

CHAPTER 3

The Struggle over National Security Policy in an Age of Parity

As the Nixon administration began its second term, the United States confronted economic and strategic challenges that called the nation's defense planning status quo into question. Nixon and Kissinger believed their policies of détente with the Soviet Union had resulted in a considerable lessening of Cold War tensions. Yet from the Pentagon's perspective, these policies had done nothing to weaken Soviet conventional and nuclear forces. Instead, James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld would forcefully argue that they caused domestic support for a strong U.S. defense posture to wane. Public weariness with the Vietnam War, broad approval for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Nixon administration's opening to China all resulted in increased congressional pressure to reduce the U.S. military presence overseas and cut the Defense budget. Such pressure hit just as rising inflation began to erode the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar, threatening to intensify the effects of any budget reductions congress might enact in pursuit of a post-Vietnam peace dividend.¹

The Soviets improved their military position considerably as the United States pursued its long and costly war in Vietnam even during the era of détente. The Soviet humiliation during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis humiliation and growing hostility between Moscow and Beijing, fear of technological inferiority relative to the U.S. nuclear forces had resulted in a massive buildup in nuclear forces. Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson warned in the spring of 1973 that the superpowers had reached "an age of approximate nuclear parity."²

Richardson's successor, Schlesinger came to office with the problem posed by parity as a particular concern. In response, he oversaw two significant changes at the Pentagon. The first

was the appointment of Andrew W. Marshall as director of net assessment. Unlike pure threat assessments, Marshall's net assessments compared both superpowers' military capabilities, doctrines, strategies, and national resource bases. At a time of diminishing resources, Marshall would identify areas of U.S. comparative advantage and Soviet weakness, allowing Schlesinger and his successors to accentuate the former while exploiting the latter. Schlesinger's second change came with the promulgation of a new doctrine promising to give the president limited nuclear war fighting options that might strengthen the credibility of deterrence.³

As Schlesinger later claimed, he was a "revivalist." He would seek not simply to restore a military whose morale and public image had been badly battered by the Vietnam War but to revive a sense that Washington did not have to agree to a balance of power settlement with the Soviet Union. The Soviet buildup, he believed, inflicted steep costs on the Soviet economy. Disoriented and demoralized though the United States might be, if reawakened, the country could not only compete with the threatening but vulnerable Soviet Union but could inflict grave damage on its adversary. To accomplish this redirection, Schlesinger would have to contest the CIA's control over assessments of the Soviet threat. Only then could he take effective aim at what he saw as Kissinger's unwise *détente* policies. Although he would develop the intellectual groundwork to do so, he failed both to develop the necessary rapport with the presidents he served and to master the art of bureaucratic combat, as his successor would, to gain control over national security policy.⁴

Origins of the Office of Net Assessment, 1969–1973

Nixon's interest in net assessment had its origins in his first administration and developed gradually in response to his and Kissinger's disgust with intelligence information. Both were

convinced that an overhaul of the intelligence community was necessary. Concluding that Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms would not begin a deep restructuring himself, Nixon tasked George Schultz and James Schlesinger (director and assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, respectively) in late 1970 with conducting a thorough review of the intelligence community. The resulting NSC/OMB study, sometimes known as the “Schlesinger report” because of the assistant OMB director’s predominant role, found that though Washington’s increased funding for intelligence collection had resulted in a spectacular growth of raw intelligence from satellites and other innovations, the increase had “come to serve as a proxy for improved analysis, inference, and estimation.” To improve the quality of intelligence analysis, the Schlesinger report called for the establishment of a national net assessment group to “keep questioning the community and challenging it to refine and support its hypotheses.” Although Shultz would later fire Schlesinger—Alexander Haig later remembered that it was “for his alleged arrogance”—his report proved highly influential. In reaction to it, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird created an assistant secretary of defense for intelligence position on November 3, 1971, and selected Albert C. Hall for the new post.⁵

In response to the study and Kissinger’s recommendation, Nixon in November 1971 considerably broadened the DCI’s responsibilities, granting the position leadership over the entire intelligence community. He also established a Net Assessment Group (NAG) within the National Security Council to review and evaluate intelligence products and produce net assessments that compared U.S. capabilities with those of adversaries. Disagreement persisted within the administration, however, about how and where such assessments should be conducted.⁶

The administration did not begin laying real groundwork for national net assessments until after Laird departed the Pentagon in early 1973. A shrewd bureaucratic operator and staunch defender of DoD turf in strategy formulation, Laird had decided if net assessments were to be done, they must be done under him rather than Kissinger. He therefore established a director of net assessment position within Office of the Secretary of Defense as a direct report to the secretary but left the new office unstaffed. For the remainder of Nixon's first term, net assessments of the comprehensive sort Andrew Marshall advocated and would later oversee at the Pentagon were not done, though several OSD components carried out narrower analyses that bore the name. Laird's OSD, Marshall later recalled, stymied movement toward a national net assessment capacity because "the people in Defense didn't want to do very much" with it.⁷

With Laird gone, Kissinger moved forward in the spring of 1973 with establishing a net assessment function within the NSC. He tasked Marshall with chairing an ad-hoc group that outlined a process whereby the president or national security adviser would initiate net assessments and assign responsibility for producing them to agencies with "primary interest." The assessments would involve collaborative exercises that drew upon the expertise of multiple agencies. Marshall's group distinguished between those "net assessments" already underway, such as the narrowly focused ones in DoD, and those to be assigned under this new guidance. The new form of analysis relied heavily on Marshall's analytical work at RAND. Net assessments of military balances would account for political, economic, and technological factors that affect side-by-side comparisons of forces. Such assessments would offer a comprehensive understanding of emerging national security problems and opportunities—not specific solutions or even recommended options. Done properly, an assessment would help leaders ascertain whether Washington faced a problem in the area under study. If the answer was

yes, the assessment would illuminate the size of the problem as well as whether and why it was getting better or worse.⁸

The Pentagon was divided over whether to support the NSC's new net assessment function. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Thomas Moorer, thought the placement of net assessment within the NSC would cause redundancy. It would be "impractical and unwise" to move forward with the idea, he argued, until the administration had clearly defined what net assessment would do. However, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Albert C. Hall, the OSD representative on Marshall's ad hoc committee, disagreed, arguing that net assessment would differ considerably from the regular interagency approach used in response to national security study memoranda (NSSMs), because it relied on a single lead agency to create an initial draft. Early research would thus not be influenced by efforts to achieve interagency consensus.⁹

In late June, Kissinger approved Marshall's recommendation to move forward with a national net assessment program. Yet Marshall later recalled, "We did very little, except the bureaucracies of trying to establish something." Two months later, Kissinger started the first national net assessment to evaluate the state of the conventional military competition between the superpowers. Lacking the resources to conduct the net assessment himself, Marshall would oversee an interagency process in which the Pentagon prepared the assessment with State Department and CIA support. Marshall's prospects for controlling the process from the NSC appeared bleak. He needed active support from Kissinger, then the administration's leading official. Without it, despite his great analytical abilities, Marshall would be a mere NSC staffer, attempting to direct cabinet-level agencies. Kissinger, however, was then preparing to become secretary of state and had little time to devote to net assessment. Fortunately for Marshall, James Schlesinger was now defense secretary after a brief stint as director of central intelligence and

had quickly come to realize just how much he needed him—and the net assessment function—at the Pentagon.¹⁰

After becoming director of Central Intelligence in February 1973, Schlesinger had pressed hard for CIA analysts to reassess their comparative figures of the superpowers' defense programs. The agency, he believed, had consistently underestimated Soviet defense spending and the burden it placed on the Soviet economy. Roughly 55 percent of the U.S. Defense budget was absorbed by 2.2 million personnel. Although the USSR had far more uniformed personnel (the CIA estimated 4.5 million), the CIA estimates set Soviet defense spending at 25 percent less than U.S. expenditures. Schlesinger questioned how the Soviets, with a far smaller economy, could possibly support a much larger force than the United States, but spend a mere 6 percent of their gross national product (GNP), approximately the same percentage of GNP that Washington then devoted to defense. He recalled later that the CIA's estimate of the Soviet defense burden "just struck me as wrong. Because you looked at this society and the goddamned society was militarized and you knew the society had not become militarized with such a small fraction."¹¹ He demanded to know how the Soviets could purchase more equipment and weapons with less money than the Americans. Because the numbers seemed so nonsensical, he thought that the Soviets must spend far more on defense than the CIA estimated and devote a significantly higher portion of their GNP to it than the United States. He found it implausible that the Soviet Union could convert economic resources into military strength better than the United States could. The analysts had to be omitting Soviet costs. "If I am wrong," Schlesinger told his staff, "tell me why; if I am not wrong, go out and fix those projections." The projections, Schlesinger thought, could be fixed in a matter of months, but he had badly underestimated the resistance he would

encounter from analysts, who, he suspected, had too much staked in their projections. He failed to make much headway before leaving the agency to become defense secretary in July 1973.¹²

He found the Pentagon analysts far more receptive to remolding intelligence analyses on the superpower rivalry. The Defense Intelligence Agency had already developed serious doubts about the accuracy of CIA estimates. DIA had detected a CIA tendency to assume the Soviet military buildup had been in response to U.S. policy, even when evidence suggested otherwise. In August 1973 Schlesinger told the DIA director, Vice Adm. Vincent P. de Poi, that he could not believe the Soviets were getting more hardware investment than Washington did for the limited expenditures the CIA calculated they were making. They must find where the CIA erred. The agency, he said, failed to include Soviet reserve costs, though reserves might be critical to Soviet conventional strength. Washington, he added, had to offer market rates to attract enlistees to sustain the new All-Volunteer Force while Moscow relied on conscription. Although conscripts were cheaper, the manpower cost imbalance was misleading, the defense secretary thought, because the Soviets devoted far more of their labor force to the military. He recommended instead an approach that calculated the market price for military labor as a percentage of the total work force, and proposed using that figure to determine how much of Soviet GNP went to defense. Applying U.S. prices, he speculated that Soviet defense expenditures might be equivalent to \$120 billion, almost 50 percent above the U.S. level. To begin countering the CIA's analysis, Schlesinger tasked DIA with considering the "trends, directions, priorities" in Soviet weapons procurement found in the CIA budget estimates.¹³

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[REDACTED]. He moved to bring Andrew Marshall, his old friend and RAND collaborator, to OSD instead of letting him continue “floating around under Henry Kissinger or the White House.” Kissinger did not object. Schlesinger later recalled that Kissinger never treated net assessment “as a matter of great importance.”¹⁴

Schlesinger believed that Marshall and the analytical rigor he would bring could push the intelligence community to improve analyses. From the Pentagon, Marshall could construct larger net assessments of the superpower competition. On October 2 Schlesinger asked him to move to the Pentagon, and Marshall readily agreed. The next month, Kissinger issued National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 239, formally assigning responsibility for the national net assessment program to the secretary of defense. After he assumed new duties as secretary of state and war broke out in the Middle East, Kissinger had too much else on his mind in October 1973 to contest the defense secretary on what he felt was a peripheral concern.¹⁵

Marshall was happy to leave the NSC where he would never have had the freedom to do the types of net assessments he preferred. Not only did Kissinger pay little attention to net assessment, but he had a very different understanding of the superpower competition than either Marshall or Schlesinger did. At a staff meeting in February 1974, Schlesinger said it was not clear which side gained the most from détente, but he did not view improved relations as permanent or necessarily desirable. “Fundamentally,” he said, “they don’t want us as friends.”

He thought that Washington's "great strength is our volatility and unpredictability." The Soviets, he suspected, are "afraid of us." Marshall shared the defense secretary's view that Kissinger was overly willing to accept pessimistic assessments of Soviet power. He later characterized Kissinger's rationale for détente as: "The sense was that here was this young, energetic nation on the upsurge, and we were less and less willing to devote resources to defense and that we were going to have to make the best deal we could." Trained as economists, Schlesinger and Marshall were skeptical of such a view. They doubted that the Soviet command economy could spend more on defense than Washington without bearing a far greater burden than the CIA estimated. "Neither of us quite believed the CIA numbers," he remembered, "and so the notion that there was something hopeless about the situation struck us as wrong."¹⁶

In Marshall, Schlesinger had brought over not just a director of net assessment, but his intellectual alter ego. The two men's friendship and close intellectual affinity had begun at RAND in the 1960s. Marshall remembered: "I was probably Schlesinger's closest friend at RAND. Actually, my wife and I spent a lot of time at their house and with them." Schlesinger recalled: "My best pal in that period was Andy Marshall. He had seen a great deal. We used to exchange our views and confidences about the world regularly."¹⁷

They often discussed the pitfalls of analytical methods that overemphasized quantitative factors to explain and attempt to solve complex phenomena. Systems analysis, first instituted by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, became something of an intellectual punching bag for them. Marshall thought that with systems analysis, "the measures of effectiveness tended to be too narrow. It tended to push people in the direction of asking ... the wrong questions," encouraging policymakers to arrive at overly narrow solutions, such as how to destroy targets more efficiently. Such analysis took little account of the qualitative factors affecting a nation's

strategic choices, such as historical, cultural, ideological, and cultural influences. A more effective means of looking at the competition, Marshall concluded, would be to emulate successful business tactics and strategies. He later recalled, “If ... you want to address the question of strategy for the competition, the good moves will not be just the most efficient in destroying targets, but ones that will drive him out of business.” Pentagon planning had to be directed toward the pursuit of a long-term strategy, he believed, and that could only be achieved if leaders turned to analysts who asked the right questions.¹⁸

Schlesinger shared many of Marshall’s concerns about systems analysis. Although he gave it “two-and-half cheers” in a RAND report he authored in 1968 (“Uses and Abuses of Analysis”), he incisively critiqued it. McNamara’s OSD had “oversold” systems analysis by maintaining that the scientific method could be applied to policymaking. “In scientific investigations,” he wrote, “the search for truth is by and large unfettered. By contrast, in the search for preferred policies such encumbrances as social values and goals, constraints, institutional requirements (both broad and narrow) pertain. Truth becomes only one of a number of conflicting objectives and, sad to relate, oftentimes a secondary one.” Some of the McNamara era’s worst errors had resulted not from analysis itself, but from its selective use. Too often, it had been used to confirm policymakers’ beliefs or goals rather than “used in its most fruitful form, that of raising questions.” Still, Schlesinger praised analysis, if properly used, as an invaluable tool for policymakers.¹⁹

Schlesinger knew that between his time at RAND and the NSC, Marshall had developed a far more comprehensive analytical framework than existed at the Pentagon. Before net assessment, Marshall would later explain, “analysis within DoD was conditioned by the natural institutional viewpoints of the participants, difficulties in data collection and use, and most

importantly problems in obtaining comprehensive treatment of both US and Soviet military activities.” Immediately after Marshall started working for Schlesinger, he proposed exploring how the superpowers organized and structured their forces to reveal ways to exploit technological advances. His small staff consisted initially of just two military officers and two secretaries. He and Schlesinger would continue the close intellectual rapport they had shared at RAND, giving the new office of net assessment immediate outsized influence.²⁰

Despite the defense secretary’s enthusiastic backing, Marshall’s new office had a rough beginning. Marshall had not yet worked out how net assessments would be conducted and had to complete the assessment he had begun at the NSC, a comparison of U.S. and Soviet ground forces, under an interagency model. The high-level interagency participants, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs as well as the directors of CIA and DIA, lacked the time for serious engagement but had the power to protect their bureaucratic interests. The result, as Marshall later recalled, was “a very mediocre product.” The findings were not bold enough to offend anyone or offer much novel insight. Marshall was privately furious with the result.²¹

Delivered to Schlesinger in May 1974, the assessment noted that the number of Soviet divisions had risen by around 15 percent since 1964, mostly for a buildup opposite China, while active U.S. divisions had dropped by approximately 15 percent. The superpowers envisioned very different European wars. The Soviets expected a short war. In a colossal blitz, they would overrun most of Western Europe within days and destroy most NATO forces there. Washington planners, however, felt confident that NATO could halt the invaders close to the alliance’s eastern border until reinforcements poured in from the United States. These contrasting presuppositions strongly influenced each side’s force structure and tactical doctrines, the assessment determined.²²

In July 1974 memo to Schlesinger, which softened his private disgust with the product, Marshall explained his dissatisfaction with the available intelligence: “We foresaw many of the data problems and intelligence gaps, but we had little appreciation of how bad the problem was.” He told Schlesinger there were serious intelligence gaps, particularly about the quality of Soviet forces, and the intelligence community displayed a strong tendency to fill those gaps with worst-case estimates. In Central Europe, “we have about twice as many men behind each weapon as the Soviets. We can’t say whether that is good, bad, or indifferent.” As to mobilizing for war in Europe, “there must be some way out of the dilemma that our reserves cannot be made ready before the war is over, but their reserves are effective in a week or two.” Marshall ended, “We cannot leave this subject in this state.”²³

Schlesinger shared Marshall’s deep disappointment. Marshall remembered him fuming: “We don’t want any more of that shit, that junk.” The interagency process, both believed, had watered down the conclusions to the point that they were no longer insightful or useful. They decided to discard the interagency model and have Marshall take direct control over all future net assessments, relying on his small office to do the analytical work. Schlesinger would ensure that Marshall had a budget sufficient to fund research and analytical assistance from top intellectual talent throughout the United States, both within and outside of government.²⁴

Marshall’s purpose was to diagnose problems rather than to solve them. Knowing that the defense secretary already received recommendations from the Joint Chiefs and top OSD officials, Marshall thought that net assessment’s unique value would be diminished if he tried to be yet another voice proposing specific solutions. Such a quest for answers could bias or narrow analyses while placing greater time pressure on analysts, threatening the thoroughness and thoughtfulness that Marshall knew would make the analyses unique. Because he believed the

secretary's real impact on the military rested mostly with shaping force structure and capabilities for the military's later use, he focused his assessments on discovering or examining trends that might threaten American security over the medium and long term—years and even decades in the future. If a crisis erupted in Europe, for instance, a defense secretary and military commanders might wish they had better tanks, planes, bombs, or troops with better training, but he could not instantly produce and deploy them to avert disaster.²⁵

Not wanting to receive more interagency rubbish masquerading as incisive analysis, Schlesinger fully endorsed Marshall's approach. The secretary told his friend which projects he was interested in but, Marshall recalled, gave him "almost total leeway" to carry them out. He informed Marshall that he was interested in the strategic nuclear balance, the military balance, the worldwide naval balance, the European theater, and the burdens placed on each superpower by its respective defense establishment. Marshall began assessments on each. Not wanting to give anyone the chance to distort or dilute net assessments, Schlesinger directed that they be delivered directly to him.²⁶

It is difficult to measure with precision the impact of Marshall's net assessments. Marshall met with Schlesinger daily and had discussions that ranged from key department personnel appointments and particular intelligence estimates to more philosophical discussions of the Marine Corps' future mission. Schlesinger later recalled that Marshall strongly influenced his "substantive judgments about military matters." Maj. Gen. John A. Wickham Jr., who had served as Schlesinger's military assistant, recalled that the two were "almost brothers." As for his net assessments, Marshall admitted: "It's hard to judge whether studies are put to use. He did read them and made comments. We talked about them, and I think they were helpful in assembling information and changing his views a bit." Many important ideas likely formed

during conversations between the two. Unfortunately, surviving notes of their discussions are fragmentary. Yet Schlesinger's consultations with NATO allies, his debates with Kissinger, and his public pronouncements on the Cold War military balance reflect a thorough familiarity with Marshall's assessments.²⁷

Schlesinger and Marshall's Struggle with the CIA

Marshall served as Schlesinger's incisive critic of CIA estimates of Soviet defense spending. Since the beginning of the Cold War, the agency had primary responsibility for assessing Soviet defense spending. Because the basic contours of intelligence estimates of Soviet military power spread rapidly to the public following their production by the intelligence community, CIA assessments tended to shape national debate over the Soviet threat and what to do about it. Marshall's office, moreover, relied heavily on CIA intelligence on the Soviet Union in creating net assessments, though his analysts often arrived at very different conclusions than CIA analysts did.

Valuable as Marshall's net assessments were to the secretary's own understanding of the superpower rivalry, they lacked the weight that CIA national intelligence had with Congress and the administration. Schlesinger could not hope to contest what he considered Kissinger's wrongheaded domination over national security policy unless he could convince CIA analysts to adjust their estimates of both the scale of the Soviet military threat and the enormous strain military spending placed on the Soviet economy. If he could do so, he could force advocates of détente and post-Vietnam defense cuts to recognize that the Soviet Union was more dangerous in the near-term than they reckoned, but also more vulnerable in the long-term if the United States adjusted policy.²⁸

In January 1974 Schlesinger requested a CIA study of the burden defense placed on the Soviet economy. He then tasked Marshall with providing CIA analysts thorough guidance for conducting it. Rather than give a specific outline for what the secretary wanted, Marshall peppered the analysts with questions meant to challenge their assumptions, thereby freeing them from the intellectual straightjackets he felt stifled their creativity and value. He wanted them to step back from their seemingly instinctual habit of quantifying the problem. “In addition to trying to understand what the burden is at this point in time,” he wrote, “a major question of interest is will they be able to continue to carry it? Which of us will begin to feel the weight of the burden soonest? Is the Soviet level of effort sustainable indefinitely or not?” Because convincing answers to such questions required a more thorough understanding of each superpower’s internal competition for resources as well as the bureaucratic and political structures that affected its decision-making and resource allocation, “not only may it be important to move away from simple percentages of GNPs as the measure, but to try to produce much more sophisticated analyses of the real, and perceived, opportunity cost of the defense expenditures on the two sides.” If, for example, the Soviets pushed a greater share of its overall technical and managerial talent into the defense sector than the United States did, they must be depriving it from elsewhere with resulting opportunity costs far more significant to the health of the state than a mere percentage of the total GNP might suggest.²⁹

The CIA disregarded Marshall’s and Schlesinger’s concerns and guidance. On October 30, 1974, the CIA study “The Measurement and Meaning of Defense Burden in the Soviet Setting” stood by the earlier estimates that Marshall and Schlesinger had deemed deficient. The agency judged that the Soviet defense effort consumed less than 8 percent of the gross national product, less than 10 percent of the labor force, 10–15 percent of industrial production, about 20–

30 percent of machinery output, and most top scientific and technical talent. The Soviet burden had declined markedly in all these areas over the past decade because the Soviets Union's overall economic capacity was increasing faster than its defense allocation. The CIA assessed, "The Soviet economy could sustain or even accelerate the long-term growth in defense spending and continue to increase allocations to civilian programs."³⁰

Schlesinger and Marshall were frustrated. They had asked CIA analysts to question their assumptions, but they had instead reaffirmed them. Schlesinger turned to Marshall for their response while he conveyed his frustration with the agency's methodology directly to his successor at CIA, William Colby. "It seems clear," Schlesinger wrote to Colby on November 2, "that the USSR is steadily adding to its military capabilities, while budgetary constraints are forcing us to cut back, delay and stretch out our modernization programs." He believed a U.S.-Soviet comparison of dollar costs could convey a proper understanding of superpower forces and programs. He questioned the agency's assumption that rough dollar cost parity meant both sides contributed equally to their military capabilities. Much of the U.S. defense budget went to pensions, educational programs, and medical care. Because the Soviets spent far less on such programs, more funds went directly toward Soviet military power. Schlesinger recommended two kinds of comparative analysis. First, measure the respective physical sizes of U.S. and Soviet efforts (e.g., service personnel, direct civilian and defense industry employment, annual production of major items). Second, examine major functional or program areas (e.g., procurement, reserve forces, training, operations, and maintenance), describing differences, preparing cost estimates, and discussing comparability problems. He suggested the CIA collaborate with Marshall to develop such analyses.³¹

Schlesinger gained further ammunition to criticize CIA methodology from DIA and the Program Analysis and Evaluation office. [REDACTED]

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Colby attempted to placate the displeased defense secretary. On December 2, 1974, he wrote to Schlesinger to accept his assistance in developing new types of comparative analyses. The director explained that the CIA had just finished two major studies on Soviet military accounts based on the most recent intelligence and assured Schlesinger that analysts were now considering new approaches that would take Schlesinger's analytical concerns into account. The director attached a paper prepared by the agency's office of strategic research that used equivalent dollar costs to compare U.S. and Soviet defense spending. The Soviets spent more than the Americans every year since 1971, and the agency estimated that by 1973 the Soviet Union spent \$12.9 billion (in 1973 dollars) more on defense than the United States did.³³

Colby failed to reassure the defense secretary, who, according to his military assistant's notes, viewed the CIA's latest efforts "with some disdain." He added, "Their methodology is part of the problem." Responding to Edward Proctor, deputy director of intelligence, on December 4 regarding the CIA's long Soviet defense burden study, Marshall wrote that he had thought "one

objective of the paper was to review possible alternatives to current measures of the Soviet defense burden that focus on burden as a percentage of GNP.” He believed Proctor and Schlesinger had “more or less agreed that no measure of defense burden is likely to be adequate, and the percentage of GNP measure specifically had to be supplemented by other measures.” The CIA paper had largely ignored this agreement and analyzed the defense burden too narrowly. He thought that the CIA’s own evidence contradicted its judgment that the strain defense had on the Soviet economy was diminishing. He also doubted the CIA’s estimate that defense spending consumed a mere 6 percent of Soviet GNP. He found the agency’s admission that its figure could be off by 20 percent of that figure unpersuasive, writing that its underestimation was more likely 50 or even 100 percent. Marshall damningly described the CIA’s response as “disappointing” for failing to explore alternative measures of the Soviet defense burden, and “unconvincing” in maintaining that the Soviets spent only 6 percent of their GNP on defense.³⁴

De Poix’s successor at DIA, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, shared Schlesinger’s and Marshall’s doubts about the 6 percent estimate and the conclusions the CIA drew from it. It did not “hit anywhere near the mark,” he wrote to Schlesinger in January 1975. He found the CIA’s reliance on a “complex, machine-assisted” direct-costing method to estimate the Soviet defense burden absurd and inexcusable. “Even perfunctory inspection,” he wrote, “convinces a sensible man that the figures are far too low.” [REDACTED]

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Schlesinger agreed. He warned an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that the trends threatened the military balance that had made détente possible. “The Soviet Union,” he said, “is outspending us by 25 percent if one leaves out pensions.”³⁵

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If correct, the CIA had been wildly underestimating Soviet defense spending and the burden it placed on the Soviet economy, as Schlesinger and Marshall had suspected.³⁶

With agency analysts on the defensive, Schlesinger, Marshall, and Graham pressed the CIA over Soviet motivations. A 1974 national intelligence estimate (NIE) depicted the Soviet leadership as committed to détente. [REDACTED]

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When Schlesinger, Marshall, and Graham battled with the CIA over its estimates, they fought against an agency preoccupied by congressional investigation. Schlesinger, during his five months as DCI, had launched an internal investigation of the agency’s past domestic activities. Investigators uncovered abundant evidence of past illegal activity and wrongdoing. Top CIA officials would call the resulting 693-page compendium the family jewels. Fortunately for Schlesinger, knowledge of the collection did not become public until after he had moved to the Pentagon. His successor, William Colby, was saddled with the consequences. On December 22, 1974, the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh in an explosive front-page *New York Times* report described how the CIA had conducted an illegal domestic spying operation against antiwar protestors and other dissident groups during the Nixon administration. Schlesinger’s investigation, Hersh reported, “produced evidence of dozens of other illegal activities by

members of the CIA inside the United States, beginning in the nineteen-fifties, including break-ins, wiretapping and the surreptitious inspection of mail.” Uncomfortably for the defense secretary, Schlesinger’s photo appeared on the front-page story between those of his immediate predecessor and successor.³⁸

President Gerald Ford, having succeeded Nixon four months earlier, responded by ordering a blue-ribbon panel under Vice President Nelson B. Rockefeller to investigate, hoping to preempt an unconstrained congressional investigation that could gravely damage the CIA’s reputation and its ability to gather intelligence and conduct operations. “We don’t want to destroy but to preserve the CIA,” Ford told Colby on January 3, 1975. “But we want to make sure that illegal operations and those outside the charter don’t happen.” The new Congress, however, had no intention or incentive to defer to Ford. That fall’s midterm elections had resulted in the Democrats extending their House majority by 49 seats and their Senate majority by 4. The new members felt a clear mandate to check the runaway power of an imperial presidency, which had brought the country to the brink of a constitutional crisis under Nixon. With sharpened knives, Congress began two large investigations of the intelligence community—Frank Church (D-ID) chaired a select committee in the Senate and Otis Pike (D-NY) chaired the House investigation. Most negative attention fell on the CIA, whose salacious past misdeeds were paraded before the public.³⁹

Although Schlesinger’s and Marshall’s challenges of Soviet estimates had an already wounded agency on the defensive, the two men had not managed to win the argument before Ford abruptly fired the secretary in November 1975. Schlesinger’s intellectual brilliance had resulted in a powerful collaboration with Marshall to challenge the CIA’s hold over assessments of the Soviet threat. His weakness as a political operator and inability to get along with Ford,

however, caused him to fall short in translating an intellectual campaign into a shift in national policy, which would have required outmaneuvering the wily Henry Kissinger. While Ford's chief of staff, Donald Rumsfeld, shared Schlesinger's hawkish views on the Soviet threat, he better understood how Kissinger had used his close relationship to the president to isolate the Pentagon. On November 2, after telling Colby he would be replaced as DCI, Ford barked to Rumsfeld's deputy, Richard B. "Dick" Cheney, to bring in Schlesinger: "Get that son-of-a-bitch in here so I can fire him." Rumsfeld spoke with Schlesinger the next day by phone. According to Wickham's notes, Rumsfeld, who Ford had picked to succeed Schlesinger, said that he was "in a funny position," because as he had told Ford he had no policy differences with the departing secretary. The president, Rumsfeld said, had responded that he did not either. The chief of staff thought it was primarily a personality clash. "You are just not the easiest person to get to know," he told Schlesinger.⁴⁰ The same day, Kissinger also spoke with Schlesinger, telling him "how much he regretted" his firing and that it was "not my preference." "Correct, from what I know," an angry Schlesinger responded. He finished with a prophetic warning: "Your difficulties have only increased" with Rumsfeld's move to the Pentagon.⁴¹

Indeed, the incoming defense secretary understood that to win the coming confrontation with Kissinger over the direction of national policy, he would have to accompany intellectual argument over the nature of the Soviet threat with political skill and bureaucratic machination. Kissinger could not hope for the new defense secretary's relationship with the president to sour to his benefit, as had been the case with Schlesinger. Rumsfeld had been one of Ford's closest confidants since 1965, when he had helped then-Congressman Ford unseat and replace Charles Halleck (R-IN) as House minority leader. The secretary of state also could not hope to outmaneuver the defense secretary within the White House as he had his predecessor, since Ford

had elevated Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld's 34-year-old deputy who owed much of his meteoric rise to Rumsfeld, to become White House chief of staff.⁴²

Rumsfeld and Marshall

However different their backgrounds, Rumsfeld and Marshall forged a solid working relationship. Net assessment survived and thrived under the new secretary. Marshall later recalled: "After the first few weeks we did a lot of things for him and got along very well with him. I was very impressed with Rumsfeld." The two did not previously know each other. They held their first meeting on December 5, 1975, two weeks after Rumsfeld's arrival. Knowing that net assessment's future depended on surviving its first transition in secretaries, Marshall sought to sell him on the office's unique capabilities and discussed with him his assessments of the strategic balance, the central front balance, the naval balance, and the ability of either superpower to project military power into political crisis areas. Although Marshall was careful to point out those areas where Washington enjoyed comfortable leads, the defense secretary recalled that the net assessment director had "demonstrated that the Soviet Union had been gaining ground relative to the United States. America had been slipping toward a position of rough equivalence. The projections of future trend lines did not bode well for the United States." Rumsfeld had already begun developing views that aligned with the assessment. Marshall had earned the new defense secretary's respect. He later recalled spending "a lot of time" with the director. If the defense secretary intended to fight Kissinger's hold over national security policy, Marshall had much to offer.⁴³

Early in January 1976, Marshall sent the secretary his assessment of détente's strengths and shortcomings. He began by recalling Kissinger's original justification for détente: Because

Kissinger believed that Washington could no longer contain its rival, he wanted to engage the Kremlin in direct negotiations to inhibit aggressive behavior. Such a rationale, Marshall argued, implied undue pessimism about U.S. willingness to support vigorous military and political responses to Soviet aggression. Rather than constrain the Soviets, détente had only weakened the U.S. position. Its focus on diplomacy sapped public support for defense spending. Moreover, he wrote, Kissinger's strategy risked too many short-term losses to achieve "what may well be excessively optimistically estimated future benefits." The Defense Department should instead closely examine the superpowers' comparative strengths and weaknesses to "look at how we can drive up Soviet costs, how we can exploit areas of U.S. weakness and Soviet advantage." Rumsfeld fully endorsed these misgivings about Kissinger's policy.⁴⁴

The 43-year-old former representative from Illinois had risen fast but owed his rapid rise far more to his political prowess and peerless skill as a bureaucratic infighter than to his brilliance as a strategist. His predecessor, Schlesinger, recalled letting insightful philosophical discussions drag on, forcing his staff to rearrange his schedule. The perpetually impatient Rumsfeld had no such need. He kept conversations short, abruptly cutting off those who rambled. He wrote later: "Standing up while working tends to be an incentive for those who come in for a discussion to say what they need to say and not linger." His conversations resembled wrestling matches, with the former Princeton wrestler determined to end up on top, rather than academic discourses.. Robert Ellsworth recalled that Rumsfeld did not take nearly as much interest in strategy as his predecessor. Schlesinger, he said, "was a giant world class person in this field, and Rumsfeld was not."⁴⁵ Kissinger later complimented Rumsfeld, his erstwhile antagonist, backhandedly: "Rumsfeld afforded me a close-up look at a special Washington phenomenon: the skilled full-time politician-bureaucrat in whom ambition, ability, and substance

fuse seamlessly.” He saw Rumsfeld’s motivations in contesting détente as primarily political rather than philosophical, which made him far more dangerous than his predecessor:

My tensions with Schlesinger were different than those with Rumsfeld. Schlesinger was basically an academic who would occasionally fight intellectual battles using political means—though never very comfortably. Rumsfeld might invoke systems analysis in his battles, but he was more a political leader than an analyst. I was convinced that, at the end of the day, Schlesinger and I would come to an understanding because, in truth, our disagreements were essentially esoteric and technical or else bureaucratic.

Scholars and contemporaries who have ascribed a less charitable view to Rumsfeld’s motives have argued that he opportunistically used growing opposition to Kissinger’s policies as simply the most convenient tool available for eroding the power of his bureaucratic rival and increasing his personal political prominence. Others have more favorably and convincingly argued that the national interest motivated Rumsfeld to contest policies he thought had imperiled it, and this noble motivation coincided with his political and bureaucratic ambitions. Rumsfeld himself points to the December meeting with Marshall as the cause of his concern about the unfavorable trends.⁴⁶

If Rumsfeld hoped to reorient U.S. policy away from détente and Kissinger’s control, he understood he would have to challenge the CIA’s assessment of the Soviet threat. He shared his predecessor’s distrust of CIA estimates and supported Marshall’s efforts to prod the agency. He later recalled the many ways he thought the agency had mischaracterized the Soviet threat: “The CIA’s position about the Soviets was that they were not as intent, and serious, and purposeful, as they were. They were denying a significant part of their total economy, denying the consumer section of the economy to an enormous extent and the CIA didn’t understand that.” The agency “seemed to always be wrong on one side, and the wrong side, the side not of safety.”⁴⁷

As with Kissinger's State Department, Rumsfeld's struggle with the CIA had a personal dynamic. The CIA, he recalled later, "tended to represent a part of America that was elite, liberal, eastern, highly international"—a description that, aside from the "liberal" characterization, perfectly fit its Massachusetts-born, Yale-educated director, George H. W. Bush. "And I was a Midwestern boy," Rumsfeld, himself a Princeton-educated, former U.S. representative to NATO, administration insider, added. Bush harbored even deeper mistrust of Rumsfeld. Bush, then 51 and a rising star in the Republican Party, suspected that as White House chief of staff, Rumsfeld had engineered the "Halloween massacre" (Ford's late 1975 cabinet shakeup) and Bush's appointment as DCI to remove him as a possible vice-presidential contender in 1976. Rumsfeld denied having anything to do with Ford's decision, a denial most scholars who have closely examined the evidence have found honest and accurate. Ford himself recalled: "I never consulted with him (Rumsfeld) when I made these changes in October 1975; the whole deal was my deal. I didn't talk to Kissinger, Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, or to Elliot Richardson." Bush and his allies, however, believed the rumors, and a decades-long rivalry between the two began. Years later, when George W. Bush considered Rumsfeld to serve again as defense secretary, his father's close confidant former Secretary of State James Baker warned the younger Bush: "All I'm going to say to you is, you know what he did to your daddy."⁴⁸

Because Rumsfeld did not want to spend most of his time battling with the intelligence community or find himself mired in the congressional investigations then battering the CIA, he decided to appoint a second deputy secretary of defense to handle intelligence issues. His views were clear: "I was concerned about the CIA. I felt that they were not doing well by the country." He picked Robert Ellsworth, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, since mid-1974, who had been planning to leave the Pentagon at the time of Rumsfeld's arrival. The

second deputy position had been created by Congress in 1972 but left vacant. Rumsfeld's offer of a promotion convinced Ellsworth to stay. Schlesinger later recalled that he had wanted to elevate Ellsworth to the deputy position but had been rebuffed by Kissinger, whose attitude had been: "What the hell does he need this for?" Schlesinger thought that he needed a second deputy to provide OSD with more clout within the department and in interagency debates. He also did not trust or get along well with Deputy Secretary William Clements, but because he could not fire the politically well-connected Texas oilman, he likely hoped he could diminish his power. Alexander Haig later recalled that when he was chief of staff, "I had to be shock absorber between Schlesinger and Clements.... They hated each other." After he had been forced out of the Pentagon, Schlesinger explained bitterly: "The tendency of the White House was to give to Rumsfeld all the issues that I had raised previously, and so Ellsworth was elevated as a second deputy."⁴⁹

Rumsfeld understood how damaging Clements had been to his predecessor. "He was wildly vociferous about Jim Schlesinger everywhere—the White House, Congress, everywhere he went," he remembered from his time as White House chief of staff. "He was very harmful to Jim." Ellsworth became Rumsfeld's second deputy in December 1975. Although Rumsfeld maintained that his second deputy's duties were circumscribed to just intelligence matters, when asked by historians about his deputies' respective influence, Rumsfeld was clear about who he relied upon: "Bob Ellsworth was an adviser. I wouldn't say that Clements was. I met with him frequently, and I heard what he had to say. He was included." When asked how Rumsfeld divided labor between the two, Ellsworth quipped, "Rumsfeld didn't have any division of labor. He did or was responsible for everything." Clements would maintain his focus on acquisitions,

but Rumsfeld would have Ellsworth, who he deemed a more trustworthy and competent representative, handle the most important interagency matters.⁵⁰

Ellsworth's elevation changed net assessment's position in the bureaucracy but did not diminish Marshall's role with the new secretary. In May 1976 Rumsfeld reorganized defense intelligence under Ellsworth and created a Defense Intelligence Board, designed to improve the relationship between defense intelligence producers and their consumers. Marshall was on the board and attended the new deputy's daily staff meetings. Marshall, however, continued to send net assessments directly to the secretary, who endorsed the net assessment director's practice of providing him with diagnostic rather than prescriptive analyses.⁵¹

By early 1976, because of information provided by a Soviet émigré, every agency except the CIA had assessed that past intelligence estimates had grossly underestimated Soviet defense spending. The CIA insisted, however, that the new intelligence should not cause them to radically adjust their estimates. The Pentagon engaged Arthur Laffer, the supply-side economist who would become famous for his Laffer Curve, to review the methodology behind the estimates and their interpretation. On January 11, 1976, Laffer wrote to Rumsfeld and Ellsworth that because the CIA refused to change their estimate in response to the émigré's new information, he suggested they assess what the higher Soviet spending meant in different scenarios, "in terms of the effectiveness of our military effort, our role in détente, and in the SALT talks." He continued, "There are few Americans who do not feel U.S. strength is being eroded. That is the single most important issue to analyze. I suggest a high-level commission composed of businessmen, government people, academics, and military be set up."⁵²

The CIA's Military-Economic Advisory Panel, an interagency group, had already begun studying ways to improve intelligence estimates; Marshall was unimpressed. After reading its

report, he advised Rumsfeld and Ellsworth in February 1976 that the panel would not recommend major improvements. It had failed to even “surface or respond to existing criticisms of the CIA ruble estimates” for Soviet defense expenditures. The group had imprudently recommended diverting scarce analytical resources into surveying “past misuses of Agency analyses.” Rather than hope for the CIA to improve itself, Marshall proposed “a variant of Laffer’s proposal.” He recommended suggesting to the DCI the establishment of an independent group to appraise analyses of the Soviet economy, the burden of Soviet defense programs, and the size of the Soviet military effort compared with that of the United States. Rumsfeld approved, and Marshall drafted a February 26 letter for Ellsworth to send to Bush (Rumsfeld’s second deputy had a far better relationship with Bush than the defense secretary), asking him to give the highest possible priority to developing improved estimates and informing the national security community about revised dollar and ruble estimates. Doing so would instill maximum confidence about their objectivity and bipartisan nature. He also asked Bush to consider creating an independent group to “provide an independent view of the full policy implications of the change from the 6% to 8% estimate of Soviet GNP devoted to defense to the new estimates in the 10% to 15%” range. These outside experts would report to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), which Ford had created by executive order on February 18. While the DCI chaired the CFI, it also included Ellsworth and the deputy national security adviser. The committee reported directly to the NSC.⁵³

Bush replied diplomatically but firmly rejected most of the deputy’s request. He agreed that the CIA needed to better inform policymakers about the results of intelligence estimates to instill confidence in their objectivity and accuracy. He cautioned, however, that while he concurred with the need to devote more resources to a new estimate on the Soviet defense

burden, “any sizable increase in effort cannot be accomplished over night.” The DCI rejected the idea of an independent board reporting to the CFI, as the CIA “already has a Panel of academic and industrial experts.” Such groups should remain under his oversight rather than under the CFI, he thought, “because they are so much a part of the production of intelligence.”⁵⁴

Under Bush the CIA had in fact substantially raised its estimate of Soviet defense spending after concluding that the agency’s earlier Ruble price estimates had been badly flawed. In February 1976, it calculated the dollar value of Soviet programs at \$114 billion, compared with 1975 U.S. authorizations of \$80 billion. Subtracting pension costs from both sides, Soviet dollar costs were 50 percent greater. Three months later, after receiving an unusually large body of fresh information, the CIA doubled its estimate of Soviet ruble spending in 1975.⁵⁵ In July, a further CIA study placed the dollar costs of Soviet defense programs more than 25 percent above U.S. authorizations for 1975 and nearly 50 percent if retirement expenses were excluded from both sides. In effect, the agency had conceded that Schlesinger and Marshall had been right. The agency had indeed been underestimating Soviet defense spending.⁵⁶

Rumsfeld sought to use these intelligence reassessments in his effort to convince key members of Congress to increase the Defense budget. In March 1976 the chairman of the Senate appropriations committee, John McClellan, asked Rumsfeld to assess the implications of recent trends in the U.S.-Soviet military balance. The secretary’s reply painted a dark picture: “If present trends continue, the U.S. will become clearly inferior in strategic power at some point in the coming years, and the U.S. would likely be seen as inferior or becoming inferior some time prior to the crossover point.” He warned that by the 1980s, the Warsaw Pact could become not just numerically equivalent to NATO, but technically and tactically sophisticated “in practically every military mission area and resource category.” An American lead in technology still

existed, as could be seen in the airborne warning and control system, strategic cruise missiles, and precision-guided missiles, but even that edge was undergoing steady erosion. “What the U.S. needs now,” Rumsfeld concluded, “is to begin to arrest the trends and make the commitment for the long haul.”⁵⁷

Although Kissinger agreed with the effort to prevent Congress from drastically slashing the Defense budget, he was furious that the defense secretary was doing so by portraying the United States as falling behind the Soviets. The seemingly all-powerful secretary of state found himself astonishingly powerless to change the defense secretary’s tune, however. In a March 29 meeting with Ford, Rumsfeld, and Scowcroft, the secretary of state said, “The impression that we are slipping is creating a bad impression around the world.” “But it is true,” Rumsfeld responded. Kissinger retorted, “It is inevitable that our margin since ’60 has slipped. Are we trying to maintain the same margin as we had in 1960 or to maintain adequate forces?” Undaunted, Rumsfeld rejoined, “But it is true. We have been slipping since the ‘60s from superiority to equivalence, and if we don’t stop, we’ll be behind.” Rather than attempt to counter Ronald Reagan’s Republican primary challenge by moving to the right, Kissinger thought, Ford should take the posture “that Reagan doesn’t know what he’s talking about and he’s irresponsible.” The president, however, backed his defense secretary’s more hawkish approach. He said he wanted to “hit the Congress on Defense. It is a line which will pay off.”⁵⁸

Ford not only supported Rumsfeld but allowed the defense secretary to stage his campaign for more defense spending from the White House. While Schlesinger had used intellectual arguments, and Marshall’s talents, to persuade CIA analysts to rethink their estimates, Rumsfeld used his closer relationship with Ford to press the Pentagon’s own assessment of the Soviet threat directly to members of Congress, media representatives,

influential citizens, and European allies. He enlisted John Hughes, DIA's deputy director for collection (who had earned praise for his U-2 spy plane briefings during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis) to deliver briefings about the Soviet threat that featured satellite photography. Rumsfeld later recalled: "We systematically brought into the White House once or twice a week, groups of congressmen and senators. We brought them into the Roosevelt room, served them a cocktail, and gave them an hour briefing. President Ford would drop by the oval office and say hello to them." Marshall assisted the secretary with line graphs and analysis of intelligence data from 1965 to 1975 showing that the Soviets were drastically increasing their defense investments as the United States was cutting its own. The effort allowed Rumsfeld to reverse cuts to defense (explored in the budget chapters) and to take the lead in redefining the Soviet threat and how to address it.⁵⁹

With Rumsfeld's Pentagon continually casting Soviet motivations and capabilities in a more negative light than the CIA, and with conservatives in Congress and outside government charging the administration with recklessly pursuing détente despite a growing Soviet threat, Bush relented to pressure in May 1976 to begin an experiment in competitive analysis. Team A, comprising CIA analysts, would follow the procedures established in previous national intelligence estimates, while Team B, an outside group of academics and former government officials, would critique those assumptions and methodologies. Team A's report was incorporated into NIE 11-3/8-76. In December 1976, Team B produced a much more threatening appraisal of Soviet programs and objectives that challenged not just the intelligence community's assessments, but the assumptions that had undergirded Washington's pursuance of détente. Bush deemed the experiment a failure and told Ford on January 13, 1977, in the administration's final NSC meeting, that "I feel I have been had." He was furious that Team B's appraisal had gone

public. Rumsfeld agreed with Bush that the leaks must stop but approved of the competitive analysis concept, though he thought it should be narrower in scope. He also praised the NIE, but said, “The only question I have is how to tie it to policy judgements or make it a basis for policy rather than using it as policy. There are some net assessment judgements involved and they should drive decisions.”⁶⁰

Maintaining a Credible Deterrent

While Schlesinger and Rumsfeld disagreed with Kissinger, and with CIA, on the U.S.-Soviet balance of military spending and capabilities, they were generally united on the implications of nuclear parity and the need to reconsider U.S. nuclear doctrine. Kissinger had been convinced of the need since the beginning of the Nixon administration. On January 27, 1969, a member of the Joint Staff briefed Nixon and Kissinger on the U.S. nuclear war plan called the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Prepared by the Joint Strategic Planning Staff (JSTPS) under the guidance of the defense secretary and the Joint Chiefs, the SIOP covered operational plans for a nuclear war with the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China. Every option required the launching of thousands of nuclear weapons. Even if the United States targeted only Soviet strategic weapons, no one could be certain that the Kremlin would not further escalate the conflict by retaliating against American cities and killing millions.⁶¹

The 1969 briefing had disgusted the president and his national security adviser. These were not feasible war strategies, they believed, but different means to commit national suicide. Over the next three years, Kissinger fruitlessly pressed the Pentagon to develop new, sub-SIOP nuclear options. In January 1972 Defense Secretary Laird finally tasked a panel chaired by the Pentagon’s top research scientist, John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering,

with reviewing the nuclear weapons employment policy. The panel emphasized that deterrence required a credible threat against targets highly valued by the enemy. Although employment policies had to be flexible to prevent uncontrolled escalation, if massive exchanges did occur, targeting plans ought to massively degrade the enemy's postwar power and influence. The Foster Panel continued meeting meet into 1973. One of its members, State Department Deputy Director of Policy Planning Seymour Weiss, regularly briefed CIA Director James Schlesinger on its progress and solicited advice from the renowned nuclear strategist whose earlier work at RAND had heavily influenced the panel.⁶²

At the beginning of his second term, Nixon considered the changes in the strategic environment and, through NSSM 169, directed a thorough review of nuclear policy to evaluate alternatives to massive retaliation. Since Washington no longer possessed preponderant nuclear strength, the credibility of massive retaliation against Soviet population and industrial centers seriously eroded. Nixon and Kissinger feared that Moscow now believed Washington would not use nuclear weapons, and risk annihilation, except as a desperate response to a massive Soviet nuclear attack. If that was so, nuclear weapons would have lost much of their diplomatic use as a means of checking Soviet aggression. In response to the president's direction, an interagency working group headed by Foster met weekly. Early in April, Foster sent Secretary Richardson a draft summary report that concluded neither NSDM 16 nor the policy of flexible options could be implemented effectively in light of the changed strategic situation. The panel recommended developing selective, regional, and limited attack options to conduct nuclear strikes at levels below massive nuclear exchange and revise the target choice in a massive exchange to focus on crippling the enemy's postwar recovery.⁶³

The JCS added to the growing gloom about Washington's strategic situation. In March 1973, Chairman Moorer advised Richardson that Strategic Air Command (SAC) analyses indicated that the U.S. weapons remaining after several exchanges could not sufficiently destroy Soviet urban and industrial centers, but that enough Soviet weapons would survive to allow Moscow to devastate the U.S. cities and the industrial base. Moorer dourly characterized SAC's analysis as an accurate depiction of "the shift in the strategic nuclear balance of power in favor of the USSR." In most probable scenarios, "Soviet qualitative improvements possible even under the Strategic Arms Limitation constraints can perpetuate and increase this imbalance" (see chapter 15). The PA&E office downplayed these findings, telling Richardson that SAC's findings were unrealistically alarming. The weapons shortage it highlighted "was pre-determined by the use of the particular scenario. That is, an arbitrary list of targets was attacked and the 'U.S. strike planner' chose to continue attacking military targets rather than reserve enough survivable weapons to perform the urban/industrial mission." Nixon, however, would move Richardson to the Justice Department before he could discern what the true strategic challenge was, or how to calibrate U.S. nuclear strategy to meet it.⁶⁴

Schlesinger came to the Pentagon more conversant than his predecessors with nuclear war strategy. In 1968, while at RAND, he composed the monograph *Rationale for NU-OPTS* (nuclear options), in which he evaluated options less extreme than those in the SIOP. Overseas obligations required the United States to consider "sub-SIOP operations." These, he said, were "ultimately political: to force the opponent to reconsider, to demonstrate a capability of our own that he had not foreseen ... and, above all, to convey to him a sense of our own firmness." To defend Western Europe, Schlesinger continued, "we want something more ... than either a threat

that is incredible or one that features lack of controllability.” Schlesinger’s study led Pentagon strategists to create the Foster panel and heavily influenced its analysis.⁶⁵

In July 1973, just after moving to the Pentagon, Schlesinger told Kissinger that Foster’s summary report, which had been forwarded to him on June 15, represented “an excellent basis for further consideration by the NSC.” Foster’s interagency working group had concluded a new nuclear policy was needed to restore credibility in a time of parity and give the president greater flexibility in a crisis or war. The panel, however, admitted that, in a war, an American effort to keep a nuclear war limited could not guarantee that the Soviets would choose to do the same. At breakfast on August 2, Kissinger and Schlesinger concurred that the president should have precise concepts for the limited use of nuclear weapons. The highest priority would go to planning for war in Europe, showing how to achieve political objectives through effective military employment while limiting damage. For example, Schlesinger suggested planning a strike within 10 miles of the forward edge of the battle area of a ground war. They would need two years, he predicted, to complete the change in plans. Kissinger responded that that was too long. The president needed to understand sooner what controlled escalation meant, and how it might be achieved.⁶⁶

Foster’s summary report had included a lengthy draft NSDM that prescribed the nuclear weapon employment policy, giving the president a range of new options below the SIOP levels. In an August meeting with Schlesinger and Kissinger, Clements called it deceptive because he thought available forces lacked the flexibility to implement it. “The President shouldn’t think he will have these options, if he approves them,” he said. Schlesinger dismissed his deputy’s critique: “It’s a matter of time. We can’t put the mechanical flexibility into the forces until we know what is wanted.” Kissinger agreed with Schlesinger’s deputy: “I want to avoid the military

telling the President they can do anything he orders.” The main aim behind limited nuclear strikes, Schlesinger said, would be “to convey a message to stop.” One possibility was to target Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border to make the Soviet Union vulnerable to Chinese attack and imply to Moscow the existence of a U.S.-Chinese alliance. “You tell us what message you want to convey,” he told the national security adviser. Kissinger responded, “We wouldn’t have an idea what to do in case of an attack on Iran or Europe. If the Soviets could make us back down anywhere in the world, the result would be disastrous.” He urged the Defense Department to move “from the theoretical to actual packages for actual areas.” Two days later Schlesinger directed the JCS to prepare from four to six operational plans to give the president options based on “actual capabilities.”⁶⁷

In late September, the Joint Staff briefed Schlesinger about nuclear strike options in Europe and other areas. The defense secretary was not satisfied with the state of the planning. He asked the Joint Chiefs to rethink some of their targeting priorities and probe the assumptions undergirding them. He questioned, for example, strikes on oil refineries in the Baku region, saying that it only processed 10 percent of Soviet oil. In planning to defend Central Europe, he questioned why they would target airfields that did not support a Soviet attack. In all scenarios, the political messages accompanying any strikes “should be unambiguously clear, should state to the enemy what we intend to do, what we don’t intend to do, and what our bargaining arrangement is.”⁶⁸

In late October, Schlesinger conferred with the Joint Chiefs about the sensitivities involved in public discussion of counterforce plans. Nixon had often said publicly that Washington would take no action, which the Soviets could reasonably interpret as threatening a disarming first strike. The secretary noted that for the JCS such a strike would require attacking

all offensive systems, including ballistic missile submarines. Because neither side could create a capability that would ensure the destruction of all an opponent's missile submarines, he felt confident that the Soviets would not misinterpret U.S. plans to destroy or neutralize hardened targets as threatening a disarming first strike. Washington should determine how far to go toward creating such a counterforce capability, he thought, by how far the Soviets went toward adopting a similar force posture. The Soviets led in land- and sea-based launchers while the Americans had more reentry vehicles and were years ahead in deploying multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles that could hit widely dispersed targets. Schlesinger cautioned, however, the United States must not allow the USSR to unilaterally destabilize the nuclear balance.⁶⁹

The Schlesinger Doctrine

By early January 1974 a draft NSDM, based on the Foster Panel's proposal, was ready for Nixon's approval. It directed the development of limited nuclear options (LNOs) and formally introduced escalation control into U.S. nuclear policy. Before Nixon approved it, however, Schlesinger appeared to inadvertently announce the pending change in a long, convoluted response to a news reporter's question about the administration's position on SALT negotiations. "There is in prospect or there has taken place, to be more precise," he said, "a change in the strategies of the United States with regard to the hypothetical employment of central strategic forces. A change in targeting strategy, as it were." When pressed to elaborate, he explained that the new approach would give the president options more limited than a massive retaliation targeting Soviet cities. He added, "Military targets, whether siloes or other military targets, are, of course, one of the possible target sets." Several members of the administration believed Schlesinger used the announcement to push the revised U.S. nuclear policy forward and present

the president with a *fait accompli*. Worse, Schlesinger's specific mention of hard targets caused many observers to conclude incorrectly that the administration had shifted to a counterforce strategy, which would require a massive arms buildup. The convoluted nature of the announcement and Schlesinger's unintended emphasis on hard targets suggest that he had not carefully considered how to make such a revelation beforehand, although the appearance of spontaneity might have been intentional. The defense secretary wanted the administration to move forward with the change in policy and thought the NSC staff was gumming up the works. However confused his announcement, Schlesinger accomplished his aim.⁷⁰

Besieged by the spiraling Watergate scandal, the administration had little choice but to follow Schlesinger's rather clumsy lead. To Kissinger's fury, the press labeled the new policy the Schlesinger Doctrine. Kissinger had been pressing the Pentagon to provide the president with limited options since 1969. By announcing the change, Schlesinger had identified the new policy with himself, despite the Foster Panel and Kissinger having done much of the bureaucratic leg work. Although he mostly agreed with the new doctrine, except for its timing and association with Schlesinger, Kissinger worried that the military might use it to demand more funding for strategic forces. Weakened by Watergate, the White House was unwilling to restrain Schlesinger and instead formalized the new policy. On January 17, a week after the defense secretary's remarks, Nixon signed NSDM 242, ordering the defense secretary to oversee the development of limited nuclear options. As it turned out, the January press conference had given Schlesinger a personal victory over Kissinger and a bureaucratic one over the NSC.⁷¹

Schlesinger's announcement generated intense discussion, in part because he had made it without consulting U.S. allies, others in the administration, or Congress. His manner of speaking in "graduate-school English" as Vice Adm. Gerald E. Miller, SAC's deputy commander

described it, was off-putting and made him difficult to understand. Critics labeled the new policy a counterforce strategy, designed to give the U.S. the ability to launch a first strike to eliminate Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The Soviet military characterized the new strategy as a menace. Anatoly Dobrynin, the long-serving Soviet ambassador to the United States called it an effort “to legitimize a strategic nuclear war.”⁷²

In the weeks that followed, Schlesinger pressed forward with a public campaign in support of his doctrine. On January 24 he clarified his earlier revelation in carefully prepared remarks at the Pentagon. He stressed, “We are not seeking to develop a major counter-force capability.” Instead, “our emphasis is upon selectivity and flexibility.” Schlesinger refuted what he considered to be ill-informed criticism, saying that the targeting changes would not alter American nuclear capabilities, and admitting the United States lacked the ability to take out the entire Soviet ICBM force. The new approach, he explained, concentrated on the small-scale use of nuclear weapons, not a large-scale attack against Soviet nuclear forces. From Schlesinger’s perspective, the new nuclear options would strengthen, not weaken, strategic stability. The change meant that, in a crisis, the president could now launch a limited strike instead of a massive “suicidal” response that would result in a devastating Soviet counterattack.⁷³

The new targeting doctrine received a mixed reception in Congress. At a hearing on March 4, Senator J. William “James” Fulbright (D-AR) pressed Schlesinger for an example of how these selective strikes might work. The secretary responded that if a Soviet invasion of Western Europe appeared to be succeeding, the U.S. might use nuclear weapons to destroy Soviet oil refineries. Viewing Western Europe as the most important region of superpower competition, and thus the most likely area where the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend its interests, he frequently cited defense of the region to justify his doctrine. He

acknowledged that even if Washington provided the Soviets forewarning, they might well respond with their own limited nuclear strike. As long as both sides kept communication open, however, he thought the exchange could end there, and the Soviets might halt an assault on NATO. Both sides would recognize that their cities and industry remained vulnerable to attack. “Those are circumstances in which I believe that leaders will be rational and prudent. I hope I am not being too optimistic,” he said. Fulbright remained unconvinced, and Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) warned that the new approach was “fraught with danger.” Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME) declared, “this business of making nuclear war seem more respectable, maybe that troubles me more than any other aspect of this proposal of yours.” The House reacted more favorably. Representative Robert C. Wilson (R-CA) told Schlesinger that the new approach was “the only logical one that we could follow.” Representative F. Edward Hébert (D-LA) likened the change to a football team developing the ability “to counter another team that has a well-known offensive, like a forward pass or a running attack.”⁷⁴

In response to NSDM 242, Schlesinger directed the Joint Chiefs to draft plans for limited strikes and to terminate a nuclear war “at the lowest level of conflict feasible.” On April 4 he issued new guidance for nuclear weapons use, the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP). The NUWEP formally incorporated Foster’s, Schlesinger’s, and Kissinger’s thinking on limited nuclear warfare into U.S. strategic doctrine. In a nuclear conflict, the United States would seek to control escalation through limited strikes while “holding some vital enemy targets hostage and threatening their subsequent destruction.” Limited strikes would avoid targeting Soviet command and control facilities so that Soviet leaders could retain control over their nuclear forces. In pursuit of these objectives, NUWEP reorganized U.S. nuclear targeting plans into four categories: major attack options, selected attack options, limited nuclear options, and

regional nuclear options. The major options were the existing SIOP options under a different name. The selected options involved large-scale strikes on Soviet or Chinese targets, though with far fewer weapons than the major options. The limited and regional options utilized far fewer weapons to control escalation. The new options had significantly shifted U.S. nuclear doctrine.⁷⁵

While internal military planning continued in the spring of 1974, the State Department briefed American allies about some, but not all, of the targeting changes. The Defense Department directed that diplomats not discuss the various options and specific targeting with allies. Instead, the briefings would emphasize the role of the changes in strengthening deterrence, as well as their evolutionary nature. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. In his meetings with his European counterparts, Schlesinger emphasized that the targeting doctrine change made deterrence in Europe more credible. Rather than decouple the American arsenal, he argued that it more firmly bound Washington to its European allies by demonstrating a far more credible willingness to defend them with nuclear weapons.⁷⁶

Although some NATO members offered their private support for a doctrine that promised to improve the credibility of deterrence, some were frustrated that they had not been consulted beforehand, remained concerned that the United States might end a conflict only after their homelands were devastated, and worried that the new doctrine could lower the nuclear threshold. At a NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in June 1974, Dutch Minister of Defense Henk Vredeling voiced his government's frustration: "I note that although Secretary Schlesinger has said that retargeting has been done for Europe, it seems to have been done without the Europeans." He told the defense secretary that the Dutch parliament was concerned about the doctrine's emphasis on limited options, noting the United States was not willing to risk itself for

Europe. [REDACTED]. Schlesinger reacted forcefully:

“balderdash.” [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] except in terms of paranoia about American intentions and the supremacy of ideology over reason. [REDACTED]

In essence, it was those NATO allies who had allowed their conventional forces to decline that increased the chances of war—not the Schlesinger Doctrine.⁷⁷

As the defense secretary attempted to convince allies of his strategy’s merits, his push within the Defense Department for the development of specific operational plans hit severe headwinds in the summer of 1974. Several Joint Staff officers rejected the secretary’s view that limited nuclear strikes in secondary regions would not escalate into a global nuclear war, and military planners struggled to devise operational plans for limited nuclear strikes to achieve political objectives. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Donald R. Cotter attributed the resistance primarily to turnover in the military’s senior leadership that had happened in the months leading up to the doctrine’s announcement. Cotter himself had succeeded Foster as chairman of the ad hoc panel coordinating DoD studies of nuclear policy in late August 1973. In the span of three months in summer 1973, the JCS chairman, the chief of staff of the Air Force, the chief of naval operations, the director of the Joint Staff, and the commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command had all retired or been replaced. Their

successors, Cotter informed Schlesinger, had not been involved in the Pentagon's debates over nuclear strategy in 1972 and 1973. They had not participated in the Foster Panel's review of nuclear doctrine in 1972 or the ad-hoc interagency group created by NSSM 169 in 1973. The new leaders tended to equate the SIOP with the Major Attack Options, the largest strikes, and insisted that the SIOP not be weakened by using SIOP forces for limited strikes. Even limited attacks on Soviet territory, they believed, would inevitably result in escalation to a full-scale nuclear exchange. In addition, they argued that Strategic Air Command could hit specific targets if ordered and saw no reason to devote the significant planning resources required to develop limited options. These new military leaders, Cotter wrote, thought that "planning the use of nuclear weapons is basically a military task and should not involve the national civilian leadership." Although JCS Chairman General George Brown did not share this view, he felt military planners needed more specific guidance about the political objectives for limited and regional nuclear options.⁷⁸

The Joint Chiefs began throwing up new obstacles to thwart Schlesinger's ambition to quickly implement a change in targeting doctrine. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Under JCS guidance, the JSTPS would develop the limited options in coordination with SIOP planning, but these options remained separate from the SIOP. Planners would thus have to split their time between the SIOP and the limited options, slowing their development. Complicating matters further, the Joint Staff also grew more reluctant to assign significant personnel resources to limited nuclear planning, which slowed down the development of such plans.⁷⁹

To overcome this resistance, Schlesinger visited SAC headquarters in October 1974, meeting General Russell E. Dougherty, the dual-hatted SAC/JTSPS commander, and his senior staff. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. 80

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. 81

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] .83

Schlesinger was not overly concerned about confronting the Soviets under Leonid Brezhnev's leadership, but he was concerned about how future Soviet leaders might act. In a December 1974 conversation with the Joint Chiefs and the SAC commander, Schlesinger again brushed off Brown's concerns that the Soviets would respond to limited nuclear strikes by

launching a massive retaliation. “This generation of [Soviet] leaders probably will, as always before, back down,” he said confidently. He was less certain about future Soviet leaders. Preparing limited options, he added, would enhance the U.S. deterrent by “creating grave uncertainty” in the minds of Soviet leaders.⁸⁴

Interviews with senior Soviet officials and planners after the Cold War suggest that the Soviets might not have responded to a limited nuclear strike with a massive retaliation. Although the Soviets had begun to consider the possibility of limited nuclear war, they had not developed a doctrine for it. A post-Cold War study commissioned by the Office of Net Assessment conducted interviews of Soviet military officers regarding their reaction to limited nuclear war. According to the study’s summary, “Their responses made it clear ... that if the U.S. launched a limited intercontinental strike against one or several installations on Soviet territory, the Soviet response would have been determined *ad hoc* by the top leadership.” Whether either the Soviets or Americans would back down after suffering massive casualties, however, remained unclear.⁸⁵

This ongoing disagreement between Schlesinger and the military had important consequences. While the Joint Staff and JSTPS planners continued to prepare limited nuclear options, these limited nuclear options (LNOs) and the regional nuclear options (RNOs) were excluded from the main U.S. nuclear war plan, the SIOP. Only the large-scale major and selected attack options were actually included in the SIOP. By keeping the limited options outside of the SIOP, the military planners reduced the likelihood that they would be used in a crisis, given the centrality of the SIOP in U.S. nuclear doctrine. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁸⁶

Despite General Dougherty's and Vice Admiral Miller's support for the Schlesinger Doctrine, the challenge of identifying the political objective for a specific LNO proved vexing. Schlesinger tasked the military planners at SAC with developing limited options that would serve political goals such as sending a message to the Soviets about American resolve in a crisis. The planners felt this task was too vague to be useful. Their military training and education had taught them that civilian leaders would provide clear objectives, a desired end-state, and fiscal and personnel constraints on the use of force. Instead, Schlesinger wanted them to develop dozens of options with only the most limited political guidance. From his perspective, the military insisted too rigidly on specific guidance before planning. Because civilian leaders and military planners viewed the planning process from fundamentally different perspectives, finding common ground took considerable time. Dougherty later acknowledged that there was a "bias" against limited options in parts of his staff, even though he personally pressed for their development. He remembered that "it took me a year or more to get my hard-core nuclear planners convinced" that they could craft politically useful limited nuclear options without eroding the larger SIOP. When they questioned why they should work on LNOs, Dougherty responded, "Yours is not to reason why, yours is to do it!" Planners would present draft options to OSD, often only to be told that the options were not what the civilian leadership wanted. The planners would then try again.⁸⁷

In March 1975 the Joint Chiefs attempted to develop clear guidance for the planners at SAC, but the effort only underscored the unresolved differences between OSD and the JCS. Although the proposed guidance reflected much of Schlesinger's views about limited nuclear

strikes, Andrew Marshall noted it emphasized the operational goals, such as striking Soviet airfields, rather than political objectives, such as convincing Soviet leaders to halt an invasion of Western Europe. The draft guidance also lacked limited strike options on Soviet territory, which Schlesinger thought essential but which Brown thought would lead to escalation. Military planners remained more comfortable with less subjective, easier-to-measure targets, such as how many weapons would be needed and where they should be aimed to stop a Soviet conventional breakthrough in central Europe. Assessing how limited nuclear strikes might affect Kremlin decision-making, they felt, was the responsibility of civilian leadership.⁸⁸

Beginning in 1975, OSD and the Joint Staff conducted a series of war games to better prepare military leaders to develop limited nuclear options with political objectives and familiarize civilian leaders with the results of carrying out limited strikes in a crisis. Andrew Marshall wrote to Schlesinger that the JCS-organized war games would give military officers an idea of the types of questions political leaders might raise during a crisis and counter “the all too prevalent notion that they [the Soviets] will always find it best to escalate to the all-out exchange.”⁸⁹

The Joint Chiefs and Schlesinger himself participated in a September 1975 game conducted at the Alternate National Military Command Center under Raven Rock Mountain. In the role of president, Schlesinger instructed his team at the outset to “set aside traditional inhibitions” against the use of nuclear weapons and avoid “timidity.” In response to a hypothetical Soviet effort to seize Middle East oil fields, Schlesinger calmly responded by ordering tactical nuclear strikes on Soviet ground forces in Iraq and Syria as well as staging bases in the southern USSR, snuffing out thousands of fictitious Soviet lives in the process. The Soviet side, consisting of Soviet experts, responded with their own nuclear strikes against U.S.

aircraft carriers in the eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, before sending the Americans a cease-fire offer. In the exercise, the Soviets did not mount an all-out retaliation. American officials could not predict with certainty, however, how the Kremlin would respond to a real limited nuclear strike on its territory causing Soviet casualties. The scenario lasted several simulated days, and ended inconclusively, with the Soviet side preparing for further actions if the American side escalated the conflict. Whether nuclear war would have begun anew and end in the destruction of the simulated superpowers, was left unresolved.⁹⁰

Inadequate command, control, and communications (C3) systems, however, caused much of Schlesinger's doctrine to remain in the mid-1970s a theoretical goal rather than a feasible employment plan. The military had designed the massive infrastructure supporting nuclear strikes for the SIOP, allowing the president a reliable response to a large-scale Soviet strike. The C3 systems were not configured to conduct a series of more limited strikes over a period of days or even weeks as envisaged by Schlesinger. In an actual crisis, the command structure would have to contend with mounting pressure for launching a large-scale strike, because of the era's technological limitations. The fixed command centers most capable of conducting a limited nuclear war were the least survivable in a full-scale nuclear war and could be vaporized shortly after the onset of war. The most survivable command nodes, command and control aircraft, had only a limited ability to conduct a limited war. Satellites and radar technology then available could detect large-scale missile launches, but planners were less certain that they could detect limited Soviet responses. A 1974 study determined that, at best, "limited responses with strategic weapons to limited strikes on CONUS [continental United States] are feasible on an ad hoc basis, with some reservations." Such reservations, of course, could mean the difference between a

successful or chaotic response, either of which could lead to miscalculation by the other side and nuclear holocaust.⁹¹

In his brief tenure, Richardson had concluded that limited targeting options needed further study but left before much headway had been made. In the end, Schlesinger enjoyed only marginal success in getting limited nuclear options incorporated into U.S. nuclear war plans. Although supportive, Rumsfeld was less interested in limited options than his predecessor, which took pressure off the planners. However, Schlesinger's April 1974 directive on the employment of nuclear weapons, and his focus on the subject, did produce results. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. By early 1977 the Joint Chiefs and SAC had prepared a number of limited and regional nuclear options in coordination with the unified commands. The Carter administration began its efforts to revise strategic doctrine with these types of limited options as a starting point. The feasibility of a president using limited nuclear options in a controlled, protracted manner remained in doubt long after Schlesinger left the Pentagon. Carter's defense secretary, Harold Brown, acknowledged, in a 1991 interview "the capabilities that are required for that sort of doctrine didn't come fully into place probably until late in the Reagan administration. One can question, in fact, whether they are completely in place even now."⁹²

Schlesinger's effort to revise U.S. nuclear war plans in response to Soviet strategic parity originated in the early days of the Nixon administration. Although he secured Nixon's approval, he struggled to convince the military of the value of including limited nuclear options in war plans. SAC planners and the JCS resisted the Schlesinger Doctrine and constrained the number

of limited nuclear options created during the Ford administration. In their view, no American official could be truly certain that, in actual war, the Soviets would not, through error or in fulfillment of their own warfighting doctrines, respond to a limited strike with a massive strike of their own. The fundamental disconnect was that, from Schlesinger's point of view, perception mattered as much, if not more, than actual employment policy. By declaring that the United States would consider limited nuclear strikes, Schlesinger hoped to force the Soviets to reconsider whether they could start or exploit localized crises without risking a nuclear response. Although the Schlesinger Doctrine did convince the Soviets of a somewhat more aggressive posture in U.S. nuclear doctrine, it failed to prevent the Soviets from intervening massively in the Angolan civil war in 1976 or later in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan. The doctrine, moreover, alienated European allies whose cities and armies might not survive the initial limited exchange of nuclear strikes before cooler heads prevailed. But Schlesinger's persistence, codified in NSDM 242, did produce a doctrinal shift toward greater nuclear flexibility and selectivity. The Carter and Reagan administrations would build on this work.

Perhaps the greatest contributions Schlesinger made to the long-term trajectory of defense policy, however, was his decision to bring Andrew Marshall to the Pentagon and giving him the resources and leeway to allow net assessment to thrive. Schlesinger moved Marshall to the Pentagon, because he knew his former RAND colleague could provide an analytical counterweight to Kissinger's détente policies. Schlesinger and Marshall viewed the relative rise of Soviet power not as inevitable, but as a trend that could be reversed if Washington made proper course corrections. Before they could challenge Kissinger's hold on policy directly, however, they needed to diagnose the Soviet threat. But the CIA's control over Soviet estimates was an obstacle. Although Kissinger had his own problems with the agency's analyses early in

the Nixon administration, by 1973 the CIA estimates largely supported his policies. The agency concluded that the Soviets were able to build larger conventional and nuclear forces than the United States without unduly burdening their overall economy. If correct, Washington's pursuit of détente was appropriate, because the United States could not hope to sustain let alone win a pure military arms race.

Marshall and Schlesinger viewed this underlying feature of CIA estimates as fundamentally flawed. The Soviet command economy could not possibly be allocating its resources more efficiently than the United States. The CIA analysts must be missing something or were failing to ask the right questions. By doing so, they failed to uncover Soviet weaknesses that could be exploited or to perceive relative American strengths that could be accentuated. Schlesinger used Marshall's net assessment framework in attempt to wrest control over U.S. grand strategy from Kissinger and put it in the Pentagon. Schlesinger and Marshall's analytical brilliance, however, could not compensate for the former's lack of bureaucratic skill and off-putting personal arrogance, which would result in his firing by Ford. Although lacking his predecessor's extensive background in strategy, Rumsfeld succeeded in this one vital respect where Schlesinger had failed. As a result, the Pentagon effectively challenged Kissinger's control over policy. By the end of the Ford administration, Rumsfeld had used his closer relationship with Ford and his better understanding of the growing political backlash against détente to force Kissinger on the defensive. A second Ford term might have resulted in Rumsfeld further solidifying his control over national security policy, but it was not to be. Jimmy Carter succeeded Ford and sought to reverse many of his predecessor's policies. The trends pointed to by Rumsfeld and the dark portrait of Soviet objectives painted by Team B would all be referred to by conservative opponents of the Carter administration as they awaited an opportunity to

return to power. Net assessment, however, would thrive under Harold Brown, as the new defense secretary turned to the office to seek competitive advantages over the Soviet Union.

Endnotes

1. Robert D. Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 195–196; Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*, 153–154; Lawrence J. Korb, *The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 144–164.
2. Pavel Podvig, “The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s: A Research Note,” *International Security* 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 118–138; John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, John F. Shull, “Soviet Intentions 1965–1985” (OSD-Net Assessment, BDM Federal, Inc., 1995), 10–13. The Soviets themselves were not nearly as confident that they had achieved parity. Raymond Garthoff wrote that the Soviets were not convinced that they had achieved parity with the West in the mid-1970s and were “concerned whether they could maintain the strategic parity they had not quite attained. The rising concern within the Soviet military that détente not curtail their programs while the United States moved forward with a new generation of weaponry based on more advanced technology should be seen in this context.” Insecure Soviet leaders were thus deeply concerned that the Schlesinger Doctrine was an aggressive policy change that threatened détente and portended a greater willingness of the Americans to use nuclear weapons. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 466–467, 482; Elliot Richardson, Statement Before the House Armed Service Committee, 10 Apr 1973, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1974*, 5.
3. Zubock, *A Failed Empire*, 243. For an excellent biography of Marshall and history of the office of net assessment, see Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, *The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of American Defense Strategy* (New York: Basic Books, 2015). For a succinct explanation of the Schlesinger doctrine, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, Third Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 360–365. For a thorough examination of Nixon’s nuclear strategy, see Terry Terriff, *The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
4. Schlesinger interview, 7 Feb 1991, OSD/HO, 25–26.
5. In September 1969 Kissinger asked Andrew Marshall, a 48-year-old RAND analyst, already considered an intellectual giant by his peers, to review the intelligence products received by the president. Beginning his review in December, Marshall noticed that Nixon’s distinctive markings and marginalia disappeared after the first several agency-produced Presidential Daily Briefs, and correctly suspected Nixon had turned instead to NSC staff products, which were covered with the president’s markings. Marshall found that Kissinger’s staff responded better to the president’s specific interests and concerns, unsurprising given the closer proximity and the national security adviser’s personal interest in maintaining the president’s favor. He also found the NSC staff superior at blending policy analysis with intelligence. Andrew Marshall, interview by Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg, Washington, DC, 1 Jun 1992, OSD/HO, 14; Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 77–79; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 11. Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms recalled later that he was never sure “how often Nixon even glanced at his PDB.” Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder*, 379. Intelligence reports, they found, lacked thorough analysis of Moscow’s motives or sufficient information about the Soviet nuclear stockpile’s characteristics. Nixon quickly discounted CIA analyses, Kissinger later reflected, because he suspected

the agency was “staffed by Ivy League liberals who behind the façade of analytical objectivity were usually pushing their own preferences.” Richard Helms, the agency’s director, personified the elitism Nixon loathed and envied. The president initially excluded the career intelligence officer from NSC meetings before relenting to Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who insisted on the DCI’s attendance. Kissinger wrote that Nixon was “ill at ease with Helms personally, since he suspected that Helms was well liked by the liberal Georgetown social set to which Nixon ascribed many of his difficulties.” Kissinger wrote that Laird convinced Nixon that the DCI’s absence “would leave the President dangerously vulnerable to Congressional and public opinion.” Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 36–37; Alexander M. Haig, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Ronald Landa, Washington, DC, 14 Feb 1996, OSD/HO, 13. According to Haig, he saved Schlesinger from being ousted from the administration altogether: “Jim came to me totally shaken and I got the president to rehire him in another position.” (Nixon would appoint Schlesinger chair of the Atomic Energy Commission in August 1971. Haig, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, Washington, DC, 11 Jun 1996, OSD/HO, 16. The DCI directly controlled just 15 percent of the overall intelligence budget, while the Pentagon managed the remaining 85 percent. The lack of centralized management of DoD intelligence programs, the review found, caused redundancy, inefficiency, and a lack of overall strategic direction. Although the deputy secretary of defense had often been tasked with overall management of DoD intelligence and the assistant secretary of defense for administration had been given nominal responsibility for intelligence, neither position had the staff or the incumbents the necessary time to assert meaningful control over it. Janet McDonnell, *Defense Intelligence Coming of Age* (Washington, DC: History Office, Defense Intelligence Agency and Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), 5; Mike Warner, “Reading the Riot Act: The Schlesinger Report, 1971,” *Intelligence and National Security* 24, no. 3 (Jun 2009): 395.

6. The change was made while Laird was in South Vietnam to discuss troop withdrawals with South Vietnamese officials. On Nixon’s order for a study of the intelligence community in late 1970, see Hunt, *Melvin Laird*, 52–53. For specifics of the resulting reforms and the creation of the NAG, see Memorandum by President Nixon, 5 Nov 1971, *FRUS 1969–1972*, vol. 2, *Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. David C. Humphrey (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), 539–544 (doc 242). Decades later Marshall recalled that after Deputy National Security Adviser Al Haig and director of NSC’s Program Analysis staff Wayne Smith haggled over the report’s details, “a paragraph got inserted, that I did not write, that recommended that there be a net assessment activity set up on the NSC....” Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, OSD/HO, 14–15.

7. Telcon, Kissinger and Laird, (quote), 9 Nov 1971, DNSA Collection. Several days after the directive’s dissemination, Laird had returned to Washington and told his staff, “One change that happened while he was gone to South Vietnam is that Helms was to be Chairman of the Net Assessment Group, but it is now in the NSC staff.” Also furious about the DCI’s expanded authority over intelligence, Laird told Kissinger the following day: “You pulled a trick on me—this god-damned intelligence business.” When Kissinger asked whether he would refuse to cooperate, he responded, “God-damn right I’m not.” He vowed to tell his friends in the House and Senate that he had been intentionally left in the dark about the changes. Marshall indicated that Laird filled the position in November 1971, with Fred Wikner as director. He recalled, however, “There was no staff; if anything was done, it was to be ad hoc.” Marshall appears to have either misremembered or not known at the time from his vantage point at the NSC that Laird had created the director of net assessment position in December 1972, and Wikner was special assistant for net technical assessments at DDR&E. Department of Defense Directive 5105.39, 6 Dec 1971, Director of Net Assessment, see 1972-09-15 DoD Org Chart in March 1973, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Albert Hall informed the defense secretary that the net assessment office “has not yet been staffed.” Memo, Hall for Richardson, 7 Mar 1973, folder 020 Net Assessment, 1973, box 7, Acc 330-78-0001. A special assistant for net technical assessments to the director of Defense Research and Engineering, for example, compared the technological capabilities of U.S. and Soviet weaponry. The director of net threat assessment within the Office of the ASD for Intelligence determined intelligence needs by relating intelligence forecasts to force structure decisions, programs for weapon systems, and

arms control policy. These assessments, however, had far narrower scopes than what Marshall envisioned. Minutes of Secretary of Defense Laird's Staff Meeting, 8 Nov 1971, *FRUS 1969–1972*, 2:545–546 ; Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, OSD/HO, 15; memo, ASD(I) Hall for Richardson, 7 Mar 1973, folder 020 Net Assessment 1973, box 7, Acc 330-78-0001, WNRC.

8. NSSM 178, 29 Mar 1973, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 35:631 (doc 136); memo, NSC staff secretary for Clements et al., 18 May 1973, folder 020 Net Assessment 1973, box 7, Acc 330-78-0001.

9. For Moorer's view, see memo, Moorer for Kissinger, 31 May 1973, attached to memo, Clements for Kissinger, 1 Jun 1973; for Hall's view, see memo, Hall for Clements, 30 May 1973: all in folder 020 Net Assessment, 1973, box 7, Acc 330-78-0001.

10. NSSM 224, 28 Jun 1973, 638–639 (doc 138); NSSM 186, 1 Sep 1973, 639–640 (doc 139): both in *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. 35; Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 93.

11. Elliot Richardson, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1974, Richardson Testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, 27 Mar 1973, *Richardson Public Statements 1973*, 325; Firth and Noren, *Soviet Defense Spending*, 54.

12. Schlesinger interview, 12 Jul 1990, 2, OSD/HO, 2; Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 99(100). In a 2001 speech at a Princeton conference reflecting on the Soviet estimate, he spoke about his frustration at the time in detail, recalling he used the back of the envelope to indicate to analysts why he thought they were wrong. See Schlesinger, Address by Former DCI, Conference on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991, Princeton University, 2001, www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article08.html#3.

13. After being sworn in on February 2, 1973, Schlesinger assumed his role as Nixon's hatchet man with ruthless gusto. Robert Gates, then an intelligence analyst at CIA, later recalled: "The three and a half months Schlesinger was at CIA were a bad time." Schlesinger directed the purging of approximately 7 percent of CIA personnel, by either firing them or forcing their resignation or retirement. In a January 1973 memo, DIA Director, Vice Adm. Vincent de Poix, wrote to Laird: "In the past 7–8 years, while we exercised great restraint in offensive strategic systems, the Soviets have made a tremendous effort in this field. While the U.S. reduced its surface navy, the Soviets dramatically increased their own." Memo, DirDIA for SecDef, 12 Jan 1973, subj: CIA View of Soviet Reaction to US Defense Programs, folder USSR 320.2 1973, box 8, Acc 330-78-0002; "Partial Chronology," attached to memo, A. W. Marshall for Robert Ellsworth, 17 Feb 1976, folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-Jun) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049. De Poix wrote: "I realize that the enclosures do not respond fully to your questions." MG Wickham Notebooks, entry for 11 Aug 1973, box TS-4, Schlesinger Papers, Library of Congress.

14. [REDACTED]. On Schlesinger's desire to have net assessment in OSD, see Schlesinger interview, 7 Feb 1991, 21.

15. On October 13, 1973, the defense secretary signed a memo that appointed Marshall as his director of net assessment, effective October 15. On Schlesinger's and Marshall's compatible shared understanding of the U.S.-Soviet military competition, see Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 93–95. On net assessment methodology and promise, see Marshall, "Longer-Term Goals for Defense Policy," paper attached to memo, Marshall for Schlesinger, 20 Aug 1973, folder 020 N-Z, box 6, Acc 330-78-0058.

16. When asked whether Kissinger paid much attention to him or net assessment-type analyses when he was at the NSC, Marshall recalled: "No, not to that dimension. The only thing that had any real interest for him was the issue of the intelligence community and its performance." Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, OSD/HO, 15–17; BG Taylor Notebook, entry for 21 Feb 1974, folder 020 SD, box 7, Acc 330-78-0011. Marshall stated that Schlesinger thought Kissinger was defeatist. Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992,

23. In his own oral history with OSD historians, Schlesinger recalled that Kissinger had concluded that the Soviet Union was passing the United States and that Washington needed to use diplomacy to lock the Soviets into treaties that restrained them. “He was quite Spenglerian in his views.” Schlesinger interview, 1 Aug 1991, 36; Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 23 (quote); Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 96–99.

17. Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 8, 18; Schlesinger interview, 12 Jul 1990, OSD/HO, 6; Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 57.

18. Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 94. For more on the effect systems analysis on the Vietnam War and strategy during the tenures of McNamara and Clark Clifford, see Drea, *McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam*, 508–533; Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 7–8 (quote).

19. William Kaufmann, Schlesinger’s speechwriter and consultant who had worked with Marshall at RAND, later remembered: “Schlesinger was a very critical student of McNamara, in a negative sense.” William Kaufmann, interview by Maurice Matloff, Washington, DC, 23 Jul 1986, OSD/HO, 28. When OSD historians reminded Marshall of Schlesinger’s “two-and-half cheers” line, Marshall quipped: “I would have given it one less cheer.” Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 7; James Schlesinger, “Uses and Abuses of Analysis,” Memorandum Prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 90th Cong, 2nd sess., 1968, 1, 12.

20. “History of the Net Assessment Effort attached to memo, Marshall for Rumsfeld, 2 Dec 1975 (quote), OSD Historical Office Records Collection; “Longer-Term Goals for Defense Policy,” attached to memo Marshall for Schlesinger, 20 Aug 1973, folder 020 (N-Z) 1975, box 16, Acc 330-78-0058; Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 19–22.

21. The working group also consisted the Army and Navy secretaries, the director of the office of defense research and engineering, the assistant secretary of defense for the office of program analysis and evaluation (PA&E), and Marshall. Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 18. Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 100.

22. Marshall’s Memo and the Executive Summary are also published with only slight redactions in *FRUS, 1969–1976*, 35: 667–675. The Army and Navy Secretaries, the JCS chairman, the director of defense research and engineering, and the assistant secretaries for intelligence and program analysis and evaluation concurred with the working group’s assessment. The Directors of Central Intelligence and DIA did not.

23. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Memo, A. W. Marshall to SecDef, 30 Jul 1974, subj: Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Ground Forces, folder USSR 320.2 1974, box 75, Acc 330-78-0011.

24. Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 18; Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 102–103.

25. “History of the Net Assessment Effort attached to memo, Marshall for Rumsfeld, 2 Dec 1975 (quote), OSD Historical Office Records Collection; Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 104–105; Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 18.

26. Marshall interview, 1 Jun 1992, 19 (quote); Marshall, interview by Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg, 15 Jun 1992, 3.

27. Schlesinger interview, 7 Feb 1991, 21 (quote); Wickham interview, 5 Apr 2019, telephone, OSD/HO, (quote) 8. See Marshall interviews, 1 Jun 1992 and 15 Jun 1992, 3; and notebooks of Schlesinger’s

military assistant, Maj. Gen. John Wickham, at the Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Manuscripts Division, Classified Reading Room.

28. Schlesinger later recalled having Marshall supervise the Pentagon's effort to have the CIA revise its estimates. Schlesinger, Address at Conference on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union (March 2001). The historian John Prados wrote on CIA estimates of the Soviet Union: "Intelligence information also conditions the public debate over national security policy. Most information, particularly if it is of an alarming nature, generally reaches the public in more or less watered-down fashion within six months to a year of its appearance at the intelligence community level." John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces* (Princeton, 1982), 292; Firth and Noren, *Soviet Defense Spending*, 6, 201.

29. Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, *Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimate* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1998), 6. Economic "burden" focuses on the ability and willingness of a nation to sustain defense expenditures at a given or increasing level over an extended period. In a handwritten memo to Robert Ellsworth, Marshall described the attached February 19, 1974 memo as "giving guidance to the CIA, written by me as a follow up to Schlesinger's meeting with Proctor in Jan 1974." The attached February memo itself is dated but unsigned. "Partial Chronology," attached to memo, A. W. Marshall for Robert Ellsworth, 17 Feb 1976. He further described the February 19 memo in a later memo for Proctor as one "I sent to some of your people earlier this year." Memo for the Record, Marshall, 19 Feb 1974, subj: The Soviet Defense Burden; memo, Marshall for Proctor, 4 Dec 1974, subj: Comments on Measurement and Meaning of Defense Burden in the Soviet Setting: all in folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-Jun) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049.

30. "Partial Chronology," attached to memo, Marshall for Ellsworth, 17 Feb 76 (quote), folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-Jun) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049; CIA, 30 Oct 1974, subj: The Measurement and Meaning of Defense Burden in the Soviet Setting, folder USSR 000.1-322 1974, box 75, Acc 330-78-0011.

31. Memo, Edward Proctor (DDI) for Schlesinger, 1 Nov 1974 (quote), with attachment CIA, "The Measurement and Meaning of Defense Burden in the Soviet Setting," 30 Oct 1974, folder USSR 000.1-322 1974; memo, Marshall for SecDef, 17 Oct 1974, folder USSR 320.2 1974: both in box 75, Acc 330-78-0011; memo, SecDef for DirCIA, date, subj: Comparing the Size of U.S. and Soviet Defense Efforts, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 35:675-678 (doc 148); "Partial Chronology," attached to memo, Marshall to Ellsworth, 20 Feb 1976, folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-Jun) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049.

32. In explaining the assessment, DIA analysts wrote: "On an overall basis, the total current assessment is based on better methodologies and on substantially more evidence than earlier ones. In addition, more success has probably been achieved by including a larger portion of the Soviet military's sustaining base than what had previously been counted." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and 13 Dec 1974, folder USSR 320.2 1974, box 75, Acc 330-78-0011. Sullivan noted that, in numbers of surface combatants, the U.S. trend was downward while the Soviet trend was essentially steady, but the United States was producing about 50 percent more tonnage.

33. Ltr, Dir CIA to SecDef, 2 Dec 1974, folder 320.2 Strategic (Sep-Dec) 1974, box 30, Acc 330-78-0011.

34. Memo, MG Wickham for Marshall, 17 Dec 1974, folder 320.2 Strategic (Sep-Dec) 1974, box 30, Acc 330-78-0011; memo, A. W. Marshall to Edward Proctor (DDI, CIA), 4 Dec 1974, Comments on Measurement and Meaning of Defense Burden in the Soviet setting, folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-Jun) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049.

35. Although CIA had claimed that Soviet military spending increased at just 1.5 percent annually between 1960 and 1972, during that time the Soviets had deployed 1,600 ICBMs in six models, put

ballistic missile defenses around Moscow along with a vast radar network, re-equipped their tactical air force, created a modern surface navy, and replaced most of their tanks and armored personnel carriers with new models. After DIA's "refusal to buy" the CIA's 1.5 percent estimate, a group of interagency analysts compromised on a 2.5 percent annual increase, mainly to account for inflation. The adjustment nudged the USSR 120.1 1975, box 81, Acc 330-78-0058. Graham believed that direct costing was valid when applied to hardware acquisitions where inventory data were reasonably attainable (e.g., ICBMs and tanks) and to certain construction costs. However, in areas like operations and maintenance, personnel costs, consumables, training, war reserves, and medical support, he perceived "a sharp increase in probability of gross error." Memo, DirDIA for DI and DE, 1 Feb 1975, subj: Costing (quote); [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] *Schlesinger Public Statement 1975*, 1:39.

36. The émigré's findings and its consequence are detailed in Firth and Noren, *Soviet Defense Spending*, 62–66; ltr, DirCIA to SecDef, 2 May 1975; [REDACTED]

37. According to NIE 11-3/8-74, Soviet leaders viewed detente as "the optimum present atmosphere for maximizing the power, security, and economic strength of the USSR, and as a way of setting prudent limits on strategic rivalry while allowing for greater Soviet foreign policy maneuver." Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence dissented, believing that Soviet leaders foresaw "a decisive shift of the strategic balance in their favor." Donald P. Steury (ed.), *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983* (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1996), 331, 334. After taking office, Schlesinger became concerned that agency officials had been hiding past misdeeds and illegal activities from him, including assistance with the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. On May 9, 1973, he issued the directive ordering all senior agency officials to report all activities, past and present, "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency," John Prados, *Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power* (University of Texas press, 2014), 15–21. [REDACTED]

38. Seymour Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years," 22 Dec 1974, *New York Times*, 1; Gerald Haines, in Michael Warner and Scott Koch, *Fifty Years in of the CIA* (History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central intelligence Agency, 1998), 233.

39. John Prados wrote that Deputy Chief of Staff Dick Cheney had devised Ford's strategy. Prados, *Family Jewels*, 24; Richard Immerman, *Hidden Hand: A Brief history of the CIA* (John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 95–96. Robert Gates recalled, "Nineteen seventy-five was the worse year in the CIA's history." As the agency confronted numerous crises throughout the world, "CIA's senior officers were preoccupied with the multitude of investigations. Colby was constantly testifying, often several times a week, before a number of congressional committees on virtually the entirety of CIA's history." Gates, *From the Shadows*, 60; Ford, *A Time to Heal*, 230. For Ford's discussion with Colby about the Hersh story and the truth behind the allegations, see memcon, Ford, Colby, Buchen, Marsh, and Scowcroft, 3 Jan 1975, subj: Allegations of CIA domestic Activities (quote), Ford Library Online. Colby admitted that the agency had illegally spied on Americans in the past or had operated "outside our jurisdiction" in the past. Robert Gates, *From the Shadows*, 58–63.

40. Marshall later recalled of Schlesinger's dismissal: "It wasn't entirely unexpected, but I think that the abruptness of it shocked me a bit." [Get source (Marshall interview); As quoted in Bartholomew Sparrow, *The Strategist*, 174. Cheney later wrote, "Schlesinger did not go quietly. The president later told me that

his parting with Jim was one of the most unpleasant sessions he ever had.” Cheney, *In My Time*, 91; Clements said of the firing: “The story that I get, and I think it is absolutely correct, is that Ford called him to the White House and kept him waiting for about 30 minutes. Schlesinger walked in and Ford looked up and said, ‘Jim, you have lied to me for the last time. You are fired.’ That was the end of the conversation. You can quote me on that.” Clements did not reveal what lie it was that Ford was referring. Clements interview, 16 May 1996, OSD/HO, 11; BG Wickham Notebook, entry for 3 Nov 1975, “Rumsfeld,” Schlesinger Papers, box TS-6.

41. MG Wickham Notebooks, entry for 3 Nov 1975, “HAK-JRS,” Schlesinger Papers, box TS-6. Kissinger’s claims of innocence were belied by meeting notes of his conversation with Ford on October 16, shortly before Schlesinger’s dismissal. Kissinger warned “Haig says he [Schlesinger] wants to be President, Kissinger told the president. They then discussed whether or not Schlesinger would resign. Memcon, 16 Oct 1975, in *FRUS 1969–1976*, 35:266 (doc 59). Kissinger’s former mentor and friend Fritz Kraemer, then serving as an analyst at the Pentagon, thought Kissinger was responsible for Schlesinger’s dismissal and severed his relationship with Kissinger. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 844.

42. Korb, *The Rise and Fall of the Pentagon*, 106; Graham, *By His Own Rules*, 60–61.

43. Marshall interview, 15 Jun 1992, 16 (quote); Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 224. In his confirmation hearing, Rumsfeld had expressed concern in the “trends we have seen on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to various capabilities.” Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Nomination of Donald Rumsfeld to Be Secretary of Defense,” 12 Nov 1975, 22. James Mann wrote that Rumsfeld’s hawkish view of U.S.-Soviet relations and skepticism about détente had become apparent during his tenure as NATO ambassador from 1973 to 1974. James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 68; Rumsfeld interview, 2 Aug 1994, 19; memo, Marshall for Rumsfeld, 2 Dec 1975, subj: Net Assessment, OSD/HO Reference Collection; memo, Marshall for Rumsfeld, 6 Dec 1975, subj: Key Military Balances, Rumsfeld Papers online.

44. In September 1975 Marshall provided the Joint Economic Committee of Congress with a lengthy technical explanation of what he saw as the shortcomings in CIA estimates that defense consumed only 6–8 percent of Soviet GNP. Marshall considered 10–20 percent more likely. Ltr, Andrew Marshall to Richard Kaufman, JEC, 18 Sep 1975, folder USSR 000.1-332.1 1975, box 81, Acc 330-78-0058; memo, Marshall for SecDef, 8 Jan 1976, subj: Assessing Détente, folder USSR 092 1976, box 84, Acc 330-79-0049.

45. Schlesinger interview, 1 Aug 1991, 42; Rumsfeld added: “I want folks to be comfortable in my office—just not too comfortable. Donald Rumsfeld, *Rumsfeld’s Rules*, 28; Bradley Graham, *By His Own Rules*, 115–117. Ellsworth served under Schlesinger as ASD(ISA) and under Rumsfeld as his second deputy. Ellsworth interview, 2 Sep 1988, 34.

46. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 175. Kaufmann, who had worked with both Schlesinger and Rumsfeld later remembered about Rumsfeld: “I think he spent more time worrying about the corridors than he did about the planning. Quite candidly, he used to drive me crazy with his absolutely insane nitpicking about speeches and things.” Kaufmann interview, 23 Jul 1986, 31. Andrew Cockburn wrote that Brent Scowcroft had told him that Rumsfeld “was making a tactical shift to the right.... Insofar as I was concerned, it was merely a matter of political convenience.” Cockburn, *Rumsfeld*, 37. James Mann and Bradley Graham both argue that Rumsfeld’s concern for the national interest fused with his ambition. See James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004), 68–69; Bradley Graham, *By His Own Rules*, 129–130; Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 224.

47. Rumsfeld interview, 12 Jul 1994, 37 (quote).

48. Jon Meacham, *The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush*, 190–192; James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 67–68. Bradley Graham, *By His Own Rules*, 123–124. According to Andrew Cockburn, an adviser and friend of Bush’s told him that Bush thought Rumsfeld had planted a demand during the

former's confirmation hearings that Bush not politicize the CIA by pledging not to run for political office in 1976. Bush was forced to agree to this request. Cockburn, *Rumsfeld*, 31; Peter Baker, *Days of Fire* (New York: Penguin, 2004), 28, 81 (quote); Ford interview, 23 Mar 1993, 22.

49. Rumsfeld interview, 12 Jul 1994, 39. Ellsworth confirmed that he was indeed planning on leaving the Pentagon and had already submitted his letter of resignation to Schlesinger before the defense secretary was fired. Ellsworth interview, 2 Sep 1988, 27; Haig interview, 2 May 1996, OSD/HO, 27. In a later interview, Haig elaborated further. He said of Schlesinger: "A very bright man, but also with many quirks and a personality that was very bad. He was in a running fight with Kissinger all the time. At first I didn't know that he was also in a running fight with his deputy, Bill Clements. The deputy actually detested him, and I had to apply the mercurochrome to that problem.... I don't know if he told you how many visits I made to his office to keep him from quitting or going public. It was totally uncalled, but it occurred because Jim is a very insensitive, arrogant fellow. He's a friend of mine. I got along with him fine." Haig interview, 26 Sep 1996, 7; Schlesinger interview, 7 Feb 1991, 22.

50. Rumsfeld interview, 12 Jul 1994 (quote), 42; Ellsworth interview, 2 Sep 1988 (quote), 31; Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 218.

51. Memo, Scowcroft for Ford, "Defense Intelligence Reorganization, 13 May 1976; memo, Ellsworth for Secretaries of Military Departments, et al., 24 May 1976. Under the cover of producing an assessment on the Middle East region, Marshall later revealed, he and his staff held semiannual discussions with Israeli defense planners, headed by the Israeli deputy minister of defense. Marshall interview, 15 Jun 1992, 18–19; Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 119.

52. When chief of staff, Rumsfeld and his deputy, Dick Cheney, had met with Laffer for dinner, and the Treasury Department economist had impressed them by drawing what would be his famous Laffer Curve on a cocktail napkin to demonstrate that higher taxes did not necessarily result in higher revenue. Rumsfeld wrote that according to his personal calendar, the dinner had taken place on September 16, 1975. Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 183; memo, Arthur Laffer for Rumsfeld and Ellsworth, 11 Jan 1976, subj: Soviet Expenditures, folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-Jun) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049.

53. Executive Order 11905, *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. 38, pt. 2:222 (doc 70).

54. Ltr, George Bush to Ellsworth, 2 Mar 1976, folder USSSR 110.01, Jan-Jun 1976, Acc 330-79-0049.

55. About 90 percent of that increase resulted from better information about the ruble costs of Soviet hardware. Since 1970, by CIA's calculation, Soviet defense spending had risen at an average annual rate of 4–5 percent and defense requirements, absorbing 11–13 percent of Soviet GNP, far above the earlier 6–8 percent estimates. Although the new figures did not change existing estimates of Soviet forces and equipment—tanks, missiles, aircraft, and ships, they did indicate that the Soviets were far less efficient at building and deploying advanced weaponry than the CIA had previously assumed. CIA SR 76-10053, "A Dollar Comparison of US and Soviet Defense Activities, 1965–1975," Feb 1976; CIA SR 76-10121U, "Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970–1975," May 1976; "CIA Estimate of Soviet Defense Spending," 17 May 1976; memo, Noel Firth to William Hyland, n.d., folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-Jun) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049.

56. Firth and Noren, who examined the evidence closely, concluded that the CIA did not simply accept the émigré's account. They wrote, "The fact is that the collection and analysis of new prices in the early 1970s demonstrated that the initial conversion from 1955 ruble to 1970 ruble prices had been badly flawed." CIA SR 76-10165, "A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1965–1975," Jul 1976, folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-June) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049. The agency, however, maintained until the end of the Cold War that the Soviet military burden was considerably lower than either Marshall or Schlesinger had thought it was. Krepinevich and Watts, *The Last Warrior*, 107.

57. Ltr, SecDef to Senator McClellan, 23 Mar 1976, folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-June) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049. Simultaneously, DoD compared U.S. and Soviet capabilities for delivering “surge” quantities of major hardware systems. In most cases, estimates of Soviet surge capabilities exceeded those of the United States. Forwarding these findings to the secretary, Marshall emphasized two caveats. First, estimates of Soviet capabilities represented what was economically feasible under specified assumptions, not what intelligence analysts believed the Soviets would do. Second, history showed that “we tend to underestimate our capability to increase production under extreme circumstances.” Memo, Marshall for SecDef, 6 Apr 1976, subj: Comparative U.S. and Soviet “Surge” Delivery Capabilities; memo, Marshall for Adm. Holcomb, 6 Apr 1976, subj: Surge Production Study, folder 320.2 Strategic 1976, box 1, Acc 330-79-0050.

58. Memon, 29 Mar 1976, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 39:310; Rumsfeld, *When the Center Held*, 240.

59. Ltr, Chairman, PFIAB to SecDef, 19 Apr 1976; ltr, SecDef to Chairman, PFIAB, 13 May 1976; memo, DepSecDef Ellsworth for SecDef, 23 Jul 1976, subj: Broadened Awareness of Soviet Military Capabilities in folder USSSR 320.2 (Jan-Aug 1976); MFR by John T. Hughes, “Discussion with the Secretary of Defense,” 30 Sep 1976, msg, SecDef to Amb. Stausz Hupe, 270010Z Nov 1976, folder USSR 320.2 (Sep-Dec) 1976: all in box 85, Acc 330-79-0049; Rumsfeld interview, 12 Jul 1994, 32. The documentary record indicates a prolonged back-and-forth between Marshall and Rumsfeld’s military assistant, Staser Holcomb,

60. Jon Meacham, *The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush* (New York: Random House), 201; *FRUS, 1969–1976*, 35:798–799; memo, A. W. Marshall to SecDef, 19 Feb 1976, subj: Evaluation of the 2nd Report of the CIA Military-Economic Advisory Panel; ltr, DepSecDef Ellsworth to DCI Bush, 26 Feb 1976; ltr, Bush to Ellsworth, 2 Mar 1976, folder USSR 110.01 (Jan-Jun) 1976, box 85, Acc 330-79-0049; *Intentions and Capabilities*, 335–336, 365–390; NSC, meeting minutes, 13 Jan 1977, *FRUS, 1969–1976*, 35:804–805 (doc 172); Raymond Garthoff, “Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities” in Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds. *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union*, 2001, www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-anlysis-of-the-soviet-union/index-html.

61. William Burr, “The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy,” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 4 (Summer 2005), 45; Fred Kaplan, *The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret history of Nuclear War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), 101. The SIOP briefing is unclassified and available on the George Washington University National Security Archive website. Memo, Air Force Chief of Staff for Lt. Col. Robert McCully, Joint Staff Briefing of SIOP, nasarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/SIOP-1.pdf,

62. Poole, *JCS and National Policy 1965–1968*, 17, 267n43; NSDM 16, 24 Jun 1969, printed in *FRUS 1969–1976*, 34:153–154; “Talking Points, Review Panel on Policy for Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” Jul 1972, folder USSR 388.3 (May) 1973, box 8; memo, DDR&E for SecDef, 24 Oct 1972, subj: Supplemental Review of U.S. Policy for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, folder A 381 (Jan-Apr) 1976; memo, SecDef Laird for Secretary (designate) Richardson, 25 Jan 1973, subj: U.S. Nuclear Policy, box 4; “Talking Points, Review Panel on Policy for Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” Jul 1972, folder USSR 388.3 (May) 1973, box 8; memo, DDR&E for SecDef, 24 Oct 1972, subj: Supplemental Review of U.S. Policy for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, folder A 381 (Jan-Apr) 1976, box 4; memo, SecDef for Richardson, 25 Jan 1973, subj: U.S. Nuclear Policy, box 4: all in Acc 330-78-0002; Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 369.

63. NSSM 169 for SecDef et al., 13 Feb 1973; “NSSM Summary Report,” 4th Draft, 9 Apr 1973; “NSSM 169 Summary Report,” 8 Jun 1973: all in folder A 381 (Jan-Apr 1973, box 4, Acc 330-78-0002.

64. CM-2579-73 for SecDef, 22 Mar 1973; memo, Principal DepDir(PA&E) Christie for SecDef, 27 Apr 1973, subj: Strategic Force Requirements, folder 320.2 Strategic 1973, box 2, Acc 330-78-0002.

Christie's memo was marked, "SecDef has seen" on May 21, 1973. At that time, Richardson had already been announced as Nixon's nominee for attorney general and was confirmed by the Senate three days later.

65. Korb, *The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon*, 98; James Schlesinger, RAND Rpt. R-1608-PR, "Rationale for NU-OPTS," United States Air Force Project RAND, Dec 1968, 1974, box 30; quotes on 2, 18, 21 and 24, folder 320.2 Strategic (Sep-Dec) 1974, box 30, Acc 330-78-0011. According to William Kaufmann, a former RAND strategist who became the secretary's speechwriter, consultant, and close confidante on nuclear strategy, Schlesinger "came to feel that the whole thing was not only intellectually dishonest and misleading but also that targets were changing in such a way that it was no longer an adequate sort of algorithm for arriving at force structure." Kaufmann interview, 23 Jul 1986, 9. Fred Kaplan described how Schlesinger's monograph was noticed by Pentagon officials and became the basis for their recommendation to Laird to create a panel on exploring how to add options below massive retaliation to war planning. See Kaplan, *The Bomb*, 109–113.

66. Memo, Schlesinger for Kissinger, 13 Jul 1973, subj: Response to NSSM 169, nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB173/SIOP-21.pdf; Cotter, "Outcome of Schlesinger/Kissinger Discussion on NSSM 169, 2 August 1973", folder A 381 (May-Dec) 1973, box 4, Acc 330-78-0002; memcon, 8:00 a.m., 2 Aug 1973, NSA Memcon Collection, Ford Library.

67. Memcon, 8:00 a.m., 9 Aug 1973, NSA Memcon Collection, Ford Library; memo, SecDef for CJCS, 11 Aug 1973, subj: Operational Plans for Nuclear Forces, folder A 381 (May-Dec) 1973, box 4, Acc 330-78-0002.

68. Memo, D. R. Cotter to SecDef, 24 Sep 1973, subj: Limited Nuclear Options; memo, Cotter for Wickham and SecDef, subj: JCS Briefing for SecDef ... 28 September 1973; Cotter, "Notes on September 28, 1973 Discussion with Secretary of Defense on Nuclear Strike Options," 3 Oct 1973, folder A 381 (May-Dec) 1972, box 4, Acc 330-78-0002.

69. Memo, Gene H. Porter for DirPA&E Sullivan, 30 Oct 1973, subj: Action Items from the 29 October SecDef/JCS Meeting, folder 337 Staff Meetings Alpha 1973, box 43, Acc 330-78-0001.

70. Memo, Cotter for Schlesinger, 17 Oct 1973, folder A 381 1973, box 62, Acc 330-78-0001; memo, Kissinger for Nixon, 7 Jan 1974, *The Nixon Administration*, ed. Burr, 1 (quote), doc 24a, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/SIOP-24a.pdf>, accessed 4 Apr 2016; memo, Acting Chairman General William Westmoreland for Secretary Melvin Laird, JCSM-188-71, 23 Apr 1971, II-1, MDR 12-M-1688; Remarks to Overseas Writers Association, 10 Jan 1974, *Schlesinger Public Statements 1974*, 1:21–32 (quotes, 21–22); John W. Finney, "Nuclear Options Stressed by U.S.," *New York Times*, 24 Jan 1974, 5; Michael Getler, "The Schlesinger Strategy," *Washington Post* 1974, A22; Anthony Sampson, "The Pros and Cons of MADness," *The Observer*, 17 Feb 1974, 9; Robert Stephens, "France v Rest on nuclear policy," *The Observer*, 3 Mar 1974, 9; Janne Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 118–119; Kaplan, *The Bomb*, 117–118.

71. NSDM 242, 17 Jan 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 35:142–146; Terry Terriff, *The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 188–191; Kaplan, *The Bomb*, 118.

72. *The Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired), Volume II* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1984), 769 (quote); Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)* (New York: Random House, 1995), 307 (quote).

73. Remarks, Schlesinger at the Pentagon, 24 Jan 1974 (quote), *Schlesinger Public Statements 1974*, 1:32, 34–36, 42; Schlesinger interview, 7 Feb 1991, 69; House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 7 Feb 1974, HASC No. 93-43, pt. 1:50 (quote).

74. House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975: Hearings*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 26 Feb 1974, 345–347, 499; Terriff, *The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy*, 192–195; SCFR, *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies*, 4 Mar 1974, 12–14, 42 (quotes, 14, 42); HCAS, *Hearings on Military Posture*, 7 Feb 1974, 47, 51 (quotes).

75. Memo, Schlesinger for Moorer, 4 Apr 1974, enclosing Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, 3 Apr 1974, folder A 381 1974, box 2, Acc 330-78-0010.

76. Vredeling and Schlesinger quotes in [REDACTED].

77. Memo, Rush for Kissinger, 10 May 1974, enclosing Report to the NSC Verification Panel on Declaratory Policy for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, 2, National Security Archive website; 10-M-0526A1; [REDACTED]; both in folder A 381 1974, box 2, Acc 330-78-0010; memo, General Brown for Schlesinger, 4 Mar 1975; memo, ASD(ISA) Robert Ellsworth for Schlesinger, 21 Mar 1975; memo, Schlesinger for Brown, 22 Mar 1975: all in folder A 381 1975, box 59, Acc 330-78-0058. [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]. Although supportive of Schlesinger's efforts to increase deterrence, they were uncertain about what exactly the change would mean in a crisis. One West German colonel asked in a bilateral meeting about the employment of nuclear weapons in a crisis. Seeking to reassure the West Germans, Schlesinger said, "In periods of crisis, we must be able to demonstrate to the East that the West has capabilities it won't hesitate to use. However, we don't want to take precipitous actions which would result in the destruction of Western Europe, especially in that of the FRG." Memcon, Meeting Between SecDef and Minister of Defense Georg Leber, 4 Nov 1974, folder Germany 091.112 (Jun-Dec) 1974, box 62, Acc 330-78-0011. [REDACTED].

78. James Schlesinger, interview by John Hines, Washington, DC, 29 Oct 1991, 128, in William Burr, Svetlana Savranskaya, ed., *Previously Classified Interviews with Former Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades*, 11 Sep 2009, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20II%20Schlesinger.pdf>, accessed 17 Aug 2016; memo, SecDef for CJCS et al., 28 Aug 1973, subj: Nuclear Policy Issues; Poole, *JCS and National Policy 1973–1976*, 245–247; memo, Cotter for Schlesinger, 19 Nov 1974 (quote); memo, Cotter for Schlesinger, 2 Dec 1974: both in folder A 381 1974, box 2, Acc 330-78-0010.

79. Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates established the JSTPS in 1960 to create and maintain the SIOP, thereby eliminating the inefficiency and redundancy caused by the poor nuclear targeting coordination among the services. Thereafter, the SAC commander held a second hat as commander of JSTPS and responsibility over the creation and maintenance of the SIOP. The large planning staff had members from every service but consisted mostly of experienced SAC and Navy personnel. Memo, Brown for Schlesinger, 15 Jul 1974, folder A 381 1974, box 2, Acc 330-78-0010; Russell E. Dougherty, "The Psychological Climate of Nuclear Command," in Ashton Carter, et al., *Managing Nuclear Operations* (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 411–413; Robert J. Watson, *Into the Missile Age* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), 489–495; Lawrence Kaplan, et al. *The McNamara Ascendancy*, (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006) 316–317. [REDACTED].

80. [REDACTED].

81. [REDACTED].

82. [REDACTED]
83. [REDACTED]
84. Don Cotter's notes on Tank meeting, Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) Discussion, 2 Dec 1974 (quote), 10-M-1234.
85. John Battilega, "Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The Post-Cold War Interview," in Henry Sokolski, ed., *Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 154–159 (quote, 155); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946–1976* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 212–215; William Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 68–71; David Stone, *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya* (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2006), 230–232.
86. Memo, Cotter for Schlesinger, 2 Dec 1974: both in folder A 381 1974, box 2, Acc 330-78-0010; SAC, History of Strategic Air Command, 1 Nov 1977, 2, Joint History Office; memo, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski for President Jimmy Carter, 31 Mar 1977, file 8, box 47, Subject File, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. Ford's successor, Jimmy Carter, was not even provided briefing material on "non-SIOP nuclear options" until October 1977, months after he had received his SIOP briefing. Defense Secretary Harold Brown warned: "Some of the examples have been worked out fairly completely; others are incomplete, or in a few cases highly speculative." Memo, Brown for Carter, 19 Oct 1977, folder A 381 1977, box 2, Acc 330-80-0016.
87. When Miller first read the secretary's January 10, 1974 announcement, he thought the comments were "perfect." Miller later recalled that Schlesinger's push to develop limited options "was long overdue" as the SIOP needed to include smaller strike options. *The Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller*, 760–773 (quotes, 768, 770). Janine Davidson, "Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (Mar 2013): 129–145.
88. Memo and attachment, Brown for Schlesinger, 12 Mar 1975; memo, PDASD(ISA) Amos Jordan for Schlesinger, 24 Apr 1975; memo, Andy Marshall for Schlesinger, 9 Mar 1975: all in folder A 381 1975, box 59, Acc 330-78-0058; Janine Davidson, "Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (Mar 2013): 129–145.
89. Memo, Marshall for Schlesinger, 28 Feb 1975, folder A 381 1975, box 59, Acc 330-78-0058; Suggested Comments for Omega II-75 Blue Captain Dr. Schlesinger, n.d. [Sep 1975]; memo and attachments, Brig. Gen. Richard Anson for Schlesinger, 16 Sep 1975: both in folder 353 M-Z 1975, box 43, Acc 330-78-0058.
90. Suggested Comments for Omega II-75 Blue Captain Dr. Schlesinger, n.d. [Sep 1975]; memo and attachments, Brigadier General Richard Anson for Schlesinger, 16 Sep 1975: both in folder 353 M-Z 1975, box 43, Acc 330-78-0058
91. Ernest May, John Steinbruner, Thomas Wolfe, *History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945–1972: Part II* (Washington, DC: OSD/HO, 1981), 608 (quote), www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/MDA/227.pdf, accessed 11 May 2016; L. Wainstein, C.D. Cremeans, J.K. Moriarty, J. Ponturo, *The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945–1972* (city: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1975), 471, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a331702.pdf, accessed 28 Mar 2016; Joint History Office, *A Historical Study of Strategic Connectivity, 1950–1981* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1982), 26, www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Other/92-A-0781-A_Historical_Study_of_Strategic_Command_1950-1981.pdf, accessed 28 Mar 2016; Francis Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

2012), 34; Command Control and Flexible Nuclear Response, attached to memo, A. C. Herrington for Schlesinger, 6 Nov 1974, 1–2 (quote), 14, folder A 381 1974, box 57, Acc 330-78-0011; Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal*, 124. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] folder NATO 334 NPG 1974, box 3, Acc 330-78-0010.14.

92. David Rosenberg, “Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945–68,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 9, no. 1 (1986): 47–48; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] memo, Director of Strategic Target Planning for Brown, 10 Sep 1976, subj: MDR 08-M-0278; *An NHP Interview with Donald R. Cotter conducted at the University of Maryland, College Park*, 18 Dec 1990 (Nuclear History Program, 1990), 112; Lt. Gen. Andrew B. Anderson Jr., interview by Hugh N. Ahmann, 3–4 Nov 1986, K239.0512-1730, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, 170; memo, ASD(PA&E) Leonard Sullivan for Rumsfeld, 16 Jan 1976, folder A 471.61 (Jun-Dec) 1975, box 59, Acc 330-78-0058; Brown interview, 8 Oct 1992, OSD/HO, 2, 12 (quote).