATO meeting from a disturbing report General Ridgway sent the Standing Group warning that, on the basis of recent intelligence, "a full scale Soviet attack within the near future would find this command critically weak" and that "the initial battle, likely to be of short duration, could be decisive." The deficiencies in NATO defenses were correctable, but not overnight: "Providing timely action is initiated and sustained . . . this command could be made capable, within the next two to three years, of effectively defending Western Europe against a full scale Soviet attack."\(^\text{12}\)

American officials arriving in Paris on 22 April for the NATO ministerial meetings thus found an atmosphere of foreboding spiced with irritation and mutual suspicion. As the principal U.S. spokesman, Dulles dominated the meetings and combined reassurance with warning, declaring that nothing the Soviets had done since Stalin's death had given reason for believing their hostility had abated or their dreams of world conquest had been modified in any fundamental way. The United States, said Dulles, must build for the long haul, as the Soviets were doing. In any
event NATO governments need not fear increased pressure from Wash­
ington to expand their force goals and accelerate the buildup. Only a
moderate increase over several years was envisaged, with greater empha­
sis on qualitative improvement through new weaponry, intensive training,
and better planning. Dulles also addressed directly fears current in NATO
that the new administration’s interest in the Far East signified a diminish­
ing interest in Western Europe. The flow of end-items to NATO Europe
would increase, not diminish, he told the ministers, even if the wars in
Korea and Indochina continued. At a subsequent session, Dulles issued a
blunt warning regarding the delays in EDC ratification. “It is obvious,” his
prepared statement stressed, “that the decisions to be made by the execu­
tive and legislative branches of the United States Government [regarding]
foreign aid programs will be greatly influenced by the progress made
toward early ratification” of EDC.13

Secretary of Defense Wilson fleshed out Dulles’s remarks on the
administration’s new long-haul policy in a short address to the council. He
urged the member governments to focus productive effort on materiel
needed most urgently while stretching out programs of less critical and
more deferrable items. Wilson warned that all delivery forecasts were
likely to be reviewed later in the year in the light of progress toward rati­
fication of the EDC treaty. Beyond 1953, future U.S. programs for support
of NATO would take fully into account the extent to which NATO gov­
ernments screened their defense budgets to embody the long-term con­
cept and provide the more selective emphasis on efficiency and real needs
for which the United States was striving in its own budget—and, more
generally, the degree to which each government sustained the collective
defense effort needed to prevail against the Communist threat.14

The council responded to Dulles and Wilson for the most part with
a chorus of “amens.” Bilateral U.S. meetings with the French, however,
revealed differences. The French viewed with alarm talk of a leveling-off
of the NATO buildup, as well as the planned phaseout of U.S. economic
aid and the uncertainty as to its continuance at all beyond 1953. Minister
of National Defense René Pleven warned that France would be forced to
reduce its defense expenditures if other countries did so, and that in any
case the French budget in 1954 could not rise above the 1953 level. It
followed that increased American subsidies would be required both for
the continued buildup that France considered essential to NATO’s survi­
val and to her own future secure coexistence with a resurgent Germany.15

In separate talks with the U.S. delegation, the British emphasized that
their chief worry centered on the strain that might be imposed on the
already weak British economy by the approaching phaseout of U.S.
economic aid. Like the French, the British—especially Prime Minister Winston Churchill—opposed any real or apparent relaxation of NATO's buildup in response to current Soviet tactics, but made it clear that they would need more American help to support the effort required.16

For DoD representatives the main task at Paris was to complete the 1952 Annual Review left unfinished in December 1952. A general impression had then prevailed that the Lisbon force goals for 1952 had been substantially met, and since final figures were not available the point was not questioned. By April 1953 it was already evident that the force buildup since Lisbon had fallen significantly short of those goals in D+30 divisions and frontline aircraft. During 1952 only 3 combat-effective divisions had been added to the 20 1/3 D-day divisions on hand at the beginning of the year; the number of combat-effective D+30 divisions had increased from 33 only to 40 2/3, 10 short of the Lisbon goal. Frontline aircraft had increased from 2,907 to 3,957 in 1952, but only 3,352 rated as combat-effective. The growth of naval forces was more impressive, less in numbers (from 1,557 to 1,642 vessels) than in improved readiness and efficiency. In addition, 29 Greek and Turkish divisions and about 440 aircraft and 103 combat naval vessels had been added to NATO's defense array but were not yet incorporated in NATO defense strategy.17

At Paris the council approved 1953 and 1954 force goals well below the Lisbon objectives in most categories, emphasizing the degree to which the latter, under the pressure of political and economic realities, had become virtually irrelevant to force planning. More relevant, and disturbing to military planners, was the gap between the new goals and the estimated requirements for an effective defense of Western Europe, as opposed to what "European governments could realistically expect to extract or cajole from their peoples." The currently accepted requirements estimate (MC 26/1) had been approved as far back as November 1951. It aimed toward achieving by 1954 a total of 99 D+30 divisions, approximately 11,000 frontline aircraft (including maritime types), and about 3,000 naval vessels, large and small. Assuming the materialization of German divisions and aircraft as a reasonable probability by 1954 or 1955 but discounting Greek and Turkish forces as needing much more modernization in equipment and training before they could take on a "bastion" role on NATO's right flank, the approved provisional goals for 1954 added up, in effective forces, to only 78 divisions, about 8,600 aircraft, and 2,310 naval vessels—roughly 80 percent of MC 26/1 requirements.18

The main culprits in this retreat from Lisbon goals and real defense requirements were the nine Western European NATO countries, whose 1954 force goals were 27 percent short of MC 26/1 requirements in
divisions and 29 percent short in frontline aircraft. The whole NATO buildup was leveling off at approximately its existing strength; emphasis would shift to qualitative improvement through training and new weaponry.

Dulles gave the NSC an upbeat assessment on 28 April of what had been accomplished in Paris, especially in adjusting NATO military plans to the realities of the members' economic capabilities. The greatest cause for worry was the anticipated delay in ratification of the EDC treaty, which now seemed unlikely before October. NATO’s mission henceforth, Dulles remarked, would be viewed as “the defense of Europe by Europe with United States assistance,” an idea which he said the Europeans had accepted “with equanimity and ... no tailspin ... . The NATO program is now more alive than ever and, more than ever before, should be considered a long-range operation.” He did not mention that for the next two years, at least as now planned, U.S. forces would form the heart of NATO’s defenses. 19

NATO and Emerging Strategy

After Dulles’s reassuring words at the Paris meeting, the $5.8 billion aid bill for FY 1954 the president submitted to Congress on 5 May must have come as a shock to European governments. Overall, the military assistance portion of the new program represented a 27 percent reduction from President Truman’s program and a 44 percent cut in its European component.

During the ensuing three months the basic hostility or indifference of most legislators to foreign aid, reflected in the press and the defection of veteran aid supporters such as Senators Mike Mansfield and Walter George, clearly foreshadowed major cuts. In July the House and Senate in conference adopted the Richards amendment to the authorization bill providing that half of the military aid funds in the bill for Europe should be earmarked for the European Defense Community, but that materiel procured with it should not be delivered until the organization actually came into being, unless Congress, in response to a presidential recommendation, saw fit to reconsider the prohibition. Urgent cables went out to U.S. embassies in Paris and elsewhere pointing out that since only FY 1954 funds were affected, procurement lead times for most equipment would postpone the impact of the amendment for a year or more, by which time, hopefully, EDC would be in place and functioning. European officials were to be assured that the Richards
amendment demonstrated the strong desire of Congress and the American people that EDC come into effect.

In August Congress passed an aid bill appropriating $1.86 billion in military assistance for Europe, in a global total of $4.5 billion for all aid—$630 million and $1.3 billion less, respectively, than the president had requested (although the administration had substantially reduced the original request before the final vote). However, the bill also made available for reappropriation up to $2.1 billion in unobligated prior-year funds, including $1.3 billion for military assistance in Europe, making overall totals considerably larger than the original request. Defense allotted for military assistance in Europe only $214 million of the $1.3 billion of unobligated prior-year funds that Congress had made available for the purpose.

Meanwhile, the emergence of new basic security policies was providing context and direction for U.S. policy toward NATO. NSC 149/2, approved at the end of April 1953, laid down many of the broad postulates soon to be formalized as the New Look, notably the crucial importance of a sound American economy to the survival of the free world and the corollary necessity of balancing federal spending with income as soon as pressing national security commitments and needs would permit. Regarding NATO, the document confirmed some of Dulles's recent assurances to European leaders: henceforth his government would support attainable force goals and be more relaxed about schedules for attaining them, would support France's Indochina war more vigorously (short of direct intervention), and would make critical equipment available for raising NATO first-line divisions to combat readiness. American aid would become more selective, concentrating on "vital free countries" with a view to "helping the weakest to attain economic strength, and encouraging and enlisting the strong"—notably France, West Germany, and Britain—"to maximize their carrying of their share of the over-all defense requirements."

The persistence of a requirements-resources gap remained a central concern. Draper, about to leave his post in June, wrote the president a long letter analyzing NATO's maladies and prospects as he saw them and calling for a re-examination of requirements "to be sure that the best use and division of resources is being made." Evidently impressed by Draper's letter, the president saw to it that it received more attention than it might otherwise have, requesting brief responses from the State Department to each of Draper's points. The incoming Joint Chiefs had problems with Draper's letter, initially splitting on the question of whether current NATO strategy was the best possible under the
circumstances. Ridgway and Carney thought it was, but Twining argued that it was based on implementing unattainable requirements. The chiefs eventually agreed to fudge the issue: NATO was making the best possible use of its resources, "insofar as is politically possible," and the problem would be kept "under continuing review and analysis."  

In August the Joint Chiefs were told to rewrite strategy for the long haul, without imminent target dates, and to redesign the military establishment on a "really austere basis." Squeezed between dictated economy requirements and dwindling assets on the one hand, and a growing threat on the other, the chiefs, not surprisingly, emphatically recommended a sharp refocusing of defense priorities to permit a rapid buildup of continental defenses and expansion of strategic retaliatory power accompanied by a drastic reduction of overseas commitments and wholesale redeployment of forces homeward—in effect a retreat to "Fortress America." In any case the recommendation called for no immediate action, since the chiefs estimated that the redeployment operation would require careful diplomatic and administrative preparation extending over a period of two years or more.  

For the long term, the main obstacle to accepting the JCS proposal was its likely effect on official and public morale in Europe and the structure of European defense. A new draft basic national security paper (NSC 162), discussed by the NSC early in October, contained a paragraph drafted by the chiefs which, after noting the dangers of overextension, declared that "the best defense of the free world rests upon the mobility of U.S. forces centrally based," the political commitment to retaliate vigorously against any aggressor, and the indigenous security efforts of the allies. It proposed that a decision be made whether "reasonably soon to initiative, and during the next few years to carry out, the redeployment toward the United States of the bulk of our land forces and other forces not required to guard overseas bases." Such a move would require a concerted diplomatic effort to win allied support. The president and Dulles, although favoring major redeployments in principle, quashed the paragraph for fear that if it became known it might wreck the NATO alliance. As finally approved at the end of October, NSC 162/2, the "bible" of the New Look, alluded briefly to the overextension problem but concluded that "under present conditions, however, any major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe or the Far East would be interpreted as a diminution of U.S. interest in the defense of these areas and would seriously undermine the strength and cohesion of the coalition." With masterly ambiguity, it went on to call for a diplomatic "clarifying" effort directed at U.S. allies not yet under attack to persuade them of the merits of a deployment of
U.S. forces permitting "initiative, flexibility and support." The word "redeployment" did not appear.26

Consideration of a plan to withdraw some U.S. forces from Europe was hinted at in public statements in October by two of its more ardent champions, Secretary Wilson and Deputy Secretary Kyes. Discussing the effect of new weapons on defense requirements, Kyes dropped a remark that NATO's unfulfilled force requirements were in the process of being reappraised. When asked a few days later (19 October) whether this meant that American troops were to be withdrawn from Europe, Wilson said no, but in the ensuing exchange could not bring himself to state categorically that this would not occur. The Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune promptly reported Wilson's remarks as a bald assertion that new weapons would permit a substantial reduction in U.S. troops in Europe, and for more than a week the press on both sides of the Atlantic happily exploited the story.27

Damage control measures went into effect. John C. Hughes, Draper's successor, assured the NATO Council that the president had authorized him to deny any intention of withdrawing troops and to reassert his government's loyalty to NATO as the "keystone" of Western European defense. The president tried to set matters right in his own press conference on 28 October. Dulles lodged a complaint with him about Wilson's transgression as well as with Wilson himself. Obviously upset with Wilson, the president complained in a long, apologetic letter to General Gruenther on 27 October that "some people have more trouble in controlling their tongues than they do their wives . . . I suppose that we shall have to counteract what has happened with reasoned and thoughtful statements. However, in all honesty, we cannot allow anyone to get up and protest that we are going to keep troops in Europe forever."28

On other matters of concern to NATO, NSC 162/2 spoke with both cautious reassurance and blunt admonition. The military buildup and economic recovery of Western Europe, the paper noted, had given NATO and associated forces the capacity to make Soviet aggression costly and had fostered a sense of security in these countries. But they still could not prevent Soviet forces from overrunning Western Europe in a full-scale attack, and even after the planned accession of German forces much of Western Europe would be indefensible in such an event. The states of Western Europe must build up their defensive strength, especially since U.S. military aid could not be maintained at present levels and grant economic aid must be phased out altogether. Despite common interests and basic strengths, moreover, the NATO coalition suffered from serious weaknesses: a growing sense of independence and resistance to American
guidance in matters of coalition policy, the notorious instability of French and Italian governments, the heavy costs of clinging to disintegrating colonial empires in Asia and Africa, the persistence of ancient feuds and disputes within Europe itself, and increasing distrust of American leadership in the cold war. Most of all, Europeans feared an all-out nuclear war, heedlessly precipitated by American rigidity and incompetence, which would be fought on their own soil.29

Nevertheless, the United States needed allies—for their strategic air bases, their armed forces and economic resources, and because of their role as the essential heart of the free world—as they depended on the United States for their survival. U.S. strategy could not be executed unless the "essential" allies—i.e., the industrialized countries of Europe and Japan—believed that the strategy served the collective defense against the Soviet threat. Absorption of these nations into the Soviet orbit would upset the world balance and endanger the ability of the United States to win, perhaps even survive, a general war. NSC 162/2 thus posed, without resolving, a basic dilemma in U.S. defense policy: In a postwar world intent on adjusting to the ways of peace, could the NATO allies with their combined resources afford, or could they muster the will, to defend themselves against aggressive communism? "The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe," said NSC 162/2, "is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked." But what if the deterrent failed to deter? The thrust of the paper held that Western Europe could not be defended—except by resorting to the hyper-destructive "defense" of atomic preemption.30

The British launched an initiative in September that helped bring out of the closet the idea that NATO's salvation might lie not in the probably foredoomed effort to build up massive conventional defense forces but in the nuclear option available to the United States. They proposed informally that the two governments jointly put before the North Atlantic Council at the December meeting a new political strategy based on candid recognition that for the foreseeable future the full requirements for defense of Western Europe were unattainable. Indeed, with American aid tapering off, merely to maintain in being the forces thus far built up would be difficult. Accordingly, NATO's objective must be "to keep in being over a period of years forces which, with atomic weapons always in the background, will provide an effective deterrent to Soviet attack and which countries can afford to maintain and provide with up-to-date equipment." So long as the United States continued to provide an effective deterrent, attaining full NATO force requirements became less immediately urgent. Major aims over the next few years would be maintenance and qualitative
improvement of existing forces, and, of course, the earliest possible introduction of German forces.\textsuperscript{31}

Since June DoD officials involved in NATO matters had concerned themselves mainly with formulating the U.S. position for the upcoming Annual Review. The JCS, after digesting the preliminary service submissions, reported a probability of substantial shortfalls in U.S. force commitments for 1954 from the provisional goals approved in April. They wondered about the reaction of NATO governments to a reduction in U.S. goals at a time when they were under pressure to meet theirs; would it not be wise to consider now how best to present the case, perhaps by stretching the assumptions somewhat? Dulles and Stassen, even more worried about NATO reactions, wanted a more forthright approach. Wilson told the Army and Air Force to develop better answers. Both services came up with slight reductions, their task made easier by the ending of Korean hostilities on 27 July.\textsuperscript{32} In an interagency meeting on 25 September the principals agreed on the importance of maintaining, while improving, existing NATO forces but with only “moderate additions . . . within countries' capability to raise and maintain.” Admiral Radford undertook, for the JCS, to review the current NATO strategy and explore possible revisions that might be workable as early as 1956.\textsuperscript{33}

Later, in October, with time running out and the new American strategy still unborn, the chiefs submitted an interim report admitting failure to agree on a new strategy. Conceding that the current NATO strategic concept would have to be revised in the near future, the chiefs argued that any attempt by the United States to change it in conjunction with the 1953 Annual Review might lead to decisions to give up NATO territory, with attendant repercussions at least as serious as those expected from continued failure to meet projected requirements. They recommended retaining the present strategic concept “for any necessary use” in the Annual Review, during which they thought U.S. representatives should say as little as possible about possible changes in force goals. Recalculation of NATO strategy and forces should be postponed until the 1954 Annual Review.\textsuperscript{34}

To make the postponement of basic decisions more palatable to the allies, the Defense Annual Review Team recommended an across-the-board reduction in the NATO April force goals, which admittedly were far below estimated requirements, but the “probable maximum in conventional forces which can be achieved by NATO nations under present political and economic conditions.” The operative word here was “conventional”; atomic firepower, by implication, could fill the gap. The Joint Chiefs, yielding to the pressure, signed off on the proposed goals.\textsuperscript{35}
Toward a New Atomic Partnership

With Eisenhower's election, it appeared that the policy of holding tight to nuclear secrets might be relaxed. With hopes raised worldwide for a reduction in cold war tensions following Stalin's death, Eisenhower delivered an address on 16 April, "The Chance for Peace," declaring the desire of the United States for peaceful relations with the Soviets, limitations on armaments, and control of atomic energy. Late in May the president launched Operation Candor, implementing one of the recommendations of the Oppenheimer panel of consultants, appointed under the previous administration, that the American people be told frankly of the nature and perils of nuclear war. After months of deliberation within the administration, in a speech to the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1953, the president proposed an international pooling of fissionable materials to be used for peaceful purposes.36

These developments created a climate more favorable to a sharing of nuclear weapons information with the allies. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act), the basic legislation providing for civilian control of atomic energy, restricted the exchange of information and cooperation with foreign governments concerning it—specifically, information about the manufacture or use of atomic weapons, production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material for the production of power. In January 1948 the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom negotiated a modus vivendi modifying the McMahon Act and providing a mechanism for the allocation of available uranium ore among the three countries and the exchange of information in certain militarily innocuous areas.37

Shortly after taking office Eisenhower had directed action on another proposal of the Oppenheimer panel—that the policy of candor be extended to allied nations through free discussion of the "problems and dangers posed by the use of atomic weapons." In March the NSC began to consider options for further revising the McMahon Act, and on 8 June Eisenhower publicly urged that it be changed to permit more cooperation with allies since its original aim, to preserve the American atomic monopoly, had been overtaken by events. Both Dulles and the new Joint Chiefs who came aboard in August shared this view. As in the preceding administration, however, resistance came from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) and from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), especially after 1 July when the president appointed as its chairman former AEC Commissioner Lewis Strauss, who had consistently warned against Communist influences in the British government. By this time, however, there was no real prospect of enacting new legislation before the congressional session ended on 31 July.38
The spectacular detonation of the first Soviet thermonuclear device on 12 August 1953 boosted the drive for broader sharing of nuclear information with the allies. Retired JCS Chairman Bradley promptly called for a lifting of barriers to U.S.-NATO cooperation in atomic energy; even JCAE Chairman W. Sterling Cole urged the president to release information on atomic weapons effects in order to enhance public awareness of the horrors of nuclear war. Shortly before the Soviet test the British had announced the scheduling of their own second atomic bomb test for October, and asked for a more liberal interpretation of the McMahon Act. At Bermuda in December Churchill himself tried to persuade Eisenhower to include in any revised legislation language that would permit disclosure of the weight, dimensions, and ballistics of American atomic bombs in order that British V-bombers could be redesigned to carry them. Eisenhower replied regretfully that these specifications were basic weapons data under the McMahon Act that Congress would never agree to release. "We will have to spend millions we poor Britons can ill afford," Churchill complained, "to learn what you chaps already know and could tell us if you would. We will learn it, of course, but at what an unnecessary cost. It makes no sense whatever . . . . The enemy will be our common one. The means to stop him should be common means."\n
Although Eisenhower could offer Churchill little immediate encouragement, the emergence of the New Look strategy would over time tilt the issue in the British favor. NSC 162/2 made explicit and inescapable the links between U.S. security and nuclear weapons (henceforth to be "as available for use as other munitions"), allied manpower, and air bases. For some years to come, American bombers would need bases in Britain and on the continent in order to bring nuclear airpower effectively to bear against the enemy; use of such bases would of course require the consent of host governments. It made no sense to emplace nuclear airpower on NATO soil in sealed compartments insulated against technical communication and interaction with its surrounding military environment. Indeed, this was only the tip of the problem. NATO planning, observed an Annual Review working group early in October, must be based "squarely on the fact that any attack will be carried out with atomic as well as conventional weapons and . . . countered by atomic retaliation and defense. [This dictates] the provision to our NATO allies of such atomic information as is required to carry out effective planning." Late that month Assistant Secretary Nash reminded Deputy Secretary Kyes that, with atomic plenty only a few years down the road, military planning had little time to bridge the transition from conventional to nuclear war. "We must reassess our strategic and logistic planning in the light of technological
advances and have the courage to discard outmoded procedures and weapons." Recently General Gruenther had confessed that he lacked sufficient knowledge of the latest developments in weapon systems, tactics, and doctrine to make an intelligent assessment of requirements. All NATO commanders, Nash argued, shared this need. He urged that Defense press for an early NSC decision on a policy for the "fullest disclosure politically feasible of atomic energy information to our Allies," and also that Defense seek approval for releasing actual weapons to allied countries as needed to carry out wartime missions.40

The new policy paper on sharing atomic information with the allies (NSC 151/2), which the president approved on 4 December, turned out to be a prescription that could not become effective without revision of the McMahon Act. Still, it was a step forward, authorizing disclosure of carefully defined types of information not only on the effects of atomic weapons, but also, in broad terms, on a variety of other data useful in NATO planning. Explicitly excluded, however, was detailed information on the manufacture, design, and numbers of atomic weapons, total U.S. atomic capability, and deployment.41

Augmentation of U.S. forces in Europe with nuclear-capable weapons made more urgent the clarification of nuclear relationships with other NATO members. In June 1953 General Ridgway, before leaving his post as SACEUR, had asked that five battalions of the Army's new 280-mm. artillery, capable of firing both conventional and atomic ammunition, be assigned to Europe—a significant and early move in the development of a tactical atomic capability for NATO. In due course arrangements were made to ship the units to the Seventh Army in West Germany, for the present with conventional ammunition only. In deference to Chancellor Adenauer's fears of adverse effects on the upcoming West German elections, the public announcement was withheld until 15 September. The Air Force also planned to send two short-range Matador atomic-capable missile squadrons to Europe in 1954 and two more in 1955, besides two additional day-fighter squadrons under national command over and above the NATO commitment.42

Alternatives to EDC

Despite the steps taken toward the nuclearization of NATO forces, the hope that six German divisions might join NATO's defense array by the end of 1953 had all but faded. Impatient with the delay in ratification of EDC and frustrated by the State Department's unwillingness to talk about alternatives to it, DoD proposed setting a deadline for ratification,
failing which the United States would begin to consider other courses of action.43

The Defense-State disagreement came to a head in August 1953, when the NSC took up a draft of a new policy paper on Germany. Wilson explained that Defense favored establishment of a deadline for ratification because of the problem of what to do with the considerable amount of military materiel being accumulated for use by the anticipated German units. Although Dulles felt that the chances of general war—and thus the urgency of rearming Germany—had been reduced considerably, he agreed with Wilson that alternatives to EDC should have been studied earlier and that the NSC Planning Board should begin immediately to consider them. Dulles conceded that if all the other countries except France would ratify the treaty, the United States should start to talk about and even to begin rearming Germany, not as an alternative to French ratification but as a psychological tactic to induce France to ratify. The policy paper that the NSC subsequently adopted (NSC 160/1), although not setting a ratification deadline, contained much of what Defense had been advocating:

... It may be desirable to take bilaterally with the West German government certain initial steps in the actual creation and arming of German units, if developments should so indicate and if this can be done without serious repercussions on our relations with France. This, it would be made plain to all EDC signatories, would be to expedite the implementation of EDC when ratified. The implication that such bilateral action would continue even though French ratification was further delayed should provide additional leverage on the French to ratify the EDC treaty at an early date.44

To prevent Defense from prematurely initiating contacts with the West Germans, Dulles asked Wilson to take no action unless State concurred that it could be done without injuring relations with France. Under present conditions, he emphasized, such action “could have very serious adverse effects in France and in Germany.”45

It did not take long, however, for the NSC partially to retract the new policy. At a meeting on 1 October, Dulles told the council that a number of favorable developments—notably, Chancellor Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union had won a clear majority in the Bundestag in September’s West German elections—now pointed toward favorable action on EDC. The situation was therefore too fluid to warrant making initial contacts with the West Germans regarding rearmament. Stassen, noting that a serious logjam of military equipment would develop if creation of
West German units were delayed beyond the end of 1953, asked whether equipment might be sent to Germany and distributed prior to EDC ratification. Eisenhower wondered whether the equipment might be shipped in the guise of reserve stocks for U.S. occupation forces, but Wilson thought the amount of equipment too great for this to work. Dulles suggested the end of January as the date to begin rearming West German units, since he anticipated definitive action on EDC by then. Eisenhower "expressed strong skepticism as to whether there was any really effective alternative to French membership in the EDC." After further discussion, the NSC asked Wilson to report in two weeks as to the desirability of establishing a revised planning date for EDC ratification as a guide to the scheduling of production and delivery of equipment for the German military forces. At the NSC meeting on 13 October Wilson recommended, and the council approved, setting 1 April 1954 as a planning date on which the German military buildup would begin, but only in the event EDC had already been ratified. 46

In the weeks following, however, new complications developed in both France and West Germany, as nationalist elements in each country sought new amendments to the treaty and positions hardened. By the end of November it appeared that ratification would be delayed beyond the NATO ministerial meeting in December and probably for months thereafter. One symptom of the growing pessimism was a revived search for alternatives to EDC. The Joint Chiefs restated their preference for full West German membership in NATO, admittedly ruled out by the certainty of French rejection; if EDC were also ruled out they predicted, on the basis of strictly military considerations, that NATO would be forced to fall back to the insular-peninsular "peripheral" strategy. 47

This strategy assumed that West Germany could not be defended and NATO forces might have to fall back through France to Spain and Italy behind the natural barriers of the Pyrenees and the Alps. Apart from the questionable viability of such a strategy, Spain offered obvious potential assets for any defense of Western Europe through its strategic location, defensible northern frontier, and economic and demographic resources. If they were to be realized, of course, Spain would have to be provided at least the framework for rapid transformation into a major military base, and its political reliability assured, although close association with NATO was ruled out by bitter memories of Franco's pro-Axis role before and during World War II. 48

The groundwork had been laid in 1951 when Congress, at President Truman's instigation, appropriated $125 million for military, economic, and technical assistance to Spain for FY 1952-53. By executive action
Truman also concluded a bilateral mutual assistance agreement with Spain giving the United States, in return for aid, the right to station air and naval forces in that country. Negotiations over base rights and aid, after dragging on through 1952, had reached an impasse by the time the Eisenhower administration came to power, but in May 1953 Wilson, queried by the NSC, endorsed an estimate of $465 million as a justified cost for the base rights. After further negotiations, on 26 September three agreements were concluded authorizing the exchange of aid for the right to develop and use bases as provided in the 1951 bilateral agreement. Informally the United States agreed to the $465 million cost estimate, to be paid over the next four years, but subject to congressional approval; $350 million of this sum would be allotted to military assistance.49

Eisenhower and Dulles, however, remained committed to EDC. Greatly concerned about French dilatoriness in ratification, they personally exerted great pressure on French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault at the Bermuda Conference, held in conjunction with the British in early December. The president warned the French leaders that rejection of EDC would be “cataclysmic” and that he “could not see what direction” the United States might then take. Dulles spoke of “tragic consequences” that “would require a complete reevaluation of our whole foreign policy.”50

Paris in the Winter: “Agonizing Reappraisal” and More

What the president and secretary of state had expressed privately at Bermuda Dulles would vent openly at the NATO meeting in Paris later in December in colorful language that only heightened European fears about a possible U.S. retreat from the continent. Ironically, pre-meeting deliberations in Washington focused on preventing the recently chastened but unpersuaded Secretary Wilson from upsetting the Europeans by spilling something at Paris about planned American troop withdrawals. Having seen an early draft of remarks Dulles was to make at the meeting, Wilson, fearing they represented “a long-time commitment” that would make it difficult eventually to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe, wrote to the secretary of state that “we can spend our money more effectively and get more defense for NATO” by using it “for air and naval components rather than indefinitely keeping hundreds of thousands of our ground troops and their dependents in Europe at great expense.” Wilson believed the allies had the capacity to provide the ground troops.51

For the 10 December NSC meeting ISA advised Wilson to outline the points he intended to make in his address at the NATO meeting and to obtain
NSC and presidential approval. On Wilson's point that the United States planned "eventually to reduce, if not to phase out completely, its ground forces stationed in Europe," ISA asked, if indeed this was the plan, "whether any indication should be made at the forthcoming [NATO] Council meeting or should we, in fact, take special precautions to prevent any indication of it, in the interests of obtaining ratification of the EDC and the German force contribution on which our ultimate aim of withdrawal is predicated."52

The question evoked a decisive answer at the NSC meeting on 10 December. Dulles warned that irresponsible statements could render ineffective the essential diplomatic preparation for redeployment by allowing the impression to get around that the United States planned shortly to pull out of Europe. Such statements required prompt official denials, which had the effect of freezing U.S. policy on this issue and thus making its later modification more difficult. The president emphatically agreed; "philosophical dissertations" on new weapons were permitted, he said, but their connection with forces in Europe was off limits. On that subject "he wanted everybody to keep still" until EDC was ratified and German forces were in place. In Paris, Dulles said, the U.S. delegation would try to avoid discussion of the subject altogether. When Wilson and Treasury Secretary Humphrey stubbornly argued that since eventual redeployment was the approved policy it might be preferable to alert the public to expect successive reductions in NATO force levels, the president remained firm. Because of France's "almost hysterical" fear of being left alone on the continent to face a rearmed Germany, he explained, any such disclosure must be carried out "very gradually." For some time to come, "we could not afford . . . even to talk about redeployment . . . ."53

A revised draft of Wilson's address, apparently prepared within ISA following the NSC meeting, clearly reflected the president's thinking. It included a statement that speculation about the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces was unfounded. In transmitting the draft to Wilson, Assistant Secretary Nash recommended that he unequivocally assure the other NATO members "of the enduring nature of U.S. adherence to and support for the North Atlantic Treaty including the availability of military assistance and U.S. combat units."54

Dulles's controversial keynote address on the afternoon of the first day, 14 December, was the salient event of the Paris meeting. His theme of a European community that would combine indissolubly the interests and capacities of France and Germany was an appeal to European hope and idealism. He warned, however, that if EDC "should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart so that they will again be
potential enemies, then there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy. In a press conference afterward Dulles hammered home his point, repeating the “agonizing reappraisal” threat. According to a U.S. embassy official, the press reaction was “instantaneous and violent” both in Paris and “everywhere in Europe,” where it was resented as “blackmail.” The reaction is difficult to explain, because Dulles had been issuing similar warnings regarding EDC for nearly a year.

During his address Dulles also announced that the U.S. Congress would be asked to make available to NATO governments more information about atomic weapons, particularly tactical weapons, than was now permitted. Such information would serve an immediate purpose, he said, by permitting a more realistic recalculation of NATO force requirements to take into account the introduction of atomic firepower into the NATO arsenal. However, the firepower would accrue only to American, not allied forces; the relaxation of legislative restrictions did not look toward the eventual provision of atomic weapons to European NATO forces or of information about their design and fabrication. The policy of wider disclosure was intended only “to enable NATO countries to participate more fully in military planning for their own defenses and in the conduct of combined operations” with U.S. forces.

In his address to the NATO Council on 15 December Wilson evidently intended to soften the impact of Dulles’s “agonizing reappraisal” threat; it contained no hint of possible troop withdrawals. “Our national survival,” Wilson declared, “is interlaced with the survival and defense of the NATO area as a whole.” The key to survival was modernization, the primary aim of the current restructuring of U.S. forces and the focus of SACEUR’s current reappraisal of NATO strategy. He amplified Dulles’s announcement of the U.S. intention to seek legislation to permit sharing of information about nuclear and other new weapons with allies—without divulging the kind of information or the uses to which it might be put. Noting the relevance of such information to NATO planning, he cautioned against expectations of quick results and urged “a longer range view than has hitherto been the basis for our NATO planning.” Wilson eschewed exhortations to accelerate or maximize effort, to achieve greater as opposed to better results.

Back in Washington, on 23 December Dulles reported to the NSC that the other NATO members considered the meeting “as successful as any such meeting ever held.” NATO, he believed, had now embraced the concept of the long haul. He and Wilson had tried hard to induce the NATO
ministers to think "in something like our terms of atomic weapons and of
the atomic age," but with limited success, if any. The NATO ministers
were "still very frightened at the atomic prospect." On the question of
stationing atomic bombers on allied bases, Dulles had learned that the
United States could not count on advance agreements to use the bases,
but it might be possible to agree on an alert system that could be put
quickly into effect if war broke out. Dulles had not addressed the corollary
question, whether atomic weapons could be made available to allies, and
apparently no one had embarrassed him by asking. "Our campaign of edu-
cation for our allies on atomic weapons," Dulles concluded, "must go on." 59

Demise of the EDC

Dulles's threat of an "agonizing reappraisal"—however great the im-
mediate commotion it stirred in France—failed to prod the Laniel
government into action on EDC. The French preferred that a conference
be held with the Soviet Union to discuss the overall German question and
European security—to demonstrate to the French public the futility of
negotiating with the Soviet Union—before putting EDC to a vote. But a
four-power foreign ministers meeting in Berlin early in 1954 produced
no diplomatic fireworks, only agreement to hold a follow-on conference
in Geneva that spring regarding Far Eastern questions, including Indo-
china. Dulles warned Foreign Minister Bidault not to use the scheduling
of the Geneva conference as a reason for further postponing the vote
on EDC. 60

Still doubtful of sufficient backing for EDC in the Assembly, the
Laniel government asked for additional public commitments from Great
Britain that it would associate in some form with the EDC, and from the
United States that American troops would remain on the continent fol-
lowing EDC ratification. Deliberations regarding the French request pitted
an impatient Department of Defense against a more sympathetic Depart-
ment of State, with President Eisenhower—though vexed by the French
tactics—finally supporting State. At an NSC meeting in early March 1954
Secretary Wilson questioned whether new assurances would do any
good. Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith strongly favored pro-
viding them, because they were essentially a reiteration of previous pub-
lic pronouncements. Bristling at Smith's statement, the president asked,
"Must we go on forever coddling the French?" Smith explained that the
situation was reaching a critical stage. If EDC was to be ratified, it would
have to be done by the Laniel government, since chances were slim that
any successor government would approve it.
When Deputy Secretary of Defense Kyes took sharp issue with Smith, Eisenhower placed himself squarely on State's side. A recent visit to France had persuaded Kyes that the Assembly would approve EDC, thus obviating the need for further assurances. He thought the French should now be warned that failure to ratify would prompt the United States to withdraw its troops from Europe. Eisenhower, stressing that he was speaking from experience, disagreed completely with Kyes. A threat to withdraw American forces from Europe, he maintained, would not help at all in securing French ratification. Concerned about the widening assurances to the French and opposed to an indefinite stationing of American troops abroad, the president nevertheless favored meeting the French request. Wilson remained upset by the implications and the cost of keeping U.S. forces in Europe. Recalling that the United States had come to France's aid during two world wars, he felt "sick and tired of seeing the United States pulling France's chestnuts out of the fire." The president pointed out that Frenchmen would counter that "France had held the fort while the United States was making up its mind and getting ready to save its own skin." 61

Following the meeting Wilson and Smith agreed, with Dulles later concurring, on a draft statement to be made by Eisenhower. After a series of discussions involving the president, congressional leaders, State and Defense representatives, and General Gruenther, the statement was revised slightly to reflect senatorial concern not to extend U.S. commitments beyond those already embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty. Eisenhower released the statement on 16 April 1954, having secured a commitment from the Laniel government to begin Assembly debate on EDC. The president continued to insist that EDC was the only acceptable choice. 62

Defeat seemed far from certain. By late April the legislatures in four of the six EDC signatory nations—the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, and Luxembourg—had ratified the treaty. Only Italy and France remained, and Italian government officials forecast speedy parliamentary approval of the treaty once the secret negotiations over the Trieste dispute being conducted by the United States and Great Britain with Italy and Yugoslavia reached a successful conclusion. 63 Prospects for French ratification dimmed, however, when the worsening French military position in Indochina caused the fall of the Laniel government before the EDC debate began. A new government, formed in June under Pierre Mendes-France, promised first to end the Indochina war and then to deal with EDC. Mendes-France also raised the possibility of amending the EDC treaty before submitting it to the Assembly. 64

The Eisenhower administration looked at possible actions if the French dragged out consideration of EDC beyond the end of the summer.
Although DoD and the British government favored German membership in NATO over EDC, State refused to face the possibility that EDC would not be approved. It continued to oppose discussion of alternatives lest French awareness that such a process was under way would doom any chances, however slight, for eventual ratification. For DoD the need to begin preparing for German rearmament loomed especially large. That spring the NSC had again pushed back the planning date, this time to 1 October 1954, for the start of the German military buildup. Wilson—whether at the president’s direction is not clear—notified the JCS in late June that the decision the previous year to suspend consideration of EDC alternatives “is not now interpreted as precluding planning within the Defense and State Departments.” The JCS responded by calling attention to the October planning date and urging that the United States try to bring about either early French ratification of EDC or agreement to full NATO membership for West Germany. The French were to be informed that rejection of both alternatives would lead the United States and Great Britain to restore German sovereignty in their zones, assist Germany with its rearmament efforts, and eventually integrate German forces into NATO.

The JCS recommendations found a cool reception at State. Although the chiefs argued that waiting indefinitely for a French decision would risk loss of both Germany and France, Dulles resisted discussion of alternatives. At lower levels, however, State representatives made clear to their Defense counterparts that they too favored German membership in NATO as the most desirable alternative to EDC. Concerned at State’s unresponsiveness, ISA kept up the pressure, urging the earliest possible development of a formal joint State-Defense position regarding EDC alternatives and full Defense participation in planning and decisions.

DoD had indeed been left out of key discussions between the United States and Great Britain. At a meeting in Washington in late June 1954, Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower, and Dulles (no Defense representatives were present) considered how to deal with the possibility of more French procrastination. Dulles mentioned the impatience of the JCS and their view that the chances for rearming West Germany in a controlled and effective fashion were slipping away. The Western leaders agreed, so long as EDC was still before the current session of the French Assembly, to maintain their public and private support and to dampen public discussion of alternatives. They recognized the need, if the Assembly rejected EDC (but not before then), to quickly restore German sovereignty and to consult with other NATO members about securing a German defense contribution. An Anglo-American study group (including on the U.S.
side representatives only from State) subsequently developed plans for the restoration of German sovereignty in the event the French Assembly recessed before putting EDC to a vote. The group did not look at specific alternatives to the EDC in the event the French actually voted it down, because the U.S. members preferred to delay consideration of such alternatives until a later time. 69

The hopefulness of the State Department and White House was bolstered by generally optimistic reports from U.S. diplomats and others that EDC was still viable and preferable to other options. In talks with U.S. military and civilian officials during a trip to Western Europe in early July, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, Robert Cutler, gained the impression that the French Assembly would ratify EDC "if the political leadership would move." In reporting to the president, Cutler concluded, "It is idle to consider admitting West Germany as a NATO partner, subject to certain restrictions (as the British sometimes suggest). The Germans will not agree." Nor did the president believe that the threat of rearming Germany would spur the French to action. Eisenhower told the NSC he doubted whether "a strong U.S. initiative toward arming Germany would be a means of compelling the ratification of EDC." 70

Pressure by the United States, Great Britain, and the other EDC countries brought a reluctant, resentful Mendes-France to submit the treaty for ratification, only to have the Assembly reject it on 30 August. 71 Just prior to the vote both Mendes-France and the British advanced alternative arrangements—versions of the "little NATO" solution—that would allow German rearmament through a small grouping within NATO but without EDC's supranational features that so bothered the French. Asked by Churchill to support a "variant of NATO" in place of EDC, Secretary Dulles remained skeptical. He stood by EDC to the end, calling French rejection "a saddening event" and proposing a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council to consider future courses of action. Moreover, the French decision "without the provision of any alternative" obliged the United States, Dulles said, to reappraise its European policy. 72

Dulles and Eisenhower were slow to accept alternatives despite the urgings of DoD and the British government. They misjudged the level of support for EDC in the French Assembly and locked the United States—for tactical advantages that proved ephemeral—into an unnecessarily rigid stance. The British then took the lead in considering how the West should cope with the crisis created by the EDC's demise. 73
While French rejection of EDC terminated a lengthy, frustrating effort by the United States and left up in the air the question of West Germany’s relationship to NATO, Washington could at least take heart at progress achieved, albeit slowly, in putting into place two other elements of the New Look policy. The first element involved the incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons into NATO strategic planning. In July 1954 the major NATO commands finally completed the capabilities studies requested at the North Atlantic Council meeting the previous December, aimed at a revision of basic NATO strategy. These became the basis for a Standing Group draft paper (SG 241/3), circulated to the Joint Chiefs in August, which forecast that an intensive exchange of nuclear weapons in the initial few days or weeks would likely decide any future war. Although it assumed a West German contribution to NATO defense, SG 241/3 recommended that NATO, instead of planning to mobilize large forces after D-day, concentrate on maintaining combat forces equipped with nuclear arms. At the same time, Wilson forwarded to State the views of the JCS on the need for reaching agreements within NATO regarding U.S. operating rights in foreign territories, exchange of nuclear information, the role of nuclear weapons in strategy, and the measures to be taken prior to a counterattack. The major point at issue between State and Defense was State’s preference merely for prior “arrangements” to be made between the allies regarding authorization for a nuclear counterattack, while the Joint Chiefs envisioned “agreements” granting this authorization. State favored the more flexible language on the grounds it would facilitate adoption of a new strategy paper at the NATO meeting coming up in December 1954.74

The second element, similarly time-consuming, pertained to the liberalization of the McMahon Act to permit more sharing of atomic information with the allies. In February 1954 the president submitted a special message to Congress proposing amendments to the Atomic Energy Act having both domestic and international ramifications. In the international sphere Eisenhower recommended that “authority be provided to exchange with nations participating in defensive arrangements with the United States such tactical information as is essential to the development of defense plans and to the training of personnel for atomic warfare.”75

During the hearings begun in May and the subsequent prolonged congressional debate, concerns expressed by Democratic opponents, primarily senators from the Tennessee Valley Authority region, about the bill’s encouragement of private participation in the domestic development of atomic power overshadowed its groundbreaking international
features. Following passage by the House and Senate of differing versions and resolution of their differences in two conference committees, the president signed into law the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 on 30 August, ironically the same day that the French Assembly rejected EDC. The act represented a triumph for the president, who had inspired the legislation, given it his complete support, and gained broader powers from it. Under its provisions, sharing U.S. fissionable material or classified information with a foreign government now required negotiation of a cooperative agreement, but only after the president had determined that the proposed agreement "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security."76

By September 1954 NATO, primarily because of budgetary constraints, had taken major strides in reducing force goals from the unrealistic Lisbon levels of two years before and in accepting the New Look's emphasis on nuclear weapons. Within the Eisenhower administration Wilson often had found himself opposed by the president and Dulles on what seemingly were military questions. Wilson and the Joint Chiefs had made no secret of their desire to withdraw some U.S. forces from Europe as a cost-cutting measure and to offset this reduction with German force contributions through West Germany's membership in NATO. DoD's importunings on these matters had met resistance from Eisenhower and Dulles, who, more alert to possible negative repercussions of U.S. actions (especially vis-à-vis France), focused above all on maintaining and strengthening European political cohesion. With the collapse of EDC, however, that goal seemed even more difficult of achievement.
Western diplomatic triumphs in late 1954 and early 1955, for the most part unanticipated, helped soften the acute disappointment in Washington over French rejection of the European Defense Community (EDC). The masterstroke, a result of British decisiveness and initiative, was devising a substitute for EDC as a way to bind Germany to the Western security system and begin its rearmament program.

The Western powers also made great strides in shoring up the defense of southern Europe, a region that President Eisenhower referred to as "our weak flank." The October 1954 resolution of the controversy between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste and the signing in May 1955 of an Austrian state treaty resolved longstanding issues that had clouded the security of the region. While the Department of Defense played a limited role in the negotiations, both agreements subsequently raised troublesome questions with political and money overtones about the redeployment of U.S. forces that had participated in the occupation of Trieste and Austria.

Worrisome, too, were the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union that began in the fall of 1954, the former's shunning of closer ties to NATO, and the problems the U.S. military assistance program increasingly encountered in Yugoslavia that led to the program's termination later in the decade. Ultimately, although no formal link ever developed between Yugoslavia and NATO, the neutralist position adopted by Yugoslav President Tito offered a satisfactory, if less than ideal, contribution to stability in the region. To a greater degree than Department of Defense officials, State Department representatives, especially Secretary Dulles, would come to view Tito's feisty neutralism as a fair exchange
for the disruptive impact Yugoslavia's continuing independence from Moscow might have on the Soviet satellites.

Despite approval in December 1954 of a new strategy paper (MC 48) that embraced the use of nuclear weapons, NATO found itself still struggling with many of its old problems—striving to achieve unrealistically high conventional force goals, working out equitable formulas for funding the modernization of equipment and new infrastructure, and improving the preparedness of forces. In the summer of 1956 the hoped for boost in manpower and financial contributions from West Germany's admission to NATO was still slow in materializing. Detente between East and West and signs of liberalization within the Soviet bloc made it difficult for NATO members, particularly West Germany, to gain public and parliamentary support for a military buildup.

**West German Entry into NATO**

Although the French National Assembly's rejection of EDC at the end of August 1954 caught the United States without specific alternate plans for linking West Germany to NATO, the British had been examining several possibilities and were prepared to move quickly. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden pushed for an arrangement to restore West German sovereignty and bring Germany into NATO through the medium of the Western European Union (WEU), a mutual defense organization formed in 1948 consisting of Great Britain, France, and the Benelux nations, which now was to be enlarged to include both Germany and Italy.²

Like the British, the Department of Defense had been urging consideration of alternatives to EDC. Frustrated by the State Department's delay in responding to the Joint Chiefs' proposals submitted in June, DoD began to prepare a comprehensive program for the rearmament of West Germany.³ At the same time Eden and Secretary of State Dulles separately visited several European capitals and obtained agreement on the holding of a conference in London (28 September through 3 October) to work out the details of the British plan. The arrangements, finalized at a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris 19-23 October at which Deputy Secretary Robert Anderson and Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs H. Struve Hensel represented the Department of Defense, constituted a complex set of interrelated documents, involving sometimes as many as 14 countries and sometimes only one nation in a unilateral declaration. Great Britain, for example, gave a unilateral commitment to maintain forces on the continent; Germany unilaterally renounced the manufacture of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons,
guided missiles, large naval vessels, and strategic bombing aircraft. The United States provided a series of unilateral assurances, including the continued deployment of U.S. troops on the continent.  

Even before West Germany's formal admission to NATO on 6 May 1955, study groups and multilateral working groups began tackling the time-consuming details of implementing the Paris accords. Attention centered mainly on measures to reach the goal of a 12-division 500,000-man army, the amount of military assistance and training the German armed forces were to receive, the costs Germany would pay to support the armed forces in Germany of other NATO members—the “sending” states—the size of the West German defense budget, and the portion of the budget to be devoted to NATO’s infrastructure program.

Two issues in particular caused especially deep concern within NATO—the slow pace of the German manpower buildup and Germany’s share of the support costs. Raising the West German army proved slower than expected. In September 1955 German Chancellor Adenauer stated publicly that ground forces would be brought to full strength in three years and the naval and air forces in four years, goals that were approved in NATO’s 1955 Annual Review. But it was not until 2 January 1956 that the first 1,000 volunteers were put into uniform and started limited training. The early units were located in Andernach, 40 kilometers south of Bonn, in the hope that German soldiers on display and close to the seat of government would have a positive political effect on the German parliament and NATO. Volunteers came forward more slowly than the government had hoped, perhaps because of a general relaxation of East-West tensions. By December recruitment had picked up, but lack of accommodations prevented the attainment of the year-end goal of 96,000.

The new army, the Bundeswehr, had been envisioned as a mix of volunteers (60%) and conscripts (40%), but the Adenauer government increasingly turned to conscription to fill the ranks. Early in 1956 the government proposed legislation to authorize conscription for all males between the ages of 18 and 45, with a period of 18 months service. Despite strong opposition in the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, and among the German public to the length of the conscription period, Adenauer continued to support the 18 months of service. Critics also charged that NATO’s decision to rely on nuclear weapons for defense made the proposed 500,000-man German army unduly large and the rate of the buildup too rapid. The Bundesrat, the upper house, narrowly approved conscription in March with a large majority recommending a 12-month term of service. In July the Bundestag merely approved conscription without specifying a term of service. But in September the Bavarian Christian Socialist wing of Adenauer’s Christian Democratic
Party, led by Franz Josef Strauss, publicly called for a 12-month service term, and the Bundestag cut Adenauer's proposed military budget, forcing the chancellor to accept the 12-month draft. The North Atlantic Council quickly expressed concern at the lowering of the requirement for military service. By year's end some in Washington were doubting that the 12-division goal would be met or that the conscription measures would be put into effect before the 1957 elections.\(^6\)

The amount of money West Germany would pay to support foreign troops on its soil presented another contentious issue. At the end of 1954 the United States had over 250,000 military personnel and nearly 5,000 civilians in West Germany, a number larger than in any other foreign country. Under the contractual agreements of May 1952, Germany had agreed to pay DM 7.2 billion ($1.7 billion) per year in occupation costs. With the termination of allied occupation in May 1955, the Federal Republic agreed to provide support amounting to DM 3.2 billion over the next 12 months, with the United States receiving nearly half the amount.\(^7\)

In the spring of 1956, although the sending states wanted to renew the agreement at the same levels, Finance Minister Fritz Schäffer disclaimed German responsibility for support costs, pointing out that no other NATO member paid them and that Germany had to be treated as an equal partner. Germany was willing to negotiate only for provision of goods and services for the sending states' forces, not for continuing monetary support. The United States contended that Germany differed from other NATO countries in that it depended for its defense on outsiders until its own forces could be built up. Germany therefore should at least meet some of the costs of its defense provided by other countries. The U.S. embassy in Bonn wanted the United States to propose a figure of DM 1.2 billion per year, but to be prepared to accept much less.\(^8\)

As the Comptroller's Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense noted, the United States, Britain, and France had minimal leverage in negotiating with the Germans. Their major assets were the troops stationed in Germany and MDAP assistance. These mattered for little, since the Germans assumed the Western powers would not pull their troops out of Germany over failure to receive support. Such action "could wreck NATO." The office concluded that the United States might have to consider settling for minimal German support in the form of goods and services with the understanding that no further grant aid would be forthcoming beyond the commitment of DM 3.6 to 4.0 billion made by Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash in April 1953 and reaffirmed by Secretary Dulles in October 1954. Any additional equipment might be provided on a cash reimbursable basis or in exchange for specific
amounts of deutschemark support for U.S. forces. Implicit in the office's analysis was the likelihood that the German buildup would stretch out over six to eight years, a conclusion that ISA's European Region disputed. Although preparations for the buildup had been quite slow, the European Region saw no indication of a stretchout of such duration, which, moreover, would run contrary to Adenauer's private and public assurances. 9

To deal with several issues in U.S.-German relations, including support costs, Secretary of Defense Wilson appointed Karl R. Bendetsen, former assistant secretary of the Army, as his special assistant and dispatched him to Europe in May 1956. Bendetsen worked with Ambassador James B. Conant in securing an agreement whereby the German government would contribute DM 650 million to the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Germany for the 12-month period ending 5 May 1957, about half the previous year's amount. Under the agreement the United States reserved the right to reopen negotiations for further German contributions should effective efforts toward the buildup of German forces not be forthcoming. Upon returning to Washington Bendetsen recommended that no further grant aid for Germany be programmed or considered beyond the Nash commitment until Germany demonstrated that it was making a real effort toward the buildup of effective military forces of its own. 10

While Bendetsen was in Germany and the Bundestag was debating the conscription legislation, the NSC Planning Board, worried about the difficulties Adenauer might face in the elections scheduled for the fall of 1957, recommended a slight change in policy toward West Germany. It proposed that the NSC reaffirm the importance of achieving "an adequate German defense contribution," but in light of Germany's internal political situation, the United States "should not press for a German defense buildup in a such a manner as would jeopardize the continuation of a moderate pro-Western West German Government." 11

Admiral Radford expressed the Joint Chiefs' opposition to the proposed revision. The chiefs wanted to continue pressure on Germany to participate more fully in Western European defense. "It was our duty," he said, "to find out as soon as possible where the Germans stood on their contribution to NATO.... The situation will be less satisfactory in Germany a year from now if we do not continue to push them on the nature of their participation." Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson asked whether the degree and timing of pressure to be exerted on the West German government should not be left up to the secretary of state. Dulles, who believed he had pushed Adenauer about as far as he could regarding the buildup, did not want to see the Adenauer government
toppled. Radford agreed that too much pressure should not be applied, but "we must also not let the Germans off the hook." How Germany handled its contribution to NATO, particularly the length of the conscription period, would be a test case for other NATO members. Acting on Dulles's view that the pressure to be applied was essentially an operating rather than a policy question, the NSC rejected the Planning Board's recommendation.¹²

Given the long period under EDC of planning for and anticipating Germany's rearmament, the delays encountered in the early months after West German entry into NATO proved frustrating indeed. Ambassador Conant remarked in his diary, "What irony. First we were afraid the Germans would rearm, now we are afraid they won't!" Finance Minister Schäffer received most of the blame for the slow pace. But there is evidence that Adenauer, despite his professed support for a speedy buildup, at least supported Schäffer on the support costs issue. Because the Eisenhower administration, however, viewed Adenauer as indispensable to Germany's reintegration with the West and worried about the possible negative ramifications of U.S. actions on the German electorate, it may have been overly solicitous of him and given him a "quasi-veto power" over American policy.¹³

**Settlement of the Trieste Dispute**

The Trieste area at the head of the Adriatic Sea had been a source of tension between Italy and Yugoslavia since Italy acquired it after Austria-Hungary's defeat in World War I. When Yugoslav forces began to take control of the area in the closing days of World War II, British and American troops quickly moved in and worked out a joint occupation with Yugoslavia, formalized in 1947 with the signing of the Italian peace treaty and creation of the Free Territory of Trieste divided into two zones. Some 5,000 American and an equal number of British forces remained in the predominantly Italian city of Trieste and the areas to the north and east (Zone A). Yugoslavia, permitted 10,000 troops, occupied the area south of the city (Zone B) populated mostly by Slovenes and Croats.¹⁴

Since Yugoslavia refused to recognize Italy's claim to Zone A, tensions remained high along the zonal boundary. In the fall of 1953 Yugoslavia nearly went to war with Italy when the Italian government, with the support of the Americans and the British, announced that it would take over administration of Zone A upon the withdrawal of the two occupying powers. Tempers cooled, and the United States and Britain scrapped their plans for withdrawing.¹⁵
In February 1954 secret talks to resolve the dispute began in London among British, American, Italian, and Yugoslav representatives. Llewellyn Thompson, high commissioner in Austria who shuttled unobtrusively between Vienna and London, represented the United States. DoD’s role in the negotiations was limited. In the early stages Maj. Gen. Clyde Eddleman, assistant chief of staff of the Army (G-3), served on the U.S. delegation. Thompson, however, soon dispensed with the other members of the delegation, preferring to deal on a one-to-one basis with his counterparts. Little progress was made until the summer of 1954. A clinching visit in September to Italy and Yugoslavia by Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy paved the way for an agreement on 5 October 1954 that divided the territory roughly along the lines of the occupation zones. Eisenhower had remarked that a Trieste agreement was important “if for no other reason than to provide some counter-balance for the EDC flop.”

That summer the prospect of agreement stirred discussion in Washington of what eventually to do with the U.S. forces stationed in Trieste, now numbering about 3,000. Three options came under consideration: (1) redeploying the forces to the U.S. occupation zone in Austria, (2) redeploying them to the port of Leghorn (Livorno) about 160 miles northwest of Rome, or (3) returning them to the United States. The discussion occasioned a clash of views between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Wilson and a rare point of agreement between Wilson and Secretary of State Dulles.

Purely military considerations favored redeployment to Austria. The Joint Chiefs, backed by Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) General Alfred Gruenther, reiterated their recommendation from the previous fall that the Trieste forces be redeployed there to strengthen defenses along the Italian border. General Gruenther doubted the wisdom of the second option—redeployment to Leghorn—because the forces would find themselves too far away to move eastward quickly on short notice. Gruenther also felt that an augmentation of U.S. forces in Austria would compensate for British and French withdrawals from the country earlier in the year that had left only token forces in their zones of occupation and would strengthen the Austrian belief that the West would not abandon them in the event of a military crisis.

Financial and political factors made the other options more attractive. Secretary Wilson strongly preferred that the forces be returned to the United States. He noted that the terms of the settlement under discussion involved the United States dispensing considerable sums of money to Italy and Yugoslavia; returning the Trieste garrison to the United States would help reduce the overall cost of the settlement.
Between the position of the military authorities and that of Wilson stood Dulles and Eisenhower. Dulles did not object to the transfer of most of the troops to Austria, but the political reactions to such a move, he believed, would be minimized if the forces could “be phased into Austria gradually and ostensibly as replacements.” In addition, sending at least a small number of troops elsewhere in Europe would permit the United States to issue a statement that only a portion of the Trieste forces had been redeployed to Austria. In view of the military authorities’ judgment that the troops be redeployed to Austria rather than returned to the United States, Dulles chose at this time not to comment on possibly bringing them home. 

While acknowledging the concerns of his military advisers, the president essentially agreed with Wilson’s point of view. Eisenhower counted on an eventual Trieste settlement strengthening the southern front by allowing Yugoslavia and Italy to “look to the east instead of neutralizing each other.” Italy therefore would be able to provide reserve forces in the north to move into Austria quickly if need be. If this could be arranged, Eisenhower told Gruenther, “then some time in the future it would be proper to consider the question of returning our troops all the way to the United States.” At an NSC meeting in mid-August, Eisenhower remarked that the political importance of the Trieste forces was “out of all proportion to their monetary cost and military value” and postponed a decision on their disposition until a final settlement was reached. In the event of a settlement, however, the troops were to be temporarily redeployed to Leghorn. After the meeting, Eisenhower wrote to Gruenther, reminding him of the Joint Chiefs’ view that the United States should expect the allies to share more of the burden of European defense. Transferring the Trieste forces to Austria, he pointed out, would give the European nations the impression that “no matter how much they fail to do so, we would attempt to fill their deficiencies.”

No further discussion of the matter occurred until the conclusion of the agreement on 5 October 1954. Traveling in Europe after taking part in the London nine-power conference, Deputy Secretary Anderson offered a compromise. The proposal, concurred in by Lt. Gen. William H. Arnold, commander of the U.S. forces in Austria, called for the 351st Regiment to move from Trieste to Leghorn, where it would receive short-term inductees from other European components and would eventually be brought back to the United States. Long-term inductees, however, would be assigned to the U.S. forces in Austria. Personnel levels there would be raised without creating new units. The proposal would thus satisfy the main objectives of the two contending positions. Not only would U.S.
defensive capabilities in Austria be bolstered slightly, but the 351st
Regiment, following its temporary redeployment to Leghorn, would be
brought home and formally deactivated.

Anderson's proposal met stiff opposition from Army Chief of Staff
General Matthew Ridgway, who argued that additional troops would be
unwieldy to superimpose on existing units in Austria and would not
significantly increase the command's combat effectiveness. Nor could he
see a military justification for returning the forces to the United States
unless the move was part of a larger withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Europe. He was unhappy over the prospect of deactivating a regiment
with longstanding traditions and earmarked in planning documents as a
key part of a division to be created immediately after D-day. With Gruen-
thur's support, Ridgway continued to urge redeployment of the 351st
Regiment, as presently organized, to the U.S. zone of Austria. 23

At the NSC meeting on 6 October, presided over by Secretary of
State Dulles in the president's absence, Wilson and Ridgway restated their
positions. For Wilson, who backed the Anderson compromise, filling the
gap created by the British and French withdrawals from Austria would set
a bad precedent. Nor would a single regiment really add to the defense of
Austria. Once in place, however, it would be difficult to withdraw. Money
was also a major factor. To keep its forces in Europe the United States had
to pay two to three times what it cost the allies for their forces. Moving
the troops along with dependents to Austria would run up housing and
other expenses. Although Wilson understood the Joint Chiefs' argument,
he thought the decision should rest primarily on the judgment of Secre-
tary of State Dulles from the political viewpoint.

Wilson found an unfamiliar ally in Dulles, who only several months
before had opposed withdrawing U.S. forces from Europe. As if trumping
the arguments of the Joint Chiefs, Dulles suggested that the president
was the "best judge" on the military aspects of the question and would
have to decide on that basis. Echoing Wilson, the secretary of state
pointed out that the troops could easily be returned to the United States,
but if transferred elsewhere in Europe, "we may never get them out." Finally,
Dulles believed that the lessened risk of war in Europe made it
desirable to bring the troops home. Eisenhower's special assistant for
national security affairs, Robert Cutler, telephoned Wilson the next day
notifying him of the president's decision to have the troops transferred
temporarily to Leghorn and to postpone final action until he could dis-
cuss the matter further with the interested officials. 24

Two weeks later, the president, in a meeting with Wilson, Dulles, and
JCS Chairman Radford, "generally" decided that the forces should be
returned to the United States "for reasons advanced by the Secretaries of State and Defense." Since loose ends remained relating to the London conference and the integration of West Germany into NATO, the return was to be delayed. Eisenhower had earlier expressed concern about the effect of redeployment on the French Assembly's consideration of the nine-power agreements regarding West Germany. In a telephone conversation with Dulles, he had remarked that if the Assembly ratified the accords, the Trieste forces should be brought home. Doing so before then "might discourage some boys" in the Assembly and cost a few votes in favor of the agreements. Concerned nevertheless at leaving Austria inadequately defended, the president suggested that soundings be made with the British, French, Italians, and Yugoslavs to see whether they might be willing to help.25

To ISA officials the president's approach seemed indecisive and confusing. It did not take into account Italian willingness for the American troops to remain in Leghorn only long enough to be staged through to another destination. They also wondered why, if the president had generally agreed to the eventual return of the troops to the United States, action should not begin to provide the necessary facilities. It would become increasingly difficult to maintain the troops in Leghorn on such an uncertain basis.26

The British-American military government in Trieste formally came to an end on 26 October, after an elaborate withdrawal ceremony was cancelled at the last minute because of bad weather and fears by the British commanding general of an assassination attempt. Dulles made a last-ditch effort to persuade the British to transfer one battalion from Trieste to Austria if the United States would augment its forces in Austria with two Trieste battalions. But the British refused.27 No effort apparently was made to enlist the help of other nations.

In the meantime, the president decided on 1 November to adopt the essence of the Anderson compromise. Between 1,500 and 2,000 additional spaces were to be made available to General Arnold in Austria for organizing into units as Gruenther might recommend, provided that such spaces would not require new housing construction. The 351st Regiment, with its remaining strength and short-term personnel from other commands, would then be returned to the United States. Although the regiment's formal return would slightly reduce the U.S. forces committed to NATO, the administration hoped to offset this with the introduction into Europe of new weapons such as 280-mm. artillery with nuclear capability, Corporal missiles, and Honest John rockets.28
Concerns over the adequacy of defensive arrangements in Austria proved short-lived, as a breakthrough in the long-stalemated talks to end the occupation of Austria by the Western powers and the Soviet Union followed on the heels of the Trieste settlement, leading to the signing of an Austrian state treaty in May 1955 and the withdrawal from the country of all occupation forces later that year.

Although the official U.S. position in the treaty negotiations under way since 1947 called for the unification of Austria, the Department of Defense had resisted including language in the treaty that would leave Austria militarily or economically weak and subject to Soviet pressures, preferring to see Austria remain divided and occupied rather than unified and unoccupied. Progress in negotiations was also hindered by Soviet insistence on linking the Austrian settlement with an overall German settlement.

The breakthrough resulted not from any shift in the U.S. position, but a combination of initiatives by the other participants. Through the early years of the occupation the Soviet Union had a stronger military presence in Austria, averaging nearly 50,000 troops in its zone compared to almost 15,000 Americans, 5,000 British, and 5,000 French in the three Western zones. This numerical advantage increased in 1953. In September the British and French governments, weary at the slow pace of the negotiations and anxious to redirect their military spending, announced sharp reductions of their forces in Austria. The French withdrew almost all their troops; the British kept only one battalion. Not only were the Joint Chiefs concerned at the weakened Western defensive capabilities in Austria, they also worried that the reductions would “establish the precedent of sanctioning unilateral withdrawal of troops previously earmarked for NATO.” Other members “already more or less affected by neutralist leanings could be expected to seize upon this action as an excuse to reduce their own commitments and efforts.” Wilson shared these concerns and emphasized to the president that the “maintenance of a firm understanding and area of consultation with these major Allies on all matters affecting our common defense would appear to be as important as our joint partnership in NATO itself.”

A new policy paper on Austria (NSC 164/1) approved in October 1953, while recommending that the United States should continue to “vigorously resist the neutralization of Austria,” noted the divergence in views among the Western powers. If the British and French were to press strongly for some degree of neutralization, the paper recognized that the United States might have to make a concession to avoid being blamed for
unilaterally blocking the treaty. No treaty was to be signed, however, that would “preclude Austria’s association with the economic community of Western Europe, which would prejudice Austria’s capacity to preserve internal order, or which would restrict the western powers in giving aid to Austria in the establishment of adequate internal security forces.”

On 8 February 1955, the Soviet Union announced it would consider signing an Austrian treaty even without a German peace treaty. On 19 April after bilateral negotiations with the Austrians, who were eager for the restoration of their sovereignty, Moscow submitted specific new treaty proposals in a formal note to the three Western powers. The Joint Chiefs requested a week to study the military implications of the proposals, particularly a four-power guarantee of Austrian independence. Their concerns were threefold: (1) how to withdraw the U.S. forces in an orderly way if a treaty were concluded, (2) the great strategic significance of Austria and preserving its independence, and (3) whether the United States and Austria through a bilateral agreement could establish an Austrian gendarmerie to keep internal order. Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., argued that speed was essential and that Secretary Dulles would need broad latitude in the conduct of the negotiations, particularly regarding the four-power guarantee. President Eisenhower was worried that a guarantee would be a “Pandora’s box” and would subject the United States to all kinds of uncertainties. He agreed with the chiefs that the issue should be studied further. The president made clear his strong preference for an armed neutrality that would allow Austria, like Switzerland, to participate in its own defense. After consultation with the British and French, the Western powers proposed, and the Soviets agreed, that their ambassadors meet with Austrian representatives in Vienna on 2 May to work out an agreed text which would then be signed by the foreign ministers of the four occupying powers.

As with Trieste, a diplomatic success caused a military headache—where to move the forces stationed in Austria and how quickly this could be accomplished. Because Army Chief of Staff General Ridgway believed a three-month withdrawal period, as the Soviet Union had proposed, would be physically impossible, the Joint Chiefs wanted to extend the period to six months. The president believed it would be reneging to ask for a six-month period and might give the impression that the United States was playing obstructionist. Dulles thought an extension would not sit well with the Austrians who strongly desired the prompt removal of foreign troops. The argument could be made that if the Soviets could withdraw in three months, why could the United States not remove a much smaller number in the same time. Joining Dulles in opposing the chiefs’ requested extension, Wilson declared the issue was not important
enough to waste energy and time that might be more usefully spent on other matters. However, the president hedged on the question and suggested that Dulles, while not pressing for an extension, should understand the value for the United States if the period for withdrawal could be extended to six months.33

Nor did the Joint Chiefs receive support for their position from Ambassador Thompson in Vienna or the U.S. commander in Austria, General Arnold, who pointed out that an extension would have “little if any military value and would have extremely adverse political effects if we were obliged to advocate such delay.” Unless he was instructed otherwise, Thompson did not plan to raise this point in the ambassadors’ conference.34

By 7 May most of the issues, except for the article dealing with economic reparations, were buttoned up. The president recognized the dilemma that faced the United States. At this late stage, it would be difficult to refuse to sign the treaty, but if the reparations article remained unrevised, the Soviets would gain a hold on the Austrian economy. It seemed to Wilson that the Soviets wanted to negotiate bilaterally with the Austrians regarding oil fields and Danube shipping. Eisenhower thought the Soviets wanted to provide themselves an excuse to move into Austria at some later time.35 Eventually the Soviet Union gave way on the article and also agreed to drop from the preamble to the treaty reference to Austria’s war guilt in World War II. Dulles and the other foreign ministers signed the treaty in Vienna on 15 May 1955. In the meantime, the Soviet Union and seven East European nations had signed a treaty of “friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance” at Warsaw on 14 May. At least at the inception the Warsaw Pact was probably intended less to hasten the already well-advanced integration of Soviet and East European military forces than to serve as a symbolic buffer between the Soviet Union and West Germany—recently admitted into NATO—and to legitimize the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania that should have been withdrawn after the Austrian state treaty.36

The conclusion of the Austrian state treaty forced a decision on where U.S. forces were to be redeployed during the three-month period allowed. Arguments similar to those made the previous year regarding the redeployment of the Trieste garrison were resurrected—bringing the forces home to the United States might be construed in Western Europe as evidence of a U.S. intent to reduce its commitment to Europe or as evidence of a U.S. belief that world tensions had diminished.37

The Joint Chiefs recommended that the forces be redeployed to northeast Italy, reorganized as a special weapons support force with atomic capability, and designated United States Army, Italy (USARIT). The chiefs
emphasized that Western forces in Austria, along with Italian and Yugoslav national forces, had always had an extremely marginal capability to hold NATO's southern flank, especially in light of Yugoslavia's reluctance to coordinate military planning with the West. Therefore, the neutralization of Austria and the withdrawal of the occupation forces, along with Yugoslavia's tendency toward neutrality and possible rapprochement with the Soviet bloc, further weakened what was already a less than satisfactory situation. Under the circumstances, the chiefs were worried that the area around Villach, Austria, and the Ljubljana Gap might become an undefended avenue of approach to northeast Italy. Unlike the discussion of redeployment of the Trieste forces the previous year, this time Secretary Wilson supported the chiefs in their recommendation to keep the forces in Europe. 38

Italian military authorities keenly favored the redeployment, but wanted it to be "dressed up" as much as possible as a NATO requirement. The U.S. embassy in Rome thought redeployment would manifest U.S. interest in Italy's defense, reinforce pro-NATO feeling, and help the government in its struggle against the Communists. The Italians were worried, however, that the proposed name—USARIT—connoted an army of occupation. General Gruenther therefore suggested Southern Europe Task Force (SETAF), which was accepted. By 22 October 1955, all foreign forces had completed their evacuation from Austria. SETAF, activated three days later, set up headquarters at Verona with the majority of its combat troops stationed at Vicenza. 39

Yugoslavia: A Partial Success

The Eisenhower administration experienced great difficulty in continuing the policy, inaugurated by the Truman administration, to provide military and economic assistance to Yugoslavia to safeguard its independence following the 1948 rift with the Soviet Union, a policy dubbed "keeping Tito afloat." The cornerstone of U.S. military support was a Mutual Defense Assistance program set up under a 1951 bilateral agreement, though Western policymakers hoped for an eventual Yugoslav connection to, if not membership in, NATO. Tripartite (U.S.-U.K.-France) talks with Yugoslavia held in Belgrade in November 1952 and in Washington in August 1953 aimed to integrate Yugoslav defense planning more closely with those of the three Western countries—and ultimately with NATO regarding defense of the southern flank. 40

Establishment of a regional military alliance (the Balkan Pact) between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey in August 1954 and settlement of the
Trieste dispute that October seemingly cleared the way for Yugoslavia's closer military association with the West. In fact, the ensuing relationship with the United States saw a weakening of links with the West. Growing disenchantment with Yugoslav behavior prompted the Department of Defense and some State Department officials, such as Ambassador to Yugoslavia James Riddleberger, to advocate curtailment of military assistance. Sentiment in Congress also supported a tougher stance. But Dulles and others at State, hopeful of the disruptive effect of Yugoslav independence on the Soviet bloc and fearful that a tough policy might drive the Yugoslavs back into Moscow's arms, managed to keep the military assistance program alive.

Following the Trieste accord, differences quickly emerged between Defense and State on timing and tactics in dealing with the Yugoslavs. Defense wanted to avoid forcing the issue of closer collaboration with the West; State favored an early meeting between Admiral William Fechteler, commander in chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and military representatives from the Balkan Pact countries and Italy to explore operational problems of mutual interest. 41

The Defense approach won out. An October 1954 meeting in Washington between Fechteler, Riddleberger, Vice Admiral Davis of ISA, and Army and Joint Staff representatives maintained that no matter how desirable military cooperation was among Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, it "should not be pushed unduly." They recommended first developing low-level relations between Italian and Yugoslav military officers before attempting a more formal arrangement. Eisenhower endorsed this approach, suggesting that a mutually friendly feeling between NATO and Yugoslav personnel might be promoted by allowing the Yugoslavs to see routine NATO equipment and military formations, without divulging nuclear or strategic information. 42

That fall, as the United States and Great Britain were successfully brokering an agreement on Trieste, the Soviet Union made overtures to Yugoslavia to mend the rift in their relations. The Yugoslavs expressed cautious interest in a "normalization" process, and for the next several years, as Soviet-Yugoslav relations gradually improved, Yugoslav enthusiasm for a military connection with the West waned. The first manifestation of this reluctance occurred in November 1954 when Tito told Riddleberger that Yugoslavia did not want any formal connection between the Balkan Pact and NATO, but he would be willing to discuss with his military leaders the possibility of "informal liaison arrangements." He feared that a formal link would hinder Yugoslavia's long-term policy of exercising a nationalist influence on the satellite nations in Eastern Europe. 43
What raised additional concerns in Washington were the day-to-day difficulties in administering the military aid program, especially Yugoslav unwillingness to allow expansion of the American Military Assistance Staff (AMAS) in Belgrade and to permit inspections by U.S. officers of the units employing the military equipment furnished them. Given the lack of cooperation, Admiral Radford found it difficult to justify a program whose legislative basis required cooperation on defense matters from the recipient country. The Joint Chiefs felt that, pending clarification of Tito's attitude, the United States should grant no new assistance and should thoroughly review the program. "It was a simple fact," Radford observed, "that Tito had not lived up to his commitments to the United States." Eisenhower wanted to use the supply of ammunition and spare parts as leverage on countries, like Yugoslavia, whose "essential loyalty to us was questionable." By regulating the flow of these two items the United States generally could control the situation. "If Tito was proposing to sit back and blackmail the United States," the president declared, "we should play a very cagy game."^44

When Riddleberger met Tito again in April 1955, the ambassador warned that a number of urgent questions regarding military assistance would have to be resolved or the United States would suspend military shipments. Although Tito declared that Yugoslavia remained committed to friendly relations with the United States, he nevertheless emphasized that a fundamental element of Yugoslav foreign policy was non-membership in any bloc. Riddleberger, moderately hopeful that Tito's proposal for talks with the Western allies to discuss mutual problems might prove fruitful, postponed recommending any large-scale suspension of equipment deliveries.^45

Foreign Minister Popovic's unyielding responses to the issues Riddleberger had raised with Tito, including Popovic's firm rejection of any Yugoslav connection with NATO, caused Riddleberger and AMAS Chief Maj. Gen. Peter Hains to recommend to Washington the complete and immediate suspension of military aid. In Paris General Gruenther and the Defense representative to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas, Wendell Anderson, vigorously disagreed, questioning the effect such a drastic step would have on possibly linking Yugoslavia more closely to Western defensive efforts. Because of overriding political considerations, the Yugoslav military assistance program from its inception, Gruenther and Anderson pointed out, had been treated as an exception to standard procedures. It had always benefited from looser interpretations of legislation, programming criteria, and procurement activities.^46

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Hensel replied sharply to Anderson, stating that Yugoslav conduct violated both
the Mutual Security Act provisions and the 1951 bilateral agreement, violations that a Senate committee had already begun looking into. Hensel did not understand how such abuses could be overlooked “simply because Tito very conveniently for his position will negotiate only when he is being stroked and placated.” Advocating that the suspension be carried out politely but as firmly as possible, Hensel also asked how, if Tito was not honoring the provisions of the bilateral agreement, he could be expected to adhere to any possible future agreement regarding Yugoslavia’s association with NATO.47

The American deliberations were complicated by the Yugoslav government’s announcement that a high-level Soviet delegation, including Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, would visit Yugoslavia in late May 1955. Wanting to avoid giving the Yugoslavs the impression that the suspension of military deliveries was the result of the Soviet visit, State requested—and Defense concurred—that the suspension should be accomplished in a way that the Yugoslavs would be unlikely to detect it prior to the conclusion of their talks with the Soviets. To conceal what was happening required some obfuscation. A Yugoslav official questioned General Hains whether a delay in an ammunition shipment had been due to U.S. displeasure over the Soviet visit. Hains denied this and suggested the holdup might have resulted from a periodic review of the program, routine adjustments, or perhaps confusion on the part of shipping agents, explanations that seemingly satisfied his inquirer.48

Although the suspension was effectively hidden, State became worried that possible Yugoslav awareness that shipments had been held up might damage prospects for the conference scheduled with the Western ambassadors in Belgrade at the end of June. State therefore asked Defense to restore “the appearance of an uninterrupted flow of aid.” Defense agreed that for a few months, until the results of the conference were known and the National Security Council could undertake a thorough policy review, it would resume deliveries of only the least sensitive categories of equipment, such as ammunition and spare parts.49

The ambassadorial conference held 23-27 June proved disappointing, especially regarding future military coordination. The Yugoslav representatives continued to profess a desire for Western military assistance, pointing out that their cooperation with the Balkan Pact allies and other Western powers aligned their interests with those of the West in defense matters. Yet they ruled out new ties to NATO or other countries. Nor would they agree to an overall review of Yugoslav military planning, only to hold another conference, perhaps at a high level, to plan for the use of equipment already received. The State Department felt that the
Yugoslavs now considered an attack from the Soviet bloc very unlikely and were accordingly in an excellent bargaining position where they could play off East and West against one another.  

A meeting between Hains and Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff Vuckovic on 9 July produced no significant softening in the Yugoslav position. Hains reported that the Yugoslavs were treating each of the three U.S. service aid programs separately for their own purposes, cooperating more with the Air Force than with the Army and Navy, because much of its equipment was yet to be delivered. He foresaw no improvement until a new agreement was negotiated spelling out in detail the responsibilities and functions of AMAS in implementing the program. Riddleberger and Hains were now convinced that the Yugoslav government planned "to employ delaying tactics so long as equipment deliveries continue." To induce Yugoslav cooperation, the ambassador recommended "a well-controlled and planned delay" in delivery of equipment, focusing on the air program, where the most "leverage" remained. He called for an early decision on the recommendation, since the initial delivery of spare parts was scheduled for that fall. "If, because of overriding political considerations, deliveries must continue, we should recommend that work be initiated upon a reduced program which could be adapted to political developments." OSD, based on further recommendations from AMAS and CINCEUR, decided to implement a plan to delay delivery of aircraft, spare parts, and ground handling equipment (except for training aircraft) at least until April 1956. The delaying policy was not to be divulged to the Yugoslavs, and explanations for specific delays were to be made only when they could be related to technical reasons or a lack of information as to the items' intended use.

According to Dulles, Defense Department officials—specifically the Joint Chiefs of Staff—were curtailing military aid to Yugoslavia because the chances of linking Yugoslavia to NATO were now so slim. Since Dulles, however, saw little likelihood of Yugoslavia becoming subservient to the Soviet Union, he thought the United States "could afford quietly to countenance" the prospect of Tito as the head of a bloc of independent, neutralist Communist countries, a role Tito seemingly envisaged for himself. To ease the strained relations Dulles suggested the president send a special emissary to Belgrade, perhaps Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy. General J. Lawton Collins had been mentioned as a possibility, but Dulles preferred Murphy because of "the delicate political nature of the task," a preference with which the president strongly agreed.

In preparing for the visit Murphy expressed concern that the embassy's pressure tactics of cutting back on military assistance, as well
as avoiding discussion with the Yugoslavs regarding the economic aid package for FY 1956 and other matters, might, "if carried too far," be "self-defeating." These tactics, he feared, tended "to push Yugoslavia into the waiting arms of the Soviet orbit." Murphy worked out a negotiating strategy, approved in principle by Hensel's successor as assistant secretary of defense (ISA), Gordon Gray. In accordance with the president's and the secretary of state's emphasis on political factors, Murphy planned to "retreat from the Embassy position which expects the Yugoslavs to adhere to standards applied in NATO countries, but which they feel to be incompatible with their non-bloc position." He would mention, but not stress, the desirability of joint planning to meet the contingency of a Soviet-bloc attack, but would insist on a program review that would divulge basic Yugoslav plans and estimates. What was needed was a general understanding to reduce the remaining deliveries for Yugoslav ground forces. If the Yugoslavs made significant concessions regarding military cooperation with AMAS, Murphy would play the "trump U.S. card," a promise to resume delivery of F-84G and F-86E jet aircraft but at a somewhat reduced rate.53

During Murphy's visit at the end of September 1955, Tito and other Yugoslav officials expressed a willingness to accommodate the United States on the contentious military issues, which Murphy felt substantially removed the difficulties that had led to the suspension of deliveries. As a result he recommended the resumption of deliveries, including release of spare parts and ground support equipment by approximately 1 December and delivery of F-86E aircraft two to three months later. Murphy proposed a "stretch-out" of deliveries on a schedule more closely geared to political considerations. To bring about major economies, he advocated a thorough program review to eliminate expensive items, perhaps saving as much as $200 million of the $400 million left in the program. He felt that prior to the recent suspension, the rapid pace of deliveries where the United States was providing five or six thousand tons a month made sense from the technical military standpoint but was "excessive" from the political standpoint. For the Yugoslavs "this rapid delivery rate became a minimum." Accepting Murphy's proposals, Riddleberger, Hains, SACEUR, and DoD agreed to the resumption of military deliveries.54

Defense and State also agreed, for the time being, not to urge the Yugoslavs to coordinate their military planning with the West. That coordination no longer seemed crucial. In response to a request from ISA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a military reevaluation of Yugoslavia's strategic importance under three different assumptions: (1) a pro-Western Yugoslavia aligned with the West including effective coordination of
defense planning, (2) a pro-Soviet Yugoslavia in which Yugoslavia would return to the Soviet bloc, and (3) a flexible position, in which Yugoslavia would achieve benefits from both blocs with minimum commitments to either. The chiefs agreed with a recent National Intelligence Estimate that neither of the first two assumptions was likely during the next several years, and that the third position, which Yugoslavia had adopted, would continue so long as Tito lived. The minimum requirements for military cooperation with Yugoslavia, though less than desirable, would be fulfilled as long as Yugoslavia maintained its flexible policy, showed a determination to defend itself against aggression, continued to support the Balkan Pact, and did not give "transit rights of any kind, under any circumstances, to Soviet Bloc forces."

At an NSC meeting on 22 December 1955, during discussion of a revised policy paper on Yugoslavia that contained many splits in recommended courses of action, Dulles expressed doubt as to whether State and Defense differed all that much in their views. He indicated, for example, that State agreed with Defense that aid to Yugoslavia should be reduced, but believed that "political factors ought to be decisive in determining the rate of the slow-down." Recalling that the joint statement he and Tito had issued at the end of his November visit to Yugoslavia "had created a terrific stir in the satellite world," Dulles emphasized that Tito was "our best lever for freeing the satellites."

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson agreed that differences between the two departments were "more a matter of degree and phraseology than of solid substance." He noted, however, that the United States over the next four years was scheduled to provide Yugoslavia about $500 million in military assistance, including some 100 jet aircraft. Since military assistance to Turkey and Pakistan was taking on added importance, Robertson believed it might be "desirable to make our aid to Tito come a little bit harder." Noting that the crux of the problem was Tito's intentions, President Eisenhower "suggested that we should approach the situation cautiously, but give no hint that we are reneging on our earlier promises to provide Yugoslavia with assistance." Although the flow of aid could be cut back a little, the president agreed with Dulles's view that the main considerations were political, not military.

The draft policy paper, sent back to the Planning Board for rewriting, was approved by the council on 18 January 1956 as NSC 5601. The paper concluded that the "original limited objective of keeping Yugoslavia independent of the Soviet bloc has been well served by timely aid." But the "more far-reaching objective of tying Yugoslavia into the Western system and ensuring its effective contribution to free world power in case of war in Europe, chiefly through a larger-scale military aid
program and the growth of U.S. and Western influence, has not been attained and there is no sound indication that it is attainable." As for the military aid program, the paper recommended that the present program be reviewed and revised along more austere lines "taking into account U.S. willingness to support minimal military requirements for maintaining Yugoslav independence outside the Soviet bloc, and the degree of Yugoslavia's cooperation." The revised program should be completed, with the major items delivered in a way to assure Yugoslav compliance with the agreements and to stretch out the schedule; the training programs and provision of spare parts, ammunition, and other items should be continued in a minimal way in order to keep equipment delivered in reasonably good condition; and any further military aid programming should be conditional on how well Yugoslavia informed the United States regarding its defense planning or took part in joint NATO defense planning. The report pointedly recognized that "political objectives justify the provision of military assistance that would not be justifiable on strictly military considerations." 

Deliveries were resumed and a review completed of what, if any, of the undelivered portion of the program could be reduced without affecting overall relations or lowering to an unacceptable level Yugoslav cooperation with the United States. No reductions were made in the Army and Navy programs, where most of the programmed equipment had already been delivered and where the undelivered portion was deemed necessary for a balanced program. However, the Air Force program was reduced by some $7 million, primarily in communications equipment intended for Yugoslav Air Force coordination with NATO air forces, an event now considered unlikely. No reduction was planned in the delivery of F-86E and F-84G aircraft.

By the summer of 1956 doubts were again surfacing in Congress about the wisdom of continuing the military assistance program, feelings shared to some degree in OSD. At an Armed Forces Policy Council meeting in June, when Secretary Wilson advised caution in the military assistance program because of the scarcity of MDAP funds and the inability to "buy friends" with money, Assistant Secretary Gray remarked that for political reasons aid was continuing to Yugoslavia and "we do not know whether we have poured some billion dollars down the drain." 

In the Senate, Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.) introduced a bill to terminate immediately U.S. military assistance to Yugoslavia. Especially upset at Tito's public remarks about Soviet-Yugoslav solidarity during a recent visit to Moscow, McCarthy criticized the policy "of building up the war machine of the avowed enemies of our way of life." Dulles privately reassured congressional leaders that Yugoslavia was "the main card we
are trying to play in breaking the satellites loose from Russia." It was crucial not to do anything to push Tito back into Russia's arms and for this reason it was important that "Tito gets his military equipment from us rather than from Russia." Dulles stressed how NATO needed "a band of independent countries (even Tito's) between NATO and Russia." If "Tito's actions ceased to be consonant with our program," Dulles promised that military assistance would be immediately terminated.60

The Yugoslav aid program survived the 1956 congressional attacks. Its termination came not at the instigation of the United States but at the request in November 1957 of the Yugoslav government. The following month the United States ceased all shipments and in March 1958 withdrew its military mission from Belgrade. While the National Security Council continued to believe that the long-term objective of using aid to link Yugoslavia militarily with the West and ensure "its effective contribution to Free World power in case of war in Europe" had not been achieved, the more modest objective of keeping Yugoslavia independent of the Soviet bloc had been "well served."61

By contributing to the viability of Yugoslav independence, the United States helped achieve yet another objective. Dulles's belief that the spirit behind Yugoslavia's national communism would spread to the Soviet satellites was borne out in 1956. Internal ferment in Poland and Hungary, encouraged by Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin, helped touch off demonstrations in Poznan in June, the defiance of the Kremlin that fall by Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, and the tragic Hungarian revolt. Whether Yugoslavia was a conscious model in these countries is debatable, but the 1956 fissures grew out of the same spirit of resistance to Soviet domination that Tito had displayed.62 The cracks that Dulles had hoped for in the Iron Curtain, however, would take decades to widen and become permanent.

NATO's Adoption of MC 48

The preparatory work on a new NATO strategy paper under way in the first half of 1954* came to fruition that fall. At a meeting with General Gruenther in October, Defense and State Department representatives agreed that the United States should seek to establish a nuclear capability in NATO by pushing for approval at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December of a new policy embodying the concepts in the

* See Chapter XXV.
Standing Group paper 241/3. Recognizing the extreme delicacy of the subject, they decided not to pressure the allies to accept it. Regarding the actual use of nuclear weapons, the Joint Chiefs favored obtaining prior agreements with the allies. The State Department, with backing from both Gruenther and Secretary Wilson, thought it better to have less formal arrangements and ones made gradually rather than immediately and in a comprehensive manner. In early November Wilson and Dulles jointly submitted a memorandum to the president, which he approved, recommending acceptance of the new strategy paper and stressing how essential it was for the allies to prepare public opinion in their countries on NATO’s need for a nuclear capability. State particularly felt that moving “too quickly in this highly sensitive area may have adverse effects on the entire NATO structure.” The best way, in State’s view, to accomplish the objective of utilizing nuclear weapons from NATO bases was “to ease into a gradual phasing in of these weapons” to NATO forces.

Despite the concerns, acceptance of NATO’s new strategy came quickly and rather easily. On 22 November NATO’s Military Committee approved a further redraft of the Standing Group paper and designated it MC 48, “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years.” Intended for submission to the council at its meeting the next month, it reflected British and French revisions. In contrast to previous strategy papers that made only veiled references to nuclear weapons, MC 48 explicitly discussed their use. For the “foreseeable future,” it noted, “superiority in atomic weapons and the capability to deliver them will be the most important factor in a major war.” In addition to employing nuclear weapons for a retaliatory strike, MC 48 assumed that NATO would use atomic and thermonuclear weapons “in defense from the outset.”

Because the paper raised the question of where authority rested to use atomic weapons defensively, Dulles went to Paris a day earlier to discuss the issue with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Canadian Secretary for External Affairs Lester Pearson. The three agreed on a formula embracing MC 48 as the basis for military planning and preparations but stipulating that the civilian leaders of the NATO governments were not to delegate their authority to invoke the atomic defense. The formula was cleared with both Admiral Radford and General Gruenther and was subsequently approved by French Premier Pierre Mendes-France. MC 48 produced virtually no discussion or debate and was unanimously approved by the council on 17 December. The final communiqué noted that, regarding the use of nuclear weapons, the governments were not delegating the responsibility to NATO “to make decisions for putting plans into action.” Pearson and Dulles agreed the entire question was somewhat
artificial, since it involved "constitutional and political problems which are virtually impossible of solution in the abstract but which are as a rule determined without difficulty by events themselves." 

At the last minute Secretary Wilson, who had planned to attend the meeting and after the formal sessions discuss with General Gruenther cost-cutting measures, such as reducing personnel at headquarters units in Europe, cancelled the trip because of his wife's hospitalization. Deputy Secretary Anderson went to Paris in Wilson's place and delivered an address on 17 December for the secretary. Alluding to the concepts in MC 48, Anderson indicated that the atomic deterrent "does not lessen the measure in which we must provide current military strength ready for instant employment if necessary, nor does it permit any of us to minimize the future efforts which must be undertaken for that purpose." The anticipated West German membership in NATO and resulting defense contribution provided "no justification for reductions in the overall NATO force goals for 1956 below those which were foreseen in the 1953 Annual Review."

As with previous strategy papers, NATO members found it easier to approve MC 48 and a follow-up paper, MC 48/1, than to carry out their recommendations. At a NATO defense ministers meeting in Paris in October 1955, some ministers indicated for the first time their awareness that implementing the two papers—with their emphasis on a forward defense of the Rhine as far east as possible, a forward strategy at sea, and a workable air defense system—would require greater national expenditures than they had planned or anticipated. They expressed general concern about the magnitude of the preliminary estimate to upgrade NATO's infrastructure over three years. Some argued that ways had to be found to eliminate parts of their defense programs to free up funds to carry out the new NATO strategy and that a thorough re-examination be conducted of force goals and priorities. Certain European nations indicated they might not meet their 1956 force goals and, in light of the new emphasis on atomic weapons, questioned the need for increasing conventional forces. While all members favored equipping their forces with new weapons, some had no plans for maintaining and replacing equipment already in place. What prompted much discussion was Germany's proposal initially to contribute DM 9 billion, a little over $2 billion, to meet overall NATO costs. Secretary Wilson, along with his British counterpart, contended that the amount should be much higher—DM 13 to 15 billion.

The budgetary pressures confronting NATO members manifested themselves dramatically in the spring of 1956 when Italian Chief of Staff
General Mancinelli informed Radford that the Italian government would have to reduce its force levels unless the United States could provide some $250 million in support. Radford replied that the United States would give new weapons to the Italian Army so long as Italy itself furnished the necessary spare parts, which Mancinelli indicated Italy could not do. The JCS chairman thought Mancinelli's gambit amounted to blackmail, a tactic Secretary of Treasury Humphrey thought would become more widespread. The United States would increasingly be faced, he said, with "the proposition that either we help support the armed forces of our allies or else they would quit being allies."69

As a whole NATO continued to be plagued by shortfalls in reaching manpower goals. At the December 1954 meeting, the council approved lower goals for the next three years, including significantly lower ones for 1955 than those adopted the previous December. The new Annual Review conducted in 1955 brought no improvement. Even the United States experienced serious difficulty in meeting its goals. It proposed shortfalls in naval and amphibious forces and masked a shortfall in Army D+180 divisions by including five National Guard divisions in that total, with the explanation that they would require additional training to be fully combat-ready. Although some JCS members had wanted to report frankly that the United States would be five divisions short, Radford persuaded them that doing so would have an unacceptable effect on other NATO members who would view the statement as a lack of interest by the United States in meeting its force goals.70

Another problem was the unpreparedness of many NATO forces. Gruenther had reported at the end of 1954 that over one-third of NATO's M-day ground units and more than half the air force units were not fully ready for combat. In fact, although U.S. forces generally received high marks, the readiness of other members' forces assigned and earmarked for SACEUR was "significantly less" than it had been at the end of 1953. The drop in effectiveness raised doubts in ISA whether MC 48 could be implemented and, as a result, whether a forward strategy could be carried out. Recognizing that readiness improvement would require considerable time, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Admiral Davis suggested that the European governments might need promptly to be made aware of Gruenther's "indictment."71

The Department of State considered having Gruenther's effectiveness report discussed at the NATO Council meeting in Paris in May 1955, held primarily to welcome West Germany into NATO. In a personal message to Gruenther, Dulles acknowledged that the report raised serious problems and merited discussion at the ministerial level. But Dulles was unsure of the wisdom of "washing our dirty linen at the meeting
when probably the Germans will be present for the first time and when we want to strike a high note of optimism and success." He asked whether it might not be advisable to have the report discussed at a separate meeting of the defense ministers prior to the council meeting or to put off discussion until later in the year when perhaps exaggerated hopes of success at the Geneva summit meeting had dissipated. Gruenther agreed that it would be best to postpone discussion of the report.\textsuperscript{72}

A major reorientation of NATO strategy, MC 48 and MC 48/1 represented significant achievements, but their emphasis on nuclear weapons nourished the belief in many allied countries that conventional forces should be cut, especially in light of what seemed to be a reduced Soviet threat and the growing dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Facing up to difficult and potentially divisive questions, such as shortfalls in force goals, the unpreparedness of some forces, and the procedures whereby NATO would resort to nuclear warfare, was deferred in the interest of maintaining political cohesion, a goal that Dulles stressed and one which Wilson increasingly came to share.

\textit{Balancing Military and Political Options}

As the United States sought to strengthen the Western alliance, political and psychological factors became important, on some occasions even more than purely military considerations. This was reflected in the looser standards applied to the Yugoslav military assistance program, reluctance to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe for fear that it would signal the NATO allies that they could reduce their own force levels, and concerns that pressuring Adenauer too hard on the pace of German rearmament might contribute to the fall of his government.

Wilson and other OSD officials became increasingly sympathetic to the political ramifications delineated by Dulles usually with the backing of President Eisenhower. Not only did Eisenhower's military background allow him to challenge forcefully the views of the Joint Chiefs and his friend General Gruenther, but his World War II experience, as well as later service as SACEUR, lent particular weight to his views on European issues. Wilson's clashes with Dulles during the early months of the administration, often on Western European issues, became less frequent after 1954. OSD deferred to the secretary of state, often distancing itself from the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dulles and the Department of State, not the Department of Defense, were thus the primary architects of U.S. European security policy. Dulles's broader conception of the struggle with the Soviet Union over Europe
provided a more complex framework than simply maintaining or improving a military edge. Neutralism came to serve a helpful function. The Austrian state treaty represented not just the removal of a contentious diplomatic issue, but an opportunity, much as with Yugoslavia, to weaken the Soviet hold on the satellites to which Dulles thought the contagion of Austrian independence would spread. The Iron Curtain would disappear, he privately predicted after the signing of the treaty. In the future the sharp line between the Soviet bloc and the free world would be replaced by a fuzzy area.

Neutralism, however, was not an acceptable alternative for West Germany. Dulles accurately foresaw the long-range implications of the Federal Republic's integration with the West. As that integration proceeded, the Western powers nevertheless remained willing to discuss with the Soviet Union the possible reunification of Germany and the eventual withdrawal of occupation forces under an overall European security plan. The reason for Soviet unwillingness to accept the Western proposals, which Soviet representatives had not expressed openly at the Geneva summit meeting in the summer of 1955 but which, according to Dulles, they had privately intimated, was that unification would probably mean the end of the East German regime. "The liquidation of the German Democratic Republic," Dulles believed, "coming on the heels of what had happened in Austria and the new relationship between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, would gravely disturb Soviet control over the satellites." Moreover, he indicated, the Soviets might well ask "why they should be expected to give up East Germany if in doing so an anti-Communist alliance would be strengthened, and the NATO forward strategy brought closer to the borders of the Soviet Union itself."
In the waning weeks of 1955 an apparent warming trend in the cold war abruptly turned chillier. The Soviets became intransigent at Geneva, pursued aggressive diplomacy in the Middle East, and pushed competitive aid and trade programs in the Third World generally, most notably an arms-for-cotton barter with Egypt. Late in November they staged another spectacular, detonating a large thermonuclear device (at least two to four megatons) at a very high altitude, a feat not yet achieved by the Americans or the British.1

On the domestic scene, a canvass of views in both houses of Congress at the end of November 1955 indicated that the administration could expect more pressure from the Democrats to increase military spending. The president took heed. On 13 December he told the congressional leaders of both parties that he would allow a $700 million increase in military spending over the current year's level. Republicans were pleased; some Democrats suspected they had been outmaneuvered, but most of them went along. House Speaker Sam Rayburn, however, thought the situation called for more foreign aid and hinted that the Democrats might attempt to increase the military budget. Still, an informal estimate predicted that 90 percent of congressional Democrats would support the president's revised Defense Department budget "pretty much down the line."2

"Short of war," Eisenhower asserted in his State of the Union address on 5 January 1956, "we have never had military strength better adapted to our needs with improved readiness for emergency use." Communist tactics, formerly characterized by violence and threats of violence, now relied, he said, more on "division, enticement and duplicity," posing a "dangerous though less obvious threat." The most significant feature of
the address's brief remarks on national security was the virtual omission of the concept of threat, a staple of its predecessors. At a time when service leaders and their media partisans were trying to arouse the public to a sense of imminent peril, the president called for measured, just-enough defense. He also asked for support of legislation to provide better medical care for military dependents and more equitable survivors' benefits.³

The same upbeat, non-provocative tone reappeared in the budget message on 16 January, emphasizing a "respectable posture of defense" as the first charge on the budget. The hoped-for budget surplus was slim—only $400 million—although double the one now expected for the current fiscal year. Estimated expenditures in FY 1956, $64.3 billion, represented the third successive annual reduction in government spending. In FY 1957 spending was expected to rise again, about $1.6 billion above the FY 1956 level.⁴

Defense expenditure still dominated the budget, as it had since the beginning of the Korean War. What the president now called "protection" (the so-called "major national security" category in previous budgets) accounted for much the largest slice of the budget pie—$42.4 billion or 64 percent of the whole (about the same as in FY 1956). This included DoD’s military functions, mutual security, atomic energy, stockpiling, defense production expansion, civil defense, selective service, and foreign information activities (which the president wanted to increase). DoD budget expenditures accounted for $35.5 billion, almost 84 percent of the "protection" package. Modernization helped account for about $1 billion of the increased spending and about $1.8 billion of the increase in NOA. It emphasized "air-atomic power, guided missiles, research and development, continental defense, and the re-equipping of our forces with new types of weapons." For conventional weapons and stockpiling, outlays would be decreased. Conventional hardware would be cut back sharply, chiefly affecting the Army, and spending for guided missiles (including ICBMs and IRBMs) would rise to the highest level ever.⁵

Navy fleet modernization perhaps best exemplified the new emphasis. Faced with block obsolescence in a fleet built largely during World War II, the Navy asked for authorization in FY 1957 of a sixth Forrestal carrier, additional guided missile frigates and destroyers, nuclear-powered submarines, and an experimental nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser. Work on nuclear power plants would go forward and an extensive conversion effort would arm ships in the fleet with guided missiles and additional atomic weapons and otherwise modernize still serviceable older ships. For the Air Force accelerated production of B-52s...
and supersonic interceptors would continue. Oddly, perhaps ominously from an Army point of view, the president said nothing specific about Army weapons or weapons development.\(^6\) And somewhere in the fine print of the published budget document, sharp-eyed reporters could find a line-item of $282.47 million for new atomic weapons and their storage and custody, a slight increase over FY 1956 expenditures.\(^7\)

Overall, requested new obligatory authority for FY 1957 ($34.9 billion from Congress, plus $785 million from revolving funds) was little more than the amount ($35.5 billion) DoD planned to spend. But expenditures would include many billions of unobligated funds carried over from prior appropriations. The Army, for example, proposed to allot $1.3 billion of unspent Korean War funds for procurement, and for the third successive year it requested no new procurement money at all. Thus the requested size of DoD new money—$1.76 billion above the FY 1956 request—indicated that spending in the years beyond FY 1957 would increase. The amounts of requested NOA and planned spending pointed to increases in procurement for naval shipbuilding and especially for guided missiles for all the services.\(^8\)

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Deduct applicable receipts:
Defense production expansion               -270         -304

Net budget expenditures                    39,467        40,370

The Air Force's Preemptive Strike

The president's submission of the budget to Congress was preceded by a blare of publicity from the press, fed by undisclosed sources in the Air Force, continuing that service's ongoing campaign against budgetary constraints on airpower. General Twining had supposedly said that the Air Force "absolutely" required from 140 to 150 wings, instead of 137, whereas with current funding it could barely maintain 50 wings "of truly modern aircraft in top operational shape." He had no intention of going public "on his own initiative," but he would have to speak his mind if quizzed by a congressional committee. Without at least $1.5 billion more, both Twining and Secretary Quarles had asserted, only a weak 137-wing force could be produced by July—undermanned, undertrained, underequipped. The president's $700 million add-on a few days later did not pacify the malcontents.9

The attack on the DoD budget intensified in the new year. On 4 January Sen. Henry Jackson told reporters that the Russians might have already achieved a 1,500-mile nuclear missile, giving them striking access to "virtually all" SAC bases.10 The Alsops, presumably with help from their Air Force sources, promptly picked up the ball from Jackson, reporting major advances by the Soviets in IRBMs that could soon threaten SAC European bases. Moreover, they were on their way to building the ICBM. Most of this was apparently a product of speculative interpretation of limited intelligence spiced by imagination. In reality the Soviets had successfully tested a 600-n.m. missile—the SS-3 IRBM.11

In all this angry chorus, one calm voice could be heard. On the opening day of the House budget hearings, American Aviation Daily came out with what it called a "realistic appraisal of the nation's efforts to expand its airpower." The Air Force, it pointed out, was getting a lot of new money: 44 percent of the total NOA requested. Air Force and Navy together would get $7.5 billion to buy new aircraft and missiles. Aircraft for the 137-wing force were assured by orders already placed, regardless of future appropriations, and the 936,000 military personnel authorized would include the pilots and crews needed to man them.12

Alone among the services, the Air Force conducted a systematic publicity campaign against the president's FY 1957 budget during the six weeks or so before the House hearings began. Like the 1955 campaign, this media blitz used information and ideas supplied by Air Force officials and staff and employed the standard techniques of citing "informed sources" and unnamed "officials." Overt and direct criticism of the budget and the policies it reflected came in the main from known partisan purveyors of "opinion" (like the Alsops). General Twining skated dangerously
close to the edge, obviously moved by strong conviction. Twining’s unequivocal assertion, before the congressional hearings even began, that he regarded the USAF budget as “tight” and would support it only with the reservation that the next one must be larger may have been more effective than a dozen columns by the Alsops.

Land and Sea

In the other services, the top leadership, without shunning publicity, also avoided direct criticism of their budgets. Besides standard descriptive and image-improving publicity about new weaponry and mission-related activities (such as maneuvers), their staffs engaged in normal competitive propaganda, pitting one service’s interests or point of view against another’s, often with budgetary implications. During Army-Air Force maneuvers (Sage Brush in Louisiana in December, for example) the Army operated a provisional reconnaissance unit, known as “SkyCav,” equipped with helicopters and small fixed-wing aircraft, which made spectacularly successful landings behind “enemy” lines. To the Air Force, of course, SkyCav looked like a foot-in-the-door move to give the Army its own air force to provide all the tactical air support for ground forces.

General Taylor similarly exploited his prized IRBM development work for its between-the-lines implication that the Army’s role was expanding with the revolution in warfare and would require larger budgets in future. As for the FY 1957 budget, he made it reasonably clear that the administration had little to fear from him. The Defense program, he argued, should be designed for the long haul; it must also provide for “the increasing danger of so-called small wars, which may erode the borders of the free world.” A general nuclear war was highly unlikely, but “the attractiveness of undefended assets and resources offers an inducement to small-scale aggression which potentially may be as dangerous as the big war itself.” In effect, Taylor was hinting (as General Twining would say explicitly in January) that, while he would not attack the FY 1957 budget, larger costs loomed beyond. Nevertheless, the Army received excellent publicity, independently of its official spokesmen.

Surprisingly, the Navy and Marine Corps were inconspicuous almost to the point of invisibility in defense-oriented publicity during the weeks preceding the budget hearings. Among naval officials Admiral Burke showed the highest profile, urging the House Armed Services Committee in mid-January to approve quickly the $1.5 billion shipbuilding bill for FY 1957 (the committee quickly complied), and warning that the Soviet navy, with 400 submarines already afloat and 75-85 being built every
year, had become the second-ranking naval power in the world. The widely touted all-nuclear fleet, he pointed out, was not a realistic prospect; it would cost $2 billion a year and take 20 years to build, and conventional power would probably continue to be more efficient for certain types of warships. But he defended the planned nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser and nuclear power as the dominant form of propulsion for large ships and submarines in the future Navy. General Randolph Pate, Marine Corps commandant since the beginning of the year, attracted some press attention as a "new breed of leader," a reputed planner and administrator. But, from Secretary Thomas and Admiral Burke on down, no whisper of official criticism of the proposed budget came to the ears of reporters looking for a story.17

Ridgway's Cold Ashes

The remarks of Taylor, Burke, and Pate gave the administration welcome assurance of high-level support in the coming congressional battle. Less welcome was the publication by the Saturday Evening Post, at the end of January, of the first two installments of General Ridgway's memoirs, soon to be published in book form.* In the first, Ridgway recalled his "shock and surprise" over the president's statement in the 1954 State of the Union message that the FY 1955 defense budget reflected the unanimous recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. As a member of the JCS, he had "most emphatically" not concurred in the 1955 military program finally submitted to Congress. Ridgway had quickly learned that DoD decisions were based on "budgetary considerations . . . , on the advantage to be gained in domestic politics by a drastic reduction in military expenditures, rather than on clear-cut military needs." On occasion,

* Almost coinciding with the appearance of the Ridgway articles was the publication in Life magazine of an article (also damaging in its repercussions) by James Shepley, based on interviews with Secretary of State Dulles, purporting to show that on three occasions Dulles, with the full support of the president, had gone to the brink of war with one or the other (or both) of the leading Communist powers and faced them down by communicating the threat of U.S. military action (including, by implication, use of nuclear weapons) unless they yielded on the points at issue. The three occasions were the crisis precipitated in June 1953 by South Korean President Syngman Rhee's release of Communist prisoners who had refused repatriation; the Dien Bien Phu crisis in 1954; and the Formosa Strait crisis in the spring of 1955. In the article Dulles allegedly asserted, "You have to take chances for peace . . . . We walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action." The article caused an uproar in the press and Congress even greater than the publication of the Ridgway articles, and, while not directly related to the budget debate, was exploited by the Democratic opposition. See James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, 16 Jan 56.
moreover, it was made clear to him that he was not expected to give Secretary Wilson his "reasoned military judgment" on certain issues. Pressure to make him conform, Ridgway said, was "sometimes subtly, sometimes crudely, applied," and he told of one occasion when Wilson advised him that it "would not be good" to express views opposing those of the president, "a former soldier of wide experience," since to do so would "place me in the position of taking issue with my Commander in Chief." Despite his persistent opposition, DoD adopted policies that by the coming summer would reduce Army strength from 1.5 million, when he became chief of staff, to a little over 1 million, and its budget from $16.1 billion to $8.9 billion.

The first installment of the memoirs concluded with a summary of Ridgway's final report in the form of his retirement letter to the secretary of defense, in which he had warned that existing U.S. forces were "inadequate in strength and improperly proportioned" to fulfill numerous commitments to allies around the world. Ridgway noted with relish Wilson's unsuccessful attempt to suppress this letter by classifying it "confidential." 18

The administration's initial reaction to Ridgway's attack seemed confused and uncertain. In a news conference after the first memoir installment appeared, Secretary Wilson noted that it had been cleared for publication without change and confirmed that Ridgway had consistently fought for higher Army strength than the other chiefs favored or were finally approved. But he ducked questions about Ridgway's allegations of pressure to conform his views to an official party line, merely asserting that he never expected associates to "polish the apple" and seem to agree when they really did not. Wilson issued a statement later that he and Admiral Radford had believed at the time that Ridgway had gone along with the other chiefs in supporting the FY 1955 budget. 19 When questioned on 19 January, the president simply denied that Defense budget cuts had ever been politically motivated. On the matter of JCS unanimity on the FY 1955 DoD budget, he neatly passed the buck to Wilson and Radford, who, he pointed out, had cleared their portion of the State of the Union message for accuracy. 20

Serious analysis of Ridgway's charges soon followed. On the 22d the New York Times ran a thoughtful review by Hanson Baldwin, putting the charges in the context of the New Look. On the whole, he thought, Ridgway's charge that economic considerations had been paramount in determining military force levels, and that massive retaliation and air-nuclear power had been emphasized at the expense of manpower and conventional forces, was undeniable. Baldwin concluded: "If we are to prevent a nuclear war we must have the capability of fighting a non-nuclear
one. Our future military policy must be a blend of massive retaliation and graduated deterrence.\textsuperscript{21}

Ridgway may have expected, as many of his partisans surely did, that his media attack on the administration would reach an early climax in a triumphant and well-publicized appearance before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, followed by appearances before other committees as well. On 8 February 1956, some two weeks after the budget hearings began, Ridgway faced a mostly friendly audience in the House subcommittee, which had 9 Democrats among its 15 members. "We are not too interested in rehashing old controversies," Chairman George Mahon gently admonished him in his introduction. The general did not qualify as an expert on the FY 1957 budget and there was little he could say about it that he or others had not already said.

In his preliminary remarks Ridgway noted that the New Look that he and the other chiefs had approved in December 1953, including "preset manpower and dollar ceilings . . . qualified by a series of stated assumptions and conditions," pertained to FY 1957, not FY 1955. The chiefs had not recommended personnel ceilings for the latter year at any time during the last half of 1953. His basic objection was that the proposed Army personnel cuts—approximately one-third (500,000) over a period of two years—were "too drastic and too rapid," although the effects might not be fully apparent for years to come "until and unless that Army is thrown into the crisis of a great battle again." Ridgway favored an optimum size of the Army under current commitments of 1.3 million men with about 26 divisions, more airborne mobility, and a family of tactical nuclear weapons at the disposal of field commanders.\textsuperscript{22}

The Republican minority operated as a team, with assigned areas of interrogation. They treated the witness with scrupulous courtesy, but they also pressed each question relentlessly. As the day wore on, the Republicans' prosecutorial style of interrogation increasingly ruffled Ridgway's equanimity. He stubbornly defended his statement that as chief of staff he had often felt he "was being called upon to destroy, rather than to build," the Army. It accurately reflected his reaction to the prospect of being ordered to knock off a third of a force of 1.5 million over a period of 30 months.\textsuperscript{23}

Chairman Mahon's opening admonition that the committee did not want a rehash had in fact proved futile. Thanks to the Republicans' interrogation tactics "old controversies" had dominated the hearing after all. Mahon lamented at the end that "we have not developed more of your ideas . . . as to what we should do from here on out." All the Democrats got from his testimony that might prove politically useful were his views, now a little stale, on the New Look, past and future. On the
current budget review he had nothing to tell the committee that General Taylor had not already told them as persuasively and more authoritatively. The 8 February testimony was, in fact, Ridgway's swan song, ending his formal participation in the budget hearings and, indeed, in the larger national security debate. None of the predicted later committee appearances materialized. Ridgway passed into history.24

Taylor's Turn

If Ridgway failed to strike sparks with his performance before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, one reason undoubtedly was that he had been preceded the week before by General Taylor, a hard act to follow. Taylor, Secretary Brucker, and a large entourage of subordinates gave testimony on 1-3 February. Representative Sikes later pronounced the presentation the Army's best to date and better than any of the other departmental presentations he had heard.25

As spokesman for the underdog service, the chief of staff brought to the hearings an impressive persona. A facile speaker with a superior command of language, a linguist and an intellectual, Taylor was a persuasive, disarming advocate—as well as a soldier tested and proven in combat, leadership, and high command. Throughout more than two days of grueling, almost uninterrupted interrogation, he seemed brisk, buoyant, and affable, holding the attention of his auditors through sometimes lengthy expositions, all apparently without irritating anyone.26 He maintained his firm position on the adequacy of the Army's FY 1957 budget. This, in effect, was the bottom line, and, for the Republicans at least, the one that mattered most. Taylor would not challenge the budget now under review, publicly or off the record, thus aligning himself more or less with the other chiefs.27

Most of his prepared statement was a succinct analysis of the Army's role in the deterrence and war fighting missions of the armed forces—enunciating in the process the Army's new doctrine, soon to be known as "flexible response." Deterrence, he stressed, came first. All-out nuclear war, Taylor went on, was not the type of war most likely to occur, since the superpowers, as they approached nuclear parity, would make every effort to avoid it. The Communists would probably continue to try to extend their boundaries through subversion, guerrilla actions, coups d'état, small-scale wars, and "the ever-present threat of their large armies." Enemy land forces posed a serious threat, but he believed "that the United States and its allies have the capability, if they have the will, of producing ground forces able to counter the enemy divisions. There is no
reason to say that we are hopelessly outnumbered and that our defense on the ground must be obtained indirectly from atomic superiority in the air." Prompt and effective response to enemy probes was imperative to prevent "piecemeal loss of important areas to friends and allies." Any military action in the likely trouble spots around the world would be essentially land operations with very little use, if any, for weapons of mass destruction. Taylor summed up the Army's view of the basic priorities: first, a capability to deter general atomic war and also to deter, or quickly suppress, a small war. Only after allocating resources for these capabilities should the "residual" requirements for fighting a general war be met. 28

He expressed cautious optimism about the Army's capability to play its part in deterring and fighting wars. The quality of its forces was excellent. The field forces were multiplying their firepower with atomic weapons and would soon have longer-range ballistic missiles. Expansion of the reserves under the 1955 legislation was lagging, however, hampered by the absence of compulsion for participation and inequality of pay between the National Guard and Reserve. To Mahon's blunt question of whether his endorsement of the budget was a "forced attitude," Taylor replied: "I had my full day in court. I . . . consider the funds allocated marginally sufficient to maintain the Army I have described." 29

On the second day of his testimony Taylor dropped the other—i.e., manpower—shoe. To the question, what did he believe the "size and composition" of the Army should be if no budgetary restrictions were imposed, he later replied in writing that an "optimum" army, "disregarding all considerations except 'purely military,'" would be "perhaps on the order of magnitude of around 1.5 million men with an active combat force of about 28 divisions." He brushed off as unimportant his public "disagreement" with Ridgway's assertion that the Army was not large enough. Conditions, said Taylor, had "changed somewhat" since his predecessor retired, and "in general, on military subjects, General Ridgway and I think very much alike." 30

Taylor played down his differences with the Air Force over airlift, tactical aviation, and long-range missiles. His most unequivocal assertion of dissatisfaction concerned restrictions on the Army's use of ground-to-ground missiles beyond a 500-mile range. Asked what use the Army could have for an intermediate-range (1,500-mile) missile, he replied that the Army was not necessarily thinking of the extreme range: perhaps only a few hundred miles, but from a launching site "safely" far to the rear. 31

Taylor's—and the Army's—most fundamental dissent from Air Force and, indeed, from administration policy, was his view that the armed forces as a whole must have a balanced dual atomic and conventional
capability to fight any kind of war. Taylor inherited Ridgway's views on this point. Small atomic weapons, he argued in a brief exchange with Sikes, had of course brought about important changes, but conventional weapons would remain a fundamental part of the Army's arsenal. To the Democrats on the subcommittee the Army's top spokesman had proved disappointing on one count; he provided them little or no ammunition for attacking the administration's FY 1957 budget. The legislators' attention, in any case, focused mainly on the airpower issue, which clearly was becoming the principal target of the budget debate.

Wilson and Radford for the Defense

"Nothing has occurred in the international situation during the past year," Wilson told the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee during the first hearing on 24 January, that "would indicate the necessity for any major change [in the new Defense budget]," and he went on to recite a list of his department's recent achievements, starting with the completion of the New Look manpower cutback, which he called a "personnel adjustment." His audience, tuned to the daily headlines of resurgent Soviet airpower and recent fissures in the free world, expected and wanted something stronger. The stage was set for the president to receive the first of several major budgetary rebuffs.

Subcommittee Chairman Mahon, courteous but tenacious, came quickly to his main point: "Are we not more vulnerable in 1956 in many ways than we were in 1955," similarly in 1955 than in 1954, and so on? Both Wilson and Radford seemed taken aback and fumbled for answers. Wilson pointed to the immediate postwar years as a period of high vulnerability, but Mahon reminded him that the threat of crippling air attack was then much less than now. Radford conceded the gravity of the current threat, but was not sure it was the gravest the country had ever faced. At first he avoided responding to Mahon's thrust about the country getting stronger all of the time while simultaneously getting more vulnerable to a heavy enemy attack.

On 30 January, when Radford returned for another round of questioning, Mahon emphasized again the theme of the overall direction of U.S. national security policy. "It seems to me we may to some extent be at the crossroads in our military policy," following a period, first, of drastic reduction after World War II, then the buildup of the Korean War, and, more recently, cutbacks and leveling-off looking toward an indefinite period of danger. With the FY 1957 budget, however, defense spending appeared to be rising again. Radford recognized Mahon's tactic, aimed
at eliciting statements that might prove damaging to the budget he was
to defend. Defense planning, he argued, did not stand at a “crossroads”
and did not face a crisis. Since its inception in 1953 the evolution
of the New Look had been orderly and it had not changed direction.
The proposed FY 1957 budget now under review generally followed
the course projected in 1953; its proposed spending levels were merely
an unavoidable consequence of higher equipment and personnel costs
and stepped-up missile R&D. Without arguing the point, Radford then re­
jected Mahon’s “strange paradox” of increasing vulnerability despite grow­
ing strength. To another questioner Radford admitted that “this Nation
has never been faced with a more serious threat.” The long-range danger
was clear for all to see. Then, asked Mahon, “there was no great contro­
versy” over the FY 1957 budget? “No battle of the Pentagon? . . . . Gener­
ally speaking, the budget is the creature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense, and the top people in the three services?” “That
is correct,” Radford replied.35

The Air Force Takes the Stand

Meanwhile, the airpower publicity offensive continued to heat up
outside the committee room. On 1 February Senator Jackson repeated in
the Senate his recent prediction that the Soviets might launch a 1,500-
mile ballistic missile before the year’s end. He urged again that the entire
ballistic missile program be put immediately on a war footing under a
civilian administrator reporting directly to the secretary of defense and
the president. Asked about Jackson’s statement, Wilson said that he
would soon appoint an administrator for the missile program. A few
days later Sen. Stuart Symington, speaking on national television, rein­
forced Jackson’s warning, stating that he knew that the Soviets were
ahead in the ballistic missile race. He accused the administration of with­
holding alarming facts about the growth of Soviet airpower.36

On the eve of the Air Force hearings, a new rash of headlines erupted
with the resignation of Air Force Assistant Secretary (R&D) Trevor
Gardner. * In an impromptu news conference on 8 February Gardner

* Gardner, a 40-year-old native Welshman, had become a naturalized American citizen in
1937. A graduate engineer with a master’s degree in business administration, in World War II
he headed research projects at the California Institute of Technology. After the war he be­
came an executive vice president of General Tire and Rubber Co. of California and then
established the Hycon Manufacturing Co. In February 1953 he had come to Washington
with the new administration to become special assistant for R&D to the secretary of the
air force, subsequently redesignated assistant secretary of the Air Force for R&D.
reportedly stated that the "essential" point in dispute was his request, turned down by Quarles and Wilson, for $200 million more in the budget to accelerate research and development, especially for ballistic missiles. Gardner declared that ICBM and IRBM development should be put on a "wartime emergency basis," as Senator Jackson had urged. He was also known to favor a larger share for the Air Force in missile development. The president, at his press conference on the same day (before Gardner's), had disparaged the notion that larger R&D appropriations would necessarily bring large results; he emphasized the limited accuracy of the long-range missiles now under development and the corollary requirement that very large numbers would have to be used in an all-out war, resulting in "complete devastation"—"race suicide, and nothing else." He reminded his audience that he had issued "positive orders" giving ballistic missiles the highest priority, and they were "being researched and developed as rapidly as it can be done in this country." The next day he accepted Gardner's resignation. 37

Ostensibly Quarles and Twining provided the administration's principal response to the complaints of airpower partisans in their testimony to the House on 9 and 10 February. Both felt strongly that the Air Force was seriously underfunded. Quarles had come to terms with the administration party line and could expound it without much discomfiture; Twining had not and did not conceal his distaste. Accordingly, Twining, not Quarles, confronted the airpower issue head-on. "The Air Force this nation needs," he began, "must be determined not only by decisions made here in Washington, but also by decisions made in Moscow." Methodically, Twining went down the list of pertinent "estimates and facts," detailing the total number of aircraft on both sides—B-52s vs. Bisons, B-47s vs. Badgers, B-36s vs. heavy turboprop Bears, light jet bombers, jet fighters, all-weather fighters. The Soviets were ahead in numbers, or probably soon could be if they tried, "in all categories of warplanes except that of the medium jet bomber."

Twining testified that the Bison and the Badger compared "very favorably" with their American counterparts, which he gave only a "slight edge in performance." For the United States he claimed significant advantages—an aerial refueling capability, a worldwide base system, and greater experience in long-range operations. But the Soviets were expanding and improving their own base system. From their Arctic bases alone, several hundred heavy bombers could be launched in a single attack. Against improving Soviet air defenses SAC faced the probability of increasingly severe losses. The new U.S. F-102 interceptor was faster and more hard-hitting than anything the Soviets were known to have, and the

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F-101 and F-104 day fighters, not yet in production, were believed to be superior to the now operational Soviet Fresco and Farmer fighters. In airlift, the USAF enjoyed a definite qualitative though not numerical advantage. But Twining made no inflated claims for airlift. The Air Force could now move one airborne division, without heavy equipment, only by diverting aircraft from the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). 38

It remained for Quarles, in a more detailed briefing, to present what amounted to a revised USAF position on the whole bomber-versus-missile question. All the "ultimate weapon" publicity surrounding the long-range ballistic missiles, he declared, was "highly misleading and highly damaging." For a long time to come the B-52 would remain a more effective weapon, overall, than any missile, perhaps for as much as 10 years. Fundamentally, he went on, the defense against ballistic missiles was to create a strategic air force that would deter the Russians from using their ballistic missiles. However, "we are not ignoring the technical problem of intercepting attacks." 39

The two officials seemed to be telling the committee, in short, that they were braced both to lose the missile race and to fail to develop an effective anti-missile defense but could count on neutralizing the Soviet advantage for many years to come by the retaliatory threat of SAC's long-range bombers. Soviet interceptors and ground defenses would be spread thin by the immensity of Soviet geography, and the first generation of long-range missiles would be too inaccurate for effective preemptive strikes at SAC bases. Eventually both sides would have an abundance of missiles and bombers, along with improved air defenses, and a state of mutual deterrence would prevail. To round out the picture, Twining praised the prospective nuclear-powered aircraft, which would represent a "potent counterweapon even when the ICBMs come on the scene." 40

Throughout their testimony Quarles and Twining carefully refrained from asking for more money; read literally, their statements were a plea merely not to cut the proposed budget. But the whole thrust of their exposition, and the implicit message, argued that austerity had been pushed to dangerous lengths. The 137-wing goal, Twining assured the committee, would be reached on schedule, but 137 was "just a number," not a measure of effectiveness. In sum, Twining supported the president's budget but had deep misgivings as to its adequacy. Quarles considered it a "sound" budget, but thought that "if we are to continue to support an Air Force program of this magnitude there is no escape from a larger budget in fiscal year 1958." 41

The Democrats reacted to the flagrant inconsistency of this position with mingled glee and bafflement. Why, they demanded, did the Air
Force not ask for more money now? Under Secretary Douglas explained that for various reasons including the shortage of skilled maintenance personnel, the Air Force did not want more aircraft deliveries in FY 1957 than the 1,900 asked for in the budget, 800 less than in the current year. "We do not want them coming any faster this year," said Twining, "if we get the increased aircraft procurement funds we will need next year."42

Like the Army, the Air Force had its Ridgway, now billed as a witness for the opposition. Trevor Gardner, until only a few days before assistant secretary of the air force for research and development, testified before the House subcommittee on 13 February, several days after the appearance of Quarles and Twining. Unlike Ridgway, who, testifying the week preceding, had turned out to be something of a spent force, Gardner came on as a vigorous, outspoken critic of the proposed budget.

He began his testimony on a low key, however, stressing his personal friendship and high respect for both his former superiors, Quarles and Wilson. The disagreement, Gardner said, originated in his growing alarm in recent years over the rapid Soviet advances with the attendant threat of overtaking and passing the United States in technological progress. Beginning in 1954 he had expressed this concern on several occasions. In mid-January he organized what amounted to a collective protest by some of the Air Force's top R&D leadership. In a formal letter to the secretary of the air force signed by Gardner, Twining, and a half-dozen other top military and civilian Air Force officials, the group asserted a need for $178 million more in current (FY 1956) funding and $316 million more in the FY 1957 budget then being presented to Congress. Quarles met with the group, listened to their views, and rejected them tactfully. The secretary regarded his own judgment as "superior to the combined judgments of those of us who were working on the problem full time." Facing this "honest difference of opinion," Gardner saw no alternative but to resign.43

For the FY 1957 budget Gardner had urged a substantially larger allocation for R&D, possibly $850 million or even more. But this was only the beginning of his discontent. Under the current system, "when we come up here and ask for $610 million [in the FY 1957 Air Force budget], that is not what we want, that is what we are told to ask for." Mahon tried to bring him down to earth. "Is it ever possible to satisfy the reasonable requirements of our scientific people?" Gardner conceded that that was a "very real worry"—as was also the risk that "if you got this money, you would not be able to spend it."44

Gardner made it clear that he did not consider the ballistic missile program to be currently underfunded, although it had been starved in
earlier stages. Both Quarles and his predecessor, as well as Wilson, had provided all the funds asked for, but under the system of budget ceilings the money was simply taken from other important work, notably aircraft, other missiles, and continental defense. One consequence was an extremely cautious procurement policy (fly-before-you-buy) for aircraft and missiles, which prescribed only small initial production orders, and then only after thorough testing. Gardner believed the urgency of the threat warranted much larger initial orders, regardless of risk.

Missile development, he believed, should have independent funding managed under a "czar" with statutory rank, in effect a "crash" program. He disapproved of the injection of interservice competition into IRBM development, with three services "racing down the same channel" with inevitable friction. Gardner felt strongly that the missile effort was not the only issue. He feared that the budget was billions of dollars short of what was needed. "If we were buying the right kind of air power we would be spending about $20 billion, in my opinion." This represented almost 60 percent of the proposed DoD expenditures for FY 1957.45

The Air Force budget hearings on 9-13 February opened the floodgates of the airpower publicity drive. Within a few days the most newsworthy parts of all three principals' testimony had seeped through the closed doors of the hearing room into the public domain, and on the 18th Mahon released most of the remainder in order to clear up public "confusion as to the true facts."46 On television's "Meet the Press" on 19 February, Gardner followed up with a strong plea for doubling or tripling the currently "pitifully" low level of B-52 production. He had had no opportunity to urge this upon the president, he said, because his only audience with him had been "under controlled conditions" with limited time to speak. The administration's two leading senatorial adversaries weighed in earlier, Symington with another angry speech from the Senate floor on the 10th and a dinner speech a few days later. On 26 February Jackson sounded a frightening note about the anticipated impact of Soviet missiles and charged that Wilson and Quarles had not acted to give ballistic missile programs the priority they required.47

**Tactical Retreat: The Supplemental**

Airpower partisans, for the most part, enjoyed a free ride during February, a banner month, while administration spokesmen suffered in silence. On the 23d Chairman Russell of the Senate Armed Services Committee, after listening to Quarles and Twining repeat their House budget testimony, declared that he had decided to fight for an additional
$1.5 billion for the Air Force in FY 1957. He asked the Air Force to work up a detailed statement on how a budget augmentation of that size might be used. Hard on the heels of this announcement, Russell told newsmen that he would appoint a special subcommittee headed by Symington to conduct a “blue-ribbon” investigation of the Air Force and the guided missile program.48

Russell’s announcement caused immediate alarm in the White House. At his news conference on 29 February the president came prepared with a detailed response, concluding with an assertion that he saw “no present need” to increase the budget. The matter, however, did not come up.49 But by then the president had probably already decided that his standpat position would not do and that it was important to regain the initiative before the proposed budget increase could gather momentum in Congress and the press. It was certainly not to be tolerated that the president should be bullied by an alliance between one of the services and its partisans in and out of Congress into accepting an almost 10 percent increase in a budget it professed to support, not to mention the effects of such a capitulation on the morale and loyalty of the other two services.

Pressure to increase the Air Force budget mounted daily. Russell had urged Congress on 2 March to transfer the $1.5 billion he wanted for that purpose from the foreign aid bill, and Senator Stennis, criticizing the Defense Department for its apparent apathy, called for a bipartisan effort to provide the Air Force with adequate funds. Wilson told Eisenhower on the 13th that Twining wanted to double B-52 procurement (from 400 to 800) and that General LeMay was talking of an ultimate requirement for 1,800. Relentlessly, the drumbeat of publicity continued.50

The president directed Wilson to explore the options. The exploration resulted in what looked like directed conclusions. “Certain factors,” Wilson reported to the president on 29 March, “now indicate the need for additional appropriations and expenditures in FY ’57.” The salient factor was recent information about increases in Soviet output of Bison bombers and supersonic fighters. The Air Force and Wilson proposed to meet this increase by a slightly steeper acceleration of B-52 output—from 17 to 20 per month—in 1958, raising total output to 500 by October 1958 instead of February 1959 under the current schedule. Aggregate Soviet output, however, would continue to exceed U.S. output until mid-1960. Wilson also recommended construction of more bases for the additional bombers and for the SAC dispersal plan and supported the Air Force proposal to proceed with relocation of the Pacific DEW line extension along the Aleutian chain recently recommended by the Joint
Additional new appropriations for the Air Force budget would come to $376.5 million, out of a total DoD supplemental appropriation proposal of $547.1 million. The package was discussed with a disgruntled Eisenhower in his office on the same day, 29 March. “A fine recommendation,” the president sourly remarked after reading the paper, but where would he get the money? Director of the Budget Hughes said that he had not been consulted and he had been under the impression that all the difficult choices had been made back in December. The president challenged almost everything and complained repeatedly that “no one ever comes up to him to say ‘let’s get rid of something.’” He gloomily admitted, however, that the demands to accelerate ballistic missile development and B-52 production, and the pressure exerted by the forthcoming Symington committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, would be difficult to resist.

On 9 April the president forwarded to Congress a request for $547.1 million in additional DoD appropriations, noting that his original budget message had forecast “continued study and scrutiny” and that subsequent developments made this request necessary. Spending in FY 1957, he said, would not be increased by more than $400 million, but it was not expected to unbalance the budget, since a larger surplus was anticipated. The new request would raise DoD’s 1957 budget to nearly $35.5 billion and spending to more than $35.9 billion; total government spending would rise to $66.3 billion, barely under anticipated revenues.

By the time of official release on 9 April most of the story had appeared in press reports. During what amounted to a council of war with Humphrey, Wilson, and top DoD and BoB officials, the president revealed that the supplemental request had been timed to reach Congress before the inquiry began and thus, hopefully, to counteract sentiment favoring the proposed $1.5 billion increase. He confided that Secretary Humphrey’s approval of this strategy had finally persuaded him. He wanted an all-out fight in the Senate against the proposed $1.5 billion increase and expected DoD officials to oppose it vigorously.

With Quarles’s cooperation, the president finessed the Air Force reply to Senator Russell’s “how would you spend $1.5 billion more” inquiry. On 9 April Quarles sent Russell a response, cleared through the White House, that dovetailed with the president’s requested $547.1 million supplemental and barely mentioned Russell’s proposed $1.5 billion. Quarles’s “further specific needs” added up to the $376.5 million the president was now requesting for the Air Force. The supplemental request and Wilson’s tardy appointment, at the end of March, of the long-awaited
“czar” to head the missile program—Eger V. Murphree, president of Esso Research and Engineering Company—took some of the wind out of the Democratic sails.55

On 18 April Wilson, accompanied by other DoD officials, went back to Capitol Hill to explain the requested amendments to the House appropriations subcommittee. The proposed amendments, he assured the committee, simply resulted from the continuing review of the military requirements, and added up to only 1.5 percent of the total DoD budget. Since his last appearance the review had revealed that it would be feasible to accelerate B-52 production, slightly raising the peak rate and also reaching it several months earlier than planned, with only minor additions to existing plants.56

By dint of persistent questioning, Chairman Mahon extracted a more complex and believable picture of the rationale behind the amendments. Concern over the Soviet threat was, of course, the driving factor. Quarles declared that he would have included provision for acceleration of B-52 production in the original budget had he known that Boeing could step up output from its two plants in operation. The timing of the decision, then, had been dictated by Boeing's happy “discovery” that acceleration was feasible without plant expansion.

Understandably, Mahon was puzzled. Had not General Twining emphatically stated in his earlier testimony that he wanted no more airplanes, which were already coming as fast as they could be absorbed operationally, but did want more money for airfield construction and R&D? Wilson answered at some length that the general now saw the light. Twining, when quizzed on the following day, dismissed his own asserted preference for new airfields and more development money as in-house arguments, which he had lost and were now history. As for the “no more airplanes” testimony given before Russell offered the Air Force an additional $1.5 billion, Mahon asked whether the offer was the reason for the supplemental request. Yes, Twining replied. Evidently he had spoken out of turn, for Quarles promptly set the record straight. The possibility of getting more spending money, he told Mahon, “was perhaps the vehicle for getting this matter to you,” but “it was not any thought of the availability of the $1.5 billion that led me to propose this [acceleration]. I assure you that was not a factor in the administration's handling of this matter.” Again Mahon persisted. Would the supplemental request have been submitted even if the possibility of an additional $1.5 billion had not been raised? Yes, Quarles replied, “in my judgment.”57
Nothing in the two days of testimony on the 9 April supplemental nor in the January-February hearings on the original budget submission had served to allay Mahon's foreboding over the direction of the nation's military. He worried over what seemed to him a lack of imagination and vision on defense issues within the administration, the public, and his own party. He asked each administration witness a ritual question: Can you suggest any way in which this budget might be cut? Both he and the witnesses understood the charade and gravely played it out for the record. At one point Wilson put aside the script and enlivened the hearing by confessing to a personal venture he kept in the back of his mind and hoped some day to bring to fruition: elimination of the Veterinary Corps from the Army and the Air Force, which in these two services accounted for 2 generals, 34 colonels, 738 other officers, and 2,100 enlisted men (with only 481 horses and mules)—"an example of how hard it is to get people out of the old rut, and to face the new." Mahon's Democratic colleagues evidently shared his reluctance to try seriously to impose significant increases on the administration's Defense budget—particularly in the light of the results of previous efforts to challenge the president's role as the nation's foremost military expert.

So the committee report, submitted to the House on 3 May, approved the budget, including the 9 April supplemental, substantially as submitted. It noted the committee's feeling that "barring unforeseen developments, the amount appropriated is generally adequate to fully implement our projected military requirements for the fiscal year and will enable the Department to continue to give the country an increasingly strong and well balanced force." It even made a modest net appropriation reduction of $236 million. The committee cut by only $187 million the Air Force's $15.66 billion appropriation request. The largest category, aircraft and related procurement (including missiles), remained intact at more than $6 billion. The recommended total ($15.5 billion) still represented an increase over the 1956 budget.

USAF procurement for 1957 included 1,927 aircraft—down from 2,777 in FY 1956, in part because of a shift to more expensive types, including the B-52 bomber, the F-101B fighter interceptor, and the F-104 day fighter. Most of the other subcategories represented substantial reductions from the previous year, but an increase in missile procurement, $470 million, outweighed all the reductions and amounted to a 62 percent increase in

* In fairness, it should be known that the Veterinary Corps had the prime responsibility of inspecting all meat products purchased for the services.
that category over FY 1956. Even so, missile procurement only accounted for about one-fifth as many dollars as aircraft in the Air Force budget, a modest step into the missile age.  

R&D funding, for which the committee approved the entire request of $610 million, revealed the extent to which Quarles had overruled virtually the whole Air Force R&D community in the missile dispute that Gardner had brought to a head in January 1956. Requested amounts showed reductions from the FY 1956 budget in all but two subcategories. The largest reduction, $28 million for guided missiles and related equipment, was the reverse side of the 62 percent increase in missile procurement noted earlier, underscoring the ongoing shift of this program from research and development to production. Quarles, whom the committee seemed to regard as a guru for the whole R&D field (presumably owing to his role until recently as assistant secretary of defense for R&D), argued persuasively that it would not necessarily be helpful to throw more money at R&D. About one-half of the nation's whole R&D capability, he pointed out, was already being devoted to defense. The $610 million total for FY 1957 was a ceiling imposed by OSD, to which all the R&D work had to be adjusted, one of Gardner's principal grievances and a sore point with many committee members, who evidently acquiesced with Quarles grudgingly, reflecting their respect for his judgment.

The House debated the DoD budget on 9 and 10 May, but public interest, and with it congressional attention, had shifted since mid-April to the airpower hearings in the Senate, from which titillating news and rumors seeped out almost daily. Mahon's presentation of the Appropriation Committee's bill consisted largely of a grim analysis of the looming Soviet threat and a confession that the budget he and his subcommittee now recommended was a grossly inadequate response to it. Congress had pushed the Defense Department into accelerating procurement in 1955 and again in the current year, but he tended to agree with the administration that the existing rate of output was probably the best that could be achieved at present. On 10 May 1956 the House passed the DoD appropriation bill unanimously and sent it to the Senate.

**Senate Maneuvers**

During May and the first half of June, budget hearings had droned on behind closed doors in the Senate, attracting little press comment. By early June, the appropriations subcommittee was ready for fireworks. They were set off by General LeMay's huge bomber-tanker-base "wish list" for SAC, which he had prepared at the request of the Symington
subcommittee. LeMay had recommended a SAC expansion plan aiming at a force by 1960 built around 27 wings of B-52s and 61 squadrons of KC-135 jet tankers, numbering respectively 1,360 and 1,327 of each type of aircraft. It would involve construction of 70 additional bases for a total of 101. The existing force of medium bombers, piston-engine tankers, and interceptors would be sharply cut back and all B-36 bombers retired. At the same time, SAC would move into the missile age with missile augmentation (penetration aids) for its bomber wings, plus wings of intercontinental cruise missiles, IRBMs, and ICBMs.64

On 11 June LeMay presented this huge bill of particulars with chilling force and gravity to the Senate appropriations subcommittee. At the moment the United States was clearly superior to its adversary and, should a war start tomorrow, would “unquestionably” emerge the victor, although hurt. But studies, each more pessimistic than the previous one, emphasized that “the supremacy which we enjoy today is on the wane. By 1959 the Soviets will have the superior strategic air force.” His wish list represented, he said, only the force structure that the country could absorb and support without emergency procedures, and that would “give us the greatest deterrent capability practical for the time period.” Even so, the list of aircraft, bases, R&D, etc. was formidable enough. The senators had little to say about it, but the staggering cost implications, compressed into a three-year time frame, were sobering. LeMay tried to confine his exposition to his own jurisdiction, but he conceded that the Air Force’s manpower ceiling of 975,000 would be inadequate to man a 137-wing force; he would need more people, for example, for his planned 24-hour alert. He thought a 1,200,000-man ceiling would be more realistic.65

For the FY 1957 budget LeMay endorsed the Air Staff’s estimated price tag of $3.8 billion in NOA for his program, added to the roughly $5 billion already budgeted for SAC. For FY 1958 the bill would be larger—the Air Staff estimated an annual additional $4 billion to $5 billion, running into the indefinite future. At the end of his testimony, LeMay seemed to become aware that he might be pushing the limits of what the country could afford. “We do think of those things,” he said in his closing statement, alluding to the risk of spending the country into bankruptcy. It was all a question of priorities. The subcommittee, including the Republican members, was impressed. Senator Russell, apparently without having heard LeMay’s testimony, raised the possibility of diverting to SAC the total foreign aid funds authorized by the House on the same day, 11 June, which by coincidence came to almost exactly the $3.8 billion LeMay had requested.66
In its report the subcommittee recommended and the full committee approved an addition of $800 million to the Air Force budget, specifying that the added funds should be used “primarily for increasing the production of heavy bombers for the Strategic Air Command,” along with more fighter aircraft, if deemed advisable. The committee also voted to restore some $173 million of the $187 million that the House had cut from the Air Force budget. The Army and Navy budgets were left almost untouched, the former reduced by $216 million, the latter by $48 million, these cuts much smaller than those made by the House. Overall, the committee added $1,389 billion to the House bill and $876 million to the president’s budget.57

The 18 June committee vote on the Air Force budget-increase amendment was close—13 to 12—suggesting that LeMay’s predictions of doom may have lost some of their potency when reported to those who had not heard him in person. On the Army and Navy budgets the votes were unanimous. This hairline vote on the Air Force augmentation did not augur well for the bill’s fortunes on the Senate floor. When it came up for debate the next day, 19 June, the ranking Republican on the committee, Styles Bridges, was waiting for it with an alternative amendment. Sponsored by a bipartisan group of five colleagues, it proposed an increase of only $500 million, including $350 million for aircraft procurement and $100 million for R&D. Its author professed to have reason to believe the president might be persuaded not to impound the money.68

Wilson Drops the Ball

On 21 June Secretary Wilson was badgered by newsmen to comment on the two amendments. Would he spend additional money if it were appropriated? Wilson curtly answered that if he had thought he needed more money, he would have asked for it in the first place. Later, a reporter quipped that Wilson’s problem apparently was “how to stave off more money.” Annoyed, Wilson snapped, “I think that’s a phony.” Immediately he seemed to regret the remark (“Maybe I shouldn’t have said it”). Unfortunately, he continued: “I would just like to see the people . . . that vote for the expenditures, that vote for the taxes to produce the money to pay for it [defense]—same people—stand up and be counted.” At first, Wilson’s gaffe seemed no more than an ordinary attack of his chronic “foot-in-mouth” affliction. This time, however, the immediate consequences were unusually explosive. For one thing, the press played it up with unusual glee, giving the story a momentum that extended it over several days. The next day Democratic senators and even a few
Republicans, inferring that Wilson had used "phony" to describe the proposed increases in the DoD budget, promptly engaged in a veritable orgy of Wilson-bashing. Bridges expressed "amazement and shock" and called Wilson's remark "an unwarranted slur" on senators on both sides of the aisle who supported a larger Air Force budget. "I am very pleased," remarked Majority Leader Johnson the next day, "that no member of the Senate on either side of the aisle has sought to justify the statement made by the Secretary of Defense yesterday."

Johnson and other Democratic senators saw the budget battle as a phase of the airpower inquiry with which their political interests were linked. Skilled strategists all, they found in the hapless defense secretary a target of opportunity whose sudden vulnerability could be turned to account by making him a symbol of the administration's economy obsession and blindness to the nation's peril. Jackson, Symington, and Russell all solemnly called for Wilson's resignation or dismissal. Near the end of the debate Russell delivered a particularly vitriolic attack on Wilson.

Much of the Democratic attack aimed at undermining support for Bridges' amendment, which offered a half-billion increase in the Air Force budget as a reasonable "compromise" between the president's wishes and the committee's proposed $1.1 billion. The committee, torn between the two judgments, had chosen a figure less than a third as large as the additional amount per year ($3.8 billion) that LeMay had warned his command alone would need to meet the threat of a superior Soviet air force by 1959. The amassing of unobligated funds, Symington charged, was an administration strategy, pursued by deliberately slowing B-52 production, in order to deter Congress from appropriating more money and thus obtain a balanced budget in an election year.

The floor debate was hardly a debate at all. The Democrats spoke mostly to one another in tones of warm agreement, and to their constituency outside the walls. Most of the Republicans listened in silence. On 23 June the president moved to end the spectacle. After a meeting with aides in his hospital suite, he notified leading Republican senators that he would, if necessary, go along with the Bridges amendment.

Wilson now found himself isolated. Clearly upset, he refused to answer a question whether he intended to resign. In Washington the White House denied any pressure to induce Wilson to modify his remarks of the 21st but admitted that the matter had been discussed. Talking to reporters, Wilson was alternately contrite and querulous, and insisted he had been misinterpreted. He had never meant to insult senators. But on the budget question he stuck to his guns: he needed no more money.

* He was still recuperating from an operation for ileitis.
Since the president did not formally advise Republican leaders of his decision to support the Bridges amendment, the debate was thus conducted as though the president's budget still represented the administration's position, although hardly a voice was raised on its behalf. Republicans now pinned their waning hopes on the Bridges amendment, but it lost, 47 to 42, and a little later the committee bill was carried by a larger margin, 48 to 40. These were, of course, largely party-line votes.74

One must conclude that Wilson's news conference indiscretion on 21 June was a major factor, if not the crucial one, in the outcome. Certainly many senators, Republicans and Democrats, thought so, especially Bridges. He believed that Wilson had given the opposition a campaign issue that "will be discussed from now to November on every Democratic platform." The intensity of the furor was widely regarded by veteran reporters as almost unprecedented.75

The House and Senate quickly wrapped up the DoD budget. In conference their representatives settled with little difficulty on a compromise that preserved the main points of the Senate bill—additions to the Air Force budget of $800 million for aircraft procurement and $100 million for R&D—while conceding the House a little over $100 million in small reductions. This increased the president's budget (not including the still-to-be-considered military construction budget) by $806 million and exceeded the House bill by $1.022 billion, for a final NOA total of $34.656 billion. The House passed the conference bill by a standing vote, 79 to 57. The Senate concluded the adoption with a voice vote the same day, 29 June, and the president signed the bill.76

### Table 13
The Approved FY 1957 DoD Budget
($ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approp FY 1956</th>
<th>Budget FY 1957</th>
<th>House FY 1957</th>
<th>Senate FY 1957</th>
<th>Conference FY 1957</th>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>695.6</td>
<td>672.3</td>
<td>658.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>7,330.0</td>
<td>7,761.4</td>
<td>7,497.6</td>
<td>7,545.8</td>
<td>7,539.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>9,127.8</td>
<td>10,047.6</td>
<td>9,999.5</td>
<td>9,999.9</td>
<td>9,999.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>14,739.8</td>
<td>15,666.5</td>
<td>15,479.1</td>
<td>16,579.1</td>
<td>16,459.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31,893.2</td>
<td>34,147.8</td>
<td>33,635.0</td>
<td>34,783.6</td>
<td>34,656.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cong Rec, Senate, 29 Jun 56, 84 Cong, 2 sess, 11,335.

The president had already moved to put the matter behind him. From his hospital bed on the 28th he directed Wilson in his scheduled
appearance before the Symington subcommittee the following day to "lay it on the line" in a full-dress presentation of the U.S. defense posture. Press Secretary Hagerty also told reporters that rumors to the effect that Wilson was in bad odor with his boss because of the recent flap were "absolute nonsense." 77

With the augmented FY 1957 DoD budget safely enacted, one large question remained: would the administration spend the extra money? Near the end of the Senate floor debate, Symington had warned that the president "could well impound the funds now being proposed in this amendment," as he had done before. 78 But the Air Force evidently decided it would be prudent to stake a specific claim right away. On 19 July Twinning, reporting to Symington's subcommittee on his recent visit to the Soviet Union, produced a prepared statement on uses for the extra money: several important R&D projects, still unnamed; accelerated production of KC-135 tankers to 20 per month; B-52 performance improvements; and purchase of long lead-time items for the bomber. 79

The FY 1957 budget process was marked by a great deal of turbulence and volatility. The military, particularly the Air Force, saw the Soviet menace more darkly than ever, as did the administration's Democratic opposition in Congress. Eisenhower and the civilian leadership did not regard the threat as requiring increases in money for additional personnel and weapons. Wilson, caught between the upper stone of the president and the nether stone of Congress and the services, found it difficult to sustain a consistent and balanced approach to the DoD budget through the long and trying obstacle course he had to traverse. He did not improve his image with Congress and the public by his sometimes inconsistent, impolite, and bumbling statements, but he was also the victim of circumstance—conflicting signals from above, misunderstanding on all sides, and Democratic opportunity for a political punching bag, the majority party finding him an easier target than the president.

Sensing political gain in a presidential election year, the Democrats exerted strong pressures to increase DoD appropriations and spending, for which, of course, they had the behind-the-scenes support of the military services. Eisenhower, ever mindful of the centrality of the DoD budget in the national budget, which he had desperately sought to bring into balance after many years of deficits, fought hard to contain the powerful thrust for more Defense money and finally settled for an increase of about $500 million. Congress, normally given to cutting DoD budgets, found it difficult to resist the lure of more and better weapons for the Air Force to meet the growing Soviet threat. At the end of the confused and labyrinthine budget excursion, Wilson, although wounded by the intense political skirmishing, retained enough resilience and clout to maintain his authority over his fractious department.
The FY 1957 budget hearings had to play against the distracting counterpoint of presidential campaigning and the ongoing debate on airpower. From mid-April through July 1956 the central arena of the debate was the old Supreme Court Chamber of the Capitol where, on 16 April, Senator Symington's armed services subcommittee on the Air Force opened hearings on U.S. airpower and its prospects. Advance publicity had been lavish, much of it inspired by the chairman's role as a possible dark horse Democratic nominee for president. Three days later Symington disclosed his plan to take the subcommittee on the road following the Washington hearings, to visit aircraft factories around the country. Administration efforts to divert public attention from the upcoming inquiry, such as the earlier appointment of Eger V. Murphree as missile "czar," had no apparent effect.¹

The Symington Committee Hearings Begin

Sen. Henry Jackson alerted the public to some of the issues the hearings would grapple with, starting with "why it took . . . the Defense Department a year" to provide additional funds for the Air Force (the recently submitted supplemental) in the FY 1957 budget now before Congress. Jackson suggested that the $300 million supplemental request for the Air Force was clearly an administration attempt to preempt the Senate investigation, as Senator Russell had charged. Talk about a balanced budget was only preelection rhetoric, and General Twining had testified that in 1958 he would need $3.5 billion more just to maintain a 137-wing force and that development and production of aircraft would have to be
accelerated. Jackson predicted that the country would "get a big defense bill right after the election," but he said no, the inquiry would not be partisan. 2

The president had already held two strategy meetings early in April. In the first, a briefing with Sens. Leverett Saltonstall and James H. Duff, the two Republican members of the Symington subcommittee, he re-emphasized the basic tenets of the New Look, the varied components of airpower, the fallacy of trying to match the Soviets plane for plane or missile for missile, and the too often ignored importance of naval airpower in the total equation. Missiles were vital and, he believed, adequately funded, but if the new missile "czar" determined otherwise, he would promptly ask Congress for more. 3

On the eve of the airpower hearings Eisenhower met with Secretary Humphrey, new BoB head Percival Brundage, and the Pentagon's top leadership. Annoyed by reported Air Force testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that ignored the Navy-Marine role in the airpower picture, and that described the Air Force as "second best" compared with Soviet air strength, the president plunged into a lengthy complaint about the tendency of service spokesmen on such occasions to "make it look as though each does the job alone." The upcoming inquiry, he warned, "seems to be concentrating on the services to get each to say they need a little more." The supplemental request about to be submitted, the president continued, constituted the administration's final concession. He reiterated the "long haul" thesis: Defense costs must be held down to a level "that we can sustain indefinitely. [Otherwise] the result would be to ruin the America we know and force us into a garrison state." The chiefs should voluntarily get together and swap missions with the aim of assigning each mission where it could be performed most cheaply and efficiently. "If the Chiefs are not doing this, they should be doing it." 4

Symington opened the airpower hearings on 16 April. The subcommittee proposed to focus its inquiry on one fundamental question: "Are the present and planned strengths of the United States Air Force adequate to preserve the peace through the deterrence of aggression?" After objections by Saltonstall and Duff the subcommittee's mandate was broadened to include Navy-Marine and Army aviation as well. 5 The schedule of hearings, which ultimately ran into July and brought more than 100 witnesses before the committee, covered four broad subject areas: (1) developments in the military situation since World War II; (2) existing and prospective airpower of the Communist bloc; (3) current strength of U.S. airpower; and (4) evaluation of the adequacy of policies and programs affecting U.S. airpower. 6
The leadoff witnesses, four retired military leaders—General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Generals Carl A. Spaatz and Walter B. Smith, and Admiral Robert B. Carney—all agreed that technology had relegated to history's ash bin America's traditional reliance on its industrial capacity and mobilization base to build, after war began, the military strength needed to win it. Forces in being at the outset, not the forces that might be created later, were the decisive factor in modern war. All four generally accepted the implication that modern technology had made airpower, as General Bradley put it, "predominant, both as a deterrent to war, and . . . as the devastating force to destroy an enemy's potential and fatally undermine his will to wage war."7

In their first week the hearings, as one reporter put it, had "got off to a tame start amid little public notice." Symington may have overestimated public concern over the Communist threat and failed to appreciate the publicity value of a more partisan approach. "Most observers feel," wrote another veteran reporter, "that the Symington inquiry will not arouse the general public very much" or, for that matter, advance the senator's political fortunes.8

General LeMay Sounds Off

Symington and Jackson undoubtedly counted on their star witness, General LeMay, to energize the hearings and revive public interest. On 23 April, two days before LeMay's scheduled appearance, Communist party leader Nikita Khrushchev, then touring in England with Premier Nikolai Bulganin on a "trade and good-will" mission, declared in a speech in Birmingham, "I am sure that we will have a guided missile with a hydrogen bomb that can fall anywhere in the world"; some reporters thought he had added "very soon." He went on to claim Soviet "firsts" in dropping an H-bomb from an aircraft and in producing a jet airliner. Symington called the statement, if true, a "significant and terrible warning." Secretary Quarles made no effort to discredit the claims, noting the accuracy of earlier ones, but repeated his prediction that the manned bomber would remain the nuclear weapon delivery vehicle of choice for at least the next five years. President Eisenhower downplayed Khrushchev's threat and reiterated earlier assurances that U.S. missile development was moving ahead "somewhere certainly around the limit" of possible speed.9

The waves from Khrushchev's pronouncement were still rolling in when the Symington subcommittee opened Phase 3 and the second week
of its inquiry with General LeMay in the witness chair. The SAC commander’s performance changed the whole character of the hearings. LeMay’s persona undoubtedly had something to do with this: somber, humorless (at least in the hearing room), intense but calm, exuding power, sentences and phrases short and unadorned. His spectacular military credentials drew flowery tributes from the committee. LeMay’s testimony, while not new, did seem to pull together more coherently than had been done before the manned-bomber school’s view of the air-power crisis.

In terms of news value the LeMay hearings got off to a slow start. The closed sessions of 25 and 26 April generated no leaks and therefore no headlines, but in LeMay’s last two days of open testimony, 30 April and 2 May, the subcommittee had a more lucrative publicity payoff. LeMay said that by current estimates the combined production of the two Soviet heavy bombers, the jet-powered Bison and the turboprop Bear, already substantially exceeded the output of B-52s. Unless the United States boosted output of B-52s and jet tankers (the KC-135, in production) and expanded its base system, the Soviets could surpass U.S. overall striking power in the 1958-60 period. LeMay also stressed that adequate strength meant a force considerably stronger than the enemy’s, in order to absorb losses and still have sufficient residual strength to retaliate and inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy.10

LeMay clearly saw himself as spokesman chiefly for his command’s modernization requirements, which meant, in essence, more B-52s and their support needs. This thrust suggested an almost ruthless disregard for other elements of SAC. To SAC’s only operational intercontinental bomber, the aging B-36, on which Wilson, in a recent press conference, had bestowed a few kind words, LeMay gave the back of his hand: “If I had my desires now, they would all be in junk piles.” As for the B-47 medium bomber, SAC’s real workhorse and the only U.S. bomber that outnumbered its Soviet counterpart, he hardly alluded to it. LeMay had the pilot’s skepticism for the new long-range missiles, reinforced by his single-minded concern for the B-52. The ICBM had good potential, he said when asked, and should by all means be pushed, but the missile was beset by problems. He believed that the first model would not be as efficient as the manned bomber. LeMay’s most damaging open testimony, saved for the last day, 2 May, revealed that only 47 of the 78 B-52s produced had been accepted through April. Complementing these dire tidings, it was disclosed the next day that the intelligence estimate of aggregate Soviet production of Bison bombers to date was more than 100.11

The headlines generated by the LeMay hearings thus far were only the tip of a sizable iceberg. High-level discussion of the airpower crisis
had entered a critical period early in March, when Robert Sprague, the NSC's consultant on continental air defense, had reported that recent intelligence on the Soviet nuclear stockpile suggested that on one-way bomber missions by mid-1958 the Soviets would be able to deliver a decisive surprise air attack on the United States, presumably aimed mainly at wiping out SAC. Manifestly this left little sense of complacency in SAC. In the closed sessions of the hearings on 25 and 26 April LeMay and his aides provided a mass of information on SAC's plans and procedures that left no doubt how personally they took the prediction of 1958-60 as a time of peril.12

As for the missile threat, which portended an attack warning of only 15 minutes, SAC proposed to place as much of the total strike force as practicable on a 15-minute alert, a concept developed late in 1955 and approved by the Air Force early in 1956 as a plan to be put into effect by 1958. It would supersede the current dispersal plan for getting bombers quickly airborne in an attack. The greatly increased requirements for special alert hangars with crew ready-rooms, dual taxiways, and combat crews meant more construction on each SAC base, more high-skill personnel, a 60- to 75-hour work week, and of course more money. When asked whether, even if the Soviets developed the ICBM well ahead of the United States, the new alert system would provide an adequate counter to the threat of surprise attack, LeMay replied that it would, if the system operated with a high degree of efficiency; many bombers would survive, and Soviet planners would still have to ask themselves whether they were prepared to accept x number of atomic bombs in a retaliatory blow.13

LeMay believed the 15-minute alert, not yet programmed or budgeted for, could be made to work, but fundamentally, he put his trust in deterrence, the capacity for swift retaliation on a scale that would make any attack on the United States unprofitable. He insisted on the need for an overwhelming force of B-52s, now and for years to come the most modern and capable carrier of nuclear bombs and the nation's key offensive weapon system. To give the B-52s a genuinely intercontinental capability, more KC-135 jet tankers should be ordered to provide an adequate tanker fleet by 1960.14

LeMay submitted a promised "wish list"—a 50-page document (mostly tables and graphs) setting forth SAC's "major requirements during the time period 1956 to 1960." Acceleration of B-52 and KC-135 tanker output would provide a force of 1,360 B-52s (27 wings) and 1,327 KC-135s (61 squadrons) by mid-1960. The existing force of B-47s and associated KC-97 tankers would be radically cut. SAC's personnel strength would climb from 196,000 to 319,600 in 1960. The SAC base system would expand
from the existing 31 bases to 101 in 1960, an increase of 56 bases over the current plans. The long lead times would require funding the whole expanded base program in FYs 1957-58. High-yield nuclear weapons would be scheduled as appropriate. Five new missile wings would be created in 1959 and 1960. "This proposed force," LeMay's report concluded optimistically, "will give SAC the capability of maintaining a high state of alert with a force relatively secure from destruction by presently predicted Soviet capabilities during this time period."15

Of course, the cost of all this promised to be astronomical. The estimates, worked up in haste, were no doubt significantly understated, since they covered only direct costs to SAC during the specified time period, ignoring what would surely be a large bill for support from other Air Force commands and probable follow-on programs. The wish list would add about $3.8 billion to the $4.9 billion (new obligational authority) already budgeted for SAC in FY 1957, peaking in FY 1958 and tapering off rapidly thereafter to FY 1960 for a four-year total of $31.7 billion.16

The administration did not seem unduly upset by LeMay's testimony. His views were no secret; earlier he had talked of even larger numbers of B-52s than the 1,360 now proposed.17 On 1 May Wilson attempted in a news conference to dampen the impact of what had been said thus far, conceding that the Soviets were probably building heavy bombers "at a somewhat higher rate than we are," but this did not amount to much on either side. He hinted that another acceleration in B-52 output might be in the offing, perhaps in FY 1958. But he refused to accept LeMay's prediction of Soviet superior striking power in 1958-60, referring to the general as a "dedicated specialist."18

\textit{Naval Strategic Airpower?}

A few days later, 4 May, the president tried to broaden the scope of the debate. Thus far, he said, the critics had focused on one weapon, the B-52 bomber, while largely ignoring other USAF and naval airpower. "We have the most powerful navy in the world . . . ." When all the Defense Department testimony had been presented, he went on, it would become apparent that the administration had not been "indifferent to the security of the United States."19

Testifying before the Senate appropriations subcommittee on 8 May, Wilson lost no time in following this guidance, labeling as untrue the "almost daily stories alleging that the U.S.S.R. is far outstripping the United States in terms of airpower." U.S. airpower comprised the total strength of the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army, the Air
National Guard and Air Reserve units of all services, and the civil air fleet, plus the aviation industry—all supplemented by the considerable airpower of America’s allies. SAC’s medium bomber wings remained “the heart of our strategic striking power” and “the most powerful single element of air power in the world today.” Especially to be reckoned with, said Wilson, was the “strategic capability that our carrier based aircraft add to our retaliatory striking power” with 15 large carriers each carrying atomic-capable aircraft and able to project American airpower into areas otherwise closed to it or inhospitable to land-based aircraft. Under JCS direction, use of the carriers was “carefully integrated into the plans for the employment of our strategic forces.” As Wilson well knew, this last flourish was a red flag to the Air Force, and especially SAC. Both Twining and LeMay in congressional testimony had made it clear that the Air Force did not and could not count on help from the Navy in the opening strategic air battles of a war. Wilson went on: “The aircraft carrier today represents one of the most important parts of our overall security program, playing a vital role in protecting our sea lines of communication and providing mobile bases for immediate retaliation against enemy attack.” He may well have had in mind the president’s sarcastic remark earlier in the month—“what in the world we are building Forrestal-type carriers for?”—prompted by Air Force testimony disparaging the Navy’s strategic bombing capabilities. Granted, Eisenhower had continued, the Key West agreements assigned strategic bombing to SAC, but times had changed and the Navy now possessed units of great striking power. Wilson confirmed what was already common knowledge, that B-52 production would be accelerated to 20 per month by late 1957 or early 1958, and that B-52 wings would be enlarged from 30 to 45 aircraft. In a public speech on 7 May he declared emphatically that he opposed any further speedup in B-52 output, saying that the Soviets could be expected to “forge ahead” in some areas from time to time.

By calling attention to the Navy’s air arm as a part of the nation’s long-range striking power the president, as one columnist pointed out, had issued “a virtual White House invitation to renew the old public dispute with the air force over which can best atomize Russia if war should come.” Wilson had reinforced the invitation with more explicit and feistier language in his Senate testimony on 8 May. Both services were quick to respond, the Air Force first. After Twining pointed out the limitations on the capability of carrier-based aircraft to assist SAC in its strategic mission, Burke made a dramatic announcement—the first official acknowledgment that carrier-based aircraft [the A-3D jet bomber] could

* See Chapter II.
now drop H-bombs, a capability that helped to explain Eisenhower's insistence on the Navy's "tremendous" airpower as a recent development. Burke backed off, however, from the question whether carrier-based aircraft could reach targets in the Soviet heartland, pointing out that naval air strategy dictated a "fight our way in" approach, first hitting such targets as ports, submarine bases, and coastal air bases that posed a threat to the fleet.24

Not surprisingly, at his news conference on 15 May Wilson faced a well-primed audience that plagued him with a barrage of questions. He stated that "everybody knows the Navy has a strategic striking power," but he refused to define or quantify it as a percentage of the nation's total, and denied change or reinterpretation of the Key West agreement. He maintained that the Navy had a "double mission," the second half of which was "to assist . . . in any strategic bombing mission." The secretary pointed out that Twining had merely said that the Navy's strategic capabilities were small, not nonexistent, compared to the Air Force's. Wilson's stubborn and maladroit resistance to disclosure of information, already widely known, proved to be self-defeating. It had the immediate consequence of fueling, instead of dampening as intended, the emerging roles-and-missions argument between the Air Force and the Navy.25

**Competitive Publicity**

Another roles-and-missions dispute was the already simmering argument between the Army and Air Force over prospective competition between the Army's Nike and the Air Force's Talos, both antiaircraft missiles.* Early in March 1956 Wilson gave the Air Force the go-ahead to install Talos, when ready, as part of the continental air defense system at selected SAC bases. The Army promptly protested the decision as an invasion of its air defense mission and a wasteful duplication of the Nike system. At a meeting with Brucker and Taylor on 20 March Wilson promised to look into the matter.26 When questioned by the Senate appropriations subcommittee on 10 May, General Taylor stated that the assignment of a "point defense" mission to Talos, "which does not presently have interceptor characteristics," looked to him like an invasion of the Army antiaircraft role. Secretary Brucker, replying to Senator Stennis's

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* Talos was powered by a ramjet engine, giving it about four times the 25-mile range of the rocket-powered Nike; it rode a radar beam to its target and had a proximity fuse. Nike depended on a ground command guidance system that required the full attention of the crew until the missile reached its target—a serious disadvantage in a multiple-bomber attack. Talos was designed by the Navy as a successor to the shipborne Terrier.
insinuation that the aging Nike missiles ringing American cities might have outlived their usefulness, made a spirited defense of the weapon and its prospective improved versions.  

This dispute eventually petered out inconclusively, but the Senate subcommittee reached a sweeping but tentative decision favoring the Air Force on all points—future development of all Nike missiles would be discontinued and Talos would be assigned the mission of defending targets in the United States. This decision, however, was never implemented. The heralded “duel” never materialized, the Army’s Nike continued to grow and prosper, and Talos was eventually turned over to the Army for development.

The president’s unwitting incitement to interservice strife and Wilson’s follow-up fell on fertile soil, ready to sprout. In March the Air Force had launched a public relations campaign to celebrate SAC’s 10th anniversary and, more generally, to “make certain that all Americans understand why the Air Force is the principal force, and what must be done to keep our Air Force the mightiest in the world.” Participants were admonished not to “take issue with the other services,” but at the same time to stress such arguments as: USAF airpower is the dominant, decisive force; USAF airpower can be applied anywhere, anytime, in any strength; missiles are an air weapon and, by their very nature, fall into the Air Force arsenal. Also in April the Navy launched a six-month campaign aimed at stressing three themes: “The U.S. depends on the Navy more today than ever before; in global war the oceans become a giant, interconnected battlefield surrounding all continents; the U.S. Navy is more important than ever.”

One of the first fruits of the USAF campaign, the April issue of Air Force, published by the Air Force Association, consisted in its entirety of articles about SAC. The following month’s issue took the offensive against the Army with a “staff study” entitled “The Army’s Atomic Dilemma,” flogging the theme that the Army, desperate over its steadily shrinking role in the employment of nuclear firepower, was grasping for its own long-range air force and missiles. “National strategy,” it declared, “doesn’t foresee a decisive role for U.S. ground troops in any kind of nuclear war, global or peripheral. And it is even more difficult to foresee a non-nuclear struggle big enough to be called a war.” This representative view of Air Force strategic thinking reflected a lack of vision. Not many years passed before the Vietnam War exposed the superficial and narrowly parochial character of such thinking.

The Army’s retort to this “assault” in the June issue of Army, journal of the Association of the U.S. Army, briefly reviewed what it called “The Air Force’s Technological Dilemma,” jibing at the Air Force’s “insistence
on concentrating on the kind of war that isn’t going to be fought,” inasmuch as “there is little likelihood of thermonuclear war so long as two or more powers have the capability of destroying each other.” They ridiculed the claim that airpower could control or seal off land areas, “despite the plain evidence of Korea that it is unable to do so.” The Air Force, they wrote, “refuses to face up to the growing obsolescence of the manned bomber” or to recognize that ballistic missiles “are more a province of ordnance than of aerodynamics.” “This Air Force position,” the editors concluded, “is such a calculated drive for arbitrary power that it can be of no help to the cause of service unification or to the stature of the public’s opinion of the armed forces.”

The Navy’s contribution to the upsurge of service bickering appeared in the April issue of the Navy League’s publication, *Now Hear This!* Its point of departure was the Icelandic parliament’s demand at the end of March that the United States withdraw all American forces stationed on the island. Reminding its readers that it had earlier warned of the possibility of such action, the journal interpreted the incident as “an impressive warning to our defense planners as to what can and may happen to our other immobile land air bases” in Morocco, Saudi Arabia (both subjects of current negotiations for base renewal), Libya, and elsewhere. Now it was “abundantly clear that increased emphasis in our future defense planning must be placed upon our mobile air bases, the fast carriers of our modern fleet,” invulnerable to foreign neutralism and nationalism and protected by their mobility.

*Taylor’s Colonels*

With little warning the interservice feud erupted anew over the weekend of 19-20 May, brought to a head by the bold stroke of a group of “young colonels” on General Taylor’s staff who had been assigned earlier in the year to energize the Army’s faltering public relations effort. According to one of them, Col. George Forsythe, Taylor told them they were on their own “in a dangerous assignment and that if they were ever ‘uncovered’ he ‘wouldn’t know us.’” “Taylor’s colonels” were assigned to write staff studies, using classified information as they saw fit, and not necessarily hewing to the officially approved line, defining the Army’s problems and interests as they perceived them. The group’s existence was not secret, but it maintained low visibility.

By mid-May they had decided to take drastic measures to counter the tide of pro-Air Force and anti-Army propaganda in the press and other
media. Selected reporters known to be sympathetic to the Army were given some of the special studies. The results appeared in two long articles by Anthony Leviero of the *New York Times*, lavishly embellished with quotations, on 19 and 20 May. "Grave interservice differences," Leviero began, announcing his theme, "are afflicting the armed forces," going much deeper than budgetary competition. They "cannot be dismissed as mere interservice bickerings." He listed the salient areas of contention—strategic bombing, ground forces, the big carriers, and missiles. Despite the president's characterization of thermonuclear war as "unthinkable" and his admonition to prepare for the whole range of lesser threats, lamented one of the Army studies used by Leviero, "we continue to pour excessive manpower and money into an Air Force which has been substantially neutralized and which pleads for more money, more money, more money. We continue to divert large quantities of our military capacity into a Navy that is seriously threatened by a nation with practically no naval experience or tradition." Even if the Soviets really cut their armed forces by 1.2 million as promised, the study noted, they would remain vastly superior to the West in conventional arms.

Another Army study, Leviero wrote, condemned excessive reliance on aerial bombing as a needless resort to mass destruction that restricted foreign policy to the "extremes of inaction or action which may be wholly inappropriate," making military power "more a determinant of national policy than an instrument of it." Leviero's two articles were the prize "scoop" of the weekend, revealing the breadth of the Army-Air Force undercover guerrilla war.

**Wilson Takes Charge**

Secretary Wilson seems to have been unaware of these goings-on. As early as 2 April, however, Admiral Radford had informed the president, in the presence of Twining, Taylor, and Burke, that "unless brought under control, a situation may develop in which the Services are involved in increasing public disagreement among themselves." Eisenhower responded with a short lecture on "competitive publicity" among the services. He thought it "highly harmful to the Nation," and declared that stopping it was the job of the service chiefs. Public relations activities for building service morale were understandable, but "there should be none of this competitive publicity."

When the leaked disclosures in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* appeared on Saturday morning, 19 May, Wilson failed to notice them
and no one tipped him off. After reviewing Washington’s Armed Forces Day parade, he went to National Airport to fly to Hot Springs, Virginia. At the airport a crowd of reporters ambushed him; “I thought you told me there wasn’t anything hot going on,” he muttered to an aide. When told what had happened, he improvised a few comments, saying “this is not the right way to solve our problems . . . . We don’t have to try our case in public.”

Over the weekend, Senator Jackson accused Wilson of avoiding the issue and exercising no leadership. Sen. Estes Kefauver called on President Eisenhower to settle the “bickering” before it became a “national scandal” that foreign powers would interpret as reflecting weakness. Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee declared that “if the Pentagon itself or the White House do not calm the furious interservice row over roles and missions . . . [my] committee may be required to consider the matter further.” Senator Saltonstall said in an interview that he would insist on being given the names of the officers responsible for the leaks.

Meanwhile, the services continued their “competitive publicity” at a brisk pace. Secretary Thomas announced that the Navy planned to install its 1,500-mile IRBM, when ready, on its nuclear-powered submarines. At Patrick AFB in Florida, a crowd of 25,000 watched the launching of an Air Force Matador missile, and off Bikini in the Central Pacific a B-52 dropped the first American air-launched H-bomb from about 50,000 feet—“by far,” proclaimed the report, “the most stupendous release of explosive energy on earth so far.”

Wilson returned to Washington Monday morning (the 21st) and met with the service chiefs and secretaries that afternoon, preparatory to a joint press conference with all principals in attendance, an unprecedented venture in Pentagon public relations. Wilson had a prepared introductory statement for the press conference, which he was persuaded to modify in some particulars, including (presumably at Taylor’s request) deletion of the term “irresponsible persons” to describe those who “leaked” Army studies to the press. The secretary announced the conference’s purpose: to “clarify the situation” resulting from weekend press reports of serious differences among the services based on disclosure of certain staff papers. “Honest” differences and “reasonable” interservice competition were healthy, he said, but the airing of differences was “not good for the country” when motivated by excessive service partisanship; neither was the unauthorized release of classified documents. Roles and missions of the services came under continual review by the Joint Chiefs, but at the moment he did not contemplate any changes in the Key West agreement, a point reporters pinned down at the outset.
With preliminaries out of the way, Wilson opened the conference to questions. He remained very much in charge, taking some questions himself, referring others to his associates ranged on his right and left, interrupting freely, obviously enjoying himself. His colleagues, by contrast, were variously "glum," "tight-lipped," and "stiff," feeling the pressure to avoid missteps.40

Taylor, the principal target, established his position early on, promising a "very thorough investigation." From a "cursory glance" at some of the documents, he disavowed them "as views of the Army," but refused to disavow "everything that's been published" before he had determined the facts. He was not yet prepared to commit himself to any course of action, court-martial or other. "There is no mutiny or revolt in the Army," he declared. Taylor skillfully parried reporters' efforts to engage him in argument with the other chiefs, stating that his views had been adequately presented to them and his superiors. On the Nike-Talos issue he got little reciprocity from either Quarles or Twining. Both had praise for Nike. To the loaded question whether Nike was suitable to defend SAC bases, Twining allowed that it was far better than "standard anti-aircraft artillery, and I certainly hope that it is as good or better than advertised." He reminded his audience that the Air Force, not the Army, owned the air defense mission. Taylor cleared the air a moment later by explaining that the current version of Talos lacked interceptor characteristics, but later versions were expected to have them. Had he received a full and fair hearing from the Joint Chiefs, Secretary Wilson, and the president? Yes, he had. Did he agree with their decisions? Taylor dodged this one: "I would say there is nothing—no finality in any of these matters. They are so important they are constantly being reviewed." He and the other chiefs agreed on the necessity for an adequate air-atomic retaliatory capability, but the Army also had a vital deterrent role, which required an "adequate allocation of means."41

It was a polished performance, one of Taylor's best, but almost a solo one. He must have felt very much alone. The only other active participants, apart from Wilson, were the two USAF principals, for whom the conference, with Wilson's bland acquiescence, provided a forum to expound Air Force positions, mainly on Army-Air Force disputes. The others might as well have been in the audience. Burke, when questioned about the Navy's role in strategic bombing, brushed it aside as a "controversy which blew up over the weekend [and] is much more serious outside of the Pentagon than it is inside."42

Two topics dominated the conference, the affair of the leaked papers and the Nike-Talos dispute. On the titillating matter of the leaked papers, Taylor faced a no-win situation. The abortive machinations of his colonels
were of course indefensible and had to be disavowed, while the issues they had hoped to trumpet to a sympathetic public were too diffuse and complex to be dealt with in a one-hour press conference. Almost ignored in the hubbub was the fact that the Air Force had also leaked classified papers that had been extensively paraphrased and quoted in Leviero's articles. No one quizzed Twining about his undercover colonels. 43

From where Wilson sat, the press conference must have seemed a smashing success: The chief troublemaker had been pilloried and forced to deny his guilt publicly (next best to admitting it); Wilson and his colleagues had all joined in a ritual reaffirmation of service unification. Wilson also took the occasion to point out that he had made a commitment that "success in the development of a missile wouldn't necessarily determine which Service would have the roles and missions." He was referring to the November 1955 development assignments for the IRBM. "[W]e want to have the Service that is best fitted . . . to do the job [of deploying and operating the missile]." 44

In his own press conference on 23 May the president restated his familiar credo of free discussion before decisions were made and loyal support without argument afterward. "The day that discipline disappears from our forces, we will have no forces, and we would be foolish to put a nickel into them." Had he given thought to a more unified military structure, "perhaps a single Chief of Staff or even a single service military organization?" Of course he had, many times over the past 15 years, but it was "a very, very intricate problem." The roles-and-missions controversy, he said, had been going on since he joined the Army in 1911 and it would continue. 45

The president's unhappiness over the upsurge in service rivalry and near insubordination went deeper than his remarks indicated. He had discussed the idea of greater centralization of authority in the secretary of defense with both Wilson and Radford separately during the week preceding the weekend of the roles-and-missions revolt. He had almost decided, he told Radford, that "some reorientation of the whole organization ought to be made sometime next year. It would involve strengthening the position of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS, reducing the services to a more operational, less policy role." The chiefs of staff would become, in effect, "assistants to the Chairman," who would have authority to select and reassign them. Under this radical change the chiefs would then "have the duty of implementing policy within their own service—not of developing over-all policy." More immediately, he was thinking of requiring (through legislation) that all military and civilian officials serving in the Pentagon take an oath "that on
termination of their duty they will disclose nothing which the Department of Defense determines to be security information." New appointees would also take an oath "to accept decisions once made." These ruminations stemmed from a feeling that "the Chiefs of Staff system we now have has failed." What was needed, he pointedly told Wilson, was for the secretary of defense to find a way to get "disinterested, competent advice," decide on a course of action, then stick to it. Wilson, seemingly not aware that he had been given both an order and an invitation, replied that he would prepare a list "of a dozen or so things" and "see how many of them the president wanted." No, said Eisenhower; what he wanted was for Wilson "to reach his judgment as to what needs to be done and then report to him."46

Later that week Taylor met with Eisenhower on another matter, during which the roles-and-missions subject was briefly touched upon. The chiefs of staff, said the president, pursuing the train of thought of his earlier talks with Radford and Wilson, "still thought much too much each in terms of his own service .... Each service should have what the corporate judgment of the Chiefs thought proper .... If the Chiefs can't develop corporate judgment on the great problems that are facing us, the system as we now have it will have failed and major changes must be made." But the examples of competitive publicity he cited—public criticism of the Navy's carriers and of the Army's Nike—both pointed the finger, not at the Army or Navy and their partisans, but at Air Force partisans aided and abetted by Air Force officials.47

Both the president and Wilson, whatever their private thoughts, evidently had decided to regard competitive publicity as a disciplinary matter to be handled by the services internally. Both Twining and Taylor made the appropriate public gestures: Twining sent a letter to all major air commands directing them to avoid "negative" publicity and to "strengthen the [defense] team as a whole by acknowledging the competence of the other members." Taylor issued a memorandum discouraging public airing of service differences, pointing out that there were "ample means" in the Pentagon for settling them. More dramatic was the Army's purge of the maverick colonels. Retirements and reassignments followed Taylor's order banning controversial articles and speeches. Although a "purge" of sorts, these actions seemed not to have a punitive intent. As one maverick later recalled, "We were all sent out of the Pentagon immediately, to great assignments," although he also admitted that the Army staff was "delighted" to see them go and "treated us like lepers" as soon as their fate was known. Taylor had taken care of his own.48
As Wilson headed for his scheduled 29 June hearing before the Symington airpower subcommittee he and the president were both aware that he was being thrown to the wolves. These sessions were the most grueling ordeal he endured during his entire tenure at the Pentagon, and the secretary more than earned his salary. Both Symington and Jackson pursued a coldly correct and aggressive style of interrogation, sometimes insisting on "yes or no" answers, even challenging the secretary's veracity on occasion. Wilson, although on the defensive throughout, did not submit tamely. When the "phony" episode came up, he at first affected to have forgotten it, then refused to apologize for using the word, adding that it would be in order for certain senators, including Jackson, to apologize to him. He dismissed as political not personal the uproar against him on the Senate floor.\textsuperscript{49}

Unfortunately, Wilson's game demeanor under fire could not offset the lack of substance in his testimony. His prepared statement, while mercifully brief, consisted of party-line generalities which his inquisitors hardly bothered to challenge. Under interrogation he produced one significant attention-getter, an emphatic assertion that the B-52 was "quite superior" to the Soviet Bison. "If the situation was reversed," he declared, "and their Bison was as much better than our B-52 as our B-52 is [actually] better than their Bison, we would all be greatly worried." To bolster the assertion, he supplied the subcommittee with classified data on comparative characteristics of the two bombers, showing, he said, that the B-52 was superior in speed, combat radius, and combat ceiling.\textsuperscript{50}

For well over a year an outpouring of information and analysis by airpower partisans, most of it originating inside the Air Force, had built up a cumulative popular impression, shared by most congressmen, that the Bison was qualitatively a dangerous rival to the B-52. General Twining and several other high-ranking USAF officers, in carefully worded public statements, had on the whole supported this view, and certainly had done nothing to discourage it. As became known later, the "bomber gap" campaign would collapse under mounting evidence that the Soviets had decided to leapfrog the creation of a massive fleet of manned bombers and instead move directly into development of strategic ballistic missiles—but that time was not yet. In July 1956 all the evidence still pointed to a major Soviet effort to surpass the Americans in the development of airpower built around the modern long-range bomber, with missile development as a parallel but still subordinate "next phase" undertaking. Wilson's attempt to exploit the B-52 versus Bison issue in
his final appearance before the Symington subcommittee may have been a response to the president’s instructions to “lay it on the line,” but, if so, it did not help carry the day.

Wilson denied or expressed skepticism about most of the other contentions of the airpower lobby. Twining’s earlier statement that the Communists had thousands more combat aircraft than the United States must, he said, have been a comparison of total Soviet air strength and the U.S. Air Force alone, not counting naval or allied aircraft; the free world was ahead in total numbers. He flatly rejected as untrue Vice Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White’s public statement that the Communists were “making scientific and technological advances at a faster rate than we” and as a result were “approaching us in quality” of aircraft. Wilson belittled the significance of the flybys; the Soviets, he said, had only shown what they wanted to show, and anyway “we knew they were trying to build a bomber.” The whole issue of accelerating B-52 production was overblown, Wilson argued. Long before the 1955 May Day flyby he had taken steps on his own initiative to ensure that Boeing would have capacity to increase production when needed, and production goals had subsequently been raised in an orderly way. There was no disagreement between him, Quarles, and Twining on this score. For the present the plan was to increase B-52 production gradually to 20 per month. Wilson’s feisty behavior under this grilling was probably sustained by a conviction that his inquisitors desired solely to trap him into admissions that could be exploited politically. But he seemed genuinely troubled by the efforts of some people, as he put it, to “belittle the capacity and resolve of this Government” and to foster an impression that the country was militarily “woefully weak, when we are not.”

In the closing minutes of the 3 July hearing, Symington read to Wilson what amounted to a personal indictment. The secretary’s testimony over the past two days, he declared, was inconsistent with the testimony of virtually the entire high command of the Air Force except Secretary Quarles. Knowing that it was feasible to increase B-52 output beyond current schedules and that Congress wanted this to be done, Wilson had nevertheless stated that he would “put the money in the bank,” which could mean “maybe do nothing.” The subcommittee, Symington asserted, confronted two inescapable conclusions: “(1) You are considering going against the expressed will of the Congress by refusing to increase B-52 production as promptly as practicable; (2) either you are misleading the American people, or responsible military officials of the Defense Department are misleading the American people as to the relative military strength of the United States vis-a-vis the Communists.”
To resolve these conflicts, he concluded, the subcommittee would have to take some further testimony.\textsuperscript{52}

Wilson remained calm, ascertained that Symington's remarks reflected only his own views, and reserved the right to reply in writing. The inconsistencies that disturbed Symington, he told him, were differences of opinion and interpretations of fact. In retrospect this turned out to have been close to the mark. In a written statement, submitted two weeks later (on 18 July) Wilson repeated this view, admitting that "in some cases my advisers have not been in complete agreement," and promised anew not to impound the additional funds voted. On the bottom-line question of relative U.S. and Soviet air strength, he still held that "we are ahead of the Russians today."\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Twining's Russian Visit}

The grand finale of the hearings came more than two weeks later when General Twining reported on his trip to the Soviet Union, the first by a U.S. chief of staff. Even though he and his principal subordinates had all testified earlier, this was a publicity opportunity Symington could not afford to pass up. Twining's trip had been a headline item since 24 May, when it became known that he had received an informal invitation from the chief of the Soviet General Staff to attend the Aviation Day celebration on 24 June. Twining's party, carefully selected for "extensive knowledge of airplanes and equipment," was in the Soviet Union from 23 June to 1 July. Besides seeing the air show on the 24th, the members visited airports, factories, aeronautical research and training centers, and, on their one trip outside Moscow, the city of Stalingrad, rebuilding from its wartime devastation.\textsuperscript{54}

To reporters on his return Twining had said he felt "about the same as I did when I left, about the comparative strengths of the Russians and U.S. Air Force," but after a conference with the president, Wilson, and Quarles at Gettysburg (where Eisenhower was convalescing from his ileitis operation), he began to change his tune. On the issue of relative numerical aircraft strengths he deemed that the Soviets were probably ahead in numbers of jet aircraft, and that the score was about even for modern aircraft, counting total strength on both sides, although the Soviets were ahead of the USAF alone. "Qualitatively," Twining declared, "we are out in front. No question about that."\textsuperscript{55}

In his report, released to the press on 10 July, Twining walked a fine line between praise of Soviet airpower achievements and reassuring comparisons with the United States, reminding his audience repeatedly that
the Soviets had revealed very little the visitors did not already know. In particular, they had divulged nothing at all about their missiles. Except for the turboprop Bear, a line of development the United States had chosen not to pursue, "nothing we saw could honestly be described as being superior to the best United States aircraft in comparable categories." He praised the Zhukovskii Air Engineering Academy in Moscow, describing it as "unique among the world's professional military institutions." Soviet production processes, on the other hand, to judge by the two old plants the Americans saw, appeared old-fashioned. Nevertheless, Twining reported, the Soviets possessed to a "high degree the ability to apply mass production processes and techniques to the manufacture of airframes and jet engines." Overall, Twining concluded, the visit reinforced "our previous judgment that the rate of progress and improvement in Soviet air weapons, backed by a massive scientific and industrial effort, is such as to give us cause for serious thought about the future." 56

Evidently Twining had managed to steer a course between the positions of the administration and the Democrats without running afoul of the rocks on either side. No comment came from the White House or Wilson's office. Symington declared that the general's report "completely vindicates the position taken by some of us that we should give due recognition to the tremendous advances in Soviet airpower." Both Symington and Jackson agreed that there was still a conflict between Wilson's and Twining's testimony, which the subcommittee would try to resolve in a final session with the general on 19 July. Symington recalled that Twining had told the committee that the Soviets had more Bisons than the United States had B-52s, and could "probably maintain this advantage for some time." Had he learned anything on his recent trip to cause him to modify this testimony? Twining noted that the recent planned increase in B-52 production might reduce the disparity. Nevertheless, "they will continue to have a margin over us for several years." In 1958, when B-52 aggregate output would reach about 500, the score would be "about a stand-off." On the qualitative side, however, Twining said that he had returned from Russia with a better opinion of the B-52, as compared with the Bison, than before. 57

Symington pursued the numbers count through medium bombers and fighters, with Twining confirming on request. The United States had a much larger fleet of B-47s than the Soviets had, but Soviet fighter production was running into the tens of thousands. Grudgingly Twining conceded that the Soviets were closing the gap in strategic airpower and that LeMay's prediction of Soviet strategic air superiority by 1959 seemed valid if defined narrowly in terms of heavy bomber strength and assuming continuation of current production trends. He raised one qualifying
consideration little discussed up to now: the Soviets would need a larger bomber force than the United States to assert strategic superiority because we presented a larger array of targets. Symington's aggressive questioning steadily tipped the scales back toward the Democrats' alarmist view of the airpower threat and away from the more benign administration view. To Symington's question as to the likelihood of being "suddenly confront[ed]" by a Soviet long-range supersonic bomber, Twining remained skeptical. "What are our prospects," Symington asked, "of having a supersonic, long-range bomber in operational quantities in the near future?" "Not in the near future," answered Twining. "The heavy bomber, supersonic, is quite a ways off." In the end Twining submitted a brief written statement pleading in effect that it was impossible at this juncture to come up with a meaningful conclusion as to the relative capability of the opposing forces in 1959.58

The hearings ended on a more thoughtful and speculative note, introduced by Twining himself. What he feared most, he said, reverting to his earlier don't-underestimate-the-Russians theme, was that they might "break through with something outstanding." Did that mean, Symington asked him, we must spend more money, lots more? Twining replied, "I do not think we can afford to be too austere, certainly in the research and development field."

"Is it not certain," Symington pressed his point, "that if we do not take the wraps off of money control of our research and development . . . they are going to pass us in a relatively short time?" "I have said before," remarked Symington as he closed down the hearing, "that if people who feel like some of us do are wrong, we are going to lose some money; but if we are right, unless there is a change in our policy, we are going to lose the United States."59

The Symington Committee Report

No fireworks, either on Capitol Hill or in the press, attended the closing of the airpower hearings. Through August and September testimony released piecemeal generated occasional headlines, but the Senate airpower inquiry, launched with fanfare, disappeared as a major news item after July.60 The subcommittee deferred preparation of its report until after the elections, probably by mutual agreement of the majority and minority members. A split report was a foregone conclusion, and its publication during the campaign would probably have been discounted as representing only the opposing partisan views of three
Democratic and two Republican senators. The report finally appeared on 25 January 1957 and passed almost unnoticed.

The judgment that none of the Air Force primary missions—strategic air warfare, defense against air attack, and the gaining and maintaining of general air superiority—could be adequately performed under existing plans and programs constituted the core finding of the majority report. The majority report gave short shrift to naval airpower and the Army’s air arm. For the Democrats, the “study of airpower” was, in essence, a study of its strategic aspects. To avoid loss of U.S. strategic superiority, the majority report called for additional funding to expand the bomber force and provide sufficient bases to permit dispersal of SAC aircraft. The minority report cited Wilson’s insistence that additional B-52s were not yet needed. 61

Defense against air attack, according to the majority, was inadequate on almost all counts—interceptors, early warning, and base construction. The minority report dutifully disagreed. Twining had virtually written off the alleged threat of a surprise attack by Soviet obsolescent bombers flying one-way missions. Newer interceptors would come into the inventory in large numbers by the end of 1958. Air defense was also improving with the Talos and Bomarc ground-to-air missiles, and the DEW line radar coverage was progressing rapidly under high priority. 62

The majority report stressed the alarming rapidity with which the Soviets, starting from a position of extreme inferiority at the end of World War II, had closed the gap, achieving quantitative superiority in most categories of combat airpower and near parity or better in quality. The United States had numerical superiority only in medium bombers. Air Force witnesses testified that under existing R&D ceilings, the United States would yield qualitative superiority to the Soviets in three to five years. In the minority report, Senator Saltonstall attempted no explicit refutation of the majority charge that the administration had effectively abdicated the mission of “gaining and maintaining general air supremacy.” Conceding Soviet numerical superiority in combat aircraft, he repeated Wilson’s claim that the United States and its allies together were ahead of the Communist bloc in total numbers and total production of modern jet aircraft. 63

The majority report contended that since 1953 Defense R&D funds had been held to an arbitrary ceiling and many important R&D projects had been deferred for lack of money. In ballistic missile development, the Soviets had started earlier and might be ahead in some areas. A Soviet capability to launch medium-range missiles against American coastal cities from offshore submarines would pose a major threat, to which the only
available response would be an all-out retaliatory strike. The minority report cited Secretary Quarles, who scoffed at the majority prediction that the Soviets would gain a qualitative advantage within three to five years. In FY 1957 all identifiable R&D programs aggregated $5.2 billion, as contrasted with $3.4 billion in FY 1955. Even though Soviet progress in this field since World War II had been more rapid than American, it did not follow that "because a second runner is moving up . . . he will win the race."64

The majority report declared that in the aggregate the testimony implicitly, and in many individual cases explicitly, supported the conclusion that the administration's rigid economy drive had weakened the U.S. response to the Soviet threat. In the minority report, Saltonstall pointed out that in the last four fiscal years the cuts had been much smaller than during the Korean War years, and also that Congress had reduced the president's defense budget in every fiscal year from 1950 through 1956.65

While maintaining that future wars were likely to be limited or peripheral, Army officials generally avoided contentious positions on the Army's differences with the other services and OSD by hewing to the line that they could live with austerities of the FY 1957 budget while warning that more ample funding would be required in future years. The committee majority reported that "witness after witness testified that this country does not now have sufficient mobile forces . . . to handle successfully limited conflicts."66

In the minority response to the "witness after witness" views quoted in the majority report, Saltonstall pointed out that all the services claimed the capability of dealing with various levels of limited conflict, using small atomic or conventional weapons. Saltonstall's minority views reflected pique and resentment. He refused to sign the majority report because, he said, it took an "unduly pessimistic" view of the status and prospects of the nation's defense, was biased in its selection and use of testimony, relied too heavily on military witnesses, and virtually ignored the years before 1953, which shaped the situation inherited by the Eisenhower administration.67

The Symington committee hearings and surrounding events revealed the depth and intensity of interservice competition and the political dimensions of the inquiry. The Democrats sought to create a major political issue out of the so-called bomber gap and gave intimations of what a few years later they proclaimed as a "missile gap." The widespread political fallout from the sometimes acrimonious battle between the administration and the congressional Democrats inevitably engulfed the military services, which were at the storm center. The hearings provided them with the opportunity to speak candidly and publicly about
their deficiencies and their needs. And beyond the hearings they engaged each other directly or indirectly in propaganda battles, seeking to influence official and public opinion. For the president and Wilson it was painful to witness what they regarded as excessive public exposure of differences between major elements of the Department of Defense. It confirmed Eisenhower in his view that major changes were needed in the DoD and especially in the JCS. Both the president and Wilson generally hewed closely to established policies, refusing to be driven by the near-tidal wave of criticism they had to endure. In the next several years, as still other events, such as Sputnik in 1957, had powerful impact on perceptions of U.S. national security, the administration altered some of its directions and made some increases in funds for the military services.

Overall, in retrospect Eisenhower's refusal to panic in the face of alarming reports of Soviet gains in military power and heavy political assaults by the Democrats served the nation well. Wilson, who was often less than sure-handed in dealing with issues, nevertheless served the president well in defending his policies and keeping the military services generally in hand during this trying time.
The year 1956—a presidential election year—saw a forceful effort by President Eisenhower and Secretary Wilson to apply pressure on the Joint Chiefs to develop an overall military strategy and the war plans to implement it. In addition to the usual annual production of war plans, Wilson tasked the Joint Chiefs to prepare for FY 1958 and FY 1959 a comprehensive military strategy paper that would provide overarching guidance for the armed forces. He was asking for a paper like the one that Eisenhower had called on the Joint Chiefs to prepare in 1953, early in the administration. Consideration of the new strategy paper coincided with JCS development of the war plans JSCP-57 and JSOP-60. All of these papers inevitably were affected by the continuing interplay between them that engaged the planners and the Joint Chiefs.

A Newer Look?

In January 1956 Wilson completed three years in office, during which he had endured what must have seemed never-ending battles between the services over money, weapon systems, and roles and missions. During these years there had occurred striking changes in the international order that would have to be taken into account by the Defense Department in planning for the future. The time had come, Wilson decided, to take another look at DoD's military strategy for the future. On 27 January he directed the Joint Chiefs to develop a new outline military strategy and guidance for determining the "size, nature, composition and deployment" of the armed forces for FY 1958 and FY 1959. Two matters, he reminded them, had already been settled and were not open to reconsideration: preservation of a sound U.S. economy would continue to be
“a necessary part of the fundamental values and institutions we seek to protect,” and atomic weapons would be used from the outset in a general war and in any lesser hostilities “whenever it is of military advantage to do so.” For certain long-range programs—aircraft, missiles, shipbuilding, base construction, reserves, and the mobilization base—guidance should be projected beyond FY 1959 as appropriate. Budget planners would need the new JCS study for their FY 1958 submissions early in August.¹

Thus Wilson, without fanfare or rhetoric, launched an effort (prolonged, as it turned out) to adapt the policies of the administration’s first term and devise new ones to meet the emerging challenges of the missile era—what would later be called the “New New Look.” Later in the decade Albert Wohlstetter aptly summed up the challenges in the phrase the approaching “balance of terror,” a situation of mutual deterrence resulting from the rapid growth of American and Soviet air delivery capabilities and the early prospect of nuclear plenty on both sides. The consequence would be a greater likelihood of small wars and creeping Communist expansion, as well as more intense competition in the diplomatic and economic spheres, straining the solidarity of U.S. alliances and relations with Third World countries.²

Wilson probably expected no radical proposals from the Joint Chiefs, and they gave him none. He had, however, suggested that they first talk the matter over with the president, advice that they apparently did not heed. Their reply on 12 March was prepared during a week’s stay at Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico. Among the first items of business considered there, the chiefs contemplated a surprise contribution by the Army’s new chief of staff, General Maxwell Taylor. “A National Military Program,” a short paper written about a year earlier, outlined an emerging “flexible response” strategy, which would become the Army’s preferred alternative to the orthodox “massive retaliation” strategy. It should be “suitable for flexible application to unforeseen situations . . . In short, the military program of the United States should include all reasonable measures to prevent general and local war and at the same time contain the potentiality of waging any war, large or small.” Secretary Brucker had applauded the paper, but Taylor’s colleagues were not impressed. “Quite content with the status quo,” as Taylor later put it, they read it “politely” and “then quietly put it aside.” When Brucker sent it to him, Secretary Wilson similarly pigeonholed it with a scribbled “no further action.”³

In their reply to Wilson the chiefs stated that the existing military programs, as best they could forecast, would remain valid through 1958-60 and “continue to represent the minimum U.S. military forces required for national security.” This was not a reassuring judgment for, as they went on
to warn, they perceived the whole free world situation to be “gradually deteriorating” and moving within a few years toward a condition of “great jeopardy” for the United States unless something were done to reverse the trend. The problem was political, social, and psychological, not military. U.S. national policy was based on deterrence of wars, large and small, but visible strength in being, while indispensable, was not alone sufficient to deter war.

It must be reinforced by a world-wide understanding that the United States will use that strength promptly ... when necessary ... . There is a feeling throughout the world that the United States lacks the essential determination to act in time ... . Decisiveness is endangered by the need to obtain concurrences of our allies and by the requirements of our constitutional processes ... . Our military strength will have little effect if every word and deed of our government and its representatives do not attest our national resolution to act promptly when the moment of decision arrives. We must appreciate the fact that the effect of our free debates and the operation of our free press tend to present a picture of confusion and indecisiveness to the rest of the free world.⁴

This was an old plaint; the really bad news came in their estimate of the cost. Annual military spending in the period 1958-60 might, with great difficulty the JCS thought, be held down to the range of $38-40 billion, still a tolerable level for the prospering U.S. economy. But military aid should be expanded to at least $4-5 billion annually (about a $3 billion increase over current levels), in part to finance an adequate NATO air defense system and to provide more modern weapons worldwide. All this pointed to annual defense expenditures that could reach $45 billion, a heavy burden for the U.S. economy to support, but the JCS could not forecast any change in the military situation that would warrant much reduction. Military aid had indeed strengthened the recipient countries both economically and militarily, but had not enabled them to “become self-sustaining”; some of them had even begun to “demand continued and increasing financial support as the price of their adherence to our alliances.” Military assistance needed to be examined with a view to “increased selectivity and definite cutoff dates.”⁵

The president’s reaction to the paper was caustic. The Joint Chiefs, he remarked, painted a “very dark picture,” which would seem to warrant calling for a declaration of emergency, going to “field conditions,” a wartime budget, even a garrison state—in which case, he added sardonically, the services would be reduced to a “much more Spartan mode of living.”
He pronounced unrealistic the extraordinary powers proposed for the president "in anything like the present circumstances." We were not worse off now, he said, than we were three years ago, especially with regard to the Soviets, who in fact had been dissuaded from military aggression. The president seemed to share, to some degree, the Joint Chiefs' disenchantment with the allies; the premise seemed to be that they were not themselves threatened, that the United States "must practically pay" for their help in fighting communism, that "we [the allies] are fighting your war." It might be better, and certainly cheaper, he wryly added, "to encourage some nations to be neutral." The president also expressed annoyance with the unceasing demand of the military services for ever-increasing budgets. Why couldn't they cut manpower, especially in the Army and Marines? Wilson pointed out that DoD spending was actually several billion dollars larger than current funding would indicate, since the services were still living in part off of past appropriations and various one-time savings.6

Eisenhower told Radford to have the JCS rewrite their paper, and he specified organization and content. He wanted a version in three sections: first, the domestic military situation, with an upbeat review of developments in the last three years and a focus on the emerging role of missiles; next, the U.S. alliance system, how to sustain confidence and cohesion, be more selective in choosing allies, and correct the "we are fighting your war" syndrome; third, the world security problem, with a critical look at the role of military power. Colonel Goodpaster of the White House staff would send a written outline for the chiefs to follow.7

Radford could have had no doubt that he had, in effect, been given new and far-reaching marching orders. The president had dropped a parting remark of unmistakable meaning: "Each Chief of Staff . . . [should] take the same attitude toward the importance of a sound economy as he knows Admiral Radford does—to recognize it as a fundamental element of over-all U.S. security strength." A few weeks before, in his budget message, the president had proclaimed to the nation the need for new and expanded domestic spending—for schools, housing, highways, etc. Now he had the shocking forecast of $42-45 billion national security budgets beginning in 1958. Which of these imperatives would have to yield was clear enough. Service and aid budgets must be reduced, even at the cost of structural changes in U.S. forces. The primacy of a sound economy was an absolute. So was his conviction that in the last resort the nation's security came first—but only in the last resort, which was not yet.8
Over the next few weeks the president hammered on the economy theme and the responsibility of the service chiefs to take it to heart and broaden their perspectives. Repeatedly he insisted that each service chief should see himself less as a champion of his service and more as a "national military" adviser. "The patriot today," he declared, "is the fellow who can do the job with less money."9

"A little staggered," as Radford admitted, the JCS submitted a new report on 17 April. It followed the president's prescribed outline to the letter, including sub-topics; the tone was far from euphoric, but less depressing than its predecessor. However, their new version, labeled "further views," still retained their gloomy conclusions of 12 March. It carefully affirmed "confidence" that the comparative strengths of the two superpowers provided a "margin of relative advantage in general war" for the United States and its allies—although this was "not bound to persist and may change" at any time. The trend in comparative strengths, the JCS believed, still was not favorable enough to justify curtailment of existing programs. If the president had hoped to goad his military advisers to more venturesome thinking he must have been disappointed. They studiously avoided matters of interservice dispute, and much of the paper simply paraphrased current policy. They seemed to feel that obstreperous or otherwise "difficult" allies were not worth the effort of placating and perhaps should be left to their own devices. On one point—how to cope with the Communist bloc's current non-military competitive tactics—the Joint Chiefs revealed heightened caution in their thinking. "Our military mode of international action alone," they admitted, could only borrow time by deterring aggression. Meanwhile, the free world must rely on political, economic, and psychological strategies to combat communism.10

When the president saw Radford on 18 April, the day after receiving the Joint Chiefs' "further views," he offered a few noncommittal comments and turned to other matters.11 The whole exercise must have seemed to him futile. The JCS had let him down. Still, Radford seems to have committed himself without reservation to the president's stated purposes. From that point on he was demonstrably searching for a new strategy and force structure that could be accommodated within the austere budgetary framework the president believed the nation's economic health required. Since national strategic interservice planning was the Joint Chiefs' exclusive bailiwick, it would fall to them to define the choices.
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War Planning

Defining choices had become increasingly difficult for the Joint Chiefs during the New Look years—1953-56. Strategic planning was marked by a high degree of volatility and sharp competition between the military services. After the plenty of the Korean War era the services had difficulty adjusting to what they regarded as lean postwar years. The constraints on money and people directed by the White House and powerfully driven by President Eisenhower intensified the battles between the services to establish their respective missions as indispensable and even dominant. Such considerations carried heavy weight in the approach of all of the services to war planning, as revealed in the discussions of the Joint Chiefs. Consequently, the existing elaborate structure of war planning failed to produce plans on a timely basis and thereby further compounded the difficulty of decisionmaking at the highest levels of national security planning.

The Eisenhower Joint Chiefs inherited a system of strategic planning, promulgated in mid-1952, that envisaged the annual preparation of long-range, mid-range, and short-range plans looking ahead 10, 7, and 4 years, respectively.* The system had not worked well, and its output had fallen far behind schedule. By the end of 1955 it should have produced three Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimates (JLRSE) projected through June 1965, three mid-range Joint Strategic Objectives Plans (JSOP) through June 1962, and four short-range Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans (JSCP) through June 1957.† But the long-range plan was abandoned as “impracticable” in March 1954 after two successive drafts had been rejected. The JSCPs fared best: one was completed for FY 1955 and one for FY 1956, each three months late. The more complex JSOPs fell far behind: JSOP-56 never materialized, and work on JSOP-57 was suspended in 1954 after prolonged wrangling among the planners. In the end it was decided to substitute a mid-range war plan (JMRWP) aimed at a July 1957 D-day. In conjunction with the basic policy paper, JCS 2101/113, this would cover both war and peace contingencies. Effectively completed by the end of 1954, the JMRWP was finally approved on 15 April 1955, little more than two years (instead of the prescribed three) before its assumed D-day of a general war.12

* Adjustments in these numbers occurred in 1955.
† The plans were not, of course, intended to cover the entire time span between approval of a plan and its projected terminal date. The short-range plan, the JSCP, assumed a D-day of 1 July, six months after JCS approval, and would guide use of military forces during the initial phase of a war. The mid-range plan, the JSOP, would begin on 1 July three years after JCS approval and would apply to the four years thereafter. The long-range plan, the JLRSE, would begin five years after approval and would apply to the five years thereafter.
Most of the issues that had slowed completion of joint strategic plans during the first three years of the Eisenhower administration concerned the probable nature, weaponry, duration, and patterns—especially beginnings—of a general war. Throughout this period general war continued to be perceived as the major peril facing the nation. If not the most likely conflict, it was the chief contingency that had to be planned for.

Early on, during discussion of the first JSCP in 1953, planners confronted perhaps the most basic and intractable of the general war issues: whether to rely mainly on strategic nuclear retaliatory power to bring the war to an early end by crippling Soviet warmaking capacity (the Air Force view) or to develop balanced forces of all services capable of dealing with any military threat. The Air Force position required a clear priority in peacetime for development of forces needed at the outset of war with logistic support for the first six months only, on the assumption that these forces, spearheaded by the nuclear retaliatory elements, would quickly triumph. Air Force planners did not reject the possibility of a more protracted conflict involving the other services, but assigned the primary role to strategic bombing. Later these differences were finessed by submerging them in more general phraseology, and the JSCP was updated and issued in April 1954 as the plan for the following year. It retained the focus on general war, with no provision for limited conflict except a statement that ready mobile forces should be on hand to deal with limited aggression anywhere.13

Later, during discussion of the JMRWP in October 1954, the Air Force planners asserted that the initial atomic phase of the war must be the "primary consideration in military planning." The other services, conceding the probability of an initial Soviet nuclear surprise air attack, still insisted that a large-scale buildup of forces after D-day should be planned in order to provide flexibility for whatever strategy the situation might dictate. Deadlocked, the Joint Chiefs sent up individual views. Radford took a position close to that of the Air Force but with a difference. Accepting the remote possibility of extensive post-D-day operations, he stressed as more likely that both sides would be for some time too "devastated and stunned" to fight back effectively. Since the first to recover would have the upper hand, it was imperative in any event to ensure maximum mobilization of reserves up to six months after D-day "to absorb the initial shock, to deliver our own atomic offensive, and to form the nucleus" for further offensive action. In November Wilson endorsed Radford's view.14

Arguments over the opening and subsequent duration of a general war held up preparation of the FY 1956 JSCP. During the debate the
Army surfaced for the first time an alternative view that general war might emerge by unintended escalation from conventional local origins and perhaps even remain conventional. In the final version the JCS quashed the view that general war might thus flower from a very small seed, but left open the (remote) possibility of a prolonged aftermath. In January 1955, six months before the joint planners began work on the FY 1957 JSCP, NSC paper 5501 endorsed as a "possibility the Army's small-origins theory of general war."

On 15 March 1956, two days after the joint planners submitted to the chiefs a draft of the FY 1957 JSCP, the president approved NSC 5602/1, which repeated verbatim (par 11) the small-origins theory of general war. It also asserted, however, that nuclear weapons would be integrated with conventional weapons and used with them "in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President." Radford sprang into action. On 28 March he wrote his colleagues criticizing as "a radical departure" from the new policy affirmed in NSC 5602/1, the statement in the draft FY 1957 JSCP that it was possible that atomic weapons would not be used from the outset in a general war. Two days later, at a meeting in his office, the president obligingly told the Joint Chiefs he was "clear in his own mind" that nuclear weapons (including air defense weapons as soon as available) would be used "in any war with the Soviets." Radford pointedly remarked that the reluctance "in some quarters" to plan on this basis flew in the face of the "actual fact" that "we are already largely committed as regards our force structure, and will become increasingly so as time goes on."16

Following up quickly, Radford met with his fellow chiefs in his office on 3 April to discuss new guidance for the JSCP. They approved a formulation that atomic weapons would be used "against the USSR" in the event of a Soviet attack on the United States or on U.S. forces and also, as authorized by the president, in other military operations not against the USSR (presumably Communist China or other Soviet allies) when to the advantage of the United States. On 5 April Radford directed that, as he had implied in his 28 March memo, this guidance should apply to all joint strategic planning—more particularly to JSOP-60, on which the planners had been working since August 1955.17

*Taylor Challenges Massive Retaliation*

This move brought Taylor back into the fray. On 12 April he formally objected to the application of the new policy to mid-range as distinct from short-range planning. Within the time frame of JSCP-57, he pointed
out, when the United States would still enjoy a comfortable nuclear superiority over the USSR, the threat of massive retaliation for even a small Soviet aggression would probably have enough credibility to deter an attack. But by 1960, when the Soviets were expected to attain nuclear parity, the threat of massive nuclear retaliation against any level of Soviet aggression would have very low credibility indeed. For a “massive retaliation for anything” strategy to command an iota of credibility it would require continued U.S. air-nuclear superiority well into the period in which the USSR was expected to enjoy parity with the United States. This would require beefing up SAC even beyond the level LeMay was demanding, soaking up the already meager portion of the budget available for limited war forces. Taylor warned that the USSR, “recognizing the unprofitable character of general nuclear war, will seek to achieve its ends through subversion, infiltration and local aggression in situations in which general atomic warfare . . . is not an appropriate response.” He proposed an amendment to the recently approved guidelines for JSOP-60 to provide not only a deterrent nuclear capability but also “ample forces of all services with the capability of waging limited war with conventional weapons or tactical atomic weapons.” But on 17 April, in revised guidance for JSOP-60 and JSCP-57, Taylor’s fellow chiefs rejected his proposal, stating merely that the existing force structure was “adequate to cover the military contingencies we might face in the planning period to be covered.”

As it turned out, even this decision was not final. Three weeks of debate ensued. At the White House on 14 May Radford alluded to his current difficulty in extracting unanimous decisions from the Joint Chiefs on the JSOP, especially on the question of whether atomic weapons would be used in “small wars.” To suggest in a plan that atomic weapons would not be used, he stated, would leave “the way . . . for a building up of service requirements.” The president took the hint. He felt “that we would not get involved in a ‘small war’ extending beyond a few Marine battalions or Army units. If it grew to anything like Korea proportions, the action would become one for use of atomic weapons.”

Thus armed, Radford had no difficulty two days later in mustering a majority—himself, Twining, and Burke—to redefine general war as any war “in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the U.S. are overtly engaged.” In any armed clash between the two, the United States would use atomic weapons from the outset. Taylor and Marine Corps Commandant Pate held to the 17 April guidance limiting use of atomic weapons to the response to a Soviet attack on the United States or its forces overseas that, in the latter case, threatened their survival. They also insisted on the possibility, based on NSC 5602/1, of a major conventional
conflict with the USSR restrained on both sides by awareness of the risk of mutual annihilation. Taylor and Pate reaffirmed the view, which the chiefs had held in earlier plans, that operations of substantial scope could be expected in the later phase of the war. Even during the initial phase, there should be preparations and deployment for a general offensive in Europe.20

Radford lost no time in wrapping up his victory, in meetings with Wilson on 21 May and the two of them with the president the next day. Wilson then notified the chiefs of his concurrence with the chairman's position and directed them to proceed with planning on the assumption that "in a general war, regardless of the manner of initiation, atomic weapons will be used from the outset," and in lesser hostilities "when required in order to achieve military objectives"—i.e., without requirements for presidential authorization.21

There was an epilogue. Taylor solicited and gained an audience with the president and Radford on 24 May (the president had told the Joint Chiefs on 30 March that any of them "could always come along with Admiral Radford to see him," i.e., not alone). Taylor asserted that the JCS majority's emphasis on a big war starting with a Big Bang was contrary to the NSC's view (i.e., as stated in NSC 5602/1) that the two powers were more likely to back into war through a series of small actions and counteractions. Moreover, the argument that if the worst case was provided for, lesser ones could be handled in stride, was not supported by experience; brush fires must be dealt with at their own level. Moreover, the costs of building up "tremendous atomic forces and the defenses against them" would leave no funds for the kinds of forces needed to handle small wars.

The president heard Taylor out, then replied at length. He made no concessions. "It was fatuous to think that the U.S. and the USSR would be locked into a life and death struggle without using such weapons." The definition of general war to which Taylor objected was not important: "the question was simply one of a war between the United States and the USSR," and it must be assumed that atomic weapons would be used by both sides and at once. As for local wars, the president asserted that the use of tactical atomic weapons would be no more likely than old-fashioned "block-busters" to trigger the Big War. The United States must rely on countries attacked or threatened to defend themselves, with American help in organizing and equipping their forces, and on small U.S. mobile support forces armed with tactical atomic weapons that "have come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern armed forces." But the United States would not "deploy and tie down our forces around
the Soviet periphery in small wars." Massive retaliation, though maligned by some, would be the key to survival.22

As he listened to Radford's follow-on remarks enumerating some of the "far-reaching effects" of the president's decisions, Taylor knew that on these issues he was playing against a stacked deck: a built-in adverse majority in the JCS, a defense secretary who reflexively supported his boss and usually the JCS chairman as well, and a president who had made up his mind. On 29 May the Joint Chiefs received a revised draft JSOP-60. Subsequently, they deadlocked on the issue of the Air Force's demand, resisted by the other services, for more B-52s to replace B-47s. Radford noted that the aggregated cost estimates of the services far exceeded what the nation could afford. On 20 June Wilson once again sent back the draft paper to the JCS for further study, stipulating budget ceilings of $38 billion, $39 billion, and $40 billion, respectively, for FYs 1958-60.23

The Eisenhower-Radford Plan

Two weeks later, on 5 July, Radford gave his colleagues a paper outlining what Taylor later characterized as "the most drastic proposal of the New Look period." It declared that the essential aims of current military policy—capabilities to wage both general and limited war, reduction of overseas deployment, support of allies with atomic weapons if attacked, continued economic strength—now dictated certain measures. Beginning in 1957 Army forces in Europe and Asia would be reduced to small atomic task forces* responsible, with allied forces, for dealing with limited Communist aggression in those areas. Elsewhere, air and naval forces and a slimmed-down Marine Corps, all armed with atomic weapons, would take over the limited-war mission. At home the Army, with drastically reduced strength, would devote itself mainly to civil defense. Tactical air forces and airlift and sealift would also be severely cut back, but SAC and the Navy's antisubmarine warfare and strategic striking forces would be modernized at current levels. The "Radford Plan," as it was soon called, probably came as no great surprise to the other members of the JCS. Radford had ample warrant for his boldness, for every significant feature of the plan could be traced to the president himself. There was no need to worry that the plan went too fast or too far for the president.24

The Joint Chiefs considered Radford's paper on 9 July. Taylor "took the offensive at the start," stressing the plan's inconsistency. If it went into

* Ironically, the model for these groups was similar to the future "battle groups" Ridgway described in his memoirs.
effect, he pointed out, by 1960 U.S. forces would be shaped mainly to fight a general war with the USSR, beginning with a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. For the kinds of conflict, ranging from small local aggressions to regional wars on the scale of Korea, such components as SAC and continental air defense forces would become, in large part, "sterile assets." In lower-level conflicts, "small atomic task forces . . . cannot substitute for forces [eliminated in the plan] able to seize and hold ground." The plan was militarily unsound. It might deter the Soviets from initiating general war, but it could not deter or effectively combat infiltration, subversion, coups d'etat, or limited aggression. Politically, Taylor feared, the plan threatened disaster—a wave of force reductions among allies, defections from NATO, increasing neutralism.

Taylor was fighting more than concepts at this meeting. Radford's manpower figures showed that by 1960 the armed forces would take a one-third cut of about 800,000. The Army would, of course, bear the brunt, losing between 400,000 and 500,000 men, while the Navy would be cut 200,000 and the Air Force 150,000. Reportedly Radford did not circulate this manpower plan to the services, but he did send it to Assistant Secretary McNeil to provide the basis for a costing analysis. It is likely that Taylor—and perhaps the other chiefs as well—were aware before the meeting of the scale of the proposed manpower cuts. Taylor's account of the 9 July meeting, however, gave no hint that the information was discussed. His presentation, he wrote, was "received in strained silence. The other Chiefs gave me no support, the Chairman undertook no defense. The meeting broke up with no final action."

The immediate aftermath, however, brought important consequences. On 13 July the New York Times carried on its front page the first of a series of articles by veteran reporter Anthony Leviero, giving a generally accurate account of the whole episode. Leviero, using the 800,000 figure for the total cut, accurately cited the Navy and Air Force cuts and split the difference to arrive at the Army cut of 450,000. But his most startling "revelation" was that Radford's proposal had precipitated a "revolt" by the other chiefs, who "united in vigorous protest." Top Defense officials, Leviero reported, had also reacted with alarm to what they perceived as a proposed "withdrawal to a Fortress America." The New York Times story provoked alarmed reactions at home and abroad also and apparently influenced Wilson to order an indefinite suspension of the preparation of JSOP-60. On the 15th, the Times claimed that it had been assured by "competent Defense Department sources" that its published account was "entirely accurate."

Taylor's assumption during the 9 July meeting that his colleagues' silence following his aggressive rebuttal signified support of the
chairman, was not necessarily correct. For them, Taylor's vigorous counter-attack may have been an unexpected boon. Although the reasons of the other chiefs for opposing Radford probably differed significantly from Taylor's, all wanted at least to keep their existing programs, with their built-in tendency to grow instead of shrink. Radford's plan would make hash of existing mission assignments and called for a leap into a very cloudy future. The JCS evidently preferred the traditional incremental approach, one year at a time, fighting each budget battle as it came.

By the time the Leviero articles appeared, Radford's plan was on the shelf. Nevertheless, Leviero's revelations caused a "tremendous hullabaloo," as Taylor put it. Radford promptly issued a statement characterizing as "a mixture of fact and pure speculation" the views attributed to him. He did concede that manpower needs might well be reduced in the future by the introduction of new weapons, and he did not specifically deny any of the particulars of the articles, including the reported "revolt" of the service chiefs. Wilson on 7 August said that he had never seen the reported Radford paper and denied that any personnel reductions had been decided on.29

In Congress leading legislators hastened to voice their alarm loudly and publicly: an 800,000-man cut would be a national security disaster, and adoption of the plan would dictate a revision of foreign policy. Similar outcries came from NATO leaders, particularly West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who sent his highest-ranking general, Lt. Gen. Adolf Heusinger, to Washington to gain assurances that U.S. troop withdrawals were not in the offing. Taylor must have taken particular pleasure in speaking to Heusinger for the Joint Chiefs on this point.30

Air Force Perspectives

The abortive Eisenhower-Radford plan was the administration's first major response to the multiple challenges that would soon produce the so-called "New New Look." Had the plan not been foiled by the explosive domestic and international response to Leviero's journalistic coup, it might have superseded the New Look as the approved national strategy in the summer of 1956. As the revolt precipitated by its unveiling showed, however, it would, like the New Look before it, have been imposed on four, in varying degrees, dissenting and resisting services.

In the Air Force, the strategic air offensive, spearheaded by SAC, reigned supreme as the dominant war doctrine. Before 1950, when the Soviets had no atomic stockpile, the envisaged priority targets were population centers and war industries. When the Soviets acquired an
atomic stockpile and a growing delivery capability, SAC's primary mission increasingly came to be seen, as General LeMay explained, to "fight the air battle first, . . . [and] as quickly as possible destroy their capability of doing damage to us."31

By 1955, as the expectation grew that within a few years both sides would possess ready combat forces able to destroy each other's cities and industries, that target system seemed to be losing its utility. As long as the United States had a larger and varied stockpile of atomic weapons, as currently it did, the alternative "counterforce" strategy of attacking only key military targets promised to give it the upper hand. Objections to counterforce included the requirement for large numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and their cost, and the need for more accurate advance identification and location of Soviet forces than the Air Force possessed in mid-1956. Theoretically, a U.S. counterforce strategy could be effective only during a stage in the superpower arms race when U.S. offensive forces, even if vulnerable (like their adversaries) to a surprise attack, were still capable of overwhelming enemy defenses. In October 1955 Air Force Secretary Quarles referred to the next stage of the arms race, commonly labeled mutual deterrence, as "a stalemate that would be paradoxically, our best hope for peace."32

In the Air Force few agreed with Quarles. The prerequisites seemed too daunting and complex to be sustained for more than a brief period. An effective nuclear deterrent required offensive forces of sufficient power to overcome enemy defenses, plus defenses invulnerable to surprise or counterattack. Such forces seemed impossible for both sides to possess at the same time. To maintain a stalemate, on the other hand, both sides must have major offensive nuclear capabilities while "lacking defenses capable of protecting their vital areas from destruction by the enemy"—a theoretical standoff that would later be called "mutual assured destruction."33

Doctrinal thinking in the Air Force was not wholly preoccupied with the Big War. Not surprisingly, SAC's institutional rival, the Tactical Air Command (TAC), became a hotbed of concern for the problems of limited war, in part in an effort to broaden TAC's mission orientation beyond a defensive strategy. At an Air Force Commanders' Conference in May 1954, General Otto P. Weyland, the TAC commander, proposed that his command be authorized to create a mobile tactical air force, based in the United States, to deter brushfire conflicts abroad. In July 1955 Weyland's original proposal for tactical mobility took on reality when TAC activated the Nineteenth Air Force at Foster AFB, Texas, as an operational headquarters for what would later be called the Composite Air Strike Force. It reflected, announced Vice Chief of Staff General White, the "new look" in tactical
air forces resulting from TAC's new nuclear strike and aerial-refueling capabilities, "to meet the threat of lesser wars." The following year Weyland told the Symington airpower hearings that the United States needed adequate tactical air forces in being to deter brushfire wars, just as SAC deterred global wars. SAC's "postures and concepts," he asserted, were "limited to major war situations."34

Actually, current intelligence in 1956 indicated that the Soviets had no small-wars aim in view, but were going all out to develop long-range air and rocket forces and had prospects of forging ahead of the corresponding American efforts. In the Suez crisis later in 1956 the Soviets threatened to unleash IRBMs against the British and French, raising the ominous prospect of major local aggressions by Soviet client states, backed by the Soviets. Responding to this challenge, by late 1956 Secretary Quarles was publicly arguing that the ability to deter general war included also the ability to deter little wars, and the following February Twining asserted that local aggression would be dealt with by all appropriate U.S. resources, including "part of the strategic force," to end it quickly before it spread.35

**Flexible Response and Other Army Strategies**

Like the Air Force, the Army claimed a dominant role in the next Big War and lesser ones as well. For the Air Force the "Big" one was a short war, an all-out "exchange" of thermonuclear strikes that might leave "our" side not too damaged to declare victory. To the Army the Big War was a probably long, escalating, nuclear and conventional war, a replay of World War II with modern trappings. Army planners also foresaw a variety of less than all-out conflicts, some with a nuclear component, but all likely to thrust the Army into a leading role.36

During General Ridgway's tour as Army chief of staff he launched an ambitious retraining and doctrinal development effort to begin the task of readying his forces to operate in the presumed nuclear environment of the 1960s. The army of that period, he later wrote, would be "a streamlined, hard-hitting force, armed with a wide variety of nuclear weapons . . . and greatly improved non-nuclear weapons," and organized in "aggregations of small 'battle groups' of all arms—infantry, armor, artillery, and engineers." In both offensive and defensive maneuver, dispersion would be the basic rule for survival. In the face of the airpower orientation and Air Force domination of approved national military strategy, Army thinking, as presented by Ridgway, tended to assume a defensive, reactive cast aimed primarily at discrediting the strategy of
massive retaliation. Ridgway pointed out that the United States had reacted defensively to Communist hostility by building a network of alliances around the world, involving commitments, "some vague, some specific, to take action, to deploy forces, or to provide materiel support . . . . Those . . . pledges . . . express our intent to meet force with force . . . in local or global wars, with or without the use of nuclear weapons." By developing their own adequate nuclear deterrent, Ridgway believed, the Soviets could force the United States in a big war to confront them where they were stronger, in ground forces and supporting air forces, and on large land masses where superior American naval power could not be brought effectively to bear. Ridgway's proposed solution was "a fast-moving, hard-hitting, joint force in which the versatility of the whole is emphasized, and the preponderance of any one part [read, SAC] is de-emphasized." 37

Ridgway and his successor, General Taylor, thought much alike on most aspects of the Army's role in modern warfare. The purpose of a "proper" national strategy, in Taylor's stark definition, was "to deter war, particularly the general atomic war which will be so mutually destructive as to offer little choice between the fruits of victory or defeat." So compelling was this aim that its requirements must be "amply" satisfied before additional preparations were undertaken to fight and win an all-out nuclear war. It should not be difficult, Taylor thought, to deter the deliberate initiation of all-out war by either the USSR or the United States because both were aware of the "unremunerative character" of such a contest. The greater danger was that the superpowers might back into the Big War, "either by mistake or by way of a series of smaller military undertakings which expand into general war." It followed, therefore, that the national strategy must provide for deterring not only general war but limited aggression as well, "or of quickly suppressing it before it can grow"—without threatening or resorting to retaliation so massive as to provoke a like response.

In order of emphasis (not as preclusive priorities) Taylor listed the essential aims of his strategy: "to deter general war, to deter or win local war, and, finally, to cope with a general war if deterrence fails." This strategy required—in order of emphasis—maintenance of technological superiority over the Communist bloc, an effective atomic retaliatory capability and continental defense system, adequate (not merely token or "tripwire") ready forces deployed abroad to provide a buffer against aggression, other ready mobile forces at home, armed for both conventional and atomic combat and prepared to move rapidly to danger spots as needed, naval forces to keep important sea lanes open, and indigenous allied forces supported in part by military aid. To these he cautiously
added a requirement for limited mobilization of backup forces to reinforce the active forces during a period of tension either before or after hostilities began. The total bill would surely "exceed any peacetime budget in United States history." But the money would go mainly to buy deterrent strength.38

Taylor's strategy thus eschewed a "fixation on the requirements of survival in general atomic war," concentrating instead on measures to deter such a war.39 Among these measures, perhaps second only in importance to the air-nuclear retaliatory capability, was the deterrence or quick suppression of limited and local wars precipitated by Communist aggression. Such conflicts were prone to escalate. Radford's plan, much of current Air Force planning, and the approved massive retaliation strategy disposed of general war costs simply by positing a presumably victorious war ending shortly after an opening nuclear exchange. But the rigid rejection by Taylor's critics, notably the president, of even the possibility of a long war, conventional or less than apocalyptically nuclear, surely placed them well below the conceptual level of Taylor's hypothesis, which stressed the unpredictability of such events and candidly accepted calculated risks.

The Navy: Independent Player

In this period of trenchant debate over national security policy, the Navy occupied a middle position between the Air Force's primary emphasis on strategic nuclear airpower and the Army's reliance on multiservice forces. This position began to emerge late in 1953 when the chief of naval operations, Admiral Robert Carney, became Ridgway's quasi-ally in resisting the drastic force cutbacks imposed on the Army and Navy in the so-called "Interim Look." Carney protested, although in the end he accepted the massive retaliation strategy, but with reservations that went to the heart of the Navy's perceived role in the New Look. "The new emphases," he said at budget hearings in 1955, "have in no way altered the roles and missions of the Navy. It is still responsible for the accomplishment of its fundamental assigned mission: To gain and maintain control of the seas."40

Carney's successor, Admiral Burke, who took office on 17 August 1955, had previously registered his opposition to massive retaliation. He criticized as excessive and counterproductive its reliance on nuclear strategic airpower and its failure to provide adequate conventional forces to deal with the multifaceted threat of limited Communist aggression. But he supported the use of nuclear weapons in limited conflicts,
when appropriate. In 1956, as the junior member of the Joint Chiefs and an old friend of Radford, he refrained from active support of Taylor's views. Broadly speaking, the New Look and its impending revisions seemed unlikely to threaten the Navy's independent strategic mission of controlling the seas. Dissent might have jeopardized the Navy's interests as the lesser victim, after the Army, of prospective budget and force cuts. In a nuclear war, carrier striking forces, while unable to penetrate to the enemy's continental heartland, could complement SAC's bombers by attacking port and coastal installations. But until the development, several years down the road, of the 1,500-mile ballistic missile fired from a submerged nuclear-powered submarine, the Navy had no competitive alternative to the Air Force's long-range nuclear bomber.

Burke moved energetically to hasten that day. With Nautilus, the first nuclear sub, already at sea, Burke actively promoted the building of a nuclear-powered fleet. Against considerable resistance in his own service, he also put his weight behind the Navy's participation with the Army in the Jupiter IRBM development directed by Secretary Wilson in November 1955. A year later the Navy withdrew from the joint effort in order to build its own solid-propellant Polaris fleet ballistic missile.

Burke's strategic views matured steadily during this period and drew closer to those expounded by Taylor in the spring of 1956. During the Senate airpower hearings in June 1956 he asserted that the Navy planned not to rival, but to complement the Air Force's capabilities by preparing "to deal with isolated danger spots during periods of cold war as well as limited or global war." In November, protesting a proposed drastic reduction by OSD in the Navy's FY 1958 budget, he reasserted the unlikelihood of all-out nuclear war. Overemphasis on strategic bombers and nuclear weapons drained funds from other, more needed limited-war defense forces. Noting that several local conflicts had been contained or averted in recent years "without recourse to nuclear weapons," Burke recognized that quick settlement of such conflicts might require use of tactical nuclear weapons, but only as a last resort, with utmost care to avoid escalation to all-out war. A year and a half later, when Taylor renewed his attack on the massive retaliation strategy, Burke endorsed it fully, creating for the first time a majority of the Joint Chiefs favoring a primarily limited-war orientation of national strategy.41

The outcome of this prolonged debate between the services was once again, as in previous years, delay in acceptance and approval of the two war plans under consideration by the JCS. JSCP-57, on which work had begun in July 1955, and the initial draft of which had been submitted to the JCS on 13 March 1956, was not approved by the Joint Chiefs until
21 December 1956. As for the hotly debated JSOP-60, it experienced an even longer delay. In July 1956 Secretary Wilson ordered indefinite suspension of its preparation, and planning was not resumed until 1957.

The differences in strategic perspective between the major elements of the national security structure became sharper and more pronounced as the president, Wilson, and Radford sought to impose their strategic views on the military services. The administration's avowed intent to give what seemed overriding priority to strategic nuclear forces caused fear in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps that their status vis-à-vis the Air Force would be seriously diminished. Changes in strategic direction and large cuts in funds and manpower could seriously impact their operational capabilities and their missions. Under the pressure of tight ceilings for money and manpower the services felt compelled to battle for their own interests. Able to secure only minor modifications in the thrust of administration policy, the services engaged in intense, sometimes desperate, competition to secure larger shares of the limited resources made available. The issues that erupted from this competition in turn became the subject of heated public and congressional debate that clearly influenced policy decisions.

This period provides a fascinating and classic object lesson, and an instructive paradigm, of how American national security policy and its military strategy elements are fashioned. The events of these years seemed to lend point to the sardonic view that the real war was not between the United States and the Soviet Union but between the U.S. military services. Still, the continuing interaction of the policymaking process, with all of its twists and turns, uncertainties, and retreats, exemplified the American democratic process. From it emerged a synthesis that, even if it left most, if not all, parties dissatisfied in some measure, nevertheless was accepted as a workable modus vivendi.
United States defense policy during the years 1953-1956 reflected a surprising persistence of clear purpose: the New Look had a well-defined direction. Three paramount convictions, staunchly held and frequently invoked by President Eisenhower, constituted its essential foundations. First, the United States must shape its defense structure to deter a nuclear attack. Second, the country must maintain a healthy economy while meeting the requirements for national defense deemed acceptable by the administration. Third, Europe must be safeguarded from Communist attack by a strong NATO defense under the U.S. nuclear shield. The military strategy that emerged from this context accorded airpower, especially strategic nuclear forces, the highest priority. But it also clearly diminished the size and importance of land forces, with troublesome consequences for the Army. The diplomatic strategy that supported this posture emphasized the preeminence of European security.

Convinced that the combination of American and European arms constituted the best defense against the Soviet military challenge, Eisenhower continued the Truman administration's policy of bolstering Europe's defense capabilities and economic strength. More important, he undertook strategic initiatives, especially the development of ballistic missiles, that were intended to reassure the European states of the U.S. commitment to deter nuclear conflict in the NATO theater while continuing the objective of containing any further Soviet advance. Guided by the priorities of European defense, nuclear arms enhancement, and budget restraint, the administration studiously avoided deep entanglements in other zones of conflict, including the Far East, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. This avoidance reflected also Eisenhower's instinctive aversion, shared by Wilson, to U.S. involvement in areas of the world that
he believed did not warrant the commitment of U.S. military resources that could be better used elsewhere.

During the 1950s the USSR maintained large ground forces and tactical air units in Eastern Europe that appeared to pose a clear threat to Western Europe. The Soviet Union also acquired nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and built an extensive air defense system for protection of the Russian heartland. Confronting this burgeoning threat posed a challenge for the United States to establish a defense structure to counter the concentration of Soviet military might that imperiled not only Europe but also the United States. The question the Eisenhower administration addressed was straightforward: how to achieve the long-term security of the U.S. and its allies at minimum cost. The answer centered on two essential components: massive nuclear offensive power and protection of the air arm to assure its capacity for retaliation. This posture would be further enhanced by an air defense system for the whole United States. Uncertainties about the scope and cost of air defense delayed decisions and effective actions. The proposed posture also included the shaping of a diminished land force whose foundation rested in large part on a mobilization base and a reserve program. Such a combination of military elements had the attraction of providing for the defense of Europe and the United States while offering the possibility of reducing the number of Americans under arms both abroad and at home.

The predominance of American nuclear power, however, created tensions between the United States and its European allies and revealed conflicts that were inherent in the Eisenhower administration's priorities. Europe was both reassured and alarmed by U.S. nuclear strategy that, by the mid-1950s, saw the stationing in Europe of a number of B-47s equipped with an arsenal of atomic bombs. Fearful of the obvious danger to their countries from a European war, European leaders pushed for greater authority in any decision to employ these weapons. Washington opposed these requests, believing that such an arrangement would undermine the credibility of the airpower deterrent. Washington also encountered a second setback. As the U.S. strategic nuclear force took shape the allies tended to slacken their buildup of conventional forces—a situation that prevented the United States from sharply drawing down its own military manpower posted abroad. The administration found this especially disappointing. In an effort both to strengthen the allies' military power and to stimulate their economies so that these nations could assume more of their defense burden, the United States not only expanded its military and economic assistance but also increased its offshore military procurement. Although these programs worked, their success did not translate into a reduced U.S. military role abroad.
The president's defense policies and the tight budget ceilings required to free up financial resources for his priorities caused resistance within all the services, especially the Army, which mounted an assault on the New Look that intensified once Eisenhower made known his belief that in future wars the Army's role would consist chiefly of keeping domestic order in the United States. Both Generals Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor—the Army's chiefs of staff during the years 1953-1956—argued vigorously that the most likely form of future conflict would be incremental land aggression rather than nuclear war, since the prospect of mutual atomic devastation would deter combatants from using these weapons.

The president categorically rejected this reasoning and dismissed the Army's position as self-serving. Should a conflict occur with the USSR, he believed the Soviets would immediately resort to nuclear arms and the United States had to be prepared to do the same. The Army's position—that the United States should maintain a broad range of military options from nuclear to conventional—was, in his judgment, too expensive. Adamant in this conviction, Eisenhower pursued policies that diminished the capacity of U.S. conventional military response to defense crises by nuclearizing American forces. He intended that America's military strength be designed primarily for deterring nuclear attack and protecting the nation if attack should occur. Other goals, such as halting low-level insurgency, might be desirable, but they were preferably to be pursued by less costly means—covert actions, surrogate forces—that did not place a heavy financial burden on the U.S. economy.

Although the New Look had clear objectives, the years from 1953 to 1956 were marked by uncertainty. After Stalin's death in March 1953, some evidence indicated that Russian officials were placing a greater emphasis on meeting consumer needs. Even more hopeful were reports suggesting a greater willingness on the part of Russian officials to negotiate. But these impressions had at best a gossamer texture—Russia's true intentions remained inscrutable. Was the Soviet Union preparing for an inevitable war with the United States or was it willing to coexist? Was the Soviet bloc content with piecemeal expansion or did it intend to launch a major attack on Western Europe? Admittedly far behind the West in economic strength, the Soviet economy appeared to be growing; certainly its advances in weaponry could not be denied. By 1956 the USSR possessed a formidable array of planes, ships, and men under arms and a growing arsenal of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Administration critics intoned a constant refrain that emphasized Soviet airpower, a mass of aircraft capable of hitting U.S. cities with thermo-nuclear destructive power.
Seemingly confident that it was riding the crest of history, the Soviet Union deliberately cultivated an aggressive image. Its influence appeared to be spreading to all parts of the globe. Members of the press along with Democrats in the House and Senate painted a grim picture. The United States was vulnerable to air attack; its allies in Europe were weak and dispirited. Communism had triumphed in China; Western influence in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East was in decline; domestic subversion was on the rise, not only in Central and Latin America but also within the United States itself. Perhaps the American century had already passed.

Eisenhower and Wilson would not be stampeded by this litany of doom. Eisenhower brought to the presidency a thorough knowledge of defense strategy, a deep understanding of the structure of forces, and perhaps most important, a well-developed skepticism of the military budget process. He believed that too often the services advanced programs and interests inspired as much by interservice rivalry for funds as by a genuine concern for achieving the best national defense. As commander in chief he remained confident in the military superiority of the United States and its allies. He was especially impressed by the persuasive power of atomic weaponry, a conviction confirmed in his judgment by the successful settlement of the Korean conflict. Eisenhower's faith in the technological lead enjoyed by the United States in advanced weaponry received important reinforcement from his secretary of defense.

Chosen by Eisenhower to manage the Department of Defense, Wilson prided himself most on being an engineer and on understanding that government-supported science and technology constituted critical components of the nation's security. Wilson also knew his limitations—he was no strategist, although he did not believe that the United States would confront a potent strategic threat until after 1960 at the earliest. Like the president, Wilson also recognized the growing power of the USSR and remained committed to reaching an accommodation along the lines of mutual deterrence. Wilson defined his primary role as executing the policy of the president. Eisenhower set the budget ceilings, embraced the concept of deterrence, and decided on the structure of forces.

But Eisenhower also understood his own limitations—he was not an engineer, he could not know with confidence what was technologically possible. That recognition on the part of the president provided the core ingredient for his and Wilson's successful relationship. Although at times irritated with his secretary of defense, Eisenhower accepted that on matters of engineering, science, and technology, Wilson was more deeply informed. Nowhere was this more important than in dealing with ballistic missiles.
In 1953, the biggest liability with regard to missiles was that their target error was still estimated in miles. The prevailing wisdom that the problems of accurate targeting could not be overcome soon came under challenge from several high-level studies in 1953 and 1954 that argued for the feasibility of effective long-range missiles. Current intelligence estimates put the USSR well ahead of the United States in long-range missile development. These estimates projected that the Soviets would have an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) by 1957 to 1959 and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as early as 1960.

Influenced by these developments, the president commissioned the Killian Panel, whose February 1955 report strongly recommended that, given the danger to the European alliance posed by these weapons, the United States should simultaneously pursue the building of an ICBM and a land- and sea-based IRBM. The president initially expressed skepticism of the recommendation for a variety of reasons, including cost, but most especially because of its potential for setting off another round of fierce interservice rivalry. Nonetheless, in this critical matter he deferred to the secretary of defense. Here Wilson made his greatest contribution—and most important defense decision—by persuading the president to authorize the parallel and concurrent development of the IRBM and the ICBM. Wilson's confidence that this was the right course of action came from his understanding that what drove advances in the technology of weaponry came not only as a consequence of the competition between the U.S. and USSR, but just as importantly because of the rivalry between U.S. defense contractors. The president's trust in his secretary's judgment in this matter could not have been stated more explicitly than in an authorizing memorandum to Wilson:

It was with some qualms that I approved the plan of allowing the three different Services to work on the problem of long-range ballistic missiles. This doubt was inspired not only by historical difficulties in achieving adequate coordination among the Services, but because of the uneasy feeling in my own mind that the August-to-November delay in issuing the necessary Defense directives in this matter had been occasioned by arguments among them as to who was to carry the responsibility. All this seemed to me to presage similar difficulties in the future. However, on your assurance that in the current plan all such differences were, and would continue to be, eliminated and that in your opinion two separate programs could be carried on simultaneously and with the resulting benefits of competition, all to be achieved without mutual interference, I approved the system that the Defense department suggested.1
Perhaps more than any other move, this reassured the European nations that the United States could provide for their protection even though it also caused them to fear that Europe might become a nuclear battleground. The consequences of Wilson's actions extended beyond his term in office. By the early 1960s it became clear that the United States held a commanding lead over the Soviet Union in missile capability. Conceivably the lead would have opened without the accelerated effort promoted by Wilson. But his conclusion to move ahead on the twin trajectory of IRBM and ICBM development may have been the single most important U.S. decision in the history of strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Wilson's decision foreclosed or severely constrained other options, particularly continental defense. Although dire forecasts with respect to U.S. vulnerability were made repeatedly, the administration refused to pursue a crash continental defense policy, in part because continental defense had no strong constituency pushing it within the services. Hence no real parallel constituency existed in Congress or among the broader public. Moreover, the JCS consistently favored an offensive as opposed to a defensive posture; continental defense would compete for money with the much-preferred offensive systems. Only after the 1955 "bomber gap" scare and intelligence reports of growing Soviet airpower and advances in missiles did the administration and JCS agree to provide defenses to insure the Strategic Air Command's capacity for retaliation. Even within the Air Force—the service that continental defense would have most benefited—the weight of official opinion resisted any programs that might result in reduced B-52 and other aircraft procurement. The staggering costs associated with a massive continental defense effort constituted another major impediment. Such a program would have to feature as a key component a broad civil defense structure that not only entailed huge expenditures but would probably also be politically unacceptable.

One further consequence of the decision to accelerate the ballistic missile program was to make any talk of disarmament or arms reduction moot. In reality no real potential for meaningful action ever existed. The need to protect Europe and the United States restricted whatever small flexibility might have been possible. Although the Soviet "peace offensive" of 1953-54 demanded some response from the United States, no real constituency interested in exploring it existed anywhere except perhaps in some circles of the Department of State. But within the defense establishment all parties, including the president and his defense secretary, believed the only realistic course was to stay ahead of the USSR
in military strength, particularly airpower. That they did, through their energetic exercise of the power and authority vested in their offices.

The effort to create a smaller and more technologically advanced military machine that would stay ahead of the Soviets and yet be affordable for defense of the country engaged Wilson’s full-time attention and received close and constant guidance from a greatly concerned Eisenhower. Confronted in 1953 with a budget that allocated almost three-quarters of the government’s income to national defense, the Eisenhower administration experienced enormous pressures to rein in the heavy requirements of the military establishment. The Korean War armistice in July 1953 made it possible to effect large reductions in the size and cost of the armed forces. Military manpower was reduced by 20 percent between 1953 and 1956—from 3.5 million to 2.8 million. This should be compared with the fewer than 1.5 million in uniform at the beginning of the Korean War. Budgets (total obligational authority) declined from $57 billion in FY 1952 to $44 billion in FY 1953 and $30 billion in FY 1954. Thereafter they rose steadily to almost $34 billion in FY 1955 and $38 billion in FY 1956 and would continue to rise.

Domestic critics—foremost among them within the administration Treasury Secretary George Humphrey—demanded large cuts in the military establishment in the name of fiscal responsibility. But the cold war exerted powerful pressures in the opposite direction. Perception of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism as an enduring and growing threat to the security of the United States diminished the thrust of the budget cutters. The need to maintain large U.S. forces in Europe and Korea to help protect those areas from attacks effectively slowed and diluted efforts to make huge cuts in manpower. The constant demand for new and improved weapons—especially ballistic missiles and aircraft—created by a dynamic technology at ever-increasing cost constituted a powerful offset to the efforts to hold down the national defense budget.

Eisenhower and Wilson walked a narrow line as they sought to get the balance right. Decisions on manpower and money generally represented compromises between what seemed desirable and what was deemed possible. This was the essence of the process of decisionmaking in a democracy. While the allocation of the means ebbed and flowed in the volatile domestic and international context, the aim remained constant—safeguarding the nation and its democratic foundations. In this the Eisenhower administration succeeded admirably through pursuit of careful and cautious policies during these years—1953-1956—that in retrospect appear to have served the nation well.
## List of Abbreviations

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<td>ADC</td>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<td>AEW</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning</td>
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<td>AEW&amp;C</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning and Control</td>
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<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFPC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Policy Council</td>
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<td>AMAS</td>
<td>American Military Assistance Staff</td>
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<td>AMAY</td>
<td>American Military Assistance, Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<td>ARDC</td>
<td>Air Research and Development Command</td>
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<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>ATSD</td>
<td>Assistant to the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>AWF</td>
<td>Ann Whitman File</td>
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<td>BNSP</td>
<td>Basic National Security Policy</td>
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<td>BoB</td>
<td>Bureau of the Budget</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Comptroller</td>
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<td>CenDec</td>
<td>Central Decimal</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CINCEUR</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
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<td>CINCFE</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Far East</td>
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<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>CONAD</td>
<td>Continental Air Defense Command</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
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<td>DDEL</td>
<td>Dwight David Eisenhower Library</td>
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<td>DEFREPNAMA</td>
<td>Defense Representative, North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DepSecDef</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>DEW</td>
<td>Distant Early Warning</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DRV</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUR/RA</td>
<td>Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<td>EUR/WE</td>
<td>Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCDA</td>
<td>Federal Civil Defense Administration</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>French Expeditionary Corps</td>
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<td>FMA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOA</td>
<td>Foreign Operations Administration</td>
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<td>G/PM</td>
<td>Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCFA</td>
<td>House Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>HSCA</td>
<td>House Subcommittee on Appropriations</td>
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<td>IAC</td>
<td>Intelligence Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>ICA</td>
<td>International Cooperation Administration</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Control Commission</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs</td>
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<td>JCAE</td>
<td>Joint Committee on Atomic Energy</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JLRSE</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate</td>
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<td>JMRWP</td>
<td>Joint Medium-Range War Plan</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
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<td>JSPC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plans Committee</td>
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<td>JSSC</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Survey Committee</td>
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<td>LOFAR</td>
<td>Low-Frequency Acquisition and Ranging</td>
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<td>M&amp;RA</td>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
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<td>MATS</td>
<td>Military Air Transport Service</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDAP</td>
<td>Mutual Defense Assistance Program</td>
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<td>memorandum for the record</td>
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<td>MS</td>
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<td>Mutual Security Agency</td>
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<td>MSTS</td>
<td>Military Sea Transport Service</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NESC</td>
<td>Net Evaluation Subcommittee</td>
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<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<td>New Obligational Authority</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>National Security Training Commission</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
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<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>OCB</td>
<td>Operations Coordinating Board</td>
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<td>Office of Defense Mobilization</td>
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<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PL</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Regimental Combat Team</td>
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<td>RG</td>
<td>Record Group</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Republic of Vietnam Air Force</td>
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<td>S&amp;L</td>
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<td>S/P</td>
<td>Policy Planning Staff, Department of State</td>
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<td>S/S</td>
<td>Executive Secretariat, Department of State</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<td>SAGE</td>
<td>Semi-Automatic Ground Environment</td>
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<td>Senate Committee on Armed Services</td>
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<td>SCFR</td>
<td>Senate Committee on Foreign Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>SETAF</td>
<td>Southern Europe Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Standing Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCA</td>
<td>Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Technological Capabilities Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>TERM</td>
<td>Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIM</td>
<td>Training Relations and Instructions Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRUST</td>
<td>Trieste United States Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMT</td>
<td>Universal Military Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARIT</td>
<td>United States Army, Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>United States Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USec</td>
<td>Under Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNA</td>
<td>Vietnamese Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDD</td>
<td>Western Development Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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</table>
The citations that follow represent a wide variety of published and unpublished sources. Detail has been kept to a minimum without sacrificing essential information. Full publication information is in the bibliography.

Unless otherwise noted, all citations of archival documents refer to the retired records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Record Group (RG) 330. Also used were the General Records of the Department of State (RG 59) and Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218).

At the time the author conducted his research, the National Archives buildings—in downtown Washington, D.C., and later also in College Park, Maryland—in general housed RG 330 materials only through 1954. Records for subsequent years remained under OSD control and had to be consulted at the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. Many collections for this later period have since been transferred to the College Park facility, where they will be reboxed and incorporated in RG 330. In the notes, however, these collections are identified—as they were when researched—by their Washington National Records Center accession and box numbers.

Files identified as "OSD Hist" are in the custody of the OSD Historical Office. References to the Congressional Record are either to the version published on a day-by-day basis, with date and page numbers, or to the record version published subsequently, with part and page numbers. Principal abbreviations used in the notes are identified in the List of Abbreviations.

**PROLOGUE: ATOMIC WEAPONS AND THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR**

Notes to Pages 2-10 685

8. Memo of disc at 145th NSC mtg, 20 May 53, ibid, 1065-68, 1068-69, 1071; memo of mtg w/Pres Johnson, 17 Feb 65, FRUS 1964-68, II:300-01. The participants at the latter meeting included President Lyndon B. Johnson, Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler, Johnson's national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, and General Andrew J. Goodpaster. At that meeting Eisenhower recounted how he passed a series of messages to the Koreans and the Chinese that brought the Korean War to a close.
10. The president cited the relationship between Operation Solarium and the administration's discussions regarding continuing the use of atomic weapons in Korea in the NSC meeting of 13 May 1953. See FRUS 1952-54, XV, pt 1:1016.

I. NEW BOSSES IN THE E RING

1. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 100-01; Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, 20-23; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, 721; Richard S. Kirkendall, ed, The Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia, 109, which contains the remark by Stephen E. Ambrose about the transition.
2. New Republic (Dec 52), 15. Columnist "TRB" here labeled the incoming cabinet as comprising "eight millionaires and a plumber." The "plumber" was Martin Durkin, president of the AFL plumbers' union, the only Democrat and the only Catholic in the cabinet.
3. E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957, 34-37, 42; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 86.
5. Geelhoed, Wilson, 19 (citing James D. Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, 163), 38-39, 42.
10. In 1958 the chiefs were to oppose successfully a move to incorporate them in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. See Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960, vol III in History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 279-83.
11. The other two chiefs were General J. Lawton Collins, Army chief of staff, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force chief of staff. See Department of Defense Key Officials, 1947-1995, 60-61; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 582-83.
13. For this discussion of Wilson's confirmation hearings I have drawn heavily on the excellent, more detailed treatment in chapter 3 of Geelhoed, Wilson, 40-58.
14. U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec 434 (1863).
15. Geelhoed, Wilson, 45; Borklund, Men of the Pentagon, 79, 141-42.
16. Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, 1953 (hereafter Wilson Public Statements), 1:27 (emphasis supplied). At the time even many of those who had seen or heard of the actual statement regarded the inversion, i.e., "What was good for General Motors was good for the country," as Wilson's real view.
22. This section is based on a draft study prepared by Ronald Hoffman, OSD Hist.
46. Randall interv, 26 Apr 88, 33-34, 45.
II. REORGANIZING DEFENSE


2. Eisenhower speech to Republican Party rally in Baltimore, 25 Sep 52, cited in New York Times, 26 Sep 52; ltr Eisenhower to Wilson, 9 Feb 53, 1953 Rockefeller Committee Files, OSD Hist. Eisenhower gave him the options of a reorganization commission or a "continuing advisory body."

3. The other staff members were Carl H. Pfuntner, Rudolph A. Winnacker, George A. Wyeth, and John D. Young. See "Rockefeller Committee Background Paper," nd, 1953 Rockefeller Committee Files, OSD Hist.


6. Ltr Lovett to Truman, 18 Nov 52, in Cole et al, Department of Defense, 115-26; ltr Price to Lovett, 12 Mar 53, ltr Coolidge to Foster, 22 Sep 52, summary statement of Outline of Coolidge Proposals: fldr Reading Files Original, 1953 Rockefeller Committee Files, OSD Hist. A good summary is in Condit, Test of War, 525-29.


16. Memo Kent for Kyes, 26 Feb 53, ibid; Cole et al, Department of Defense, 143-49.


29. Ibid, 142-43.
30. Ltr Wilson to Pres, 13 Apr 53, Chron File, Partial Log of Progress of Rockefeller Committee Report, Mr. Wyeth File: 1953 Rockefeller Committee Files, OSD Hist.
33. Ltr Arends to Pres, 20 May 53, 1953 Rockefeller Committee Files, OSD Hist. Eisenhower’s reply was dated 25 May. “Prussian General Staff” was a term widely used as a pejorative by opponents of unification and a strengthened JCS chairman.
43. See Chapter XXVII.
45. Memo of conf w/Pres, 30 Mar 56, ibid, 281; memo of conf w/Pres, 5 Apr 56, ibid, 285-90.
46. See Chapter XXVII.
47. Ibid.
49. Memo of conf w/Pres, 24 May 56, \textit{FRUS 1955-57, XIX}:311-15. See also Chapter XXVII.
53. Memo of disc at 280th NSC mtg, 22 Mar 56, ibid, 269-70.
54. Memo of disc at 285th NSC mtg, 17 May 56, ibid, 310.
55. Memo of conf w/Pres, 14 May 56, ibid, 302.
57. Memo of conf w/Pres, 5 Apr 56, \textit{FRUS 1955-57, XIX}:288.
III. MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

1. Geelhoed, *Wilson*, 41 and n 4, citing papers in the Wilson Archive at Anderson College, asserts they had known each other and had corresponded for several years. Ambrose, *President*, 23, states they had never met. He cites Geelhoed’s book, but not the references noted above.


3. Memo McNeil for McElroy, 23 Apr 58, fldr House Approp Cte FY 1958, ASD(C) Testimony, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

4. Interv with McNeil by Doris M. Condit and Ronald Hoffman, 7 Jun 76, OSD Hist.

5. Memo of disc at 132d NSC mtg, 18 Feb 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.

6. For the Indochina crisis of 1954, see Chapter XXIII.

7. Memo McNeil for DepAsstSec for Nat Sec Affairs and Plans, OSD(ISA), 23 May 57, fldr FY 1958 Budget File #1A, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.


9. Briefing of American Society of Newspaper Editors, 15 Apr 54, fldr Preparation of the FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; McNeil interv, 31 May 74 and 7 Jun 76, OSD Hist, passim.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid; McNeil interv, 7 Jun 76, OSD Hist, 65 (quote).


20. Ibid, 105, 541.


22. Ibid, 541-42.

23. Ibid, 542-44.


30. ASD(C) paper, “FY 1956 Justification of Army’s Unobligated Funds,” fldr House Approp Cte FY 1956, SecDef Testimony, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.


32. Ibid, 970-71, 974-75, 1041.

33. Ibid, 1032 (foldout table).

34. Ibid, 1088-90.


IV. SHRINKING THE TRUMAN BUDGET


10. Ltr Dodge to SecDef, 3 Feb 53, fldr CD 111 (1954) 1953, box 18, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 129.


13. Ltr Dodge to SecDef, 3 Feb 53, cited in n 10.
15. In his memoirs Eisenhower stated the figure of “something like” $60 billion was mentioned in the conversation. In Taft’s prepared text issued to the press, however, which Eisenhower had gone over in advance, the senator stated that they had agreed on the desirability of reducing spending to “about $70 billion” in FY 1954 and to $60 billion in FY 1955. See *Mandate for Change*, 64; Murphy, “The Eisenhower Shift, I,” 87; table, *Budget Bureau Estimates of New Authority . . . ,* 17 Feb 53, cited in n 3.
17. Memos of disc at 131st and 132d NSC mtgs, 11, 18 Feb 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
18. Dodge mentioned this figure at the NSC meeting on the 18th (memo of disc cited in n 17). See also memo Glass for Stone, 17 Feb 53, cited in n 4.
25. Ibid.
27. Ibid, 6, 7. Miffed by Wilson’s cool response to his idea of procurement savings, Mahon later complained to McNeil (ibid, 133).
28. Ibid, 21-26, 31, 32.
29. Ibid, 4.
31. Memo of disc at 133d NSC mtg, 24 Feb 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
39. *FRUS 1952-54*, II, pt 1:244-45; memo of disc at 135th NSC mtg, 4 Mar 53, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL; memo Kyes for SvcSecs, ASD(C), JCS, 9 Mar 53, fldr Effects of Balanced Budget Expenditures 1954-55, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. In the president’s absence, Vice President Nixon presided over this NSC meeting; probably the president had approved the proposal before the meeting.
40. ASD(C) paper, "Informal Suggestions as to Response to NSC Action 730-c," 6 Mar 53, fldr Effects of Balanced Budget Expenditures 1954-55, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.


43. Memo Bradley (for JCS) for SecDef, 19 Mar 53, ibid.

44. Memo McNeil for Wilson, 19 Mar 53, ibid.


49. See ltr Robert Cutler to Kyes, 5 Jun 53, w/atchd draft memo summarizing NSC actions and discussions on budget in March and April, fldr CD 111 (1954) 1953, box 19, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953.

50. Paper by Philip Odeen (Off of Econ Adviser), "Revision of the FY 1954 Budget by the Eisenhower Administration," 17 May 61, in fldr Budget History (Summary), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.


52. Memo atchd to ltr Cutler to Kyes, 5 Jun 53, cited in n 49. The final version of NSC 149 was NSC 149/2, dated 29 April 1953, Basic National Security Policies and Programs in Relation to their Costs, in FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:305-16.


55. Memo Douglas for ASD(C), 17 Apr 53, ibid.

56. Earlier in April the Air Force had used a similar tactic in resisting the OSD staff analysis of the FY 1954 budget issued on 26 and 27 March. See memo H. Lee White for SecDef, 9 Apr 53, ibid.


58. Unsgd paper, 21 Apr 53, fldr NSC 149 Security Policies and Programs, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; note by ExecSec to NSC, w/ NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:306. See also memo ExecSec for NSC, 24 Apr 53, fldr CD 381 War Plans NSC 149 ... , box 34, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953.

59. Unsgd paper, "Discussion of Possibilities ... ;" nd, in fldr FY 1954 Budget Fact Book, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

60. Memo Garlock for SecDef, 18 Apr 53, w/atchmt, cited in n 57; NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:305-17.

61. Memo Garlock for SecDef, 18 Apr 53, par 9d, cited in n 61.

62. Ltr Dodge to SecDef, 7 May 53, in HSCA, DoD Hearings, 1954, 309; NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53, par 9e and g, cited in n 61.


64. Unsgd paper, "The FY 1954 Funding Problem in Relation to NSC Expenditure Objectives," nd, fldr FY 1954 Budget Fact Book, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Although no addressee is indicated, it seems probable that a message of such importance was intended for the secretary, and therefore was probably sent over McNeil's signature.
66. Memo Garlock for SecDef, 18 Apr 53, cited in n 57. For service requests, see memo Stevens for SecDef, 10 Apr 53, memo ActSecArmy for SecDef, 17 Apr 53, memo SecNavy for SecDef, 14 Apr 53, memo James H. Douglas (DepSecDef) for ASD(C), 18 Apr 53; fldr CD 111 (1954) 1953, boxes 18-19, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953.
67. Memo Garlock for SecDef, 18 Apr 53, cited in n 57; unsgd paper, "Discussion of Possibilities . . .", nd, cited in n 59; statement by DepSecDef Kyes at White House conference of Republican leaders, 30 Apr 53, fldr Revised FY 1954 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
68. Ltr Dodge to SecArmy, 20 May 53, fldr FY 1955 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

V. DEFENSE GOES TO CAPITOL HILL: THE FY 1954 BUDGET

1. For the president's briefing to legislative leaders, see Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 129-31, and Joseph and Stewart Alsop's column, New York Herald Tribune, 6 May 53. The president's 30 April press conference is in Eisenhower Public Papers, 1953, 239-52; the 19 May radio address, 306-16; the 10 June address, 384-92. Much of the information for this chapter is in unclassified subject folders marked "Budget" and organized by month in OSD Hist.
2. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 130.
10. Ibid, 361 (quote), 387-90. The claim that the entire $5 billion was a "statistical result" of process was, of course, false, since that figure had been given to McNeil as a stipulated parameter for analysis. Later, however, McNeil sustained the party line. See ibid, 471-72.
15. Ibid, 427.
16. Ibid, 44.
31. Ibid, 284, 289 (quote), 292, 308.
32. Ibid, 244, 247-48, 251, 252 (quote), 255, 263, 288-89.
33. Ibid, 163 (quote), 244-45, 253 (quote), 257, 263.
34. SSCA, *DoD Hearings, 1954*, pt 1:188.
41. Ibid, 276, 318, 349, 355-54.
42. Ibid, 345-46, 349 (quote), 355.
44. Ibid, 435-38.
45. Ibid, 531-34, 543-47, 564-65 (quotes).
47. Ibid, 460-64, 541-42 (quotes, 462, 464).
49. Ibid, 467-68, 511 (quotes), 552.
50. Ibid, 508, 526, 548, 557 (quotes, 508, 548).
54. Ibid, 976-77.
56. Ibid, 49-53.
58. Ibid, 7752-53, 7809, 7955-56. Mahon's amendment provided for the addition of $1.175 billion, including all of Vandenberg’s $1.435 billion “wish list” except the military construction item, which was covered in a separate supplementary appropriations bill.
59. Ibid, 7808-09, 7955-56. See also speeches of Representatives Holifield and Yorty, ibid, 7943-44.
60. Ltr Eisenhower to Scriver, 30 Jun 53, ibid, 7817.
62. Symington had sought unsuccessfully to have budget witnesses interrogated by his committee (*Cong Rec*, Senate, 83 Cong, 1 sess, pt 7:9483). See also S Rpt No 601, 17 Jul 53, 12-19; OSD(C) table, *Congressional Action on Basic FY 1954 Budget Request*, 1 May 56, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
64. Table, *Congressional Action on Basic FY 1954 Budget Request*, 1 May 56, cited in n 62; *Cong Rec*, Senate, 83 Cong, 1 sess, pt 8:10252-58, 10339-49.
65. PL 179-83, 1 Aug 53.
VI. DEBATING DEFENSE OF THE CONTINENTAL VITALS


8. NSC 141, 19 Jan 53, ibid, 210-11, 213-14; memo DirPolPlngStf for SecState, 12 Jan 53, ibid, 202-05 (quote, 203).

9. Memo Savage, 10 Feb 53, ibid, 231-34 (quote, 231); Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 118. In March, however, the chiefs conceded the need for allocating more resources to continental defense, affirming that there could be "no reduction in the commitment to defend the United States against disaster," even if this meant "some modification of the policies pertaining to other areas." See memo by Nitze and Savage, 6 May 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:318-23 (quote, 320).


12. DoD Ad Hoc Study Group Report, w/ cover ltr to SecDef, 11 May 53, DoD press release, 3 Jun 53: fldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 119-20. According to Watson, the report was apparently not submitted to the NSC although Wilson told Dr. Kelly, in his letter thanking him, that he expected to make it available to the council.

17. Memo of disc at 148th NSC mtg, 4 Jun 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:367-70 (quotes, 369); NSC 140/1, w/ rel corres, ibid, 328-49 (quote, 333), 355-60.
20. Ibid, 118, n 22.
21. The ensuing discussion of the Bull report is based on ibid, 121-25.
23. ADC study, cited in n 3; memo AsstCompN for ASD(C), 18 Sep 53, flldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
27. NSC Action 873, 6 Aug 53, cited in ibid.
34. Memo JCS for SecDef, 28 Aug 53, flldr CD 381 (Nat Sec), Def Exec Off, GenDec Files 1953. The chiefs were vague as to how priorities should be used ("only as a guide for bringing all programs into alignment").
36. Memo McNeil for Nash, 19 Sep 53, flldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 129, citing NSC 159/3, 16 Sep 53.
37. Memo JCS for SecDef, 22 Sep 53, flldr CD 381 (Nat Sec), Def Exec Off, GenDec Files 1953, OSD Hist.
44. Memo Cutler for SecDef, 28 Oct 53, fldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
46. Ibid, 478-79.
50. Ltr Cutler to Kyes, 24 Nov 53, w/ attached MFR 23 Nov 53, fldr CD 381 (Cont Def) 23 Nov 53, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953. See also memo McNeil for Kyes, 30 Nov 53, MFR Col C.H. Bonesteel III, 7 Dec 53; fldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
51. NSC 159/4, 25 Sep 53, *FRUS 1952-54*, II, pt 1:483-84, paras 15a and b. A long list of smaller programs was also to attain a high state of readiness in two years; see MFR Cutler, 23 Nov 53, ltr Cutler to Kyes, 25 Nov 53, w/ attachment paper dd 24 Nov 53; fldr CD 381 (Cont Def) 23 Nov 53, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953.
56. Memo of disc at 176th NSC mtg, 16 Dec 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
58. Memo AssocDirBoB for DASD(C), 18 Jan 54, w/ OSD table, Estimated Phasing of and Expenditure for DoD Continental Defense Programs, 12 Feb 54, and charts attached to paper, "Oral Presentation by JCS for SecDef to NSC on Continental Defense," nd, fldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1953-54*, 130-33.
60. OSD table, Estimated Phasing . . . , cited in n 58.
62. Memo Bonesteel for ASD(C) et al, 5 Feb 54, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
64. HSCA, *DoD Hearings*, 1955, 86.
VII. ECONOMY AND STRATEGY DECOUPLED: THE OCTOBER 1953 BUDGET CRISIS

1. Ltr Dodge to SecArmy, 20 May 53, fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
9. Ltr Dodge to SecDef, 10 Jul 53, fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
12. Memo of disc at 154th NSC mtg, 14 Jul 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; memo Glass for SecDef (ca 3 Aug 53), atchd to memo Mautz for McNeil, 20 Aug 53, fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Not all the figures used in this paragraph appear in the summary of the NSC meeting; the Glass memo contains additional figures describing the "BoB approach" to the FY 1955 budget problem. The latter figures have been used to flesh out the summary of the NSC meeting, along with those in the 10 July BoB tables, on the assumption that they were probably used in Dodge's presentation. It is not clear in the summary from which figure the $12 billion was to be subtracted; the Glass memo states it was to be taken from the security program expenditures in the revised FY 1954 budget.
15. Chart, "Expenditures for Military Functions of DoD, FY 1954-55, Estimated on Basis of Procurement Programs Under Way and Financed," nd, fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Not all the figures used in this paragraph appear in the summary of the NSC meeting; the Glass memo contains additional figures describing the "BoB approach" to the FY 1955 budget problem. The latter figures have been used to flesh out the summary of the NSC meeting, along with those in the 10 July BoB tables, on the assumption that they were probably used in Dodge's presentation. It is not clear in the summary from which figure the $12 billion was to be subtracted; the Glass memo states it was to be taken from the security program expenditures in the revised FY 1954 budget.
16. The figures Garlock used can be found in the table, An Approach to the FY 1955 Budget Based on Estimated 1955 Revenue, 14 Aug 53, ibid.
17. Ltr Pres to SecDef, 6 Aug 53, ibid.
20. Under the apportionment process, BoB was authorized to determine what obligations might be incurred by agencies within a congressional appropriation. See BoB paper, "Approach to 1954 and 1955 Expenditures—DoD," nd, fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
22. Memo SecDef for SvcSecs and ASD(C), 12 Aug 53, w/atchd Ltr Pres to SecDef, 6 Aug 53, ibid. The president's letter had been read the day before at a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council. For discussion of the JCS report to the president, dated 8 August 1953, see memo of disc at 160th NSC mtg, 27 Aug 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:444-55.

26. Taft and the other Republican leaders wanted the review to be completed by 1 August. See Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 15-17, n 69, n 74; Snyder, "New Look," 411-15; Ridgway, Soldier, 267.


28. Ibid.


37. Memo Pres for SecDef, 1 Jul 53, cited in n 27.


41. Eisenhower Public Papers, 1953, 388; News Conf, 30 Apr 53, ibid, 239; Gleason memos of disc at NSC mtgs on 31 Mar, 6, 13, 20 May 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.

42. Memo Radford for SecDef, 8 Aug 53, cited in n 38.


44. Memo McNeil for SecDef, 9 Sep 53, sched atchd to memo Cutler for DirBoB, 3 Sep 53: fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

45. This analysis of Dodge's thinking is, in part, inferred from his actions and tactics at this stage of the budget preparation and from a few documentary sources, particularly his memo to the president. See memo Dodge for Pres, 9 Sep 53, admin ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

46. Memo McNeil for SecDef, 9 Sep 53, memo Cutler for DirBoB, 3 Sep 53: cited in n 44.

47. Memo Dodge for Pres, 9 Sep 53, cited in n 45; memo Wilson for CJCJS, 16 Sep 53, fldr CD 111 (1955) 1953, box 19, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953; sched atchd to ltr Dodge to Wilson, 23 Sep 53, memo Wilson for ASD(C), 28 Sep 53: fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

48. Tables atchd to memo Radford for SecDef, sub: Budget request for FY 1955, 2 Oct 53, fldr CD 111 (1955), box 19, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953; Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 64-65 and tables 5 and 6, 81-82.

49. Memo Radford for SecDef, 2 Oct 53, cited in n 48; Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 65, 82-84.

50. Memo of disc at 164th NSC mtg, 1 Oct 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.


54. Ibid; memo Eisenhower for SecState, 8 Sep 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:446, 452; memo of disc at 161st NSC mtg, 9 Sep 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.


56. NSC 162, Review of Basic National Security, 30 Sep 53, w/ covering note by ExecSec NSC, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:489-514 (quotes, 509); Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 22-23 (NSC 162 was a revision of NSC 153/1, the last approved BNSP paper); memo H.D. Farley, sub: Discussion at 162d NSC meeting, 17 Sep 53, memo of disc at 164th NSC mtg, 1 Oct 53; NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.


60. Memo of disc at 164th NSC mtg, 1 Oct 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.


62. Ibid, 543.

63. Ibid, 543-47.

64. Memo of disc at 165th NSC mtg, 7 Oct 53, ibid, 526-29; NSC 162, ibid, 508.

65. Memo of disc at 166th NSC mtg, 13 Oct 53, ibid, 546.


67. Memo of disc at 166th NSC mtg, 13 Oct 53, ibid, 545-49.


70. On 25 October the New York Times noted: “the Joint Chiefs ... had completed their part of the task of devising the next annual budget. From now on the budget will be the work of the civilian budget experts in the Defense Department.”


VIII. CUTTING MANPOWER


5. Memo Dodge for Pres, 4 Nov 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.


11. Ibid; ltr Dodge to Kyes, 27 Nov 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
15. Watson, Baltimore Sun, 29 Nov 53.
16. Memo Stevens for SecDef, 5 Dec 53, fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
17. Memo Pres for DirBoB, 1 Dec 53, ltr Dodge to SecDef, 4 Dec 53: PP(AWF), DDEL.
19. Memo Wilson for SvcSecs, 4 Dec 53, fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
20. Memo Stevens for SecDef, 5 Dec 53, ibid.
22. The Bob 19 November estimates stated $36.2 billion as the spending limit for a Defense budget necessary to "meet our budget goal for 1955." See memo Veatch for DirBoB, 19 Nov 53, cited in n 9.
29. Ibid, 282-83.
30. Ridgway, Soldier, 286-88, 303-04 (quote).
32. The record of the actual decision has not been found, and Robert Watson, in noting it in his JCS history, merely cites Snyder's "New Look." See Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 68, n 57. The formal NSC action regarding withdrawal of two divisions from Korea, following the meeting of 3 December, made no reference to the eventual inactivation of the divisions. See NSC Action 972d, 3 Dec 53, included in memo of disc at 173d NSC mtg, 3 Dec 53, FRUS 1952-54, XV, pt 2:1636-44.
33. Memo SecDef for SecArmy and SecNavy, atchmt 3, 19 Dec 53, fldr FY 1955 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

IX. CONTAINMENT'S NEW TESTAMENT

2. See Chapter VII.
4. See Chapter VII.
5. See the interpretation of Robert Bowie, director of State's Policy Planning Staff, to the effect that the revised paper involved "some acceptance" of the Treasury-Budget view, in accordance with "views expressed by the President," in order to "mollify Treasury" (memo DirPolPlngStf for SecState, 28 Oct 55, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:565-67). Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 24, on the other hand, interprets the compromise as largely favoring the JCS position.
7. NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, ibid, par 19-29, 588-89.
8. Ibid, par 2-8, 578-81.
10. Ibid, par 16, 586-87.
12. Ibid, par 12-13, 583-84.
13. Ibid, par 12d, 36d and e, 37, 584, 592-93; see also memo DirPolPlngStf for SecState, 28 Oct 53, cited in n 5, 566.
14. NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, ibid, 591.
15. NSC 162, 30 Sep 53, ibid, 494, 534, 562-64; Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 22-23.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, 573-74. The president’s concession was formalized in NSC Action 944, 30 Oct 53, ibid, 577. Subsequently the president made a further concession by ruling that the phrase “offensive striking power” should be interpreted to include all offensive forces, including aircraft carriers. See Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 23-24.
20. For a roster of those present, see ibid, 567.
22. Most analyses of Ridgway’s role in the New Look rely heavily, as this study does, on the last few chapters of his 1956 memoir Soldier, published soon after his retirement.
23. HSCA, Army Hearings, 1955, 8 Feb 54, 43-44; Ridgway, Soldier, 304, 293; Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 33-34; Snyder, “New Look,” 481.
27. Ibid, 595; memo of disc at 168th NSC mtg, 29 Oct 53, ibid, 569.
28. NSC 162, 30 Sep 53, ibid, 508-09.
29. Ibid, 509n; memo of disc at 165th NSC mtg, 7 Oct 53, ibid, 532-34.
30. Memo of disc at 166th NSC mtg, 13 Oct 53, ibid, 545-47; NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, ibid, par 39b (quote, 593). The quoted statement was carried over intact from NSC 162/1.
32. See Chapter VIII.
34. NSC 162, 30 Sep 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:508-09.
35. Memo of disc at 165th NSC mtg, 7 Oct 53, ibid, 526-28; NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, ibid, 593.
39. See Chapter VIII.
41. Ibid; Huntington, Common Defense, 80-81.
42. Memo USecState (Smith) for Pres, 3 Dec 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 2:607-08.
X. THE NEW LOOK TAKES FORM

6. HSCA, *DoD Hearings, 1957*, 610. Ridgway referred here to the total armed forces strength finally approved, 2,815,000.
7. Table, Projection of Federal Budget Receipts and Expenditures FY 1954-57, fldr 2 Oct & Everest Committee Costing, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
8. Table, Estimated Expenditures Necessary to Maintain Level-off Forces of 2,750,000 Military Personnel, 14 Nov 53, ibid; Watson, *JCS and National Policy* 1953-54, 30.
12. Memo Radford for SecDef, 9 Dec 53, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
15. Ibid; Watson, *JCS and National Policy* 1953-54, 31-32. The JCS formalized the paper, after several revisions, as JCS 2101/113, 10 Dec 53.
20. Memo Wilson for Pres, 11 Dec 53, PP(AWF), DDEL.
22. Memo Stevens for SecDef, 17 Dec 53, w/atchd Memo for Presentation at NSC Meeting, 16 Dec 53, at 4:00 pm, fldr 1953, Wilson Misc files 1953-57, Acc 63A-1768. The summary of the NSC meeting contains only a brief digest of Stevens's statement.
24. For all these, see *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1954*, 10-12, 117-30, 313-18.
25. Ibid, 12. The president made the same assertion in the budget message, ibid, 118-19.
30. "Evolution of Foreign Policy," 1-4. The reference to "new weapons" was the only direct one to atomic weapons in the speech.


36. Baltimore Sun, 1 Feb 54; Washington Post, 1 Feb 54.


38. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, New York Herald Tribune, 31 Jan 54. One Izvestia article, dated 19 Jan 54, was also commented on in Newsweek, 8 Feb 54.

39. Alsops, New York Herald Tribune, 15 Feb 54; New York Times, 16 Feb 54. The Soviet bombers were described, with photographs, in the magazine Aviation Week, 15 Feb 54.

40. See Chapter XXIV.


43. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), VI, 1954, 107-46; Reston, New York Times, 15, 16 Feb 54. For details of Smith's and Radford's testimony, see Chapter XXIV.


47. Robert S. Bird, New York Herald Tribune, 10 Mar 54; Raymond J. Blair, ibid, 17 Mar 54; SSA, DoD Hearings, 1955, 79-91 (quote, 89-90). For his earlier appearance before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, Radford had simply read into the record the speech he had given on 14 December.


49. News Conf, 10 Mar 54, Eisenhower Public Papers, 1954, 306; Bigart, New York Herald Tribune, 10 Mar 54; Reston, New York Times, 11 Mar 54 (Stevenson quote). Reston believed that the president's reply was extemporaneous.


55. "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs (Apr 54); State Dept press release No. 139, 16 Mar 54, 4-5.


XI. CONGRESS AND THE NEW LOOK: FY 1955

3. Annual Budget Message, 120-21. Since the last budget, national security programs had been redefined to include the stockpiling program for strategic and critical materials, along with the Defense (military functions), military assistance (now labeled "mutual military"), and atomic energy programs, but not economic and technical assistance, which were covered under International Affairs and Finance.
6. Ibid, 117 (quote), 120-21, 123, 147, 151. The Federal Civil Defense Program was funded through agencies other than Defense.
8. Ibid, 117, 122-24 (quotes, 117, 123). The president's conditional "may" in referring to the number of Army divisions was technically correct in that the JCS had recommended that the services not be held to the projected number of major combat units (14 Army divisions) "if they can do better."
10. Ibid, 367.
11. Ibid, 337. In the Korean War budgets, larger appropriations than in FY 1955 had gone to major procurement and production through FY 1953, and also to O&M in 1951 and 1952.
12. Ibid, 117.
17. Ibid, 341-42.
18. Ibid, 16-17.
22. Ibid, 17-40 passim. The problem was that no precise definition of management savings existed, since the scope and boundaries of management itself were not precisely defined.
27. Ibid, 345-47.
32. Ibid, 70-75.
37. Ibid, 54-55.
**XII. BASIC STRATEGY AND THE FY 1956 BUDGET: PRESSURES TO EXPAND**

1. *Congress and the Nation*, 338.
4. Memo McNeil for Wilson, 27 Mar 54, fldr NSC-BNSP FY 1956, ATSD and DepSecDef files; memo of disc at 198th NSC mtg, 20 May 54, memo Hughes for Pres, 10 May 54: NSC scr, PP(AWF), DDEL.

*The figures from *Congress and the Nation* (including the actual deficit for FY 1955) are corrected and refined, and thus probably more accurate than those in the contemporary sources cited.*
10. For development of this program, the “strategy and posture” paper of 9 December (JCS 2101/113), see Chapter X; Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1953-54*, 30-31.
13. See Chapter XI.
15. Memo of disc at 200th NSC mtg, 3 Jun 54, Decisions, par 3, 4, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1953-54*, 231-33, 261. The 1 April redeployment plan also involved major naval and Air Force units.
24. Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1953-54*, 70-73, and table on 83; memo SecDef for JCS, 26 Aug 54, fldr FY 1956 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
25. Memo ActSecDef (Anderson) for SvcSecs, 28 Aug 54, fldr FY 1956 Budget, ATSD and Dep SecDef files, OSD Hist.
26. Ltr Hughes to SecDef, 23 Jul 54, w/attachd “Assumptions and Policy for Prep of 1956 Budget,” ibid.
27. Memo G.V. Gibson for McNeil, 11 Sep 54, fldr 1955-56, box 9, ASD(C) files, Acc 65A-3552.
28. Ibid.
31. Memo Radford for SecDef, 21 May 54, cited in n 19.
33. Par 41, ibid, 675.
34. Par 39-41, ibid.
35. The JCS history offers a different reading of the JCS paper. See Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1953-54*, 42-44.
40. Memo of disc at 200th NSC mtg, 3 Jun 54, cited in n 39.
41. Memo Radford for SecDef, 21 May 54, cited in n 19; annex 2 to NSC 5422, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:672-77.
42. Memo SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Aff for Spec Cte, 19 May 54, fldr NSC 5422 Tentative Guidelines Under NSC 162/2—FY 1956 (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo Amory for NSC Ping Bd, 17 May 54, ibid.
43. Staff papers developing the theme are in fldr NSC 5422 Tentative Guidelines . . . , cited in n 42; see esp memo Bonesteel for Anderson, 7 Jun 54, and memo BrigGen P.W. Caraway for Def Member NSC PB, 19 May 54.
44. Memo Bonesteel for Anderson, 7 Jun 54, cited in n 43; also briefing notes for 204th NSC mtg, 24 Jun 54, fldr NSC 5422 Tentative Guidelines Under NSC 162/2—FY 1956 (1), cited in n 42.
47. Ibid.
49. NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:658-59, par 18, 19, 20. Gerhart's 9 June paper was not, of course, an official statement of JCS views, and NSC 5422 was merely a Planning Board paper circulated for discussion by the council.
52. NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:655-57, par 7-16.
56. NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54, ibid, 657; memo Garlock for Bonesteel, 25 Jun 54, fldr NSC-BNSP FY 1956, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The author of the Garlock memo was Henry Glass. He ridiculed the notion that the Soviet Union, which would strike the first blow, would ever "forego its advantage of surprise by limiting its first attack to conventional weapons so long as we have nuclear weapons."
57. Bonesteel paper to Randall, 23 Jun 54, fldr NSC 5422 Tentative Guidelines Under NSC 162/2—FY 1956 (2), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. Ridgway dissented from Radford's view that NSC 162/2 was an adequate statement of policy, but evidently he was the only dissenter.
58. NSC 5422, 14 Jun 54, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:666-67; OSD briefing paper for NSC 204th mtg, 24 Jun 54, fldr NSC 5422 Tentative Guidelines Under NSC 162/2—FY 1956 (2), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. Ridgway dissented from Radford's view that NSC 162/2 was an adequate statement of policy, but evidently he was the only dissenter.
60. Ibid, 678-79; memo Garlock for Bonesteel, 25 Jun 54, cited in n 56.
61. ODM study, "Basic Assumptions . . .," cited in n 59, 678.
63. Memo Cutler for SecDef, 23 Jun 54, fldr NSC 5408, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.

XIII. CONTINENTAL DEFENSE: AMBIVALENCE COMPOUNDED

1. Memo ExecSecNSC Lay, 9 Apr 54, w/encl rpt by Ping Bd, OSD briefing note for 200th NSC mtg, 3 Jun 54: fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo Wilson for SvcSecs and JCS, 15 Jun 54, fldr 373.24 (Def of Vital Areas) (Cont Def), box 17, Acc 59A-2376. The NESC was established by NSC 5423, 23 June 1953; see FRUS 1955-57, XIX:2, n 4, 56-57.


3. Sprague, Rpt on Cont Def, 18 Mar 54, cited in n 2, 4-7.

4. The "basic" report (not available to the author) apparently ran to more than 120 pages and was probably classified top secret; a "summary" report, about one-third that size (the one used here), was classified secret. Sprague delivered all copies of both reports to the president, who kept the summary version and directed that the others, together with the recommendations, be filed with the NSC for examination by authorized persons only. See Itr Cutler to Wilson, 31 Mar 54, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. A copy of the recommendations is also in this file, bearing two dates, 26 February and 30 March 1954.

5. Memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 10 Jun 54, fldr 381 Cont 1954, SecDef subject files Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792.

6. Memo Cutler for SecDef, 22 May 54, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo of disc at 197th NSC mtg, 14 May 54, NSC ser, PP (AWF), DDEL.

7. DoD Prog Rpt to NSC on Status of Mil Cont US Progs as of 1 Jun 54, 25 Jun 54, 1-2, memo Twining (for JCS) for SecDef, 11 Jun 54, w/app: fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. The appendix to the memo appears as Sections I and II of the progress report.

8. DoD Prog Rpt, 25 Jun 54, cited in n 7, 3 (quote), 6-9; Cutler notes on DoD Prog Rpt, encl to memo Cutler for SecDef, 23 Jun 54, fldr 381 Cont 1954, SecDef subject files Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792; memo G. Harvey for Bonesteel, 29 Jun 54, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.


11. Ibid, 7, 28; also Cutler notes and Harvey memo cited in n 8.


15. Memo Radford for SecDef, 23 Jun 54, fldr 1954, Wilson Misc files 1953-57, Acc 63A-1768; NIE 11-5-54, 7 Jun 54, "Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy through Mid-1959," excerpts in Koch, ed, Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 209-10. The date of the Soviet one-megaton detonation is not shown, and the most recent NIE (11-5-54), approved on 1 June and published on the 7th, did not mention it; nor was it mentioned in subsequent NIEs.

16. Memo Cutler for SecDef, 23 Jun 54, w/encl notes on DoD Prog Rpt, cited in n 8; OSD briefing notes for 205th NSC mtg, 1 Jul 54, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo Radford for SecDef, 23 Jun 54, cited in n 15; memo of disc at 205th NSC mtg, 1 Jul 54, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; Sprague Rpt to NSC, 24 Nov 54 (fourth draft 11/21/54), fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (2), ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
17. Memo Lay for NSC, 1 Jul 54, w/encl “Recommendations,” fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
18. Memo Sprague for Cutler, 1 Jul 54, ibid; memo of disc at 205th NSC mtg, 1 Jul 54, cited in n 16.
19. Memo Sprague for Cutler, 1 July 54, cited in n 18.
22. Ibid; memo Cutler for SecDef, 2 Jul 54, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
23. Memo Quarles for SecDef, 16 Jul 54, fldr 381 Cont 1954, SecDef subject files Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792; memo ActSecDef Anderson for SvcSecs and JCS, 7 Jul 54, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
24. Memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 16 Jul 54, w/app, “Comments on Recommendations made to NSC,” fldr NSC-BNSP FY 1956, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
26. Memo of disc at 208th NSC mtg, 29 Jul 54, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; Sprague Rpt to NSC, 24 Nov 54 (11/22/54 draft), cited in n 16; see also Cutler’s remarks at NSC Ping Bd mtg, 17 Nov 54, MFR R.S. Livesay, 24 Nov 54: fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (2), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
30. Memo Cutler for SecDef, 5 Aug 54, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (1), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
33. Sprague Rpt to NSC, 24 Nov 54, cited in n 16; MFR Livesay, 24 Nov 54, cited in n 26. The DoD progress report has not been found, but the more detailed and less sanitized Annex is in Annex to DoD Prog Rpt to NSC on Status of Mil Cont Def Progs as of 1 Nov 54, 20 Nov 54, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (2), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
34. Annex to DoD Prog Rpt, cited in n 33, A5. An earlier version of the report gave an early 1957 date as possible.
37. Draft memo Elliott for Flemming, 5 Nov 54, fldr NSC 5422 Tentative Guidelines Under NSC 162/2—FY 1956 (2), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. The author found no evidence of in-house discussion or follow-up on this draft proposal.
41. memo Livesay for Bonesteel, 17 Feb 55, cited in n 38; Annex to DoD Prog Rpt, 20 Nov 54, cited in n 33.
42. Memo Col C. W. Delanoy for Anderson, 16 Feb 55, fldr 373.24 (Def of Vital Areas) (Cont Def), box 17, Acc 59A-2376.
43. Memo Cutler for SecDef et al, 28 Jan 55, JCCAE, w/atchd rpt, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (2), ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
44. Memo Twining (for JCS) for SecDef, 14 Mar 55, fldr 373.24 (Def of Vital Areas) (Cont Def), box 17, Acc 59A-2376.
45. Memo Wilson for Cutler, 28 Mar 55, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (2), ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
46. Memo ExecSecNSC for various addressees, 3 Nov 55, ibid.
48. Memo Douglas for SecDef, 5 Jan 56, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (3), box 4, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo Adams for McNeil, 25 Jan 56, memo Wilson for Sec AF, 1 Feb 56: fldr Cont Def NSC 5606, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
50. Ibid, 275-81.
52. Livesay for McNeil, 20 Jan 56, fldr Cont Def NSC 5606, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; draft statements of policy on Cont Def, 19 Dec 55, 17 Feb 56, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (3), box 4, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
53. Draft statements of policy on Cont Def, 19 Dec 55, 17 Feb 56, cited in n 52.
54. 17 Dec 55 draft, cited in n 52.
56. 17 Feb 56 draft, Annex, cited in n 52.
57. Memo Col R.J. Dixon for DoD-NSC, 24 Feb 56, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (3), box 4, ASD (ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
59. Memo Lay for Gordon Gray and Robert Amory, Jr., 12 Mar 56, w/atchd rpt dtd 9 Mar 56, no title or addressee, fldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
60. Memo (not used) ISA for SecNavy, SecAF, and CJCS, 13 Mar 56, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (3), box 4, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo K.G. Harr (ISA), no addressee, 14 Mar 56, fldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
61. Memo Farrell for ASD(ISA), 14 Mar 56, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (3), box 4, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
62. Briefing notes for Gray, 15 Mar 56, fldr Cont Def NSC 159, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; draft memo for ExecSecNSC, 15 Mar 56, fldr NSC 5408 Cont Def (3), box 4, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
66. Memo Wilson for CJCS, 15 May 56, ibid; memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 7 Jun 56, fldr NSC 5606 Cont Def, box 15, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
68. Memo A. Dulles for SpecAsst to Pres, 8 Jun 56, atchd to memo ExecSecNSC for NSC, 11 Jun 56, fldr NSC 5606 Cont Def, box 15, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
69. Memos Elliott for Flemming, 11, 12 (quote), 14 Jun 56, fldr 373.24, box 20, SecDef subject files 56, Acc 60A-1379.
70. Memo Elliott for Flemming, 14 Jun 56, ibid.


75. AF paper RD 298/1 (Supplement), "Measures to Reduce the Ground Vulnerability of SAC Forces to Air Attack," 17 Jul 56, fldr TCP Rpt File #2, box 14, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.


77. See briefings for Plng Bd mtg, 4 Mar 57, fldr NSC 5606 Cont Def, box 15, ASD (ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.

78. Memo of disc at 293d NSC mtg, 16, 17 Aug 56, cited in n 73. See briefing notes for Plng Bd mtg, 4 Mar 57, fldr NSC 5606 Cont Def, box 15, ASD (ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.

79. OSD paper, "Continental Defense," nd [ca 1 Jun 56], fldr DoD Prelim FY 58 Budget Estim, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; NSC 5606, 5 Jun 56, par 25 and Finan App, cited in n 78.


XIV. BASIC STRATEGY AND THE FY 1956 BUDGET: DECISION TO RETRENCH

1. Memo of disc at 204th NSC mtg, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:686-98; mins of 205th NSC mtg, 1 Jul 54, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; ed note, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:698; memo DirPlngStf(State) to SecState, 4 Aug 54, ibid, 699 and n 1.


3. Memo Twining (for JCS) for SecDef, 4 Aug 54, fldr 381 Nat Def Jan-Jun 54, SecDef subject files, Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792; memo Bonesteel for ExecSecNSC, 4 Aug 54, fldr NSC 5422 Tentative Guidelines ... (2), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. For Radford's early comment, see Bonesteel to Randall, 25 Jun 54, ibid.

4. Memo of disc at 209th NSC mtg (extract), 5 Aug 54, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:700-15; NSC 5422/2, Guidelines Under NSC 162/2, 7 Aug 54, ibid, 715-22. Except as otherwise noted in the account of the 5 August meeting, provisions of NSC 5422/1 were carried over into the approved final paper, NSC 5422/2.

5. Memo of disc at 209th NSC mtg, 5 Aug 54, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; memo of disc at 209th NSC mtg (extract), 4 Aug 54, cited in n 4, 706-07, 714; NSC 5422/2, ibid, par 9, 718 (quote).


7. Ibid, 709-10 and notes 11, 12; NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54, ibid, 718-19 (quote).

8. Ibid, 711-12 and notes 14, 16; NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54, ibid, 719-21 (quote).

9. Memo of disc at 209th NSC mtg, 5 Aug 54, ibid, 711 (quote) and n 15; NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54, ibid, 720.

10. NSC 5422/2, 7 Aug 54, ibid, 721-22.

11. Ibid, App B, 729-31. The table was carried over without change from NSC 5422/1.

12. Memo of disc at 209th NSC mtg, 5 Aug 54, ibid, 710-11, 719; memo Hughes for Pres, 4 Aug 54, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.


14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. For Wilson’s comments at the NSC meeting on 4 August, see also memo of disc at 209th NSC mtg, 4 Aug 54, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:706-07, 710, 713.
16. Memo Pres for SecDef, 21 Jul 54, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
18. Draft paper, “Guidelines for Mobilization,” 10 Sep 54, w/ covering memo ExecSecNSC for Plng Bd, 10 Sep 54, fldr NSC 5422 Tentative Guidelines . . . (2), ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. The paper noted that 63 percent of the country’s general industrial capacity was located in 53 prime-target metropolitan areas.
21. For the emergence of Wilson’s de facto mobilization base policy during the spring of 1953, see HSCA, DoD Hearings, 1954, 11-12, 30, 67, 109-10, 364-72, 452-54; HSCA, Army Hearings, 1954, 878. More generally, see Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 149-56.
32. Memos SvcSecs for SecDef, 4 Oct 54, fldr 110.01 Jun-Oct 54, box 27, SecDef subject files Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792. The procedure of a joint (rather than sequential) review by the ASD(C) and BoB had been instituted several years earlier as a time-saving measure. Although BoB every year ritually scheduled submission of the Defense budget for 15 September, this deadline was never met—not since 1950, according to McNeil. See HSCA, DoD Hearings, 1956, 588-89; ltr W.F. Schaub (ChMilDivBoB) to McNeil, 22 Sep 54, memo McNeil for ASDs, 22 Sep 54: fldr FY 1956 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
33. See memos SvcSecs for SecDef, 4 Oct 54, cited in n 32; BoB papers, “Preliminary Highlight Review of 1956 Budget for Defense” and “Budget Problem,” both 15 Oct 54, BoB Series 51.142, OSD Hist.
34. Memo Garlock for SecDef, 4 Oct 54, fldr 110.01 Jun-Oct 54, box 27, SecDef subject files Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792; OSD Staff Analysis of Proposed Budget, Dept of Air Force, FY 1956, 20 Nov 54, AF-1-3, 9-10, AFX-2, and more generally AF-1-2 through 10, ibid.

35. Memo Talbott for SecDef, 29 Nov 54, ibid.


37. OSD Staff Analysis of Proposed Budget, Dept of Navy, N-7-2 through 16, ibid.

38. OSD paper, "Dept of Navy, New Obligational Authority by Major Budget Category . . .," cited in n 36.

39. OSD Staff Analysis of Proposed Budget, Dept of Army, 19 Nov 54, AX-2 and A-3-2 through 18, memos Stevens for SecDef, 1, 6 Dec 54: ibid.


41. Memo Hughes for Pres, sub: Preliminary look at 1956 budget expenditure proposals, nd [internal evidence suggests 15 Nov 54], w/ cover memo [signed "Rowland"], Hughes for DepSecDef Anderson, 17 Nov 54: fldr 110.01 Jun-Oct 54, box 27, SecDef subject files Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792.

42. Ibid. See also memo Hughes for Pres, 30 Nov 54, w/ cover memo for Cutler, same date, fldr Budget FY 1956, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

43. Memo Hughes for Pres, 30 Nov 54, Tables II and Ila, cited in n 42.

44. See Chapter XVIII. A good summary is in Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1953-54*, 165-73.

45. Memo McNeil for ASD(M&P), 23 Mar 54, memo Hannah for McNeil, 16 Mar 54, memo McNeil for ASD(M&P), 5 Apr 54: fldr Budget CL 100 Jan-Mar 54, box 15, ASD(C) files, Acc 64A-2375.

46. Memo Cooper for McNeil, 16 Aug 54, fldr Budget CL 100 Jul-Sep 54, ibid; memo McNeil for ASD(M&P), 5 Nov 54, fldr NSC 5420/1&2, box 9, ASD(C) files, Acc 65A-3552; AFPC Advice of Action, 10 Nov 54, fldr NSC 5420 Reserve Mobilization Rqmts, ASD (ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.


53. See sources in n 52.


55. Ltr Stevens to SecDef, 1 Dec 54, ibid.

56. Memo McNeil for ActDepComp(Budget), 5 Nov 54, memo Hughes for Pres, 30 Nov 54: fldr Budget FY 1956, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The author found no record indicating Wilson replied to Stevens's 1 December letter.

Notes to Pages 325-35

60. Memo Hughes for Pres, 30 Nov 54, cited in n 42; Goodpaster memcon w/Pres, 6 Dec 54, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; Minnich notes on meeting with legislative leadership, ibid; OSD paper, "Continental Defense," 9 Feb 55, cited in n 59.  
61. Memo of disc at 227th NSC mtg, 3 Dec 54, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; memcon Goodpaster w/Pres, 6 Dec 54, cited in n 60.  
64. Ibid.  
66. NSC Action 1286, 228th NSC mtg, w/atchd table, 9 Dec 54, fldr FY 1956 Budget, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo of disc at 228th NSC mtg, 9 Dec 54, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.  
68. For the revision of basic security policy culminating in approval of a new policy paper, NSC 5501, early in January, see Chapter XV.  
69. Memcon Goodpaster w/Pres, 22 Dec 54, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL. Admiral Radford was absent on a trip to the Far East.  
71. Memo Ridgway for Cmdr-in-Chief thru SecArmy and SecDef, 17 Dec 54, w/ cover ltr SecArmy for SecDef, fldr 1954, Wilson Misc files 1953-57, Acc 63A-1802.  
74. Ltr Wilson to Hughes, 21 Dec 54, w/atchd tables, fldr FY 1956 Budget (McNeil File), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Cutler notes on 8 Dec 54 conf in president's office, 9 Dec 54, cited in n 65; memo Randall for Wilson, 9 Dec 54, fldr Sec Wilson's Reading File Jul-Dec 54, Wilson Misc files 1953-57, Acc 63A-1802.  
75. Ltr Wilson to Hughes, 21 Dec 54, cited in n 74; ltr Hughes to Wilson, 29 Dec 54, fldr 110.01 Jun-Oct 54, SecDef subject files Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792.  

XV. UPDATING BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: NSC 5501 AND THE SOFT LINE

4. Memo Talbott for SecDef, 9 Nov 54, fldr NSC 5440 BNSP (1), box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
5. The ensuing discussion is drawn from Bonesteel’s paper in two parts dated 5 and 10 November, respectively, ibid. Most of the other staff papers are in this folder and folder (2).


7. Memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 3 Nov 54, fldr 1954, Wilson Misc files 1953-57, Acc 63A-1802; Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1953-54*, 49. Apparently the paper was completed before the arrival of Wilson’s 18 October memo requesting recommendations on policy changes, since it did not address some of the specific points in Wilson’s memo.

8. Memo Ridgway (for JCS) for SecDef, 12 Nov 54, fldr 381 Nat Def Jan-Jun 54, SecDef subject files, Nov 53-Dec 54, Acc 59A-792.


10. Memo Stevens for SecDef, 20 Nov 54, fldr NSC 5440 BNSP (2), box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.


15. Memo Wilson for ExecSecNSC, 22 Nov 54, ibid, 785-87.


20. Ibid, 794-95.


22. Ibid, 793-94.

23. Ibid, 799-800.

24. Paper by SecState, 15 Nov 54, par 2a, ibid, 774.


26. Ltr Cutler to Wilson, 17 Nov 54, memo Cutler for CSA, 24 Nov 54: fldr NSC 5440 BNSP (2), box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. Cutler’s letter to Wilson indicates that the president had talked earlier to Wilson about giving individual chiefs of staff an opportunity to “speak their views frankly” at council meetings.


28. Ridgway’s report has not been found, and the memorandum of discussion at the 3 December meeting does not summarize it. Its general content can be inferred from the comments that followed. See memo of disc at 227th NSC mtg, 3 Dec 54, *FRUS 1952-54*, II, pt 1:804-06.

29. Ibid.


31. The 21 December date had been set to allow principals to return from NATO meetings during the week ending 18 December and to precede the president’s departure for Christmas vacation. See memo Cutler for Bowie, Bonesteel, et al, 26 Nov 54, ltr Cutler to Bonesteel, 7 Dec 54: fldr NSC 5440 BNSP (2), box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.

33. Remarks by Bohlen at 1 Dec 54 Plng Bd session, fldr NSC 5440 BNSP (2), box 9, ASD (ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
34. Memo of disc at 228th NSC mtg, 9 Dec 54, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
36. John D. Morris, New York Times, 4 Dec 54; Dana Schmidt, ibid, 8 Dec 54; Walter Kerr, New York Herald Tribune, 9 Dec 54; Paul W. Ward, Baltimore Sun, 8 Dec 54; Minnich notes on legislative leadership meeting, 13 Dec 54, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
38. See papers in fldr NSC 5440 BNSP (2), box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
40. Memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Dec 54, ibid, 828-32.
41. NSC 5440, 14 Dec 54, par 35, ibid, 815-16; memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Dec 54, ibid, 831.
42. NSC 5440, 14 Dec 54, ibid, 814.
43. NSC 5440, par 47, ibid, 818-19; memo JCS for SecDef, 17 Dec 54, ibid, 828-32.
44. Memo Stevens for SecDef, 18 Dec 54, memo Talbott for SecDef, 20 Dec 54, memo Thomas for SecDef, 20 Dec 54: fldr NSC 5440 BNSP (2), box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
45. "Review of BNSP (NSC 5440)," Item 1, 229th NSC mtg, 21 Dec 54, ibid.
47. Ibid, 833-36.
49. Ibid, 838-42.
51. Ibid, 843-44; NSC 5440, 14 Dec 54, ibid, 818.
52. Memo Twining (for JCS) for SecDef, 30 Dec 54, fldr NSC 5440 BNSP (2), box 9, ASD (ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. Admiral Radford had not participated in the review.
54. NSC 5501, 7 Jan 55, ibid, 26, 29-30.
55. Ibid, 30, 33.
56. Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 27.
57. NSC 5501, 7 Jan 55, par 34, FRUS 1955-57, XIX:33.
58. NSC 5501, par 39, ibid, 34.
59. NSC 162/2 (par 44) was more forthright and candidly aggressive, calling for "political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit trouble-some problems for the USSR." See FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:595.
60. Kerr, New York Herald Tribune, 3 Jan 55.
63. Ibid. For another analysis of the 5 January letter in conjunction with NSC 5501, see Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 5-14.
64. William Knighton, Jr., Baltimore Sun, 6 Jan 55.
65. Ltr CSA to SecDef, 27 Jun 55, in Ridgway, Soldier, 328.

XVI. CONGRESS AND THE FY 1956 BUDGET

1. State of the Union Address, 6 Jan 55, Eisenhower Public Papers, 1955, 9; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 467-69.
2. Notes on bipartisan leadership meeting, 14 Dec 54, Leg ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.


9. See Chapter VIII.

10. These force levels were approved by the secretary of defense on 18 January. See Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 78, 113.


12. Baldwin developed most of this argument in two articles in the New York Times, 18 Jan and 6 Feb (quotes) 55. See also his articles on 16 Jan and 4, 5 Feb 55.

13. See Chapter XXIV.

14. SCFR, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), VII, 1955, 171-75.


18. Ibid.


20. Ltr Vinson to Wilson, ibid, 214-15.


22. HCAS Hearing, cited in n 19, 305-52 passim.


34. Ibid, 81-86, 106-07 (quote).


44. Ibid, 75-90, 107; Trussell, New York Times, 5, 6 Apr 55.

45. SSCA, DoD Hearings, 1956, 90-91; Don Irwin, New York Herald Tribune, 6 Apr 55; Ambrose, President, 240-41.


47. Norris, Washington Post & Times Herald, 8 Apr 55; Finney, ibid, 9 Apr 55; John C. O'Brien, Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 Apr 55.
49. Norris, *Washington Post & Times Herald*, 6 May 55. The bill as submitted requested in excess of $32.2 billion in new obligational authority. The committee recommended slightly less than $31.5 billion, a reduction of $744 million.
51. Ibid, 6128-29.
52. Ibid, 6195-99.
58. Ibid, 8703.

XVII. THE 1955 BOMBER GAP FLAP

7. May et al, *History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972,* I, 186, OSD Hist. The official National Intelligence Estimate incorporated the forecast even though the CIA (which published it) believed the numbers would be somewhat smaller. See also Murphy, “New Air Situation”; tables following memo Lay for SecDef, 27 May 55, fldr NSC 5501 (1) Basic Policy, box 9, ASD(SA) Pol Plng Stf, Acc 65A-3500.
15. Memo Radford for SecDef, 16 May 55, fldr Russia 452, box 3, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376.
16. Ibid. The figure of 26 appears in OSD undated pencil notes on paper, "B-52 Acceleration—Testimony of AF Undersecretary Douglas . . . quoted by Sec Talbott . . .", 15 Jun 55, OSD Hist. See also table, B-52 Production Schedule, attd to Record of Actions, 250th NSC mtg, 26 May 55, OSD Hist.
17. Murphy, "New Air Situation," 86 ff.
18. OSD pencil notes, cited in n 16; Murphy, "New Air Situation"; memo Radford for SecDef, 16 May 55, cited in n 15, gave an end-1959 total of 408, against a Bison total of 700.
20. Phillips, Reporter, 30 Jun 55; Murphy, "New Air Situation."
29. For the "inside story" of the decision, as reported, see R.S. Allen, New York Post, 2 Jun 55.
37. Ibid; SSCA, DoD Hearings, 1956, 6 Jun 55, 1432-34.
45. SSCA, DoD Hearings, 1956, 6 Jun 55, 1434-40.


54. Phillips, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10 Jul, 12 Aug 55. Air Force projections as of about January 1956 showed a total B-52 production of 471 through December 1958, with peak output of 17 per month during most of that year. See table, B-52 Production Schedule, and OSD pencil notes, "B-52 Acceleration ...,” cited in n 16.

55. Phillips, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10 Jul 55. In a TV interview on 24 July Sen. Clinton Anderson (D-N. Mex.) repeated a number of the points made in Phillips's article; see CBS-TV, "Face the Nation," 24 Jul 55, Current News file, OSD Hist. See also Senator Jackson interv on NBC-TV; "Youth Wants To Know," 17 Jul 55, ibid.


60. Alsop, New York Herald Tribune, 19 Sep 55.

61. Memo Robertson for SvcSecs, CJCS, and ASD(R&D), 17 Sep 55, memo Robertson for Svc Secs, CJCS, ASD(R&D), and ASD(C), 8 Sep 55; fldr TCP Rpt (Killian Rpt) (NSC Gen), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; Rudolph A. Winnacker, "Development of Long-Range Guided Missiles 1945-59," 13-14, OSD Hist; memo of disc at 258th NSC mtg, 8 Sep 55, FRUS 1955-57, XIX:121.


65. Murphy's Fortune article (see n 3) implied as much, but without divulging classified information about implementation of the Killian report.

XVIII. MINUTEMEN AND VETERANS


2. Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 163-65; 20th Century Minutemen, 7, 10, 13; Condit, Test of War, 490-91.

722 Notes to Pages 402-11

4. Watson,

6. Charles E. Egan, New York Times, 10 Jan 54; Watson,

7. HSCA, DoD Hearings, 1955, 275-80; DoD press release, 9 Feb 54; Wilson for SvcSecs, 4 Feb 54, fldr 326 Manpower Nov 53-Jan 54, box 43, SecDef subject files 1954, Acc 59A-792; Watson,
8. Watson,


11. Ltr Adler to Flemming, 24 May 54, memo NSTC for Flemming, 24 May 54, ODM memo on DoD Rpt, 28 May 54: ibid.

12. Memo Twining (for JCS) for SecDef, 15 Jun 54, memo Stevens for SecDef, 4 Jun 54, w/encls: ibid.


14. NSC 5420/1, 26 Jul 54, OSD Hist; Watson,
15. Memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 8 Oct 54, fldr NSC 5420 Reserve Mobilization Rqmts, box 6, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; Watson,
16. NSC 5420/2, Military Manpower Programs, 6 Nov 54, fldr NSC 5420 Reserve Mobilization Rqmts, box 6, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; Watson,

18. Burgess presentation before NSC, 15 Nov 54, 13, ibid.

19. NSC 5420/3, 12 Nov 54, ibid; Watson,


27. See “A Comparison of Reserve Proposals,” Army Times, 19 Feb 55. The table lists plans put forward by various organizations.


41. New York Times, 10, 11 Jul 55; Drury, ibid, 11 Jul 55; Rose McKee, Washington Post & Times Herald, 10 Jul 55.

42. Burgess statement before SCAS, 11 Jul 55, 8-9, fldr Res Act of 55, 55 Jul 55, OSD Hist.

43. Ibid, 10-19.


XIX. SURPRISE ATTACK AND NUCLEAR PARITY


2. See Chapter XV.


5. Ibid, 14-16.


8. Ibid, 10. For Sprague's November timetable, see Chapter XIII.


10. Memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 18 Apr 55, w/app, fldr TCP Rpt File #1, box 14, ASD (ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.


12. Memo Anderson for SvcsSecs, JCS, 1 Mar 55, memo Quarles for SvcsSecs, JCS, 11 Mar 55, memo Wilson for SvcsSecs, JCS, 29 Mar 55: fldr TCP Rpt (Killian Rpt)(NSC Gen), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. See also related correspondence during March, April, and May in this folder.

13. App A, nd (ca 18 May 55), Financial Summary, fldr TCP Rpt (Killian Rpt)(NSC Gen), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. This document was not attached to any report.


17. Memo Carney (for JCS) for SecDef, 27 Apr 55, w/app, fldr 381 Cont Def 1955, box 18, SecDef subject files, Acc 59A-2376.

18. OSD table, Extent of Agency Concurrence in Recommendations of TCP, 14 Jul 55, fldr TCP Rpt File #1, box 14, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; Max Lehrer briefing notes on Killian report, 23 May 55, fldr TCP Rpt (Killian Rpt)(NSC Gen), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

19. Draft paper, "Review of Key Aspects of Basic National Security Policy," atchd to memo Lay for PIng Bd, 8 Jul 55, fldr NSC 5501—Basic Pol #1, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol PIng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; Amory memo, 18 Jul 55, fldr TCP Rpt File #1, box 14, ibid.


23. Memo of disc at 257th NSC mtg, 4 Aug 55, FRUS 1955-57, XIX:103; staff memoranda on Killian Timetable, 12, 15, 22 Sep 55, ibid.

24. Timetable memos cited in n 23; see also Chapter XVII.


29. Ibid, 6. The Tea Pot Committee report was quite short, consisting of a brief introduction and recommendations, under the title “Recommendations of the Tea Pot Committee.” The original report was dated 1 February 1954; however, a slightly amended official version was submitted on 10 February. Both versions appear in App 1 in Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1960, 245-69.
32. OSD table, Tentative Obligations for Guided Missiles Programs, FY 1950 through FY 1960, 13 Jun 55, Table VC, Surface-to-Surface Systems, Air Force, in notebook Briefing Material for 19 Jul 55 Special Guided Missile Cte Meeting: ASD(C) files, box 6, Acc 65A-3552. The data are as of 1 December 1954.
34. TCP Rpt, I, 37, 64 (quote).
36. Ibid, 15-16.
37. Comments and recoms on TCP Rpt, w/ memo Radfor for SecDef, 18 Apr 55, fldr TCP Rpt File #1, box 14, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; Winnacker, “Development of Long-Range Guided Missiles,” 13, OSD Hst; May et al, "History of Strategic Arms Competition," I, 200; DoD statement in regard to TCP Rpt, 1 Jun 55, 3, fldr TCP Rpt (Killian Rpt)(NSC Gen), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hst.
38. DoD statement cited in n 37, 5.
41. May et al, "History of Strategic Arms Competition," I, 201-02; OSD briefing notes for 258th NSC mtg, 8 Sep 55, item 2, ICBM Prog, fldr TCP—ICBM, IRBM, and 1500-mile Missile, box 13, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo Bonesteel for Wilson, 28 Jul 55, ibid; memo Flemming for Wilson, 5 Jul 55, fldr TCP Rpt File #1, box 14, ibid; memo of disc at 256th NSC mtg, 28 Jul 55, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; "Answers to Questions Raised in Senator Jackson’s Letter of 27 June 1955," 26 Jul 55, fldr Budget FY 1956 Work File, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hst. For handling of the Anderson-Jackson letter, see Rosenberg, “Ballistic Missile IOC Program,” 16; also memo Wilson for Pres, 6 Jul 55, w/ other corres in fldr 470 Guided Missiles (Jan to Jun) 1955, box 20, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376.
42. Memo Dillon Anderson for CJCS, 1 Aug 55, fldr TCP—ICBM, IRBM, and 1500-mile Missile, box 13, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; NSC Action 1430, 11 Aug 55, par b and c, FRUS 1955-57, XIX:103, n 9; memo of disc at 257th NSC mtg, 4 Aug 55, ibid, 103-08. Proposals to meet the need for IRBMs included an Air Force derivative of Atlas, a British project, an Army version derived from Redstone, a Navy ballistic shipborne version, and an extension of the Navy’s current Triton project for a submarine-launched non-ballistic missile.


45. ODM, DoD, and Ping Bd revised drafts, 29 Aug 55, memo Lay for NSC, 30 Aug 55, w/atchd "Proposed NSC Action": ibid.

46. Memo of disc at 258th NSC mtg, 8 Sep 55, FRUS 1955-57, XIX:121-22; memo Lay for Sec Def, 15 Sep 55, fldr TCP—ICBM, IRBM, and 1500-mile Missile, box 13, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo Robertson for SvcSecs, JCS, ASD(R&D), 17 Sep 55, ibid. See also Rosenberg, "Ballistic Missile IOC Program," 18-19. The final statement was designated NSC Action 1433.

47. Memo Brucker for SecDef, 6 Sep 55, fldr 470 Guided Missiles (Jan to Jun) 1955, box 20, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376.

48. NSC Action 1450c, 4 Aug 55, FRUS 1955-57, XIX:103, n 9; memo Robertson for SvcSecs and ASD(R&D), 6 Sep 55, fldr TCP—ICBM, IRBM, and 1500-mile Missile, box 13, ASD (ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. The projects are listed in n 42.


50. Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 179-85 (quote, 180); for the Key West Agreement, see Reardon, Formative Years, 136-37.

51. Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 184-86 (quote, 185).


54. Sapolsky, Polaris System, 15-19; Armacost, Politics of Weapons Innovation, 64-67; Davis, Politics, 22, 35.


56. Armacost, Politics of Weapons Innovation, 54-55; Davis, Politics of Innovation, 39, n 29; SCAS, Airpower Hearings, 1956, 1311; memo Thomas for SecDef, 21 Sep 55, fldr 470 Guided Missiles (Jan to Jun) 1955, box 20, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376.

57. Ltr Wilson to von Neumann, 20 Oct 55, fldr 470 Guided Missiles (Jan to Jun) 1955, box 21, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376. The letter requested that von Neumann make the services of his Scientific Advisory Committee available to Wilson as well as to the Air Force.


59. Ibid, Refs 7, 8, 9 (quote, Ref 8).


62. Briefing for SecArmy on IRBM, w/ cover memo DepChR&D A.P. O'Meara, 27 Oct 55, fldr 470 Guided Missiles (Jul to Dec) 1955, box 20, SecDef subject files, Acc 59A-2376. O'Meara noted that he had been directed to forward the paper to Robertson.

63. Memo Radford for SecDef, 2 Nov 55, cited in n 60; rpt on DoD ICBM and IRBM Progs, w/ cover memo Robertson for ExecSecNSC, 29 Nov 55, fldr 470 Guided Missiles (Jul to Dec) 1955, box 20, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376.
64. Memo McNeil for DepSecDef, 7 Nov 55, fIdr Guided Missiles, box 5, ASD(C) files, Acc 65A-3552.
65. Memo Wilson for SvcSecs, JCS, ASD(R&D), ASD(C), 8 Nov 55, sub: ICBM and IRBM Programs, memo Wilson for SecAF, 8 Nov 55, sub: Management of ICBM and IRBM . . ., memo Wilson for SecArmy and SecNavy, 8 Nov 55, sub: Management of IRBM #2 . . ., memo Wilson for all ASDs, SvcSecs, CJCS, 8 Nov 55, sub: Establishment of OSD BMC, ltr Wilson to R. R. Hughes, 8 Nov 55: fIdr 470 Guided Missiles (Jul to Dec) 1955, box 20, SecDef subject files, Acc 59A-2376.
69. Ibid; memo Pres for SecDef, 21 Dec 55, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
70. TCP Rpt, I, 14 (quote), 15, 37-39, 66-68.
71. DoD statement in regard to TCP Rpt, 1 Jun 55, cited in n 37.
72. OASD(R&D), "Summary Report on DoD Consideration of the TCP Report," nd, App B, 3-4, w/ marginal pencil notations, box 13, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; OSD(C) paper, nd [Nov 55], "Killian and Sprague Recommendations Affecting DoD and Requiring Budgetary Support," fIdr TCP Rpt (Killian Rpt)(NSC Gen), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
74. OSD working paper, "Air Force Briefing on Vulnerability of SAC," 17 Oct 55, w/atched pencil notes, fIdr TCP Rpt (Killian Rpt)(NSC Gen), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. The briefing was scheduled in October to benefit from the presentation of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee report. See memo Dixon for Dir NSC Aff (DoD), 15 Aug 55, fIdr TCP Rpt File #1, box 14, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
75. Memo OASD(R&D) for SecDef, 17 Nov 55, fIdr TCP Rpt File #1, box 14, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; draft memo for SecAE, 17 Nov 55, ibid; memo Robertson for SecAE, 23 Nov 55, fIdr TCP Rpt (Killian Rpt)(NSC Gen), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo Robertson for Dillon Anderson, 21 Oct 55, fIdr TCP Rpt File #2, box 14, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; ltr Anderson to Robertson, 26 Oct 55, ibid. The revised briefing was actually given to the NSC on 8 December; see *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:171-72.
76. OASD(R&D) rpt, "RD 298/1," Jan 56, vi, 508, fIdr TCP File #2, box 14, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
77. Ibid, 9-12.
78. Ibid, 4, 12-13 (quote, 13).
80. DoD rpt, "Funding related to TCP Rpt," nd, ibid.
81. Ibid. The report was read at the NSC 8 December meeting. See mins 270th NSC mtg, 8 Dec 55, 2, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.

**XX. UPDATING BASIC STRATEGY: NSC 5602/1**

2. See Chapter XV.
6. Ambrose, President, 264. Since the Soviets already knew the location of most U.S. military installations, mutual aerial surveillance would benefit them much less than the United States.

7. Memo Bonesteel for ExecSecNSC, 16 May 55, fldr NSC 5501 Basic Policy #1, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.


11. Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 2 Jul 55, w/ memo Lay for NSC, 5 Jul 55, ibid; memo of disc at 254th NSC mtg, 7 Jul 55, FRUS 1955-57, V:268-83 (quote, 283); NSC 5524/1, ibid, 287-98 (quote, 289).


15. On 4 August the NSC had directed the Planning Board, in effect, to pursue the review of NSC 5501 in parallel with the study of the Killian report. See NSC Action 1430 in memo of disc at 257th NSC mtg, 4 Aug 55, FRUS 1955-57, XIX:108; Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 12.

16. Memo Brucker for SecDef, 16 Sep 55, w/encl, "DoD Comments on NSC 5501," 24 Sep 55 [by Bonesteel], memo DepASD(ISA) (VAdm A.C. Davis) for Dir NSC Aff, 16 Sep 55, memo Thomas for ASD(ISA), 14 Sep 55: fldr NSC 5501 Basic Policy #1, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.

17. Memo Davis for Dir NSC Aff, 16 Sep 55, memo Thomas for ASD(ISA), 14 Sep 55, "DoD Comments on NSC 5501," 24 Sep 55: cited in n 16.

18. For example, memo Brucker for SecDef, 16 Sep 55, memo Thomas for ASD(ISA), 14 Sep 55; cited in n 16.

19. Memo McNeil for ASD(ISA), 21 Sep 55, fldr NSC 5501 Basic Policy #1, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.

20. Ibid.

21. This discussion of State’s position is drawn from Dept of State General Comments on NSC 5501, 3 Oct 55, FRUS 1955-57, XIX:123-25.

22. NIE 100-7-55, World Situation and Trends, 1 Nov 55, ibid, 131-45.


26. The ensuing discussion of views of the Soviets is drawn from "Review of BNSP: Summary of Principal Points Made in Planning Board Discussion of 19 October 1955," 25 Oct 55, Basic Policy #2, ibid. This is a running account of the discussion, presumably abridged; speakers are not identified, but some can be discerned from the arguments advanced.
27. Memo Gray for SecDef, 18 Jan 56, fldr NSC 5501 Basic Policy #5, ibid.
29. NSC 5501, par 4, ibid, 26; NSC 5602/1, Annex, par 3, ibid, 258-59.
30. NSC 5602/1, Annex, pars 12, 23, 24, ibid, 262-63, 267-68.
31. Working Group rpt on Local Aggression and Subversion, 7 Nov 55, fldr NSC 5501 Basic Policy #3, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
32. Draft summary, "The Likelihood of Local Aggression Throughout the World," 9 Sep 55, w/Annex, "Excerpts from NIEs," Working Group draft rpt on Communist Expansion, 23 Sep 55, Sec V, memo State and CIA members of Plng Bd for ExecSecNSC, 20 Sep 55: Basic Policy #1, ibid.
33. Working Group draft rpt on Communist Expansion, 23 Sep 55, cited in n 32.
34. Ibid, Sec V, 13.
35. The chief of the Army's Plans Division challenged the 9 September summary as not precisely reflecting the intelligence estimates on which it was based. See memo Col Svensson for Def Mem Plng Bd and SpecAsst to JCS for NSC Aff, 22 Sep 55, fldr NSC 5501 Basic Policy #2, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
36. Working Group rpt on Local Aggression and Subversion, 7 Nov 55, cited in n 31, Sec IV, Sec I, 2-3; Working Group draft rpt on Communist Expansion, 23 Sep 55, cited in n 32.
37. Working Group draft rpt on Communist Expansion, 23 Sep 55, cited in n 32, Sec I, 2, 6-9; Working Group rpt on Local Aggression and Subversion, 7 Nov 55, cited in n 31, Sec I, 6-7, Sec II, 4-6, 8-12.
38. Working Group rpt on Local Aggression and Subversion, 7 Nov 55, cited in n 31, Sec III (quote, 19).
40. NSC 5602, 8 Feb 56, par 14-15, revising par 32 and par 34 in NSC 5501, copy in OSD Hist.
42. Memo Thomas for SecDef, 25 Feb 56, notes of AFPC mtg, 23 Feb 56: fldr 5602 BNSP, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. See other submissions to the secretary of defense and the NSC in this file for other reactions to NSC 5602.
43. Notes of AFPC mtg, 23 Feb 56, memo Radford for SecDef, 24 Feb 56, w/encl, "Comments by JCS on BNSP (NSC 5602)": fldr 5602 BNSP, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. See other submissions to the secretary of defense and the NSC in this file for other reactions to NSC 5602.
45. Memo of disc at 277th NSC mtg, 27 Feb 56, ibid, 203.
46. Ibid, 204-06; memo of disc at 278th NSC mtg, 1 Mar 56, ibid, 229 and n 9; memo Exec SecNSC for SecState, SecDef, and ChAEC, 15 Mar 56, fldr 5602 BNSP, box 9, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500; memo Wilson for ExecSecNSC, 24 Feb 56, cited in n 41.
47. Memo of disc at 277th NSC mtg, 27 Feb 56, *FRUS 1955-57*, XIX:205-06; memo of disc at 278th NSC mtg, 1 Mar 56, ibid, 230. The changes resulted in the addition of a paragraph 13. Paragraph 12 omitted mention of the nonexistent radiological weapons. Paragraph 13 included them, and also the "if time permits" and "if attack on U.S. forces involved" provisos. See NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, ibid, 246.
48. Memo of disc at 277th NSC mtg, 27 Feb 56, ibid, 208-09.
49. Ibid, 210-11.
50. Memo of disc at 278th NSC mtg, 1 Mar 56, ibid, 224-27; NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, par 46, ibid, 256. For a detailed criticism of the mobilization base paragraph in NSC 5602, see memo T.P. Pike for SecDef, 15 Feb 56, fldr NSC 5501 Basic Policy #5, box 9, ASD (ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 65A-3500.
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XXI. PREPARING THE LAST NEW LOOK BUDGET

1. Memo Stevens for SecDef, 13 May 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo G.A. Wyeth for ASD(C), 20 May 55, fldr 110.01 1955, box 9, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376; Eisenhower Public Papers, 1955, 17.

2. Cabinet Record of Action, RA-21, 13 May 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; memo Stevens for SecDef, 13 May 55, cited in n 1.


5. Ltr Hughes to Wilson, 17 May 55, fldr 110.01 1955, box 9, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376.


7. Memo C.C. Finucane (USecArmy) for SecDef, 1 Jun 55, with attachments, fldr FY 1957 Budget (file II), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; ltr Wilson to Hughes, 9 Jun 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ibid.


9. Memo Wilson for SvcSecs, ASDs, GenCoun, 14 Oct 55, FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ibid. There is also a 21 September draft in the same file.


12. Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 75-76; undated paper outlining "presentations" by Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, with tables and charts, fldr Budget FY 55 and FY 56, OSD(C) files, OSD Hist. Figures in this paper do not agree with those in Condit, which may refer to reduced requests resulting from committee deliberation.

13. Memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 6 Oct 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.


16. Memo SecNavy for SecDef, 10 Oct 55, memo SecAF for SecDef, 18 Oct 55, memo SecArmy for SecDef, 27 Oct 55: fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

17. Ibid.


21. OSD(C) table, Estimated New Obligational Authority by Major Budget Category, FY 1955, 1956 and 1957, 7 Jun 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (file I), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.

22. Enc 4 to memo Brucker for SecDef, 27 Oct 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (file I), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
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24. OSD(C) table, Estimated New Obligational Authority by Budget Category, FY 1957, Service Requests, 31 Oct 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (file I), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
26. BoB memo for DirBoB, 16 Nov 55, ibid; ltr Hughes to Wilson, 17 Nov 55, fldr 110.01 1955, box 9, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376.
28. Bound notebook, DoD Preliminary FY 1957 Budget Estimates, 5 Dec 55, in ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Most of the tables are dated 3 December 1955, and are liberally sprinkled with penciled corrections, amendments, and additions.
29. The Army's guided missile procurement program was dominated by the Nike air defense missile—$480 million of the $726 million total.
30. Memo Wilson for Pres, 2 Dec 55, fldr 110.01 (1958-59 Budget) 1956, box 11, OSD CenDec Files 1956, Acc 60A-1379. Wilson and Radford had seen the president the day before at Camp David, where the president's second NSC meeting since his heart attack was held, but the budget was not discussed. The 2 December meeting was reported in the Baltimore Sun the next day, but without details on the discussion. What appears to be the same meeting is described in some detail by Colonel Goodpaster, the president's military secretary, in a memo for the record written a few days later. See MFR Goodpaster, 7 Dec 55, PP(AWF), DDEL. Goodpaster gives the date, however, as 1 December.
31. Anthony Leviero, New York Times, 3 Dec 55. The article is datelined 2 December and probably was in preparation before Wilson's meeting with the president.
32. MFR Goodpaster, 7 Dec 55, cited in n 30.
34. Mins of 270th NSC mtg, 8 Dec 55, NSC Minutes 1953-56 file, OSD Hist. This afternoon meeting, like the three preceding, was held at Camp David.
35. Ltr Robertson to Hughes, 14 Dec 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
36. Ltr Hughes to Wilson, 17 Nov 55, w/encls, Budget Problem—FY 1957, DoD, fldr 110.01 1955, box 9, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376; Summary Table—1957 Defense Budget, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
37. Ltr Robertson to Hughes, 14 Dec 55, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; ltr Wilson to Hughes, 22 Dec 55, ibid.
38. Ltr Hughes to Wilson, 30 Dec 55, ibid.
39. Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956, 81, 93-99; draft statement for congressional leaders on Defense program, ca 10 Dec 55, fldr FY 57 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist. Quotes are from draft statement.

XXII. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

4. Memo Kyes for SvcSecs, ASD(C), and JCS, 9 Mar 53, table, Mutual Security Program, Cost Estimates Based on FY 1954 Budget Proposal by Previous Administration, fldr Effects of Bal Budget Expen 1954-55, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.


13. Ltr Nolting to Dodge, 6 Dec 53, ibid, 665-72; Nolting staff memo, 24 Nov 53, cited in n 12; memo DirFMA(ISA) VAdm A.C. Davis for DepSecDef, 4 Feb 54, w/encls, msg Polto 1209, 5 Feb 54, msg Polto 1276, 8 Feb 54, DirBoB Hughes to USecState Smith, 5 Feb 54: fldr Mutual Assist Prog, Wilson Misc files 1953-57, Acc 65A-1768.


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24. Ltr Hughes to Stassen, 13 Dec 54, FRUS 1952-54, 1, pt 1:807-08.


26. Memo ActSecDef Anderson for JCS, 15 Jan 55, watchd MFR, fldr 091.3 Jan-Mar, box 15, ASD(ISA) files, Acc 60A-1025.

27. Memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 2 Feb 55, ibid; Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 241-42.


32. SCFR, Mutual Security Act of 1955, Hearings, 5 May 55, 1-3, 6-8, 21-22, 26-27. See also Dulles statement in SCFR mtg, 17 May 55, in Executive Sessions of SCFR (Hist Ser), VII, 493-512.

33. Executive Sessions of SCFR (Hist Ser), VII, 26 May 55, 604-05; Cong Rec, 84 Cong, 1 sess, 1955, 101, pt 6:7262-68. See also Rose McKee, Washington Post, 3 Jun 55.

34. HCFA, Mutual Security Act of 1955, Hearings, 25 May-17 Jun 55; HCFA, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-1956 (Hist Ser), XII, Pt 4:529-783; ibid, XIII, Pt 5:5-262. A short summary of the committee hearings is in XII, 531-37.

35. House 1071 Conf Rpt, Mutual Security Act of 1955, 6 Jul 55, in App IV, HCFA, Selected Executive Session Hearings, 1951-56 (Hist Ser), XIII, Pt 5:254-56; Allen Drury, New York Times, 8 Jun 55. Congress passed the measure on the 7th, the Senate by voice vote, the House by roll call vote, 262 to 120.


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40. Memo DepSecDef Anderson for CINCFE and CINCPAC, 13 Apr 55, fldr 091.3 MAP (Feb) 1955, box 8, SecDef subject files 1955, Acc 59A-2376; Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 249. Similar memoranda went to CINCEUR and to the Army and Air Force as executive agents for their areas.

41. Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 249-51; ltr McNeil and Gray to Hollister, 2 Dec 55, w/ ltr Hollister to Hughes, 7 Dec 55, fldr MDAP FY 1957, box 1, Mautz-Lehrer files, MAP-MDAP Corres 1951-59, ASD(C) files, Acc 64A-2061.

42. MFR Goodpaster, 7 Dec 55, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; ltr Hollister to Hughes, 7 Dec 55, cited in n 41.


44. Draft memo prepared for NSC, 28 Nov 55, FRUS 1955-57, X:37-40. Actually, the board submitted a draft "NSC Action" dated 29 November based on this analysis; see ibid, 41-43, and Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 250-51.

45. Memo of disc at 269th NSC mtg (Camp David), 8 Dec 55, FRUS 1955-57, X:45-52.

46. Eric Sevareid, Washington Post, 4 Dec 55; Warren Unna, ibid, 9 Sep 55; "Penny-wise Foreign Aid," ibid, 17 Nov 55; Roberts, ibid, 30 Nov 55.


48. Budget Message of the Pres, Budget of the US. Government, FY 1957, M50-35; Dana Adams Schmidt, New York Times, 6 Jan 56; memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 30 Sep 55, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL (quotes).

49. Memo McNeil for Gray, 23 Nov 55, memo Lehrer for McNeil, 22 Nov 55: fldr MDAP FY 1957, box 1, Mautz-Lehrer files, MAP-MDAP Corres 1951-59, ASD(C) files, Acc 64A-2061. The author did not see a copy of the Gruenther letter; the description of its contents has been inferred from Gruenther's subsequent testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. See HCFA, Selected Executive Session Hearings, 1951-56 (Hist Ser), 22 Mar 56, XIII, Pt 5:273-78.

50. Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 251-56; Gray draft statement before HCFA, 21 Mar 56, 5-6, fldr MDAP FY 1957, box 1, Mautz-Lehrer files, MAP-MDAP Corres 1951-59, ASD(C) files, Acc 64A-2061.

51. Memo Radford (for JCS) for SecDef, 2 Mar 56, w/app, fldr 091.3 MAP (Jan-Jun), box 10, SecDef subject files 1956, Acc 60A-1379; Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 252.

52. Memo McNeil for Wilson, 27 Feb 56, w/ draft policy statements and related corres in fldr MDAP FY 1957, box 1, Mautz-Lehrer files, MAP-MDAP Corres 1951-59, ASD(C) files, Acc 64A-2061; DoD Dir 2110.23, 9 Mar 56; Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 253, 256.


54. Ibid, 318.


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63. Summary of Conclusions and Issues, 1, 3, cited in n 62.

64. Ibid, 5-7.


67. Ibid, 126-29.

68. Ibid, 129-33.


XXIII. INDOCHINA: ROOTS OF ENGAGEMENT

1. For the background survey in this and following paragraphs, see Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, esp chs 4-10; Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, II, chs 8, 9; Georgette Elguy, La République des Contradictions, 1951-1954, ch III, pt III; DoD, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (hereafter referred to as Pentagon Papers), bk 1, pt I:1-8ff, C1-7ff; Rearden, Formative Years, 267-72; Condit, Test of War, 205-21.

2. NSC 124/2, U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia, 25 June 52, w/encl, par 2, FRUS 1952-54, XII, pt 1:127.


7. For estimated ground force strengths and dispositions as of 1 April 1953, see Annex A, B, NIE-91, “Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1954,” 4 Jun 53, Pentagon Papers, bk 9, pt V-B3a, doc 24, 54-55.


11. Msg 4303 Dunn to State, 3 Feb 53, msg 4294 Chargé UK to State, 4 Feb 53, FRUS 1952-54, V:1557-61. See also ibid, XIII, pt 1:377-78 for a brief editorial note on the 2 February meetings.


20. JCS Hist Div, "History of Indochina Incident," 306-11; memo Robertson for SecState, 28 Apr 53, Pentagon Papers, bk 9, 39.


23. Memo of disc at 141st NSC mtg, 24 Apr 53, ibid, XIII, pt 1: 518-19, n 3; memo of disc at 143d NSC mtg, 6 May 53, ibid, 548; msg 5522 SecState to Emb France, 7 May 53, ibid, 550-51; msg 5883 Dillon to State, 9 May 53, ibid, 561; mins US-France convs, 26 Apr 53, ibid, 509; msg 5754 Dillon to State, 30 Apr 53, ibid, 531-32; Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, 28-29; Spector, Advice and Support, 172-73.


27. Ibid; JCS Hist Div, "History of Indochina Incident," 281.


35. Msg 2552 Heath to State (from Bonsai), 24 Jun 53, ibid, 616-18; msg 7 Heath to State (from Bonsai), 2 Jul 53, ibid, 628; State Dept position paper (STF-D-2b), 9 Jul 53, ibid, 646.

36. Ed note (Doc 600), ibid, VI, pt 2:1358-59; msg 2552 Heath to State, 24 Jun 53, ibid, 616-18; msg 7 Heath to State (from Bonsai), 2 Jul 53, ibid, 628; State Dept position paper (STF-D-2b), 9 Jul 53, ibid, 646.


38. Ibid, 664, 666-67; msg 206 Dillon to State, 16 Jul 53, ibid, 681; msg 285 Dillon to State, 22 Jul 53, ibid, 699-95; msg 370 Dillon to SecState, 29 Jul 53, ibid, 701-03.


41. Msg 671, 26 Aug 53, ibid, 738-41; memo by the French Govt (Laniel), 1 Sep 53, ibid, 770-75.


43. Substance of disc of State-JCS mtg, 4 Sep 53, \textit{FRUS 1952-54, XIII}, pt 1:752-56; memo of disc at 161st NSC mtg, 9 Sep 53, ibid, 782, 783-89; msg 902 Dillon to State, 3 Sep 53, ibid, 748-49; msg 819 Dillon to State, 29 Aug 53, ibid, 740-41; memo Regional PIng Adviser (FE), 8 Sep 53, ibid, 762-66.

44. Unttd State Dept memo, Annex B to memo State for NSC, nd, ibid, 778-79; memo by disc at 161st NSC mtg, 9 Sep 53, ibid, 780-89.

45. Text of communique, texts or summaries of six ltrs, 29 Sept 53, ibid, 810-19. Financing arrangements are detailed in Dillon ltr to Bidault, 814-17.


49. Msg 1007 McClintock to State, 10 Dec 53, cited in n 48; JCS Hist Div, "History of Indochina Incident," 326-28; msg 954441 Nash to ChMAAG(Indochina), 17 Dec 53, fldr 091 Indochina Jan-Apr 54, SecDef subject files 1953-54, Acc 59A-792.

50. JCS Hist Div, "History of Indochina Incident," 327-28. For more details on U.S. aid program, see ibid, 304-19, 485-94.


XXIV. DIEN BIEN PHU AND AFTER


4. Ibid, B5-6.

5. Memo of disc at 179th NSC mtg, 8 Jan 54, *FRUS 1952-54*, XIII, pt 1:949-54; rpt by SecState, 7 Jan 54, *Executive Sessions of SCFR (Hist Ser)*, VI, 22. "Summary notes" on 170th NSC mtg, *Pentagon Papers*, bk 1, pt II:B6-7, describes a disagreement on intervention between State (for) and Defense (against). The Dulles statement is from this source. The *FRUS* version, much longer, has some omissions.

6. For NSC 5405, 16 Jan 54, see *FRUS 1952-54*, XII, pt 1:366-81.


17. Dulles memcon w/pres, 2 Apr 54, FRUS 1952-54, XIII, pt 1:1210-11; State Dept, draft joint resolution, ibid, 1211-12.


19. Herring and Immerman, “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dien Bien Phu,” 89 and n 30; msg 3710 Dillon to Dulles, 4 Apr 54, FRUS 1952-54, XIII, pt 1:1236-38; msg 3482 Dulles to Dillon, 5 Apr 54, ibid, 1242; msg 3729 Dillon to State, 5 Apr 54, ibid, 1243; JCS Hist Div, “History of Indochina Incident,” 380-81.


26. JCS, “History of Indochina Incident,” 398-403; msg 4287 Dillon to State, 10 May 54, FRUS 1952-54, XIII, pt 2:1522-23; memo of disc at 196th NSC mtg, 8 May 54, ibid, 1506-09.


34. JCS Hist Div, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1954-1959,” 1-5; Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam, 7-10; Hoopes, Devil and John Foster Dulles, 239; Gurtov, First Vietnam Crisis, 129-30; Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, 300-11; Smith’s statement in msg US del to State, 21 Jul 54, FRUS 1952-54, XVI:1500-01.


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42. Msg ActSecState (Smith) to Dulles, 30 Sep 54, *FRUS 1952-54*, XIII, pt 2:2120-21; msg Smith to Emb France, ibid, 2095-97; communique on Washington talks on Indochina, 29 Sep 54, ibid, 2097-98; memo of disc at 218th NSC mtg, 22 Oct 54, ibid, 2153-58; msg ActSecState (Hoover) to Emb Vietnam, 22 Oct 54, ibid, 2161-62.


47. Msg 2303 Kidder (Collins) to State, 16 Dec 54, *FRUS 1952-54*, XIII, pt 2:2379-82; msg 2250 Kidder (Collins) to State, 13 Dec 54, ibid, 2362-66.


53. Msg 36 Dillon to State, 11 May 55, ibid, 393-99; msg Dulles 32 SecState to State, 12 May 55, ibid, 399-400; msg Secto 42 SecState to State, 12 May 55, ibid, 401-05; msg Secto 46 SecState to State, 13 May 55, ibid, 406-08; JCS Hist Div, "JCS and War in Vietnam," 117-20.


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**XXV. DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE: CONFRONTING REALITY**

14. The proceedings of the 24 April meeting at which Wilson spoke, as reported in Secto 10, 25 Apr 53, contain only a five-line summary of his comments (FRUS 1952-54, V, pt 1:382-84). The foregoing description is based on a copy of the address, "Statement by Secretary Wilson Concerning Production and Delivery of Equipment," nd, in fldr CD 092.3 NATO AR 1953, box 15, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953; see, too, Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 288.

15. Msg Secto 6, US Deleg at NAC mtg to State, 24 Apr 53, FRUS 1952-54, V, pt 1:373-78; msg 5624 Dillon to State, 24 Apr 53, ibid, 369-71. France's needs for the Indochina war had been set forth by Prime Minister Mayer and Associated States Minister Letourneau in talks held in Washington in late March. See Chapter XXIV.


17. Memo Ridgway for Wilson, 25 Apr 53, w/encl Excerpts from Statement on 6 Apr 53 to Subcte of House Cte on For Affs, fldr 1, CD 091.7 (Europe), Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953. Ridgway briefed Wilson on 30 April using this material. For comparison with Lisbon goals, see Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 283, and tables 17 (282) and 21 (319). Watson's figures for end-1952 forces are from a 1955 source, presumably more accurate than those Ridgway used in April 1953 which are used here because they were the basis for judgments made at the time.


22. NSC 149/2, 29 Apr 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:305-16.

23. Ltr Draper to Pres, 5 Jun 53, ibid, V, pt 1:401-08. The letter was accompanied by a longer study prepared by Draper's plans and policy staff, dated 15 May, developing the same theme; an earlier version of chapter 4 of the staff study, devoted to military defense, had accompanied his March letter. The staff study is not printed in the FRUS volume. A copy is in fldr CD 092.3 NATO (Strategy), box 17, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953.

24. Memo for Pres, 8 Jul 53, FRUS 1952-54, V, pt 1:432-36. The NSC was also asked to review Draper's letter.


26. NSC 162, 30 Sep 53, FRUS 1952-54, II, pt 1:489-514 (quotes, 508-09); NSC 162/2, 30 Oct 53, par 38, ibid, 593.


30. NSC 162/2, par 12, 15b, ibid.

31. Ltr Makins to Bonbright, 18 Sep 53, w/attachd paper, fldr CD 092.3 NATO AR 1953 (second of two fldrs), box 15, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953.
32. Memo JCS for SecDef, 16 Jul 53, memo SecDef for JCS and SecArmy, 7 Aug 53, memo SecArmy for SecDef, 7 Aug 53, memo SecAF for SecDef, 23 Sep 53, fldr CD 092.3 NATO (Force Levels) 1953, box 16, ibid; memo JCS for SecDef, 27 Nov 53, untitled table comparing USAF goals, 10 Dec 53: fldr 092.3 Ann Rev 1954, box 23, Entry 200B, ibid; Watson, *JCS and National Policy 1953-54*, 297-98.


36. For Eisenhower's speeches of 16 April and 8 December 1953, see *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1953*, 179-88 and 813-22, respectively.


40. Memo Nash for DepSecDef, 23 Oct 53, fldr CD 092.3 NATO AR 1953, box 16, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953; paper Merchant for SecsState, Def, Treas, DirFOA, Dir BoB, JCS, nd, fldr 092.3 NATO AR 1953 (second of two fldrs), box 15, ibid.


44. Memo of disc at 159th NSC mtg, 13 Aug 53, ibid, 501-08.

45. Ltr Dulles to Wilson, 17 Aug 53, ibid, 520-21.

46. Memo of disc at 164th NSC mtg, 1 Oct 53, ibid, 540-43; ed note, ibid, 542-44.


49. Ibid; see also memo ActDirMS for ActSecState, 22 May 53, HCFA, *Spanish Bases: Hearings*, 4 Jun 53 (trans of exec sess), memo ASD(ISA) for SecDef, 7 Jul 53: fldr CD 092.2 Phil-UK 1953, box 15, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953; memo JCS for SecDef, w/app, 13 Jan 54, memo DirFMA(ISA) for SecDef, 4 Feb 54: fldr Spain, OSD Hist.


51. Ltr Wilson to Dulles, 7 Dec 53, fldr Sec Wilson's Reading File Jul-Dec 53, Wilson Misc files 1953-57, Acc 63A-1802. The draft of Dulles's address to which Wilson referred has not been found.

52. Unsgd briefing paper for NSC mtg 10 Dec 53, "Item 3 (for Information) NATO Ministers' Meeting," nd, fldr 092 NATO, box 5, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 68A-4024.


54. Memo Nash for SecDef, nd, fldr 092 NATO, box 16, Def Exec Off, CenDec Files 1953.


62. Regarding the draft presidential statement of 2 March submitted to the NSC for consideration at its 4 March meeting and the revised draft Wilson and Smith approved the following day, see msg 3067 State to Emb Paris, 6 Mar 54, *FRUS* 1952-54, V, pt 1:892-94, and n 2, 892. Further discussions of, and changes in, the draft are described in Davis memo for SecDef, 9 Mar 54, w/atchd revised "Proposed Presidential Statement Regarding EDC," fldr 092 NATO, box 5, ASD(ISA) Pol Png Stf files, Acc 68A-4024. The text of the president's statement on 16 April 1954 is in *Eisenhower Public Papers, 1954*, 400-02. His press conference remarks of 31 March are in ibid, 367.


67. *FRUS* 1952-54, V, pt 1:994-95, n 1 and n 3; memo Davis for ASD(ISA), 12 Aug 54, ltr Davis to Murphy, 16 Aug 54; fldr 091 Germany Mar-Dec 1954, SecDef subject files 1953-54, Acc 59A-792.


XXVI. STABILIZING CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN EUROPE

1. Memo of conv by Byington (State), 22 Oct 54, FRUS 1952-54, VIII:325.
3. Memo Anderson for JCS, 2 Sep 54, fldr 091 Germany Mar-Dec 1954, SecDef subject files 1953-54; memo Billingsley for ASD(ISA), 8 Sep 54, fldr NSC 5433—Immediate US Policy Toward Europe, box 8, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 65A-3500. The Joint Chiefs' proposals for West German rearmament, submitted on 13 October in response to Anderson's 2 September memo, are summarized in Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 315.
5. OCB Progress Reports on NSC 160/1, 17 May, 5 Dec 56, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:99, 182; John A. Reed, Jr., Germany and NATO, 61; msg APG 596 Emb Bonn to State, 13 Oct 55, fldr Germany 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist; David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era, 238-45.
7. Memo Mautz for McNeil (Compt), 31 Mar 55, fldr German Forces Arrangements, box 11, ASD(ISA) files, Acc 60A-1025; memo prepared by E&ISE Div (Compt), 25 Apr 56, attached to memo Solomon (DirEurRegionISA) for ASD(ISA), nd, fldr Germany 1956, box 2, OSD CS files 1956, Acc 60A-1379.
9. Memo Solomon for ASD(ISA), nd, and attached memo prepared by E&ISE Div (Compt), 25 Apr 56, cited in n 7. Regarding the Nash commitment, see Abelshauser, "Causes and Consequences of the 1956 West German Rearmament Crisis," 316.
10. Memo Wilson for Bendetsen, 11 May 56, ltr Bendetsen to SecDef, 10 Jun 56, with attached summary memo, 11 Jun 56: fldr Germany 1956, box 2, OSD CS files 1956, Acc 60A-1379.
12. Ibid. The Joint Chiefs' written response to the Planning Board's recommendation is in memo Radford for SecDef, 13 Jun 56, fldr Germany 1956, box 2, OSD CCS files 1956, Acc 60A-1379.
14. Regarding the Trieste dispute before 1953, see Roberto G. Rabel, Between East and West: Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War, 1941-1954, and Allison A. Conrad, "In TRUST, We Guard," Army Information Digest (Mar 51), 3-10.
15. Rabel, Between East and West, 147-53.
17. Msg Eisenhower to Bedell Smith, 3 Sep 54, quoted in Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 419. Regarding the various documents comprising the 5 October agreement, see ed note, FRUS 1952-54, VIII:570-73.
20. Msg Dulles to Wilson, 3 Jul 54, ibid, 469-70.
23. Memo Ridgway for SecDef, 5 Oct 54, fldr Trieste, box 4, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 68A-4024.
25. Cutler memo of conf at White House, 18 Oct 54, fldr Trieste, box 4, ASD(ISA) Pol Plng Stf files, Acc 68A-4024; memo of Eisenhower-Dulles telcon, 7 Oct 54, 9:33 [a.m.], fldr Telephone Calls, box 7, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
33. Memo of disc at 246th NSC mtg, 28 Apr 55, box 6, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
34. Msg 2527 Emb Vienna to State (pass to Defense for Anderson), 30 Apr 55, fldr Austria 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
35. Memo of disc at 248th NSC mtg, 12 May 55, box 7, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
38. Msg Repnamto 38 DEFFREPNAMA Emb Paris to OSD (Vadm Davis for Hensel), 12 May 55, fldr NATO 1955, msg DA 983142 Army G-3 to USCINCEUR, 13 Jun 55, fldr Italy 1955: SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
41. Msg Tosec 9 State to Emb Paris, 20 Oct 54, fldr NATO 1954, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
43. Msg 397 Emb Belgrade to State, 16 Nov 54, file 760.5/11-1654, Decimal files, RG 59. An extract of this telegram, which does not include Tito's remarks rejecting a formal Balkan Pact-NATO link, is in FRUS 1952-54, VIII:1421-23.
44. Memo of State-JCS mtg, 15 Apr 55, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:636-38; memo of disc at 247th NSC mtg, 5 May 55, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL. An extract of this memo, minus several key passages, is in FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:645-47.
45. Msg 870 Emb Belgrade to State, 25 Apr 55, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:641-44; msg 873 from Emb Belgrade to State, 26 Apr 55, fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
46. Msg 956 Emb Belgrade to State, 11 May 55, file 768.5-MSP/5-1155, Decimal files, RG 59; msgs MAS 1560 and 1562 Chief AMAY Belgrade to USCINCEUR, 11 May 55, EC 9-2383 USCINCEUR to Chief AMAY Belgrade, 12 May 55, EC 9-2397 USCINCEUR to SecDef, 13 May 55; fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
47. Msg DEF 981432 OSD (Hensel) to DEFREPNAMA (Anderson), 13 May 55, fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
48. Msg 942 Emb Belgrade to State 13 May 55, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:650-51; msg MAS 1621 Chief AMAY Belgrade to OSD (Hensel), 30 May 55, fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist; memo of conv at State (Dulles, Hoover, Murphy, et al), 19 May 55, file 768.5-MSP/5-1955, Decimal files, RG 59; msg 928 State to Emb Belgrade, 20 May 55, fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
49. Ltr Merchant to Hensel (ISA), 9 Jun 55, file 768.5-MSP/6-955, Decimal files, RG 59; memo of conv between Dulles and Yugoslav Amb Mates, 23 May 55, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:652; msg MAS 1621 Chief AMAY Belgrade (Hains) to OSD (Hensel), 30 May 55, and msg 6389 State to Emb London, 20 Jun 55, fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
50. Msg 1151 Emb Belgrade to State, 25 Jun 55, fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist; msg 1171 Emb Belgrade to State, 28 Jun 55, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:659-60; memo of conv between Barbour (State) and Gen Collins, 5 Jul 55, file 768.5-MSP/7-555, Decimal files, RG 59.
51. Msg MAS 1800 Chief AMAY Belgrade to USCINCEUR, 10 Jul 55, msg 34 Emb Belgrade to State, 15 Jul 55, msg DEF 986285 Leffingwell (ActDirOMAP(OSD)) to CINCUS and Chief AMAY Belgrade, 5 Aug 55; fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.
52. Memo of conv between Dulles and Yugoslavia officials on 27 September are summarized in msgs 331 and 333 Emb Belgrade to State, 27 and 28 Sep 55, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:672; memo SecState for Pres, nd, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:678-79. Murphy's discussions with Tito and other Yugoslav officials on 27 September are summarized in msgs 331 and 333 Emb Belgrade to State, 27 and 28 Sep 55, FRUS 1955-57, XXVI:672-76. Murphy's two conversations with Minister of National Defense General Ivan Gosnjak on 27 and 28 September are described in msg MAS 2163 Chief AMAY to OSD, 4 Oct 55, fldr Yugoslavia 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist. The text of a confidential memorandum spelling out the various agreements reached during the Murphy visit is in msg 357 Emb Belgrade to State, 30 Sep 55, ibid.
54. Memo of disc at 271st NSC mtg, 22 Dec 55, box 7, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
56. Memo of disc at 271st NSC mtg, 22 Dec 55, box 7, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
57. Memo Col R. M. Miner (DirEurRegionISA) for DASD(IS) for MDAP, 26 Mar 56, fldr 091.3 Yugoslavia, box 21, ISA files 1956, Acc 60A-1339.
60. S. 4001, 5 Jun 56; McCarthy's written statement, undated but probably submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 20 Jun 56 (see Executive Sessions of SCFR (Hist Ser), VIII, 691); memo of mtg in the White House Cabinet Room by LAM [L. Arthur Minnich, Jr.], 12 Jun 56, PP(AWF), DDEL.


63. Mins of State-Defense Conf with SACEUR, 6 Oct 54, fldr CCS 092 West Eur (3-12-48) BPP+32, box 88, JCS files, RG 218; Wampler, "From Lisbon to M.C. 48," 89-90; memos Dulles and Wilson for Pres, 3 Nov 54, Goodpaster for SecState, SecDef, and CJCS, 4 Nov 54: fldr NATO, box 5, ASD(ISA) Pol Ping Stf files, Acc 68A-4024; memo Weiss through Ohly for Stassen, 7 Dec 54 (quotes), fldr 1582-4 FOA, box 524, G/PM files, State Dept, Lot 64D-354.


71. Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 133; memo Davis for SecDef, 21 Mar 55, fldr 334 NATO, box 15, ASD(ISA) files, Acc 60A-1025.

72. Msg 3599 State to Emb Paris (for Gruenther from SecState), 8 Apr 55, msg 4389 Emb Paris to State (for SecState from Gruenther), 9 Apr 55: fldr NATO 1955, SecDef Cable files, OSD Hist.


74. Memo of disc at 262d NSC mtg, 20 Oct 55, NSC ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.

XXVII. CONGRESS REVIEWS THE FY 1957 BUDGET


2. William S. White, New York Times, 14 Dec 55; Albright, Washington Post & Times Herald, 15 Dec 55. See also Chapter XXI.

3. Eisenhower Public Papers, 1956, 4-5, 9-11.


8. *Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 1957*, M22, M28-29. The president's message also summarized provisions in the budget for funding of atomic energy research and operations, for procurement of strategic materials, and for civil defense planning, which are not examined in this volume.


13. On this point, see Chapter II.


24. Ibid, 629-30. Much of the discussion was off the record, and the whole session was behind closed doors. The committee released the transcript of the "record" portions of the discussion later, but news reports of the whole discussion were leaked immediately. See Levirono, *New York Times*, 10 Feb 56.

25. HSCA, *Army Hearings, 1957*, 27 Feb 56, 1; HSCA, *DoD Hearings, 1957*, 3 Feb 56, 558. The 1-3 February proceedings, held in secret like the others, were not released to the press.


27. Ibid, 442. See also 519.


32. Ibid, 469.

33. Ibid, 2.

34. Ibid, 28-30.


40. Ibid, 762, 828.

41. Ibid, 753, 756, 763, 764, 775, 826-27.

42. Ibid, 766-74.
43. Ibid, 869-74, 887, 897.
44. Ibid, 879-80.
46. Robert K. Walsh, *Washington Star*, 19 Feb 56. Ordinarily testimony was released, after deletion of classified information, only a few days before an appropriation bill reached the House floor.
50. *New York Herald Tribune*, 2 Mar 56; Goodpaster memo of conf w/Pres (13 Mar 56), 14 Mar 56, PP(AWF), DDEL. LeMay's expressed requirement was already being bandied about. See Alsops, *New York Herald Tribune*, 9 Mar 56.
51. Memo Wilson for Pres, 29 Mar 56, fldr 110.01 Jan-Dec 1956, box 11, SecDef subject files 1956, Acc 60A-1379; graph labeled "Tab 1" in preceding memo but found in another file, fldr Memo for Pres, sub: Supplemental Appropriations FY 1957, nd, ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
52. Memo on meeting in President's Office, 29 Mar 56, prepared by DoD in response to request from Pres re 1957-58 Defense budget picture, fldr Budget 1957 (2), Admin ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
53. Memo Brundage for Pres, 3 Apr 56, ibid; ltr Eisenhower to House Speaker, 9 Apr 56, w/atchd ltr DirBoB to Pres, fldr FY 1957 Budget (File II), ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist; DoD press release No. 315-56, Statement by SecDef on Amendments to 1957 Budget, OSD Hist; memo Robertson for Pres, 3 Apr 56, w/atchd lists, fldr FY 1957 Budget (McNeil File) #1, ATSD and DepSecDef files, ibid; draft memo [DirBoB] for Pres, 7 Apr 56, fldr FY 1957 Budget (File II), ibid.
54. Leviero, *New York Times*, 7 Apr 56; *New York Times*, 10 Apr 56; *Wall Street Journal*, 10 Apr 56; Goodpaster memo of conf w/Pres, 5 Apr 56, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
56. HSCA, *DoD Additional Hearings*, 1957, 18-19 Apr 56, 1-6, 15.
57. Ibid, 154, 164-66.
60. Ibid, 48-50.
61. Ibid, 54-56.
63. Ibid, 7805-16, 7965, 7982-83.
64. SSCA, *DoD Hearings*, 1957, 1221-50.
Notes to Pages 628-36 751

71. Cong Rec, 84 Cong, 2 sess, 1956, 102, pt 8:10889-91.
72. Ibid, 10879-96; Evans, New York Herald Tribune, 24 Jun 56.
73. Baltimore Sun, 24 Jun 56; New York Post, 24 Jun 56.
76. H Rpt No 2529, DoD Approp Bill, 1957, Conference Report, 84 Cong, 2 sess, 28 Jun 56; Cong Rec, 84 Cong, 2 sess, 1956, 102, pt 8:11334-35, 11444-54; Baltimore Sun, 29 Jun 56; Bynum Shaw, Baltimore Sun, 30 Jun 56.
78. Cong Rec, 84 Cong, 2 sess, 1956, 102, pt 8:10977; Jim G. Lucas, Washington News, 27 Jun 56. Symington could have recalled, but did not, that in 1949 President Truman had also "stuck in the drawer" $800 million for the Air Force that Congress had appropriated against his wishes.

XXVIII. THE GREAT AIRPOWER DEBATE

3. MFR Wilton B. Persons (DepAsst to Pres), 4 Apr 56, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
4. Memcon Goodpaster w/Pres, 5 Apr 56, ibid. See also Chapter II.
5. SCAS, Subcte on AF, Hearings, Study of Airpower [hereafter cited as Study of Airpower], pt 1, 1, 4-5, 35-36; Rowland Evans, Jr., New York Herald Tribune, 20 Apr 56; SCAS, Rpt of Subcte on AF, Airpower, 25 Jan 57 (hereafter cited as Airpower), 2.
6. Study of Airpower, pt 1, 3-4, and pts 2 through 23 passim; Airpower, 2.
7. Study of Airpower, pt 1, 21 (quote), 46, 52-53, 61, and passim; Evans, New York Herald Tribune, 21 Apr 56.
10. Study of Airpower, pt 2, 101-06; Potter, Baltimore Sun, 1 May 56.
14. Graph "Tab 1" showing comparative Bison and B-52 production curves, with separate curves for the 17-per-month and the 20-per-month B-52 schedules, in fldr Memo for Pres [29 Mar 56], ATSD and DepSecDef files, OSD Hist.
16. Memo BrigGen T.C. Musgrave, Jr. (ChSpecStfGp, USAF) for GenCoun(OSD), 12 Jun 56, w/enc1s, memo AsstGenCoun(OSD) for Fowler Hamilton (SASC), 25 Jun 56: fldr Symington Cte, ibid.
17. Memcon Goodpaster w/Pres, 13 Mar 56, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL. Here Wilson said LeMay talked of needing 1,800 B-52s.
Notes to Pages 637–46

32. *Now Hear This!* (Apr 56).
34. Leviero, *New York Times*, 19, 20 May 56. Each article was of course date-lined one day earlier than the day it appeared.
35. Memcon Goodpaster w/Pres, 2 Apr 56, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
42. Ibid, 673-76.
43. Ibid, 677-78.
46. Memcons Goodpaster w/Pres, 14 May 56 (with Radford) and 18 May 56 (with Wilson and Randall), DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
47. Memcon Goodpaster w/Pres, 24 May 56, ibid.
49. *Study of Airpower*, pt 22, 1675, 1685, 1741-43, 1759, 1767, 1770, 1773, 1786, 1789-90; Potter, *Baltimore Sun*, 3, 6 Jul 56. For the "phony" episode, see Chapter XXVII. The hearings totaled almost 10 hours.
52. Ibid, 1797-99.
53. Ibid, 1799-1805, including Wilson's written statement.
58. Study of Airpower, pt 23, 1807-15, 1822, 1826-32. Twining's statement was submitted later and included in the published testimony.
60. See, for example, Air Force (Sep 56), 15-16.
63. Ibid, 7-8, 54-68, 112-13, 118-19.
64. Ibid, 40-54, 117-21.
67. Airpower, 105-06. Farther along Saltonstall made the point somewhat differently: "Our airpower and our naval strength, together with our ground forces, make us superior to the Soviet Union today" (ibid, 127).

XXIX. STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES

3. The paper is printed in Taylor's Uncertain Trumpet, 30-34, 36-37; memo Brucker for Sec Def, 15 Mar 56, w/ memo Randall for Harr (ISA), 13 Apr 56, Wilson Misc files 1953-57, Acc 65A-1768.
5. Ibid.
6. Memcon Goodpaster w/Pres (13 Mar), 14 Mar 56, ibid, 238-41.
7. Ibid; memcon Goodpaster w/Pres (15 Mar), 16 Mar 56, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
9. Memo Pres for SecDef, 20 Mar 56, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL; memcon Goodpaster w/Pres (30 Mar), 2 Apr 56, FRUS 1955-57, XIX: 280-83; mtg in Pres office, 29 Mar 56, ibid, 276-79. See also Chapter II.
11. Memcon Goodpaster w/Pres, 18 Apr 56, ibid, 296-98.
14. Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 35-37; Watson, JCS and National Policy 1953-54, 101-03. Radford's submission of separate views was in accordance with a recent directive by Wilson authorizing this procedure. See DoD Dir 5158.1, 26 Jul 54.
18. Ibid, 32-34.
24. Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 36; Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 39-40. The author did not locate the “Radford Memo,” as Condit and Taylor call it, which is summarized here.
26. Memo Col R.J. Conran for GenCoun(DoD), 16 Oct 56, fldr 380.01 Alpha 1956, box 20, SecDef subject files 1956, Acc 65A-1379. The staff paper prepared over the 7-8 July meeting was CM [Chairman’s Memorandum] 340-56; it showed a total cut of 775,000. See Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 41; Condit, JCS and National Policy 1955-56, 37.
27. New York Times, 13, 14, 15 Jul 56. In a meeting at the White House with the president and General Persons on 18 July, Radford referred to his paper as a “talking memorandum” and produced a copy, but without actually showing it to the president. See memcon Goodpaster w/Pres, 18 Jul 56, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
34. Ibid, 448-50; HSCA, DoD Approp for 1958, 1148-50.
36. HSCA, DoD Approp for 1957, 268.

XXX. CONCLUSION

1. Memo Eisenhower [unsgd] for SecDef, 21 Dec 55, DDE Diary ser, PP(AWF), DDEL.
Note on Sources and Selected Bibliography

The basic materials used in the writing of this book were retired records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), designated Record Group (RG) 330 by the National Archives and Records Administration and housed at the National Archives facility in College Park, Maryland.

In RG 330 the most important records were the secretary of defense's central files. For January through October 1953 these were maintained as decimal files by the secretary's executive office. Document folders are identified by a CD number based on a Dewey decimal and Navy records system. For November 1953 through December 1954, and on an annual basis thereafter, the central files are organized by subject. Two collections of Secretary Wilson's miscellaneous office files contain useful information, although each comprises only a single records center box.

Of much importance were various records of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (ISA). Especially rich in materials relating to OSD's role in the preparation of National Security Council papers and briefings of the secretary or deputy secretary prior to NSC meetings were ISA's policy planning staff files. Other useful collections included those of the assistant secretary of defense (comptroller) and the records of the meetings of the Armed Forces Policy Council. In addition to RG 330 materials, the author made use of the records of the Department of State (RG 59) and Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218).

Materials maintained in the OSD Historical Office proved indispensable. Foremost among these were files of the assistant secretary of defense (comptroller) and other comptroller records that subsequently became part of the files of the assistant to the secretary of defense and the deputy secretary of defense. These materials provided much of the basis for the
chapters on the Department of Defense budget and contributed to other chapters as well. Copies of Department of State and Department of Defense cables, first kept in the secretary of defense office and later turned over to the historical office, shed light on certain foreign policy issues, particularly NATO and Europe. Also utilized were the historical office's extensive subject reference collection of DoD budget tables, organization charts, press releases, directives, and newspaper and magazine clippings compiled from a large variety of sources.

At the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, a key collection was the Ann Whitman File, which contains records of NSC meetings and other meetings involving the president, some of which have not been published. The papers of Charles E. Wilson at the Wilson Archive in Anderson, Indiana, were of limited use.

The most important published documentary collections included the Department of State series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, and *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower*. The author also drew heavily from volumes V and VI, which cover the years 1953-56, in the series by the JCS Historical Division, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, and the division's numerous unpublished studies, including those dealing with Indochina. The OSD Historical Office's compilation of the public statements of the secretary of defense, a series of bound volumes that brings together a variety of material from press conferences, interviews, speeches, and news accounts, was a principal documentary source. Wilson's *Public Statements* comprise 14 volumes.

Published congressional hearings and reports offered a wealth of information on a wide range of Defense affairs and national security issues during the period. The Committees on Armed Services in both the House and Senate held authorization hearings for various budgets; the Committees on Appropriations in both chambers heard testimony on military assistance and Defense appropriations. Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee subsequently published some executive session proceedings in a series of historical volumes.

Memoir literature for the period is uneven. While Eisenhower's own memoirs and those of some of his aides proved invaluable, neither Wilson nor his deputies—Roger Kyes, Robert Anderson, and Reuben Robertson—published reminiscences regarding their tenures. There is a similar dearth of memoirs by other high- and mid-level OSD officials. The scarcity is partly offset by memoirs of key military officers, including Generals Ridgway, Taylor, and Twining and Admiral Radford. Oral history interviews helped fill in some gaps.
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Seemingly confident that it was riding the crest of history, the Soviet Union deliberately cultivated an aggressive image. Its influence appeared to be spreading to all parts of the globe. Members of the press along with Democrats in the House and Senate painted a grim picture. The United States was vulnerable to air attack; its allies in Europe were weak and dispirited. Communism had triumphed in China; Western influence in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East was in decline. Perhaps the American century had already passed. Eisenhower and Wilson would not be stampeded by this litany of doom. Eisenhower brought to the presidency a thorough knowledge of defense strategy, a deep understanding of the structure of forces, and perhaps most important, a well-developed skepticism of the military budget process. He believed that too often the services advanced programs and interests inspired as much by interservice rivalry for funds as by a genuine concern for achieving the best national defense. As commander in chief he remained confident in the military superiority of the United States and its allies. He was especially impressed by the persuasive power of atomic weaponry, a conviction confirmed in his judgment by the successful settlement of the Korean conflict. Eisenhower’s faith in the technological lead enjoyed by the United States in advanced weaponry received important reinforcement from his secretary of defense.

For Eisenhower, what counted most about Wilson was his demonstrated competence in managing bigness, the salient characteristic of the Defense Department. For other departments the president chose executives primarily for their expertise or experience in their departments’ fields of endeavor. Unlike his predecessors, Wilson had no experience or acquired knowledge in foreign or military affairs, credentials that would not have been required by a president of Eisenhower’s military and international stature. What the president did need and want was a seasoned executive who could effectively implement his defense policies and run the vast Pentagon empire, the world’s biggest purchaser and user of armaments technology. Wilson seemed to be custom-built for the job, an executive who would not be daunted by bigness. At first he seemed to be daunted by something else, perhaps the unfamiliarity of the managerial problems he initially encountered. DoD was an administrative headache, plagued with inherited organizational and management troubles, some of them historic, awaiting long overdue solutions. Whatever the reason, Wilson apparently sought early on to have weekly conferences with the president. But Eisenhower quickly put a stop to that, telling Wilson, “Charlie, you run defense.” Wilson got the message, and his self-confidence quickly returned. Thereafter he ran DoD more or less as he had run General Motors, minus the profit imperative.

—Excerpts from Strategy, Money, and the New Look