Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation

Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates
1953-1961


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Foreword

This is the third special study in a series by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Historical Office that emphasizes the Secretary’s role in the U.S. foreign policy making process and how the position evolved between 1947 and the end of the Cold War. The study presented here concentrates on the three Secretaries who served President Dwight D. Eisenhower: Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates. The first two of these Secretaries were primarily caretakers and administrators, leaving much of the lead role in American foreign policy making to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in this era of increasing foreign policy and national security challenges. But Thomas Gates reinvigorated the role of the office in the last year of the Eisenhower Presidency, providing a springboard for Robert McNamara, his successor in the John F. Kennedy administration, to increase the power of the position to unprecedented levels.

This study is not meant to be a comprehensive look at the Secretary’s involvement in foreign affairs. But as a member of the President’s cabinet and the National Security Council and as the person charged with managing the largest and most complex department in the government, the Secretary of Defense routinely participated in a variety of actions that affected the substance and conduct of U.S. affairs abroad.

This series of special studies by the Historical Office is part of an ongoing effort to highlight various aspects of the Secretary’s mission and achievements. The series on the role of the Secretary of Defense in U.S. foreign policy making during the Cold War began as a book manuscript by Dr. Steve Rearden, author of The Formative Years, 1947–1950, in our Secretaries of Defense Historical Series. I wish to thank Dr. Alfred Goldberg, former OSD Chief Historian, and
Mr. Robert Shelala II of Larsen Consulting Group for their critique, additional research, and helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Lisa M. Yambrick, senior editor in the OSD Historical Office, and to OSD Graphics in the Pentagon for their efforts and continued support.

We anticipate that future study series will cover a variety of defense topics. We invite you to peruse our other publications at <http://history.defense.gov/>.

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Executive Summary

Despite the promising revival of the Secretary’s role in foreign affairs during Thomas Gates’s tenure at the end of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, the Eisenhower years were predominantly a period in which administrative and managerial matters took priority in Defense. This reflected the personal inclination of President Eisenhower, one of the nation’s best known and most respected military leaders, who was superbly equipped to give close attention to national security affairs. Concerning themselves with the business side of the Defense Department—the formulation and execution of budgets, the procurement of new weapons and equipment, research and development—was perhaps the soundest approach the first two Secretaries of Defense under Eisenhower, Charles Wilson and Neil McElroy, could have taken, given their limited experience and the constraints under which they operated. Yet in the long run, they did not serve as a model for subsequent Secretaries.

The story of the three men—Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates—who bridged the gap between the early Secretaries and the innovative and highly influential Robert McNamara shows an evolution in the role of the Secretary of Defense from being principally administrative to having more involvement in the making of foreign policy. Even in an administration with the diplomatic prowess of President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, two seasoned foreign affairs experts and statesmen, the Defense Secretaries were able to make their mark on policy as the Cold War continued to unfurl, tackling the administrative hurdles of reorganization, austerity, and
centralization while offering a more salient voice in discussions of foreign affairs. As military matters became more important throughout the 1950s, the views of the Secretary of Defense naturally became more integrated into policymaking, especially through the reworked policymaking structure of the National Security Council (NSC). While Eisenhower's first two Defense Secretaries were former businessmen without a background in foreign policy or international relations, the defense background possessed by his final Secretary, coupled with Secretary of State Dulles's departure, allowed the Secretary of Defense to become more entrenched in the making of foreign policy. In many respects acting as his own Secretary of Defense, President Eisenhower reserved for himself some of the key policy functions previously exercised by the Secretary. Having served as Supreme Allied Commander in World War II, Army Chief of Staff, and commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, he felt thoroughly qualified to personally oversee national security affairs. As President, in reaching decisions on strategy, force levels, weapons, and the like, he either trusted his own instincts or consulted the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). For advice and guidance on foreign affairs, he generally turned to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

Eisenhower's executive style had the net effect of emphasizing the role of Secretary of Defense as the manager of the Pentagon, a role the President stressed upon entering the White House and throughout his Presidency. Three Secretaries of Defense served under Eisenhower: Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates, Jr. The first two were highly successful former business executives—Wilson as president of the automobile giant General Motors, and McElroy as head of Procter and Gamble, a major soap and household goods company. Both were able industrial managers who knew a lot about running large organizations with large budgets but comparatively little about foreign affairs or national security. Gates, to be sure, fell into a somewhat different category, having served as Under Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense before being named Secretary in December 1959. But his brief tenure (barely more than 13 months) and his preoccupation with interservice matters (particularly the strategic targeting dispute) did not permit him to devote as much close thought and attention to foreign affairs as he felt they deserved. Coming as it did at the end of the Eisenhower administration, moreover, his period in office saw a winding down, not a launching, of new foreign policy initiatives.

What made the Secretary's role in foreign affairs during this period significant, then, was less the direct influence the Secretary himself exercised and more the continuing growth of military power as a key instrument of U.S. Cold War policy. Although Eisenhower's Defense Secretaries may not have been as significantly involved in decisions as Harry Truman's had been, they and their subordinates constituted an important part of a policy process that depended heavily on the military's contributions and assets. This became evident in framing an overarching strategic policy under the rubric “massive retaliation.” It was also clear in the management of policy at the senior staff level, which Eisenhower entrusted to an NSC refashioned to reflect lines of command and authority familiar to him from his military days. While Wilson, McElroy, and Gates may not have enjoyed the prestige and influence of their immediate predecessors, their department had to respond to increasing responsibilities for sustaining American foreign policy. In the course of doing so, they set the stage for Robert McNamara's advent in 1961.
The 1952 Presidential election brought to the White House Dwight D. Eisenhower, one of the nation’s best known and most respected military leaders. His choice for Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, had achieved notable success as a business executive. Because Eisenhower was superbly equipped and inclined to give close personal attention to national security affairs, the new Secretary was expected to concentrate on defense management rather than formulation of basic national security policy.¹

Wilson was still head of General Motors when Eisenhower selected him to be Secretary of Defense in January 1953. Wilson’s nomination sparked a major controversy during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, specifically over his large stockholdings in General Motors. Although reluctant to sell the stock, valued at more than $2.5 million, Wilson agreed to do so under committee pressure. When asked during the hearings whether, as Secretary of Defense, he could make a decision adverse to the interests of General Motors, Wilson answered affirmatively but added that he could not conceive of such a situation “because for years I thought what was good for the country was good for General Motors and vice versa.” Later, this statement was often garbled when quoted, suggesting that Wilson had said simply, “What’s good for General Motors is good for the country.” Although finally approved by a Senate vote of 77–6, Wilson began his duties in the Pentagon with his standing somewhat diminished by the confirmation debate.²

**Eisenhower, Wilson, and the Policy Process**

Wilson’s tenure proved crucial in setting precedents and establishing procedures for those to follow. Aware from the outset that he would have limited duties in making foreign policy, Wilson seemed
genuinely glad to be spared the responsibility. He never pretended to be knowledgeable about foreign affairs, nor did Eisenhower expect him to be. The President wanted him instead to concentrate on the managerial side of national security—in short, to be an administrator. “Charlie,” he reportedly told Wilson at one point, “You run defense. We both can’t do it, and I won’t do it. I was elected to worry about a lot of other things than the day-to-day operations of a department.”

Wilson proved ideal for what Eisenhower had in mind. According to Emmet John Hughes, a speechwriter in the Eisenhower White House, Wilson was the quintessential corporate executive—“basically apolitical and certainly unphilosophic, aggressive in action and direct in speech.” His appointment, Hughes maintained, reflected Eisenhower’s long-standing admiration of the business community and his belief that success in business could be translated into a capacity for government administration. As his experience as Secretary would show, however, the results were mixed. Although loyal, hard-working, and generally capable as an administrator, he may have proved too businesslike for Eisenhower’s taste. Moreover, he was prone to rambling, exploratory discourses that left Eisenhower feeling “discomfobulated.” The more uncomfortable Eisenhower felt, the less tolerant he became, even to the point of practically denying Wilson access to the Oval Office during the waning days of his tenure.

Under Wilson there occurred little of the overt rivalry and competition that had marred State-Defense relations off and on during Harry Truman’s Presidency, especially during the brief Dean Acheson–Louis Johnson period. These tensions were also largely absent during the interlude between Johnson and Wilson, while the Pentagon was under the leadership of George Marshall and Robert Lovett, two men with experience as leaders in both departments. State-Defense differences during Wilson’s tenure were more likely to occur over policy choices than personalities. Even then, Wilson was generally reluctant to challenge State Department’s (that is, John Foster Dulles’s) major foreign policy positions, though he was not so reticent as to avoid asking questions that would, as one observer recalled, “sort of blow a proposition out of the water.”

Wilson’s views on foreign affairs, such as they were, understandably lacked the mastery of detail and air of authority that characterized Dulles’s thinking and certainly could not match the worldly common sense that Eisenhower possessed. On those occasions when Wilson ventured to offer an opinion in public, he sometimes wound up causing Eisenhower considerable embarrassment—as occurred in 1955, when Wilson suggested that the United States had a weapon more horrible than the hydrogen bomb and that the loss of the Chinese Nationalist–held islands of Quemoy and Matsu to communist control would make little difference to American security. The danger with Wilson, as one source close to the President reportedly said, was twofold: whenever he “put his foot in the mouth” and “what he did when he took it out again.”

Though often mocked and criticized, Wilson remained a steadfast and reliable member of what amounted to Eisenhower’s board of directors: the National Security Council. Given greater prominence by Eisenhower, the NSC remained the heart of the policy process throughout his Presidency. Outwardly, the changes Eisenhower ordered—the redesignation of the Senior NSC Staff as the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) to assign responsibility for the execution of policy and to oversee psychological warfare strategy—seemed relatively minor, aimed ostensibly at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the system. But they also signaled Eisenhower’s clear intention to infuse the policy process with a greater sense of order and purpose. Consistent with a campaign pledge he had made, he resolved to upgrade the NSC and make broader use of the body’s resources and potential than Truman ever had.
The appointment of a full-time Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (or National Security Advisor, as the post became more generally known) would prove to be one of Eisenhower’s most significant, enduring, and controversial legacies. In sharp contrast to later years, when incumbents (especially Henry Kissinger in the 1970s) amassed and exercised extraordinary power and influence, the first Special Assistant, Robert Cutler, and his immediate successors, Dillon Anderson, William H. Jackson, and Gordon Gray, operated under a restricted mandate that consigned them to a low-key role. With the exception of Gray, none had expertise in foreign affairs or defense policy. As conceived by Eisenhower, the Special Assistant’s job was to expedite the flow of business, supply the council with its agenda, preside over the Planning Board, represent the President on the OCB, and monitor the work of the NSC staff. Though the Special Assistant could from time to time bring substantive matters to the President’s attention, he rarely acted as a policy advocate.11

There can be no doubt that Eisenhower made extensive use of the NSC. During his eight years in office, the NSC held 346 regular meetings, as opposed to 128 meetings during the NSC’s five years under Truman, and processed 187 serially numbered policy papers, 67 of which were still current when Eisenhower stepped down. The President typically presided and took an active part in discussions at NSC meetings that lasted two-and-a-half hours or more.12 While President Truman had attended only 12 meetings of the NSC, Eisenhower presided over 339 and missed only 29, reflecting the high priority he put on the council’s work.13 Besides the five statutory members (the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of Civil and Defense Mobilization), Eisenhower insisted that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Budget Director attend meetings as well, functioning as “regular participant” members.14 All involved could bring aides and advisors, so that anywhere from a dozen to a score or more people might be present.15 Discussions, which centered on policy papers worked up under the direction of the Planning Board, often fell into a line-by-line examination of the contents. Yet for all their faults and drawbacks, Eisenhower believed these meetings to be eminently useful, both for hashing out problems and for providing a mechanism through which “the members of the NSC became familiar, not only with each other, but with the basic factors of problems that might on some future date, face the president.” Eisenhower felt that this experience helped him and his advisors to get to know one another better and promoted closer consultation and coordination, and that he was more likely to receive honest, objective advice rather than self-serving recommendations.16

The President wanted NSC members to participate in deliberations as individual advisors rather than as representatives of their respective departments or agencies.17 But Wilson’s most active involvement and greatest contributions, as might be expected, came in connection with defense matters entailed in the annual reviews of basic national security policy. Instead of targeting U.S. security programs on a “year of maximum danger” as Truman had done, Eisenhower wanted to minimize the country’s defense burdens by sizing programs to meet the Soviet threat over the long term. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1953, this approach was embodied in a paper, NSC 162/2, that essentially guided the course of defense policy through the rest of the decade. Known as the “New Look,” the policy gave priority to strategic airpower and tactical nuclear weapons, with diminished emphasis on maintaining large and ready conventional capabilities.18 Eisenhower did not doubt the continuing importance of land and naval forces in the nuclear age, but he felt that the need to conserve resources took precedence and that, in any case, the atomic bomb was “simply another weapon in our arsenal.”19

It fell to Secretary of State Dulles, not the Secretary of Defense, to provide the most memorable public rationale for the administration’s national security thinking. Addressing the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1954, Dulles sketched a blueprint for security with “more reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on
local defensive power,” a concept that came to be known as the massive retaliation doctrine.20 This encouraged some military planners to assume that fewer constraints might be placed on use of the nuclear option. However, as early tests of this assumption revealed during the Indochina (1954) and Quemoy-Matsu (1955) crises, Eisenhower backed away when confronted with crossing the nuclear threshold.21 Nonetheless, the New Look and its corollary, massive retaliation, remained the basic guides used by Wilson and his successors for resource planning and allocation until the Eisenhower administration left office in 1961.22

Although the NSC functioned well in hammering out long-range plans and basic policy, its rather cumbersome and slow machinery proved less suited for coping with unexpected day-to-day problems of crisis management or sensitive diplomatic and intelligence matters. Accordingly, when such occasions arose, Eisenhower tended to respond by convening small informal meetings with senior advisors in the Oval Office. In such crises as Indochina, the Taiwan Straits, and the Suez Canal, Eisenhower routinely met privately with selected advisors, often after lengthy deliberations in the NSC, to finalize decisions. Though Wilson normally participated in these private sessions, his role was more to apprise the President as to the availability and use of military assets than to comment on the pros and cons of foreign policy. Eisenhower perceived a distinction between diplomacy and national security policy. With Wilson’s responsibilities concentrated on the Department of Defense (DoD), his role as a manager outweighed his contributions as a policy advisor.23

Advice and Staff Support

Although probably not at the top of Wilson’s day-to-day agenda, foreign affairs remained a necessary part of the Pentagon’s ongoing business.24 Containing communism, the number-one priority, was a multifaceted task that involved DoD in a variety of functions in support of American foreign policy. These functions generally fell into two categories. The first included the responsibilities arising from the increased U.S. presence abroad. The threat of communist aggression required prior defense arrangements with U.S. allies, including formal alliances such as NATO and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), access to overseas bases, and the buildup, equipping, and training of allied forces under U.S. aid programs. Accordingly, provisions had to be made with the host countries for what Philip E. Barringer, a longtime OSD official in the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA), aptly described as “keeping the machinery oiled properly,” to handle the influx of U.S. military personnel, the administration and allocation of assistance, the duties of U.S. advisors, and the negotiation of agreements governing the status of forces, usually with ISA providing the initial liaison and coordination.25

The second category embraced a wholly new set of defense problems arising from advances in military technology and corresponding decisions by the President and the NSC on how to exploit these advances. The advent of thermonuclear and tactical nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology raised problems of unprecedented political complexity and diplomatic sensitivity. Never before had any country possessed such enormous power with so few guiding precedents on how to manage it. Some of these new weapons would be deployed abroad and shared with America’s allies. How much control, if any, the host country would have in the storage, movement, and use of these weapons invariably invited prolonged discussion, both within the U.S. Government and between Washington and foreign capitals.

In trying to arrive at a Defense position on the many security problems that arose, it soon became clear that Wilson depended on his staff for advice and help more than any previous Secretary of Defense. This dependence created numerous opportunities for subordinates to make larger and more decisive inputs than they had in the past. Accepting management and administration as his primary tasks, Wilson heavily staffed his office with aides
and deputies from the business community, among them his first Deputy Secretary, Roger Kyes, like Wilson a former General Motors executive and not inclined to show any great initiative in foreign affairs. The burden of dealing with such matters fell, for the most part, on officials at the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) level. Though ISA officials predominated, others participated as well, including the OSD Comptroller's organization, which became routinely involved in NSC affairs because of a requirement that each major policy paper include a financial appendix. 

Understanding the urgent importance of being able to deal with problems abroad, in February 1953, Wilson encouraged President Eisenhower to use the forthcoming Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 30 June 1953 to elevate the position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (ISA) to the rank of Assistant Secretary (ISA). Later that same year, also under Reorganization Plan No. 6, the Eisenhower administration also abolished the Munitions Board and transferred its international programs division to ISA, further consolidating politico-military and economic affairs under one roof. The decision to elevate the ISA position to the Assistant Secretary level (a move Lovett was on the verge of making when he left office in 1952) was, to be sure, long overdue, but as a practical matter its real significance was to reaffirm the office's already well established place among the Pentagon's elite. In 1956, Wilson went a step further and tried to upgrade the office to the rank of Under Secretary, but legislation to effect the change died in the House Armed Services Committee.

Besides requiring someone with a background and expertise in foreign affairs, the ASD(ISA) position was also one of the most politically sensitive in the Pentagon. The incumbent when Wilson arrived, Frank Nash, wanted to step down for health reasons. Wilson initially offered the job to Paul Nitze, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff since 1950 and a key figure in the drafting of NSC 68. But because of his close association with Acheson during the Truman years, he was persona non grata to conservative Republicans in Congress. Wilson hastily withdrew Nitze's name and persuaded Nash to stay on until February 1954 when he was replaced by Struve Hensel, a Forrestal protégé and former Navy official. Three more Assistant Secretaries followed: Gordon Gray (July 1955–February 1957), who left to become President Eisenhower's National Security Advisor, Mansfield Sprague (February 1957–September 1958), and John Irwin II (September 1958–January 1961).

The high rate of turnover at ISA may be explained in part by the demanding nature of the job. Although much of the ASD(ISA)'s work still consisted of administrative matters arising from ongoing programs (military assistance being by far the biggest and most complex to administer), the ASD found himself increasingly involved in substantive problems as well, particularly in connection with NSC affairs. The key figure who oversaw most of the necessary organizational adjustments, Gordon Gray, reorganized ISA in 1956 on the basis of planning initiated by Struve Hensel. He effectively divided the office into two functional branches. In one part Gray concentrated ISA's military assistance and budget responsibilities, organized around the Office of Programming and Control (which monitored the dispersal of grant assistance and other aid) and the Office of the ISA Comptroller (which reviewed and prepared budget requests). Gray made policy matters the focus of the other part of the organization. This contained the Office of Planning (including the ISA Policy Planning Staff), which worked in conjunction with the military services, the Joint Staff, and other agencies to anticipate their long-term security needs; four regional directorates (for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, the Far East, and the Western Hemisphere), which operated in comparable fashion to the State Department's country desks; and the Offices of NSC Affairs and the OCB, which handled high-level policy coordination. Problems that fell into neither of these two general categories—such as economic matters, arms control and disarmament, and international conference planning—were assigned to the Office of Special International Affairs, which
was also charged with responsibility for security affairs relating to the United Nations, NATO, SEATO, and other international organizations.31

Wilson made two major changes in ISA’s mission. One delegated to the ASD(ISA) full authority and responsibility, as prescribed under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, for the “development, coordination, and establishment” of all policies, plans, and procedures in the area of foreign military assistance, the aim being to bring operational and administrative responsibility closer together.32 When the Military Assistance Program (MAP) started in the late 1940s, the Secretary of Defense, through what was then ISA, exercised little more than general policy supervision, leaving operational control to the military services acting as “executive agents.” The Secretary gave broad guidance to the services and relied on spot checks by OISA to ensure compliance with overall policy. With Wilson’s transfer of responsibility and authority to ISA came greater involvement in the operational side of MAP, which in turn increased ISA’s administrative duties and created new needs for personnel with know-how in every phase of the operation.33

The other important mission change related to the ASD(ISA)’s involvement in high-level policy coordination and NSC affairs. Although ISA had performed similar tasks in the preceding administration, its coordinating function had been a relatively minor part of its duties in view of Truman’s guarded use of the NSC and regular direct contacts between Acheson and the Joint Chiefs after the autumn of 1950. But with Eisenhower stressing primary reliance on the NSC, with carefully laid-out procedures and channels, more work needed to be done to coordinate Defense responses. Accordingly, in April 1954, Wilson gave ISA “general supervision” of all DoD activities relating to NSC affairs. At the same time he appointed a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs who also served as the Defense member of the NSC Planning Board. Initially, the Special Assistant operated under the authority and supervision of the ASD(ISA). But from Gray’s time on, the two jobs became one.34

Increased authority for ISA was not without resistance. Its overall control of politico-military affairs in relation to the military services remained fluid throughout the 1950s. Wilson never imposed the strict discipline on outside contacts—particularly with the State Department—that Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson had demanded. In this effort Wilson received substantially less cooperation from the military services than he expected. Each service continued to maintain its own politico-military and international affairs section that could be used for back-channel contacts to circumvent the Secretary of Defense and his deputies. The best organized for this purpose was within the Navy, which regularly communicated directly with State through its Politico-Military Policy Division. While ISA was responsible for policies governing the programming of foreign military aid, it often encountered resistance from the JCS and the military departments when it attempted to probe the details of their recommendations concerning program development and implementation practices.35 Had Wilson taken a greater personal interest in foreign affairs, some of these problems might have been avoided. But uncertain of the Secretary of Defense’s involvement, the ASD(ISA) generally felt constrained from pressing his authority too far.36

**JCS–OSD Relations**

Even with the growing resources available to him through ISA, the Secretary of Defense remained reliant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for all manner of help in dealing with politico-military matters, especially the planning and analysis provided through the Joint Staff (the JCS bureaucracy). Following the custom of previous Secretaries of Defense, Wilson solicited advice from the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body, but it also became increasingly common for him to deal directly, if not exclusively, with the JCS Chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford. As early as their first meeting, Radford impressed Wilson with his professional expertise and won him over. From then on, Wilson looked to Radford not merely for guidance in military matters but also for advice across a wide
spectrum of policy problems having domestic and international economic and political impact.37

Radford recalled that when he accepted the invitation to become Chairman, Eisenhower assured him that he would have clearer responsibilities and greater authority than his immediate predecessor, General Omar Bradley.38 The National Security Act of 1947 had made no provision for a Chairman, bestowing any and all advisory duties as the President or the Secretary might direct on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. When Congress authorized the appointment of a Chairman in 1949, it included him as a member of the JCS but failed to stipulate whether the advisory responsibilities conferred upon his colleagues extended to him as well. Although someone else might have treated this as a minor oversight, the first Chairman, General Bradley, felt sufficiently inhibited to adopt an exceedingly narrow interpretation of his advisory powers, especially where non-military matters were concerned. Whenever he met with Secretary of State Acheson to discuss an issue with foreign policy implications, Bradley invariably prefaced his remarks with the caveat that he was speaking “from a military point of view,” the implication being that it was up to Acheson or the President to supply “the political point of view.”39

A naval aviator with a distinguished record as a commander in the Pacific in World War II, Radford was rarely so reticent or circumspect. He had been a leader of the 1949 “revolt of the admirals” against Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson’s cancellation of the flush-deck supercarrier, the United States. Afterward, he found himself, in effect, exiled to a succession of commands in the Far East and Pacific. In 1953, Eisenhower brought him back to Washington to preside over the JCS, a shrewd ploy on Eisenhower’s part that helped to counter Navy criticism of the Air Force–oriented New Look defense posture. In addition, Radford had long advocated a more active policy in the Far East, a position that appealed to both Dulles and those Republicans who felt that the previous administration had concentrated too much on Europe and not enough on Asia.40 Personable, articulate, and adaptable, Radford was one of the most politically astute senior officers in the armed forces at the time. Though not overly enthusiastic about the New Look at first, he was a longtime advocate of defense through the exploitation of science and technology, the same approach Eisenhower preferred. Soon, Radford metamorphosed into one of the New Look’s most ardent supporters.41

During his two terms as Chairman, from August 1953 to August 1957, which overlapped closely with Wilson’s tenure as Secretary, Radford enjoyed direct access to Wilson, Secretary of State Dulles, and President Eisenhower.42 Accordingly, it was not uncommon to find him operating in the forefront for DoD in foreign affairs matters, representing and speaking for the Department in a manner that one might expect the Secretary to do. For someone like Forrestal or Lovett, who preferred to handle important foreign affairs issues themselves, Radford would have been redundant, his presence probably an unwelcome nuisance. But for Wilson he was a useful adjunct of the Secretary’s office. That the two got along exceptionally well made the job of collaboration that much easier. Radford’s importance and influence received a further boost when the 1953 defense reorganization gave the JCS Chairman management of the Joint Staff.

Defense-State Relations

The growing reliance on ready strategic forces and threats of massive retaliation during the Eisenhower years brought about changes in the traditionally accepted notions about spheres of responsibility in foreign affairs. The more the administration’s foreign policy came to rely on the threat of military sanctions, the more interested and involved Defense became in formulating policy. The NSC became a chief forum where Defense voiced its position on various foreign policy matters. Though Wilson was essentially deferential to Dulles, Defense-State relations remained, for all practical purposes, institution-minded and fraught with recurring conflicts below the Secretary level.43
Some of the most highly documented State-Defense disagreements occurred in connection with the annual NSC reviews of basic national security policy. During the first such exercise, held in the autumn of 1953 to fashion what became the New Look, Dulles stayed in the background, apparently not yet fully confident of where he stood in relation to the President and his military advisors. Though he exercised a strong conceptual influence on the resulting policy paper (NSC 162/2), he limited his involvement in the particulars, especially military matters, to a handful of inputs from State’s Policy Planning Staff.44

A year later, however, Dulles was most vocal in the debate over a follow-on paper (NSC 5501). The central issue concerned whether the new paper should reflect a more hard-line attitude toward the Soviets, as urged by the Joint Chiefs and ISA, or the soft line advocated by Dulles, who wanted more stress on diplomacy and negotiations. Within ISA, dissatisfaction with U.S. policy coalesced around Brig. Gen. Charles Bonesteel III, director of ISA’s policy planning staff and the ranking Defense representative on the NSC Planning Board, who was the most outspoken, articulate, and influential spokesman for the tougher line. Like the JCS, Bonesteel and his ISA colleagues believed that time was running out for the United States to reap substantial political and diplomatic benefits from its strategic superiority. They argued that the United States should adopt more risk-prone policies to leverage concessions from Moscow.45 Wilson initially endorsed the JCS–ISA position, but Dulles’s opposition prevailed, and President Eisenhower endorsed Dulles’s position.46

Dulles took advantage of divisions within the Pentagon to strengthen his own position, often siding with the uniformed services. He assiduously courted the Joint Chiefs, particularly Chairman Radford, with whom he shared an interest in paying more attention to the Far East.47 During the Taiwan Straits crisis in the spring of 1955, Dulles talked tough about applying military sanctions, including use of tactical nuclear weapons, unless the Communist Chinese lifted their bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, even though he had campaigned vigorously against a JCS–ISA hard line only a few months earlier.48 This astonishing shift in Dulles’s thinking prompted fears from Wilson that U.S. policy was “underwriting a war in that area” and doing more “to heat up the situation rather than cool it off.” To mitigate further tension, Wilson urged the Secretary of State to wait 60 days “in order to see what might develop.” Dulles, however, concurred with Radford that diplomatic efforts “to cool off the situation” had failed and that it was imperative to proceed on the assumption that military sanctions might have to be applied sooner rather than later, lest the Communist Chinese complete their buildup of invasion forces.

Whether actually prepared to go as far as his rhetoric suggested, Dulles cultivated the image of a no-nonsense diplomat who understood the military viewpoint and stood ready to use military force. This came out most clearly in a 1956 interview published in Life magazine in which he claimed that U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons had brought an end to the Korean War in 1953 and had repeatedly deterred Soviet and Chinese Communist aggression since then. Basking in the presumed success of his “brinkmanship” diplomacy, Dulles hinted broadly that he would not hesitate to threaten the use of nuclear weapons again should the need and occasion arise.50

In reality, Dulles remained extremely cautious about the use of military power. But it was the impression he gave that mattered, both in his public pronouncements and in his private dealings with Radford and other military officers. DoD leaders found common ground with Dulles, perhaps given the Secretary’s reputation as one of the administration’s “strong men” and his expertise in security.51
NATO Affairs

NATO provided the Defense Department a potential primary focus for much of its strategic planning and military assistance obligations. Wilson, however, had difficulties coming to grips with NATO from the beginning of his tenure. A quasi-isolationist at heart (like many Republicans of his generation), he was aware of the dangers that a Soviet-dominated Europe could pose to American security but was still uncomfortable with the sizable numbers of U.S. troops stationed there to honor U.S. commitments. He deplored “the great cost of keeping these American divisions in Europe indefinitely.” Yet each time he saw what might be an opportunity to cut U.S. strength he encountered objections—typically from the State Department, which claimed either that the moment was not propitious or that the effects on European opinion would involve “unacceptable political risks.” Matters came to a head over the so-called Radford Plan, leaked to the press in 1956, which projected large-scale troop withdrawals from NATO Europe in conjunction with an 800,000-man reduction in U.S. forces. When queried by the press, State summarily denied that the United States had any such intention, whereupon Wilson beat a hasty retreat, first refusing to confirm that the Radford plan existed, and then characterizing the whole controversy as a misunderstanding growing out of a hypothetical budget exercise.

As the level of U.S. troop strength in Europe typified, Dulles left no doubt that the path of foreign policy power and influence in Washington ran through his office in the State Department. Those who thought to do business otherwise were invariably reminded in no uncertain terms, as happened during negotiations with the British in 1956–1957 to deploy U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the United Kingdom. Finding their own Blue Streak IRBM encountering unexpected delays, the British Air Ministry entered into preliminary talks in the summer of 1956 with U.S. Air Force representatives, who had previously asked to base the new American Thor IRBM in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom was viewed by the Air Force and the JCS as an ideal location to base the missiles, prompting the 1956 offer.

In October of that year, however, as the negotiations seemed about to bear fruit, the Suez Canal crisis erupted, followed by the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. The British and French governments largely blamed lack of U.S. support for their eventual withdrawal. Dulles chose to halt the IRBM issue pending a more complete examination of other basing options and the restoration of more harmonious Anglo-American relations.

A delay may have made sense to Dulles for diplomatic reasons, but to Wilson it meant setting back the timetable for the entire IRBM program at the risk of cost overruns and other complications. Intent on keeping the IRBM program on track, he used the opportunity of a visit to Washington in late January 1957 by British Defence Minister Duncan Sandys to try to patch up differences between Dulles and the British and to expedite the missile deployment. Sandys and Wilson had worked together earlier on a 1954 scientific exchange agreement that had been successful in establishing a U.S.-U.K. joint scientific committee on ballistic missiles. This time, however, they faced a tougher set of problems. Resorting to an “end run,” the British had Deputy Secretary Reuben Robertson put a draft agreement before Eisenhower for his signature, but he found the President averse to any immediate action. By making the British and the U.S. Air Force bide their time, Dulles effectively demonstrated both his strong influence in high-level defense matters and his power to discipline wayward allies. This episode, a setback for the IRBM program, was also a personal embarrassment for Wilson. Ironically, when a deal finally was struck in March 1957 at the Bermuda summit between Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, it was Dulles rather than Wilson who accompanied the President and was involved with the negotiating, even though the agreement, subject to the resolution of numerous details, encompassed the basic terms that Wilson and Sandys had earlier discussed.
Wilson did make one final, important contribution to the IRBM negotiations. This took the form of participating in an exchange of letters with Sandys confirming the Bermuda agreement and establishing broad terms for cooperative custody and control of the missiles, the model for the dual-key approach that became the standard throughout NATO in the 1960s. Rarely was Wilson enthusiastic about sharing U.S. nuclear technology with other countries, even NATO allies. Nor, for that matter, was he a great admirer of the British, whom he regarded along with the French as great powers in eclipse. As Secretary of Defense, however, he had no choice on occasion but to put his prejudices aside. In one such instance, the negotiations over the Thor missiles, Dulles rather than the British gave him the most trouble.

**McElroy: Caretaker Secretary**

Wilson never intended to stay in office more than four years. In March 1957, he informed President Eisenhower that he would resign as soon as the President could find a successor. Finding a replacement took longer than expected, causing Wilson to postpone his departure until early autumn. On 4 October 1957, five days before Wilson’s successor, Neil McElroy, took office, the Soviets used rocket technology from their intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program to launch the first Earth orbiting satellite, Sputnik I. That stunning and ominous achievement overshadowed everything else the Eisenhower administration did in foreign and defense policy until its last day in office.

Like Wilson, McElroy was a former business executive, highly capable of managing a large, modern corporation but with no prior experience in national security affairs. He informed President Eisenhower from the outset that he did not intend to serve longer than two years. Considering McElroy’s unfamiliarity with the problems of his new job and his lack of experience, it was hardly surprising that he stuck closely to the policies, practices, and personnel of his predecessor. He launched few initiatives, instead describing himself as “captain of President Eisenhower’s defense team,” eagerly welcoming White House guidance and direction.

The launching of Sputnik I and a second Soviet satellite a month later prevented McElroy from easing into his new duties as Secretary of Defense. A favorite quip at the Pentagon, widely attributed to General Nathan Twining, Radford’s successor as JCS chairman, held that McElroy soared into office with Sputnik and remained in orbit thereafter. To meet the concern generated by the satellite launches, McElroy attempted both to clarify the relative positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in missile development and to speed up the U.S. effort. Placing considerable emphasis on the IRBMs the United States then had under development, McElroy argued that with proper deployment in overseas locations they would serve as effectively as Soviet ICBMs. Without waiting for completion of final tests and evaluations, McElroy ordered the Air Force Thor and Army Jupiter IRBMs into production and planned to begin their deployment in the United Kingdom before the end of 1958 and in Western Europe shortly thereafter. McElroy also ordered accelerated development of the Navy solid-fuel Polaris IRBM and the Air Force liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan ICBMs. In February 1958, he authorized the Air Force to begin development of the Minuteman, a solid-fuel ICBM to be deployed in hardened underground silos, with operational status expected in the early 1960s.

The Soviet Sputnik launch in October 1957 also ignited a firestorm of criticism and argument about U.S. technology, budgets, and DoD, thrusting the question of Defense reorganization into public scrutiny. Sputnik developments offered President Eisenhower an opportunity to make changes to the Department of Defense, and he asked his new Secretary on 11 October 1957 to examine the Defense structure with a view toward reorganization. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 that emerged from a long process of executive and legislative deliberation gave President Eisenhower most of what he proposed. The act moved DoD further in the
direction of centralization and unification through the following provisions: strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense, including greater control over the military departments; elevating the status of JCS Chairman and eliminating the prohibition on his having a vote in JCS decisions; almost doubling the size of the Joint Staff; prescribing the establishment of unified and specified commands by the President; stipulating the number of Assistant Secretaries; and creating the position of Director of Research and Engineering.69

Although the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act did not address the role of the Secretary of Defense in foreign affairs per se, the legislation and DoD directives that flowed from it greatly increased Secretarial authorities that McElroy’s successors would use creatively to expand their reach in national security affairs writ large. The new legislation increased the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, particularly in the operational direction of the armed forces and in research and development. During McElroy’s tenure, one immediate change was in the authority of the Assistant Secretaries, including the ASD(ISA), to issue orders to the military departments if authorized in writing by the Secretary of Defense. This provision drew criticism from the service Secretaries who, seeing their authority steadily erode, preferred a more limited assignment of functions. Further bargaining produced a compromise under which ISA would “establish” positions, plans, and procedures for military assistance but merely “monitor” Defense participation in NSC business and “develop and coordinate” all other aspects of DoD involvement in politico-military affairs.70

More significant were changes that McElroy directed in ISA administration of the military assistance program. The impetus came from the findings of the Draper Committee, a blue-ribbon panel named by President Eisenhower in 1958 in response to congressional complaints about the handling and policy objectives of foreign military aid.71 In its second interim report the following year, the committee concurred with critics that there should be closer collaboration between State and Defense and tighter administrative control of MAP within the Pentagon. The committee further recommended the appointment of a full-time director of military assistance (DMA), who would be fully responsible for the operation of the program under the ISA, and creation of an independent evaluation staff.72 Although the ASD(ISA) already had a deputy for military assistance, the new position would have broader authority and responsibilities, extending to policy and operational aspects of the program and not merely financial recordkeeping. The Assistant Secretary for ISA, John Irwin II, saw no immediate need for a change, but McElroy, deeming the matter “urgent,” moved ahead with implementation of practically the entire package of the Draper Committee’s recommendations, though it was not until after he left office that most of the reforms, including the appointment of a DMA, took effect.73

Although often preoccupied with administrative and budgetary matters, McElroy was far from oblivious to the importance of foreign affairs. A quick learner with a facile mind, he seemed genuinely eager to overcome his limitations by finding out more about foreign problems and foreign leaders. Yet he managed only four trips abroad during his two years as Secretary and never acquired superb diplomatic skills. When faced with difficult situations, he tended to rely on the prestige of his position. Thus, while meeting in Paris in December 1957 with French Defense Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas to discuss the possible deployment of U.S. IRBMs in France, McElroy brushed aside French reservations and all but demanded an early favorable French decision.74 Assuming that eventually the French would acquiesce, McElroy found his confidence misplaced as the French government rejected the presence of any U.S. missiles on its territory.75

As with his predecessor, McElroy found that the foreign affairs problems most often engaging his attention were the annual NSC policy reviews. Here, for McElroy, the problems of foreign policy
and resource management came together in a way that he could readily grasp. Interservice rivalry continued to bedevil the budget process, as did differences of concepts between State and Defense over how and where to mete out resources to cope with emerging threats. Although hardly new, the problem took on a somewhat different appearance in the aftermath of Sputnik and what Dulles saw as an approaching East-West stalemate in strategic nuclear power. Henceforth, Dulles believed that effective foreign policy—meaning the ability of the United States to retain its allies' loyalty and prevent defections to the Soviet bloc—would depend on the capacity to wage “defensive wars” that would neither trigger an all-out nuclear war nor “involve the total defeat of the enemy.” This, he thought, pointed to the need for larger and more mobile conventional forces, the kind of support provided by aircraft carriers. Although JCS Chairman General Twining disagreed that U.S. conventional capabilities for limited war were as deficient as the Secretary of State implied, he and McElroy both feared the practical consequences of what Dulles was suggesting: namely, that any expansion of conventional forces earmarked for limited war would require either increased expenditures or a reallocation of resources that would inevitably weaken the strategic deterrent. 76

Defense-State relations on the whole, however, remained remarkably free from serious rifts during McElroy's tenure. Because of Dulles's deteriorating health, his Deputy and eventual successor, Under Secretary Christian Herter, with whom McElroy developed a positive and productive working relationship, was playing an increasingly key role at State. Open-minded about staff-level contacts, McElroy raised no objection when Herter asked in May 1959 that State be kept “closely informed” on the status of military planning during the Berlin crisis. 77 He later approved a State Department request to participate in direct consultations with the JCS on overseas base planning. 78

Keeping true to his intent for a two-year term, McElroy focused almost exclusively on budgetary matters during his final months in office and increasingly relied on aides and assistants for other issues. He turned over to his Deputy, Thomas Gates, Jr., many of the routine daily matters of running the Department, as well as heavy foreign affairs responsibilities, including State-JCS discussions of overseas base requirements, IRBM deployment, the simmering Berlin crisis, readiness measures in relation to Communist China, and contingency planning for limited war situations. Gates's intimate and visible involvement in foreign affairs marked a significant departure from the customary role of the Deputy. 79

**Gates: Reasserting the Secretary's Influence**

It was a foregone conclusion when Gates became McElroy's Deputy in June 1959 that he would succeed him. Gates's credentials as one of the emerging new generation of “defense professionals” were unimpeachable—a background of active military experience and more than six years in the Department of Defense. A Philadelphia investment banker in private life, Gates had come to Washington at the outset of the Eisenhower administration to serve as Under Secretary of the Navy and since then had risen steadily in the Pentagon hierarchy. Gates had interests and ambitions that went beyond those of Wilson and McElroy, who typically concentrated on management and administration. An increase in the Secretary's participation in foreign affairs matters would occur under Gates. 80

For President Eisenhower, as much as anything, choosing Gates may have been a tacit admission that the job of Secretary of Defense had become too big and complex for foreign policy amateurs. Whatever Wilson and McElroy may have achieved, their lack of background in foreign and defense affairs circumscribed their role. After Dulles stepped down in April 1959 (he died the following month), Eisenhower had to make new arrangements for help and advice. Gates's appointment thus served a dual purpose: it helped to fill the void left by Dulles's death, and it restored the Pentagon to the care and supervision of a professional familiar with the inner workings of defense and foreign policy. 81
For Gates, as for his immediate predecessors, NSC affairs were a top priority, but he believed that the council existed to serve the President, not the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, in his view, the Secretary of Defense had an obligation to establish and sustain his own network of interdepartmental contacts, most notably with State.82 Looking back, Gates estimated that he spent as much as 75 percent of his time on State Department–related business, and he made a point of meeting privately every Sunday with Secretary of State Herter.83 “We have long realized,” he told the Jackson Committee in 1960, “that the defense program cannot be prepared in isolation.”84 Although Wilson and McElroy would have had no quarrel with this statement, their habit of deferring to State’s lead while Dulles was alive had limited DoD influence in the national security policy process. Gates was more assertive. He insisted on the following conception:

The relationship of State and Defense must be a partnership. In years past, apparently, we had a system in the Defense Department of reaction to State Department papers. State Department wrote the policy; then we scurried around with some very energetic, hard-working people and found a way to react—usually 10 minutes before a meeting of the NSC. I feel the Defense Department must also take the initiative in providing counsel in politico-military matters. The Defense Department must be a full partner of the State Department in developing policy. The military point of view must be expressed—and it can be expressed well by the dedicated people who work at these things. We must participate in creating policy rather than just reacting to papers written by the State Department.85

While Gates disavowed any desire to supplant the Secretary of State as the President’s senior foreign policy advisor, his assertion of coequal status struck some members of a Senate committee as an unsettling departure from tradition and established protocol.86 In fact, Gates hoped to achieve not an assumption of additional functions but rather a closer collaboration at all levels of State-Defense relations that would yield more truly integrated policies with less interdepartmental friction and parochialism. Citing what he estimated to be several hundred separate daily contacts—telephone calls, meetings, correspondence, and other communications between State and Defense officials—he saw a growing trend toward “a common recognition on both sides of the Potomac that most foreign policy issues have major defense connotations, and conversely that even routine military activity may have major foreign policy implications.”87

Besides broadening State-Defense contacts, Gates tried to make foreign affairs a more integral part of policy planning within the Pentagon—for one, by including ISA in the budget process at a point where ISA’s contributions would “put the foreign policy implications into the budget earlier in the Pentagon planning than it has been heretofore.”88 This proved easier said than done. ISA’s initial input, tendered in May 1960—a summary of politico-military considerations bearing on the fiscal year 1962 Defense budget—did little more than restate the obvious about American obligations to NATO, the importance of a strong strategic retaliatory force, and the value of effective capabilities for limited war. It did not, as one might have thought, make any effort to correlate American commitments abroad with the dollar costs of American defense; nor did it venture to speculate on what new burdens to expect or how existing obligations might be rendered more manageable. But it provided a start for others to build on later, and that in itself was an accomplishment.89

As a pragmatist, Secretary Gates knew not to expect too much too soon. Despite his advocacy of coequal status in foreign affairs, there is little to suggest any substantial change in State-Defense relations during his tenure. Whatever added influence DoD may have exercised, apart from its involvement in NSC affairs, tended to be the result of the close personal and working relationship Gates established with Herter, who was likewise eager to improve...
State-Defense contacts. Yet even with Dulles no longer around, the initiative in foreign affairs remained as a rule with the NSC for broad, long-range policy or with State in day-to-day operational matters. Although Herter saw the two departments making progress on closer collaboration in planning, he also felt that much remained to be done on State's part to keep Defense better apprised with political guidance, and for Defense to provide State with more timely military advice.

Gates was fated to serve during the most troubled year of Eisenhower's presidency. The Cold War grew increasingly hot. The bitter end of the Geneva test ban conference in December 1959 was followed by the disastrous breakup of the Paris summit in May 1960 caused by the Soviet downing over its territory of a U.S. U–2 reconnaissance aircraft. Then came the unrest in the Congo, signifying obvious Soviet readiness to fish in troubled African waters; the rise of a pro-communist regime in Cuba in the Caribbean backyard of the United States; and the steadily worsening situation in Laos that raised the specter of U.S. military intervention. With foreign policy problems emerging daily, Gates selected carefully those to which he gave his personal attention, ever mindful of the competing demands on his time. His brief tenure was absorbed by unusually difficult strategic policy problems, including allegations that the Eisenhower administration was not doing enough to close a purported “missile gap” with the Soviets, and a strategic targeting controversy between the Air Force and the Navy that led Gates in August 1960 to establish a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS).

The impetus in Gates's mind for the creation of the JSTPS was the inadequate coordination of targeting plans between the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Navy, which he believed led to redundancy and disputed priorities. Those differences became especially significant with the advent of the Navy’s sea-based Polaris ballistic missiles. Acting on a proposal by SAC Commander-in-Chief General Thomas Power that SAC control strategic weapons targeting, Gates set up JSTPS. The SAC commander, supported by an integrated joint staff, assumed separate duties as director of strategic target planning. When Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke objected to the new arrangement, Gates encouraged him to argue his case before President Eisenhower, who ultimately upheld Gates’s decision. By December 1960, the JSTPS had prepared the first Single Integrated Operational Plan, which specified for various attack options the timing, weapons, delivery systems, and targets to be used by U.S. strategic forces.

In foreign affairs, Gates proved especially adept in managing the flow of business and in keeping small problems from getting bigger. Having previously served in a variety of high-level positions, he was generally acquainted with foreign leaders and their key advisors. In particular, Gates enjoyed close relations with British Defence Minister Harold Watkinson, with whom he directly negotiated many of the details of the proposed Skybolt missile transfer and access to base facilities for U.S. missile submarines at Holy Loch, Scotland. Although the Skybolt missile system sharing issue, which is beyond the scope of this study, would cause considerable trouble for his successor, Robert McNamara, Gates was adept at keeping it from becoming a source of Anglo-American contention during his short tenure.

Gates had a strong hand in shaping Defense responses in another crucial area of foreign policy area—arms control and disarmament—where previously the Pentagon's support and endorsement had been barely lukewarm. Although Wilson and McElroy had spent considerable time and energy studying arms control proposals passing across their desks, they were forever confronted by the unremitting skepticism and apprehension of the Joint Chiefs, whose opinions on such matters carried considerable weight both inside the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill. Since the Chiefs knew that it was impossible for political reasons to keep arms control off the national agenda, they focused their objections instead on technical matters—the lack of adequate and effective
verification measures, for example, or the harmful consequences for current research and development. As delaying actions, these arguments worked well against such popular proposals as a ban on atmospheric testing and a cutoff of nuclear production. But such arguments wore thin after a while, giving DoD a reputation for contentiousness.96

Decidedly more inclined than his two immediate predecessors to bring arms control and disarmament into the mainstream of American defense policy, Gates readily acknowledged the “negative attitude” in the Pentagon toward arms control. Prepared to entertain any and all suggestions, he told Eisenhower that he had in mind appointing a special assistant on disarmament matters.97 Personally, Gates favored a cutoff of nuclear weapons production, preferably sooner rather than later, not so much for disarmament purposes but to preserve what he estimated as a two-to-one American advantage over the Soviets in nuclear bombs and warheads. Moreover, he fully agreed with the Joint Chiefs that arms control for its own sake was inherently dangerous and that the administration should not allow itself to be stampeded into reaching agreements merely because of public opinion.98

Whether Gates could—and should—have been tougher with the military on accepting the need for arms control is a matter of conjecture. Gates himself, although more open-minded toward such matters than Wilson and McElroy had been, remained very much committed to the concept of foreign and defense policies resting in the first instance on ready military power rather than the negotiation of agreements with one’s potential adversaries. Like Forrestal and Lovett, he came from a generation whose view of international politics derived from memories and experiences of the 1930s, when military weakness and appeasement had seemed to invite aggression and oppression. International communism, to Gates’s way of thinking, did not differ from the Axis alliance of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperial Japan in World War II. Despite rumors and diplomatic reports of a growing Sino-Soviet rift, Gates remained convinced that there existed no fundamental ideological differences between Beijing and Moscow and that U.S. foreign policy should treat such commentaries with utmost caution. Such a hard-line Cold War viewpoint was not uncommon or out of place for the time.99

**Conclusion**

Despite the promising revival of the Secretary’s role in foreign affairs during Gates’s tenure, the Eisenhower years were predominantly a period in which administrative and managerial matters took priority in Defense. This reflected the personal inclination of President Eisenhower, one of the nation’s best known and most respected military leaders, who was superbly equipped to give close attention to national security affairs. Concerning themselves with the business side of the Defense Department—the formulation and execution of budgets, the procurement of new weapons and equipment, research and development—was perhaps the soundest approach Wilson and McElroy could have taken, given their limited experience and the constraints under which they operated. Yet in the long run, they did not serve as a model for subsequent Secretaries.

The growing U.S. military presence abroad carried with it compelling and unavoidable responsibilities that drove Defense officials in Washington to wrestle with the questions of how, where, and when to use these forces—necessitating that foreign affairs become a vital and important part of every Secretary’s agenda. In handling these problems, Eisenhower’s three Secretaries of Defense relied heavily on the expertise from the newly created Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Assistance). Eisenhower’s use of the NSC as his principal forum for basic policymaking added further to the opportunities for ISA to have an impact. The carefully structured system through which policy papers and decisions evolved made ISA, the designated DoD coordinator, virtually indispensable to the smooth flow of business and forced it to branch out into more policy-related and analytical fields. Though not yet the major source of policy initiatives that it would later become, ISA moved steadily...
in that direction, helped along by Secretaries of Defense who found it necessary and desirable to delegate authority and responsibility.

Increased DoD involvement in foreign affairs did not, however, invariably translate into increased influence. Dulles, while Secretary of State, remained the principal spokesman for and sometimes symbol of U.S. foreign policy during Eisenhower’s Presidency. Moreover, even though he preferred diplomatic solutions, he also readily acknowledged the military aspects of national security. His appreciation of the role of military power in foreign policy—and his avowed willingness to apply it—earned him enormous respect among senior uniformed officers and helped him to establish a rapport with them.

In contrast to Wilson and McElroy, Gates took a more balanced view of his role as Secretary, treating defense and foreign affairs as part of the same large problem. Although his tenure was short, he reestablished the Secretary of Defense as a key figure in foreign policy decisionmaking. His personal role notwithstanding, by the time Gates left office, much remained to be done to make foreign affairs a more integral and accepted part of policy planning within the Pentagon. Gates’s post-tenure claim in 1960 that State-Defense relations had never been better reflected a limited perspective with which Secretary of State Herter only partially concurred.100 Herter still saw room for improvement, but he agreed with Gates that they were moving in the direction of closer collaboration. To this extent State welcomed greater interest and involvement by the Secretary of Defense in foreign affairs, for it gave State a greater insight on what to expect in terms of military support for policy initiatives abroad. That Gates’s tenure marked some change in direction from the previous seven years there could be no doubt. What could not have been predicted was how much further his successor, Robert S. McNamara, would carry this process.

### Notes


5 Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 140.


23 Nelson, “President Eisenhower and the NSC,” 315.


25 Philip E. Barringer, interview with Alfred Goldberg and Roger Trask, 20 Jun 95, 8, OSD Historical Office.

26 Lay and Johnson, *Organizational History*, 32–33.


29 Ltr, Robert Tripp Ross to Eisenhower, 18 May 56; unsigned memrec, ca. 14 Jun 56, both in OSD Historian’s files, ISA 1953–56 folder.


33 Memo, Gray for Wilson, 11 May 56, sub: Reorganization of OASD(ISA), ISA 1953–56 folder, OSD Historian's files.


37 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 66.


39 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 441.


42 Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 323.

43 Falk in Inderfurth and Johnson, 43–44. The difficulties involved in reaching agreement between the different constituent departments of the NSC in planning and executing foreign policy are highlighted.


*FRUS 1955–1957*, vol. XXVII, 685–693, commentary on 693 most relevant. For the Defense records of these discussions, see RG 330, Sandys-Wilson Talks Jan-Feb 1957 folder, 330–67A4739, box 1.


See Wilson to Sandys, 18 Apr 57, and Sandys to Wilson, 11 Jun 57, both in RG 330, UK 471.94 (4 Jan 57), and *FRUS 1955–1957*, vol. XXVII, 777–778.

See, for example, Wilson’s comments in *FRUS 1952–1954*, vol. V (1983), 889, 1266; *FRUS 1955–1957*, vol. XVI (1981), 171, 1128. The comments from the latter source show Wilson’s criticism of British and French policies toward the Suez Canal and the broader implications of those policies on their international standing.

*Watson, Into the Missile Age*, 127–129.

Ibid., 128.


The most detailed account of McElroy’s involvement in missile development remains *Watson, Into the Missile Age*, 157–202.


83 Interview with Gates by Richard D. Challener, New York City, 13 July 65, John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.


87 Ibid., 731.

88 Ibid., 755.


91 Ibid., 698.

92 See ltr, Gates to Jarvis Cromwell, 21 Sep 60, Gates’s Reading File, 330–65A3078, box 32.


94 Watson, *Into the Missile Age*, 473–496.

95 Ibid., 564–570.


98 Memcon, NSC Special Mtg, 18 Feb 60, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman file.


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