

## CHAPTER 6

### **Building an All-Volunteer Force**

When the Senate confirmed Elliot Richardson as secretary of defense on January 30, 1973, he assumed ultimate responsibility for implementing the most important change in the military personnel system since World War II: the transition from a system of conscription, which had inducted over 10 million men, to an all-volunteer military. In the postwar decades, the number of draft inductions had fluctuated. After a brief respite in conscription from 1946 to mid-1948, Congress passed a new peacetime draft. During the Korean War (1950–1953), the United States drafted over 1.5 million men, after which draft inductions fell significantly during the Cold War years of 1954 to 1962, as the Pentagon relied on a relatively small number of draftees to augment volunteers. Then the Vietnam War (1963–1973) greatly increased the need for draftees again. As the United States disengaged from the conflict in Southeast Asia in 1973, the Pentagon returned to volunteers. The establishment of the All-Volunteer Force was one of the lasting legacies of Richardson’s immediate predecessor, Melvin Laird. Since Richardson’s tenure at Pentagon lasted only four months—he briefly became President Nixon’s attorney general during the turbulent Watergate scandal—the task of assuring the success of the AVF fell to his successors James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld. While both secretaries were fully committed to the AVF, the Defense Department official most influential in guiding the transition was Deputy Secretary William Clements. In one of his last acts as secretary, Laird had entrusted Clements with the job of overseeing the AVF. Both Schlesinger and Rumsfeld were content to allow Clements to spearhead the implementation of the force, but the challenges were formidable. Many military leaders were skeptical, if not downright opposed to the idea. Congressional and

public policy critics thought the AVF would fail and leave the United States dangerously exposed during the Cold War.<sup>1</sup>

Doubts and critiques of the AVF stemmed from three crucial concerns: quantity, quality, and cost. First, without the draft could the armed services recruit enough volunteers to fill their ranks? Second, could the AVF attract the right kind of volunteers for a force that was beginning to utilize high-technology weapons? Third, could the Pentagon convince the president and Congress to pay for an AVF that could compete with the civilian work place and thus would require a larger personnel and benefits budget? During the Nixon-Ford second term these questions were addressed, but the fate of the AVF still hung very much in the balance.

Richardson, Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, and Clements provided the foundation for the All-Volunteer Force, allowing it to survive and eventually prosper. The process was not without its setbacks and controversies, but by January 1977 most agreed that the AVF was the model for the future. Thirteen years later when asked to fight in the Gulf War, the AVF proved a resounding success.

### **The Vietnam and Laird Legacy**

Conscription of young men into the military had worked well during World War II and enjoyed public acceptance during the early years of the Cold War. However, public and political support for the draft broke down during the Vietnam War as its flaws and inequities became increasingly obvious, especially to those who opposed the conflict in Southeast Asia. Part of the antiwar protestors' criticism was their belief that those who were asked to fight came disproportionately from economically disadvantaged and minority populations. A postwar study of the draft found that men with the means or the knowledge to challenge the system had a 90 percent chance of avoiding induction. Educational deferments allowed young men who could afford college to

postpone military service, often until they were too old for the draft. Medical deferments of all kinds also excused men from service. While many had legitimate medical concerns, critics of the draft charged some men—particularly those with money or family connections—with exaggerating or fabricating complaints with the help of sympathetic physicians. An NFL quarterback was excluded from military service due to his bad knees, even though he continued to play football for years afterward. Well-connected families also encouraged their sons to join the National Guard or the reserves, particularly if they were no longer eligible for a student deferment. Three future presidents who were of draft age during the Vietnam War would be later accused by their political opponents of either draft dodging or of obtaining preferential acceptance into the National Guard to avoid service in Vietnam.<sup>2</sup>

Public dissatisfaction with the draft system led then-candidate Richard Nixon to call for its end during the 1968 presidential campaign. In March 1969 President Nixon announced the creation of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, more popularly known as the Gates Commission after its chairman former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. Although ostensibly created to determine the viability of a volunteer system, the commission's true mandate was to chart a path that ended the draft and implemented an all-volunteer military. The commission forwarded its conclusions to the president in February 1970, including the unanimous recommendation that the United States end conscription and institute an all-volunteer system by summer 1971. To ensure a successful All-Volunteer Force, the members provided three principal recommendations: increase military pay to encourage enlistment, improve the conditions of military service to attract and retain qualified service members, and finally, establish a standby draft no later than 1971 in case the services failed to meet their recruitment targets under the voluntary system.<sup>3</sup>

Laird supported the findings of the commission but worried that the timing for the change was too abrupt. He urged a more deliberate pace, arguing that the on-going war in Vietnam meant the Defense Department needed flexibility to supply the troops requested by the services. Additionally, AVF personnel costs would stretch what was expected to be a tight Defense budget for FY1971. Instead, Laird informed Pentagon officials that the Pentagon would work toward eliminating draft calls by the end of FY1973. Two years later in late 1972, with the war in Vietnam winding down and recruitment figures looking promising, Laird was confident he could end conscription. On January 27, 1973, only a few days before leaving office, Laird announced, henceforth, the services “will depend exclusively on volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines.” It was a fitting tribute that Laird, who had done so much to develop the vision for an all-volunteer force, was able to announce its creation.<sup>4</sup>

Despite this achievement, Laird realized there was hard work ahead. He also knew he wanted incoming Deputy Secretary Clements to pick up the mantle of the AVF. An outspoken Texas oil industry entrepreneur and later a two-term Republican governor of Texas, Clements was appointed deputy secretary to manage the DoD in January 1973. He met Laird as the latter prepared to leave his office. “I’ll never forget,” Clements recalled, “[Laird] handed me two hot potatoes on two different occasions as he was clearing his desk and getting out of the building. One was the volunteer army.” During their meeting Clements noticed a towering stack of papers on the secretary’s desk. Laird indicated they were pending files related to the AVF, to which Clements bluntly responded, “Pending my ass, you’ve been sitting on that for six months.” Laird did not disagree and instead retorted, “I’ve been waiting for you to get over here.”<sup>5</sup>

Clements would have to convince Congress, the military brass, the media, and ultimately the public that the Pentagon could attract enough recruits (quantity) with the necessary

capabilities (quality) and without exorbitant expense (cost). The AVF had to fill its recruitment quotas with enough “quality” men and women—“quality” being defined as those with a high school diploma or those who scored in the upper half of the Mental Category IV (below average) on the Armed Forces Quality Test (AFQT)—and persuade Congress to fund the AVF to the levels that would allow its implementation and success.

### **Recruitment and Quality**

More than anything else, implementing the AVF became a numbers game, especially for the Army, which among the armed services had the toughest time meeting its recruitment quotas during the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, in late 1972 prospects looked good, and reports of favorable recruitment figures from July 1972 to January 1973 contributed to Laird’s decision to announce an end of the draft before he left the Pentagon. The Army Recruiting Command announced it had achieved 95.6 percent of its accession goal and increased non-prior-service (NPS) enlistments by 38 percent from the same period of the previous year. OSD reported in February 1973 that the Marine Corps and Air Force had met their NPS recruiting objectives for January and that the Navy had even exceeded their goal by a few hundred new sailors. Unfortunately, these percentages did not last. Secretary Richardson and his successors during the Nixon-Ford administration struggled to demonstrate that the AVF could recruit and retain enough volunteers to meet the personnel goals of each service branch.<sup>6</sup>

A very public demonstration of DoD’s faith in the AVF came when Richardson advised President Nixon to end induction authority. Despite Laird’s January announcement that the military would rely upon volunteers for the foreseeable future, the government had retained induction authority under the Selective Service Act. There was one last chance to draft young

men, which was to lapse on July 1, 1973, unless Congress extended the date, which DoD considered unlikely without a political fight on Capitol Hill. Although men were still needed in Vietnam, Richardson was confident that another draft call would be unnecessary. In late February he presented the president with three options regarding the future of induction authority. The first was to recommend Congress review the induction authority on an annual basis “if only as a safety valve” in case the services could not find enough volunteers. Similarly, the second option would see Congress renewing the induction authority on the basis of a military need to draft Americans into the reserves and the medical services. The third option was to end induction authority. Richardson recommended against the first two options on the grounds they would undermine confidence in the nascent All-Volunteer Force. The current force was strong, he argued, and the projections for the future were positive. He worried that if Nixon supported an extension of the induction authority it would not only signal to the public that the AVF was faltering in its first months but also damage the president’s credibility after his full-throated support of the all-volunteer concept. Lastly, Richardson hinted that any continuing induction authority would ease the pressure on the services to ensure the AVF’s success. As long as the safety net of the draft existed, the services would have little incentive to undertake a rigorous overhaul of the recruiting and retention processes. Richardson also based his recommendation on the practical concern that DoD needed Congress to act on special pay legislation, which Richardson believed would not happen as long the Nixon administration appeared to support both a draft and a volunteer military. The secretary recommended that Nixon approve the third option, which the president did.<sup>7</sup>

Regrettably, the promising enlistment numbers for late 1972 and early 1973 did not last. While recruiting and retention levels for the Marines Corps and Air Force remained fairly stable,

the Navy and Army failed to meet their goals over the January to June 1973 period. The new Army enlistments that had surged in recent months rapidly fell, with recruiters only meeting 68 percent of their quota for the six-month period. In June 1973 alone, the Navy missed its monthly recruiting goal by 41 percent. An internal DoD report concluded in summer 1973 that overall military strength was 1.1 percent below the planned end strength outlined in the FY1973 budget, a shortfall of approximately 25,000 service members. The report attributed the drop in meeting recruitment goals to the “higher qualitative goals” the Army and Navy put in place during the final six months of the fiscal year.<sup>8</sup>

Publicly, the Pentagon maintained a positive outlook. In a March 1973 Special Report on the AVF, Richardson announced that the first few months of the experiment were a success. He predicted the “historic goal of an All-Volunteer Force can, indeed, be reached by this generation of Americans.” Behind the scenes, Clements encouraged senior DoD officials to incorporate optimistic messaging about the AVF into public remarks. He circulated a set of talking points highlighting the quality of current recruits—“a better quality mix than in the earlier years of heavy draft” that “represent[s] a typical cross-cut of young America”—and downplayed shortages or concerns about the socioeconomic and racial make-up of the force.<sup>9</sup>

Criticism of the AVF, however, continued to mount outside of the Pentagon. With the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January and the gradual drawdown of American forces in Southeast Asia, media pundits and politicians alike debated what the post-Vietnam military should look like. Few disagreed that the draft had been divisive, but not all were convinced that a volunteer military would meet the nation’s security needs or that it would prove to be as equitable as supporters had promised. Would the relatively low pay the military offered attract only the poor and uneducated? Would increasing pay to attract better qualified volunteers

balloon the Defense budget to stratospheric heights? As recruitment began to falter, these critics felt justified in their concerns and began to call the AVF “experiment” a failure. Joseph A. Califano Jr., a special assistant during the Johnson administration, penned a scathing indictment in an op-ed for the *Washington Post* in March 1973. He accused the AVF program of spending billions of dollars to recruit the very same poor and disadvantaged young people that antidraft protestors sought to protect through an all-volunteer system. He concluded, “That [the AVF] is the mercenary system plain and simple.... It is bad for the services, and it is worse for the country.” Critics in Congress, foremost among them the newly elected Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, from Georgia, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, were equally skeptical about the AVF. Nunn began a protracted war against the AVF.<sup>10</sup>

In response to the growing public criticism, Clements formed a special task force of high-level military officers and Pentagon civilians to ensure AVF message discipline across DoD. In particular, Richardson and Clements wanted to make it clear to the public that the OSD and the military were in-step as they confronted recruitment challenges. As Clements told the task force, “The group will be good internally; it will be doubly good externally.” When Clements chaired the first meeting in mid-May 1973 he received a shock. This inaugural gathering devolved into an airing of grievances and concerns from military leaders. “I do not question the validity of the All-Volunteer Force,” said Army Chief of Staff General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., “but, many people in the Army, officers and senior NCOs, think it is a bunch of crap.” Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt announced, “It would be a mistake to go out on a limb with optimistic statements” about ending the induction authority later that summer, and he asked, “[I]s it too late to reconsider asking for standby draft authority?” He cautioned, “We will regret it by the end of the year if we don’t.” Other concerns expressed at the task force meeting included the

effectiveness of the AFQT for screening recruits, the recruitment of high school dropouts, and military pay. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Roger T. Kelley left the meeting discouraged and later confided to Clements it was “distressing” that the military acted as though the decision to end the draft was still under debate. Without a “complete and positive commitment” from the services, he told the deputy defense secretary, the AVF would fail.<sup>11</sup>

Other officials responsible for implementing the AVF shared Kelley’s concerns about the services. A brash, young outspoken Capitol Hill staffer, Stephen E. Herbits, who was hired in May 1973 as special assistant for the All-Volunteer Force, told his departing boss Roger Kelley at the end of May 1973, “I am convinced that for the next several months ‘business as usual’ in the Office of the ASD (M&RA) will insure [*sic*] defeat of the AVF.” Herbits noticed that critics of the AVF, both inside and outside of the Pentagon, were gaining momentum, resulting in a “dominant psychological atmosphere in this building ... that the AVF is beat.” He predicted that the change in leadership from Richardson to Schlesinger in July 1973 meant “that it is simply a matter of time ... before all credibility in the AVF will be destroyed.” Herbits viewed himself as a bulwark against the efforts of the services to undermine the volunteer military and he pledged that he would help Kelley’s successor “regain the momentum” and “stop the erosion of the AVF.”<sup>12</sup>

Prospects for the AVF in 1973 suffered a serious setback from decisions the Army made at the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973. In late 1972 the Army decided to raise its enlistment standards in order to increase the overall quality of its recruits. After all, the Army, like the other services, had seen favorable recruiting in the close of 1972. Kelley objected to the Army’s plan, but Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlke pressed ahead. First, he eliminated

recruiter incentives to enlist volunteers from the lower half of Mental Category IV and when recruitment numbers remained satisfactory, he discontinued all recruiter credits for Category IV volunteers without a high school diploma. With its recruiters continuing to make their quotas, the Army announced that effective February 1 it would limit Category IV recruits to 15 percent of total enlistments, down from the usual 19 percent, and would no longer incentivize recruiters to enlist 17-year-olds without high school degrees. In fact, the Army would establish a ceiling on non-high school graduates of 30 percent across all enlistments. While the Army's decision would certainly result in a more educated force, it significantly shrunk the pool of men and women from which it could draw.<sup>13</sup>

Participants still debate the motivations behind the Army's February 1973 recruitment guidance. Was it a good faith effort to improve the quality of Army recruits or an attempt to sabotage the AVF? Upon leaving his post as assistant defense secretary (M&RA) in June 1973, Kelley told the *Washington Post* that the AVF was under threat from within: "The adversaries (of the draft-free military) are bolder and more frequent in their acts of sabotage against the system." He declined to give specifics, only saying critics of the volunteer military "can demonstrate a need for the draft by letting failures occur." Although he did not name the Army leadership in the article, there was no doubt at the Pentagon to whom Kelley directed his thinly veiled attacks.<sup>14</sup>

Whether or not Kelly's charge of sabotage was correct, the consequences of the Army's February 1973 decisions to upgrade the quality of recruits were clear. In March 1973 Secretary Richardson published his Special Report touting the success of the AVF, but the Army missed its recruitment target by 29 percent that month. In April, the numbers continued to plummet, with recruiters missing their target of 9,000 by 51 percent. By May, the Army's shortfall had reached

approximately 12,000 enlistments, causing the service to miss its cumulative recruitment goal from January through May by almost 33 percent. Accusations and explanations began to fly around the halls of the Pentagon. The Army argued that Laird's January announcement of an All-Volunteer Force meant fewer draft-motivated enlistments and furthermore, the late winter and early spring were traditionally periods of low recruitment. Army defenders also pointed out that while overall recruitment numbers were lower, those who had joined were of a higher quality—an advantage in the increasingly technology-dependent armed forces. Although less openly discussed by the Army at the time, another reason for recruitment struggles likely stemmed from unfolding scandals plaguing the Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). An internal Army investigation found multiple instances of recruiter malpractice in the early part of 1973. Coupled with the decision to move USAREC headquarters in January 1973 and a failure to fill 20 percent of its recruiter posts, the Army's apparatus for recruitment was in disarray at the very moment the service decided to make drastic changes to its enlistment policies.<sup>15</sup>

In addition, there existed a larger cultural handicap for Army recruiting. During the Vietnam War the public perception of the services, especially the Army, had suffered. Army service in Vietnam was increasingly portrayed on television, in film, and in song as a war in which grunts—combat soldiers composed in good part by the poor, the less educated, and minorities—found themselves in a chaotic and undefined war. As the then popular antiwar anthem went, “One, two, three, four, what are we fighting for. Don't know and don't give a damn, next stop is Viet-Nam.” Even within the service itself, many in the Army believed it needed to realign itself to the emerging modern culture of the late-1960s and early-1970s.<sup>16</sup>

This tension between military culture and the new lifestyle of American youth in the 1970s found expression in something as basic as the debate over the length of a service

member's hair or mustache. In Vietnam, most officers did not usually obsess about hair length. But stateside or in other overseas deployments many service members tried to grow their locks and facial hair as long as possible without raising the ire of their superiors. The issue eventually reached Richardson, who wisely suggested it was part of a larger problem of how to accommodate the young men of the 1970s into the often constricting norms of conservative armed services. Richardson left to head the Justice Department without deciding on hair length.<sup>17</sup>

The Army's failure to attract enough recruits threatened the AVF's future. In the weeks between Kelley's departure and the arrival of his successor as ASD(MR&A), Special Assistant Herbits embarked on an unrelenting campaign to expose what he believed were the Army's deliberate steps to undermine the success of the volunteer concept. He sent a barrage of memos to his superiors on issues such as reserve enlistments, mental standards, and continued missteps at USAREC. He consistently identified failures in Army leadership to support the AVF either through detrimental recruitment policies or less than supportive statements to media. Herbits viewed the Army's actions—and inactions—as a deliberate campaign to sink the new all-volunteer military.<sup>18</sup>

Matters finally came to a head in mid-1973 when the Army, Navy, and Marines all faced shortfalls in recruits and deficits in projected end strengths. To make matters worse, in June 1973 the Senate Armed Service Committee intimated to Army leadership that unless the service improved its quantitative goals and downgraded qualitative standards, the committee would reduce the service's end-strength numbers. With a continued chorus of critiques in the media and the Senate—already wary of ending the draft and looking for weaknesses in the AVF—threatening to step in, Clements had had enough.<sup>19</sup>

In a memorandum to Clements, Herbits outlined the Army problems with the AVF. Herbits remembered when the deputy secretary called him into his massive office where only the Herbits memo lay on his desk. After Clements quizzed Herbits on his paper, he had his personal secretary usher in the Army chief of staff and Army secretary and seat them in front of Herbits. Clements asked, “So what’s going on with the volunteer force?” After the two men briefly explained, Clements slammed his fist on the table and said, “Listen, the President of the United States, [and] the United States Congress have established a policy in the country, and frankly you are not implementing it. I am giving you 30 days to turn this around, or the President will ask both of you for your resignations publicly.” Then Clements told the Army leaders “if they did not know how to do it, this young man [Herbits had not been introduced to them] “will tell you how.”<sup>20</sup>

Clements’s tirade was perhaps justified in light of past transgressions, but it was unfair because the two men he berated had begun a good faith effort to turn the Army around. By fall 1973 the Army and the OSD were already addressing the recruitment challenges and shoring up the AVF. The key to these fixes was two new appointees: Army Secretary Howard H. “Bo” Callaway and OSD’s ASD(M&RA), William K. Brehm—a strong supporter of the AVF and a longtime Pentagon civilian. Brehm championed the use of data analysis to inform personnel decisions. As a former Army assistant secretary, he had become one of the driving forces behind what he called the “analytic maturing” of the approach to manpower programs and force readiness. When Brehm became assistant secretary of defense, he applied a data-driven approach to oversee the buildup of Army forces. He also persuaded Schlesinger to transfer the data analysis function for manpower from Systems Analysis (the future PA&E) to his M&RA shop.<sup>21</sup>

Bo Callaway was a West Point graduate and Goldwater Republican in the still Democrat-dominated state of Georgia. Like Brehm, he was committed to the all-volunteer concept and recognized that the modern, post-Vietnam Army needed to evolve. Even before his dressing down by Clements, Callaway had already revisited the controversial changes to the recruitment policies introduced in February. In July 1973 he announced that the Army would increase its quota of non-high school graduates from 30 percent to 50 percent, reversing the Army's ill-fated attempt to improve quality at the expense of quantity of recruits. In October he sent personal assurances to Clements that the Army was working together to meet its recruitment challenges and undertook a campaign to assuage doubters in the Army and bring naysayers on board. Herbits found himself impressed by Callaway's actions, calling the Army secretary's October 15, 1973, speech to the Association of the United States Army, "probably one of the strongest statements coming out of the United States Army [in support of the AVF] since we began the move to end the draft." Even the Army brass seemed to heed the call.<sup>22</sup>

Brehm and Callaway formed an easy partnership based on a shared belief in the success of the AVF. If Brehm was instrumental in making the case for the AVF in the press and on the Hill, it was Callaway who succeeded in finally getting the Army leadership moving in the right direction. In February 1974 Calloway sent Nixon a summary of the Army's first year under the AVF and an accompanying letter, optimistic in tone, declaring, "The volunteer Army is a reality. It is no longer just a concept. It is here now, on the ground, ready to fight if need be, stronger than when the draft ended." The lengthy summary highlighted all aspects of the Army's transition to the volunteer model and the steps the service had taken to shake off "a post-Vietnam milieu marked by war weariness and anti-military attitudes." He challenged the prevailing criticism that the Army was racially unbalanced or populated by the uneducated, noting that

numbers were about where experts had predicted, and he praised the inclusion of more female soldiers as helping to raise the overall quality of the Army. Callaway did not shy from telling the president that the Army still faced challenges, namely that the last of the draftees inducted before the draft ended would rotate out in fiscal year 1975. He conceded that the Army was expected to be understrength by 4–6 percent in 1974. Furthermore, though the Army had increased the number of NPS recruits in mental categories it considered average and above from 42 percent in 1971 to 50 percent in 1973, the service was still well below the 61 percent goal Army leaders considered the minimum level to ensure an adequately trained modern force. Despite these concerns, Callaway confidently assured Nixon that the Army had completed a successful transition, and “we intend to keep it moving in this direction.” The president replied, “I know you can be counted on to address the remaining problem areas with the same energy, imagination and dedication that has characterized your past performance. Keep up the fine work.”<sup>23</sup>

Schlesinger mirrored Callaway’s optimism when he told the press in mid-June 1974 that after the AVF’s first year, “I think it can be said that the degree of success has been greater than many had anticipated.” He drew special attention to the Army “who have the most difficult problem of all.” The secretary was a little more circumspect in an interview for the July-August 1974 issue of *Reserve Magazine*. When asked for his assessment of a viable AVF, he responded, “We cannot say for sure that it is a viable program in terms of maintaining 2.1 million men in the Armed Forces, but we are going to give it the old college try.” However, he concluded, “we think that it may very well succeed.”<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately the old college try was not enough. While recruiting numbers and quality recruits for the armed services fluctuated during the two remaining years of the Ford administration, the Pentagon never solved the equation between quantity and quality. Missing

Army recruiting objectives became the norm. Other factors worked against recruitment. The Vietnam GI Bill with its educational benefits ended, as did two-year enlistments, and enlistment bonuses and recruitment advertising budgets were slashed, exacerbating the inability to meet recruitment quotas.<sup>25</sup>

### **The Cost of the All-Volunteer Force**

A robust AVF required the United States to assume the costs of recruiting and retaining military personnel. The most persistent criticism of the AVF through the Nixon and Ford years focused on the expense of sustaining a volunteer military. Criticism on this front came from all corners, including the White House, where Kissinger kept a close watch on the AVF's rising costs. The loudest voices, however, came from Congress, where anti-AVF legislators like Senator Sam Nunn consistently fought to undermine the all-volunteer concept. "Most of this phenomenal rise in the costs of manpower can be laid at the door of the all-volunteer force concept," Nunn proclaimed in a speech before the Georgia General Assembly in March 1973. He warned that Congress could only enact so much legislation to increase military pay and allowances "until the expense threatens to bankrupt our entire defense program." Nunn spoke for a small but influential group in Congress, including Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee F. Edward Hébert, who expressed skepticism, if not opposition, to the concept of a volunteer force and advocated or considered returning to conscription.<sup>26</sup>

Nunn and other concerned legislators pointed to the FY 1974 budget as an example of out-of-control manpower costs. The Pentagon request called for \$22 billion more in spending on pay and allowances for service members than the FY 1964 budget, despite the decrease in armed forces strength by 400,000 members over the same period. Furthermore, congressional

opponents noted “the average cost of maintaining a serviceman on duty” had nearly quadrupled in the last 25 years. Legislators on Capitol Hill already wary of the AVF balked at the realization that the FY 1974 Defense budget matched that of FY 1968, the peak of the Vietnam War. How, they asked, could a military nearing the end of a costly war still require so much money? The answer was increased manpower costs totaling 56 percent of the FY 1974 budget.<sup>27</sup>

Schlesinger and his successor Rumsfeld were each keenly aware of the budgetary pressure facing the DoD as the Vietnam War came to an end, and they knew that personnel costs were a convenient cudgel for AVF critics. However, they both understood that the high price tag was the cost of doing business. As Schlesinger told a reporter who pressed him on the expense of the AVF, “if we are going to have 3 percent of the American working force directly employed by the Department of Defense, in a free market we will discover that we have to pay 3 percent of the GNP in order to obtain them.” Rumsfeld later observed that some members of Congress “have focused on manpower costs more sharply than on any other area of Defense resources.” As he saw it, the critics, especially those in Congress, were making contradictory demands, putting the OSD in an unwinnable position. To Rumsfeld’s frustration these same AVF critics who called for a reduction in the manpower budget also demanded evidence that the military was meeting its recruitment goals in building a modern military of highly qualified service members. To do this, the services needed to be able to offer as many incentives as possible, particularly in the form of compensation and benefits. Rumsfeld’s response for these critics was clear: how could DoD reduce manpower costs when the all-volunteer experiment relied heavily on compensation to attract and retain volunteers?<sup>28</sup>

Within this environment of intense focus on personnel costs, the DoD participated in three significant reviews of expenditures during the Nixon-Ford presidency. Of the three, the

least publicized—an internal review and realignment of headquarters staffs—had the most immediate effect on the DoD. The remaining reviews included the Defense Manpower Commission formed at the direction of Congress and the third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), a regular Pentagon examination of military pay and benefits undertaken every four years. While the two latter reviews were ambitious in scope, neither served to immediately resolve the rising personnel costs. Instead, they each served as a platform for AVF critics in Congress and the military to voice concerns yet again.

The command headquarters review was part of Secretary Schlesinger's attempt to improve efficiency with the goal of reducing manpower costs without decreasing military readiness. The objective was to shrink the number of headquarters staff and in some cases, eliminate entire commands. By February 1975 the DoD had identified 23,000 headquarters positions for removal by the end of FY 1976. Brehm assured the press, "This is not legerdemain. These are real reductions in these headquarters." While the majority of the positions were in the military services, the OSD was not immune. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were slated to lose 400 personnel.<sup>29</sup>

The Pentagon promised that the review would improve readiness. The Army planned to bolster combat forces with the savings from support and headquarters reductions, introducing three additional active divisions without increasing overall manpower. Similarly, the Air Force retained three C130 squadrons in active service and was scheduled to add three tactical air wings without increasing its personnel. The elimination of two major air commands, two numbered air forces, and six headquarters and related support would free up 15,000 airmen for roles more directly connected to combat, all without drawing upon additional manpower. Finally, the DoD pledged to move 18,000 support troops positioned in Europe into combat roles by the end of FY

1976, strengthening the conventional force in NATO and meeting the June 1976 deadline set by the Nunn Amendment to the 1975 Military Appropriations Act.<sup>30</sup>

While the DoD worked to streamline its existing force, Congress directed its attention to inefficiency at the DoD by creating the bipartisan Defense Manpower Commission (DMC) on November 16, 1973. The act's sponsors, Senators Howard Baker (R-TN) and Lloyd M. Bentson Jr. (D-TX), were concerned that manpower costs were spiraling out of control and would result in reduced national security. With the concept of an all-volunteer military still new and relatively untested, the commission sought to understand whether these high personnel costs stemmed from the realities of mobilizing a force entirely comprising volunteers or from mismanagement and inefficiency by the services and the OSD. The commission consisted of seven members, four appointed by Congress and three by the president.<sup>31</sup>

The formal mandate of the bipartisan commission was to discover “the true needs for manpower” at the Defense Department, both at that time and in the following decade, and to determine if these needs could be met more economically, either through more effective means of training, compensation, or force structure, or through better management from the secretary and the service chiefs. Its members were sworn-in in April 1974, and over the next year they conducted extensive research and held public hearings across the country on topics ranging from active and reserve forces, the volunteer concept, and minority representation. They drew on the insights of academics, defense contractors, veterans' groups, vocational guilds, women's organizations, and business executives. Members also toured commands throughout the United States to see the AVF in practice at all levels of the military, from recruitment postings to combat units.<sup>32</sup>

Schlesinger, Clements, and others at DoD watched the formation of the DMC with caution. They understood that the AVF still had many detractors within Congress, and that unfavorable findings from the commission would further bolster the cause of the anti-AVF forces. Critics such as Sam Nunn hoped the commission would confirm that the AVF was too expensive to maintain. Schlesinger met with DMC Chairman Curtis Tarr, former director of the U.S. Selective Service System and then vice president of Deere and Company, to emphasize that strategic considerations—i.e., enough manpower and money—needed to be at the forefront of the commission’s approach. Schlesinger appointed Bill Brehm as the department’s point of contact for all DMC issues. Tarr and Brehm had previously worked together. Schlesinger had no doubt that Brehm would advocate on behalf of the AVF. In early 1975 the Office of the ASD(M&RA) arranged for a series of high-level briefings to apprise DMC members of the strategic environment and the manpower levels required to meet the country’s national security challenges.<sup>33</sup>

By the time the commission released its report to Congress and President Ford in April 1976, Schlesinger was no longer at the DoD. However, Donald Rumsfeld and his staff found vindication in the DMC’s conclusions and labeled the report “very positive,” noting the commission had found “no immediate action available to substantially reduce manpower costs.” The services had largely addressed the early recruitment challenges and were overall commended for their transition to the volunteer models. The DMC’s investigations indicated that education levels and mental categories of the force had improved in comparison to the pre-AVF military and it found no evidence to suggest that the U.S. military reflected the colloquial “poor man’s army.” In fact, the services continued to draw “their principal strength” from the middle

class. The DMC viewed the inclusion of more minorities and women in the ranks a plus and had done nothing to decrease overall military effectiveness.<sup>34</sup>

When examining the viability of the All-Volunteer Force over the next decade the commission struck a note of caution, writing that the AVF's success depended on many factors beyond the control of the secretary of defense or even the president. First among them was the strength of the economy, with the commission stating plainly that a booming economy could spell trouble for the ability of the services to recruit. Thus, its strongest recommendation to Ford and Rumsfeld was to maintain competitive compensation for service members and ensure the continuation of the benefits service members had come to expect. "Any erosion of this [promise?] will seriously affect sustainability beyond that projected in this report," warned the DMC. The commission's findings—that the AVF program was fairly solid and sustainable with proper investment in competitive pay and benefits—dealt a blow to the AVF's critics.<sup>35</sup>

Despite its grand conclusions and broad array of recommendations, the Defense Manpower Commission had little impact on the Rumsfeld-led DoD. While Congress and the public debated the findings, the DoD quietly put the report on a shelf. When senators asked the General Accounting Office a few months later to examine the steps the Pentagon had taken in response to the report, the GAO investigators cited an underwhelming number of actions or nonactions on the report's recommendations. For example, the Pentagon leadership had not followed through on reexamining the practice of tying increases in military pay to increases in compensation for General Schedule (GS) civilian employees. The commissionaires questioned whether this linkage was the most efficient or cost-effective way of determining military pay. In theory, GS pay scales were calibrated to comparable jobs in the private sector. There was no comparison, in the DMC view, between military and civil service or private jobs. The

commission had also recommended the establishment of a standby draft system for use in a national security emergency, but the DoD took no action. The Pentagon also ignored the suggestion to form an independent federal compensation board which could adjudicate future government pay raises while considering department needs. Indeed, the GAO noted the Office of the Secretary of Defense had determined no further action on the report was necessary. As far as Rumsfeld was concerned, the DMC had confirmed that high manpower costs reflected the reality of recruiting an all-volunteer military. What more did he need or want to know?<sup>36</sup>

Rumsfeld's tepid response to the DMC recommendations as opposed to its conclusions did not mean he was uninterested in addressing the high cost of manpower. Rather the secretary set his sights on an internal DoD review required by law, the third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation. Congress required the president to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of military compensation at least every four years. The previous review in 1971 was limited. It specifically addressed compensation for certain subsections of the military, such as submariners and medical professionals. In 1975 the third QRMC overseen by Rumsfeld would be the most ambitious and consequential to date. Directed by a Navy captain, the study group included assistant secretaries of defense, deputy chiefs of staff for personnel of the services, assistant secretaries of the military departments, and the Office of Management and Budget's associate director for national security. Theirs would be a holistic approach, examining the totality of military compensation and including a close look at the total valuation of the often nebulous category of military benefits. Such a comprehensive study had not been attempted in the earlier QRMCs and doing so now amid the heated debate on AVF costs elevated the importance of the group's work.<sup>37</sup>

The central question in the third QRMC was the structure of military pay. There were two competing perspectives on how the government should determine military compensation. The first was the existing “comparability” system, favored by the services and the military departments, in which service member pay comprised a mixture of basic pay tied to Civil Service pay and tax-free allowances for housing and other subsistence such as access to medical care and base post exchanges. In theory, the pay and allowances structure meant that service members of the same rank and same years of service received the same pay, regardless of skill or ability. In practice, the process was much more opaque, inefficient, and at times, inequitable. For this reason, most of the civilians on the study group supported a “competitive” system that would transition military compensation to a taxable salary structure in which services could increase or decrease base pay—in some instances by as much as 50 percent—in order to attract or disincentivize recruits in certain skill groups. The salary proponents argued that by tying military pay to supply and demand instead of the Civil Service, the DoD would gain greater flexibility to recruit and retain high-quality personnel. Critics of the salary system charged that it would be too difficult to implement. The services worried that it would undermine a key aspect of military culture: the importance of rank. If compensation were determined by the “pay for the job” model that characterized the civilian sector, military leaders feared it would “effectively destroy the ‘rank in the man’ concept of the armed forces.”<sup>38</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the opposition of military leaders to the suggested competitive pay for the job option meant Rumsfeld’s ambitious goal of streamlining military compensation failed. The study group released a report largely affirming the status quo that tied military pay levels to the Civil Service and left the nebulous assortment of individual benefits and allowances separate from any calculations related to comparability. For some military leaders, this was a victory

against what they considered yet another attack against an institution already under siege from the all-volunteer experiment. As the final report stated, “military life is ‘institutional’ rather than ‘occupational,’ and characterized by an entire way of life rather than a transitory ‘job’ or ‘work.’” What was at stake, some in the services argued, was not a payroll system, but “military values and the special features of the military way of life.” The civilians disagreed, seeing another attempt by the military to stall the inevitable: a modern volunteer armed force compensated by a flexible and equitable system. They registered their opposition to the study group’s conclusions, and ultimately Rumsfeld refused to sign the final report. As one of the DoD implementers and experts on the AVF has observed, instead of the third QRMC ushering in a new vision of military compensation to complement the new AVF, it became at worst a forum for military critics of the volunteer initiative and at best a confirmation of the status quo.<sup>39</sup>

Unfortunately, by the time the QRMC reported its findings to the secretary in late 1976, Rumsfeld’s opportunity to enact change had disappeared. It would fall to in-coming Secretary Harold Brown, the new Carter administration, and Congress to bring the services and the civilians closer together on the issue of compensation.<sup>40</sup>

### **African-Americans and the All-Volunteer Force**

Race relations in the armed services and in America as a whole were stretched almost to the breaking point when the Pentagon leadership committed to the All-Volunteer Force. For almost two decades the Civil Rights movement had peacefully confronted segregation and racist policies in the South and less blatant discrimination in the rest of the country. While nonviolent demonstrations were the touchstone of the civil rights movement, race riots erupted in major cities throughout the 1960s culminating in the 1968 explosion in response to the assassination of

the Rev. Martin Luther King. The military was not immune to tensions between African-American service members and the predominately white U.S. military. This friction became readily apparent during the deployment to Vietnam where some black combat soldiers often created a separate identity. Calling themselves “Bloods” they adopted the black power salute and the antiwar rhetoric of protestors at home. Part of the dialogue about ending conscription, apart from the unpopularity of the draft, was the charge that black Americans were overrepresented in Vietnam particularly within combat units. There was no assurance that an AVF would address this problem. But to many critics the Selective Service System seemed so dysfunctional and so subject to manipulation that AVF could not be worse. And yet their question remained: Under a voluntary system would recruits from poor and the less educated backgrounds still be sent to fight in disproportionate numbers as they had been prior to the AVF? Past experience was not encouraging. Of the 246,000 recruits brought in from 1966 to 1969 under Robert McNamara’s Project 100,000 (a policy to enlist those who would have been screened out by their limited education and testing results), 40 percent were black. Project 100,000 service members were more likely to be sent to Vietnam and at least 37 percent were assigned to combat units.<sup>41</sup>

Racial unrest in the military was not unique; it mirrored civilian society. Race riots took place in military facilities in Vietnam, Europe, the United States, and on naval vessels during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Clashes between black and white service members flared up at the Marines’ Camp Lejeune in North Carolina and Kaneohe Naval Air Station in Honolulu in late summer 1969. Four days of racial rioting at Travis Air Force Basic in California in 1971 belied the Air Force’s hitherto record of good race relations. The Navy at sea was not immune; it suffered from highly publicized floating race riots on the USS *Constellation* and the USS *Kitty Hawk* in 1972.<sup>42</sup>

Faced with public pressure to respond to both the disintegrating racial climate in the ranks and the charge that the draft preyed upon black and poor Americans, Laird and Nixon attempted reforms. At the Pentagon, Laird began to implement policies designed to address the concerns of both military leadership and black service members. At the urging of Kelley, Laird and the DoD leadership drafted and endorsed a Human Goals charter that pledged the entire department would advocate for equal rights regardless of race. Laird continued to emphasize equal opportunity issues until the end of his tenure in January 1973. While statements by secretaries of defense in support of better race relations and equal opportunities for minorities were a step in the right direction, they could only go so far. The issue of race in America was far too complex and had too long a history for rhetorical exhortations and easy solutions.<sup>43</sup>

Richardson sought to build on the early steps taken by Laird to improve the racial climate. In his March 1973 report to Congress, he reiterated that equal opportunity regardless of race and sex remained a priority at the DoD. He appended a copy of Laird's Human Goals charter but now signed by him and the new DoD leadership. Nevertheless, the Pentagon had to confront the issue on a practical level. Richardson did so by building upon the work of the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI) at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. Established by Deputy Secretary David Packard in summer 1971, the institute was designed to educate service members on race relations, conduct research, and disseminate educational material throughout the military. Students at DRRI studied the history of minority groups, examined current racial issues, and were exposed to "ethnic group experiences" through interactions with other students and the community surrounding the base. Graduates of DRRI were expected to take their knowledge back to their units where they would provide race relations training with a goal of 18 hours of training for each member of the military. Richardson pushed the DRRI to expand its

size and the institute expected to graduate 1,500 instructors by July 1973. Both Schlesinger and Rumsfeld would continue to support the work of the DRRI.<sup>44</sup>

While better race relations in the military was a worthy goal, there were fears among some that the AVF, especially the Army, would become too black. The Gates Commission promised that “the composition of the military will not be fundamentally changed by ending conscription,” but admitted that the poor economic outlook for black Americans made it likely that more African Americans than whites would seek out military service under the volunteer model. Some academics worried about the racial makeup of the service. Military sociologist Morris Janowitz warned that an end to the draft would not address the racial imbalance of the military, but rather lead to an “internal foreign legion” composed of black soldiers that would be “disastrous for American political democracy.” Collaborating with another leading academic in the field, Charles C. Moskos, Janowitz wrote that the armed forces, and especially the Army, were reaching the “tipping point.” This theory argued that if the military became too black, whites, especially the lower educated, would refuse to enlist. The solution according to the academics was to increase educational benefits to lure more middle-class white males and females to offset the increasing number of black enlistees. The academics were not alone in expressing this controversial view; some Army leaders were concerned that white recruiting would suffer as the number of black soldiers increased.<sup>45</sup>

These fears were unfounded and the “tipping point” theory was proved wrong. While it was true that black participation in the AVF increased at the same time the overall size of the armed forces was shrinking, this did not cause whites to reject military service. The services became more racially diversified. While the Army, the largest military branch and the service with the highest percentage of black service members, decreased in size from over 1.1 million

active-duty soldiers in 1971 to just over 777,000 by 1977, the number of active duty black soldiers increased over this same period of time from around 144,000 to almost 186,000. As a percentage of the Army, African American soldiers went from comprising around 12.8 percent to almost 24 percent of the total number of active duty personnel. The same pattern was evident in a lesser degree in the Navy (4.85 percent in 1971 to 7.87 percent in 1977), the Air Force (10.5 percent to 12.7 percent), and the Marine Corps (10.18 percent to 16.02 percent).<sup>46</sup>

The OSD attributed the increase in African American participation in part to the current economic crisis—the very same crisis that had helped ease the military’s transition to the AVF. While economic recession hurt African Americans, it also affected poor whites. When President Ford asked Schlesinger about the impact of high unemployment among both black and white youth on military recruiting, the secretary responded bluntly, “It is making the All Volunteer Force.” National unemployment was 4.9 percent in 1973 but nearly doubled to 8.5 percent by 1975. For young white men between the ages of 16 and 24 the unemployment rate was already above 8 percent in 1973. In 1975 the percentage of young unemployed white men rose to just over 15 percent. The situation was even bleaker for black men aged 16–24. By 1975 over one-quarter of young black men in the United States were unemployed.<sup>47</sup>

For Schlesinger, the increase in the number of black service members was unimportant. This was and would remain the standard line among the Pentagon leadership. As he told Congress in 1974, “the Department of Defense is an equal opportunity employer and is concerned solely with how well an individual performs his job.” Whether or not there was a higher percentage of minorities in the military than was represented across the nation as a whole “is not a concern to us,” Schlesinger said. He pointed to the 82nd Airborne, which was then 26 percent black and “our most combat-ready division,” as an example.<sup>48</sup>

These assurances were not always well received within the black community. Newspaper articles written by black activists sounded the alarm that the AVF had not addressed the problems so evident in the military during the Vietnam War. These articles noted that in 1975, blacks represented 23 percent of the infantry, the group most likely to see combat. Such overrepresentation in combat units, they argued, stemmed from policies that concentrated black service members in menial positions and neglected to offer adequate training and education to help them achieve more skilled positions. Poor blacks often entered the service at an educational disadvantage when compared to their white counterparts. However, as activist Vernon Jordan pointed out, the military had welcomed “white GIs who were low IQ school dropouts” and still managed to make them into officers, NCOs (noncommissioned officers), or skilled enlisted men during World War II. Why, he asked, couldn’t the military do the same now for young black men and women?<sup>49</sup>

Unfortunately, one military service did not follow Jordan’s call. Instead, it at least inadvertently limited black enlistment. Congress explicitly prohibited the services from introducing racial quotas when setting their enlistment targets, but the Marine Corps attempted “selective recruiting,” which sought to increase the number of enlistees in the higher mental categories and as a byproduct decrease black accessions, in effect, a de facto racial quota. When Representative Ronald V. “Ron” Dellums (D-CA) wrote to DoD requesting information about such Marine recruiting practices, the department investigated and was forced to admit that the Marine Corps instructed its recruiters to enlist no more than 15 percent Category IV minority accessions per year. The OSD quickly ordered the Marines to eliminate this quota, but the Corps responded by ordering recruiters to limit Category IV enlistees to no more than 10 percent white and 10 percent black. The DoD general counsel declared that this was not permitted either. The

Marine leadership continued to push back, arguing that their quotas did not stem from concerns about quality so much as concerns that in the event of a war a disproportionate number of black marines, particularly in rifle companies, would mean a disproportionate number of black casualties. This was not an issue of racism, they contended, but the fear that the Marine Corps would once again face charges of unnecessarily risking black lives. The DoD remained firm and the Marines turned to mathematical algorithms in an attempt to even out the racial makeup of its force.<sup>50</sup>

Another obvious way to ensure that black service members were not overly represented in the services was to shift recruiting offices from the inner cities to the suburbs. Although he received fair marks from black activists and journalists for his willingness to interact with them, Army Secretary Callaway also believed the service needed more white recruits. His move of many Army recruiting stations from the easy pickings of urban areas, where military service was one of the few jobs available, to the suburbs and small towns was known as the “Callaway shift.” It was not just this transfer of recruiting offices that had an effect. As the economy stumbled in the mid-1970s percentages of black accessions dipped as whites in search of a job joined the services in greater numbers. Dellums asked Callaway whether these moves to the suburbs and the emphasis on quality enlistments were not yet another attempt to limit black participation in the Army. Callaway assured the congressman this was not the case: “We want to attract ... individuals that are representative of all the Country so that no one segment of American people carries a disproportionate burden of war.” Callaway continued, “We will continue to send recruiters to urban and rural areas to insure [*sic*] that everyone who is qualified has an opportunity to enlist.” Callaway noted that black soldiers as of the end of 1974 comprised 22.4 percent of the Army, twice the percentage of African Americans in the country.<sup>51</sup>

The Pentagon was often justly and sometimes unfairly criticized for its recruitment practices. No one, however, including the Pentagon leadership, believed there were enough black officers throughout the military. In February 1975 black officers comprised 2.8 percent of total active-duty officers across all the services. The greatest problem rested in the Navy, where only 1.3 percent of officers were African American. However, the Army, with the highest percentage at 4.5 percent, was not much better. Schlesinger admitted that the services still struggled to recruit minority officers “of all types” and he continually promised Congress that the DoD would increase its emphasis on this recruitment area. However, he argued, there was only so much recruiters could do when a competitive private sector attracted the highest qualified minority candidates. At the end of his tenure, Rumsfeld was pleased to report in 1977 that the services had increased the number of black officers to 3.4 percent and the military had added four additional African American flag officers and an additional 400 personnel ranked E9 and E8. The Navy, which had especially struggled under charges of discrimination, gained its first black vice admiral. Still, the Pentagon had a long way to go to increase the number of black officers, particularly as the number of black enlisted men continued to rise.<sup>52</sup>

There was no doubt that by the end of the Ford administration in 1977 race relations in the armed forces had improved from the dismal low point at the start of the decade. The combination of the opportunities in the AVF, the end of the Vietnam War, and the rising tide of black expectations had helped ease the tension that had existed between white and black service members. Racism was hardly banished from the armed forces, just as it did not disappear from American society. Schlesinger noted in 1975 that although racial incidents were declining in the military the overall climate was still not good, simply “stable.” Citing commanders who referred to the current environment as “under control,” Schlesinger admitted that “total harmony” has yet

to be achieved. There were miles to go and promises yet to keep before the U.S. armed forces as well as America as a whole would honestly face racism.<sup>53</sup>

### **Women and the All-Volunteer Force**

The U.S. armed forces took incremental steps to expand the role of women in the military during the 1970s. The women's rights movement in the United States had a long history; although not ratified by the states, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S. Constitution passed Congress in 1972. Around the same time, faced with a shrinking pool of male recruits, the DoD needed to increase its utilization of women in the armed forces. The Pentagon's central AVF task force set up by Laird in January 1972 to oversee and direct the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force instructed the services to prepare contingency plans to increase the number of women service members. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were expected to double the number of women in their ranks between FY 1971 and FY 1977. The task force asked the Marine Corps to draft a proposal to increase female participation by a more modest 40 percent. In December 1972, the task force released a study on increasing the utilization of women in the military. The report examined the plans set forth by the services and concluded that, for the most part, they would meet the goals set by the task force. It projected that the Navy and the Air Force would surpass their mandate of a 100 percent increase during the allotted time, while the Army would reach their goal by 1978. The report cautioned that the Marines might have difficulty meeting their goal of a 40 percent increase by FY 1977, either because of difficulties with recruiting or high rates of attrition shrinking the number of women in the Corps. The task force did not think these challenges were insurmountable and predicted that the service plans would increase the

number of service women from 1.9 percent of total military strength in FY 1972 to approximately 4.2 percent by the end of FY 1977.<sup>54</sup>

In fact, the services would exceed the goals set by the Task Force in 1972. By May 1977 women comprised 5.5 percent of active-duty military members. The Army had increased its number of female soldiers from 16,771 in 1972 to over 48,000 by summer 1976. The Air Force and the Navy more than doubled the number of women in their ranks and even female marines increased from 2,329 to 3,449 in 1976. A DoD study on manpower noted that, while total military strength declined by about 12,000 service members during 1976, female participation over the same period had actually increased by over 9,500. With this influx of women and new attitudes toward women's rights, the separate service organizations for women—Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (Navy's WAVES), Women in the Air Force (WAF), and Women's Army Corps (WAC)—were abolished, although the WAC lingered until 1978.<sup>55</sup>

Increasing the number of women in the All-Volunteer Force brought with it an obligation to expand opportunities for female service members. The services needed to open assignments beyond the traditional fields of health care, administration, and communications. U.S. officials removed many barriers during the 1960s, such as restrictions on marriage and pregnancy and the congressional caps on the number of women on active duty. Yet the 1948 law barring women from flying combat aircraft and serving on combat ships remained in effect. While there was no law limiting the role of women in ground combat units, Army leadership followed the other services by prohibiting women from combat and certain non-combat support roles likely to engage in combat. The Army interpreted non-combat support likely to see combat very broadly, leaving few military occupational specialties (MOS) open to women. Over time, the services

began to change their attitudes toward women, slowly opening fields to female personnel, but progress was glacial.<sup>56</sup>

The military opened some new opportunities to women during the 1970s, but many limits remained in place. For years, the services claimed that all their pilots must be available for combat even though many of its existing pilots did not have combat roles. Under this requirement women were not allowed to fly. There were any number of precedents that argued against such a restrictive practice. During World War II women pilots transported military aircraft from factory to air base and between air bases, towed gunnery targets, and even served as flying instructors in both the United States and Great Britain. In the Soviet Union women successfully flew in combat against the Germans. Under pressure from the women's rights movement, the DoD began to slowly open the cockpit to women pilots. In August 1973 the U.S. Navy trained six women who earned their wings as naval aviators. In April 1974 the Army followed suit with its first female helicopter pilot. The Air Force, where flying was the heart of the service's mission, resisted until August 1976 when 20 women began pilot training. While maintenance and other support jobs were opened to women at Titan and Minuteman missile bases, women were barred from the crew that pushed the button to launch the ICBM. That was considered combat. The Navy, the most conservative service, was loathe to consider sea duty for women. After an inconclusive and poorly planned experiment of a mixed gender crew on a hospital ship, the Navy allowed women to serve on non-oceangoing tugs and harbor craft. It would take a court case in 1978 to force the Navy to allow women to serve on non-combat seagoing vessels. The Army's response was equally gradual. As for non-combat support positions, the Army slowly inched toward opening them up to women. A step on the way toward

the goal of more opportunities for women was the decision in 1975 to provide women with individual and advanced weapons training.<sup>57</sup>

Pentagon officials and especially the services saw the role of women in the military as an evolutionary process. They balked at what they considered a revolutionary step: allowing females to attend the service academies. Established in 1802, the United States Military Academy—often referred to as West Point—was almost as old as the United States Army itself and, like the United States Naval Academy founded in 1845 in Annapolis, Maryland, served as the proving grounds of some of America’s greatest military leaders. At only two decades old in 1974, the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs considered itself the foundational institution for building leaders for the growing United States Air Force. Despite their different martial traditions, the three academies had much in common. The schools combined a traditional collegiate curriculum with strict military discipline and focused training. At the end of four years academy graduates entered their respective services as commissioned officers. Most significantly, all academy graduates and students were male.

Congressional action on the ERA threatened to upend the male-dominated service academies. Did women have the right to attend these prestigious service colleges? Most in the DoD and the services feared that the popularity of the ERA in Congress and the apparent support for it in the rest of the country would force the U.S. military academies to accept women. In December 1973 the Senate attached a provision to a Defense spending bill that required admission of women to the academies, but it was eliminated in conference.<sup>58</sup>

The chief rationale of the DoD and service leadership for opposing women at the academies was that the schools were training ground for future combat leaders. Women could not serve in combat, so they should not take the place of men at the military academies,

especially since the academies were U.S. government-funded. Deputy Secretary Clements, foremost among the opponents, spearheaded DoD's defense of these all-male institutions. His ally in the House of Representatives, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee F. Edward Hébert, reportedly told Clement and Schlesinger he would not allow a vote on the issue. Chief of Staff of the Air Force General George Brown spoke for the military. He was unalterably opposed to women at the academies, but if Congress insisted, he would accept it gracefully and agree to a reasonable program for female attendees.<sup>59</sup>

In January 1974 Brehm issued a working copy of the DoD position statement on women in the service academies. The document reiterated that the fundamental mission of the military academies was to train officers for combat. "For one-hundred and seventy-two years the Congress has not considered it appropriate to admit women to the Academies," the statement proclaimed, and until the Congress passed legislation stating otherwise the DoD would continue to exclude female participation at these institutions. Clements strengthened this stance in an updated policy statement issued by his office in April 1974, noting that the academies served an important national security interest by providing officers capable of combat leadership. Therefore, Clements argued, "it is imperative that these opportunities be reserved for those with the potential for combat roles," which current law restricted to men only. The DoD would revise its position on the admission of women, he concluded, "if it comes to be the judgment of the American people that women should fill combat roles in our Armed Forces." An official statement from the CNO Admiral Zumwalt, Marine Corps Commandant General R. E. Cushman Jr., and Acting Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf used similar language, stating, "Until the American people through their representatives in Congress express a desire that

women serve in combat roles, it would be inappropriate and inefficient use of public funds to educate women at the Naval Academy.”<sup>60</sup>

Key to this strategy was proving that the service academies did, in fact, train combat leaders for the United States military. Critics of the existing policy barring women pointed out that, in reality, not all service academy graduates entered specialties designated as combat. At the time of the debate, over 12 percent of the graduates of the United States Military Academy did not enter combat-related fields. At West Point, for example, in addition to the more traditional combat specialties of infantry, armor, and artillery, cadets became officers in military intelligence, the medical service, the Quartermaster Corps, or in transportation. In a letter to Schlesinger, Senator Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy (D-MA) claimed that 85 percent of Army officers were not in combat roles as well as 70 percent of Navy officers and 68 percent of Air Force officers. Was it not possible to train women at the service academies for some of these non-combat roles, he asked?<sup>61</sup>

Clements realized that the department needed to make a concerted effort to present the three schools as oriented toward producing officers trained to lead in combat. The arguments for West Point and the Naval Academy were fairly straightforward. The Army’s recent experience in Vietnam proved that soldiers in traditionally non-combat roles could suddenly find themselves under hostile fire. While these situations were not typical, Clements and the Army argued that they supported the idea that West Point graduates needed to be ready to lead in unexpected combat situations. The Navy’s case was even simpler. The Navy Department stated that the Naval Academy prepared midshipmen for service on combat ships and in combat aircraft, neither of which were open to female sailors. The Air Force Academy’s case proved more challenging. While West Point and Annapolis could make a fairly plausible argument that their respective

services placed the majority of their graduates in combat environments where the law prohibited the presence of women, the Air Force had only three combat-related occupational specialties presently closed to female airmen: pilot, navigator, and missile launch crewmember.

Furthermore, with most air bases located far from war zones, support specializations were not classified as combat jobs.

It was a losing battle for those who clung to the idea of male-only service academies. Congress required women's enrollment in the service academies as part of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act for FY 1976. The law directed the schools to admit women beginning in 1976 under the same criteria as men, allowing only "minimal essential adjustments" to physical standards in recognition of the physiological differences between the sexes.<sup>62</sup>

It was not a popular decision within some of the military ranks. Retired General and former Chief of Staff of the Army William Westmoreland spoke for many when he characterized the decision as "silly." As he told reporters, "Maybe you could find one woman in 10,000 who could lead in combat, but she would be a freak and we are not running the military academies for freaks." Others were reconciled to the change, including former Chief of Naval Operation Admiral Elmo Zumwalt who, perhaps catering to women voters, stated during his 1976 unsuccessful run for the Senate that he approved of females at the service academies. Furthermore, he believed "women should have the opportunity to have the capability to go into combat," implying that combat training was useful for women, if combat was not. Since the service academies were four-year institutions, it was not until the Carter administration that the few female pioneers at the service academies graduated and embarked on careers as leaders. Despite the fears of Clements, Herbert, and Westmoreland, women at the academies proved a

resounding success.<sup>63</sup> In retrospect, the entry of women into the academies was one of the early shots in a debate which would engage the Pentagon for the next two decades: should combat be open to women? Women made incremental progress toward that goal during the tenures of Secretaries Harold Brown, Caspar Weinberger, and Frank Carlucci. With the invasion of Panama in 1989 and in the Gulf War of 1991 the distinction between noncombat and combat areas became even less defined than in previous conflicts. Female soldiers suffered casualties, became POWs, and led troops, and this experience served to advance the pressure to allow women the opportunities to undertake combat roles.

### **The Reserves and the Total Force**

The All-Volunteer Force in the future would depend on increased accessions by women, African Americans, and other minorities if it had any hope of meeting its recruitment quotas. It was also true that the downsized AVF would need to call up reserve and National Guard units to perform its mission in a simultaneous war with the Soviet Union and smaller regional conflicts. To accomplish these mobilization goals, the Pentagon would have to rely on a robust reserve force able to join the active-duty forces quickly and perform its role efficiently. In August 1970 Secretary Laird laid out the challenge, which he called the concept of the Total Force, a new emphasis on combining reserve and active-duty forces. Since the active armed forces were scheduled to decrease by over a million personnel, Laird stated that the DoD would increase its reliance on the Guard and reserve forces in planning, programming, manning, equipping and deploying. The Total Force concept allowed the Pentagon, in Laird's words, "to determine the most advantageous mix [of active and reserve forces] to support national strategy and meet the threat." As Laird told Congress, the lower cost of the reserve forces meant more defense at less

cost. Two years later in August 1973, Defense Secretary Schlesinger boldly stated “Total Force was no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now a Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard, and reserves forces into a homogeneous whole.”<sup>64</sup>

Schlesinger’s claim was more of a morale booster for the sagging morale of the reserves than a true assessment of their capabilities. The reserve forces were encountering serious difficulties in recruiting new members. The end of the Vietnam War and the draft meant that for many young men there was no reason to join the reserves. Consequently by the end of 1973 all reserve unit numbers fell, and the decline continued until 1980. Schlesinger attributed the 1973 shortfall not only to the end of the draft, but noted that recruiters and their commanders had been accustomed to waiting lists for draft motivated enlistment in the reserves. Now they had to actively seek new members. The Pentagon’s response was to double the number of reserve recruiters each year from 1971 to 1974, when it reached over 4,100. An added disincentive to reserve recruitment was that during the Vietnam War, the political leadership refused to call up the reserves, so members of the Guard and reserves became used to assuming they would not see combat. With Total Force, the reserves were expected to fight.<sup>65</sup>

Schlesinger’s solution was to increase the attractiveness of reserve duty by increasing access to military exchanges, better benefits including life insurance coverage, and survivor benefits for guardsmen and reservists killed while on active duty. Of course, Schlesinger asked Congress for an increase in the reserves budget. An added problem that the Pentagon faced in the mid-1970s was that Guard and reserve members who had signed up during the Vietnam War were completing their duty requirements. They initially proved hard to replace. The long-term solution to these personnel shortages was to recruit African American, women, and prior-service personnel that had separated from active duty during downsizing. But these fixes took time.<sup>66</sup>

Of the services, the U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR) and the Air National Guard (ANG) were the most successful in maintaining their strength and upgrading their reserve forces. In January 1974 the Air National Guard had actually expanded its membership by almost 7,000 and the Air Force Reserves lost just under 4,000 members, the smallest decline of any reserve force. The Air Force's opportunities for technical jobs and the lure of aviation accounted for part of its success. In addition, the ANG and the USAFR were able to attract members with prior military experience, maintain a close association between reserve units and their commands, and increase flying time training for reserve forces.<sup>67</sup>

The Army had a more difficult time. Given its planned reduction of 800,000 troops, the Army leadership counted on the National Guard and reserve units to be sufficiently trained to deploy almost as rapidly as active-duty troops. This was the rationale for the "round-out" concept where every Army division would have two-active duty brigades and one reserve or Guard brigade. Such an arrangement required better reserve training, a steady stream of reserve personnel, and more modern equipment for these round-out units. Unfortunately reductions in defense spending and the shortfalls in the number of Army Reserve personnel, lack of training for reserve units, and inferior "hand-me-down weapons" from the active-duty Army meant that the concept was more theoretical than actual. In the words of the Army's historian, the "reserve manning problem" received "only piecemeal attention" between 1973 to 1976.<sup>68</sup>

The Navy with its emphasis on control of the seas against an expanding Soviet challenge favored active-duty service members over reserves. With six-month deployments for most ships and only 50 percent of a ship's time spent in its home port, the Navy found it difficult to assign missions to part-time naval reservists. But it was more than just these factors. The Navy leadership, according to one Pentagon official responsible for reserve affairs, "had an almost

institutional resistance to innovative uses of the Naval Reserve.” Not surprisingly the Navy had difficulties maintaining its reserve strength.<sup>69</sup>

In addition to these obstacles which confronted the implementation of the Total Force, the Vietnam War Powers Act passed in 1973 prohibited the president from deploying armed forces—including reserve forces—in a conflict for more than 60 days. In July 1973 Schlesinger testified before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel in favor of allowing the president to call up 50,000 reserve forces for 90 days without a declaration of war or a state of national emergency. Schlesinger argued that such authority was essential for Total Force Policy, as well as national security and deterrence. But more than that he maintained, “It provided credibility to the U.S. public, which has taken, on occasion, a skeptical view of the effectiveness of the Reserves.” An operational problem drove home the effect of congressional restrictions on reserve call-ups. During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the U.S. supply effort to Israel required more U.S. long-range transport crews than were available in the active forces. President Nixon could not call up reserve crews without declaring a national emergency, which the resupply problem was not and which he was unprepared to do. The shortfall of available crews was resolved by reserve members contributing their service on a voluntary basis, but this ad hoc arrangement was not a viable solution for the future. In May 1976 Congress passed the Reserve Forces Call-Up Authority and Ford signed it into law. The law allowed for a call-up of 50,000 of the Selected Reserve without a declaration of war or national emergency for 90 days, but prohibited their use in cases of civil disturbances or national emergencies.<sup>70</sup>

The period between 1973 and 1976 was a difficult time for the Guard and reserves. In the transition to an All-Volunteer Force and in the implementation of the Total Force, they lagged behind the active-duty forces. Taken together, the shortfalls of personnel, lack of adequate

training, poor equipment, a feeling among the Pentagon leadership that the reserve forces were not ready for their mission, and the political leadership's unwillingness to use them contributed to their decline relative to the active duty force. In April 1976 the report of the Defense Manpower Commission stated bluntly: "The Total Force Policy is still far from a reality, and expectations of it may have been overstated." The commission's report continued, "To assume that many National Guard or Reserve units will be operationally ready for deployment overseas with 30 to 90 days after mobilization is not realistic; a more practical readiness time for most units would be from 120 [to] 180 days." It was a damning but accurate portrayal of the state of affairs. The situation did not improve until the congressionally funded military buildup of President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, which included adequate funding, training, and equipment for the reserves.<sup>71</sup>

Secretaries of Defense Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld and their staffs were faced with a formidable challenge: to implement the costly All-Volunteer Force in a time of fiscal austerity and downsizing of the armed forces after the Vietnam War. As a hangover from Vietnam, many Americans held a skeptical view of service members, subjecting returning Vietnam veterans to a stony homecoming. Recruiting enough men and women proved a persistent problem. Attracting "quality" recruits, those with high school diplomas or success on the services' mental tests was even more difficult. The legacy of racial tension during the conflict in Southeast Asia required the OSD and the services to restore a modicum of harmony. While relations between the races improved from their Vietnam low point, the issue was far from solved. The Pentagon faced increasing demand from women service members for more job opportunities. They were no longer willing to be nurses and typists. Looking at the 1970s decade

as a whole, there was no assurance that the AVF would survive. Its critics lobbied for a return to conscription. The four defense secretaries of the Nixon-Ford years, their OSD staffs, and the leadership of the services managed to keep the AVF going forward and to establish a foundation on which subsequent administrations could build. In 1991 all four secretaries—Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld—could take satisfaction that the AVF, which they had helped to conceive, nurture, and defend, performed with distinction in the Gulf War.

## Endnotes

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1. Beth Baily, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009), 10–12. From 1954 to 1962 the Selective Service averaged approximately 125,000 inductions per year. During the Vietnam War (1963–1973) 1.86 million men (with a peak of 382,000 in 1966) were drafted. Induction Statistics, Selective Service System, <https://www.sss.gov/history-and-records/induction-statistics/>, accessed 2 Sep 2020.
  2. Christian G. Appy, *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 28–38; Kyle Longley, *Grunts: The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), 9–11. Joe Namath was the football quarterback; the three presidents were William Clinton, George W. Bush, and Donald Trump.
  3. Bailey, *America's Army*, 24, Bernard Rostker, *I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 87; Hunt, *Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969–1973*, 215. The standby draft, selective service registration of 18 year-old men by mail and reactivation of a skeleton crew for the Selective Service System, was not introduced until 1980 at the end of the Carter administration; Keefer, *Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet Military Advantage, 1977–1981*, 522–526.
  4. Hunt, *Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military*, 382–383, 390–391; DoD News Release 48–73, 27 Jan 1973, *Public Statements of Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, 1973*, 264; Robert K. Griffith Jr., *The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968–1974* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1997), 182–183.
  5. William P. Clements, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 16 May 1996, OSD/HO, 15. When asked about the AVF during his January confirmation hearing, Elliot Richardson confirmed Clements would take the lead on issues related to the all-volunteer military, especially manpower cost and recruit quality. Griffith, *U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force*, 202.
  6. Griffith, *U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force*, 199; paper, All-Volunteer Trends, Feb 1973, ASD(M&RA), folder 340 Jan-Mar 1973, box 44, Acc 330-78-0001, OSD Records, WNRC.
  7. Memo, Elliot Richardson for Nixon, 23 Feb 1973, folder 327 Jan-Feb 1973, box 40, Acc 330-78-0001.
  8. Griffith, *U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force*, 199; paper, All-Volunteer Information, Jul 1973; paper, An Assessment of Current Trends and Prospects for Fiscal Years 1974–1976 (Department of Defense, 1973): both in folder 340 Jul 1973, box 44, Acc 330-78-0001.
  9. Special Report of the Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson: The All-Volunteer Force and the End of the Draft, Mar 1973, box 1090, Subject Files, OSD/HO, i (quote); memo, Clements for CJCS, Service Secretaries, and Members of the DOD All-Volunteer Task Force, 23 May 1973, subj: Speech and Response Material on the All-Volunteer Force, folder 340 Apr-Jun 1973, box 44, Acc 330-78-0001.

10. Joseph A. Califano, “A Costly Army of Volunteers,” *Washington Post*, 22 Mar 1973, A26, “The Risks of Ending the Draft,” *Los Angeles Times*, 30 Jan 1973, C6, and “the Burden of the Volunteer Forces,” *Los Angeles Times*, 14 May 1973, C6; Rostker, *I Want You*, 292–293.

11. Memo, Clements for Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., 7 May 1973, folder 340 Apr-Jun 1973, box 44, Acc 330-78-0001; Rostker, *I Want You*, 173–174; ltr, Robert M. Montague to Stephen E. Herbits, 2 Jan 1973; memo, Montague for Kelley, 14 May 1973 (quotes): all in folder 17 Official Correspondence to ASD Kelley regarding transition to AVA, Jan-May 1973, box 1 Official Correspondence, All-Volunteer Army Collection, Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA; Gus C. Lee and Geoffrey Y. Parker, *Ending the Draft: The Story of the All Volunteer Force* (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization, 1977), 209 (quotes).

12. Lee and Parker, *Ending the Draft: The Story of the All Volunteer Force*, 210; memo, Stephen E. Herbits for Secretary Kelley, 30 May 1973 (quotes), folder 340 Apr-Jun 1972, box 44, Acc 330-78-0001.

13. Griffith, *U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force*, 199–200. The army's decision stemmed from research conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs that found high school graduates were twice as likely as high school dropouts to complete a full enlistment. This was also true of recruits who held a high school equivalency certificate. Griffith, 200.

14. Kelley quoted in Warren Nelson, “Foes of the All-Volunteer Army Hit,” *Washington Post*, 4 Jun 1973, A4.

15. Rostker, *I Want You*, 266–267; Griffith, *U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force*, 205–208; memo, Montague to Herbits, 6 Aug 1973, Roskter Documents Disk, Government Documents (1), G0072.

16. Lyrics from Country Joe and the Fish band's, “I Feel Like I'm Fixin' to Die Rag”; Bailey, *America's Army*, 41–44.

17. Memo, Richard Wilbur (ASD, Health and Environment) for Richardson, 29 Mar 1973; memo, Murphy for Richardson, 7 Apr 1973: both in folder 337 Staff Meetings 1973, box 43, Acc 330-78-0001.

18. Rostker, *I Want You*, 269–270. Privately, Herbits also expressed frustration with the Army to his former Gates Commission colleague, the economist Milton Friedman, who in early 1974 forwarded a courtesy copy to Schlesinger of a article critical of the Army's opposition to the AVF to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger prior to its *Newsweek* publication. The letter got the secretaries attention especially the charge of Army “sabotage.” Ltr, Milton Friedman to Schlesinger, 28 Jan 1974, folder 340 Jan-Feb 1974, box 37, Acc 330-78-0011, OSD Records, WNRC.

19. Rostker, *I Want You*, 270–271

20. Stephen Herbits, interview by Rachel Levandoski and Anthony Crain, 12 Sep 2019, OSD/HO, 25–37.

21. Rostker, *I Want You*, 276–277.

22. Ibid., *I Want You*, 271–272; 99–100; Bailey, *America's Army*, 99–100.

23. Ltr, Callaway to Nixon, 14 Feb 1974 (quotes), with attached paper, The Volunteer Army: One Year Later, 11 Feb 1974; ltr, Nixon to Callaway, 25 Feb 1974 (quotes): all in folder 340 Jan-Feb 1974, box 37, Acc 330-78-0011, OSD Records.
24. News Conference by James Schlesinger, 17 Jun 1974, *Schlesinger Public Statements 1974*, 7:2254; Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Interview in *Reserve Magazine*, Jul-Aug 1974, *Schlesinger Public Statements 1974*, 8:2643.
25. Maxwell Thurman, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, 1983–1992: the Second Decade," in William Bowman, Roger Little and Thomas Sicilia, eds. *The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect* (New York: Pergamon-Bassey's, 1986) 269–279.
26. Sam Nunn, news release, "Remarks of United States Senator Sam Nunn before the Georgia General Assembly," 5 Mar 1973, quoted in Rostker, *I Want You*, 292–293; minutes of Defense Program Review Committee Meeting, 17 Aug 1973, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 35:107–109 (doc 23).
27. Defense Manpower Commission, *Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security*, Report to the President and Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), vii (hereafter DMC, Defense Manpower).
28. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Interview in *Reserve Magazine*, Jul-Aug 1974 (quote), *Schlesinger Public Statements 1974*, 8:2643; Donald Rumsfeld, "Preface," of *Report of the Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Military Compensation: A Modernized System* (Washington, DC: DoD, 1976), 1–2.
29. Pentagon News Briefing by Brehm, 13 Feb 1975, 19, Management, box 1088, Subject Files, OSD/HO.
30. Fact Sheet: DOD Manpower-Related Initiatives to Improve Management Efficiency, 1–3, Management, box 1088, Subject Files, OSD/HO.
31. DMC, *Defense Manpower*, vii.
32. *Ibid.*, vii–x.
33. Rostker, *I Want You*, 292–293; ltr, Curtis Tarr to Schlesinger, 23 Dec 1974, and ltr, Brehm to Tarr, 3 Jan 1975: both in folder 334 (D) 1974, box 35, Acc 330-78-0011, OSD Records.
34. Memo, Capt. J. E. Murraay, Special Assistant for Defense Manpower Commission Matters, for Rumsfeld, Apr 27, 1976, Roskter Documents Disk, Government Documents (1), G0240; Rostker, *I Want You*, 294–296; DMC, *Defense Manpower* 1–24.
35. DMC, *Defense Manpower*, 19–22, 275–385.
36. Rostker, *I Want You*, 294–296; DMC, *Defense Manpower*, 283.
37. Department of Defense, *Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation: Staff Studies and Selected Supporting Papers*, vol. 1, *Regular Military Compensation* (Washington, DC: OSD, 1976), i–ii.
38. *Report of the Third QRMC*, 14, Rostker Documents; DMC, *Defense Manpower*, 329–332; Department of Defense, *Third QRMC: Staff Studies and Selected Supporting Papers*, 1:2; Rostker, *I Want You*, 296–300. One of the chief complaints from military members regarding the present comparability system was the inequity it created between single service members and those who were married with dependents. As the result of their larger households, these

individuals received more in compensation in the form of larger allowances for housing and subsistence. The DMC determined that this imbalance made the military more attractive to married men with dependents, despite the desire of the services to attract young, unmarried men. DMC, *Defense Manpower*, 330–331.

39. *Report of the Third QRM*, 23–24, Rostker Documents; Rostker, *I Want You*, 298–300.

40. Rostker, *I Want You*, 294–296. For a discussion of Carter era attempts at reforms, see Keefer, *Harold Brown*, 526–530.

41. Martin Binkin, et al., *Blacks and the Military* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1982), 34–35; for the black experience in Vietnam, see Wallace Terry, *Bloods, Black Veterans of the Vietnam War: An Oral History* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985).

42. Binkin, *Blacks and the Military*, 36; Hunt, *Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military*, 524–527.

43. Hunt, *Melvin Laird*, 525–536; Isaac Hampton II, *The Black Officer Corps: A History of Black Military Advancement from Integration through Vietnam* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 132.

44. Elliot L. Richardson, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1974*, 29 Mar 1973, 110; “DRRI: Equal Opportunity Training School,” *Commanders Digest* 13, no. 1 (18 Jan 1973), box 1098, Subject Files, OSD/HO.

45. Binkin, et al., *Blacks and the Military*, 40; Rostker, *I Want You*, 33, 274, 321–323; Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, “Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force,” *Armed Forces and Society* 1 (Nov 1974): 113. When the number of black service members continued to grow during the Carter administration, Moskos began to walk back his support of a “tipping point.” Though he could not discount it entirely, he admitted, “I am unpersuaded that any significant number of middle-class whites ... would be more likely to join the Army, under present recruitment incentives, even if the Army were overwhelmingly white.” Quoted in Binkin, et al., *Blacks and the Military*, 106. In 1996 Moskos became a convert to the AVF and contended that the U.S. Army “is unmatched in its level of racial integration.... The Army stands out, even among governmental agencies, as an organization in which blacks often do better than their white counterparts” (quoted in Rostker, 323).

46. All statistics here drawn from Active Duty Master Personnel Files data collection provided to OSD/HO in 2019.

47. Memo of Conversation, 15 Nov 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 35:216 (doc 46). “Unemployment Rate – Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey,” Bureau of Labor and Statistics, United States Department of Labor, [https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?periods=Annual+Data&periods\\_option=specific\\_periods&years\\_option=all\\_years](https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?periods=Annual+Data&periods_option=specific_periods&years_option=all_years), accessed 26 Jan 2018.; Hal Sider and Cheryl Cole, “The Changing Composition of the Military and the Effect on Labor Force Data,” *Monthly Labor Review* (Jul 1984): 11.

48. James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975*, 4 Mar 1974, 184. There was some debate about the combat-readiness of the 82nd Airborne Division. When it went on an alert status during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, military leaders found the division to be

lacking. Forrest Marion and Jon Hoffman, *Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve* (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 2018), 61.

49. Vernon E. Jordan Jr., “Blacks in the Armed Forces,” *Philadelphia Tribune*, 17 Aug 1974; Eddie N. Williams, “Blacks in the Military,” *New York Times*, 2 Aug 1975, 16.

50. Ltr, Dellums to Milton Francis, Deputy Secretary for Equal Opportunity, 11 Oct 1973; memo, Brehm for Clements, 14 Feb 1973: both in Roskter Documents Disk, Government Documents 2, G0548; Rostker, *I Want You*, 275; Beth Bailey, *America’s Army*, 109–111.

51. Ltr, Callaway to Dellums, 22 May 1975 (quotes), Roskter Documents Disk, Government Documents 2, G0665; Bailey, *America’s Army*, 115–116.

52. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975*, 4 Mar 1974, 214; Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 1977*, 5 Feb 1975, V-11; Donald Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978*, 17 Jan 1977, 300. It was not much better for DoD minority civilian employees. The DoD admitted that it faced challenges recruiting and hiring African Americans to fill white collar positions. While about 25 percent of Wage Grade employees were black in 1973, only 8.2 percent of GS-9 to GS-11 positions were held by minorities. Only 4.4 percent of DoD’s GS-12 to GS-15 billets were held by African Americans. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975*, 4 Mar 1974, 213.

53. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 1977*, 5 Feb 1975, V-11.

54. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), *Utilization of Military Women (A Report of Increased Utilization of Military Women FY 1973–1977)*, prepared by Central All-Volunteer Force Task Force, Washington DC, Dec 1972, i–iv; Roskter, *I Want You*, 174–175; Jeanne Holm, *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution*, revised edition (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 249–250.

55. OASD (Comptroller), “Department of Defense: Women Military Personnel, On Active Duty, Officers and Enlisted by Service, 31 May 1945 to Date,” *Selected Manpower Statistics* (May 1977), 49, box 1128, Subject Files, OSD/HO; OASD (Comptroller), “Department of Defense: Women Military Personnel, On Active Duty, Officers and Enlisted by Service, 31 May 1945 to Date,” *Selected Manpower Statistics* (May 1977), 50, box 1128, Subject Files, OSD/HO; Holm, *Women in the Military*, 282–283.

56. Holm, *Women in the Military*, 261–267, 273–274.

57. *Ibid.*, 314–331; Bailey, *America’s Army*, 155, 261–267.

58. “The Equal Rights Amendment,” *Women’s Studies Quarterly: The 1970s* 43, no. 3/4 (Fall/Winter 2015): 271; Bailey, *America’s Army*, 134.

59. Carolyn Barta, *Bill Clements, Texian to His Toenails* (Austin; Eakin Press, 1996), 170–171.

60. Memo, Brehm for DSD et al., 4 Jan 1974; memo, Brehm for DSD et al., 4 Jan 1974; memo, Clements for Secretaries of the Military Depts and ASD (M&RA), 15 Apr 1974: all folder 352 Academies 1974, box 39, Acc 330-78-0011; Cushman, Zumwalt, Middendorf, “Women at the Naval Academy,” 8 Apr 1974, folder 352 USNA, box 39, Acc 330-78-0011: all in OSD Records. The Air Force and the Army also submitted statements in support of the DOD position and highlighted the mission of the academies to prepare combat leaders. See memo, Callaway for Clements, 20 Apr 1974; memo, McLucas for Clements, 6 May 1974: both in folder 352

Academies 1974, box 39, Acc 330-78-0011; Bailey, *America's Army*, 159–160; Theodore J. Crackel, *West Point: A Bicentennial History* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 239; ltr, Kennedy to Schlesinger, 15 Jul 1975, folder 352 Academies 1974, box 39, Acc 330-78-0011. Senator Kennedy also challenged the assertion that the academies were obligated to train men for the United States military, citing the example of a Laotian general's son in attendance at West Point. "Taxpayers' dollars are being spent to train someone who will not even serve in the American military, whether in a combat status or not," Kennedy wrote. Given this example, he questioned how the DoD could claim that allowing the admission of women would reduce the supply of combat-ready graduates produced by the academies. In his response to Kennedy on behalf of the secretary, Bill Brehm demurred from addressing any of the senator's concerns, citing the pending *Edwards v. Schlesinger* lawsuit. Kennedy's mention of this dissonance in DoD policy—women are not allowed because the service academies train combat leaders for the United States military, but a certain number of foreign students with no plans to serve in the American armed forces are welcome—highlights the extent to which the department's policy was less about strategic necessity and more about safe-guarding the male traditions of the service academies. Indeed, at the same time Clements was arguing it was crucial that the schools continue to produce American combat officers, he was quietly pushing the DoD to increase the number of foreign students permitted to attend a military academy. Memo, Dawkins for VADM Finneran DASD(M&RA) (Military Personnel Policy), 15 May 1975, folder Academies 1975, box 42, Acc 330-78-0058, OSD Records, WNRC.

61. Bailey, *America's Army*, 159–160; Crackel, *West Point: A Bicentennial History*, 239; ltr, Kennedy to Schlesinger, 15 Jul 1975, folder 352 Academies 1974, box 39, Acc 330-78-0011, OSD Records. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976, P.L. 94-106, 89 Stat. 531 (1975).

62. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976, P.L. 94-106, 89 Stat. 531 (1975).

63. Megan Rosenfeld, "Not a Male Chauvinist, Zumwalt Tells Women," *Washington Post*, 21 Sep 1976, C7; Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Back, *Women and the Military* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1977), 50.

64. *Laird Public Statements 1970*, 4:1868, also printed in *Cong. Rec.*, 9 Sep 1970; *Schlesinger Public Statements 1973*, 2:585–588.

65. Stephen M. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors: America's Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security* (Novato, CA; Presidio Press, 1997), 142; Col. Forrest L. Marion and Col. Jon T. Hoffman, *Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and Reserves* (Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 2018), 60; Roskter, *I Want You*, 286.

66. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975*, 4 Mar 1974, 193–194; Roskter, *I Want You*, 286.

67. Marion and Hoffman, *Forging a Total Force*, 58–59; Duncan, *Citizen Warriors*, 142.

68. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors*, 144–145; Marion and Hoffman, *Forging a Total Force*, 58–60; Griffith, *U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force*, 255.

69. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors*, 142–143.

70. Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, *Reserve Call-UP: Hearing on S. 2115*, 94th Cong. 1st sess., 30 Jul 1975, 3–7; “Reserve Call-Up Authority,” *CQ Almanac 1976*, 32nd ed., 321–322; P.L. 94-286, signed 14 May 1976.

71. DMC, *Defense Manpower*, 98.