

CHAPTER 7

The Cyprus Crisis and Discord along NATO's Southern Flank

On 19 August 1974, 11 days after President Richard Nixon's resignation in Washington, a mob of hundreds of angry Greek Cypriots formed outside the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus. "Kissinger is a murderer," they shouted. The powerful American secretary of state had allowed Turkey to seize much of the isle, they believed. They set the U.S. ambassador's limousine on fire. The car exploded and released black puffs of smoke in the air, visible throughout much of the capital. Inside the embassy, U.S. Ambassador Rodger P. Davies stood in the central hall and addressed his staff. As he did, a bullet from a Greek Cypriot paramilitary shooter ripped through a window and fatally struck him in the chest. An embassy secretary and Greek Cypriote Antoinette Varnavas rushed to aid the stricken ambassador and was shot in the head by a second bullet. She died instantly.¹

The embassy tragedy unfolded in the midst of a crisis that had begun a month earlier, centered on Cyprus—one that would nearly rip NATO's southern flank apart. A Greek-engineered coup on the contested Mediterranean isle on July 15 triggered a Turkish intervention, led to the dispossession of over 200,000 Greek Cypriots, and resulted in the enduring division of the small but strategically significant nation. Cyprus's importance to the Pentagon rested in its centrality to the protracted Greco-Turkish rivalry. Since joining the alliance in 1952, Greece and Turkey, historic foes, had together served as the bulwark of NATO's defensive posture against the Warsaw Pact in the eastern Mediterranean. Unlike in central Europe, the United States did not deploy ground combat troops to Greece or Turkey, where the rugged terrain made a large-scale Soviet armored attack unlikely. With approximately 365,000 active troops in the Turkish army and 121,000 troops in the Hellenic Army, the two countries provided the primary ground

force on the alliance's easternmost front. Most importantly, the two countries supported the U.S. deployment of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the two-carrier task force in the Mediterranean that allowed naval and air operations along the southern flank and the Middle East. Turkey was the easternmost member of NATO, and its control of the narrow Turkish straits provided the Americans with intelligence on the movements of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. In the event of war, the Turkish navy would assist with preventing Soviet passage through the straits. This strategic importance had caused Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and his predecessors to disregard concerns about the problematic nature of either government's domestic policies.²

The Cyprus crisis in July and August 1974 made the costs of this inattention clear. Because of the ill-considered toppling of the Cypriot government and the blundering in response to a subsequent Turkish invasion, the junta that had controlled Greece since 1967 collapsed and democracy returned to Greece. Congressional sympathies shifted from Turkey to Greece, and even more so after Turkish military operations resulted in Turkey's occupation of nearly 40 percent of the island following the junta's collapse. White House and DoD officials, however, continued to prioritize the bases and surveillance facilities in Turkey over sympathy to the restored democracy, setting the stage for a clash with the U.S. Congress.

The outbreak of the crisis on July 15, could hardly have come at a worse time in Washington. President Nixon's impeachment was looming, and the political wounds inflicted by Watergate had eroded the administration's domestic and international influence and curtailed its freedom of action. Confounding matters further, the coup caught the Nixon White House mostly by surprise. After the coup Schlesinger quickly concluded that the United States needed to act decisively and support the Cypriot junta's overthrow. But on this and other major issues during the Cyprus crisis the defense secretary found himself overruled by Henry Kissinger. Kissinger

held the positions of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser concurrently, and he skillfully wielded all the bureaucratic advantages that derived from each. With the president fully absorbed by Watergate, Kissinger, in essence, directed and implemented U.S. foreign policy. In his capacity as national security adviser Kissinger chaired meetings of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), a body he formed in 1969 at his instigation to manage crises he thought normal NSC channels incapable of handling. In that setting he often seized roles that were normally the purview of the secretary of defense: requesting information directly from the military and even—ostensibly on behalf of the president—issuing orders to commanders in the field. Viewing the situation in Cyprus through a cold war prism and aware that Watergate had weakened the administration’s international and domestic standing, Kissinger aimed to lessen direct U.S. involvement and maintain a stable regional balance of power while keeping the Soviets out of the region.³

Yet Kissinger’s failure to perceive the ethnic nature of the crisis or foresee its consequences on the U.S. domestic political scene made achieving these goals difficult. As Kissinger later wrote, in Cyprus the United States found itself embroiled in a “forerunner of conflict between ethnic groups” that had “the effect of launching the [Gerald] Ford administration into an immediate and totally unanticipated clash with Congress.” In the end, hemmed in by an increasingly assertive Congress and unwilling to side with either Athens or Ankara, the Ford administration accepted a course that enraged both Greece and Turkey: it opted not to push Turkey to remove its forces from Cyprus—angering Greece to the point that it withdrew its military from NATO—and then reluctantly acceded to congressional action suspending military aid to Turkey—a move that prompted Ankara to shutter crucial U.S. intelligence gathering facilities. In total, the handling of the crisis did serious damage to U.S.

relations with both Athens and Ankara and caused cracks in NATO's southern flank defensive posture that the U.S. Sixth Fleet would have to fill.⁴

Cypriot Ethnic Strife, the Greek Junta, and Turkish Poppies

Greece's 1974 intervention in Cyprus ignited long-simmering tensions between the island's ethnic Greeks and Turks and drew Greece and Turkey into the very kind of open conflict that U.S. policy had long been calibrated to avoid. In the 1970s ethnic tensions plagued Cyprus, a country slightly smaller than Puerto Rico, located less than 50 miles off the Turkish coast and four hundred miles east of Greece. It had approximately 630,000 inhabitants, with a Greek majority—roughly 80 percent of the island's population—and a Turkish minority—less than 20 percent of the populace located mostly on the northern part of the island. Once part of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus had been under British control from 1878 until the Zurich-London Accords of 1959 gave Cypriots their independence but allowed London to preserve two air bases along the southern coast. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, moreover, granted Britain, Greece, and Turkey the right to intervene if one of them decided that the Cypriot constitution and sovereignty were threatened. Although the Greek Cypriots dominated the government in Nicosia, the 1959 accords limited their control. The Turkish Cypriot vice president could unilaterally veto national security decisions and could veto fiscal policies with the support of a Turkish Cypriot legislative majority. This arrangement allowed a fragile *modus vivendi* between the two ethnic groups.⁵

The clever Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios III held the Cypriot presidency continuously from his ascension following his 1959 electoral victory until his ouster in 1974. Remembering Makarios with some admiration as “the Machiavellian in clerical garb,” Kissinger wrote later: “His ecclesiastical garb and utter self-assurance were somewhat vitiated by his shrewd, watchful eyes, which seemed always to be calculating the possibilities of gaining the

edge over an interlocutor.” Such skills served him well for many years. He pursued cold war neutrality by remaining out of NATO and sought to maintain independence from both Greece and Turkey, centuries’ old rivals despite their common NATO membership. Such a course proved difficult because Greek leaders repeatedly turned to calls for “enosis,” or union between Cyprus and Greece, for domestic political benefit. To prevent it and protect the Turkish Cypriot minority community from persecution, moreover, Ankara repeatedly threatened invasion. On the island itself, the archbishop focused on retaining Greek Cypriot loyalty while eroding the power and autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot minority. Never establishing his own party organization, Makarios relied on his personal authority as a symbol of Greek Cypriot unity to increase his control in an extraordinarily complex and foreboding political atmosphere. He maneuvered between the two major organized forces on the island: the pro-enosis National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) and the communist Progressive Party of the Working People (the AKEL). Remarkably, Makarios repeatedly outfoxed his domestic and international rivals in his quest to turn the island nation into an autonomous Greek Cypriot-controlled state under his personal control.⁶

Makarios’s policies and Greek Cypriot violence against Cypriot Turks had caused Ankara to threaten invasion in 1964 and 1967. In both cases, the Johnson administration’s pressure and mediation averted war, but bitterness between the two communities festered. A gradual warming of relations between Ankara and Moscow weakened restraints on inter-alliance conflict. Humiliated and frustrated by the Johnson administration’s interventions, Ankara waited for a chance to alter the situation in Cyprus.⁷

Turkey’s importance to Washington had increased by the time Schlesinger became defense secretary. An August 1973 appraisal of the security relationship by the Office of

International Strategic Affairs, or ISA, made clear that at a time of U.S. cutbacks, Ankara's control over the Turkish Straits and proximity to the Soviet Union made it an indispensable ally. Moreover, Turkey hosted 26 surveillance stations that provided critical intelligence on Soviet missile and nuclear testing as well as Soviet naval movements to and from the Black Sea. The Turkish army of 365,000 was the second largest in NATO. Powerful as it was on paper, the Turkish military depended heavily on U.S. aid—Washington furnished 90 percent of Ankara's equipment. With such equipment, the group concluded that Turkey's army could stop an enemy short of the straits; its air force, though weak, could reach regional parity with Warsaw Pact forces by 1980; and its navy could credibly defend the narrow straits but would never equal the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. While Turkey appeared capable of devoting more funds to its own defense, higher energy prices limited Turkey's access to foreign exchange, which hindered substantial spending increases. Given the importance of the Turkish military, Deputy Defense Secretary Clements approved ISA's recommendation on May 2, 1974, that Washington provide \$150 million in grant aid and \$725 million in foreign military sales credits during FYs 1976–1980.⁸

Such plans were complicated by Ankara's July 1, 1974 decision to end its ban on raising poppies for opium, effective since June 1971. By accepting the position of prime minister of coalition government in January 1974, Bülent Ecevit, a former student of Kissinger's at Harvard, had restored civilian rule to Turkey after three years of military control and sought to revoke the ban that had engendered widespread domestic opposition. Concerned that the ban's end might worsen the U.S. drug problem and cause Congress to enact punitive measures against Turkey, an NSC interdepartmental group for Europe recommended for Washington to insist that Ankara develop a system to prevent smuggling. The team advised making the threat more credible by

rejecting a Turkish request for two excess U.S. naval vessels and informing Ankara that Washington would refuse military grant assistance for fiscal year 1975. The group supported assuming some strategic risk to benefit the antinarcotics program. The Pentagon questioned the wisdom of threatening a military aid cutoff. Schlesinger's military assistant, Maj. Gen. John Wickham warned that military sanctions might so damage the American military assistance program that it would quash "valuable leverage which would assist in ensuring proper controls over poppy cultivation." The strategy remained unresolved when Athens embroiled the United States and Turkey in a larger crisis over Cyprus.⁹

Washington's dealings with Greece had been similarly strained in the waning months of Nixon's presidency. George Papadopoulos, a former army colonel, led a military junta that had seized power in 1967 and snuffed out Greek democracy. Most European allies disliked and distanced themselves from this repressive and antimodern "regime of colonels." The Johnson and Nixon administrations, however, worked with Papadopoulos, a staunch anticommunist, for strategic reasons. Muammar al- Qaddafi's seizure of power in Libya in 1969 and Dom Mintoff's election as prime minister in Malta in 1971 closed key NATO naval bases in the Mediterranean. The concomitant rise of regional Soviet naval power and flaring of Arab-Israeli tensions thus heightened Greece's importance to U.S. policymakers. The junta depended upon Washington's backing for legitimacy among the largely pro-American Greek populace.¹⁰

In February 1972 Nixon chose to deepen U.S. involvement with authoritarian Greece when he approved Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's plan to move the home port of an aircraft carrier, six U.S. destroyers, and support ships from the U.S. East Coast to Athens. The Navy argued it would boost service morale, recruitment, and retention by reducing family separation time—all critical considerations for recruitment and retention in the new All-

Volunteer Force. Moreover, it would allow the Navy to maintain two carriers in the Mediterranean at a time of overall fleet reductions. The DoD implemented the plan's first phase in September 1972, homeporting six destroyers and 2,000 U.S. personnel with 1,250 dependents in Athens. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird approved Phase II, the homeporting of the aircraft carrier *USS Independence* (CV-62) in December 1972, but postponed implementation from July 1973 to March 1974 to allow for "careful planning and orderly execution."¹¹

By the time Schlesinger became defense secretary in 1973, however, U.S. influence over Papadopoulos had ebbed and the prospects for an expanded American presence had dimmed. The junta had tightened its grasp on power and, as the CIA concluded, Papadopoulos increasingly cooperated only when his interests closely aligned with Washington's. Strategic considerations, nonetheless, continued to override growing U.S. concerns about the military rulers' temperament and trustworthiness. Schlesinger later confessed that he had been "perfectly happy with the position of the Nixon administration, which had been to support the colonels."¹²

The poor living conditions reported by U.S. personnel and their dependents relocated to Athens in the homeporting initiative's first phase opened up the OSD retention-based justification to State Department obstructionism and congressional derision. State balked in late July 1973 at further homeporting. Secretary of State William Rogers informed Schlesinger that he could not then endorse the second phase because of the "unsettled political situation in Greece" and growing congressional opposition. Rogers would reexamine the issue if the DoD addressed State's logistical concerns and conditions in Athens improved. In early August 1973 Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR) lodged similar complaints, informing Schlesinger that he had received letters from "dedicated Navy families who honestly believe they have been given a raw deal." They protested unsatisfactory medical care and personal safety conditions. Fulbright

told Schlesinger that “the political environment in Greece has deteriorated markedly” and warned that impending political upheaval would endanger the Americans stationed there.¹³

Still enamored by the potential strategic gains from further homeporting, the DoD pressed for congressional acquiescence and State Department endorsement to execute Phase II. In a late October response to State’s concerns, Deputy Secretary Clements wrote that though the DoD understood the risks attending homeporting, “the political as well as strategic costs could be even greater” by not doing so. “The Phase II implementation plan,” he claimed, “was designed to correct residual Phase I problems as well as preclude the occurrence of other foreseeable problems.” In essence, State should allow the DoD to fix any extant and future complications.¹⁴

In the following month, however, the worrisome political situation in Greece had devolved into a crisis that would unravel DoD plans. On November 17, 1973, the Greek military violently suppressed a student protest at the Polytechnic Institute of Athens. Concluding that the repression had destroyed Papadopoulos’s legitimacy, the director of Military Security, Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannidis, led a successful bloodless coup on November 25, 1973. The State Department characterized the new despot as an antidemocratic hard-liner who was “commonly linked to the tortures that caused so much international protest under Papadopoulos.” Moreover, State considered Ioannidis’s cabal even less competent and cooperative than Papadopoulos’s group had been and more “narrowly nationalistic.” Although rabidly anticommunist and reliant on U.S. protection, “they tend to believe ... that we need Greece at least as much as Greece needs us, so that *their approach to us is likely to be one of hard bargaining over such issues as base rights and homeporting—adversarial in style rather than cooperative.*” State predicted the junta’s growing unpopularity, along with its incompetence, would likely allow moderate opponents to take control in the “not too distant future” and reinstall parliamentary democracy in

Greece. Although a democratic successor would be inherently more cooperative with the United States and NATO than the dictators had been, any further defense aid for the junta would likely work against Washington's future relations with such a government. Schlesinger would belatedly reach the same conclusion, but only in summer 1974 after the junta's actions in Cyprus caused its collapse to appear inevitable.¹⁵

In spring 1974 the defense secretary chose to modulate rather than sever important defense relations with an increasingly unstable Athens. Because of the coup, Schlesinger decided in March 1974 against pressing the Greeks on Phase II implementation. Instead, he would review matters about six months hence or when the political situation stabilized. He was frustrated that the Greeks insisted on coupling homeporting with negotiations for continued access to Souda Bay, while Washington continued to separate the two. Despite the evident attenuation of Greek military power under the junta and the regime's growing untrustworthiness, Schlesinger told the Senate on June 26 that "as far as the military side of the alliance is concerned, Greece remains an effective member." In less than a month, however, Athens imprudent actions would render the Nixon administration's closeness with the junta foolish.¹⁶

The Crisis over Cyprus

To defuse the Greek public discontent that had prompted Papadopoulos's downfall, Ioannidis gambled once in power on forcing Cypriot enosis. His strategy focused squarely on the island's pesky president, Makarios. Although the archbishop had publicly supported union with Greece, he rejected it privately. Infuriated by what he saw as Makarios's duplicity, Ioannidis tried to undermine the Cypriot leader using the island's National Guard, a force of approximately 10,000 led by 650 officers detailed from the Greek army.¹⁷ Counting on NATO to restrain Athens,

Makarios countered on July 2, 1974, by announcing plans for drastic reductions to the National Guard and demanding that most of its Greek officers return home. The Greek junta claimed that Makarios had turned to communists for support, and distributed posters in Athens that accused the archbishop of committing “treason against the Greek nation.”¹⁸

But the archbishop had miscalculated. Rather than back down, the furious Greek strongman lashed out. Early on July 15 Ioannidis ordered the Greek officers of the National Guard to seize the presidential palace. Supported by tanks and machine guns, the Guard stormed the palace. The cunning Makarios evaded capture or death, however, by calmly walking from his office to a car and driving to the British sovereign base area in southern Cyprus before being flown by the British to London. The Greek junta then installed Nikos Sampson, an advocate of enosis, as head of a “Government of National Salvation.” The U.S. ambassador to Greece, Henry J. Tasca, described Sampson as “an out and out gangster, a gorilla type with no compunctions against murder and assassination.” No foreign government recognized Sampson, a 39-year-old former EOKA assassin and Greek Cypriot newspaper propagandist, as Cyprus’s legitimate leader.¹⁹

Athens had blundered badly in moving against Makarios. A Turkish diplomat later remarked, “The Greeks committed an unbelievably stupid move, giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and for all. Unlike 1964 and 1967, the United States leverage on us was minimal. We could not be scared off by the threats of the Soviet bogeyman.” Ankara promptly entered the fray by disingenuously calling for the restoration of the despised Makarios to further discredit the fragile Sampson government and open the way for Turkish intervention. Turkey then put its armed forces on advanced alert status.²⁰

The Nixon administration had grown increasingly alarmed about tensions between Greece and Turkey in the months leading up to Makarios's ouster but viewed the Aegean Sea—where oil deposits had been discovered in early 1974—as a more likely crisis point than Cyprus. Kissinger later claimed that the small island's troubles had simply not been important enough to merit much attention from the embattled White House. Yet the coup had not caught the State Department completely by surprise. According to an October 7, 1974 postmortem of the pre-coup intelligence, written by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and sent to Deputy Secretary Clements, the State Department had been aware that Ioannidis intended to launch a coup in late June. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]. The Defense Intelligence Agency, however, had not been privy to communications between Kissinger and Tasca, and although aware that Tasca had been directed to warn the junta against such an action, the DIA had not been “aware of the uncertainty at State about the adequacy of the U.S. warning, [and thus] had no way of deducing that the overt reaction was probably a cover for continued coup intentions.” In other words, Kissinger's penchant for secrecy thus caused interpretive problems for defense intelligence in the crucial days leading up to the coup.²¹

At President Nixon's “Western White House” in San Clemente, California, the outbreak of the crisis failed to refocus the president's attention from Watergate. Kissinger, who would shuttle back and forth between Washington and San Clemente during the crisis, later reflected on the president's state at the time: “His glassy, faraway look told us that Nixon was already coming

to terms with the emptiness that would soon be his.” As it had during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Washington Special Actions Group under Kissinger’s chairmanship would make decisions mostly without the president’s input throughout the Cyprus crisis.²²

After learning about the coup in Cyprus from overnight intelligence, Kissinger convened a WSAG meeting in the White House Situation Room on the morning of July 15 to establish a response policy that would at least contain the crisis. Initial reports from the U.S. Embassy in Cyprus incorrectly indicated that Makarios had perished, but accurately identified Ioannidis as the mastermind behind the plot. Kissinger emphasized the importance of keeping the Soviets out of the Cyprus situation. To keep the issue from becoming “internationalized,” the WSAG concluded, the United States had to prevent overt Greek or Turkish involvement. The group feared that war between the two NATO members would rip apart the alliance’s southern flank and allow Soviet penetration into the Mediterranean Sea. To avoid such a calamity, Kissinger decided to inform Athens that the United States opposed enosis as well as any infringement of Turkish Cypriots’ rights. The plan called for then informing Ankara of the U.S. message to Greece, and for urging the Turks not to intervene, lest they expand the crisis.²³

Because the Pentagon had not established a firm policy position in the coup’s immediate aftermath, DoD officials limited their participation at the WSAG to support for Kissinger’s diplomacy. JCS Chairman General George Brown informed the secretary of state that to avoid sending diplomatic signals the aircraft carrier USS *America* (CV-66) had been ordered to remain at Rota, Spain for 24 hours rather than sail toward or away from the crisis. Deputy Secretary Clements added that the Pentagon had tasked the military attaché in Turkey with determining how Ankara planned to respond to the coup. By encouraging restraint while gaining an

understanding of the Greeks' and Turks' motives and next steps, the WSAG hoped to arrive at a diplomatic solution to the crisis.²⁴

When Kissinger reconvened the WSAG the next morning, the group had lost confidence that the crisis could be contained. The U.S. embassies in Greece and Turkey had warned that intra-alliance warfare seemed likely if enosis occurred but had been unable to provide Kissinger with a clear picture of what either Athens or Ankara planned to do next. Just before the meeting, Kissinger learned from British Foreign Minister James Callaghan about Makarios's escape. Uncertain about Ankara's motives in calling for its erstwhile adversary's return, Kissinger rejected direct involvement in Cypriot politics. He did not want to react impulsively when the facts on the ground were unclear, and while the Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot protagonists' intentions remained clouded. The wrong move, he feared, could provoke and legitimize Soviet meddling or even direct intervention. He concurred with Clements that the two U.S. Navy task forces in the eastern Mediterranean should hold their positions and avoid reacting to the Soviet naval ships detected moving toward the isle.²⁵

The secretary of state had a more sanguine view of Ankara's intentions than the DoD or CIA. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Robert Ellsworth argued that Turkey would not accept either an open or a covert Cypriot union with Greece and that, in Ankara's view, the Sampson regime signified enosis with Greece. Kissinger agreed but believed the problem could be solved diplomatically. He would ask the Turks about their preferred outcome. Director of Central Intelligence William Colby feared that armed conflict on Cyprus could engulf the fractious region and suspected that Greek moves would spark a Turkish push for union with Cyprus's majority Turkish areas. Kissinger dismissed Colby's speculation that a special meeting of the Turkish parliament, planned for July 18, portended military intervention by Ankara.²⁶

In Athens, ██████████ delivered a message to Ioannidis, stating that the United States regarded Cyprus as a sovereign state and would not accept any attempt by Greece to alter the Cypriot constitution or political structure. In response, “the general literally blew up, jumped up, backed up, knocked over a table, broke [an] empty glass and uttered a strong obscenity.” Ioannidis then launched into a rambling tirade in which he accused Kissinger of meddling in Greek internal affairs. He claimed that Washington would one day view July 15 as the day “Cyprus was saved from falling into the hands of the Communists,” and accused Makarios of being “perverted, a torturer, a sexual deviate” who had been supported by communists. After breaking yet another glass and tipping the table over for a second time, Ioannidis claimed that though he did not like Sampson and believed he was “crazy,” the Greek Cypriots had made the decision and he would support it. Despite this unusual conversation, Tasca speculated that Ankara’s “uncharacteristically relaxed attitude” indicated that backchannel communication might be occurring between the Greek and Turkish militaries that could preclude Turkish military intervention.²⁷

The situation worsened the next day, however, ██████████
██████████ Ankara was massing troops in southern Turkey for an invasion to create an enclave in north central Cyprus. At the WSAG meeting on July 17, after hearing Colby’s briefing on the situation, Deputy Secretary Clements voiced doubt that the Turks would intervene. “They may make some noise,” he said, “but I don’t think they’ll move.” Colby responded that he thought the Turks would only act if they could not achieve their goals diplomatically. Shedding his earlier reluctance to meddle in Cypriot politics, Kissinger stressed that Sampson had to go, but he doubted the desirability or feasibility of bringing Makarios back. Washington could not remain idle, he believed, because if restored by Ankara the archbishop

would likely turn to the Soviets—both for protection from the Greeks and to avoid being seen as a “stooge of the Turks.” The secretary of state concluded that with the National Guard in control of the island the United States could not throw its support behind Makarios, either, because restoring him to power would require “a massive U.S.-Soviet effort” that “would probably bring down the Greek government.” That would undo the regional balance of power which, to Kissinger, was paramount. He concluded that the popular speaker of the Cypriot parliament, Glafkos Clerides, would be the better choice, but clearing his path to the Cypriot presidency would be difficult. Still, Kissinger thought, Athens and Ankara might view him as an acceptable compromise since he could provide stability and some semblance of constitutional succession. Deteriorating political conditions in Greece underscored the regional dimensions of the unfolding crisis in Cyprus. Responding to Colby’s prediction that Ioannidis could not hold on to power in Greece much longer, Kissinger stressed that how Ioannidis exited the scene mattered greatly. Whether he fell because of his own blunders or because of U.S. pressure might determine if the next junta leader turned out to be another conservative or a nationalist firebrand like Egypt’s Gamal Nasser or Libya’s Qaddafi. Kissinger concluded that until the Greek situation developed further, the United States should continue to search for a quiet, cautious diplomatic solution to the Cyprus crisis.²⁸

As the secretary of state sought to keep a tight rein on the delicate diplomacy he believed necessary to resolve the crisis, Kissinger found that his own department had been undermining his efforts. Ellsworth and JCS Chairman Brown mentioned that the U.S. ambassador in Ankara, William B. Macomber Jr., had recently suspended \$20 million worth of spare part deliveries to Turkey. The ambassador had felt obliged to apply Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act (which required the president to suspend all aid to governments that failed to take “adequate

steps” to prevent illicit narcotics from entering the United States) when the Turks decided to resume poppy cultivation. Although an appropriate course of action under normal circumstances, the ambassador’s action upended the Nixon administration’s efforts to avoid the appearance of taking sides in the deepening Cyprus crisis. Ending the meeting, Kissinger ordered the deliveries resumed immediately. “It was one thing to consider cutting off economic and perhaps military aid in the future,” Kissinger bellowed, “and quite another to dry up Turkey’s logistical supply line in this critical time.”²⁹

Later that afternoon, Kissinger spoke by phone with Nixon about his fear that the Soviets would exploit the situation. “[European allies] want us to rake the Greeks,” he told the president, “but if [the Greek junta is] overthrown then that will jeopardize our whole position.” He worried that if the Soviets offered to assist in Makarios’s restoration, the United States would “have no basis for resisting it.” Back in power the archbishop would then “have to kick the Greek officers off the island, and then the Communists will be the dominant force and to balance the Turks he will have to rely on the Eastern bloc.” Nixon allowed Kissinger to select a special envoy to send to London, where James Callaghan was attempting to mediate between Ankara and Athens. Although the president recommended new Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll, Kissinger picked Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, an idiosyncratic, boisterous, and combative subordinate who had brawled frequently with Kissinger in the past. Upon arriving in London, Sisco, however, found that he had been given little diplomatic leverage to arrest the imbroglio.³⁰

U.S. efforts to contain the crisis began to unravel rapidly, but Kissinger continued to refuse to throw Washington’s weight completely behind one NATO ally and against the other. Colby informed the WSAG on July 18 that Turkish forces were in a high state of readiness for an

amphibious operation. Kissinger wanted to have U.S. military options ready without broadcasting it. Seizing a role one might normally expect of the secretary of defense, he queried JCS Chairman Brown about military options to stabilize the situation or preempt a Soviet move, but told the chairman to keep U.S. naval forces at their present position 24 hours west of Cyprus. He then asked how quickly the 82nd Airborne could deploy in Cyprus if needed. The chairman responded that there was one company on two-hour alert, but that that timeframe only applied to situations in the Western Hemisphere. He estimated that U.S.-based forces could reach Cyprus in 12 hours, and that one to two battalions could land in 18 hours. From locations in Europe, he estimated that one company could begin to move in 12 hours along with two squadrons of fighters, but an entire battalion from Europe would take 60 hours to move. Seeking clarity, Kissinger then tasked the chairman with producing a chart displaying the deployment speeds of all available forces in the continental United States and Europe. Driving their concerns about the availability of U.S. forces was a JCS-CIA estimate that a Soviet airborne division from Odessa, recently placed on alert, could land on Cyprus within five to six days of receiving the order.³¹

Despite the worsening military situation, Kissinger remained focused on the political nature of the crisis. He disagreed with the view—leaked to the *New York Times*—of those within the administration who thought deposing Ioannidis held top priority. He continued to stress the importance of appearing neutral, preventing a Greek-Turkish war, and forestalling a Soviet intervention. “We must not be seen by Greek nationalists to be conspiring with the Turks to bring about the fall of any Greek government,” he insisted. He did not think the Greek junta would “survive very long anyway.” In the meantime, Kissinger opted to continue military deliveries already in the pipeline to both countries.³²

The Turks showed no such caution. While Kissinger was with Nixon in San Clemente on July 19, [REDACTED] a Turkish task force of 24 ships steaming toward Cyprus. Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll convened the WSAG in Kissinger's absence to consider response options. Colby told the group that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the Turks would invade on July 21 or 22 unless Sisco brought them "extensive Greek concessions." ISA notes of the meeting recorded some confusion, however, about whether the Turkish fleet had slowed, stopped, or even turned around. Ominously, Colby reported that [REDACTED] military action might extend beyond Cyprus and "include preemptive strikes on Greek airfields." The Turks, he had learned, would invade with two divisions and were prepared to withstand 50 percent casualties. Having already augmented Greek forces on the island by over 200 through a "troop rotation," the Athens junta planned to declare enosis, mobilize the Cypriot National Guard and then enlarge it by 5,000 through sealift and airlift. Conditions appeared ripe for the nightmare scenario of intra-alliance warfare.³³

In Washington, U.S. officials prepared for the worst even as they made a final desperate attempt to avert a Turkish invasion. Ambassador-at-Large (and former Ambassador to Cyprus) Robert J. McCloskey told the group that Kissinger had instructed Sisco to tell the Turks that the United States would view "with utmost gravity" any military action against Cyprus, and that Washington did not support enosis, "open, hidden, or creeping."³⁴ Deputy Defense Secretary Clements informed the WSAG that the Pentagon had moved an amphibious task force approximately 50 miles to the east of Cyprus, and that American forces could land on Cyprus within 10 hours to begin evacuating U.S. nationals in accordance with plans being developed by the Chief of Naval Operations and ISA. Clements said he preferred using the British bases in the

south as safe havens for American citizens prior to their evacuation from the island. He added, should it become necessary, the DoD would hold up the previously scheduled transfers of two F-4s from Spain to Greece on a pretext of maintenance problems, and “drag our feet” on a contract for Greek procurement of A-7 aircraft.³⁵

Kissinger’s efforts to prevent an invasion failed. In San Clemente, the secretary of state learned from McCloskey at 7:30 p.m. PDT that Ecevit had informed him that Turkish forces would land on Cyprus and had been ordered to hold their fire unless fired upon. At 8:45 PDT that evening, Kissinger called Schlesinger to discuss how best to mitigate what now appeared to be an imminent landing around Kyrenia, on Cyprus’s north-central coast. The secretary of state said the Turks would fire only if first fired upon, and he passed along Ankara’s request that Greeks on Cyprus not shoot at the invaders. With the invasion underway, Kissinger clung to the hope that the two sides would opt for a negotiated settlement that would allow a rapid Turkish withdrawal. He viewed the Clerides option as the best among a series of bad ones but was not optimistic: “Now we don’t think this will really fly but at least it’s a slender thread.” Schlesinger was even less hopeful, saying he thought the Turks were “not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island.” “No,” Kissinger replied—perhaps trusting Ecevit, his former Harvard pupil, a little too much—“the Turks have said they are willing to stabilize their forces and that they are willing to keep the existing structure and they will accept any president other than Sampson.”³⁶ Kissinger added that if the Turks insisted on territory, Washington should push for “double enosis,” allowing Greece and Turkey to partition the island. Schlesinger agreed.³⁷ Kissinger and Schlesinger spoke again later that evening after receiving reports that the Turks had reneged on their promise to hold their fire upon landing. Calling from the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center, the defense secretary told Kissinger that Turkish forces

were bombing Kyrenia and Nicosia. The secretary of state was astonished that the Turks had attacked despite Ecevit's promise that they would not. Schlesinger, less sanguine about Turkish intentions, speculated that the Turkish "military [had] their own ideas about what to do when the balloon goes up." For the time being, though, the crisis remained confined to Cyprus and had not yet devolved into a general war between Greece and Turkey.³⁸

The defense secretary feared that the invasion could spark a regional conflagration, and that a broader conflict could end in catastrophe. Just before the invasion, the DIA had warned that neither the Greek nor the Turkish government would likely survive humiliation over Cyprus and an incident "could touch off full-scale conflict between the two NATO allies." Although the intelligence community had concluded before the Cyprus crisis that, in the event of hostilities,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

Schlesinger did not want to take chances, especially after junta leaders had proven themselves dangerously unpredictable and Turkey's ultimate aims remained unclear. Thus, when Turkish forces landed on Cyprus, Schlesinger ordered the U.S. European Command to initiate the

[REDACTED] aircraft in Greece and Turkey and from surface-to-air missiles in Greece. After receiving reports that the Turks were not cooperating fully with U.S. efforts, and that Greece had seized an American merchant ship with military supplies destined for Turkey, Schlesinger temporarily halted military aid shipments to both Greece and Turkey. Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Amos A. Jordan informed the WSAG about this action on July 20. He explained that the Greeks had

commandeered an American merchant ship towing 10 barges laden with munitions and off-loaded the cargo in Greece. Seven of the barges had been destined for Greece, and three for Turkey. Jordan asked whether Washington should “widen its distance with this particular Greek government.” Immediately after the meeting, Kissinger, still in San Clemente, was informed of the DoD’s hold on aid shipments. Furious, he called Schlesinger, who said there had been a “misunderstanding” and that there had been no “cutoff.” Afterward, Kissinger told Ingersoll over the phone that defense officials at the WSAG should “get in touch with their Secretary” and that shipments were “not to be cut off but on the other hand they’re not to be delivered either.” Kissinger said there should be “technical delays,” but no formal announcement of a cutoff, lest the shipments never get started again.³⁹

Schlesinger had missed the July 20 WSAG because he was in his office conferring with the Turkish ambassador, Melih Esenbel, about how to end or at least contain the crisis. The ambassador justified Turkey’s intervention under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, saying his nation harbored no territorial ambitions on Cyprus, but could never allow it to remain under Greek control. Schlesinger urged Esenbel to accept a quick, peaceful resolution that included the formation of an autonomous Cypriot constitutional government respectful of Turkish minority rights. He raised [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Schlesinger then warned the ambassador that the Greek junta might go to war with Turkey over Cyprus, and that that prospect was causing [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The fact that Turkish forces were likely using equipment furnished through U.S. grants and sales would inevitably raise questions in Washington about the wisdom of further assistance to Turkey, the

defense secretary warned, because a provision of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibited the use of U.S.-supplied weapons for purposes other than national self-defense. Schlesinger also cautioned that Turkey's poorly-timed resumption of opium production could harm "what has been a most productive-military relationship" between the two countries. Afterward Kissinger thought the defense secretary was "not quite as tough as I would have wanted him but he was at least consistent with us." He was enraged, however, that Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartmann, who had spoken by telephone with Esenbel separately, had failed to tell the Turkish ambassador that it was his opinion, and not the position of the U.S. government, that the United States would cut off aid without a cease-fire.⁴⁰

A tense WSAG session the next day clarified the major differences between Kissinger, who had returned to Washington, and Schlesinger over leaks, arms shipments to Greece, and whether the United States should support Ioannidis's overthrow. Kissinger demanded to know the source for a story in that morning's *Washington Post* that claimed the Nixon administration had stopped all aid to Greece. Schlesinger replied that State, not the Pentagon, had leaked the story, a claim to which Kissinger bellowed, "Nothing would surprise me more than it was not leaked out of State!" Schlesinger said the *Post* reporter, Michael Getler, claimed he had been "handed the story on a silver platter by the Department of State." Nevertheless, Kissinger thought the defense secretary had leaked the story in order to force his hand on policy toward the junta. Schlesinger said that some military aid to Greece continued, but stressed he was concerned about further Greek seizures of U.S. ammunition barges, since they had already commandeered three destined for Turkey. Kissinger claimed ignorance of the seizure and redirected the discussion: "The real situation is that we are not sending in any heavy aid. We'll blame it on administrative delays or something like that." A cutoff announcement, he warned, would make it

politically difficult to resume aid. Turning to the diplomatic path forward, Kissinger predicted that despite Ecevit's unclear motives, the Turkish leader would accept a cease-fire by the day's end, and that a cease-fire would allow serious negotiations to begin. "Without one," Kissinger emphasized, "we are impotent."⁴¹

Schlesinger thought the WSAG had been focusing too narrowly on Cyprus, though, and believed the United States should consider toppling the Greek junta to save the Atlantic alliance from degeneration, division, and even dissolution. He explained that the European allies felt "that we have gone beyond the point of no return regarding Greece." Kissinger asked him incredulously, "You want to kick the Greeks out of NATO?" Schlesinger rejoined that he was thinking more along the lines of what the United States could do "bring about a more sympathetic regime in Greece." Kissinger, who thought Schlesinger was trying to enhance his own bureaucratic standing, believed that a successor regime could be worse than the present one and found the defense secretary's suggested course short-sighted. The defense secretary doubted the geopolitical wisdom of inaction: "We are viewed throughout the world as supporting the Greek regime.... If a cease-fire does not occur, I think [the Greeks] may attack in Thrace. This is a regime that is unsophisticated, irresponsible, that is growing increasingly desperate." Schlesinger said he had deferred the carrier homeporting plan and questioned whether U.S. destroyers should continue to dock at Athens. "We will not overthrow any governments," Kissinger snapped. The secretary of state insisted that they focus on Cyprus, and not Athens: "I'm not sure the Greek government will last out the week, anyway. It seems to me there is no way it will survive."⁴² Schlesinger later told OSD historians that he had argued for the United States to begin "distancing" itself from the junta not for moral reasons but because he believed

the regime's collapse was inevitable. A successor government might "take a very harsh attitude towards" U.S. bases in Greece unless Washington publicly broke with the colonels.

Schlesinger and Kissinger then debated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Kissinger said

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Schlesinger [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. The Soviets

would also need to be informed but would not object, since "they would regard this as quite a plum." The defense secretary persuaded Kissinger temporarily, but the relationship between the two men on the Cyprus issue had soured.⁴³

As soon as the WSAG adjourned, Kissinger vented his anger to White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig:

We are having a massive problem with Defense. Schlesinger ... is taking an all-out position on the overthrow of the Greeks. He says a cease-fire in Cyprus is not consistent with NATO principles. It is a very clever position. He is willing to give up home-porting. He is never going to Phase 2 and is willing to attrite Phase 1.”

The secretary of state thought he had been “outflanked on the left” and concluded bluntly: “We must insist on a cease-fire.... Schlesinger will crucify us.”⁴⁴

That afternoon, with British and French backing, Washington informed Athens and Ankara that unless they agreed to a cease-fire within 12 hours, [REDACTED]. Both governments reluctantly complied, and the cease-fire went into effect at 1000 EST on July 22. Although sporadic local fighting continued in Cyprus, Kissinger was confident enough to state publicly that the danger of a major conflict between Turkey and Greece had passed and that “a rather complicated crisis which had dangers of internationalization has been overcome.” A United Nations force was dispatched to enforce the cease-fire.⁴⁵

By the time of the cease-fire, however, the Turkish military had not advanced as rapidly as it or Kissinger had hoped. He concluded that the Turks should have rapidly achieved all their military objectives of securing Turkish majority areas. “Either you use strong force or none at all,” Kissinger lamented. The secretary of state understood that with Turkish enclaves still in danger of Greek Cypriot reprisal, Ankara would be less likely to agree to a permanent settlement on the island. At the WSAG meeting convened less than an hour after the cease-fire, Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the CIA, told the group that Turkish troops occupied an enclave around Kyrenia on the northern coast but had failed to accomplish their objectives after encountering greater resistance and receiving less Turk Cypriot support than expected. Between

50,000 and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots remained outside of Turkish-occupied territory, which made them vulnerable to Greek Cypriot reprisals and complicated the diplomatic path forward. After the cease-fire, diplomats and refugees had reported widespread slaughter of Turkish Cypriots by the National Guard as well as the indiscriminate bombing of Greek Cypriot civilians by the Turkish air force. “Why were the Turks so incompetent?” Kissinger demanded. JCS Chairman Brown replied that they had been “inept” and “amateurish.” They had even attacked and sunk a couple of their own ships by accident, he told Kissinger. But if Ankara was “incompetent,” that incompetence had limits: intelligence reporting indicated that Turkey had used the cease-fire to add reinforcements—a move, Brown speculated, aimed at “put[ting] them in a better arguing position” in negotiations to achieve a favorable settlement on the island following the cease-fire.⁴⁶

Although frustrated that Turkish forces had failed to secure the Turkish enclaves before the cease-fire, Kissinger used the meeting to push for bureaucratic victory over Schlesinger on the proper approach to the crisis. He saw no need for delaying arms deliveries to Turkey, and although he concurred with the DoD that major items to Greece (F-4 deliveries and the A-7 contract) should be delayed, he did not want to lose the Greek junta’s sympathy. “It would be useful to give at least the visual appearance that the hardware is coming in,” Kissinger remarked, adding “I do not want the Greek Government to feel that we have contributed to their rape.” After all, Greeks of all political dispositions supported the junta’s stand against Turkey on Cyprus, and therefore “we must not appear to be cutting off aid in that atmosphere.” Kissinger returned to the July 21 *Washington Post* article that had raised the suspension of military aid to Greece, which he was convinced had come from the Pentagon. According to DoD notes, the secretary of state told Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Amos Jordan, the senior DoD official

present, that President Nixon “was so angry yesterday about the Getler article [that] he ‘violently reaffirmed’ his position on aid to Greece.” Kissinger threatened that he would get a presidential directive to continue the aid, if necessary, and demanded that the DoD publicly state that aid to Greece had not been cut off.⁴⁷

Political upheaval in Greece and Cyprus, however, dramatically altered the calculations on both sides of the growing Schlesinger-Kissinger rift. Political turbulence in Athens and Nicosia soon followed the cease-fire announcement. The changeovers failed to resolve the crisis but transformed the politics surrounding it. Nikos Sampson resigned the Cypriot presidency on July 23 and Glafkos Clerides became acting president of Cyprus. The Greek junta’s bungled July 20 call for mobilization, moreover, had shined a bright light on the Greek military’s poor morale and the junta’s ineptitude. The mobilization also resulted in officers who were not loyal to the junta to take command of combat units, which undermined the junta’s monopoly on violence. On July 22, Greek officers from the 3rd Army Corps signed a letter that demanded the creation of the National Salvation council, composed of civilian and military leaders, which would recall Constantine Karamanlis from voluntary exile in Paris. Karamanlis had served multiple times as prime minister prior to the junta. The 67-year-old Karamanlis was again sworn in as prime minister in the early hours of July 24. He immediately replaced military officers in the government with civilians and declared the 1968 constitution, which had allowed the junta to rule Greece by emergency decree, null and void.⁴⁸

As they had at every turn so far, Kissinger and Schlesinger differed on how to react to the political changes in Athens and Cyprus. The secretary of state wanted to proceed cautiously with the new government in Athens, unwilling to radically upend his diplomatic track on Cyprus in the wake of Greece’s political upheaval. In San Clemente on the evening of July 26, Kissinger

vented his anger over the phone to Sisco about the defense secretary. He believed Schlesinger had overstepped his authority in public remarks about U.S. relations with the new government in Athens. “The Defense Department doesn’t recognize governments yet,” he thundered. The secretary of state was frustrated: “I’m all for Karamanlis. But I’m against this indecent rushing around of the very people,” who had accused him of not doing enough against the junta but, in the wake of Karamanlis’s return, now pressed for the administration to make an immediate about-face and turn against the Turks. He thought his diplomatic course could achieve a negotiated settlement “unless we have some guys who are out making end runs around me through other departments.” When Kissinger and Schlesinger spoke less than an hour later, they agreed to maintain the appearance of unity as the deepening Watergate scandal engulfed the Nixon presidency. “I really think that whatever our personal feelings may be that within this present crisis,” Kissinger told the defense secretary, “you and I cannot leave the impression to foreign countries that we are at each other’s throats.” “Couldn’t agree more,” Schlesinger responded. Kissinger told the defense secretary that “whatever may be in the press ... I have never done anything but support you with the President.” In a nod to the precarious state of the Nixon administration, Kissinger likened such bureaucratic battling to “fighting for the captaincy for the *Titanic*.”⁴⁹

The new Greek government’s primary objective regarding Cyprus remained the same as the junta’s: the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus. To shore up his new government and to improve Greece’s negotiating position in the upcoming talks over Cyprus in Geneva, Karamanlis sought to expel rightist elements from the Greek army and improve its credibility as a fighting force. The restored prime minister saw a negotiated Turkish departure from Cyprus as critical to democratic stability in Athens and hoped that the United States and Turkey would

work with him toward such ends. Neither Washington nor Ankara, however, proved willing to offer the fledgling democracy such succor. While British Foreign Minister James Callaghan presided over talks at Geneva between Greeks and Turks about Cyprus's future, Kissinger was mostly absorbed in convincing Nixon to resign—which the increasingly mercurial, withdrawn president finally did on August 9. The next day Kissinger warned Nixon's successor, President Gerald Ford, that the Turks might resume offensive operations in Cyprus. As Athens was unwilling to grant Turkey any concessions, the secretary of state sought to buy time by convincing Ecevit to agree to a "temporary" partition of the island. On August 12, however, the Turkish government gave Greece and the Greek Cypriots with 24 hours to accept a plan that would result in a de facto division of Cyprus that would effectively give Turkey 34 percent of the land, leave the island with a weak federal government, and permit a continued Turkish occupation. Clerides asked for 48 additional hours to consider the scheme, but Ankara refused and prepared to settle the matter through force.⁵⁰

After reinforcing their Cypriot beachhead, the Turks broke the cease-fire on August 14, bombed Nicosia, and launched a rapid offensive aimed at securing the remaining Turkish enclaves on the island. When Kissinger convened the WSAG that afternoon, Assistant Secretary (ISA) Ellsworth, the senior Defense representative present, reported that two ships bound for Athens carried cargoes for both the Greeks and the Turks. Kissinger said that they should "not stop unless they receive orders from here." JCS Chairman Brown interjected that he had an outgoing message from the secretary of state instructing the ships to stop. Aghast, Kissinger erupted, "That is total nonsense." He demanded to know who had written the message and directed that they "keep going as if nothing is happening. I don't want to escalate this thing into a big deal. Our object is to keep NATO together and keep peace between the two parties."

Confident that a cease-fire would be achieved quickly, he directed aircraft deliveries to be delayed by several days. "Use technical problems as an excuse," the secretary of state ordered once more. He reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁵¹

The Turks' military advance accomplished the original territorial goals of the July 20 invasion of securing the Turkish majority areas and more, but it sacrificed Ankara's international moral standing and incited the fury of the U.S. Congress. On August 15, Ecevit called Kissinger to inform him the cease-fire would come the following day at noon, Washington time. The Turks stopped their advance on August 16 after seizing approximately 40 percent of the island, including the port of Famagusta on the southern coast, where few Turks lived. On the day of the cease-fire the U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger Davies, had sent a cable to Washington with reports of cease-fire violations committed by both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish forces. The Turks continued attacking Greek Cypriot artillery positions near Nicosia, he wrote, causing a "deteriorating situation" in the capital and endangering the UN headquarters there. Davies would lose his life several days later in the chaos that enveloped the capital.⁵²

Several days after the second cease-fire announcement, Schlesinger urged Kissinger to have General Andrew Goodpaster, the commander of U.S. European Command, warn the Turks that they were endangering their relationship with Washington. That would not be helpful, Kissinger replied, because the Turkish prime minister already understood the risk. Then, Kissinger's long-simmering frustration with Schlesinger boiled to the surface. "If you want to do my job," he snapped, "come over here.... Every time there's a crisis you wind up in the *Washington Post* opposite from me." Harkening back to an earlier disagreement, Schlesinger

responded, “I said we weren’t going for homeporting. I never suggested that bases weren’t important.” Soon afterward, Deputy National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft tried to calm the defense secretary and explained that Kissinger was a “very emotional man.” There was a “situation of flux” in the White House, and Kissinger was threatening to resign.⁵³ The secretary of state’s power remained mostly undiminished, however, in the first months of the new administration, as Ford would develop a good rapport with Kissinger and initially relied heavily on him to direct foreign policy. Schlesinger’s relationship with the new president, on the other hand, soured during Ford’s first weeks on the job when the secretary had implied to reporters that he had issued orders to the military to report any unusual requests from the besieged and erratic Nixon before his resignation.⁵⁴

Until the end of the Ford presidency Kissinger sought in vain to achieve a lasting compromise for Cyprus. The situation on the island, however, remained an uneasy stalemate because neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots saw any benefit in entering serious negotiations to achieve a lasting settlement.⁵⁵ In the weeks following the August 16 cease-fire, the Turks would expel approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots from Turkish-occupied territory in the northern part of the island, effectively partitioning the island along ethnic lines. Neither Kissinger nor acting Cypriot president Glafkos Clerides wanted Makarios to return to Cyprus, but, supported by Athens, the archbishop arrived in Nicosia on December 7, 1974, and was greeted by cheering throngs. He resumed the presidency of Cyprus, but his writ did not extend beyond the smaller share of the island that Greek Cypriots still controlled.⁵⁶

Salvaging the Southern Flank

Although Schlesinger and later his successor, Donald Rumsfeld, battled Kissinger on overall U.S. strategy against the Soviet Union, the two defense secretaries worked with the secretary of state to mend relations with Ankara and Athens strained by the Cyprus crisis.⁵⁷ However, repairing the damage that the feud had done to NATO's southern flank was a daunting task. Embittered by Washington's failure to arrest Turkey's thrust into Cyprus, Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis notified President Ford and other NATO heads of state on August 14 that his country was reasserting sovereign control over the "territory, air space, and territorial waters" that it had ceded through its participation in NATO. Specifically, Athens withdrew from the alliance's Defense Planning Committee and its subordinate bodies and withdrew Greek forces from the NATO command structure. Greece remained, however, part of NATO's Military Committee as well as its Nuclear Planning Group. At a WSAG meeting that same day, Sisco summed up the meaning of what had taken place, telling Kissinger that the Greeks were withdrawing from NATO militarily but not politically, and that they were justifying the move on the basis of "NATO's inability to stop Turkish intervention." Washington and NATO allies were left to ponder what the announcement meant for Greece's future posture toward the alliance.⁵⁸

Schlesinger positioned himself at the forefront of the Ford administration's effort to lure the Greeks back. "Believe me," Defense Minister Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas wrote to Schlesinger, "it is my warmest wish that circumstances will change and allow us to resume our NATO collaboration."⁵⁹ Two weeks after the Greek withdrawal, in the interests of mending bilateral relations the administration acceded to Athens' request for accelerated deliveries of the 16 F-4s remaining from its 1972 purchase of 38.⁶⁰ At the Pentagon the next day, Schlesinger spoke with Jack B. Kubisch, U.S. ambassador-designate to Greece. The secretary warned him against overreacting to Greece's move and signaled his hope that "by buying some time Greece

might be able to see its way clear to retain its NATO military activities.” To improve the U.S. image in Greece, Schlesinger recommended that Kubisch pursue good bilateral relations with the Greeks and seek to accommodate them where possible. The secretary thought that because the homeporting of six U.S. Navy destroyers might cause problems for Greece’s fledgling new democracy, Washington should consider removing them [REDACTED]. He dismissed Kubisch’s concern that the Turks might take all of Cyprus, saying that the Turks had “had their fun” and had “no ambitions to push Greek noses into the ground.” Ankara had accomplished its main objectives of addressing past grievances and demonstrating military superiority over Athens. As to why the administration had tried to restrain Turkey by cutting off military aid, Schlesinger told Kubisch, “The answer to that question would have to come from the State Department.”⁶¹

The future of U.S. military facilities in Greece remained clouded, tied to the success or failure of the fledgling Karamanlis government. The Defense Intelligence Agency warned in August that “Greek humiliation on Cyprus” might cause the Karamanlis government to fall to another military junta—and that a junta would likely demand U.S. withdrawal from facilities covered through bilateral agreements.⁶² Such an outcome would be a grievous blow to the U.S. Mediterranean presence and to the NATO southern flank. On mainland Greece, major sites included Athenai (Hellenikon) Air Base on the outskirts of Athens and a Navy communications station at Nea Makri. In addition to the airfield at Souda Bay, vital to operations of the Sixth Fleet, the Greek isle of Crete hosted a technical collection facility at Iraklion, a NATO Missile Firing Installation, and a NATO weapons training center. Collectively, these sites provided critical support for the U.S. military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Keeping Karamanlis in power therefore became a top priority for Schlesinger. However, as the months passed and

Karamanlis's center-right New Democracy party handily won the November 17, 1974 parliamentary elections, the political threat of another coup ebbed. Schlesinger refocused on advancing U.S. defense interests in Greece in partnership with the progressively more confident and stable government.⁶³

Schlesinger understood, however, that Karamanlis would need to deliver on election promises to reduce the U.S. military presence in Greece. He thought the United States should assist Karamanlis so far as it could without harming American interests. The secretary concurred with JCS recommendations that the U.S. footprint could be reduced by moving functions from the mainland to Crete or out of Greece altogether and discussed the options with Kubisch (who had since taken up his post) that December.⁶⁴ The C-130 reconnaissance aircraft flying from Athenai (Hellenikon) could be moved to Souda Bay. In Schlesinger's view the United States had strong cards to play in negotiations with Greece over U.S. facilities, such as infrastructure support and security assistance. Schlesinger observed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. He suggested that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]⁶⁵

After reviewing the transcript of Schlesinger's conversation with Kubisch, Kissinger concluded that the process of consolidating facilities [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. He believed such a move might be overly precipitous and erode U.S. negotiating power, and told his staff, “The Pentagon wants to pull out of Greece, or it thinks if it throws half the bases away it can save the other half.” In response Kissinger and his staff prepared a national security study memorandum (NSSM) to establish a coherent strategy for dealing with Greece. He did “not want a treaty between State and defense on this.”⁶⁶ The resulting NSSM 215 sought interagency consensus that negotiation with Greece would be “necessarily conservative,” aimed at helping Karamanlis’s new government while maintaining as many important facilities in Greece as possible. The interagency team also agreed that despite the Navy’s plan to give up homeporting with or without concessions, Washington would first seek “meaningful Greek concessions.”⁶⁷ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].⁶⁸

While the administration calibrated its negotiation strategy toward Greece, Schlesinger found to his consternation that members of Congress proved formidable foes when it came to maintaining what he viewed as the more important security ties with Turkey. Although the defense secretary agreed that the Turks had gone too far in seizing territory in Cyprus, he did not believe Turkey’s actions required Washington to take steps that would damage its own defense interests.⁶⁹ In the wake of Watergate, however, the legislative branch would use the Cyprus crisis to assert its authority over foreign policy to an extent not seen since the 1930s, requiring the Ford administration to rely on the veto to preserve aid to Turkey while also carefully maneuvering to prevent a total collapse of bilateral relations.⁷⁰ The administration could only delay congressional efforts to punish Ankara and preserve defense cooperation with Turkey. Many in Congress thought that in moving on Cyprus the Turks had violated provisions of the Foreign

Assistance Act, which restricted the use of U.S.-furnished equipment to national self-defense.⁷¹ President Ford concluded that those in Congress who sought to punish the Turks had ignored the facts that the Greek Cypriot Guard had also used U.S. weaponry and that the defunct junta—not Ankara—bore primary responsibility for the crisis. He recalled: “They didn’t want to know the facts; they simply wanted to punish the Turks.” In their eagerness to do so and “interfere with the President’s traditional right to manage foreign policy,” Ford thought congressional advocates of an embargo against Turkey ignored his arguments that Ankara could shutdown U.S. intelligence gathering facilities or endanger NATO’s southern flank by leaving the alliance. Caustically recalling Congress’s action, he wrote “if interference had dire consequences for the country as a whole, well, that was just too bad.”⁷²

Indeed, the democratic resurgence in Athens caused many in Congress who had hitherto opposed the junta to now aggressively back the new democracy against the Turks, even if it meant curbing the authority of the executive branch. This burgeoning pro-Greek legislative faction enjoyed a much deeper wellspring of public support than the administration’s efforts to preserve strong relations with Turkey, since in 1974 the approximately 1.25 million Greek-Americans far outnumbered the estimated 54,000 ethnic Turks in the United States.⁷³ In October, Ford vetoed two continuing appropriations resolutions that would have immediately suspended all military aid to Turkey, and the House overrode both. Congress then promptly passed the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, which mandated a cutoff of all military sales and aid to Turkey beginning February 5, 1975, unless Ford could demonstrate considerable progress toward an agreement to resolve the Cyprus crisis.⁷⁴ The White House lobbied hard for an extension as the clock ticked down and progress proved elusive. However, those efforts did little to sway a

heavily Democratic Congress eager to reign in the executive branch after Watergate, and the ban went into effect.

Prior to the February cutoff, the Pentagon did what it could to keep bilateral relations with Turkey from foundering. In mid-January, the Defense Security Assistance Agency notified Congress of a \$230 million offer to upgrade Turkey's M-48 tanks. Congress lambasted the letter as an obvious effort to rush massive aid to the Turks before the cutoff took effect. After talking to congressional staffs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs Harry E. Bergold Jr. reported that former deputy secretaries of defense Cyrus R. Vance and George W. Ball were acting as the Democrats' "brain trust" on the issue. They argued that the Turks were susceptible to tough bargaining tactics. Bergold thought the attempt to pressure Ankara into withdrawing from Cyprus by suspending sales and aid would fail.⁷⁵

As Bergold had predicted, the approach failed. Ankara refused to make any concessions that might have forestalled a cutoff, and the cutoff took effect. Angry at the disastrous consequences of this blunt attempt at diplomacy, Schlesinger promptly urged his Turkish counterpart to maintain military-to-military communications. Ankara's response was polite but noncommittal. Soon afterward, OSD officials briefed Congress on the rapid, destructive effects the suspension would have on Turkish military capabilities. The DIA predicted that the Turkish air force would cease to be an effective fighting force in about six months. Its navy would likewise experience major degradation in nine months. The Turkish army could maintain units in operational status as long as one year, DIA estimated, but only by sacrificing capability. For some in Congress, however, the OSD briefing simply justified the embargo. Representative John Brademas (D-IN) reacted by urging the administration to exert even more pressure on the Turks. Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (D-MO) said he hoped the impact would be severe enough to

compel Turkish concessions, after which aid could resume. JCS Chairman Brown, however, warned Schlesinger that the degradation of the Turkish military would likely cause Ankara to become increasingly unpredictable.⁷⁶

Unwilling to allow the complete degeneration of Turkey's armed forces, Schlesinger sought to circumvent the aid cutoff. The OSD contended that selling spare parts to Turkey was permitted under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. According to the DoD general counsel, the president could use \$50 million for that purpose if he determined that "such authorization is important to the security of the United States." Senate staffers solicited an opinion from the General Accounting Office, which agreed with the DoD general counsel. Yet senators supportive of the aid embargo refused to endorse this finding publicly unless the Turks promised concessions, such as allowing Greek refugees to return to Turkish-controlled territory. The Turks continued to refuse concessions.⁷⁷

Unable to find effective workarounds, the administration went all-in to get Congress to repeal the cutoff. In that pursuit, Schlesinger's personal influence moved the needle in the Senate, but failed to persuade the more obstinate foes in the House. Before the Senate voted, the OSD Office of Legislative Affairs carefully tracked the senators' positions and urged Schlesinger to speak with five of them, lobbying some directly and soliciting others for advice on whom to contact. The effort paid off. On May 19, 1975, by a vote of 41 to 40, the Senate moved to resume most military aid.⁷⁸ The administration then shifted its efforts to the harder terrain of the House. The House Foreign Affairs Committee reported a bill on July 16 that prohibited directed grants but allowed sales, credits, and deliveries of supplies contracted before the suspension. On July 21, Ford, Kissinger, and Schlesinger briefed the House Republican leadership. The defense secretary argued that U.S. installations in Turkey were "irreplaceable." He predicted that if the

bill did not pass, “Turkey will go down the irrevocable path of closing us out.” Schlesinger’s warning failed to register. Three days later, by a vote of 206 to 223, the House rejected the committee’s bill and the suspension stayed in effect. Schlesinger had approached eight representatives at Ford’s behest before the vote. Four of the eight voted in favor of the bill, three against it, and one abstained.⁷⁹

The Turkish government was incensed that the House had refused a partial lifting of the embargo and sought swift retribution. Some of the material denied to the Turks by the embargo had already been purchased through sales credits—notably 24 F-4Es, for which the Turks were paying installments, interest, and even storage fees. Immediately after the July 24 House vote, Turkey declared its 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with the United States null and void, suspended U.S. operations at four major intelligence collection sites as well as a radio navigation facility, and restricted the privileges afforded to U.S. military personnel.⁸⁰ Only those facilities—such as Incirlik air base—that Ankara deemed as hosting only NATO functions remained open to the U.S. military, but only for NATO-related operations.⁸¹

The embargo’s continued ineffectiveness at wresting concessions from Turkey proved more persuasive to its congressional proponents than Schlesinger’s warnings. On October 2, 1975, by a margin of 237 to 176, the House voted to ease the arms cutoff after enough members had concluded that it had not and would not move Turkey’s government. This legislation allowed for delivery of \$185 million worth of equipment (including the 24 F-4Es) contracted before February 5, permitted Turkey to purchase arms through commercial channels as long as the cease-fire in Cyprus was not violated, and authorized the president to certify NATO-related credit sales. Ford signed the bill into law on October 6, averting what Schlesinger feared would be Turkey’s “irrevocable” turn away from the United States and NATO. Two weeks later,

however, the defense secretary cautioned Ambassador Kubisch that “as a result of the arms embargo and its aftermath, the Turks have learned, erroneously or not, their blackmail power over U.S. facilities in Turkey.”⁸² Moreover, the partial lifting of the embargo had pertained to only those supplies covered by deferred credit sales and grants. Still livid, the Turkish government kept U.S. facilities closed.⁸³

Until the end of the Ford presidency, the administration sought to maneuver around Congress to improve bilateral relations with Ankara and allow for the reopening of critical U.S. facilities. When Kissinger and Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil negotiated a new defense cooperation agreement, the amount of U.S. aid became a point of contention. The Turks asked at first for \$700 million but appeared ready to settle for \$300 million. Kissinger was willing to offer \$250 million annually. Defense compiled a list of “sweeteners” that included coproducing F-5 interceptors and the lease or sale of older ships and aircraft. When the Turks called the concessions inadequate, the DoD supported State’s proposal to add two destroyers and 72 utility helicopters to the FY 1977 offer, followed in FY 1978 by access to U.S. defense satellite communications. On March 26, 1976, Kissinger and Çağlayangil signed a DCA that, when ratified, would allow U.S. activities to resume at intelligence, navigation, and communications sites. When Donald Rumsfeld, who had succeeded Schlesinger on November 20, 1975, asked for an explanation of the DCA, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Eugene V. McAuliffe wrote that in the agreement Washington had conceded larger supervisory roles for Turkish base commanders and agreed to make intelligence-sharing with Turkey a matter of public record. The United States promised Turkey \$1 billion over four years, with at least \$200 million coming in the form of grant aid. Items permitted for sale included one modern naval vessel, 76 helicopters, and F-4E aircraft. These were not rental payments for facilities, McAuliffe

explained, but assistance based on “Turkey’s needs in relation to its NATO commitments.”

Under the DCA, beginning in 1978 Turkey would also enjoy free access to the Defense Communications Satellite System.⁸⁴

Congressional ratification of the new DCA became intertwined, however, with similarly complex and contentious negotiations with Greece over defense cooperation, since only a suitable settlement with Greece could lessen the pro-Greek lobby’s opposition. In February 1975, after initial discussions, Washington surmised that the Greeks wanted “changes in our operating relationship which are more than cosmetic but less than vital.” In early April, through National Security Decision Memorandum 291, Ford defined the U.S. objective for U.S. basing and facilities in Greece as preserving existing security arrangements “to the extent possible” while encouraging Greece’s return to full participation in NATO. If concessions became necessary, the DoD would consolidate or reduce the number of facilities it considered least essential, as Schlesinger had recommended. U.S. negotiators promptly agreed to terminate the homeporting of destroyers and stop using Hellenikon air base outside Athens, instead consolidating air operations with an adjacent Greek air base.⁸⁵

The White House hoped to conclude negotiations by early June, so that both Greek and Turkish DCAs could be ratified before Congress adjourned in mid-October. On April 15, 1976, Kissinger and Foreign Minister Dimitrios Bitsios signed a set of “Principles to Guide U.S.–Greek Defense Cooperation.” Kissinger and Bitsios had set a four-year, \$700 million ceiling upon U.S. military aid and support. Ambassador Kubisch suggested offering more inducements, such as allowing Greek military forces to participate in joint operations with U.S. forces; developing an electronic intelligence capability for Greek airborne reconnaissance; and offering

Athens access to the U.S. Defense Satellite Communications System. State asked the DoD to urgently comment on appropriate incentives.⁸⁶

Rumsfeld's Pentagon became increasingly convinced, however, that the Greeks were intentionally slowing negotiations by making unreasonable demands and by using any U.S. enticements promised to the Turks as leverage with Washington. During a June 15, 1976 refueling stopover in Athens, Averoff responded to Rumsfeld's calls for Greece to "regularize" its relationship to meet the growing Soviet naval challenge by stating that Athens required a deal similar to the one offered to Ankara. Irritated, McAuliffe chimed in that U.S. agreements with the Turks were "somewhat irrelevant" to negotiations with the Greeks since there were 26 U.S. bases in Turkey and only 17 bases in Greece that carried out dissimilar missions. The defense secretary pressed: "There is a need for speed." He warned that he had "a relaxed attitude about U.S. presence in the world," and that the United States would not "plead to stay." The implied withdrawal threat failed to disquiet Averoff, who concluded the meeting by saying that "eight of ten Greeks are concerned only about Turkey" and were not worried about the Soviets.⁸⁷

As this tense conversation with the Greek defense minister indicated, under Rumsfeld the Pentagon had grown weary of supporting State's diplomacy and did not want to hand the negotiators a blank check to buy Greece's assent. In a mid-July letter to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Philip C. Habib, Deputy Secretary Clements wrote that the DoD harbored doubts that "even an extensive package of inducements" could secure a quick agreement. Like the Turks, he cautioned, "the Greeks probably would accept anything and everything we might offer, and then demand more." He warned that this trend must be stopped or "we can expect to face unreasonable demands in other facility negotiations around the world." Yet because "sweeteners" had already been offered to the Turks, Clements reluctantly agreed to three

incentives for Greece beyond the \$700 million security assistance deal that Kissinger had struck with Bitsios: technical, material, and training assistance to allow the Hellenic Air Force to develop airborne reconnaissance capability; access to the Defense Satellite Communications System; and the handover of the U.S. Navy-leased pier at Elefsis to the Hellenic Navy. He warned, however, that the Greeks should not be given the impression that these constituted mere “down payments” for moving negotiations forward in expectation of further incentives. On the issue of joint operations, the Defense Department had concluded that the “Greeks do not know what they want.” The DoD thus rejected any understanding of the DCA that would allow widespread Greek participation in joint exercises, but instead would evaluate Greek requests to do so on a case-by-case basis, closely linking such decisions to negotiations over individual facility usage.⁸⁸

The Greeks, however, continued to demand further concessions, which coarsened the Pentagon’s diplomacy. During a meeting with the Greek ambassador, McAuliffe expressed frustration with the notion of paying “rent” for facilities in Greece, since the U.S. military was there to ensure collective security and not solely to protect U.S. interests. He reprised Rumsfeld’s earlier warnings, but in blunter form: “These facilities ... are not so important to US interests alone that we would not pull them out under an unhealthy rent situation.” The Greeks, Ambassador Petros Calogeras replied, had never mentioned financial aspects until they felt “compelled” to do so after the U.S.-Turkish DCA “included such considerations.” Calogeras said further concessions would accelerate negotiations and argued that the United States, as a superpower, could afford to offer them.⁸⁹

The Greeks’ sustained efforts to delay a settlement and thereby prevent the Turks from achieving an agreement with the United States caused Rumsfeld and his staff immense

frustration. By August 1976 negotiators had completed a basic DCA text but the drafting of appendices covering facilities at Nea Makri, Souda Bay, Iraklion, and Hellenikon remained at an impasse. The State Department concluded that the Greeks were using delay tactics to prevent Congress from passing the Turkish DCA. Greek defense minister Averoff admitted as much to Rumsfeld in late November after the defense secretary expressed disappointment in the progress of base negotiations and said Washington believed the Greeks were simply waiting for the newly elected Carter administration to take office. Averoff responded, Athens “is in no hurry to sign anything before the Turks do.” The Greeks would provide the administration no help. Congress adjourned without acting on the Turkish DCA, leaving to the Carter administration the job of completing both agreements.⁹⁰

Damage Assessments

Despite a rapprochement with Turkey, the embargo had dealt a grievous blow to U.S. regional and global intelligence. McAuliffe informed Rumsfeld in August 1976 that the loss of intelligence following the aid cutoff had been “significantly greater than we had anticipated.” The data acquired by monitoring Soviet missile tests from facilities in Turkey had been “generally of highest quality, and in some cases unique.” The cutoff had resulted in the loss of over 80 percent of the information gained from sites in Turkey, which amounted to a 15 percent decrease in total U.S. information about Soviet missile testing. U.S. information about Soviet regional military forces, which included ground, air, and naval forces in and around the Black Sea as well as in the southwestern Soviet Union, declined by 50 percent. The United States would thus be partially blinded when observing Soviet activities that threatened the eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East.⁹¹ McAuliffe concluded dismally: “We can replace this source

only partially and only through significant investment in time and money, and with the political cooperation of other countries.”⁹² Bilateral relations with the United States would endure, but only by a thread. Yet the overall relaxation of relations between Washington and Moscow through détente as well as Turkey’s own rapprochement with the Soviets prior to the crisis prevented the Soviets from fully exploiting the alliance fissures.

With Greece, the outcome of the crisis was somewhat more mixed and even positive in the long run. Washington sacrificed facilities and lost to the alliance the weak Greek military, enfeebled by the junta. Because of the political disruptions caused by the crisis, however, the United States would no longer have to deal with a reprehensible military dictatorship in Athens. Greece had emerged as a democracy, and the Pentagon supported rather than resisted this change. After Greece’s withdrawal from NATO, the administration wisely refused to punish or condemn the new government. Instead, it chose to seek to improve bilateral relations. Schlesinger had indicated an early willingness to support the fledgling democracy by consolidating defense assets. The Pentagon was thus able to keep critical facilities operational. It would lose homeporting in Athens but would maintain the strategically more important Souda Bay air base. Tensions rose somewhat during Rumsfeld’s tenure, but these were symptomatic of the growing health, not deterioration, of relations. They increasingly resembled the give-and-take diplomacy common between two democracies with divergent aims rather than the far more erratic relationship with the unhinged junta.

On April 22, 1975, a particularly bleak moment when South Vietnam was collapsing, the Turkish arms embargo had taken effect, and Portuguese communists were gaining power,

President Ford had sought to put the problems in the Mediterranean into context. Through NSSM 222, he directed a review of security policy toward NATO's southern tier, identifying U.S. interests and security aims. The fallout of the Cyprus crisis had led the Ford administration to reassess priorities on the southern flank and contemplate the future character of the alliance. In December, an NSC ad hoc group concluded that "the military balance of power in the Mediterranean still rests with the West.... Nevertheless, U.S. influence is in decline in all of the [southern European] countries, in different degrees and for different reasons." The group believed that, as a consequence of this decline, U.S. access to military facilities would come under increasing pressure over the long term.⁹³

The Ford administration had tacitly accepted a diminished U.S. presence in the Mediterranean and viewed NATO as a "jagged alliance," with southern nations acting as less than full alliance members. The decision to accept this "irregular" alliance helps to explain why Schlesinger and later Rumsfeld both accepted a small U.S. presence in Greece but pushed for reopening of important intelligence gathering facilities in Turkey.⁹⁴ Based on strategic and domestic political need, Washington and its allies could respectively make their own interpretations of what the alliance required, as long as they still claimed membership in NATO. In the south at least, NATO had increasingly become a symbol, if not a full reality, of unity.

Endnotes

1. *Washington Star-News*, "U.S. Envoy Slain," 19 Aug 1974, 1. Henry Giniger, *New York Times*, 20 Aug 1974, 1; *Washington Post*, "The Death of Ambassador Davies," 21 Aug 1974. For Rumsfeld's battle with Kissinger, see James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 56–78.

2. Lawrence Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years* (Westport, CT, 1999), 30–31; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1974–1975* (London: The Institute, 1974), 23, 26; memo, Acting ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 22 Apr 1974, DepSecDef

approval on 2 May 1974, folder Turkey 091.3 (22 Apr 74) X-1190, box 75, Acc 330-78-0011, OSD Records, WNRC.

3. Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 464; After concluding that the NSC was ineffective at responding to crises, Kissinger had created the WSAG in 1969 as a crisis management group. Led by him, the WSAG consisted of the deputies from the State Department, DoD, CIA, and other agencies involved in national security. Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 182.

4. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 192; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: 2004), 74.

5. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*, 72; AP, *Washington Star-News*, “Makarios Killed,” 15 Jul 1974, 1; *Current News: Afternoon Edition*—1330, 15 Jul 1974. Cyprus was formally annexed by London at the outbreak of World War I; Tony Judt, *Postwar*, 508. During and after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the British had refused to allow American SR-71 aircraft to monitor the cease-fire. Kissinger retaliated by briefly curtailing the flow of American intelligence to the British. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 450. James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950–1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 62–64; William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed., 98; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 197.

6. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 196–197. Kissinger also wrote: “I respected the dexterity and cold-bloodedness with which Makarios performed his high-wire act” but found the archbishop “more of a nuisance than a menace” (*ibid.*, 199). For a more in-depth discussion of Makarios’s many maneuvers to perpetuate his rule, see Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 84–110.

7. CIA Intelligence Report, “Cyprus—An Old Problem” 24 Sep 1973, *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. 33, *Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, 1973–1976*, Laurie Van Hook, ed. (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State, 2007), 253–254; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 110–111. In June 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson had warned Ankara that NATO may not defend Turkey from a Soviet intervention in response to action against Cyprus. Telegram, Dept. of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 5 Jun 1964, *FRUS 1964–1968*, vol. 16, *Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey*, James E. Miller, ed. (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, Dept. of State), 108; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 200–201; Judt, *Postwar*, 509; Glen D. Camp, “Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus,” *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 1 (Spring, 1980): 45–48; telegram, Dept. of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 5 Jun 1964, 16:108; telegram, Dept. of State to the Embassy in Turkey, 5 Jun 1964, *FRUS 1964–1968*, 16:108.

8. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1974–1975*, 200–201. Since 1950, more than \$3 billion worth of aid had been provided through the Military Assistance Program. *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:253–254; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 192; *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. 30; doc704; memo, Acting ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 22 Apr 1974, with DepSecDef approval on 2 May 74, folder Turkey 091.3 (22 Apr 74) X-1190, box 75, Acc 330-78-0011.

9. Seeking to combat the U.S. heroin epidemic, Washington had pressed hard for the ban as part of Nixon’s war on drugs, granting Turkey \$35.7 million to compensate and assist approximately 70,000 affected farmers. The ban closed a major heroin pipeline, removed 100 tons of opium

from the illicit drug market by 1973, and helped to create a domestic heroin shortage. NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe, “Turkish Opium Ban,” 16 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:673–677; Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia* (Chicago: Chicago Review Press/Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), 393–394; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*, 111. Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act required the president to suspend all aid to a government that failed to take “adequate steps” to prevent illicit narcotics from entering the United States. Although Ankara’s actions did not require an automatic aid suspension under Section 481, the ban’s lifting would provide members of Congress political fodder, the group predicted, as it would “constitute a prima facie case for questioning” the sufficiency of Turkey’s efforts to curb illicit drug exports. Memo, Harold Saunders and Henry Applebaum for Kissinger, 15 Feb 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:657–659; NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe, “Turkish Opium Ban,” 16 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:673–677; memo, Maj. Gen. Wickham to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “Turkey,” 25 Jul 1974 (quote), folder Turkey-1974, box 74, Acc 330-78-0011.

10. National Intelligence Estimate, Central Intelligence Agency, 19 Jul 1973, *FRUS 1973–1976*, 30:16. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, the junta had allowed the United States to use Greek ports when resupplying Israel. Ankara had refused similar assistance. Getler, “U.S. Suspends Aid to Greece,” *Washington Post*, 21 Jul 1974, 1. See, generally, Thomas W. Gallant, *Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to Present*, Second Edition (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).

11. Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 168–169. Walter Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1973–1976* (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Joint Secretariat, Joint Staff, 2015), 239. Zumwalt believed the Navy would have to reduce the carriers in the Mediterranean to one without homeporting. Laird conditioned his approval of the Navy plan to include the settlement on adequate airfields, the existence of sufficient support facilities, and the delay of the proposed implementation from July 1973 to March 1974 to allow for “careful planning and orderly execution of Phase II.” Significantly larger than its precursor, this phase included 5,100 additional military personnel and 2,550 dependents. Ltr, SecDef Laird to SecState Rogers, 31 Dec 1972; memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 12 Jul 1973; ltr, DepSecDef to USecState for Political Affairs, 26 Oct 1973: all in folder Greece 323.3 1973, box 68, Acc 330-78-0001, OSD Records, WNRC.

12. National Intelligence Estimate, Central Intelligence Agency, 19 Jul 1973, *FRUS 1973–1976*, 30:15. The Council of Europe had voted unanimously in December 1969 to expel Greece, and the European Economic Community terminated negotiations with Athens in early 1970. Tony Judt, *Postwar*, 507–508. Schlesinger, interview by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, 1 Aug 1999, OSD/HO, 20–22.

13. Ltr, SecState Rogers to SecDef Schlesinger, 31 Jul 1973 (quote), folder Greece 323.3 1973, box 68, Acc 330-78-0001. For more on the State Department’s concerns about congressional opposition, see also ltr, USecState for Political Affairs Porter to DepSecDef Clements, 11 Jun 1973; ltr, SecDef to SecState, 31 Dec 1972; ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 Jan 1973; ltr, USecState for Political Affairs to DepSecDef, 11 Jun 1973; memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 12 Jul 1973; ltr, Senator Fulbright to SecDef, 7 Aug 1973 (quote): all in folder Greece 323.3 1973 box 68, Acc 330-78-0001; Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 168–169.

14. Ltr, DepSecDef to USecState for Political Affairs, 26 Oct 1973 (quotes), folder Greece 323.3 1973, box 68, Acc 330-78-0001.

15. Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 174 (italics in *FRUS* transcription); memo, Policy Planning Staff Director Lord for SecState Kissinger, US Policy toward Greece, attachment, 15 Feb 1974 (quotes), *FRUS 1973–1976*, 30:31–34; Schlesinger interview, 1 Aug 1991, 21.

16. Memo, Lord to Kissinger, 15 Feb 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:32 (doc 10); memo, ASD(ISA) for SecNav, 13 Mar 1974; ltr, ASD(ISA) to Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, State Dept., 13 Mar 1974: both in folder Greece 323.3 1974, box 63, Acc 330-78-0011; Judt, *Postwar*, 509; The *Washington Post* reported that a May 1974 draft NATO assembly report had concluded “the effect upon the (Greek) armed forces of almost seven years of dictatorship, accompanied by periodic upheavals and a succession of savage purges, has been severely to distort their command structure and to create an atmosphere of suspicion and antagonism among factions of the officer corps with differing political views and sharply divided loyalties.” Jack Anderson, “Greek Army Weak, NATO Memo Says,” *Washington Post*, 24 Jul 1974, B15.

17. Memo, Hyland for Kissinger, 10 Sep 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:488–495 (doc 148); telegram, Joseph Sisco for the Embassies in Greece and Cyprus, 29 Jun 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:272–273; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 205.

18. Memo, Hyland for Kissinger, 10 Sep 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:488–495 (doc 148); telegram, Joseph Sisco for the Embassies in Greece and Cyprus, 29 Jun 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:272–273; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 205; *New York Post*, “Athens, Washington and Cyprus, 17 Jul 1974, 18.

19. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 207, 210. The British had about 5,000 air force and 2,700 army personnel on the island. WSAG, meeting minutes, 19 Jul 1974, 2:43–3:29 p.m., *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:328 (doc 98); memo, Rosemary Niehuss for Kissinger, 15 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:275. Kissinger later marveled at the ease of Makarios’s escape: “They forgot to guard the back door.” Memcon, “The Cyprus Crisis, 23 Jul 1974, 2:30 p.m., *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:396; telegram, U.S. Embassy in Greece, “Potential Aftermath of Coup,” 16 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:301; Lawrence Van Gelder, “Army Takes over Cyprus in a Coup led by Greeks; Makarios’s Fate in Doubt,” *New York Times*, 16 Jul 1974, 1.

20. As quoted in Miller, *United States and the Making of Modern Greece* (University of North Carolina, 2009), 189. Reacting to the coup, one senior Turkish official said: “They tried to kill Makarios and destroy the state. But he survived and the resistance was stronger than they expected. They messed up.” John Saar, “Turkey Accuses Greece of Instigating Cyprus Coup,” *Washington Post*, 17 Jul 1974; Information Paper, “Chronology of Cyprus Crisis,” 31 Jul 1974, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011, RG 330.

21. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. A State Department postmortem later concluded that “although much of it was conflicting, and even intentionally misleading, the weight of evidence pointed to an impending direct move against Makarios by Ioannidis.” Memo, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for Kissinger, subj: Cyprus Coup Post Mortem, 10 Sep 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:494; memo, Albert C. Hall for Clements, “DIA forewarning of

Cyprus coup,” 7 Oct 1974 (quote), folder Cyprus 000.1 Aug-Dec 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011.

22. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 219. Of Kissinger’s role during the Arab-Israeli conflict, David Rothkopf wrote: “During this crisis and others that followed, the degree to which one unelected man, Kissinger, dominated decision making is unprecedented.” Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 152.

23. DIA, Situation Report, “Coup in Cyprus,” 15 Jul 1974, 1500 EDT, folder Cyprus, Jun-Jul 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; memo, Niehuss for Kissinger, 15 Jul 1974, subj: Cyprus Coup by Greek-Officered National Guard and Death of Makarios, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:275.

Kissinger would also claim later that the transfer of Nixon’s material to the Supreme Court that argued for executive privilege for his taping system jammed communications between San Clemente and the White House on July 19, a critical point in the crisis. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 218–219; memo for record, subj: WSAG Meeting of 15 July 1974 on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; WSAG, meeting minutes, 15 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:276–281.

24. Memo for record, “WSAG Meeting of 16 July 1974 on Cyprus,” folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; West/Draft, “The 1974 Cyprus Crisis: A Cursory Look,” 6 Aug 1974, folder Cyprus 000.1 Aug-Dec 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. The paper asked rhetorically: “At the time of the 15 July coup, did any paper set forth what U.S. policy should be, and why, and what counter positions were held, and what tools could do be used to demonstrate or insure the policy.”

25. Memo, Tasca for Kissinger, 15 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:281–283; memo, U.S. Embassy to Turkey for Kissinger, 15 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:281–283; memo for record, subj: WSAG Meeting of 16 July 1974 on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. Verbatim, sanitized transcripts are printed in *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:276–281, 288–294. The Soviets indicated that they viewed the coup as a criminal putsch directed by Athens against the legitimate Cypriot government. The Soviet leadership asked the United States to join it and “also urgently take appropriate steps, aimed at putting an end to the external interference into the internal affairs of Cyprus.” Message from the Soviet Leadership to the U.S. Leadership, undated, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 15:1023. Brezhnev informed Nixon that the Soviet Union would seek a United Nations Security Council decision to demand the withdrawal of Greek forces and the end of Greek interference in Cyprus.

26. Memo for record, subj: WSAG Meeting of 16 July 1974 on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. Verbatim, sanitized transcripts are printed in *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:276–281, 288–294.

27. Memo, Kissinger for Tasca, 15 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:283–284; memo, Tasca for Kissinger, 16 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:301.

28. In a report distributed to Clements prior to the meeting, the DIA reported the movement of Turkish troops to staging areas in Turkey, but the DIA concluded such movements were precautionary: “Local indicators portray restraint and a wait and see attitude.” DIA, “Turkish Division Reported Staging to Cyprus,” 16 Jul 1974, 2200 EDT, folder Cyprus, Jan-Jul 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. The press had also picked up on the massing of forces in Southern Turkey.

See *United Press International*, 17 Jul 1974, in *Early Bird*, pt. 1; *Washington Star-News*, “Turks Mass Arms; U.S. Urges Caution,” 17 Jul 1974, 1. WSAG, meeting minutes, 17 Jul 1974 (quote), folder Cyprus 000.1 Jan-Jul 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; WSAG, meeting minutes, 17 Jul 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976* 30:304–308.

29. As quoted from the DoD meeting minutes prepared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs (ISA) Harry E. Bergold, memo for record, subj: WSAG Meeting of 17 July 1974 on Cyprus, folder “Cyprus 1974,” box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. Kissinger insisted, “Whenever an American Ambassador makes decisions affecting the military he wants it to go back into the inter-agency forum and not have it handled exclusively in State channels.” *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:304–308.

30. Walter Isaacson observed that Kissinger’s decision to keep Sisco at the State Department after becoming secretary was “proof that engaging in shouting matches with Kissinger could be a way to earn his respect.” Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 507; telcon, Nixon and Kissinger, 17 Jul 1975, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:311–312; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 113.

31. Memo for record, subj: WSAG Meeting of 18 July 1974 on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 300-78-0011. WSAG, meeting minutes, 18 Jul 1974, 11:41 a.m.–12:22 p.m., *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:313–317.

32. In his memoirs, Kissinger stated, “Turkey’s demands left little doubt that it was planning to intervene. Explicit condemnation of the Greek junta by the United States would have turned a likelihood into a certainty.” Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1190; Kissinger quote found in memo for record, ASD(ISA), subj: WSAG Meeting of 18 July 1974 on Cyprus, (quote), folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:313–317.

33. On the evening of July 18, the DIA sent initial reports the embarkation of Turkish troops on landing craft to Schlesinger. DIA, “Probable Embarkation of Turkish Troops,” 18 Jul 1974, 1750 EDT, folder Cyprus, Jul-Jun [[Jun-Jul?]] 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. The next day the DIA reported Turkish naval forces headed toward Cyprus. DIA, “Movement of Turkish Naval Forces,” 19 Jul 1974, 1410 EDT, folder Cyprus Jan-Jul 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. Colby quote found in ISA notes memo for record, (ASD)ISA, subj: WSAG Meeting of 19 July on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. These notes further read: “The rotation of Greek troops on Cyprus began today on schedule with 440 debarking and only 225 placed on board the troop transport for return to Greece.

34. McCloskey quote from memo for record, (ASD)ISA, subj: WSAG Meeting of 19 July on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. Also see WSAG, meeting minutes, 19 Jul 1974, 2:43–3:29 p.m., *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:324–330.

35. Clements quote found in memo for record, ASD(ISA), subj: WSAG Meeting of 19 July on Cyprus, folder “Cyprus 1974,” box 61, 78-0011, RG 330. In 1972 Greece purchased 38 F-4Es. Deliveries began in April 1974, at the rate of about four per month. By this time, 17 had arrived in Greece. Memo, Vice Adm. Peet to DepSecDef, subj: Status of F-4 Deliveries, 18 Jul 1974, folder Greece 1974, box 62, Acc 330-78-0011.

36. Telcon, Kissinger, McCloskey, Stabler, Ingersoll, 19 Jul 1974, 7:30 p.m. PDT, Kissinger Telephone Transcripts, DNSA. Kissinger and Schlesinger quotes from telcon, Kissinger and Schlesinger, 19 Jul 1974, 8:15 p.m. PDT, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:331–332. Chronology of Cyprus Crisis, 31 Jul 1974, folder Cyprus, Jan-Jul 1974, box 6, Acc 330-78-0011. Ellsworth later

recalled in an interview with an OSD historian: “Kissinger couldn’t understand why his former student Ecevit wouldn’t do exactly what he was told.” Robert F. Ellsworth, interview by Maurice Matloff, 2 Sep 1988, OSD/HO, 25.

37. Telcon, Kissinger and Schlesinger, 19 Jul 1974, 8:15 p.m. [?] PDT, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:331 (doc 100).

38. Telcon, Kissinger and Schlesinger, 19 Jul 1974, 9:10 p.m. PDT (quote), Kissinger Telephone Transcripts, DNSA.

39. [REDACTED]; Response Study to NSSM 215, 14 Feb 1975, folder Greece 000.1–199 1975, box 65, Acc 330-78-0058, 15; [REDACTED]. Jordan quote found in memo for record, ASD(ISA), subj: WSAG Meeting, Saturday, 20 July 1974, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, 78-0011; WSAG, meeting minutes, 20 Jul 1974,” *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:341–347; Kissinger quote found in telcon, Kissinger and Ingersoll, 20 Jul 1974, 9:30 a.m. PDT, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:348–349.

40. [REDACTED]; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 225. On 23 August, through NSDM 267, President Ford authorized discussions with Turkey in which we would “[m]ake clear ... that suspension of all US economic and military assistance ... is required under Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act if it is determined that the Turkish Government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced in Turkey from unlawfully entering the United States.” NSDM 267, 23 Aug 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:682 9683. Kissinger quote found in telcon, Kissinger and Ingersoll, 20 Jul 9:30 a.m., PDT, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:349.

41. Getler stated that the administration had “ordered temporary suspension of all U.S. military aid to Greece,” perhaps reflecting a “tilt” toward Turkey. Michael Getler, *Washington Post*, 21 Jul 1974, 1. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1191. The A–7 contracts continued, he said, but the “F–4s are being held up at Rota (Spain).” WSAG, meeting minutes, 21 Jul 1974, 9:33–11:23 a.m., (quote), *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:357 (doc 110).

42. Exchange between Schlesinger and Kissinger about whether to seek a regime change in Greece found in WSAG, meeting minutes, 21 Jul 1974 (quotes), *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:361. Kissinger quote stating that the United States would not seek an overthrow of the junta found in memo for record, subj: WSAG Meeting of 21 July 1974 on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 092.1 (21 Jul 1974), box 3, Acc 330-78-0010. Kissinger quote about not believing the junta would survive found in WSAG, meeting minutes, 21 Jul 1974 (quotes), *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:362; Schlesinger interview, 1 Aug 1991 (quote), OSD/HO, 21.

43. [REDACTED].
A verbatim, sanitized version of the entire WSAG meeting is printed in *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:355–364.

44. Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and General Haig, 10:50, 21 Jul 1974 (quotes), Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

45. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 222–223; memo for record, subj: WSAG Meeting of 22 July 1974 on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:374–382. Information Paper, “Chronology of Cyprus Crisis,” 31 Jul 1974, folder Cyprus 000.1 Jan-Jul 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; Kissinger quote from Murrey Marder, “Kissinger: Major War Averted,” 23 Jul 1974, *Washington Post*, 1.
46. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 113. “Turkey, “Turkey, Greece Agree to Truce,” *Washington Star-News*, 22 Jul 1974, 1. By July 27, U.S. intelligence estimated that the Turk strength on Cyprus was between 18,000 to 22,000 troops with 70 to 80 tanks. Information Paper, “Chronology of Cyprus Crisis,” 31 Jul 1974, folder Cyprus 000.1 Jan-Jul 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. That evening, Kissinger called Brown and asked, under his authority as national security adviser and based on Nixon’s insistence, for an analysis of the Turkish army’s performance. He promised he would and said: “I think they made a bad ___ on the ___ they made the mistake you mentioned this morning. Sent it with too little power.” Telcon, Brown and Kissinger, 5:55 p.m., DNSA; quotes WSAG, meeting minutes, 22 Jul 1974, 10:42 a.m.–11:25 a.m., *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:374–382. The Turkish Air Force had sunk a destroyer by accident. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 222.
47. Kissinger quotes related to avoiding contributing to the junta’s downfall taken from WSAG, meeting minutes, 22 Jul 1974, 10:42 a.m.–11:25 a.m. *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:374–382. Kissinger quotes about not wanting to alienate the entire Greek population as well as about the Getler article and Nixon’s anger derived from memo for record, subj: WSAG Meeting of 22 July 1974 on Cyprus, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011.
48. DIA, “Sampson Replaced in Cyprus,” 23 Jul 1974, 0950 EDT, folder Jun-Jul 1974 Cyprus; DIA, “Greek Mobilization,” 20 Jul 1974, 0900 EDT, folder Cyprus 000.1 Jan-Jul: both in box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:78–79, fn. 2 on 395; Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 195; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 223–224. Judt, *Postwar*, 509. Thanos Veremis, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy* (London: Hurst and Co., 1997), 170–171; C. M. Woodhouse, *Modern Greece: A Short History*, New Fourth Edition (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 305.
49. Schlesinger’s statement read: “The new leadership of Greece includes, as the Secretary of State said yesterday, a number of old friends of the United States and of NATO. I am confident that representatives of the United States Government, including representatives of the Department of Defense, will be able to work with the new Greek Government in a close and friendly relationship which will contribute to the two nations’ joint goals of a strengthened NATO Alliance and of peace and stability in the Mediterranean area.” Memorandum for Correspondents, 25 Jul 1974, *Schlesinger Public Statements 1974*, 8:2622. The “present crisis” Kissinger mentions is likely Watergate. Kissinger quotes from telcon, Sisco and Kissinger, , 26 Jul 1974 and telcon, Schlesinger and Kissinger, 26 Jul 1974, 5:15 p.m.: both in Kissinger Telephone Conversations, 1969–1977, DNSA.
50. Marry Anne Weaver, “Generals Purged,” *Washington-Star-News*, 20 Aug 1974, 1; Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece*, 197–200. Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 603–612; Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 595–601; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 229–231; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 114.
51. Kissinger quotes from WSAG, meeting minutes, 14 Aug 1974, 3:10–3:45 p.m., *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:436. Two F-4s and three F-100s had been scheduled for delivery to Turkey and one F-4

for Greece. Memo for record, subj: Meeting of WSAG, 14 August 1974, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. Colby said of the likelihood of war between Greece and Turkey: "We don't think it's in the cards, at least at this point." WSAG, meeting minutes, 14 Aug 1974, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:434.

52. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 231; cable, Davies for Kissinger, Ceasefire Violations, 16 Aug 1974, folder 000.1 Cyprus, Aug-Dec 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. Kissinger would speak over the phone that morning with Clerides and Ecevit about Davies death. Both expressed regret. Kissinger did not blame Clerides for the ambassador's death and emphasized that the United States would press forward with negotiations. Telcon, Kissinger and Clerides, 19 Aug 1974, 8:21 a.m., *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:455-457; telcon, Kissinger and Ecevit, 19 Aug 1974, 10:15 a.m., *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:458-459.

53. Memo for record, subj: Meeting of WSAG, 14 Aug 1974, folder Cyprus 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011; *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:432-437. Entries for 19 and 20 Aug 1974, MG Wickham Notebooks, box TS-5, Schlesinger Papers.

54. The relationship with the president soured early after the defense secretary claimed to reporters at a lunch on August 23 that he had directed the military to inform him if any orders from the president bypassed the chain of command out of a concern that, improbable though it was, a desperate Nixon might give units of the military orders for some form of action against Congress, then in the midst of impeachment proceedings. The *Washington Post* quoted Schlesinger for saying, "In keeping with my statutory responsibilities, I did assure myself that there would be no question about the proper constitutional and legislated chain of command, and there never was any question." Ed Goodpaster, "Pentagon Kept Watch on Military," *Washington Post*, 24 Aug 1974, 8. In his memoir, Ford later recounted how Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements had investigated the matter and had concluded that Schlesinger had given no such order to the military. The president reflected that he later concluded, "I had been remiss in not getting rid of him" after the defense secretary had made false claims that had impugned the military by suggesting it would accede to an unconstitutional coup. Gerald Ford, *A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford* (New York: Harper & Row/Readers Digest, 1979)322-323.

55. Memo, Hartman for Kissinger, 3 Nov 1976 subj: Future Cyprus Policy, 3 Nov 1976, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:643-649.

56. For Kissinger's views on Makarios's return, see Memorandum of Conversation, 16 Nov 1974, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:544. For Clerides views, see "Telegram from U.S. Embassy to Kissinger," 19 Nov 1974, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:546-547; DIA Intelligence Appraisal, "Makarios to Return to Cyprus," 6 Dec 1974, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:549-551. DIA, Defense Intelligence Notice, "Archbishop Makarios' return unblemished by Violence," 8 Dec 1974," folder Cyprus, Aug-Dec 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011. Rauf Denktash would proclaim the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in February 1974, but it would only be recognized by Turkey. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 115

57. By July 1974, the press had picked up on the developing feud between Kissinger and Schlesinger over defense policy and detente. Joseph Fromm, "Kissinger-Schlesinger Feud: What It's All About," *U.S. News and World Report*, 22 Jul 1974, 16.

58. 14 Aug 1974, *FRUS 1969-1976*, 30:434.

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59. Karamanlis's letter is quoted in memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 29 Aug 1974, subj: Meeting with U.S. Ambassador-designate to Greece Jack B. Kubisch. Averoff's letter is quoted in memcon, "Secretary Schlesinger-Ambassador Kubisch Meeting," 29 Aug 1974: both in folder Greece 1974, box 62, Acc 330-78-0011.
60. Memo, Scowcroft for Springsteen, subj: GOG Request for Accelerated Delivery of F-4s, 28 Aug 1974, in folder Greece 1974, box 52, Acc 330-78-0011.
61. Memo, Dep ATP for NSA to Exec Secy, Dept. of State, "GOG Request for Accelerated Delivery of F-4s," 28 Aug 74; memcon, 29 Aug 1974, subj: Secretary Schlesinger-Ambassador Kubisch Meeting, folder Greece 1974, box 62, Acc 330-78-0011.
62. Schlesinger did not read this intelligence until August 23, 1974. Memo, DIA for SecDef, 16 Aug 1974, subj: DIA Assessment of Ramifications of the Cyprus War, folder Cyprus, Aug-Dec 1974, box 61, Acc 330-78-0011.
63. The venerable Karamanlis would prove an skillful steward for a successful return to democracy by abolishing the monarch by referendum in 1974, ensuring army loyalty by quietly granting early retirements to officers who had been the staunchest supporters of the junta and rewarding those officers loyal to the new democracy, and winning the approval of a new constitution in June 1975 that granted the Greek presidency, which would be held by Karamanlis until 1980, wide-ranging powers. Judt, *Postwar*, 509–510.
64. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1973–1976*, 239.
65. "U.S. Facilities–Greece," 5 Sep 1974; memcon, "Secretary Schlesinger–Ambassador Kubisch Meeting," 5 Dec 1974, folder Greece 323.3 1974, box 63, Acc 330-78-0011.
- [REDACTED]
66. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting, 13 Jan 1975, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:122–123; National Security Study Memorandum 215, 16 Jan 1975, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:125–126.; NSC Staff, Response to NSSM 215 *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:140–145.
67. Memo, A. Denis Clift for Kissinger, 3 Apr 1975, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:145–146.
68. [REDACTED].
69. *Los Angeles Times*, "A Crude Grab for Territory," 20 Aug 1974, 21.
70. George Herring, *The American Century and Beyond: U.S. Foreign Relations, 1893–2014* (New York: Oxford, 2017), 517.
71. Orr Kelly, "Anti-Turkey Move Grows in Congress," *Washington Star-News*, 20 Aug 1974, 5.
72. Ford, *A Time to Heal*, 137–138.
73. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 116.
74. *Public Papers of the Presidents: Gerald R. Ford, 1974* (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1975), 299–300, 371–372, 778–780, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30, 559, fn. 8.

75. Ltr, Comptroller, DSAA to Speaker of the House Carl Albert, 14 Jan 1975; memo, DASD Bergold to MG Wickham, 24 Jan 1975, subj: Turkish Aid Cut-Off; memo, DASD Bergold to MG Wickham, 28 Jan 1975, subj: Turkish Aid Cut-Off: all in folder Turkey 091.3 1975, box 80, Acc 330-78-0058. George Ball was deputy secretary of state from 1961 to 1966. Cyrus Vance was deputy secretary of defense from 1964 to 1967, and very soon after leaving that position, he mediated a Greek-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus.

76. Ltr, SecDef to Minister of Defense Ilhami Sancar, 13 Feb 1975; msg, Chief, JUSMAT Ankara to OSD et al., 231845Z Feb 1975; memo, Fred Hitz for Mr. Fryklund, subj: Briefing on Turkey, 11 February 1975"; memo, MG Faurer to DJS, 31 Jul 1975, subj: Assessment of Turkish Armed Forces Degradation, letters and memos all in folder Turkey 091.3 1975, box 80, Acc 330-78-0058. William Hale argued that the embargo did not have as great of an impact on Turkey as the administration had claimed to Congress, since Ankara simply bought supplies from other NATO members. He found Turkey's late-1970s equipment shortage "was probably as much an effect of the government's critical financial straits and a desperate shortage of foreign exchange as it was the direct result of the arms embargo." Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 116–117. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, 242.

77. Memo, ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef, [12 Feb 1975], subj: Legislation to Lift or Modify the Turkish Aid Cut-Off; memo, L. Niederlehner to SecDef, 26 Feb 1975, subj: Security Assistance to Turkey; ltr by Comptroller General Staats, no addressee, 20 Mar 1975; Note, Brian [Atwood] to Harry [Bergold], n.d., with notation by MG Wickham, folder Turkey 091.3 1975, box 80, Acc 330-78-0058.

78. Memo, Donald Sanders to Messrs. Maury and Fryklund, 14 May 1975, subj: Senate Vote May 19, folder Turkey 091.3 1975, box 80, Acc 330-78-0058; *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:172, fn. 1.

79. Memo, James E. Connor to SecDef, 22 Jul 1975, folder Turkey 091.3 1975, box 80, Acc 330-78-0058; *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:172, 767. Before the briefing, Schlesinger had asked for an assessment of how far the Turkish armed forces had been degraded. DIA reported that it was "simply... unable to prepare the trend depiction that he would like." While there was "no hard evidence" that the February projections were invalid, there was "a feeling among those following the problem ... that the Turks are doing better than expected." Memo, MG Faurer to DJS, 31 Jul 1975, subj: Assessment of Turkish Armed Forces Degradation, folder Turkey 091.3 1975, box 80, Acc 330-78-0058. Afterwards, Deputy Secretary Clements wrote his Texas congressman, who had opposed the bill. He warned that continuing the cutoff would severely damage NATO, hurt Israel, and further damage U.S. relations with "our Arab friends." Representative Alan Steelman replied that, after attending a briefing by Schlesinger and being "impressed by the weight of his arguments," he would vote to resume supply shipments already contracted. Ltr, DepSecDef to Rep. Steelman, 4 Sep 1975; ltr, Rep. Steelman to DepSecDef, 10 Sep 1975, folder Turkey 091.3 1975, box 80, Acc 330-78-0058.

80. "Supplementary Background Data," attached to memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 23 Mar 1976, folder Turkey 000.1-293 1976, box 83, Acc 330-79-0049; *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:587, 741, 750.

81. *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:780; Steven Rearden, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1977–1980* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002), 258.

82. *New York Times*, 3 Oct 1975, 1, 2; memcon, "Meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Greece," 19 Oct 1975, folder Greece 000.1-999 1975, box 65, Acc 330-78-0058. An amendment requested the chief executive to discuss with Turkey means of preventing opium poppies from being diverted into illegal channels. Subsequently, the Turks claimed to have instituted strict controls over poppy cultivation and harvesting. *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:773.
83. Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, 116.
84. Memo, DASD(ISA) Bergold to SecDef, 23 Mar 1976, subj: Visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil; ltr, USecState for Political Affairs to DepSecDef, 19 Mar 1976; ltr, DepSecDef to USecState for Political Affairs, 24 Mar 1976: all in folder Turkey 000.1-299 1976, box 83, Acc 330-79-0049; memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 20 May 1976, subj: US-Turkey Defense Cooperation Agreement; ltr, SecState to Foreign Minister Caglayangil, with Agreement attached, 26 Mar 1976: all in folder Turkey 000.1-293 1976, box 83, Acc 330-79-0049; memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 6 Aug 1976, subj: Impact of Loss of Intelligence Collection Facilities in Turkey: all in folder Turkey 300-821 1976, box 83, Acc 330-79-0049.
85. *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:133, 147148; ltr, DepSecDef to Rep. George Mahon, 18 Jun 1975, Acc 330-79-0049, folder Greece 000.1-199 1975, box 65, Acc 330-78-0058.
86. *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:230-231; ltr, USecState for Political Affairs to DepSecDef, 28 May 1976, folder Greece 1976, box 69, Acc 330-79-0049.
87. Memcon, "Meeting Between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Greek Minister of Defense Averoff," 15 Jun 1976, folder Greece1976, box 69, Acc 330-79-0049.
88. Ltr, DepSecDef to USecState for Political Affairs, 14 Jul 1976, folder Greece1976, box 69, Acc 330-79-0049.
89. Memcon, "Meeting with Chief, Greek Delegation, US-Greece Base Negotiations," 19 Jul 1976, folder Greece 1976, box 69, Acc 330-79-0049.
90. *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:230–231, 851.
91. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 6 Aug 1976, subj: Impact of Loss of Intelligence Collection Facilities in Turkey, folder Turkey 300-821 1976, box 83, Acc 330-79-0049. Such information had proven vital to the United States during the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 and for arms negotiations. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 20 May 1976, subj: US-Turkey Defense Cooperation Agreement, folder Turkey 300-821 1976, box 83, Acc 330-79-0049.
92. Memo, ASD(ISA) to SecDef, 6 Aug 1976, subj: Impact of Loss of Intelligence Collection Facilities in Turkey, folder Turkey 300-821 1976, box 83, Acc 330-79-0049. William Hale, an eminent scholar of Turkish foreign policy, concluded, "The embargo had at least as damaging an effect on American military capabilities on those of Turkey."
93. U.S. and Allied Security Policy in Southern Europe, Paper Prepared in Response to NSSM 222, 15 Dec 1975, *FRUS 1969–1976*, 30:150–151, 194–207 (quotes, 205–206).
94. *Ibid.*, 207.